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THE ASSASSINATION OF US PRESIDENT J. F. KENNEDY

And Soviet-American Relations

Collection Of Documents

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The Assassination of US President J. F. Kennedy and Soviet-American Relations. Collection of documents
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The collection of documents "The Assassination of US President J.F. Kennedy and Soviet-American Relations" was prepared as part of an ongoing project by the Russian State Archive to publish documents from the "Cold War" period. The central focus of the collection is the theme related to the Soviet side's reaction to Kennedy's assassination and the beginning of interaction with the new US President L. Johnson. For the first time, based on strictly documentary evidence, the active assistance of Soviet authorities in conducting the investigation of this crime is shown.

The book includes documents from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, recently transferred to the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, as well as materials discovered in federal (SA RF, RGASPI, RGAKFFD) and departmental archives (archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service RF, archive of the FSB RF, archive of the KGB RB).

The publication is intended for both specialists and anyone interested in the contemporary history of Russia.

General sponsor of the publication PJSC "Transneft"CONTENTS

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Introduction to Published Documents

The assassination of US President J.F. Kennedy is one of the major sensations of the second half of the 20th century. The continuous flow of journalistic works, investigative journalism, documentary and feature

films further confirms that interest in this event persists and will continue to persist for many years. This topic is actively used not only for conspirological purposes to attract audience attention and make money and fame from it, but also for political interests. The recent decree by D. Trump dated January 23, 2025, No. 14176 on the publication of classified materials related to the assassination of the 35th US President is largely connected with internal political struggle in that country, raising questions about the permissiveness and lack of control of its special services.

The topic of Kennedy's assassination has long been firmly established in academic historiography. Not a single serious researcher of Soviet-American relations of recent times has bypassed it. Scientists paid special attention to the causes and consequences of the Caribbean Missile Crisis, as well as the history of preparation and signing of the 1963 Moscow Treaty.¹

It should be noted that the literature predominantly describes the US position, as the main American documents have long been publicly available in the US National Archives² and in the Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum in Boston³. Soviet documents largely remained difficult to access for a long time. To analyze Moscow's position, mainly memoirs of Soviet diplomats and statesmen were used, as well as those of N.S. Khrushchev's son - Sergei■, which, like all documents of personal origin, could not replace official documents.

Thanks to recent publications of the three-volume collection of documents of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium■, prepared by the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History

Footnotes

¹ This topic has been repeatedly covered in works by domestic and foreign scholars. Among recent studies, particularly noteworthy are publications: Fursenko A.A., Naftali T. *Insane Risk: Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962*. M., 2016; Same authors. *"Cold War" Khrushchev: true history of America's adversary*. M., 2018. ² See: *The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection* // <https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk> ³ See: *Archival Collections* // <https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/about-archival-collections> ■ Dobrynin A.F. *Strictly confidential. Ambassador to Washington under six US Presidents (1962-1986)*. M., 1996; Gromykovskiy O.A. *Through years and distances. History of one family*. M., 1997; Khrushchev S.N. *Nikita Khrushchev: Birth of a Superpower*. M., 2010. ■ *Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. 1954-1964. Black protocol records of meetings. Transcripts. Resolutions*. In 3 volumes. 1954-1958. Ed. comp. V.Yu. Afiani. M., 2006.

(RGANI), as well as the catalog of materials exhibited at the Caribbean Crisis exhibition, this deficiency has been largely compensated for.

This collection presents documents covering Soviet-American relations from the second half of 1963 to early 1964. The central theme of the publication is the Soviet leadership's reaction to the assassination of J.F. Kennedy, assistance to Americans in its investigation, and establishing contacts with President L. Johnson's new administration. This brief period by historical standards became a unique thaw in the Cold War that began after World War II, a time when hope emerged for its resolution and real cooperation between the two world superpowers.

* * *

The Caribbean Crisis became a turning point in the history of USSR-USA relations. Finding themselves on the brink of deadly nuclear war, the leaders of both states realized that to survive and preserve themselves, they needed to negotiate. From December 1962, dialogue resumed between Moscow and

Washington regarding the limitation of weapons of mass destruction, which had begun intermittently in the late 1950s. This led to the activation of preparation and signing process in early 1963 at the level of experts and diplomats of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, later known as the Moscow Treaty. In parallel, on Soviet initiative, discussion began regarding the conclusion of a Non-Aggression Pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, while discussions on German and other issues continued.

On June 10, 1963, J.F. Kennedy delivered his famous "Strategy of Peace" speech to American University graduates in Washington. In it, the US President publicly announced White House plans to limit nuclear weapons and paid much attention to peaceful coexistence with the USSR. He called for reconsidering attitudes toward the Soviet Union, proposed to "salute the Russian people for their many achievements - in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture and in acts of courage" and reminded that "no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union suffered in the course of World War II." Additionally, Kennedy spoke about the need to pay more attention to human rights.

_____ 6 The Caribbean Crisis: 60 years later. Comp.: Permyakov I.A., Dzhalilov T.A., Kradetskaya S.V., Prozumenshchikov M.Yu. M., 2023.

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"The right to live one's own life without fear of destruction, the right to breathe the air as nature gives it to us, the right of future generations to a healthy existence."

Soviet leaders, particularly Khrushchev, responded positively to Kennedy's speech. The President's speech was published almost in full in "Pravda" on June 13, 1963, and on June 15, "Pravda" and "Izvestia" published an "interview" with Khrushchev - the Soviet leader's response to the American President's speech.

Preparation for the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty accelerated sharply. On July 26, U.S. Under Secretary of State W.A. Harriman arrived in Moscow and was received by Khrushchev. On August 5, U.S. Secretary of State D. Rusk and British Foreign Secretary A. Douglas-Home arrived in the Soviet Union to sign the treaty. After signing the treaty, Rusk toured the country, meeting again with Khrushchev in Gagra, where various issues were discussed - from German, Vietnamese, and Laotian questions to cooperation between the two countries in space, nuclear, medical, chemical-technological, and other spheres.

The success of the Moscow Treaty encouraged Soviet leaders. Khrushchev, in a confidential message to Kennedy on August 17, 1963, urged him "not to stop at what has been achieved, but to take further steps from our good start." "Of course, the path ahead will not be easy. However, we must follow it persistently and steadfastly, moving, though not hurriedly but also not slowing our pace, consistently working towards resolving pressing international problems, which would again serve the interests not only of our two countries but of the whole world," wrote Khrushchev.

The continuation of close contacts between the superpowers was marked by A.A. Gromyko's trip to the regular UN session in New York. In September-October 1963, the USSR Foreign Minister held a record 11 meetings with J.F. Kennedy, D. Rusk, and A. Douglas-Home. During the talks, questions of peaceful settlement of the German issue and non-aggression against Cuba were again raised. But most of all, steps towards further disarmament, reduction of military expenses, and signing of a Non-Aggression Pact between Warsaw Pact and NATO countries were discussed.

Since the presidential election campaign had begun in the USA, the American administration after signing the Moscow Treaty did not seek to make any

Footnotes

7 Pravda. 1963. June 13. 8 See doc. No. 1. 9 See doc. No. 6.

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major steps in relations with the USSR, especially if they required a decision by the US Congress. Certain issues (for example, the Non-Aggression Pact) the Americans diplomatically suggested discussing later, while others were to be formalized not through the US Congress, but through a UN General Assembly resolution. This is how the US president proposed to approve the Treaty on the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons in Space.

At the same time, meetings and conversations with Gromyko demonstrated that American leaders wanted to maintain and further develop a trusting dialogue with Soviet leaders on preventing potential nuclear war, as well as on the entire spectrum of bilateral relations. This was reflected in an analytical memo by Soviet Ambassador to Washington A.F. Dobrynin, sent to Moscow just a month before Kennedy's assassination. It emphasized that USSR-USA relations were experiencing a "new period." The Ambassador believed that in developing these relations, it was necessary to consider the complex internal situation in America, "the influence of increasingly active extremely reactionary forces" and the danger of international complications related to "the threat of US interference in other countries' internal affairs," that "in improving American-Soviet relations and resolving disputed international problems, one should not rush, [...] in this direction one needs to move step by step, carefully planning and spacing out the steps taken over time, as well as trying where possible to give the achieved agreements such a form that would not require ratification by the US Senate"¹⁰.

In turn, the Soviet leader was impressed that he managed to establish informal, personal contacts with the American president. In conversations with his son, Khrushchev said that he needed six more years to establish normal relations with America¹¹. However, this inspiring optimism in the course of events was interrupted on November 22, 1963, by shots in Dallas.

Dobrynin was the first to learn about the assassination attempt on Kennedy. In his memoirs, he reported that he heard about the events in Dallas on the radio while at the dentist¹². Postponing the filling procedure, Dobrynin immediately returned to the Soviet embassy and from there contacted Moscow. Taking into account the time difference, the ambassador's verbal report to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

¹⁰ See doc. No. 9. ¹¹ Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev... p. 540. ¹² Dobrynin. Strictly Confidential... p. 95-96.

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was received between 19 and 20 hours. By this time, Gromyko was already at home, from where he immediately contacted Khrushchev.

The Soviet leader that evening was at his residence in the Lenin Hills. According to his son Sergei's memories, Khrushchev had returned from Kiev the day before, was preparing for the next Central Committee plenum and "allowed himself to rest a little." When the government communication line rang from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Khrushchev "was finishing reading evening mail and was about to go upstairs to his second floor"¹³.

Sergei Khrushchev wrote that his father was only informed about the assassination attempt on Kennedy. It remained unclear whether the US President was alive. The First Secretary of the Central Committee

instructed Gromyko to contact the ambassador, meaning the US ambassador, and clarify the details. During the conversation, there was a small misunderstanding - the minister thought it necessary to contact the Soviet ambassador in Washington and sent an inquiry there. Only after an hour did the misunderstanding become clear¹■.

A "bitter expression froze" on Khrushchev's face as soon as he received the first information about the assassination attempt. When he shared the news with his family, "an oppressive silence fell," and Khrushchev himself, waiting for a new call from Gromyko, paced around the room near a small table and three armchairs. An hour later, Khrushchev himself called Gromyko and demanded to immediately connect with F. Kohler - the US Ambassador in Moscow. Finally, the Soviet leader learned about Kennedy's death and that L. Johnson had become the new president.

Without hanging up, Khrushchev discussed with Gromyko the text of condolences and possible participation of a Soviet representative in the funeral ceremony. The minister replied that the Soviet Union could be represented by an ambassador at the funeral, but suggested his own candidacy, referring to the precedent - in May 1959, he officially attended the funeral of US Secretary of State J. Dulles. Khrushchev objected, stating that "a president should be buried by a president"¹■.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L.I. Brezhnev, who held this highest state position at that time, did not have sufficient international experience and was not entirely suitable for such a mission. The Soviet leader proposed to send A.I. Mikoyan - First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who had repeatedly carried out special assignments for the Kremlin, the person closest to Khrushchev, who had also visited America multiple times. In addition to official condolences to the new president L. Johnson, Khrushchev suggested sending

Footnotes

¹³ Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev... P. 538. ¹■ Troyanovsky. Through years and distances... P. 258. ¹■ Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev... P. 538.

condolences to Kennedy's widow Jacqueline, both on his own behalf and on behalf of his wife, which was a new development in Soviet diplomatic protocol.

While preparations for mourning texts were underway in nighttime Moscow, the Soviet embassy in Washington sent condolences to Jacqueline Kennedy, the president's brother Robert Kennedy, and D. Rusk. Dobrynin was awaiting further instructions from the Center when at 16:00 Associated Press news agency reported the arrest of L.H. Oswald - a former military man, supporter of communist Cuba, who had previously lived in the USSR and was married to a Soviet citizen - on suspicion of Kennedy's murder.

This news greatly disturbed Dobrynin. Later in his memoirs he wrote: "The situation began to take on an alarming character, as questions arose about Soviet involvement in the events related to Kennedy's assassination. The memory of the Cuban crisis was still fresh. Anti-Soviet sentiments could flare up again with new force. Potentially, this could lead to a new serious conflict. All these troubling thoughts gave me no peace. Of course, I was certain that we were not involved in this drama. However, I had serious concerns about the possibility that our special services might have had some connections with Oswald"¹⁶.

Troubled by this news, Dobrynin held an urgent meeting with the head of Soviet intelligence residency in Washington. The latter confirmed that neither KGB nor GRU had any connections with L.H. Oswald. The existing correspondence with Lee Harvey was conducted through regular mail and was likely already

known to US authorities. The only peculiarity was Oswald's last letter to the Soviet embassy, dated November 9, 1963, but which reached Soviet diplomats only on November 18. The message was typed, not handwritten like all other Oswald's letters, and contained several unclear points. In the letter, Lee Harvey described that while in Mexico, he approached the Soviet embassy and Cuban consulate requesting visas for himself and his family to visit the USSR and Cuba, but was refused. Oswald wrote about FBI surveillance and about a federal agent's offer to his wife Marina to "betray" the Soviet Union and remain under US protection. The KGB resident in the USA, who sent a coded translation of this letter to Moscow, considered the document a forgery and provocation¹⁷.

16 Dobrynin. Strictly confidentially... P. 96. 17 See doc. No. 23.

6Special copy

Dobrynin immediately sent two coded messages to Moscow, which contained the following proposals. First, to hand over to the American authorities, if they inquire, all correspondence with Oswald. Second, for Soviet leadership to send official condolences to Washington and visit the American ambassador's residence in Moscow. These steps, in Dobrynin's opinion, were meant to help counter the hysteria growing in American mass media regarding Oswald's possible connections with "extreme left-wing elements"¹⁸.

The coded messages reached the Soviet leadership's desk at 7:30 AM and 8:30 AM on November 23. By this time, the MID central apparatus had already prepared draft texts with condolences and the Central Committee resolution regarding Mikoyan's trip to the USA. The Central Committee Presidium members promptly approved the documents by poll¹⁹. Regarding the trip, it's worth noting an interesting detail - it wasn't a Soviet delegation traveling to the funeral, but Mikoyan alone, though accompanied. To America with him were to fly the head of the USA department of the USSR MID M.N. Smirnovsky, Mikoyan's assistant V.V. Smolyachenko, interpreter V.M. Sukhodrev, and security officers.

After the Central Committee resolutions were adopted, between 11 and 12 noon, Khrushchev, accompanied by Gromyko and Sukhodrev, went to the American embassy to pay respects to the late US president. During a brief conversation with Ambassador F. Kohler, the Soviet leader not only informed that Mikoyan would travel to Washington for the funeral but also inquired about the detention of the assassin. Kohler limited himself to abstract information - he didn't name his surname, only mentioned that it was a former deranged marine, adding that his exact guilt hadn't been established yet. Khrushchev, probably expecting the ambassador to mention L.H. Oswald's leftist views, came prepared with a "pre-emptive statement," declaring that the Communist party had always been against methods of terror and even cited an alleged Lenin quote from 1887 after the execution of Alexander's elder brother: "We shall take a different path"²⁰. The reference to Lenin served as proof that communists advocated for methods of political struggle and were against physical elimination of competitors.

¹⁸See doc. No. 12 and 13. ¹⁹See doc. No. 17 and 19. ²⁰According to Lenin's sister Maria Ulyanova, Vladimir Ilyich said the following: "No, we shall take a different path. Not this path should be taken." The phrase "We shall take a different path" gained circulation after the 1924 publication of V.V. Mayakovsky's poem "Vladimir Ilyich Lenin."

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This statement by Khrushchev showed that Kennedy's death caused serious concern in the Kremlin, as it could potentially turn into a major problem. Therefore, it became important to understand who L.H. Oswald was and what he did in the Soviet Union.

O.A. Troyanovsky recalled that on the morning of November 23, he called the KGB Chairman under the USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastniy and inquired about what information the special services had about the assassin. "It seemed that Semichastniy was expecting this question. He immediately replied that he had read reports about Oswald's arrest and had already given orders to gather information about him. Soon he called me back and stated that, according to his information, the KGB never had any contacts with Oswald," - wrote Khrushchev's aide²¹.

Probably then Troyanovsky, referring to Khrushchev's verbal order, requested to prepare a briefing note about Oswald, which was sent that same day to Gromyko, the Central Committee of the CPSU and Mikoyan's secretariat in Sovmin²².

Semichastniy, in his interviews with Swedish researcher T. Sniegon, later published as memoirs, stated there was no "Moscow trail" in Kennedy's assassination. There were simply no motives - he said: "I cannot imagine that any Soviet leader could take responsibility for the death of a top American statesman and for the catastrophic consequences that revealing such a connection would mean for us and for the whole world. And what would we achieve by that? Nothing, except the very fact of the dirty elimination of a politician who, unlike others, could be negotiated with, a person whom we, although fought against through propaganda means, simultaneously valued and respected more than his competitors. By such an attempt on the country's highest representative, we would demonstrate to the American public not strength, but only our own stupidity, as well as the ruthlessness of a system that after 1956 had set itself on the path to humanizing life and defined it as its main goal. In any case, events would have turned against us"²³.

While in Moscow they were gathering materials about L.H. Oswald and preparing Mikoyan's trip, in the USA a real campaign unfolded to identify and expose an international communist conspiracy. Various pro-Soviet labels were hung on Oswald. At one point, Dobrynin even advised Moscow "to express to the US government our

²¹ Troyanovsky. Through years and distances... P. 259. ²² See doc. No. 26. ²³ Semichastniy V.E. Restless heart. M., 2002. P. 332.

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concern" regarding the coverage of Soviet-American relations in the media or make an independent statement to "neutralize or deflect the current dangerous direction of American propaganda"²⁴. As another important step emphasizing the friendly disposition of the Soviet Union, the ambassador recommended conveying through Mikoyan a personal confidential message from Khrushchev to L. Johnson, expressing hope for maintaining and developing contacts between the two countries.

In Washington, the assassination so shocked the president's immediate circle that they remained stunned for a long time. American artist W. Walton, close to the Kennedy clan, later recounted that in the first days after the assassination, the president's national security advisor M. Bundy effectively ran things²⁵.

Rumors circulated about impending resignations in the US President's Cabinet. Dobrynin, analyzing various news, reported to Moscow that all these rumors contained certain elements of exaggeration and speculation. "Johnson will not rush into mass reshuffling to avoid causing widespread discontent within the Democratic party itself, especially on the eve of elections," - the Soviet ambassador reasonably summarized²⁶.

The highest American leadership recognized the necessity of maintaining business relations with the USSR. Secretary of State D. Rusk played a major role in this. Already on the evening of November 23, Gosden issued the first official statement about the non-involvement of the Soviet Union, Cuba, or any

other country in the US president's assassination. Likely, it was Rusk who on November 24 through L. Thompson conveyed - Khrushchev's visit to the American embassy, as well as the decision to send Mikoyan to the funeral, was viewed very positively by American leadership. All this was meant to counter anti-Soviet statements in the American press²⁷. However, Thompson had to request that the Soviet press, in turn, stop emphasizing the role of far-right circles in Kennedy's assassination²⁸. Thompson expressed general recommendations regarding Mikoyan's trip: for the Soviet

24 See doc. No. 20. 25 See doc. No. 63. 26 See doc. No. 24. 27 White House Press Secretary P. Salinger told Sukhodrev on November 26 "with great sincerity and excitement" that Khrushchev's visit to the American embassy made a "big and very good impression on all White House staff who were close to Kennedy" (see doc. No. 45). 28 It should be noted that Moscow complied with these recommendations. Members of the Presidium CC on November 25 removed from consideration a draft resolution prepared by MIDom and KGB about publications in Soviet press regarding

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the representative was advised to decline interviews with the press and television appearances, and was also advised not to stay in America for long after the funeral²⁹.

Mikoyan arrived in Washington on November 24 and settled in the embassy building. Dobrynin familiarized him with materials sent from the State Department, particularly with the list of representatives from foreign states participating in the funeral, and with the farewell ceremony for the deceased president³⁰. Interpreter V.M. Sukhodrev wrote in his memoirs that there were instructions about the dress code. The matter was that since the second third of the XIX century in England and the USA, men wore a cutaway - a black morning coat with rounded, diverging front tails - for mourning events. "In all my previous experience, I knew that our leaders had neither smoking jackets nor tailcoats. How surprised I was when Mikoyan suddenly announced that he brought with him 'some kind of jacket with long tails'," - wrote the interpreter³¹. It turned out that Mikoyan had worn this suit when he was at the inauguration of Pakistan's president. Mikoyan's entourage was gathering in Washington hurriedly, without sufficient time. The same Sukhodrev recalled that he arrived in the USA wearing a light coat which "was not quite suitable in color for such an occasion"³². He was helped out by one of the embassy staff who lent him a dark blue coat.

Monday, November 25, was declared a day of mourning throughout the USA. On this day at 11 AM, the solemn farewell ceremony for Kennedy began. The tightly closed coffin made of polished wood containing the president's body was moved from the Capitol Rotunda, where ordinary Americans bid farewell to their leader, to the White House grounds. From there, the procession, led by the commander of the military district in Washington, Major General F. Willa, consisting of a company of drummers and marines and a gun carriage with the coffin drawn by two light-colored horses in apples, moved toward St. Mark's Cathedral. A mourning procession followed the cortege: the widow, close relatives, President L. Johnson, high-ranking foreign and American state and public figures. A funeral service for Kennedy was held in the cathedral, after which the deceased's body was taken to Arlington Cemetery where the burial took place, and Robert and Jacqueline lit an eternal flame on the grave.

After the cemetery, all guests gathered in the White House banquet hall. This was the Kennedy widow's last official reception. Jacqueline appeared only at the end; everyone

29 See doc. No. 32. 30 See doc. No. 33. 31 Sukhodrev V.M. My Language is My Friend. M., 2008. P. 172. 32 Ibid.

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approached her and exchanged handshakes, with some she exchanged a few words. Mikoyan had received information beforehand to ensure he would approach as one of the last or even the very last. When Anastas Ivanovich and Dobrynin approached the widow, the latter said "with great feeling and barely holding back tears": "I am convinced that Chairman Khrushchev and my husband could have achieved success in the search for peace, and they truly strived for this. Now you must continue this work and see it through to the end." Zhaklin spoke this "inspiringly and movingly," holding Mikoyan's hand in her hands, "trying as convincingly as possible to convey her feelings and thoughts regarding the cause of peace, to which her husband had dedicated his efforts, and her desire for our countries to complete the work that was begun"³³. All this undoubtedly touched such an experienced politician as Mikoyan.

After the reception at the White House, a brief reception was held at the State Department for representatives of foreign states with the participation of the new U.S. President. It was attended by 26 presidents and heads of government, 30 foreign ministers, five defense ministers, dozens of ruling families - representatives of 53 states in total. While waiting to meet with Johnson, Mikoyan managed to briefly talk with the new British Prime Minister A. Douglas-Home, French President Ch. de Gaulle, Swedish Prime Minister T. Erlander, Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie, President of Israel Z. Shazar, and Japanese Prime Minister H. Ikeda.

On Tuesday morning, November 26, Mikoyan and his entourage held a more detailed conversation with L. Johnson, in the second half of the day - with D. Rusk, and in the evening - with British Prime Minister A. Douglas-Home and Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie. Dobrynin recalled that Mikoyan went to the conversation with Johnson "with some anxiety"³⁴. However, everything went well. The President was flattered by Khrushchev's personal confidential message and conveyed his own message to the Soviet leader, adding that this letter became the first document he signed upon taking the Oval Office³⁵. Johnson proposed to continue exchanging such messages and even, according to Dobrynin's recollections, added: "Perhaps we will achieve more than

³³ See doc. No. 35. A.F. Dobrynin in his memoirs somewhat differently conveys Zhaklin's words: "That morning, when they buried my husband, he unexpectedly said to me at breakfast that something needed to be done to maintain good relations with Russia. I don't know what caused these words at that particular moment, but they sounded like the result of some deep thinking. I am convinced that Premier Khrushchev and my husband could have achieved success in the search for peace, and they truly strived for this. Now both governments must continue this work and see it through to the end" (Dobrynin. Strictly Confidentially..., P. 97). ³⁴ Dobrynin. Strictly Confidentially..., P. 107. ³⁵ See doc. No. 38.

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with my predecessor"³⁶. Johnson promised that "there will be no changes in Kennedy's policy," stated that the USA would not invade Cuba³⁷. The conversation turned out to be the longest of the seven meetings of the new president with foreign delegations during those days - instead of half an hour, it lasted almost an hour. The President spoke cordially and amicably and even showed flowers and shrubs personally planted by Kennedy next to the White House terrace. The meeting showed that the new head of the White House intended to maintain a pragmatic approach in relations with the USSR.

The meeting with Rusk lasted longer and was more acute. Mikoyan once again raised the issue of creating multilateral nuclear forces and the militarization of West Germany, particularly emphasizing that "we are not afraid of Germans, as we have so many weapons that we can destroy West Germany on the very first day if war breaks out. We fear that West Germany might provoke a war, in which you will become involved, perhaps even against your will"³⁸. Rusk in turn assured Mikoyan that the FRG government would never

get the opportunity to independently control nuclear weapons, and "multilateral nuclear forces will never become a tail that wags the dog"³⁹.

Rusk confirmed Johnson's words about the continuity of Kennedy's foreign policy course and even proposed to agree on a joint freeze of military budgets. Already at the beginning of the conversation, he frankly said: "Between us, of course, there are major disagreements. I don't mean [...] ideological differences, which are deep and perhaps even irreconcilable in nature. After all, N.S. Khrushchev often says that we cannot convince him to become a capitalist just as he cannot convince us to become communists. But in the broader plane of interstate relations, we maintain contacts between ourselves, although we approach some problems from different positions. We believe it is necessary to continue studying and discussing these problems and should not show impatience"⁴⁰.

It is significant that the American press favorably commented on Mikoyan's stay in the USA. R. Kennedy addressed Mikoyan with grateful letters. Jackie's letter, which she wrote to Khrushchev during one of her last nights

36 Dobrynin. Strictly confidentially... P. 108. 37 See doc. No. 38. 38 See doc. No. 44. 39 See doc. No. 44. 40 See doc. No. 44.

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in the White House. Overall, Mikoyan's mission was accomplished. On November 27 at 16:55 Eastern Time, the aircraft with Soviet representatives departed from Andrews Air Force Base to Moscow.

The positive outcome of Mikoyan's trip to Washington became an important signal that on November 29, the Presidium of the Central Committee agreed to hand over to the American side photocopies of correspondence with L.H. Oswald, including the mysterious letter from November 9. The next day, the correspondence was in Rusk's hands. The transfer was timely, as the day before, Johnson's decision established the Presidential Commission to investigate the assassination of U.S. President J.F. Kennedy, better known as the "Warren Commission," named after its head, the authoritative American jurist, Chief Justice of the United States E. Warren.

Information about the transfer of correspondence with L.H. Oswald spread quite quickly through official and unofficial channels. Thus, several hours after meeting with Rusk at a reception hosted by Atomic Energy Commission Chairman G. Seaborg in honor of USSR State Committee Chairman for Atomic Energy Use A.M. Petrosyants, Dobrynin spoke with L. Thompson. The latter not only expressed gratitude for the document transfer but also reported that one of the journalists had "somehow inexplicably" learned about the transfer of photocopies to the State Department. Dobrynin was still returning from the reception when the first Sunday edition of the "Washington Post" (published late Saturday evening) reported about the Soviet ambassador's meeting with Rusk and the transfer of photocopies of correspondence with L.H. Oswald. The next day, this news appeared in all American newspapers. The American press commented on this message positively. Several newspapers indicated that U.S. official authorities had stopped linking Oswald to the Soviet Union.

The transfer of correspondence became an important step by the Soviet side in assisting with the Kennedy assassination investigation. On December 10, 1963, members of the Central Committee Presidium supported Gromyko's proposal to inform Rusk about the reasons for Soviet authorities' refusal to grant Oswald Soviet citizenship. On April 23, 1964, responding to Rusk's and E. Warren's request, Americans were given copies of L.H. Oswald's personal documents from his time in the USSR, including: materials about his residence and employment, departure from

See doc. No. 60. See doc. No. 52. See doc. No. 57. See doc. No. 64.

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of the Soviet Union, medical records (in particular, the medical history from psychosomatic and surgical departments of Botkin Hospital and from the Second Clinical Hospital of Minsk)⁴⁵. The transfer of all these documents was conducted in a confidential manner - neither governments of other countries, nor journalists, nor Oswald's mother, nor even a great friend of the Soviet Union, English philosopher B. Russell, were allowed access to "Oswald's dossier". Although the transferred materials about Oswald were limited in nature and did not allow forming a complete picture of his stay in the USSR, the Americans highly appreciated the fact of transfer itself.

At the same time, from the end of November 1963, various versions of Kennedy's assassination circulated in official and semi-official American circles. The head of the Washington bureau of "New York Times" J. Reston in conversation with Dobrynin reported that FBI investigators received personal instructions from L. Johnson to check the Cuban and Chinese leads⁴⁶. Among those close to the Kennedy clan, a persistent version formed that the assassination was part of a larger political conspiracy, in which people close to Johnson could have been involved. W. Walton at a confidential meeting in Moscow stated: "Perhaps there was only one killer, but there were undoubtedly more accomplices in the president's assassination"⁴⁷.

Khrushchev adhered to a similar version. In conversation with American journalist D. Pearson in Cairo at the end of May 1964, he said: "For Lee Oswald's mind, this is too complex a crime. A whole group of people acted here according to a pre-developed plan. One person cannot commit such a crime." He further added: "Behind this crime stand people who had great opportunities - both material and financial. They are the ones confusing the investigation. It is no coincidence that the assassination happened in Dallas. Kennedy essentially became a victim of his enemies"⁴⁸.

In connection with perpetuating the memory of the late president, the Soviet side continued to help Americans. On December 5, 1963, two brothers of the deceased president and the president of Harvard University began a campaign to raise funds for the construction of the presidential memorial library, and already on February 26, 1964, Robert wrote letters to Khrushchev, Gromyko and A.I. Adzhubei requesting interviews in which they would share their impressions of the former president. Robert stipulated that since

⁴⁵ See doc. No. 71. ⁴⁶ See doc. No. 58. ⁴⁷ See doc. No. 63. ⁴⁸ See doc. No. 72.

many plots in the interview may contain confidential information, so "no one will have access to it - neither scholars, nor government officials, nor congressional committees, nor journalists, nor Kennedy family members - except under conditions that You may wish to set"⁴⁹. The Soviet leadership responded positively to this request in this case as well. By decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee dated June 29, 1964, the diplomatic mail library was given a copy of the documentary film about the meeting of the two leaders in Vienna and a recording of Khrushchev's speech in the Austrian capital in 1961, as well as separate materials published in the Soviet press⁵⁰.

* * *

Trojanovsky wrote in his memoirs that in the USA every American remembers well where they were when the news of Kennedy's assassination came, and added: "I think this can be said about many Russians"⁵¹. Indeed, ordinary Soviet people perceived the American tragedy quite closely. Reflecting on the seeming paradox of this phenomenon, Dobrynin believed that the main role in this was played by the Caribbean crisis that brought the world to the brink of catastrophe⁵². Its favorable outcome was received with universal relief on both sides of the ocean. For the majority of Soviet and American citizens, the necessity

of preventing nuclear war and global apocalypse became obvious, despite any ideological and socio-political differences.

D.H.S. A.N. Artizov

49 See doc. No. 78. 50 See doc. No. 83. 51 Troyanovsky. Through years and distances... P. 258. 52 Dobrynin. Strictly confidential... P. 99-100.

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Archeographic Preface

The collection of documents "The Assassination of U.S. President J.F. Kennedy and Soviet-American Relations" was prepared as part of an ongoing project for the publication by the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History of documents from the "Cold War" period. The starting point of this project can be considered the preparation and publication, under the editorship of Academician A.A. Fursenko, of the fundamental publication "Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee" and the beginning of studying a new array of historical sources that accumulated in the activities of the highest party organ, the true history of the confrontation between two systems after World War II.

The compilers of the collection aimed to reflect, based on archival sources, one of the complex periods of Soviet-American relations in the 1960s: the restoration of full-fledged trust contacts at the highest level between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States of America after the Caribbean Crisis, the tragic death of U.S. President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, and the establishment of first contacts with the new president Lyndon Johnson.

The central place in the collection is occupied by the topic related to the Soviet side's reaction to Kennedy's assassination and the beginning of interaction with the new U.S. President L. Johnson. For the first time, on a strictly documentary basis, the active assistance of Soviet authorities in investigating this crime is shown. The selection of documents for inclusion in the collection was carried out primarily considering the criterion of their novelty and compliance with the publication's intended purpose.

Most documents were previously kept in closed storage in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (former archive of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee) and have only recently been transferred to the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History. All published materials have undergone the established declassification procedure.

The compilers chose a subject-chronological principle of document systematization. All documents are grouped into four sections, arranged chronologically within sections, while maintaining a unified through numbering. Given that materials within sections are arranged chronologically, the inevitable partial loss of cause-and-effect relationships between documents is restored in comments (content notes) using cross-references.

The first section of the collection includes documents on Soviet-American relations at the highest level during the beginning of the election campaign in the United States. They mainly

¹ Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, 1954-1964. Draft protocol records of meetings. Stenograms. Resolutions. In 3 volumes - M.: ROSSPEN, 2003-2008. ² The Vienna waltz of the Cold War (around the meeting of N.S. Khrushchev and J.F. Kennedy in 1961 in Vienna). Documents. - M.: ROSSPEN, 2011; Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Two colors of time. Documents from N.S. Khrushchev's personal collection. In 2 volumes - M.: MFD, 2009; New World in Europe (USSR, FRG and Moscow Treaty of 1970 according to CPSU Central Committee documents) - M.: Kuchkovo pole, 2020.

devoted to the preparation and conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in Three Environments (Moscow Treaty of 1963), contacts of USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko with US leadership during his stay at the XVIII UN General Assembly, as well as discussion by Soviet leadership of main issues regarding further development of relations with the USA and directly with J.F. Kennedy. This section includes 11 documents covering the period from June 13 to October 25, 1963.

The second, main section, includes documents covering several closely interconnected topics - the Soviet Union leadership's reaction to J.F. Kennedy's assassination in Dallas, the trip to the USA to participate in the funeral of N.S. Khrushchev's trusted associate - member of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan, his establishment of first contacts with new president L. Johnson and, finally, USSR's assistance to the American side in conducting the investigation. This section includes 66 documents covering the period from November 22, 1963 to September 28, 1964.

The third section is devoted to matters related to the history of establishing the Presidential Library and Museum of J.F. Kennedy in Boston and providing documentary materials for its collection. This section includes 7 documents covering the period from February 26 to August 28, 1964.

Finally, the fourth (supplementary) section includes materials about granting L.H. Oswald the right of residence in the USSR and about his stay in Minsk. This section includes 11 documents covering the period from October 13, 1959 to May 28, 1962.

The basis for preparing this collection were documents stored in Fund No. 3 "Politburo of the CC RCP(b)-AUCP(b)-CPSU" (thematic files "On the assassination of President J.F. Kennedy" and "USA. Political-economic relations" (inventory No. 66 "International issues", subgroup "USA"), files of inventory No. 16 "Protocols of CPSU CC Presidium meetings (original resolutions and materials. XXII convocation)", as well as separate documents from N.S. Khrushchev's personal fund (Fund No. 52, inventory No. 1).

The collection also includes a number of documents from other federal and departmental archives, supplementing the complex of sources found in RGANI.

Materials concerning A.I. Mikoyan's trip are stored in the State Archive of the Russian Federation and in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Documents concerning L.H. Oswald came from the archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation and the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. The Central Archive of the Committee for State Security of the Republic of Belarus provided materials about Oswald's stay in Minsk.

Along with documents, the collection publishes little-known photo and film documents from the collections of the Russian State Archive of Film and Photo Documents and the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History.

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For publication in the collection, originals were primarily selected, and only in exceptional cases were copies included, which were typically filed in thematic cases.

Separately, it is necessary to address the question of authenticity or copy status of documents received through encrypted communication channels (cipher telegrams). Upon their receipt at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers, 4-5 identical copies were printed from the decrypted text on special forms. In this case, the decrypted initial text, according to the compilers, cannot

be defined as the first copy (original) of this type of document.

Documents included in the collection from departmental archives are, as a rule, represented by copies, since the first copies were sent to the addressee. It should also be noted that during this period (1961-1964), when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent memoranda with draft resolutions to the CPSU Central Committee General Department, simultaneously with the signed original (1st copy), a second and sometimes third copy of the memorandum without signature was received. This is probably related to the specifics of forming originals of Presidium Central Committee CPSU resolutions and thematic files in Sectors I and VI of the Central Committee General Department. Later, according to the compilers' observations, originals of memoranda began to be duplicated in the Central Committee General Department using photocopiers manufactured in Czechoslovakia and GDR.

The published documents can be conditionally divided into several types of groups:

1. Resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, adopted both at meetings and during the period between Presidium meetings through polling vote. It was precisely through Presidium resolutions that the main issues related to the collection's theme were regulated. In the archive, the texts of resolutions were preserved in several variants.

In the protocols of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium. Following a Presidium meeting, the General Department prepared a protocol that included all resolutions (except for "Special Folder" resolutions, where only the item number and resolution title were included in the protocol), both those adopted directly at the meeting and decisions made through polling vote in the period after the previous meeting.

The protocol was printed in several versions: the signed version, signed by the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and sometimes together with the CPSU Central Committee Secretary presiding at the meeting; archival copy No. 1, which was almost an exact copy of the signed protocol, except for protocol items used for reference work in the Central Committee General Department; distribution copy intended for distribution to CPSU Central Committee members. The latter protocol did not include mentions of "Special Folder" items, as well as most decisions on operational, personnel, and other issues submitted by ministries and departments. Mainly decisions concerning party work organization or major national economic issues remained for distribution.

Excerpts from the CPSU Central Committee Presidium protocol. From adopted resolutions immediately
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excerpts were prepared on forms distributed to those responsible for execution, as well as sent (in several copies) to Section VI of the General Department of the Central Committee for filing in thematic cases and subsequent dispatch.

Originals of CC CPSU Resolutions (Presidium CC CPSU Resolutions). Draft resolutions were prepared and submitted for consideration by members of the CC CPSU Presidium by relevant CC departments or directly by ministry/agency (typically by force structures or MFA). They were received by Sector I of the CC General Department, after which, as a rule, copies were distributed to CC CPSU Presidium members for voting. After voting concluded (decision made), handwritten corrections were made to the original draft (including editorial changes). After this, the Head of General Department (or Deputy Head of Department) provided written instructions on the draft text regarding formatting, issuance and distribution of the CC CPSU Presidium decision. All subsequent clerical notes regarding printing and distribution, including resolution number and date, were also marked on the original. Upon completion of distribution, original resolutions, protocol excerpts along with notes and other materials that served as basis for their adoption,

were transferred to Section VI, where they were filed in cases "Protocols of CC CPSU Presidium meetings (original resolutions and materials)" and in thematic files.

Taking into account that the originals of resolutions reflect all stages of preparation, voting and document issuance in the most concentrated form, the compilers used them as the main source for publication.

2. Official messages of the USSR Council of Ministers Chairman and US President, as well as routine correspondence of the US Embassy.

Messages from N.S. Khrushchev were preserved in two main versions - as a draft prepared in the central apparatus of MFA (in some cases in his secretariat), and in the final version approved by CC Presidium resolution. Two types of messages can be distinguished - open, that is published in press, and closed, confidential. If the message text was officially published, this is indicated in the comments.

Messages from the US President were preserved in two versions - originals in English, directly signed by authors (with autographs or certified facsimile signatures); translations received from the Soviet embassy or MFA central apparatus. All foreign language materials are published in the collection in translation.

3. Records of N.S. Khrushchev's conversations with US political and public figures.

4. Documents of ministries and agencies formed the main part of the collection. They can be conditionally divided into two groups:

notes from the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chairman of KGB under USSR Council of Ministers and their

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deputies, as well as heads of other state bodies to the Central Committee of the CPSU; notes from USSR ambassadors to the CPSU Central Committee or USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, transmitted using encrypted communications. After receipt and decryption, the cipher telegrams were printed in several copies (from 1964, multiplied using electrocopying equipment) and sent to members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and other addressees. For publication, as a rule, the copy sent to N.S. Khrushchev was used.

5. Documents of personal origin are represented by letters from Jackie and Robert Kennedy, L.H. Oswald. All letters are written in English. The original letters were used by compilers as illustrative material. The documents of personal origin also include a visa application form.

6. Reference and information materials are represented by documents generated as a result of A.I. Mikoyan's trip to the USA, prepared by the USA Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the USSR Embassy in the USA.

Archeographic processing of published documents was conducted in accordance with the Methodological recommendations for the publication of archival documents, developed by VNIIDAD in 2022, taking into account the specifics of document preparation in higher party bodies.

Each document has its own editorial heading, number (if any), indication of the place of document creation (for those prepared outside Moscow) and date. If the document has its own heading, it is included in the editorial heading in quotation marks.

All headings indicate the positions of the author and addressee of the document. The only exception was the positions of N.S. Khrushchev, which are published only in the first document. The compilers proceeded this way, taking into account the current practice of not indicating the positions of top Soviet Union officials

(I.V. Stalin, N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhnev, etc.), which is largely due to both their holding multiple posts and the difficulty of determining in what capacity they are being addressed at a specific moment. Thus, notes addressed to N.S. Khrushchev as Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers were in most cases considered by the Presidium of the Central Committee and were initially formalized as Central Committee resolutions.

The date established by the compilers is indicated in square brackets.

Security classifications, copy numbers, etc. present on the document are reproduced as an integral part of the document after the editorial heading, on the right under the date.

Footnotes

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Documents are published in full, without omissions or text abridgement. The only exception is document No. 72 "From the conversation record of N.S. Khrushchev with New York Times observer D. Pierson and his wife L. Pierson regarding the investigation of J.F. Kennedy's assassination," in which a portion of text unrelated to the collection's theme is omitted.

When reproducing document texts, their stylistic and linguistic features are preserved. Obvious typos and grammatical errors that do not affect meaning and do not distort document content are not noted by compilers; omitted words are restored in square brackets. Author's underlines in the text are preserved, while underlines made during document review at the CPSU Central Committee or USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not reproduced.

All foreign surnames and names are printed as they appear in documents, their variations are not noted and not updated to modern spelling. Modern spelling of foreign surnames and names is provided in the name index, where variations found in documents are indicated in brackets.

The legend includes document storage location information. In some cases, information about originals and copies discovered in different archives is provided. The legend also mandatorily indicates whether the document is original or copy; method of text reproduction (typed text, manuscript, etc.), as well as presence of signature-autographs. For example: "Typed text. Signature-autograph, blue ballpoint pen."

The collection's reference apparatus consists of textual notes, commentary (content notes), name and geographical indexes, list of abbreviations and list of published documents.

All commentary necessary for fuller and more precise understanding of document content, whether explanatory, clarifying or reference in nature, is marked with Arabic numerals and provided after the main body of documents.

For commentary, in addition to publicly available sources, various reference and memoir literature, and periodicals, documentary materials from former archives of the Politburo, Secretariat and Apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee stored in the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History were widely used, as well as their reference apparatus.

The compilers consider it their duty to express gratitude to GARF employees L.A. Rogova and F.I. Melentyev, RGAKFD - N.I. Pestov and L.A. Denisova, RGASPI - P.P. Skorospelov and N.I. Leontyeva, RGANI - A.E. Sokolova, T.A. Dzhililov, A.A. Kazinov and L.V. Klimova, as well as former director of the Historical-Documentary Department of Russian MFA N.M. Barinova and our colleagues from archives of Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Russian FSB and KGB of Republic of Belarus, who provided

invaluable assistance in preparing the collection.

A.S. Stepanov, N.Yu. Pivovarov 21Signal copy

Section I

"The Responsibility For The Fate Of The World Lies With These Two Leaders"

documents on Soviet-American relations at the highest level during the pre-election campaign in the USA
June 13 - October 25, 1963

****No. 1****

Note from First Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev to members and candidate members of the Presidium CC CPSU, secretaries of CC CPSU regarding draft responses to questions from chief editors of newspapers "Pravda" and "Izvestia" in connection with US President J.F. Kennedy's speech at American University on June 10, 1963

June 13, 1963

To Members Of The Presidium Cc Cpsu

To Candidate Members Of The Presidium Cc Cpsu

To Secretaries Of Cc Cpsu

I am sending the draft of my responses to questions from chief editors of newspapers "Pravda" and "Izvestia" in connection with US President J. Kennedy's speech of June 10.

If there are comments, please inform.

N. Khrushchev

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 294. L.219. Original. Typewritten text.

****No. 2****

Resolution of the Presidium CC CPSU "Draft responses of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to questions from chief editors of newspapers "Pravda" and "Izvestia" in connection with US President J. Kennedy's speech of June 10 this year"

No. P102/33 June 14, 1963

Approve the draft responses of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to questions from chief editors of newspapers "Pravda" and "Izvestia" in connection with US President J. Kennedy's speech of June 10 this year (attached).

At the bottom of the page in blue ballpoint pen: "Dictated by N.S. Khrushchev 13.VI.63 O.Troyanovsky"

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[Appendix] To item 33 of protocol No. 102a

STRENGTHEN THE CAUSE OF PEACE, DEVELOP COOPERATION!b

Answers of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev to questions from chief editors of "Pravda" and "Izvestia" newspapers

US President J. Kennedy delivered a speech at American University in Washington on June 10, addressing several important international issues.

This speech was published in the Soviet press.

The chief editors of "Pravda" and "Izvestia" newspapers approached the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev with a request to comment on this speech by the US President.

Below are N.S. Khrushchev's answers.

Question: In his speech, US President J. Kennedy paid special attention to the problem of war and peace. He stated that in our age "total war makes no sense," that "peace need not be impracticable, and war need not be inevitable." He also stated that "both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, are mutually deeply interested in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race."

How do you assess these statements by the US President?

Answer: The speech of US President J. Kennedy attracted attention both in the USA and in other countries of the world, including the Soviet Union.

In this speech, the President addressed the most important contemporary issue: war and peace in conditions where nuclear weapons have acquired colossal destructive power, and the stockpiles of these weapons continue to grow.

I think that Soviet people took interest in the President's speech, as this speech made a step forward in the realistic assessment of the international situation and speaks about the necessity to find ways that would save humanity from the arms race and the threat of global thermonuclear war.

The world public, all Soviet people know well that the Soviet government in its foreign policy has always proceeded from the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Our government made concrete proposals on ending the arms race, universal and complete disarmament, on banning

a Throughout the text of the answers, corrections were made in blue ballpoint pen and pencil. These include suggestions by L.F. Ilyichev and B.N. Ponomarev, and also, presumably, N.S. Khrushchev's assistants. When available, the editors clarified who made the corrections. b Original version of the heading "Word about peace should be supported by practical deeds." c Original version "...as this speech made a step forward in understanding the realistic assessment of the international situation..."

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nuclear tests, on the creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the globe, on the withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territories, on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and resolving on this basis the question of West Berlin■, on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and member countries of the Warsaw Treaty■.

One could cite many examples of concrete, purposeful activities of the Soviet government both within the UN framework and in various commissions, committees and subcommittees, where practical proposals were made on the aforementioned and many other disputed and unresolved issues.

In President Kennedy's speech, he emphasizes the existence of real danger to peace, including for the United States of America■, as a result of the arms race and accumulation of vast quantities of nuclear weapons. He correctly states that in modern conditions, world war is especially senseless, as it would inevitably lead to enormous human casualties and destruction of material values created by the labor of many generations. He also justly notes that the arms race, if not stopped, could lead to military catastrophe. Nuclear bombs are not cucumbers that can be stored in a warehouse and kept for quite long in a preserved state.

Also noteworthy is the President's statement that world war in modern conditions is not inevitable. As is known, this conclusion was made by us long ago. From what has been said, it is clear that the speech contains several positive points, indicating a sober assessment of the real situation■.

Reading the U.S. President's speech, one cannot help but notice some contradictory positions contained within it.

The President speaks about the necessity of ending the "cold war." However, in declaring this, does the U.S. President seek to eliminate the sources of the "cold war"? This is not evident from the speech.

Let us take, for example, one of the most important problems - the question of concluding a German peace treaty.

President Kennedy states: "Our commitment to defend Western Europe and West Berlin, for instance, remains unchanged due to the identity of our vital interests. The United States will not make any deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other countries and other peoples not only because they are our partners, but because their interests and our interests coincide."

■ Original text "In President Kennedy's speech, there is an understanding of the real threat to peace, including for the United States of America..." Correction by L.F. Ilyichev. ■ Original text "...that the speech contains several positive realistic points." Correction by B.N. Ponomarev.

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It appears that the US government is not seeking to find ways for a coordinated solution to the German problem and remains practically in its old positions, which essentially align with the position of the most reactionary aggressive forces in West Germany, led by Adenauer, Brandt and other revanchist-minded people. Thus, one of the main sources of the "cold war" is not being eliminated.

The Soviet government would like to sign a German peace treaty and resolve on its basis the issue of West Berlin together with its former allies in World War II. As known from repeated statements of the Soviet government, the resolution of this issue does not pursue goals of advantage for one side or disadvantage for another. The signing of the German treaty will benefit the cause of peace as a whole, benefiting all peoples, including the American people. Soviet proposals on the German question are concrete and clear. They are based on recognition of the existing situation in Europe and Germany - the presence of two sovereign German states: the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

As for West Berlin specifically, there are no more reasonable and logical proposals than creating a free city of West Berlin with corresponding guarantees of its international status.

I again confirm that the Soviet government stands for the strictest international guarantees for the free city of West Berlin with UN participation. It must be emphasized with all determination that there is no way to avoid the conclusion of a German peace treaty - this issue must be and will be resolved. We would prefer it to be resolved by agreement with western powers.

In order to eliminate the sources of the "cold war", and not only the "cold war", but dangerous sources of a new world war, concrete actions are needed, not just good wishes.

Or take another very important issue. The President speaks about reducing international tension. But how can this be reconciled with the existence of American military bases on foreign territories. It is a fact that the USA has surrounded the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with their military bases. They have essentially occupied South Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, and several other states. Moreover, to this day, as a result of US aggression, the original Chinese territory of Taiwan is still occupied by American forces. In some countries, American troops

a Initially the text read "From this it follows that the US government is not going to seek ways for a coordinated solution to the German problem. President Kennedy essentially remains in old positions on this issue. Thus, one of the main sources of the 'cold war' is not being eliminated. The President's statement essentially aligns with the position of the most reactionary aggressive forces in West Germany, led by Adenauer, Brandt and other revanchist-minded people." b The word "Japan" is crossed out.

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practically perform the functions of an international gendarme, conduct military operations, suppressing national liberation movements.

And what about the US trampling on the sovereign rights of other states?

The most outspoken US political figures - and they in many cases occupy quite high positions - directly call for open and even armed intervention in Cuba's internal affairs, seeking to impose on the Cuban people arrangements favorable to US imperialist monopolies.

If we take President Kennedy's statement about ending the "cold war" and strengthening peace to its logical conclusion, then it is necessary to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other states, respect their sovereignty, observe international law norms and not just in words but in deeds respect the UN Charter, eliminate military bases which serve as a springboard for aggression against other states.

Or take such a rather clear issue as the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO countries and Warsaw Pact member states. An agreement on this matter would only bring a thaw in the political atmosphere. After all, it's not about territorial or other concessions, because concluding such a treaty

would bring equal benefits to all countries that sign it. Despite this, Western countries say that such a treaty should not be signed. They explain this by saying that we are all UN members, whose Charter provides for non-aggression between countries. But if they refer to the UN Charter providing for non-aggression, then why did Western powers create aggressive blocs? Talk about NATO being created for defensive purposes is talk for naive people. After all, many officials of this military alliance do not hide its aggressive nature, its orientation against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

It turns out like this: they justify even the creation of military blocs to create tension in the world, but when it is proposed to conclude a non-aggression pact, they say such a pact is not needed. Yet it is clear to everyone that a non-aggression pact would be a positive factor in improving relations between countries.

Some figures in the West brazenly declare that a non-aggression pact should not be concluded because it would lead to reduced tension, and improved relations between states is not advantageous to them. The goal of such figures is to support revanchists, constantly threaten the German Democratic Republic and other

Footnotes

a Original text "How would Americans look at it if the United States were surrounded by a ring of Soviet military bases aimed against the USA? And what about the US trampling on sovereign rights of other states?" b Original text "...directly call for intervention in Cuba's internal affairs..." Pravda B.N. Ponomarev. c Original text "It is asked, if the UN Charter provides for non-aggression,..."

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socialist countries and thereby escalate the Cold War and increase international tension.

Where is the logic in reasoning that a non-aggression pact is not needed?

The U.S. President* speaks about ending the Cold War. We welcome such statements. However, as they say**, if A is said, then B must also be said, good statements and appeals must be supported by practical actions.

Question. President Kennedy specifically emphasized the issue of banning nuclear tests and disarmament.

How do you assess the prospects for reaching an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests and, in particular, the upcoming negotiations in Moscow on this issue?

Answer. Negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests, as is known, have been ongoing for several years. And now in Geneva, many speeches are being made on this topic.

What is the stumbling block? Western countries have put forward their condition about a certain number of inspections for concluding an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. What do they want? They essentially want Soviet territory to be open to spies from NATO military headquarters.

The advancement of this requirement indicates that Western governments base relations between nuclear powers on distrust. But if we take such a position, it becomes impossible to resolve any disputed international issue. It turns out to be something like the tale of the white bull: we don't trust you, so you don't trust us.

The Soviet government has stated and continues to state that it will not agree to provide our country's territory for inspection purposes that amount to espionage. Science has proven the possibility of detecting

nuclear explosions through national means of control. This, we think, is well known to the President himself, and presumably to the audience he addressed in his speech. Moreover, we have agreed to accept the proposal of British scientists – and we repeat this agreement now – to deploy a limited number of automatic seismic stations for observation purposes.

National detection means combined with automatic seismic stations provide reliable guarantees to identify any possible attempts to violate the agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests. As is known, we have given consent to conduct two or three inspections to monitor the cessation of underground tests, and this was done by us for political considerations. This was, so to speak, a step toward meeting the wishes of the other side. It is regrettable that this proposal of ours was not properly appreciated by our negotiating partners.

*After the word "USA" the word "many" is crossed out. **Original text "However, it is said,..."

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What is lacking today? What is lacking is the desire of Western powers to reach an agreement and abandon playing at negotiations*.

As for the Soviet Union, we are ready to sign an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests today. The ball is in the West's court. We agreed to a meeting of representatives of three powers in Moscow to try once again to negotiate on this issue. But the success of this meeting will depend on what baggage the representatives of the USA and England bring to our country.

The President of the United States addresses such a crucial modern problem as universal and complete disarmament. He is right when he says that this is not a simple or easy problem, and its solution will require considerable effort and certain time.

The Soviet government continues to spare no effort in considering disarmament issues. State leaders must finally realize their great responsibility to humanity for solving such an urgent task as ending the arms race.

President Kennedy suggests that it would be good to direct the resources freed from the arms race to more noble purposes. There is indeed still much poverty, hunger and unemployment in the world. It would be good if the United States government's concrete actions followed these good wishes about disarmament.

The Soviet government's proposals on this matter are widely known.

To improve the international situation and relations between states, along with the mentioned issues, the expansion of economic ties and development of trade is of great importance.

The President of the United States, unfortunately, says nothing about this in his speech.

The United States government practically prohibits trade with the Soviet Union■. True, the ban on importing crabs from the Soviet Union to the USA was lifted. Crabs are indeed a tasty thing. However, one cannot go far on crabs alone.

The Soviet Union is a large country. We possess all necessary resources for developing industry and agriculture. We manage without trade with the United States of America and, apparently, will continue to successfully develop our economy without trading with them in the future. I speak about developing trade between the Soviet Union and the USA because trade is an indicator of good relations between countries.

The United States of America not only refuses to trade with us themselves but also pressures their allies, often prohibiting them from trading with the Soviet Union. The most striking example of such pressure is that the USA forced West German firms to violate contractual obligations and not supply steel pipes to the Soviet Union.

*The word "agreement" was replaced with "negotiations".

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It did not cause us any damage, but those who gave in to pressure lost out. As they say, another cold gust has been added to the winds of the Cold War.

Look at how the American press reacts to the presence of the Soviet foreign trade workers' delegation in the USA*. It accuses this delegation of virtually anti-American activities* because the Soviet delegation seeks to establish contacts with business people to develop normal Soviet-American trade relations. If such activity is condemned in the USA as "impermissible"**, then what remains of the words in favor of improving Soviet-American relations and ending the Cold War?

Question. From the President's speech, it is clear that he acknowledges the inevitability and necessity of coexistence of states with different social systems. At the same time, his speech repeats the usual assertions of Western propaganda that communists are trying to impose their system on other countries and that this is supposedly the main cause of international tension.

What can be said about such statements by the US President?

Answer. In this case, the US President, unfortunately, uses Dulles' vocabulary, who spoke many harsh words about communism. Capitalist orders are crumbling and cracking due to objective laws of historical development. And the President tries to explain this by "attempts of communists to impose their political and economic system on others." The foundations of capitalism are not crumbling from harsh words, but due to irreconcilable contradictions between labor and capital, as a result of peoples' struggle for their freedom.

As is known, while advocating for peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, we do not propose coexistence in the realm of ideologies, but we are also not supporters of resolving ideological disputes through war between states. This is our point of view, this is our policy.

In conclusion, I would like to say that overall, US President Kennedy's speech makes a positive impression. We welcome with satisfaction the call for improving relations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, his statement "let's reconsider our attitude toward the Soviet Union." We agree with the President's statement that the peoples of our countries are mutually interested in preserving peace. The peoples of the Soviet Union respect the talented and hardworking people of the United States of America and want to have friendlier relations with them.

We are deeply convinced that the US President's call for improving relations between countries and ending the "Cold War," for improving relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the USA will be supported by absolute

*The words "anti-American activities" were in quotation marks in the original text. **Original text: "If such activity is viewed in the USA as anti-American, ..." Correction by L.F. Ilyichev.

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by the majority of the American people; and the peoples of the Soviet Union have always stood and stand* on these positions. We strive to ensure that good relations between countries are implemented in practice, but to achieve this, efforts must not be spared in the struggle with those forces** that stand for waging a "cold war" and resolving disputed issues through starting a war.

Time will show whether these statements will be followed by concrete actions of the American government, its political practice. Words about peace must be supported by practical deeds***. In these concrete actions, the American government will find understanding and support from the Soviet government.

For our part, we will spare no effort to find solutions to unresolved problems, to establish good relations between our great powers.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 294. L. 207. Original. Typewritten text. L. 208 - 217. Electrographic copy. Typewritten text with corrections in blue ballpoint pen and regular pencil.

■3 Record of conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and US Secretary of State D. Rusk

August 5, 1963****

Reception by Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. KHRUSHCHEV of US Secretary of State D. RUSK

The Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev received US Secretary of State D. Rusk at the Kremlin on August 5, who was accompanied by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee W.J. Fulbright, US Representative to the UN A. Stevenson, Senators J.J. Aiken, L. Saltonstall, J.D. Sparkman, H.H. Humphrey and J.O. Pastore, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency W.C. Foster, Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission G.T. Seaborg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State L. Thompson, US Representative to the Committee

* The words "and stand" inserted in regular pencil.

** Original text "...for the struggle within each state with those forces, ...". Correction by L.F. Ilyichev. ***

Original text "Words about peace must be supported by practical deeds." **** On the first page at the top, marked in blue ink presumably by G.T. Shuyskiy "Classified", at the bottom - "Record of conversation by comrade N.S. Khrushchev not proofread."

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18 countries on disarmament: Ch. Stelle, consultant of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, A. Dean, Deputy Assistants to the US Secretary of State R. Davis and J. Grinfield, Deputy Assistant to US Secretary of Defense W. Bundy, as well as US Ambassador to the USSR F.D. Kohler.

N.S. Khrushchev says he is glad to welcome D. Rusk and his accompanying persons who arrived for the noble cause that interests all humanity - signing the Treaty on banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. The ban on testing is, figuratively speaking, a medical prescription. If someone opposes this, such a person should undergo psychoanalysis, since they do not understand that it is harmful to their health.

D. Rusk thanks for the warm reception given to him, and also for N.S. Khrushchev postponing his vacation to be present at the Treaty signing.

He conveys warm greetings to N.S. Khrushchev from Kennedy and says that he eagerly awaits conversations with N.S. Khrushchev and members of the Soviet government.

He notes that if everyone from the USA who sought to be present at the signing had come to the Soviet Union, it would have been perceived as an invasion.

N.S. Khrushchev says that we welcome such "invaders." He thanks D. Rusk for the kind words and expresses gratitude to Kennedy for his good wishes and for the correct assessment of this historic act.

This should be considered an initiative undertaken in the right direction, creating a good environment for solving major problems.

You and we represent antagonistic state systems, we have often used and use expressions of hostility towards each other and we should solve issues step by step. After all, even to fell an oak tree, one must first notch and saw it. A mother, teaching her child to walk, doesn't push him in the back, but teaches him to take small steps, otherwise he will bruise his nose or even his head.

Each such act of international significance gradually strengthens trust between us, leads to creating a favorable atmosphere. We highly value the actions of the President and the US government, the Senate and all American citizens who support the Treaty.

In our time, war can no longer be a tool for resolving disputes between states. Therefore, attention must be paid to developing the economy, culture, everything that meets human needs and brings joy. We must end the arms race that leads to catastrophe.

Of course, our social systems are different and we cannot convince each other on this issue.

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D. Rusk expresses his agreement that the systems are indeed different, however, there are also common interests, for example, the aspiration for peace. Perhaps the Treaty will serve as a starting point for solving other tasks. Both the USA and the Soviet Union have many internal tasks. For instance, the United States needs to build schools for 500 thousand students, reconstruct several major cities. The Soviet government also has much to do and we know, says D. Rusk, what attention N.S. Khrushchev pays to improving the welfare of the Soviet people.

N.S. Khrushchev says that indeed our systems are incompatible and even if we were lying side by side in graves, we would still take different positions. But we need to build a better life for the living, not graves. We must do everything to end the arms race, not stop at what has been achieved, but move forward and forward. There are several issues that I presented to Harriman, says N.S. Khrushchev, as well as in public speeches. These should be discussed.

For us, the German question is fundamental. Until we resolve it, we will constantly, like hedgehogs, be pricking each other with needles. It's understandable that each side wants to resolve it in their own way. It's clear to us what kind of victory it would be for the US President, Congress, and supporters of capitalism if they managed to liquidate the GDR. Well, what if the opposite happened? If the FRG became a socialist country and joined the socialist camp? However, in current conditions, both scenarios are unrealistic, and this issue cannot be resolved without war. We are experienced people and have fought ourselves. Isn't it time for us to seek acceptable solutions? We need to move the cart of events from military rails to peace rails, i.e., resolve issues in a way that acknowledges the actual situation.

One shouldn't listen too closely to Adenauer and your other allies who are striving for one specific goal. We also have allies, - continues N.S. Khrushchev. Unfortunately, some of them don't understand the real situation in the modern world. Time will pass and they will, of course, realize they were wrong.

D. Rask acknowledges that the German question has fundamental importance for relations between our countries, and he, Rask, would not want to rule out that some mutual understanding could be reached on it. The German question is important for the Soviet Union and USA for historical reasons. The USA has twice participated in wars in Europe and is interested in stability in this region.

D. Rask further says that he is ready to discuss with Soviet representatives the possibilities of finding a mutually acceptable solution during his stay in Moscow.

According to D. Rask, recently there has been some easing of the situation in central Europe. Relations have improved, particularly trade relations, between the FRG and countries lying to the east of it.

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N.S. Khrushchev notes that D. Rask does not want to pronounce the word "socialist," but calls these countries "lying to the east." We will teach you to pronounce this word, says N.S. Khrushchev.

D. Rask remarks that this is not difficult, as some people call the USA a socialist country.

N.S. Khrushchev says it would be interesting to look at such a person.

D. Rask says that he recently visited Yugoslavia and got the impression that in the USA, the state participates in economic life to a greater extent than in that country. Rask notes that the term "incentives" has recently been in use in socialist countries.

N.S. Khrushchev says that there were indeed disputes with some communists about moral and material factors. We believe that during the transition period, the influence of these factors should intertwine.

Regarding capitalism, in its time it was a progressive phenomenon compared to feudalism. But socialism, communism inevitably comes to replace capitalism, which is the highest social formation compared to all previous formations. Without capitalism, there would be no Marx, and in this case, humanity might not have gone beyond the legends of Christ and Campanella's dreams.

D. Rask says that he heard about the content of conversations between the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Seaborg, Ministers Udall and Freeman with N.S. Khrushchev and other Soviet officials. They believe there is a wide range of issues on which agreement could be reached. In infantry, when advancing on a broad front, sometimes an obstacle appears in some place, but the advance as a whole does not stop because of this. Similarly, both the USA and the Soviet Union could cooperate in space exploration, atomic energy, medicine, without forgetting about fundamental issues. Rask expresses desire to discuss such issues during his stay in Moscow.

N.S. Khrushchev says that we are ready to discuss even larger issues.

D. Rask notes that, not being authorized to speak on behalf of the Senate, he would like to ask Senator Fulbright to say a few words.

D. Fulbright says that he had the opportunity to meet with N.S. Khrushchev four years ago in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. Fulbright says that he is not a diplomat but a politician and believes that all disagreements can be overcome, as it was in the case of disagreements between the North and South USA. The goals of the Soviet and American governments are the same, only the methods of achieving them are different. Both governments strive to improve people's lives. It is thought that the differences between the two countries are not as great as they seem. After all, some accuse the Soviet Union of developing capitalism there.

N.S. Khrushchev says that the philosophy of the USA and Soviet Union is different. The US government declares that its ultimate goal is to ensure the welfare of the people. However, in the USA, capitalist ownership and such social conditions prevail, where everyone is for themselves and all against one. And we are achieving rapid development of our economy based on socialist ownership under such social conditions where one is for all and all for one.

Nevertheless, we are ready to take the good that exists in the USA. Lenin highly valued American entrepreneurship and business acumen, and Stalin also spoke positively about it.

When US Minister Udall visited here, he noted that Americans have something to learn from Soviet hydroelectric power plant builders. After all, in our time, we learned this from American specialists. So both teachers and students proved worthy of each other.

Now one of the main tasks is to raise agriculture in the Soviet Union. We intend to do much in the next 7 years, and the final solution will be achieved by 1980. N.S. Khrushchev says that his friend - capitalist Garst says that for agricultural development, the main thing is artificial fertilizers, and this requires money. Now we have this money. We are investing billions of rubles in the chemical industry, in the construction of plants producing artificial fertilizers, polyethylene, terylene, etc. Some thought that if the arms race was imposed on the Soviet Union, it would not catch up with the USA economically. To think so is unwise; this race has not stopped the development of the USSR's national economy.

At the end of the conversation, N.S. Khrushchev invites Rusk to visit him in the Caucasus. D. Rusk thanks for the invitation.

From the Soviet side, the following comrades attended the conversation: A.A. Gromyko, V.V. Kuznetsov, M.N. Smirnovsky, A.F. Dobrynin and L.M. Zamyatin.

Recorded by O. Alennikov.

RGANI. F. 52. Op. 1. D. 583. L. 151-157. Copy (3 copies). Typewritten text.

■4 Record of Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and US Secretary of State D. Rusk

Gagra August 9, 1963

Record Of Conversation

between com. N.S. KHRUSHCHEV and US Secretary of State D. RUSK

a On the first page at the top, marked in simple pencil "to Shuyskomy." b Document note: "Record of conversation with com. Khrushchev N.S. was not reviewed."

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After exchanging greetings, Rusk tells N.S. Khrushchev that he and his accompanying persons had just returned from Leningrad yesterday. He very much liked this historic city of great traditions.

N.S. Khrushchev notes that Leningrad is a city of our revolutionary glory, a symbol of the Soviet people's resilience. Leningrad is a city of remarkable cultural values. After the war, continues N.S. Khrushchev, we managed to rebuild Leningrad and make it even more beautiful than it was before the war. Recently, we have achieved great success in restoring and expanding cities. For example, currently each year in Moscow so many houses are being built that, as calculated, it amounts to 1/3 of Moscow's

pre-revolutionary housing stock. In other words, every three years we build a new Moscow.

Rusk says that at the beginning of the conversation, he would first like to express feelings of deep satisfaction regarding his visit to the USSR. This was his first trip to the Soviet Union, and he is happy that it coincided with such an event as the signing of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Tests. We, continues Rusk, extremely highly value the friendliness and hospitality shown to us. We are grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, to your colleagues and to all Soviet people for the remarkable reception. President Kennedy has sincerely expressed hope that the signing of this Treaty will be the first step toward easing tensions and a solid foundation for improving relations between the USA and USSR. It is known that Soviet-American relations are of primary importance not only for the Soviet and American peoples but for the whole world.

Rusk notes that he is ready to discuss with N.S. Khrushchev all issues of interest to both sides.

N.S. Khrushchev says that in the Soviet Union they also feel satisfaction regarding the signing of the Treaty and expresses hope that the American guests have felt that the people and government of the USSR approve this agreement. We highly value the efforts undertaken by the US President and Secretary of State to achieve agreement on this issue. This Treaty is such a matter from which neither side loses anything; on the contrary, our countries benefit from this, as do other countries of the East and West, and indeed the whole world.

We would consider it very useful, continues N.S. Khrushchev, for our peoples and for the whole world not to stop at what has been achieved, but to strive to develop agreements on other issues. This could be a precedent for the US President to come to Moscow to sign a new agreement. It would be a good combination – the signing of the agreement and his return visit, which he should pay us, whereby the signing of the agreement would create a favorable background for displaying our people's traditional hospitality. In principle, there is a possibility to agree on such issues from which no one loses and everyone only gains.

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Rusk says that, as he believes, President Kennedy would like to visit the Soviet Union, and he spoke about this possibility when the appropriate circumstances arise. When a favorable moment comes, such a trip could be made, and this will demonstrate genuine feelings of friendship between our peoples and will contribute to the development of Soviet-American relations. It is important to seek such a favorable moment and make efforts for its emergence.

N.S. Khrushchev says that he agrees with this and speaks in favor of concluding a non-aggression treaty. A treaty or pact of non-aggression between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO countries is like seltzer water, it changes nothing, no one gains or loses anything, but it has a refreshing effect on public opinion.

Rusk further notes that, as Harriman communicated to N.S. Khrushchev on President Kennedy's instruction, the United States is carefully studying this issue with their advisers. He, Rusk, told A.A. Gromyko that they have several questions regarding this pact, but in a broad sense, the ideas included in the project presented in Geneva are acceptable. The United States supports the provisions of the UN Charter, supports resolving disputed issues peacefully, through negotiations, not using force and not threatening to use force. The American side's questions about the pact mainly concern the purpose of this pact and how it can actually help improve the situation.

Rusk assures N.S. Khrushchev that the United States will consider this proposal most seriously and without delay and notes that he takes into account the Soviet side's statement that, in its opinion, matters

of form will not cause difficulties. In his opinion, the non-aggression pact does nothing more than the Kellogg-Briand Pact. If such a pact is concluded while there are a number of unresolved problems, the public will question the value of such a pact. Frankly speaking, Rusk notes, since there are currently a number of unresolved issues, we believe that the non-aggression pact would be better concluded after an agreement is reached on them, rather than at the beginning. There are such serious problems as Berlin and Germany, moreover, one might say that it will be difficult to conclude such a pact if the Laotian question is not finally settled. We, in particular, would also like to address the Laotian question. We believe that it is possible to eliminate this source of danger provided that the parties act in the spirit of the Geneva Agreements and if the USA and USSR work together.

Rusk further notes that his statements regarding the non-aggression pact are preliminary remarks, and they are now conducting thorough consultations with their allies to clearly understand their opinion on this issue, as it would hardly be useful if the USA and England expressed views that do not reflect the viewpoint of all their allies.

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Rusk adds that discussions are currently underway in America regarding the nuclear test ban treaty, and it will take two to three weeks for the Treaty to be ratified by the Senate²². Therefore, he asks to understand that if the USA remains silent for some time on the non-aggression pact, it is only because they want to make maximum efforts to secure the highest number of positive votes for the Test Ban Treaty now.

N.S. Khrushchev says that we understand this and in this case, we are in no hurry.

N.S. Khrushchev continues: You raised the question about the sequence of measures. We also like this point of view - first a series of measures, and then signing the non-aggression pact. We would also prefer to resolve the main issues affecting our relations, tackle the difficult but actually simple questions - signing the German peace treaty and resolving the West Berlin issue on this basis. These are the main problems requiring their solution and, so to speak, "thorny" problems.

In our time, we had a questionnaire survey of institution employees and they tell such a case that to the question: "do you believe in God?" one employee answered: "not at work, but at home - I do." It's the same with the peace treaty - if you ask one on one: are you for the peace treaty? They answer confidentially - yes, but don't want to speak about it publicly. When in conversation with Eisenhower I raised the question of the German peace treaty²³, I did not meet opposition from him. In this case, he thought the same as de Gaulle, who proved to me that he was not against the peace treaty²⁴, but only for Western Germany remaining in the alliance of Western countries.

I told him that this is a question that the West Germans themselves must decide. De Gaulle even stated that it's good that there are two Germanies, and it would be even better to have three Germanies, and generally there's no need to hurry with resolving this question, let it remain as it is. This is, of course, an incorrect position. The peoples must decide their own fate.

N.S. Khrushchev further notes that he asked Eisenhower why the USA is arming West Germany, after all, it's dangerous. Eisenhower replied that Germany competes with America economically and competes quite successfully. If West Germany is free from armament expenses, it will become an even more dangerous competitor to the USA, so it's advantageous for them to arm Germany.

As for de Gaulle's position, it must be said that, strange as it may seem, he has gone further than all Western countries on the question of borders and publicly stated that he recognizes the German borders²⁵, while others only whisper about this.

If we analyze, continues N.S. Khrushchev, who in NATO countries opposes the peace treaty, it becomes clear that only Adenauer does. De Gaulle opposes it only in form, but in essence, he is for the treaty. He does this because he thinks it will help in his struggle with America; therefore he seeks a strong state

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in Europe that it could rely on, and is betting on Adenauer, i.e. engaging in political speculation. This is one of the consequences of imperialism's degeneration, its unresolvable contradictions, but I wouldn't want to delve deeper into this.

Regarding the position of the British government, it can be said that the conservatives are also for a peace treaty, but don't want to declare this to avoid disrupting the Western orchestra. The Labour Party has long stated that they consider our position on this issue reasonable. Spaak told me, and he knows well the opinion of those NATO countries where the so-called workers' parties are in power, that they are also for a peace treaty. Denmark, Norway, Holland, Luxembourg and others are not against the treaty. Thus, West Germany remains, and France, which does this in the interests of its struggle for leadership in Europe, to push out US political influence from Europe and take this place, but it is weak and wants to achieve this by relying on West Germany. I believe that the US government's position is similar to England's, and if it weren't for such political speculations by France, the United States could have proceeded with signing the peace treaty. It's also clear that there is a certain influence from Adenauer here. Strange as it may be, it turns out that Adenauer has become a figure determining international policy. He imposes his views, his aggressive course directed against socialist countries. It turns out that the defeated are leading the victors.

If we look at our and your position, NATO's position, you essentially acknowledge the conclusion that war cannot change the existing borders established after World War II. But this needs to be formalized publicly, and the peace treaty pursues exactly this goal. In the West, some want to maintain the Cold War, but this is dangerous. Now, 10 years after Dulles called for pushing back socialism in Europe, you are beginning to realize you were wrong. The borders must be recognized legally. They tell us - we need to wait. But it's hard to say what will happen in five to ten years. The world changes quickly. Undesirable political events may occur, people may lose patience and hope, and Eastern European countries may proceed with unilateral signing of the treaty. We have said and continue to say that we would welcome the opportunity to sign the treaty together, but we may be forced to sign the treaty unilaterally. You state that this will lead to war, but we think Americans will have more common sense than stupidity. What sense is there, really, for Americans to wage war in defense of Adenauer's interests, who, by the way, may die soon, as we are all mortal.

Rusk says that he would like to make several general observations. He was left with a deep impression from his trip to the Soviet Union and from what he saw of how the Soviet people work. He traveled across America from San Francisco to New York and knows how the American people work. There is no doubt that both the American people and

38and the Soviet people want to work most productively and want peace. The governments of the USA and USSR must give their peoples this opportunity.

Rask further notes that, in his opinion, only Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy truly understand what war is. There are, of course, other people who know the technical details well, but the responsibility for the fate of peace lies with these two leaders. Therefore, it is necessary to strive to seek and find solutions on as many issues as possible. War in our time is a terrible phenomenon. President Kennedy recently in one of his speeches quoted to the American people N.S. Khrushchev's statements about the true nature of modern war.

Rask goes on to say that history has connected both the USSR and USA with Germany. This, of course, affects the Soviet Union more, which suffered significantly more from Hitler's forces. Since the Soviet Union and USA fought Hitler together, they must not allow the German question to divide them. As for the peace treaty, the USA is concerned not by the idea of a peace treaty itself, but by the circumstance that it may lead to ossification of the current situation.

In 1954, the Western powers solemnly declared that they would not attempt to change existing borders by force²⁸. True, this was done for another reason, but this solemn obligation remains in force. The USA deeply regrets that the USSR does not agree with their point of view. They ask to believe what they are saying. They hope that the USSR will agree that to resolve the German question on a permanent basis, it must be linked to the desires of the interested peoples. However, Rask cannot imagine how East Germans could express their will. According to Rask, if the USA and USSR divide the people of West and East Germany without their consent and leave, this will simply sow seeds of discord and not eliminate the danger of war in the future. The German people must organize their own destiny.

We agree, Rask continues, that Germany should not have national nuclear power. Our position is the same on this. We believe there are already enough nuclear powers. As you know, we pursue exactly such a policy, and this has led to our relations with France becoming very strained. We do not want Germans to have nuclear weapons, either of their own production or transferred to them by others.

Let's assume that our relations will continue to calm down and improve. This requires making certain efforts, allowing more contacts, communication not only between West and East Germany, but also between the West and socialist countries. As you can see, Rask jokes, I have already learned to use this word. Already now we can say there are signs of improvement in the situation. The situation which seemed difficult two or three years ago is now improving. I also believe we can achieve progress in solving the disarmament problem. There are measures on which we can

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to reach agreements in the near future, to conclude certain agreements, and this will provide substantial assistance in solving disarmament problems and improve the situation regarding relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. It is difficult to count on comprehensive, decisive disarmament measures, but agreement can be reached on a number of issues. This will allow us to gain momentum towards solving the disarmament problem. Whatever might be resolved regarding agreements in Europe, everything still mainly depends on solving the disarmament problem, and if this is accomplished, it will be a fundamental improvement for both the capitalist West and socialist East.

It seems to me that the governments existing today have inherited the burden of post-war period problems. Each side brings the past into their approach to German and Berlin issues. Immediately after the war, we withdrew our troops from East Germany's territory and moved some units into West Berlin. We did this in the interests of reaching agreement, although at the time some thought that such a solution might lead to complications, and there were voices suggesting we should block the corridor to West Berlin. We did not insist on this before the Soviet government, as it could have been interpreted as a lack of trust in the Soviet Union, our military ally during those years. Then we experienced the blockade, later there was an agreement on access routes, and we proceeded from the position that trust in the Soviet government must be maintained. We still believe that we must seek ways to strengthen such trust. Various measures need to be implemented in humanitarian areas, in trade, etc. This will strengthen trust and increase hope for the future. It seems to me that you and we have now taken on significant responsibility in resolving the German question, and our presence in West Berlin has led to stability, not the opposite. We don't know

who and what could happen there if you and we had not taken responsibility for maintaining peace in this part of the world.

N.S. Khrushchev emphasizes the necessity of signing a peace treaty. This is an inevitable act, natural after the end of the war.

I agree, continues N.S. Khrushchev, with many of your reasonable arguments. However, we disagree that the treaty signing should be postponed. If there is no treaty, friction will remain in our relations. The GDR cannot agree that Americans use communications through its territory without paying for it. Let's say the GDR cuts your telegraph cables. After all, you don't pay for this. And the GDR has every right to do this.

You encouraged West Germany not to pay us reparations, even those that were agreed upon in Potsdam. This particularly concerns the dismantling of certain enterprises. West Germany stopped paying us reparations, and this, of course,

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became one of the reasons for friction. While the GDR and countries like Hungary and Finland paid us all reparations, I repeat, West Germany, the richest country in Europe and directly responsible for the war, did not pay reparations, relying on veto.

We agree with your point of view and accordingly stipulate in the peace treaty that the path for reunification of the two German states remains open, and that the parties who signed the peace treaty will facilitate the resolution of the question of German reunification, whereby this should be subject to agreement between the German states. We, of course, have different positions. We sympathize with the political system in the GDR, and you - with the system in the FRG. This is natural. But you cannot change the system in the GDR just as we cannot change the system in West Germany. Such matters are decided by the people of these two states themselves.

N.S. Khrushchev jokingly remarks that American "corns" are on GDR territory and they should be removed from there, and we will help with this. This needs to be done now, without waiting until they start stepping on them. By the way, says N.S. Khrushchev, the expression about corns belongs to Lippmann, that intelligent person of yours.

Rusk says that Western countries withdrew in their time from Saxony and Thuringia, from territories of several hundred square kilometers.

N.S. Khrushchev says that we are not planning to seize West Berlin. We simply don't need it. Let it be a third German state with special status, whose sovereignty should be respected by all countries.

Rusk notes that American "corns" create temptation due to special geographical conditions, but this temptation should be restrained, as it would be quite difficult for the United States to just apologize if someone steps on these corns.

He further says that he attaches certain importance to N.S. Khrushchev's remark that on the question of German reunification, the people should be consulted. In his opinion, the people of East and West Germany should be consulted separately. Rusk emphasizes that he is not raising this question now, he is asking in general whether it would be possible to learn the opinion of people from different parts of Germany separately. It is important for him to clarify the Soviet Union's view on how the opinion of East German population could be learned, and he asks this not for short-term tactical considerations, but from the perspective of long-term stability on the continent. The very same continent, Rusk jokingly remarks, which, according to de Gaulle's definition, extends from the Atlantic to the Urals.

N.S. Khrushchev says that, in his opinion, this question cannot be a subject of discussion now. In both parts of Germany, there are governments and parliaments, elections have been held multiple times and, in particular, elections to the People's Chamber of the GDR will soon be held on the most democratic basis. Is there any need in this connection to somehow further poll the people?

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I would like to ask further, continues N.S. Khrushchev, when you and we recognized the government of Ayub Khan, was the opinion of the people of Pakistan sought? After all, Ayub Khan removed the government that was elected on a democratic basis. Did you ask the people of Guatemala after the president was expelled from there and the legitimate government was overthrown with the help of American intelligence? Did you ask the people of South Vietnam, where Diem carries out brutal repressions against the population? If you ask the people, you will be convinced that the people do not want Diem's regime and he would have to leave immediately without you. So let's not raise such questions. We can also recall that the United States more than fifty years ago "voted" by war against England, and we did the same when we drove out the White Guards and their American, English, French, Polish, and other allies. People fight according to their own laws and methods. We can also remind you that you recognized Franco's regime, which overthrew the legitimate government of Spain. Who chose this bandit government that was imposed on the people of Spain? And such governments can be found in abundance.

Rusk notes that there is a significant difference in those cases where the fall of governments was an internal matter. One could develop quite lively debates on this issue, since the American side also has its own view on certain governments in different countries. But he, Rusk, does not intend to delve into this question. He understands that N.S. Khrushchev has his own position on this matter, and can only regret that a common language cannot be found.

Rusk jokingly remarks that he is not an optimist in this case and does not hope that this problem can be solved now, at this table, although that would be good.

N.S. Khrushchev says that he has an unpleasant question: according to the Geneva agreements, elections were supposed to be held in South Vietnam, however, two years prescribed by the agreements have long passed, and there are still no elections, they were disrupted by the USA. In this case, the American side shows a clearly mercantile approach – it declares what is beneficial to it as democratic and proper process.

N.S. Khrushchev further notes that, apparently, this question needs to be set aside and talk about a more harmless matter – trade. We would like to purchase a large amount of chemical equipment in America. If we were given the opportunity to negotiate with American industrialists, we would come to an agreement with them.

Rusk says that Minister Freeman spoke to him about his conversation with N.S. Khrushchev on these issues. Besides that, he, Rusk, discussed this topic with President Kennedy. As A.A. Gromyko has already said, the American side is considering the question of selling chemical plants to the Soviet Union. It is ready to discuss this. Speaking about trade, two groups of goods can be distinguished: those covered by acts of Congress, and those

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which such acts do not apply to. According to Rusk, chemical plants do not require any legislative acts from Congress. If the executive authorities can resolve this issue, he will definitely address it upon

returning to Washington.

Rask further notes that N.S. Khrushchev spoke about how trade leads to peace. He, Rask, also believes that those who trade want peace, while those who don't trade don't want peace. He is convinced that as the situation improves, trade will develop. Socialist countries trade quite successfully with Western Europe and Japan. Their turnover amounts to 5.5 billion dollars. This is a huge figure. The USA, however, has insignificant trade with socialist countries. The point is that if the situation worsens and pressure is applied in certain issues, for example, regarding Berlin, many people will question whether trade really leads to peace. Thus, it can apparently be considered that trade itself does not remove tension, but leads to its softening. He agrees that trade is one of the indicators of good relations, and the United States is glad that trade channels are opening between Western Europe and socialist states. He would be very pleased if such channels opened in trade with the USA.

N.S. Khrushchev says that trade is not about lending. No one trades with another to make a loan, but trades when it's profitable. Trade restrictions are, of course, determined by political considerations, not considerations of profit. Countries that have laws restricting trade are not guided by good interests. We advocate free trade between all countries. It would be good, continues N.S. Khrushchev, if you could prove that you also strive for this and convince Ambassador Kohler, who maintains cold war positions on Soviet-American trade issues and opposes the development of our trade, to act in a different direction.

By the way, our trade organizations are not particularly eager to place orders for chemical equipment in the USA. They explain this by saying that American equipment is the most expensive in the world, and we will place orders in other Western countries if we can agree on a suitable price. We are ready to place very large orders in the USA if American industrialists want this, but subject to firm credit and if prices correspond to world prices. We are not extending our hand, we want to trade on equal terms.

Rask notes that, as he heard from American industrialists, Soviet trade circles enjoy a very good reputation.

He further says that he will definitely consider the issue of chemical plants upon returning to Washington and, possibly, US legislative bodies will return to those measures that are inhibiting in relation to providing credits. As for Ambassador Kohler, he acts according to instructions. He, Rask, knows that Kohler

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had received "bruises" from Congress at the time for his attempts to liberalize trade relations with socialist countries.

In conclusion, he would like to say that, as A.A. Gromyko already mentioned, the American side would like to continue discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington on trade issues and try to develop solutions favorable for the development of trade between the USA and USSR.

N.S. Khrushchev says that he mentioned commercial, not government credit, although we would welcome government credit as well, but that's already a matter of politics. In any case, we want to trade on an equal basis. We want to buy what suits us at fair prices corresponding to world market prices.

Rusk jokingly remarks that this is what they call "yankee-style trading," when partners trade fiercely but still find a solution that satisfies both sides and benefits everyone.

N.S. Khrushchev says that he remembers that, in particular, we had good trade relations with the Dupont company. He is well aware that a number of American industrialists would gladly trade with us if the US government didn't prevent them. These industrialists approached the relevant American authorities and

were dissatisfied after receiving rejection to their request for permission to trade with us; they are dissatisfied with US government policy on trade issues. They believe, and rightly so, that while we don't have trade with the USA, other countries like FRG, France, Japan will find their way to the vast Soviet Union market.

Rusk says that he would like to say a few words regarding Laos. The American side is concerned about the situation in Laos. America attaches great importance to the Soviet Union and USA working together in support of the Geneva Agreements, which are based on the personal agreement between N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy reached in Vienna. It is known that the USA reluctantly accepted the terms of the Geneva Agreements and the proposal for a coalition government headed by Souvanna Phouma. Nevertheless, the USA loyally supported the coalition government and Premier Souvanna Phouma, the actions of the International Control Commission and the Geneva Agreements. The United States is very concerned that Souvanna Phouma has encountered major difficulties with Pathet Lao. This may lead to the collapse of the Geneva Agreements. According to the USA, this issue is important not only for maintaining peace in Southeast Asia but also for maintaining trust between the USA and USSR. The Soviet ambassador in Vientiane told the American ambassador that he has no contacts with Pathet Lao, and his influence on these forces is declining. In this regard, it can be recalled that the American side also had difficulties regarding contacts with certain elements in Laos. He, Rusk, hopes that the American and Soviet ambassadors will work in close cooperation with the British

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as co-chairs, and will facilitate compliance with the agreements, striving to resolve emerging differences. According to Rusk, it would be an encouraging factor for the cause of peace if the Soviet Union, England, USA, and other participants of the Geneva agreements would continue to provide public support for the Geneva agreements. He also hopes that the Soviet Union can influence the Polish representative in the International Control Commission to cooperate with the ICC and show a positive and constructive attitude toward emerging issues. We hope, Rusk continues, that the Soviet Union will clearly demonstrate that it supports the independence and neutrality of Laos. I would like to add that, as President Kennedy indicated, we have no ambitious designs regarding Laos. Anyone who has seen the Laotians in their country would not want them as allies. It must be said that these are strange people who have their own peculiar approach to all issues. We advocate for Laotians to resolve their own issues. I want to remind that President Kennedy, upon coming to power, showed certain courage and changed American policy regarding Laos, which was not always as it is now.

N.S. Khrushchev notes that we no longer want to deal with Laotian issues. We believe we have achieved the goals regarding which an agreement was reached with President Kennedy in Vienna. In Laos, a neutral government was created headed by Souvanna Phouma, who pursued a policy of neutrality. Now they want to fight among themselves. And what should we do? Send troops there? The Americans have good experience in this matter. They sent troops to South Vietnam to, so to speak, support Diem's pants, and these American soldiers are being quietly killed. We adhere to a different policy, we don't want to interfere in Laos's affairs and believe that the people should figure everything out themselves. There is their own government, and we cannot impose our recommendations, especially since we're not being asked about this. They might simply ask - who are you to interfere in matters that don't concern you. We believe we have fulfilled our functions and do not intend to undertake any new measures. There are three forces led by three princes, let them fight among themselves and come to their senses. I don't want to get a headache because of Laos, I have my own obligations to my people. We have neither troops nor observers in Laos, only an ambassador who listens to what the Laotian government tells him and relays

this to us. We believe we have fulfilled our obligations well, and now, apparently, the second stage has begun, so let them fight among themselves, maybe they'll wise up.

N.S. Khrushchev jokingly remarks that good hosts save the sweet dish for the end of dinner, while Rusk brought bitter pills at the end of the conversation. N.S. Khrushchev suggests continuing the conversation at the dinner table.

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Rask asks permission to say a few words to conclude the discussion of this issue and says that, as he understood, N.S. Khrushchev believes that the Geneva Agreements have been fulfilled. The USA is concerned that if the great powers who signed the Geneva Agreements remain silent, it will create an impression that they are not interested in the situation in Laos, and then the parties in Laos might think they have the support of certain great powers. Of course, it is difficult to understand the Laotians who today might fight among themselves, and tomorrow participate in a joint water festival. It seems to him that the Soviet Union, England, France, USA and other countries seriously want to achieve agreement and harmony in Laos. He would like to appeal once again to the Soviet government to publicly express its support for the Geneva Agreements. It should also be taken into account that the agreement on Laos was one of the most productive agreements between the USA and USSR in recent times.

At the end of the conversation, when N.S. Khrushchev noted that he would apparently go bear hunting in Romania in autumn, Rask said that the State Department gave strict instructions to American polar hunters to keep further away from "Soviet white bears" in the Arctic, referring to the Soviet note of protest regarding the violation of the Soviet border in the Alaska region by "American hunters".

The conversation lasted 2 hours 30 minutes.

Present were: from the American side - Ambassador for Special Missions L. Thompson, US Ambassador to USSR F. Kohler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State R. Davis, State Department officer A. Akalovsky; from the Soviet side - comrades A.A. Gromyko, A.F. Dobrynin.

Recorded by: Yu. Vinogradov.

RGANI. F. 52. Op. 1. D. 583. L. 160-177. Copy. Typewritten text.

■5 Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko to CC CPSU regarding the draft message from N.S. Khrushchev to US President J.F. Kennedy

■ 2442/GS August 16, 1963

Secret. Copy ■2

Cc Cpsu

The USSR MFA presents a draft letter from comrade N.S. Khrushchev to US President J. Kennedy, which would be expedient to transmit through our ambassador comrade A.F. Dobrynin, who is returning to Washington in the coming days.

46Signal copy

Draft resolution attached42. Please review.

A. Gromyko

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 322. L. 56. Copy (2 copies). Typewritten text.

****No. 6****

Resolution of the Presidium of the CC CPSU "On the letter of comrade Khrushchev N.S. to US President J. Kennedy"

No. P111/6 August 16, 1963 43

Approve the draft letter of comrade Khrushchev N.S. to US President J. Kennedy (attached).

Instruct USSR Ambassador to USA comrade Dobrynin A.F. to deliver the letter to President Kennedy.

[Attachment] To item 6 of protocol No. 111

Dear Mr. President a,

Taking advantage of our Ambassador A. Dobrynin's return to Washington, I would like to express some thoughts regarding the situation developing now after the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Tests was signed in Moscow.

I think both our governments feel satisfaction about the signing of this Treaty. And it is understandable - after all, the Treaty is such a matter from which none of the parties loses anything; on the contrary, both our countries and other countries of the world, all humanity equally benefit from such an agreement.

A visible evidence of support for this good initiative is, in particular, the fact that immediately after the Treaty was signed by representatives of the USA, USSR and England, many other countries not only declared their readiness to join this Treaty but have already put their signatures under it⁴⁴. The Soviet government is now receiving a stream of letters, messages, congratulations literally from all corners of the world. Apparently, the White House mail is no less busy. This once again shows that the public worldwide has received considerable satisfaction and welcomes the agreement

a On the first page above the main text is printed: "To His Excellency Mr. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America Washington."

47Signal exemplar

of three governments, which not only cleans the atmosphere of the Earth from harmful precipitation, but in a certain sense also makes the international political atmosphere cleaner. All this strengthens the hopes of peoples for further détente, creates prospects for resolving other unresolved issues.

As far as I can judge from your statements, Mr. President, as well as from the statements made here by your Secretary of State Mr. Rusk, you share our conviction that now it is important not to stop at what has been achieved, but to take further steps from the good start we have made. Of course, the path ahead will not be easy. However, we must follow it persistently and steadfastly, moving neither hastily nor slowly, consistently working towards solutions to pressing international problems, which would again serve the interests not only of our two countries but of the whole world.

There is hardly any need to list all these problems again here. They have been mentioned by us repeatedly. I mentioned them in my last conversation with Mr. Rusk. I would only like to emphasize that these problems await their solution.

And it is better to solve them without delay, as they say, without putting them on the back burner, to solve them right now, in the calmer and therefore more favorable environment that has developed, rather than under other circumstances that may always arise, since serious unresolved problems remain.

Mr. Rusk has already, of course, informed you about his stay in the Soviet Union and our conversations with him. We believe that the Secretary of State's visit to us was useful. In a short period, Mr. Rusk managed, besides Moscow, to visit Leningrad - a city of great historical traditions, as well as the Black Sea coast. As I understood, he was satisfied with his trip. I was told that the senators who were present at the signing of the Treaty were also satisfied with the trip. I don't know to what extent this may facilitate the Treaty's ratification by the U.S. Senate, but the fact that they visited us and met, among others, with our deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet is, in our opinion, a positive factor. We have always believed that such contacts contribute to better mutual understanding.

During conversations with the Secretary of State, we had the opportunity to exchange views on a known range of issues, including matters directly related to Soviet-American relations. Naturally, improved relations between our countries would have a beneficial effect and would facilitate the search for solutions to fundamental international problems that currently divide us.

Mr. Rusk expressed his wish after his report to you, Mr. President, to continue the exchange of views on all such matters. We agree with this, and moreover, consider the continuation of exchange of views necessary.

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I, my wife Nina Petrovna and our entire family send greetings and best wishes to you, your spouse and family.

Please accept, Mr. President, our sincere condolences regarding your loss - the death of your newborn son.

Respectfully,

N. Khrushchev

August 17, 1963

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 322. L. 53-55. Copy (2 copies). Typewritten text.

****No. 7****

Note from First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.V. Kuznetsov to the CC CPSU regarding the draft message from N.S. Khrushchev to US President J.F. Kennedy and Prime Minister of Great Britain H. Macmillan

****No. 2873/GS October 5, 1963****

Secret. Copy No. 1

To Cc Cpsu

In accordance with instructions, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents draft messages from Comrade Khrushchev N.S. to US President J.F. Kennedy and Prime Minister of Great Britain H. Macmillan regarding the entry into force of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.

The Treaty will enter into force after the exchange of instruments of ratification, which is scheduled to take place on October 10, 1963.

Draft resolution is attached.

Please review. V. Kuznetsov

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 350. L. 22. Original. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph - blue ballpoint pen.

At the top of the note in the left corner marked in black ink "For. Khrushchev 7/X-1963"

49Signal Copy

****No. 8****

Resolution of the Presidium of the CC CPSU "On messages from Comrade Khrushchev N.S. to US President Kennedy and Prime Minister of Great Britain Macmillan regarding the entry into force of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in Three Environments"

No. ■118/25 October 9, 1963

1. To approve the text of messages from Comrade Khrushchev N.S. to US President J. Kennedy and Prime Minister of Great Britain H. Macmillan (attached).
2. To publish the messages from Comrade Khrushchev N.S. in the press.

[Attachment] To point 25 of prot[ocol] No. 118

Dear Mr. President (Prime Minister)*, Today in three capitals - Moscow, Washington and London, the final act has been completed in connection with the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water - the ratification instruments of the original participants of this treaty - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain have been deposited for safekeeping.

Thus, the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests has entered into force. This is, undoubtedly, a momentous event in international life that will bring joy to all peoples.

Together with the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain, the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests has been signed by more than one hundred states. It can be said with certainty that this treaty has found ardent response and approval among all people of good will.

Our governments have repeatedly noted that the test ban treaty represents a document of great international significance, and hope was expressed that the conclusion of this treaty would have a positive effect on the international climate, on relations between states. Indeed, the conclusion

* On the first page under the main text is printed: "TO HIS EXCELLENCY

Mr. John F. Kennedy, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Washington

(To His Excellency

Mr. Harold Macmillan,

Prime Minister Of Great Britain

London)".

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The treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing has breathed fresh air into the international atmosphere, showing that, no matter how complex modern problems are, no matter how great the differences between the social systems of our states, we can find mutually acceptable solutions in the interests of all humanity, in the interests of maintaining peace, if we show the necessary aspiration for this.

However, of course, the agreement on the prohibition of experimental nuclear explosions, with all its importance for nations, does not by itself solve the main international problem of our era - it does not eliminate the danger of war. Now it is necessary - and our governments have spoken in favor of this - to develop the achieved success further, to seek solutions to other pressing international issues.

These issues are well known; they are brought forward by life itself, by all development of world events. These include strengthening security in Europe, including the elimination of remnants of World War II, concluding a non-aggression pact between NATO countries and Warsaw Pact member states, creating nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world, preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons, prohibiting the placement of objects with nuclear weapons on board into orbit, measures to prevent sudden attack, and several other steps. Their implementation would contribute significantly to strengthening peace, improving international relations, would clear the path to universal and complete disarmament and, consequently, to freeing peoples from the threat of war.

The peoples expect that our governments will now show even more persistence and consistency in their further actions in the interests of strengthening peace. As for the Soviet government, invariably guided by the course toward peaceful coexistence of states, it is ready to make new efforts, to do everything in its power to ensure that the shift toward better international conditions, which emerged as a result of concluding the nuclear test ban treaty, becomes the beginning of a sharp turn toward broad international détente.

Allow me, Mr. President, to express hope that the United States government will, for its part, make an appropriate contribution to solving international problems required by the interests of reducing international tension and ensuring universal peace.

Respectfully,

N. Khrushchev

Moscow, Kremlin October 10, 1963

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 350. L. 19 Copy (2nd). Typewritten text. L. 20-21. Original. Typewritten text.

51Signal Copy

****No. 9****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to CC CPSU regarding the course of US President J.F. Kennedy's administration on relations with USSR after signing the Moscow Treaty

Spec. No. 1754 - 1765 October 22, 1963 at 50 Washington

Top Secret

Ex. No. 12

Urgent

To Cc Cpsu

Analysis of the course pursued by the Kennedy administration in matters of relations with the USSR since the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty, the exchange of views with US leadership conducted by A.A. Gromyko in New York and Washington on a wide range of issues⁵¹, as well as embassy observations of internal political developments in the USA, allow us, in our view, to express certain considerations regarding the Kennedy administration's position and our further tactical and strategic line in Soviet-American relations.

First. The development of our relations with the USA in the remaining period before the elections and after the elections will largely depend on how the pre-election struggle in the USA unfolds, and who will be the next president in 1964. Kennedy's main opponents are Senator Goldwater and Rockefeller⁵². In recent days, Nixon's figure has also emerged, who has not abandoned hope of running for president again⁵³. The main rival today is Goldwater, the mouthpiece of the most militant and reactionary circles in the USA who support and finance him. While previously the president's supporters predicted an easy victory over Goldwater should he be nominated by the Republican party, now Kennedy's closest circle in private conversations expresses certain concern about Goldwater's rapidly growing popularity. The latter is an experienced demagogue, playing on a few simple and catchy slogans (for example, reducing Washington's government interference in state affairs), which find response in various parts of the country, especially among politically unsophisticated broad segments of the population. The weak political consciousness of the masses in the USA remains a significant factor that must be

Footnotes

* On the first page at top there is a stamp "to N.S. Khrushchev"

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consider - after all, in the previous election, almost half of Americans voted for the obvious reactionary Nixon.

While harboring no great illusions about Kennedy himself, it appears undoubtable that his re-election as US President for a new term would be the most preferable option for us, since any possible Republican Party presidential candidate (not to mention figures like Goldwater or Nixon), due to the very logic of inter-party struggle in US conditions, will inevitably campaign from positions more right-wing than Kennedy's on issues of relations with the Soviet Union.

An important point in this connection - both from the perspective of characterizing the current Kennedy administration's line on questions of war and peace, and from the perspective of this moment's known binding influence on the future government policy - is Kennedy's already sufficiently defined intention at present to build his election campaign under the slogan of preserving peace and gradual normalization of the international situation. Kennedy's line consists of maximally utilizing the favorable situation in the country that developed as a result of the Moscow Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Tests (which he became convinced of during his recent trip through 12 western states) in the interests of strengthening his positions in the election campaign. Kennedy is interested in maintaining this favorable situation, although regarding further steps to reduce international tension, one should expect - taking into account internal and inter-party struggle - that the current administration will delay their discussion, in any case moving forward very cautiously.

A not unimportant factor for us regarding the future president is also the question of Cuba, since any new president will not be bound by the agreement between the heads of both governments that was reached during the Cuban crisis in October of last year. The personal relationships that have already developed between the heads of the USSR and USA governments also have certain significance.

Kennedy's position - in light of electoral factors - is quite complex at present. It is further aggravated by the circumstance that a general expansion of opposition forces against him is occurring here now, connected primarily with the problem of civil rights for the Negro population of the country. The point is that, having put forward under pressure from the stormy growth of the Negro movement a rather broad legislative program to ensure equal rights for Negroes with whites, Kennedy thereby definitively pushed away the southern wing of the Democratic Party, and also turned against himself certain other segments of the population, including among labor unions, which, consisting mostly of white workers, in purely self-interested considerations

53Special copy

do not support the demands of Negroes regarding equal pay for work, living in the same houses, etc., although they sometimes do not openly speak about it. The same segments of the population who were impressed by Kennedy's position on civil rights largely supported Kennedy in previous elections as well. Therefore, Kennedy can receive relatively few additional votes from this category of voters.

At the same time, the government's desire to pass the mentioned program through Congress significantly reduces, due to the opposition from Congress members - Southerners, the chances of passing another major government bill through Congress this year - on tax reduction, the adoption of which would give

Kennedy much more political dividends (Kennedy, as we know from his aides, plans to conduct his election campaign under the slogan: "Peace and prosperity," and tax reduction is important for economic revival in the country).

Kennedy has tactical difficulties as well: while the Republicans have not put forward a specific candidate, it is difficult for the president and his supporters to choose an effective tactical line for the election campaign, as they now have to disperse attention among several candidates. The latter, however, concentrate their criticism on one person - Kennedy. His aide Bundy told me about this. As a result, although most observers continue to believe that victory will ultimately remain with Kennedy, it is becoming increasingly clear now - and Kennedy himself understands this perfectly well - that the upcoming struggle will be far from as easy as it might have seemed some time ago, and that he has reasons to fear all kinds of unexpected developments, especially if he makes any missteps from the viewpoint of election strategy.

The main thing for Kennedy at this stage is to achieve re-election as president. His steps in foreign and domestic policy will be largely subordinated to this.

Second. Regarding relations with the Soviet Union, the above-mentioned, in our view, means that the Kennedy government in the period before the elections will adhere to approximately the following line.

On one hand, it will seek to maintain the current slight improvement in relations between the USA and USSR and, if possible, prevent this favorable election situation from changing for the worse. Moreover, it will apparently show readiness to pursue time-distributed agreements on separate, relatively less complex or, as they say here, "peripheral" issues, which is useful for the president in domestic politics as well as evidence that his policy in this area is bearing fruit.

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However, on the other hand, the Kennedy administration is unlikely to take any major steps regarding relations with the USSR before the end of the election campaign, especially those that would require discussion in the US Senate, let alone its approval. Kennedy assumes that the closer to the elections, the fewer chances he has to gather a majority in the Senate because Republicans will not vote for his support for tactical reasons. It should be emphasized that the US Congress as a whole still remains one of the main centers of anti-Soviet sentiment in the country. This is also where accusations of "appeasing communism" mainly come from, and the Kennedy administration seeks to prevent or neutralize such accusations whenever possible.

There is another important factor - the absence of unified opinion in the government regarding the Soviet Union in light of Soviet-Chinese disagreements*. According to unofficial data, there is still ongoing persistent discussion on this issue in US government circles. There are mainly three groups. The first consists of Acheson, Navy Secretary Nitze, Air Force Chief General LeMay, the Bundy brothers (one - presidential assistant, another - McNamara's assistant), influential senators Jackson, Russell and Dirksen (the first two deal with military matters in the senate, the latter is the Republican leader). This group, connected with the Pentagon, believes that Soviet-Chinese disagreements go deep into these countries' past and are of an irreconcilable nature. This means a "second front" has been created for the USSR, which, they say, forces Moscow to maneuver and avoid complications with the West. Hence the proposal: to increase pressure on the USSR and try to force it to make concessions, for example, in Berlin, using "show of force" on communications in West Berlin and on FRG-GDR borders.

The second group represents more political rather than military circles of the USA. It includes Rusk, ministers Hodges, Udall, State Department leadership: Ball, Harriman, Thompson, as well as Senator Fulbright. They believe that Soviet-Chinese disagreements, although sharp, are fundamentally ideological

in nature and may be resolved between both parties at some point, especially if the USA exerts strong pressure on the USSR or PRC. Therefore, in their opinion, it is more expedient to continue, albeit unhurriedly, the "policy of agreements" with the Soviet Union to show it the prospects of developing diplomatic, cultural and other ties with the West. For these purposes, the group also advocates for known relaxation of trade restrictions with the USSR.

The third group, consisting of influential cabinet members, takes an intermediate position. It includes R. Kennedy, Defense Secretary McNamara, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Taylor, Intelligence Director McCone. At present

*Here and further underlined in the document text.

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time they are more inclined to the opinion of the second group, especially given the election campaign, but in their sympathies, some of them are rather on the side of the first group.

The discussion of all these issues within the president's inner circle cannot but leave its mark on the president's own behavior, his policy, which is characterized by certain zigzags, maneuvering, paying tribute to the viewpoint of one group or another, although in general his line is now clearly closer to the second and third groups than to the first.

All these outlined factors are reflected in Kennedy's current policy. Hence, in conversations with Soviet representatives, the American government leaders' emphatic underlining of the idea that in matters of improving American-Soviet relations and resolving disputed international problems, one should not rush, that progress in this direction should be made step by step, carefully considering and spacing out over time the steps to be taken, and also trying where possible to give the achievable agreements such a form that would not require ratification of such agreements by the U.S. Senate.

Third. In practical terms, if we analyze the position of Kennedy and Rusk during the exchange of views with A.A. Gromyko, the U.S. government will likely agree, by the end of this year, in addition to the treaty on banning nuclear tests and the agreement on not placing weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbit■■■, only to sign with the USSR a consular convention■■■ and agreement on direct air communication■■■, as well as – after concluding the wheat deal■■■ – to conduct unofficial exchange of views to explore possibilities for some expansion of trade within the framework of existing American legislation; in the future, it will apparently agree to consider the question of broader trade prospects, bearing in mind, however, that the necessary revision of legislation in this case will be implemented only after the 1964 elections.

Regarding other specific issues that were touched upon to some degree in conversations with American leaders, it can be expected that the U.S. government will show willingness to return to discussing the question of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization sometime early next year after additional consultations with its allies, particularly during the December NATO Council session, taking into account our proposal to make simultaneously with the conclusion of the pact a statement, the text of which was communicated to A.A. Gromyko¹. In our opinion, on the pact issue, we should continue to put pressure on the Kennedy administration.

From recent conversations with the president and other U.S. leaders, it is clear that the American government continues to show interest in reaching an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but only on the condition that such

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the agreement will not exclude the possibility of creating multilateral NATO nuclear forces⁶². The Americans' departure from the principle of absolutely preventing other states from possessing and disposing of nuclear weapons remains the main disagreement between the positions of the USSR and the USA on this issue. The exchange of views on this issue, as well as on other issues related to multilateral rather than bilateral relations, has quite clearly shown that the Kennedy administration is still avoiding entering into such agreements with us that cause serious objections from their NATO allies, primarily West Germany.

The initial American interest in the issue of control posts clearly disappeared as soon as they learned that we continue to link this issue with the question of reducing foreign troops in Europe and the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the two German states. Since in a different context this issue is of no interest to us, it apparently has little prospect in terms of reaching a concrete agreement, although we can continue to use it for propaganda purposes.

Kennedy realizes that the West Berlin issue continues to remain a very painful "corn" and therefore, one should assume, will be ready to resume the exchange of views on this issue if we show appropriate initiative. However, it is very doubtful that he would agree to resolve this issue on a mutually acceptable basis in the period before the elections - both for foreign policy and domestic political reasons.

Fourth. The conversations between A.A. Gromyko with Kennedy and Rusk, in our view, quite clearly showed the American leaders' desire to maintain and even develop, in a certain sense, the confidential nature of exchanges of views on a number of issues between the governments of both countries and especially their leaders. In this connection, one cannot fail to note Kennedy's quite clearly manifested tendency toward a certain tacit agreement with N.S. Khrushchev, without formal and even more so public agreement, on freezing military budgets and some mutual reduction of forces in both German states.

Some very frank statements by Rusk made in conversations with A.A. Gromyko (about West Germany, GDR, Japan, India) are indicative, clearly calculated to create a certain atmosphere of confidential relations. All this is especially clear if we recall that just a year ago, during the Cuban crisis⁶³, the same American leaders strongly played up the theme of impossibility to trust the Soviet Union.

Naturally, the behavior of both Kennedy and Rusk is explained not least by their desire to maintain or even somewhat improve the current more favorable atmosphere in Soviet-American relations, without any unexpected sharp

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deterioration, since such a turn of events during the election campaign could cost Kennedy, as it did Nixon in 1960, the presidential post, and he undoubtedly takes this into account. Regarding Kennedy's emerging position on disarmament issues (seeking solutions to specific problems through some actual containment of the arms race in certain areas), it is largely explained by the growing financial difficulties of the USA itself.

Regardless of motives, objectively the above-mentioned Kennedy tendencies align with our foreign policy goals and, as we see it, should be utilized to the maximum extent. Kennedy's confidential statements regarding Soviet-American relations in broad terms were useful in this sense, as well as his repeated assurances regarding Cuba.

Cuba, like West Berlin, remains one of the main, if not the main, issues most significantly affecting our current relations with the USA and fraught with the possibility of unexpected flare-ups. The question of Soviet military personnel in Cuba continues to be one of Kennedy's most vulnerable points domestically. If

we add to this the possibility of N.S. Khrushchev's trip to Cuba in the near future, the prospect of which causes obvious concern for Kennedy, then all this serves as a certain tool of influence in our hands on Kennedy, especially during the election campaign, and the president understands this perfectly.

Analyzing all aspects of the USA's foreign and domestic political situation, one cannot finally exclude that Kennedy will be ready to agree to a summit meeting if he considers it useful from the viewpoint of improving his electoral chances. And with the appointment of Home as British Prime Minister, who has established very good personal relations with Kennedy and Rusk, British pressure on the president in favor of such a meeting, even within the Committee of 18, will significantly increase.

Fifth. Taking into account everything stated above, it seems expedient from our side to take the following steps:

a) With the aim of consolidating the positive results of A.A. Gromyko's talks with Kennedy and Rusk and, figuratively speaking, building bridges to the future, send Kennedy a confidential message from N.S. Khrushchev, in which, after briefly analyzing the content of these talks, note the positive aspects, from our point of view, in the Americans' position, criticize positions unacceptable to us, and express our considerations regarding further measures to normalize Soviet-American relations and resolve international problems.

In this message, in particular, it would be appropriate to inform Kennedy that we have taken note of his promise to consult again with US allies on the non-aggression pact and propose to begin developing a concrete form

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of the mentioned pact (simultaneously it would be expedient to communicate the text of our new parallel statement, which was conveyed to A.A. Gromyko for the president, to the British as well, so that they, particularly Home, would learn about it not only from the Americans).

In the message, it would also be worth noting as a positive point that, according to Kennedy, the US government still attaches great importance to the problem of German peaceful settlement and that he advocates continuing efforts aimed at resolving this issue. In this regard, express the wish that the American side would clarify its position on this matter (the Americans still have not revealed the nature of "temporary measures" regarding West Berlin that they spoke about earlier, and the duration of the proposed arrangement). In this context, as another evidence of the danger associated with the unresolved West Berlin issue, one could mention the recent incidents on the access routes to West Berlin■■■.

Overall, it seems we should continue to put pressure on the USA on these issues to, if possible, clarify their position, their readiness for some kind of arrangement regarding West Berlin and push them toward such an arrangement. However, it is probably not necessary to rush now with discussing the procedure for further exchange of views on these issues with them.

b) Simultaneously, in a separate oral message, inform Kennedy, perhaps in general terms for now, about our principal agreement with his idea that on certain issues (such as freezing or reducing military budgets and reducing troops in Germany), on which the American side cannot yet conclude formal agreements, the governments of the USSR and USA would exchange information about their "intentions" in an unofficial manner.

Orally, it would also be worth letting Kennedy know that we understand his difficulties in connection with the election campaign, but at the same time we do not intend to give him any indulgences during this period in case of hostile actions or statements against the Soviet Union aimed at reducing international

tension from his side. This also applies to Cuba.

The message could be delivered either through Thompson or directly to the president (he practices unofficial meetings with ambassadors when it comes to confidential messages from heads of other governments).

c) We also consider it timely to organize now N.S. Khrushchev's appearance on American television to convey our point of view on the most important issues to broad circles of the American population before the election campaign in the USA intensifies.

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g) Develop now a program-minimum and program-maximum for conducting unofficial exchange of opinions with the American side on matters of expanding trade between the USSR and USA, highlighting first the issues that could be resolved without Congress's sanction, and second - broader issues (including the matter of concluding a trade agreement, credits, and Lend-Lease settlements), the resolution of which will require the US government to submit certain legislative proposals to Congress.

d) Consider a comprehensive plan of measures regarding relations with the USA, taking into account both the aforementioned and other possible measures, distributing all these measures over time so as to, on one hand, not create an impression of excessive haste, especially given the Kennedy administration's position on timing, but on the other hand, not indulge the Americans in unjustified delays in settling those issues which are already ripe for resolution. Of course, we should simultaneously continue to maintain our principled line on decisively exposing various schemes of US imperialist circles and actions of the American government aimed at continuing the arms race and maintaining international tension (as was the case, for example, in the matter of NATO nuclear forces). Kennedy should have no doubts about this going forward.

Overall, USSR-USA relations are now experiencing, in our view, a new period. We have already forced Kennedy to take a defensive position on several issues, including the Cuban question. Having received resistance to attempts to intimidate us and extract concessions on the Cuban issue and having become convinced that such an approach would not bring him success, the president was forced to readjust. Recently, after our warning, the US government, as far as one can judge, has taken measures to stop the bandit raids by Cuban counter-revolutionary aircraft. The signing of the Moscow Treaty on banning nuclear tests and the favorable reaction of the American people to this, the strengthening of sentiment in the USA in favor of some agreement with the Soviet Union and the easing of international tension - all this has forced Kennedy, who had long been at a crossroads, to choose to conduct his election campaign under slogans of preserving peace, from positions of seeking expedient agreement with the Soviet Union on international problems, although this is sometimes accompanied - paying tribute to entrenched sentiments here - by various reservations, as occurred, for example, in the president's recent speech in Maine. Overall, one can firmly say that all these positive factors are largely the result of the success of our offensive and initiative-taking foreign policy.

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Of course, it is impossible to make firm conclusions about the stability of Kennedy's course towards known détente of international tensions and its duration now, given the very complex situation in the USA and the influence of increasingly active extremely reactionary forces; moreover, the danger of international complications related to a number of unresolved problems and the constant threat of US interference in internal affairs of other countries remains, especially regarding American policy towards Cuba.

Under current conditions, we obviously should not act hastily; it is advisable to carefully consider the next steps in order to maintain pressure and achieve more advantageous positions for ourselves on key issues, including by using the specifics of the electoral situation in the USA. This primarily means ensuring non-invasion of Cuba and normalization of the situation in West Berlin within the framework of German peaceful settlement. Simultaneously - continue efforts on issues where possibility of agreement emerged during A.A. Gromyko's conversations with American leaders.

A.Dobrynin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 328. L. 13 - 30. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 10****

Note from First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of USSR V.V. Kuznetsov regarding draft information for First Secretaries of CC of Communist and Workers' Parties about A.A. Gromyko's meetings with J.F. Kennedy, D. Rusk and A. Douglas-Home

****No. 3092/GS October 23, 1963****

Secret

To Cc Cpsu

USSR MFA considers it expedient, as was done before, to confidentially inform in oral form the First Secretaries of CC of Communist and Workers' Parties of GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia and Cuba about the main content of conversations between USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs with Kennedy, Rusk and Home, which took place in New York and Washington in September-October of this year.

Draft resolution is attached. Please review.

V. Kuznetsov

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 354. L.144. Electrographic copy. Typewritten text.

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****No. 11****

Resolution of the Presidium of the CC CPSU "On informing First Secretaries of CC of fraternal parties of GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia and Cuba regarding the conversations of USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Comrade A.A. Gromyko with US President Kennedy,

US Secretary of State Rusk and British Foreign Secretary Home in New York and Washington"

No. ■120/XIII October 25, 1963

Approve the draft information for First Secretaries of CC of fraternal parties of GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia and Cuba regarding the conversations of USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Comrade A.A. Gromyko with US President Kennedy, US Secretary of State Rusk and British Foreign Secretary Home in New York and Washington.

[Attachment]

Secret

Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest,

Sofia, Ulan Bator, Havana

Sovposol

Visit Comrade Ulbricht (Gomulka, Novotny, Kadar, Dej, Zhivkov, Tsedenbal, Castro) and, referring to the instructions from CPSU and Soviet government, communicate verbally in confidential manner the following information about Comrade Gromyko's conversations with Kennedy, Rusk and Home during his recent stay in New York and Washington.

Questions of German peace settlement and normalization of the situation in West Berlin*. During meetings with Kennedy, Rusk and Home, the previous position of the Soviet government was confirmed regarding the conclusion of German peace treaty and normalization on its basis of the situation in West Berlin (liquidation of occupation regime in West Berlin, replacement of NATO flag with UN flag, transformation of West Berlin into a free city, respect for GDR sovereignty, etc.)⁷⁶.

Comrade Gromyko insisted during the conversations on the speediest resolution of the German peace settlement issue, emphasizing that for ensuring lasting peace in Europe, the conclusion of German peace treaty maintains all its relevance. In conversation with Kennedy, Comrade Gromyko said that the Soviet government regrets that the US government apparently shows no understanding of the importance and urgency of concluding the German peace treaty from the viewpoint of European security and ensuring peace throughout the world. Although the Soviet government does not specify deadlines

*Here and further underlined in the original document.

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conclusion of the German peace treaty, however, it is convinced that the Western powers would make a mistake if they continued to indefinitely delay, together with the Soviet Union and other interested countries, the resolution of the German peace settlement.

Representatives of the USA and England stated that they recognize the paramount importance of resolving "the German problem and the Berlin question" for improving relations between NATO countries and member states of the Warsaw Treaty.

To the direct question posed by Comrade Gromyko - whether it is correct to consider that the US government still attaches great importance to the problem of German peace settlement and that it advocates continuing efforts aimed at resolving this problem - Kennedy responded affirmatively. However, the Americans believe that currently there is no real possibility for solving the German problem, although "time is working in favor of such a solution." Rusk referred, in particular, to certain changes that occurred over the past two years which have deprived the German problem of its former acuteness and tension.

From the discussions it became clear that the US government, while stating the impossibility of achieving a solution to the German problem now, does not reject recognizing the degree of agreement that was reached on a number of issues relating to the German peace settlement, and shows readiness to work on creating a more favorable general international environment, including further improvement of relations between the two German states and between East and West as a whole. Meanwhile, Rusk claimed that the new FRG government would supposedly gradually implement a more conciliatory policy towards socialist countries and would eventually move towards creating joint technical commissions of FRG and GDR representatives, and that all this would smooth out disagreements. Now the main question is how to prevent the aggravation of the German problem while finding ways to resolve other unresolved issues.

Hume repeated the previous proposal of Western powers to assign the preparation of issues relating to the German problem, including those concerning German unification, to deputy ministers, who would be given several months for this purpose. Representatives of both German states could participate in discussing such issues.

When discussing matters regarding West Berlin, Kennedy and Rusk continued to declare the unacceptability for the USA of Soviet proposals regarding the composition and duration of foreign troops' presence in West Berlin, and in their statements proceeded from the position that Western powers' troops must remain in West Berlin until the final settlement of the German problem. Kennedy stated that one of the obstacles preventing agreement on the German question is the issue of changing

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of troops stationed in West Berlin and establishing a final deadline for their stay. Issues related to access to West Berlin and its status, Kennedy said, are also important, but provided the troop issue is resolved, these issues could certainly be resolved.

In one of the conversations, Rusk, touching upon the West Berlin issue, expressed the idea that some "temporary measures" should be agreed upon. However, when Comrade Gromyko subsequently asked to clarify what was meant by "temporary measures," Kennedy avoided explaining this wording, and Rusk responded in general terms that all measures implemented in Germany in the post-war period should be considered "temporary" until the final German settlement.

Disarmament and arms race limitation issues. During the exchange of views on these issues, our side pursued the goal of determining whether there was anything new in the Western powers' position on general and complete disarmament, as well as identifying the possibility of reaching agreements on specific measures that would contribute to strengthening peace and further easing international tensions that emerged as a result of concluding the nuclear test ban treaty.

The exchange of views with U.S. and British representatives showed that the Americans and British are still not ready to take radical steps in disarmament and are not inclined to actually negotiate on general and complete disarmament. President Kennedy in the conversation on October 10 even stated that he generally does not believe in the possibility of agreement on this issue in the near future, but, nevertheless, believes that disarmament negotiations are useful and should continue. Rusk and Home, while showing some interest in our new proposals in the field of general and complete disarmament (maintaining a limited number of missiles with nuclear warheads at the disposal of the USSR and USA until the completion of the entire disarmament process), also quite clearly indicated that the USA and Britain do not intend to seek convergence of positions now. Regarding our proposal to convene a meeting of the 18-nation Committee participants at the highest level, U.S. and British representatives responded with restraint, not rejecting it, but not expressing desire to implement this proposal.

At the same time, the conversations reveal that U.S. and British leaders are increasingly aware of what dangerous consequences the continuing arms race may lead to. It was felt that they are concerned – and not least due to financial considerations – with finding ways to limit the further arms race to some extent acceptable to the West.

In this regard, Kennedy's and Rusk's statements draw attention to the fact that the USA at this stage considers it possible to seek solutions to individual disarmament issues not through formal agreements that would require complex procedures

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ratification and could face difficulties passing through the Senate, but through the implementation of separate arms limitation measures by both sides in a unilateral manner, in parallel, so to speak, "looking at each other."

When considering individual measures aimed at easing international tensions, as is known, an agreement was reached on renouncing the deployment of nuclear weapons in orbit aboard space objects. This agreement, formalized by a unanimously adopted resolution of the UN General Assembly⁷⁷, which welcomes the intention of the USA and USSR "not to place in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction," has, we believe, positive significance. It represents a real step toward preventing the spread of nuclear arms race into outer space.

During the exchange of views on the issue of a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, our efforts were directed at consolidating the certain readiness to find a mutually acceptable solution to this issue, shown by US and British representatives during talks in Moscow in July-August of this year, and to try to move further toward reaching a specific agreement.

The US and British representatives confirmed that they generally have a positive attitude toward the idea of a non-aggression pact, however, they attempted to put forward, as before during negotiations in Moscow, as a condition for concluding such a pact, our obligation regarding guarantees of free access to West Berlin. Comrade Gromyko, naturally, decisively rejected these attempts by the Americans and British to demand from us, as a price for the non-aggression pact, abandonment of our principled position on the issue of German peace settlement and normalization based on it of the situation in West Berlin. From our side, it was also emphasized that Western powers should be no less interested in the non-aggression pact than we are.

During further discussions, the US and British representatives no longer insisted on any obligations "on free access" to West Berlin in connection with the non-aggression pact issue, but suggested that it would be good if the Soviet Union, when signing this pact, would make a parallel statement indicating that the

situation in West Berlin can only be changed by agreement between the USSR and Western powers. This approach was also rejected by Comrade Gromyko, as it contradicts the agreed position of socialist countries by limiting our freedom of action regarding the peace treaty with the GDR.

At the same time, President Kennedy was told that the Soviet government has consistently opposed and opposes the use of force in resolving all disputed issues, including issues related to the German peace settlement and normalization based on it of the situation in West Berlin, and that the USSR could

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forced to resort to force only in response to the use of force by one side or another against him or his friends and allies.

At the same time, it was emphasized that the Soviet government considers it necessary to reach a speedy resolution on the peaceful settlement with Germany.

Furthermore, Comrade Gromyko emphasized that the Soviet government will maintain the stated position if there is no invasion of Cuba. In case of invasion of Cuba, we will fulfill our obligations to the Republic of Cuba. The U.S. President was informed that this statement regarding Cuba is made to give the American government a clear understanding of our position, and it is not intended for publication.

Kennedy said that although France and FRG oppose the non-aggression pact, in light of the considerations expressed by the Soviet government, the USA will once again discuss this issue with its allies.

Overall, from the exchange of views on the non-aggression pact, the impression formed that the possibilities for moving forward in negotiations on the non-aggression pact are not exhausted and that it is expedient to continue pressure on the Americans and British.

President Kennedy said that the U.S. government shows interest in the USSR's proposal on military budget reduction and that the USA, in any case, does not plan to increase its military budget for the next year, nor for the subsequent period, unless some international crisis arises. However, Kennedy and Rusk claimed that concluding a formal agreement on military budget reduction could, supposedly, encounter several difficulties, particularly related to control issues and different budget structures. It would be better, Kennedy said, to agree on maintaining military budgets at their current level, but without a formal agreement.

The issue of nuclear non-proliferation was subjected to detailed discussion. On our side, regarding this issue, the same line was maintained as agreed between socialist countries, which the Soviet Union held during previous negotiations with the USA on nuclear non-proliferation. In accordance with this line, Comrade Gromyko insisted that the agreement on nuclear non-proliferation should exclude the possibility of not only direct transfer of these weapons to non-nuclear states but also providing them any indirect access to these weapons, including through military blocs. It was emphasized from our side that although the positions of the USSR, USA, and England seem close in the part where all three powers in principle consider it desirable to achieve an agreement on nuclear non-proliferation, however, the Soviet Union advocates preventing access to nuclear weapons by other states in any form, including through various combinations via blocs, for example,

creation of NATO's unified nuclear forces, while the USA insists that nuclear weapons should not appear "in national hands" of other states.

In this regard, Mr. Gromyko strongly criticized the plans to create NATO's unified nuclear forces, aimed at providing actual access to nuclear weapons to West German revanchists with all the dangerous consequences for peace that would follow. The Soviet side also clearly indicated that these US plans currently represent the main obstacle to reaching an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

US representatives, while expressing willingness to negotiate non-proliferation of nuclear weapons only on the previously proposed American basis, which does not exclude the creation of NATO's unified nuclear forces with West Germany's participation, tried to dispute our criticism of the plans to create these forces. Kennedy and Rusk stated that the USA does not intend to provide nuclear weapons to other states under any circumstances, including West Germany. The plans for creating multilateral NATO nuclear forces, according to them, are not yet finalized, but under all circumstances these plans will not involve transfer of American nuclear weapons to other states, and neither the West German government nor any other non-nuclear NATO state will be able to order their military to deploy these weapons. In NATO's unified nuclear forces, according to Kennedy and Rusk's statements, no actual involvement of West Germany with nuclear weapons would supposedly occur.

The American side also stated that the USA fears West Germany might follow France's path and begin creating nuclear weapons on a national basis. Kennedy and Rusk tried to present the matter as if the creation of NATO's unified nuclear forces is conceived primarily to bind West Germany in this regard. They also claimed that concluding a non-proliferation agreement would serve as an important additional "insurance" in this sense, as this agreement would prevent West Germany from attempting to transition from participation in NATO's unified nuclear forces to possessing nuclear weapons on a national basis.

All these arguments were, of course, rejected from our side.

With a view to increase pressure on the US government, Mr. Gromyko posed a question to American leadership whether it would be possible to agree that the plan for creating NATO's unified nuclear forces would not be actually implemented. He indicated that such an agreement would facilitate reaching an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Americans responded to this question indicating that the USA would not agree to abandon the plan for creating NATO's multilateral nuclear forces.

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The stated position of the US government regarding non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the creation of unified NATO nuclear forces with West Germany's participation was confirmed by President Kennedy in conversation with Comrade Gromyko on October 10 of this year. Under these conditions, achieving any progress in negotiations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has proven impossible so far.

Representatives of the USA and, especially, England showed heightened interest during discussions regarding measures to prevent sudden attack. Discussion of this issue revealed that Western powers seek to gain unilateral advantages by pursuing the placement of control posts on territories of Warsaw Pact and NATO countries without connection to disarmament measures and improving the situation in Europe. As the only measure they expressed willingness to combine with establishing control posts, they named advance mutual notification between parties about major troop movements in Europe.

From our side, it was stated that the Soviet Union has a positive attitude toward adopting measures to prevent sudden attack, including establishing control posts in territories of countries belonging to the two opposing state groupings. However, control posts can be beneficial if their establishment is accompanied by specific practical steps aimed at easing international tension - reduction of foreign troops in European countries and refusal to place nuclear weapons on the territory of the two German states. Comrade Gromyko especially emphasized that without implementing these measures, placement of control posts

would not only bring no benefit but would even intensify the current suspicion in relations between states.

Regarding the reduction of foreign troops in Europe, Rusk stated that he does not deny the importance of this problem, but without linking it to the issue of control posts. He claimed that the USA has already started taking some practical steps regarding reduction of their troops in Europe. Kennedy indicated in the October 10 conversation that the USA considers it more appropriate not to achieve any formal agreement on reducing foreign troops in Europe, but rather implementation of unilateral actions by parties in this direction. He said that the USA does not intend to increase their troop numbers in West Germany, and in a year these troops will even be reduced.

Rusk and Home spoke in favor of having the issue of control posts further examined in the Committee of 18. From our side, no objections were raised against this proposal, but it was indicated that the issue of control posts should be considered in conjunction with reduction of foreign troops in Europe and refusal to place nuclear weapons in FRG and GDR.

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Questions related to the situation developing around Cuba (For everyone except Havana, which was given detailed information). Speaking about Soviet-American relations, Kennedy mentioned the so-called Cuban problem, expressing in general terms hope that this problem would not escalate.

In connection with this, Comrade Gromyko drew the president's attention to the fact that Cuba is under constant pressure from certain forces. The territory of Cuba is subjected to raids by "unidentified" aircraft, which drop bombs on industrial facilities and populated areas of the country. It was emphasized that if the US government truly wanted to put an end to such provocations against Cuba, such provocations would cease.

In response, Kennedy stated that the US government had already taken a number of measures to stop such actions. Now, for example, hostile aircraft raids on Cuba have almost completely ceased.

From our side, it was indicated that hostile aircraft are still continuing to take off from somewhere and conduct raids on Cuban territory. If such aircraft are taking off from the territory of any Latin American country, said Comrade Gromyko, then, in our conviction, such practice would hardly continue if the US government gives appropriate advice to its allies in Latin America.

Kennedy acknowledged that in the last two cases, one aircraft took off from the territory of a Latin American country, while another took off from Florida territory. He indicated that it is difficult, they say, for the US to control flights of small sport aircraft from private airfields in Florida.

To Comrade Gromyko's remark that it is, of course, difficult to convince anyone that US authorities cannot control aircraft flights, even small ones, from their own territory and that it is necessary to put an end once and for all to any raids on Cuba, the president said that after receiving the message from the head of the Soviet government N.S. Khrushchev, the US government had already taken certain measures to stop such actions against Cuba. The US, Kennedy stated, "does not intend to attack Cuba."

During conversations with the American side, the question of Soviet military personnel's presence in Cuba was also raised. Kennedy asked what the number of this personnel would be in Cuba, for example, in six months.

To this, the Americans were told that Soviet military personnel is in Cuba by agreement with the revolutionary government and questions of its numbers and duration of stay are exclusively within the competence of the governments of the USSR and the Republic of Cuba.

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The Americans complained that Cuba allegedly continues to actively conduct subversive activities against the governments of Latin American countries, stating that the US government supposedly has relevant documents at its disposal confirming this. Such activities by Cubans cause significant concern for the US government. Additionally, suggestions were made that perhaps such activities are encouraged or even directed by China.

These arguments by the Americans were firmly rejected. Comrade Gromyko said, in particular, that if statements by Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba F. Castro in favor of socialism or against capitalism are interpreted as some kind of subversive activity, then this is nonsense. It was stated that the USA could just as successfully accuse the Soviet Union of conducting subversive activities against the USA on similar grounds. Following this logic, the Soviet side in turn could declare that the USA is carrying out subversive activities against the USSR and other socialist countries.

The Americans showed increased interest in the question of why Cuba had not signed the Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and whether it would change its position on this issue.

From our side, it was stated that the Cuban government, as is known, justifies its position regarding the Moscow Treaty by hostile actions from the USA against Cuba. And such actions, unfortunately, do take place. If these actions cease, then, apparently, much will change. However, we cannot, of course, speak for the Cubans.

During the conversations, issues of bilateral Soviet-American relations were also discussed.

Earlier during the exchange of views in Moscow in August of this year, Rusk stated that the American side in principle does not object to signing the agreement on air communication with the USSR, initialed on August 21, 1961 in Washington.

During talks in New York and Washington, the Americans expressed readiness to sign the agreement by the end of this year.

At the meeting with Comrade Gromyko on October 2 of this year, Rusk expressed the American side's readiness to complete negotiations on concluding a consular convention with the USSR. Exchange of views on this issue has been conducted since 1959. Currently, negotiations are being held in Moscow at the expert level between the USSR and USA with the aim of developing the convention text.

Besides the question of possible grain purchases by the Soviet Union in the USA, during talks in New York and Washington, US representatives touched upon the general problem of Soviet-American economic relations.

During the meeting with Comrade Gromyko on October 10, President Kennedy spoke in general terms in favor of expanding trade between the USA and USSR. Rusk and his deputy Ball

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emphasized that at present there is much greater interest in the United States in developing trade with the Soviet Union than there was before, and that there are certain opportunities for expanding trade.

Rusk stated that the United States is ready to discuss with the Soviet Union possible ways to develop Soviet-American trade, as well as related issues.

From our side, it was stated to the Americans that it is necessary to end the discriminatory U.S. policy regarding trade with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, that this would be an important stage in

the development of Soviet-American relations and would serve the interests of the USA, USSR and other countries. It was emphasized that Americans should not think in any case that only the Soviet Union would benefit from trade development. This is a matter of mutual interest and mutual benefit.

An agreement was reached that at this stage specially designated representatives from the USSR and USA would conduct an unofficial exchange of views to explore possibilities for developing Soviet-American trade. The Americans requested that this exchange not be publicized for now.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 354. L. 129. Original. Typewritten text. L. 130 - 143. Electrographic copy. Typewritten text.

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Section li

"The Death Of J.F. Kennedy Is A Heavy Blow To All People

Who Hold Dear The Cause Of Peace

And Soviet-American Cooperation"

documents on the participation of Soviet representatives in J.F. Kennedy's funeral and USSR-USA cooperation in the investigation of the crime November 22, 1963 - September 28, 1964

****No. 12****

Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the arrest by police of Lee H. Oswald, suspected of assassinating US President J.F. Kennedy

Spec. No. 1967 - 1968 November 22, 1963 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12 Urgent

US news agency reported at 16:00 that Dallas police, Texas arrested American citizen Lee H. Oswald, 24 years old, chairman of the local branch of Fair Play for Cuba Committee, on suspicion of Kennedy's murder.

It is also reported that Oswald had previously been in the USSR and is married to a Russian woman.

Verification through the embassy's consular section established that indeed Oswald lived in Minsk for several years, where he married Soviet citizen Marina Nikolaevna Prusakova, born 1941.

In June 1962, they returned to the USA. In March 1963, Prusakova petitioned to return with her daughter to the USSR for permanent residence.

USSR MFA Consular Department (letter No. KU-USA-540058-24518 dated October 7, 1963) reported that her petition was denied.

The embassy's consular section has correspondence with Prusakova and Lee Oswald regarding her return to the USSR. The last letter from Lee Oswald was dated November 9 (text transmitted through close neighbors).

It is possible that American authorities may request to review the correspondence in our possession.

Footnotes

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The fact of such correspondence is known to US authorities since it was conducted through official mail.

Considering that there is nothing compromising in the correspondence, apparently, in extreme case, we could agree to this (withdrawing our internal correspondence with MFA).

I request instructions on this matter.

Radio and television, which have stopped all other broadcasts and are only transmitting messages related to the president's assassination, increasingly refer to the fact that the killer was apparently connected "with extreme left elements."

A. Dobrynin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 3 - 4. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 13****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA regarding possible condolences to US leadership in connection with J.F. Kennedy's death

Spec. No. 1969 November 22, 1963 ■82 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12 Urgent

In connection with Kennedy's death, would consider appropriate:

1. Send condolences from N.S. Khrushchev and L.I. Brezhnev to new president L. Johnson and Kennedy's wife, and from A.A. Gromyko to Rusk.
2. Have someone from government members, for example, A.A. Gromyko visit Kohler and express condolences.
3. Possibly send someone to USA for D. Kennedy's funeral, however this matter can be decided somewhat later when funeral procedure becomes clear, about which we will inform additionally.

Personally, I have sent condolences to the president's wife, Rusk and R. Kennedy.

A. Dobrynin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 5 - 6. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

*On the first page at top stamp "to Khrushchev N.S."

73Signal Copy

****No. 14****

TASS Reports "On the Assassination of US President John Kennedy" and "L. Johnson Assumed the Powers of US President"

November 22, 1963

Assassination of US President John Kennedy

NEW YORK, November 22 (TASS). Associated Press correspondent reports from Dallas:

US President Kennedy and Texas Governor John Connally fell, struck by assassin's bullets at the moment when they were traveling today in an open car along one of Dallas's central streets.

NEW YORK, November 22. (TASS). Americans are shocked by the assassination of President John Kennedy.

The President was fatally wounded in the head by a shot from a large-caliber sniper rifle and thirty minutes later, at 14:00 New York time, died in a Dallas hospital (Texas). According to agency reports, the assassin shot from a fifth or sixth floor window when the president was approaching in an open car the building where he was supposed to deliver a speech.

Commentators in Dallas link this crime to the activities of ultra-right organizations.

Dallas is one of the main centers of these organizations.

Since Kennedy's arrival in Dallas, small groups of ultra-right elements have been demonstrating in various parts of the city under Confederate flags and with hostile slogans against Kennedy.

According to agency reports, in the speech that President Kennedy was supposed to deliver at breakfast and the text of which was in his pocket, he condemned his ultra-conservative opponents.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy

Outstanding American statesman John Fitzgerald Kennedy was born on May 29, 1917, in Brookline (Massachusetts).

In 1940, J. Kennedy graduated from Harvard University. From September 1941 to April 1943, he served in the Navy and participated in World War II in the Pacific theater of operations. After the war, J. Kennedy worked in journalism.

In 1946, he was elected to the House of Representatives of the US Congress from Massachusetts. In 1952 he was elected and in 1958 re-elected to the Senate. In 1960, he was nominated as presidential candidate from the Democratic Party and elected president. J. Kennedy held the post of President of the United States of America from January 20, 1961.

74[]

The late US President, speaking in the summer of this year at American University in Washington, indicated that all countries are "mutually deeply interested in a just and genuine peace and in ending the arms race." He insisted on the ratification by the US Congress of the Moscow Treaty on banning nuclear tests in three spheres. Kennedy's steps toward improving the international situation met with sharp attacks from American "hawks."

The terrorist act against Kennedy was committed during his trip with political speeches related to the already effectively begun US presidential election campaign, which is to be held in November of next year.

L. Johnson assumed the powers of US President

WASHINGTON, November 22 (TASS). US Vice President L. Johnson assumed all constitutional powers of the US President immediately after the death of J. Kennedy, American news agencies report.

Lyndon Johnson officially took the oath as President of the United States of America.

Lyndon Baines Johnson was born in 1900. He received education at Texas State Teachers College and Georgetown Law School. In 1937 he was elected to Congress. From 1949-1960 he was a member of the Senate. He held several leadership positions in the Democratic Party. In the 1960 election he was elected Vice President of the USA. He took this position on January 20, 1961.

RGANI F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 1. Typographic text. Excerpt from newspaper "Pravda."

1963. November 23. No. 327.

****No. 15****

Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko to CC CPSU regarding draft telegrams on behalf of N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhnev, N.P. Khrushcheva and A.A. Gromyko to American leadership in connection with the assassination of J.F. Kennedy

****No. 3379/GS November 22, 1963****

Secret. Copy No. 1

To Cc Cpsu

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents draft telegrams from Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L.I. Brezhnev, N.P. Khrushcheva and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the assassination of US President J.F. Kennedy.

75Signal Copy

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs also considers it expedient for the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit the US Ambassador in Moscow F. Kohler and express deep condolences on behalf of the Soviet government.

Draft resolution attached■■■. Please review.

A. Gromyko

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 13. Original. Typewritten text. Signature-autograph in blue ballpoint pen. Ibid. Op. 16. D. 372. L. 100. Copy. Second copy. Typewritten text.

****No. 16****

Note from US Ambassador to USSR F. Kohler to USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko regarding the assassination of J. Kennedy

****No. 3497/TS-ns November 23, 1963■■■****

AMERICAN EMBASSY Moscow

Dear Mr. Gromyko,

I consider it my sad duty to inform you of the death of President of the United States of America John Fitzgerald Kennedy, which occurred on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas. I would also like to inform you that Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson was sworn in as President of the United States of America at 15:39 on November 22, 1963, Eastern time■■■.

In accordance with our national customs, the Embassy will observe mourning for 30 days.

A book of condolences will be open at my residence on November 23, 24, and 25 between 12:00 and 13:00 and 15:00 and 17:00.

I am deeply grateful for the condolences you expressed to me yesterday evening by telephone, which I, of course, reported to my government.

Sincerely yours, Foy D. KOHLER

To His Excellency

A.A. Gromyko

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 2. Copy. Translated from English.

■ Copy of N.S. Khrushchev.

****No. 17****

Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On measures in connection with the assassination of US President J. F. Kennedy"

No. P125/1 November 23, 1963

1. Approve the text of the telegram from Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev to US President L.B. Johnson (Appendix 1).
2. Approve the text of the telegram from Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L.I. Brezhnev to US President L.B. Johnson (Appendix 2).
3. Approve the text of the telegram from Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev to Mrs. Kennedy - Jacqueline Kennedy (Appendix 3).
4. Approve the text of the telegram from N.P. Khrushcheva to Jacqueline Kennedy (Appendix 4).
5. Approve the text of the telegram from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko to US Secretary of State D. Rusk (Appendix 5).
6. Publish the telegrams specified in items 1-5 in the press.
7. Instruct USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko to visit US Ambassador F. Kohler in Moscow and express deep condolences from the Soviet government regarding the villainous assassination of US President J.F. Kennedy.

Publish this announcement in the press.

[Appendices] To point 1 of protocol No. 125 Appendix 1

To Mr. LYNDON B. JOHNSON

President Of The Usa

Washington White House

I am deeply saddened by the news of the tragic death of the outstanding statesman - President of the United States of America Mr. John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

The death of J.F. Kennedy is a heavy blow for all people who hold dear the cause of peace and Soviet-American cooperation.

The villainous assassination of the US President at a time when, as a result of peace-loving peoples' efforts, signs of international tension easing were emerging and prospects for improving relations between the USSR and USA were opening up, causes indignation among Soviet people regarding the perpetrators of this vile crime.

77Signal Copy

I will preserve the memory of personal meetings with President J.F. Kennedy as a figure of broad views, who realistically assessed the situation and sought to find solutions to international problems currently dividing the world through negotiations.

The Soviet government and Soviet people share the grief of the American people regarding this great loss and express hope that the search for solutions to disputed issues, to which President J.F. Kennedy made his considerable contribution, will continue in the interests of peace, for the benefit of all humanity.

Please accept, Mr. President, my personal condolences.

N. Khrushchev

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Moscow, Kremlin "___" November 1963

Appendix 2

To The President Of The United States Of America

Mr. Lyndon B. JOHNSON Washington White House

I have just learned of the villainous assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy. I am deeply saddened by this news. The Soviet people share the grief of the American people in connection with this grave loss - the tragic death at the prime of his strength of this outstanding statesman.

Please accept my most sincere condolences.

L. Brezhnev

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Appendix 3

TO Mrs. JACQUELINE KENNEDY Washington White House

With a feeling of deep personal grief, I learned of the tragic death of your spouse - President of the USA John F. Kennedy.

To all who knew him, he inspired great respect, and meetings with him will forever remain in my memory.

Please accept my most sincere condolences and expression of heartfelt sympathy in your grave sorrow.

N. Khrushchev

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Appendix 4 Washington White House

To Mrs. JACQUELINE KENNEDY

Shocked by the tragic death of your husband - President of the United States of America John F. Kennedy
- I ask you to accept in this sad hour my sincere condolences and sympathy to you and your entire family.

Nina Petrovna

Khrushcheva

Appendix 5 Washington

To The Secretary Of State Of The Usa

Dean RUSK

Please accept, Mr. Secretary of State, my deep condolences regarding the tragic death at the hands of an assassin of the President of the United States of America John F. Kennedy.

I express hope that the cause of easing international tension, initiated by the Moscow Treaty, which the late President highly valued, will be continued and this will serve as the best memory to the deceased.

A. Gromyko

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 372. L. 94-99. Copy. Typewritten text.

****No. 18****

Cover note from Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.A. Zorin to the Head of General Department of CC CPSU V.N. Malin with attached draft resolution of CC CPSU on measures in connection with the departure of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.I. Mikoyan to the USA for J.F. Kennedy's funeral

November 23, 1963

To Comrade MALIN V.N.

I am forwarding the draft Resolution of CC CPSU on measures in connection with the departure of Comrade Mikoyan A.I. to the USA for arrangements. Comrade Khrushchev N.S. expressed support for this

decision.

V. Zorin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 21. Original. Typewritten text. Signature-autograph in blue ink.

79Signal Copy

****No. 19****

Resolution of the Presidium of the CC CPSU "On Measures Regarding the Funeral of US President John F. Kennedy"

No. ■125/10 November 23, 1963

1. Send First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Comrade A.I. Mikoyan to Washington to participate in the funeral of US President John F. Kennedy.

2. Together with Comrade A.I. Mikoyan, send to the USA Comrades M.N. Smirnovsky,

V.V. Smolyanichenko, V.M. Sukhodrev, as well as three accompanying persons.

3. Task GUGVF under the Council of Ministers of USSR (Comrade Loginov) to allocate a special aircraft for Comrade A.I. Mikoyan and his accompanying persons' flight to Washington and back.

4. Charge the expenses for Comrade A.I. Mikoyan and accompanying persons' trip to the reserve fund of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 372. L. 147. Copy (2 copies). Typewritten text.

****No. 20****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA regarding the accusation of L.H. Oswald in the murder of J.F. Kennedy and possible cooperation between Soviet and American governments on this matter

Spec. No. 1973 - 1975 November 23, 1963 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12

Urgent

To our No. 1967

Oswald has been officially charged with President Kennedy's murder.

In all press, radio and television reports, Oswald is being labeled as "Marxist", "extreme leftist", "pro-Castro" etc., and the fact of his residence in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1962 is also noted. It is also reported that his wife is Russian, who is also being continuously questioned by the police.

Footnotes

a On the resolution, marked in blue ballpoint pen "CC CPSU Presidium members - for" - 23.XI - 63 Format. V. Malin b On the first page at top, stamp "to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev"

80Reference copy

Moreover, according to some reporters, the initial text of the indictment prepared in Dallas contained an assertion that Kennedy's murder by Oswald was part of an "international communist conspiracy." According to the same sources, this assertion was omitted on instructions from Washington, as the government fears that including it in the official indictment would further inflame the already heightened passions regarding Cuba and could have far-reaching consequences for US-USSR relations.

However, we consider it undoubted that reactionary circles will not cease attempting to use Oswald's alleged "pro-communist" orientation to fuel anti-communist, and particularly anti-Cuban, hysteria in the country, in order to, by speculating on feelings caused by Kennedy's murder, discredit Kennedy's own line of seeking compromises with the socialist world. In this connection, it cannot be ruled out that Kennedy's murder was organized by far-right circles precisely with this goal, and Oswald, if he was involved in this murder at all, was simply used by them as a very suitable instrument for this purpose. The police and judicial authorities of Texas, one of the most reactionary states in the USA by its attitudes, are also interested in shifting responsibility for poor protection of the president through sensational "exposures of international communist conspiracy." The Dallas police chief, where the president was killed, is especially trying hard.

People from Kennedy's inner circle express notable concern in private conversations about further development of events and their impact on the international situation. Clifford, Salinger's deputy (the latter is now in a completely confused and depressed state) stated in an unofficial conversation with our employee, whom he knows well personally, that all attempts yesterday by Kennedy's aides to contact Hoover, FBI chief, and learn anything about the circumstances of the murder and investigation progress, ended in failure. Hoover refused to provide them any information. He only reported to Johnson, who, however, has become withdrawn and is not telling any cabinet members anything about this yet. "Off the record," Clifford characterized Johnson as a person "with dictatorial inclinations" and inexperienced in foreign policy matters.

We are receiving information from other people previously close to the White House, indicating that apparently very soon there will be a replacement of Kennedy's entire inner circle and at least part of the cabinet, especially those with more or less liberal reputations. There is talk that the former president's closest aides Bundy and Sorensen intend to resign themselves.

It should be said that many people previously associated with the president's inner circle and generally well-disposed toward us express in private conversations certain

81Signal copy

concern about the international consequences of President Kennedy's assassination, in particular, the possible sharp right turn in US policy, up to dangerous military provocations against Cuba.

Given the highly unbalanced, immature and emotional nature of American public opinion, we must seriously consider the above-mentioned possibility, which may be used by far-right circles in the USA, especially if the new president does not take measures to calm the growing passions around Kennedy's assassination and Oswald, who is accused of this assassination.

According to available data, Rusk discussed possible international aspects of recent events with Johnson today. Details of their meeting are unknown, but correspondents who know Rusk personally tell us that he is very concerned. Some radio and television commentators are beginning to talk about a possible new crisis in Soviet-American relations, although this is mainly linked not directly to any accusations against us, but to "pro-Cuban and pro-communist sympathies" of the accused Oswald.

In connection with the above, a question arises whether we should express to the US government, either through Kohler in Moscow or through Rusk here, our concern about the tone being given to Kennedy's assassination in the American press, and draw attention to the extremely negative consequences for relations between the USSR and USA, and for world peace in general, which this tendency may have if not stopped in time. Simultaneously, as a gesture of goodwill, it might be possible to offer the American side information about Oswald that we possess (circumstances of his arrival and departure from the USSR, his wife's correspondence with the embassy, etc.).

It would also be expedient, depending on further developments, to consider the question of our possible special statement, with publication in the press, to somehow neutralize or deflect the current dangerous direction of American propaganda around Kennedy's assassination.

F. Castro should also be informed about these events so that, on one hand, the Cuban government is not caught off guard, and on the other hand, does not make any careless move that would give additional cause for the anti-Cuban campaign gradually unfolding here now.

A. Dobrynin

REFERENCE: No. 1967-1968 (incoming No. 53927) from 22.XI.63 t. Dobrynin reported about the arrest by Dallas police on suspicion of Kennedy's assassination of American citizen Lee H. Oswald, who some time ago was in the USSR and married to a Russian woman, and also about the existence of correspondence between the consular department of the embassy with Lee Oswald and his wife - Prusakova regarding the latter's return to the USSR.

82RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 24 - 28. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 21****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA regarding transmission through First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan of a confidential message from N.S. Khrushchev to US President L. Johnson

Spec. No. 1977 November 23, 1963 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12

Urgent

For establishing and subsequent development of relations with the new president, it would be good, in our opinion, if A.I. Mikoyan would deliver here to Johnson a personal confidential message from Khrushchev expressing, in particular, hope that contacts between the heads of both governments will be maintained and will develop further.

A. Dobrynin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 328. L. 104. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 22****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA regarding conversation with US President's Special Representative for USSR Affairs L. Thompson about future Soviet-American relations

Spec. No. 1980 November 23, 1963 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12

Urgent

Thompson, with whom I had a brief conversation, is very distressed by President Kennedy's death and related events. This, he said, is "a major blow to relations

Footnotes

* On the first page top stamp "To Khrushchev N.S."

* On the first page top stamp "To Khrushchev N.S."

83Signal Copy

between our countries and especially regarding those unique confidential connections that were established between the heads of our governments and which have proven themselves well. I do not know

yet how everything will develop in this regard further.

Agreed to meet with him tomorrow, in a home setting for an unofficial exchange of opinions regarding the developing situation.

A. Dobrynin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 328. L. 110. Copy. Typewritten text on a cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 23****

Cipher telegram from KGB resident in Washington to KGB at the USSR Council of Ministers with the text of L.H. Oswald's last letter to the Soviet embassy

****No. 1023 November 23, 1963****

Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 1

We transmit the text of Oswald's last letter to the embassy dated November 9 of this year. The letter is written in poor English and contains several unclear and incomprehensible passages for us. It is completely unclear why he wrote a letter of such content to the embassy. All this somewhat resembles a provocation.

"Dear Sirs! I am informing you about recent events since my meetings with comrade Kostin at the Soviet Union embassy, Mexico City, Mexico. I could not stay in Mexico indefinitely due to restrictions on my Mexican visa, which was only for 15 days. Since I could not reveal my real surname, I did not decide to request a new visa and returned to the United States. I had not planned in advance to contact the Soviet embassy in Mexico, therefore it was not prepared. If I could have contacted the Soviet embassy in Havana as planned, the embassy there would have had time to complete our business. Of course, the Soviet embassy is not at fault that it, as I say, was not prepared; the Cuban consul is guilty of serious violation of rules, I am glad he has already been replaced. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is not currently interested in my activities in the progressive organization 'Fair Play for Cuba Committee', of which I was secretary"

[Note at bottom of page:] *At the top of first page is stamp "to Khrushchev N.S."

84[]

in New Orleans (Louisiana state), since I no longer reside in this state. However, on November 1, the FBI visited us here in Dallas, Texas. Agent James P. Hasty warned me that if I participate in the work of the Committee for Fair Treatment of Cuba, the FBI will again "take interest" in me.

This agent also "suggested" to Marina Nikolaevna that she could stay in the USA under FBI "protection," i.e. that she could defect from the USSR; of course, my wife and I strongly protested against such FBI

tactics.

Please inform us about receiving our Soviet entry visas as soon as you receive them. I also inform you about the birth of my wife's daughter Audrey Marina Oswald on October 20, 1963 in Dallas, Texas.
Respectfully, Lee H. Oswald.

The Ambassador and I believe that in case American authorities approach us with a request, we should show them the indicated letter.

Resident of the Committee for State Security under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 33 - 35. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of 8th Department of 8th Main Directorate of KGB under Council of Ministers of USSR. Archive of SVR of Russia. L. 198 - 200. Typescript on cipher telegram form of 8th Department of 8th Main Directorate of KGB under Council of Ministers of USSR. Copy 8

****No. 24****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding mood in White House in connection with J.F. Kennedy assassination

Spec. No. 1983, 1984 November 23, 1963 Washington TOP SECRET Copy No. 12

Urgent

During continuous radio broadcasts, which are now dedicated only to Kennedy's death, by evening there was a brief statement from a State Department representative that, as far as he knows, there is no evidence that Russia, Cuba or any other country were involved in the president's assassination.

*On the first page at top stamped "To Khrushchev N.S." 85Signal copy

However, in the same transmission, data was provided about Oswald and his "pro-communist and pro-Cuban" sympathies and connections. Soon after, it was also reported that Oswald had allegedly expressed a desire to be defended by attorney Abt, known here for court cases where he appeared in defense of American Communist Party members. It is possible that Oswald could have been prompted with this idea about Abt, which adds an even more compromising tone to the entire case.

The above-mentioned statement by the State Department representative was transmitted only once, and it got lost in the continuous speculations and conjectures by radio and television regarding the Oswald case. For many Americans, it went completely unnoticed.

In the evening, our correspondent, who knows Salinger well personally, had a brief unofficial conversation with him. When asked why the White House had not published any statement similar to the one mentioned above but more authoritative and noticeable for everyone, Salinger, hopelessly waving his hand, stated that currently no one in the White House is confirming anything for publication. "The situation is very complex, many things are still unknown, no one wants to take any responsibility because of this." Salinger implied that the State Department representative's statement was sanctioned by Rusk, who is greatly concerned about serious international consequences due to events related to Kennedy's death. The rather

timid nature of this statement is explained, as could be understood from Salinger, by the fact that Johnson has not yet given Rusk any firm instructions on this matter, and Rusk acted more on his own initiative.

Currently in the U.S. capital, there is complete confusion in various departments and ministries and tense anticipation of the new president's first steps. All sorts of assumptions and guesses are being made about possible changes in the cabinet and other high administrative positions, which according to the constitution and tradition are filled by the president himself and are subordinate only to him. Rumors have emerged about Rusk's possible replacement by Acheson, about Bundy's imminent resignation, Udall and so on.

Undoubtedly, there is a certain element of exaggeration and speculation in all these rumors. Apparently, Johnson will not rush into mass reshuffling to avoid causing widespread discontent within the Democratic Party itself, especially on the eve of elections, and time is needed for him to figure out the complex U.S. administrative machine. However, serious observers close to the White House, in private conversations, express a unanimous opinion that the first to leave the cabinet, judging by everything, will be Robert Kennedy. He has poor personal relations with Johnson, especially after the Ministry of Justice, which R. Kennedy heads, helped collect compromising materials on Baker, a former Senate majority leader's aide and Johnson's personal friend (the Baker case has been at the center of attention for the past month

86Signal copy

of Washington's scandalous chronicle[101]). The same was true with the recent resignation of Naval Minister Kort[102], a direct protégé of Johnson.

Judging by several indicators, there is now an intense discussion behind the scenes of the White House regarding which course the new president should take in US foreign and domestic policy. One of the nearest problems fraught with serious consequences is how to assess the events related to Kennedy's assassination and how we can best use these events in the pre-election context (and there is little doubt that Johnson will seek re-election). The state of our relations with the USA, and indeed the general international situation, may largely depend on what decision Johnson ultimately makes. The proposals expressed in our No. 1973[103] could, in our opinion, play a positive role in this matter.

A. Dobrynin

REFERENCE: No. 1973-1975 (incoming No. 54142) dated 23/XI-63 from comr. Dobrynin, reported about charges brought against Oswald in Kennedy's murder and US reaction to this, made proposals for the embassy to express to US government the USSR government's concern about the tone given to Kennedy's assassination in American press and to draw attention to the consequences for USSR-USA relations that this tendency may have if not stopped in time.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 29 - 32. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 25****

Record of conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and US Ambassador to USSR F. Kohler during embassy visit

November 23, 1963[104]

On November 23, during comr. N.S. Khrushchev's visit to the US Embassy in Moscow, a conversation of the following content took place between him and Ambassador Kohler.

Having expressed deep condolences on behalf of the Soviet government and people regarding the assassination of US President Kennedy, N.S. Khrushchev tells Kohler that the Soviet government has decided to send comr. A.I. Mikoyan to Washington to participate in the funeral of the late president.

87Signal Copy

Kohler thanks N.S. Khrushchev for expressing condolences and adds that A.I. Mikoyan will be issued a visa for travel to the USA without delay.

Kohler further says that he is deeply touched by N.S. Khrushchev's visit to the embassy and is confident that these feelings will be shared by President Johnson and the family members of the late president.

N.S. Khrushchev expresses deep regret regarding Kennedy's death. With him, he continues, I developed good personal relations. We respected each other and understood that, although we are, of course, people of different poles, we must live on one planet.

Kohler responds that he personally knows well that N.S. Khrushchev and the late president well understood the enormous responsibility that rested on both of them for the world's fate. From the very moment, he continues, when he took office as president, I worked closely with him and was glad that soon after he became president, Kennedy met with N.S. Khrushchev and frequently exchanged messages with him.

Throughout this entire period, the ambassador continues, Lyndon Johnson was always beside the president and worked in close contact with him. Therefore, we can note with satisfaction that there will not be any interruption in the relations between our countries.

N.S. Khrushchev responds that the Soviet government, for its part, would like to continue developing and maintaining contacts between the governments of our two countries, cooperating on those issues that contribute to the easing of international tension.

Further, N.S. Khrushchev asks Kohler to convey his condolences to John Kennedy's father and mother, adding that he, N.S. Khrushchev, as well as his daughter R.N. Khrushcheva and A.I. Adzhubei have already sent their condolences to Mrs. Kennedy.

Kohler says that all his efforts as US Ambassador to the USSR will continue to be directed at strengthening relations between the USSR and USA and for the benefit of peace, which, in his opinion, corresponds to the common interests of both countries.

N.S. Khrushchev notes that in this field Kohler will always find full support from the Soviet government.

Kohler then says that when he received the first news of the president's death the day before, he simply could not believe it. However, he says, there can always appear some madman. They have appeared before in American history.

N.S. Khrushchev asks whether the killer has been detained yet.

Kohler responds that a former US Marine Corps serviceman, who was discharged from the US army with dishonor, has been detained on suspicion of Kennedy's murder, but there is no precise information regarding his guilt yet. In any case, he continues, I think that the person who committed such a crime is undoubtedly insane.

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N.S. Khrushchev says that communists are revolutionaries. However, our party has always stood against methods of terror, believing that class struggle should be conducted through political means. In his time, after V.I. Lenin's elder brother was executed for participating in an attempt on the tsar's life, Lenin said: "We shall go by a different path," meaning, of course, political struggle.

Further, N.S. Khrushchev says that Kennedy made a strong impression on him. He was a person who, though young, knew how to carry himself and possessed great tact.

Kohler notes that Johnson is somewhat older than Kennedy. He is 55 years old, but like Kennedy, he is a World War II veteran and thus also represents the military and post-war generation.

N.S. Khrushchev says that Kennedy had one important trait - a sense of reality, which cannot be acquired through any diplomatic science.

Kohler notes that Kennedy was a person of great perseverance who, despite his youth, possessed great experience.

N.S. Khrushchev agrees with this and says that from his meeting with Kennedy, he got the impression that he truly had a good grasp of the issues that were being discussed then.

Kohler expresses regret that N.S. Khrushchev is not acquainted with L. Johnson and expresses confidence that Johnson will be liked by N.S. Khrushchev. He is a Texan, an experienced political figure who always worked closely with Kennedy, sharing the same views.

N.S. Khrushchev notes that this is evident if only from the fact that even journalists, who sometimes like to make up things about supposed disagreements between various political figures, never wrote anything of the sort about relations between Kennedy and Johnson.

Further, N.S. Khrushchev asks Kohler, when he meets with the new U.S. president, to convey his best wishes and express hope that good relations will develop between our countries.

Kohler promises to convey N.S. Khrushchev's wishes to Johnson and in conclusion, on his own behalf, thanks N.S. Khrushchev and members of his family for expressing condolences to the family of the late President Kennedy.

Present at the conversation were A.A. Gromyko, head of USA Department of USSR MFA M.N. Smirnovsky, Minister-Counselor of US Embassy Stessel and Embassy Counselor Toon.

Recorded by: V. Sukhodrev

RGANI. F. 52. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 111-114. Original. Typewritten text. Signature-autograph in blue ballpoint pen.

89Special Copy

****No. 26****

Note from the Chairman of KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR V.E. Semichastnyi to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko about L.H. Oswald

****No. 3125-s November 23, 1963****

To The Minister Of Foreign Affairs Of The Ussr

Comrade GROMYKO A.A.

In connection with foreign agencies' reports about the arrest by American authorities of Lee Oswald, allegedly involved in the assassination of the US President, I am reporting the following information known to us about him.

Lee Harvey Oswald, born in 1939, is a native and citizen of the USA. He comes from an insurance agent's family. His father died in 1939, his mother lives in Texas. From October 1956, he served in the military in Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In mid-1959, he was demobilized and immediately undertook a tourist trip to various countries, including Finland, where he received permission to enter the USSR for 5 days.

Having arrived in October 1959 in the USSR as a tourist, he appealed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a petition for accepting him into Soviet citizenship and granting him the opportunity to permanently reside in the USSR¹■■■.

Due to this request being denied, he attempted to commit suicide by cutting a vein in his arm. After recovery, he continued to insist on being granted Soviet citizenship and did not wish to leave the USSR. On October 31, 1959, he visited the US Embassy in Moscow and declared his renunciation of American citizenship.

Considering that Americans previously granted Soviet citizenship, after living in the USSR for some time, were leaving our country, the Committee for State Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a proposal to the CC CPSU not to grant Oswald Soviet citizenship, but only to provide him with the right of temporary residence in the USSR (for one year)¹■■■.

In accordance with the directive of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated December 1, 1959¹■■■, Oswald was sent to Minsk, where he was provided with a separate apartment and, considering his wishes, was employed at the Minsk Radio Factory. Through the Red Cross, Oswald was provided with material assistance in the amount of 70 rubles per month.

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In April 1961 in Minsk, Oswald married a Soviet citizen Prussakova Marina Nikolaevna, born in 1941, who worked as a nurse.

Contrary to his initial statement about the impossibility of his residence in the USA, from early 1961 Oswald began persistently seeking permission to leave the USSR, in connection with which he established official correspondence with the US Embassy in Moscow, and in July 1961 visited the embassy with his wife for this purpose. Since there were no obstacles to Oswald and his wife's departure from the USSR, and considering that he was granted only temporary residence in the USSR, they were given permission to leave and in June 1962 they departed for the USA.

In March 1963, Oswald-Prussakova appealed to the USSR Embassy in Washington with a written request to allow her to return to the USSR for permanent residence, with residence in Leningrad. In her application, Oswald-Prussakova stated that her reasons for requesting permission to return to the USSR were homesickness for her Homeland, as well as financial difficulties that she was experiencing with her family

in the USA. Oswald-Prussakova's petition was forwarded by the USSR Embassy for consideration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR.

Due to the fact that Oswald-Prussakova's relatives living in Leningrad did not express a desire to accept her, she was denied permission to enter the USSR. Oswald also appealed to the Soviet Embassy in Washington with a similar request at the same time, but his petition was not considered due to the previous denial to his wife.

In October 1963, Oswald visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico and again appealed with a request to grant him political asylum in the USSR, citing that he, as a secretary of a pro-Cuban organization, was being pursued by FBI agents. This petition by Oswald was reviewed by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and was rejected for the same reasons his previous requests were rejected.

Chairman Of The State Security Committee

V.Semichastniy

TsA FSB RF. F. 5-os. Op. 10. D. 72. L. 344 - 346. Copy (2 copies). Typewritten text.

91Signal copy

****No. 27****

Note from the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko to the Central Committee of the CPSU with attached draft of confidential message from N.S. Khrushchev to US President L. Johnson

****No. 3372/GS November 24, 1963****

Secret. Copy No. 1

To The Cc Cpsu

In connection with comrade A.I. Mikoyan's trip to Washington for J.F. Kennedy's funeral, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents a draft of confidential message from comrade N.S. Khrushchev to US President L. Johnson.

Draft resolution is attached.

Please review. A. Gromyko

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 372. L. 154. Original. Typewritten text. Signature-autograph in blue ink.

****No. 28****

Resolution of the CC CPSU Presidium "On confidential message from comrade Khrushchev N.S. to US President"

No. P125/11 November 24, 1963

Approve the draft message from comrade Khrushchev N.S. to US President Johnson (attached).

[Attachment] To point 11 of protocol No. 125

Confidential Dear Mr. President,

I am writing this message to you at a moment that holds a special place in the history of your country. The villainous assassination of the head of the American state John F. Kennedy

[Page number: 92]

Footnotes

a At bottom of page marked in purple ballpoint pen "Za. D. Polyansky" b On original resolution, note by M.V. Sokolova in blue ballpoint pen "com. Khrushchev N.S. - Za[.] Mikoyan A.I. - Za - coordinated by G.Gromyko[.] Brezhnev L.I. - Za[.] Voronov G.I. - Za[.] Kirilenko A.P. - Za[.] Kosygin A.N. - Za[.] Podgorny N.V. - Za. Note after list of surnames stands curly bracket and inscription "Voted by telephone 24.XI.63" c On first page under main text printed: "His Excellency Mr. Lyndon B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America Washington, White House"

represents a heavy, very heavy loss for your country. I will say directly that the weight of this loss is felt by the whole world, including us - Soviet people.

I have no need to tell you that the late President John F. Kennedy and I, as the head of government of the socialist Soviet Union, were people of different poles. But I think that you, apparently, and he himself had developed a certain opinion that the awareness of great responsibility for the fate of peace guided in recent years the actions of both governments - both the Soviet Union and the United States of America. These actions were based on the desire to prevent catastrophe and resolve contentious issues through negotiation, taking into account the most important, most fundamental interests of our peoples, the interests of ensuring peace.

The awareness of such responsibility, which I discovered in John F. Kennedy during our very first conversations in Vienna in 1961, laid that invisible bridge of mutual understanding, which, I dare say, was not broken until the last day of President John F. Kennedy's life. For myself, I can definitely say that I never lost my feeling of respect for the late President precisely because he, like us, built his policy on the desire to prevent military confrontation between major powers bearing on their shoulders the main burden of responsibility for maintaining peace.

Now, taking advantage of the trip to the USA of my first deputy A.I. Mikoyan to participate in John F. Kennedy's funeral, I address these lines to you, as the new President of the United States of America, vested with high responsibility before your people. I don't know how you will take these words of mine, but I will tell you directly that we saw in you an ally of the late President, who was always next to the President and supported his line in foreign policy. This, it seems to me, gives us reason to express hope that the foundation that dictated to the leaders of both countries the necessity to prevent the unleashing of a new

war and preserve peace will be determining in the development of relations between our two states going forward.

Needless to say that from our side and personally from my side, as head of government of the Soviet Union, there was and is readiness to find through exchange of opinions mutually acceptable solutions to those problems that still divide us. This applies both to problems of European security, remaining for the current generation of people mainly as inheritance from World War II, and to other international problems.

Judging by experience, exchange of opinions and our contacts can take various forms, including through exchange of personal messages, if this does not contradict your wishes. Recently we marked the 30th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations between the USSR and USA. This is a historical act, in which President Franklin D. Roosevelt played an outstanding role. We have always believed that the late President John F. Kennedy, being

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representative of the same political party, to some extent continued Roosevelt's foreign policy traditions based on recognizing that the coinciding interests of the USSR and USA dominate over what divides them.

To you, Mr. President, as a representative of the same direction in US politics that brought to the forefront of political life such statesmen as Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, I want to say that if these great traditions continue to be supported and strengthened, then, in our conviction, both Americans and Soviet people could look optimistically to the future. We are convinced that every state would sympathize with such development of events, and moreover, every person who stands for peace and cherishes peace.

If you wish to express your thoughts in connection with these ideas, even if somewhat general in nature, which I considered possible to share with you in this message, I would welcome this.

Respectfully,

N. Khrushchev

Moscow, Kremlin November 24, 1963

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 372. L. 150-153. Original. Typewritten text.

****No. 29****

TASS Report "Departure of First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to Washington"

November 24, 1963

On November 24, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan departed from Moscow to Washington to participate in the funeral of US President John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

At Vnukovo-2 airport, A.I. Mikoyan was seen off by comrades G.I. Voronov, D.S. Polyansky, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers D.F. Ustinov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko, Chairman of the State Security Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastnyi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.A. Zorin and other officials.

Among those seeing him off were US Ambassador to the USSR Foy D. Kohler and diplomatic staff of the American embassy.

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Before departure A.I. Mikoyan made the following statement to representatives of Soviet and foreign press:

"We are departing for Washington to accompany on the final journey the President of the United States of America John Fitzgerald Kennedy, whose life ended so tragically as a result of a vile assassination attempt.

The Soviet government and its head Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev have instructed me to convey to the family of the deceased president, the leadership of the US government, and all American people sincere condolences regarding this grave loss."

(Tass).

Newspaper "Pravda". 1963. November 25. No. 329. Typographic text.

****No. 30****

TASS Report "Foreign Representatives at J. Kennedy's Funeral"

November 24, 1963

WASHINGTON, November 24 (TASS). White House Press Secretary P. Salinger announced that the following representatives of foreign states will attend Kennedy's funeral: First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.I. Mikoyan, President of France de Gaulle, Prince Philip of Edinburgh and Prime Minister of England A. Douglas-Home, Chancellor of FRG L. Erhard and Mayor of West Berlin W. Brandt, Prime Minister of Japan H. Ikeda, President of Philippines D. Macapagal, Prime Minister of Cambodia Norodom Sihanouk.

Newspaper "Pravda". 1963. November 25. No. 329. Typographic text.

****No. 31****

Message from US President L. Johnson to N.S. Khrushchev with gratitude for condolences

November 24, 1963

To His Excellency N.S. Khrushchev Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Moscow

Dear Mr. Chairman,

On behalf of the American people, I would like to thank you for your expressed condolences regarding the tragic death of President Kennedy. All efforts of the President

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Kennedy was dedicated to the cause of peace and peaceful settlement of international problems and improving relations between all countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States. I intend to continue striving towards these goals.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Pravda Newspaper. 1963. November 26. No. 330. Typographic text.

****No. 32****

Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding conversation with US President's Special Representative on USSR matters L. Thompson about Soviet-American relations

Spec. No. 1990 - 1995 November 24, 1963 Washington TOP SECRET Copy No. 12

Urgent

Today Thompson visited me at my apartment. He is clearly distressed by all recent events and is greatly concerned about their negative impact on Soviet-American relations.

1. Thompson said that N.S. Khrushchev's visit to the American embassy in connection with Kennedy's death was a very far-sighted step, which he personally fully welcomes and which will immediately help significantly reduce the anti-Soviet tone of subsequent events. However, the development of events still greatly worries Thompson. In this regard, as his personal advice, he wanted to express some considerations as a long-time supporter of improving relations between our countries.

Firstly, in his opinion, it would be better if the Soviet press would for now report more on the factual side of recent events, without particularly emphasizing the involvement of far-right circles. All such statements by the Soviet press immediately begin to be debated here and are contrasted with Oswald's "communist connections". Additional passions flare up, and in US conditions, propaganda always takes the side of those who are against the "reds".

a On the first page at the top is stamped "to. Khrushchev N.S." b Here and further underlined in the original document.

and thus against the Soviet Union (Norman Kazins from New York also called me today about this, asking to convey his "friendly advice to Moscow").

To my question whether he really thinks that Oswald is virtually a "tool of international communism," Thompson firmly replied that, of course, he does not think so. However, Thompson said nothing to my comment that isn't it not in the interests of relations between our countries to expose any insinuations and hints directed at the Soviet Union and progressive forces in connection with recent events. And these events, apparently, certain circles in the USA are not averse to using for their own selfish interests, especially when no official statements are made here that would help stop the intrigues and reduce tensions within the country in connection with everything happening here after Kennedy's death.

Secondly, welcoming A.I. Mikoyan's upcoming arrival to Washington, Thompson, again as his personal opinion, advised him:

To avoid any interviews with press and television if possible. "Whatever A.I. Mikoyan might say publicly now," Thompson noted, "almost certainly everything under current conditions will be transmitted in a distorted light and used to incite anti-Soviet sentiments." Our very participation in the president's funeral "speaks for itself quite eloquently and creates a good impression among the majority of the American people." American authorities will, of course, take all precautionary measures to ensure A.I. Mikoyan's personal safety. Nevertheless, in Thompson's opinion, after the funeral A.I. Mikoyan should probably not stay too long in Washington.

Regarding my comment about the usefulness for Soviet-American relations of organizing a personal meeting between A.I. Mikoyan and the new president, Thompson replied that he fully agrees with me, but the question of individual meetings between Johnson and arriving high officials has not yet been decided, as there are too many of them. They wanted to organize such meetings only for heads of state at first, but then prime ministers of many important countries would be left out. So far there is an intention to arrange a general reception for heads of delegations, where it will be possible to talk with Johnson for 5-10 minutes.

I told Thompson that such matters, of course, depend on the president's decision and what he considers most necessary. Thompson immediately said that he understands that meeting with "some duchess," who formally holds a high protocol position, cannot be compared to meeting with a member of the Soviet government, and that he has been thinking about this himself since learning about A.I. Mikoyan's upcoming arrival here (late in the evening Thompson called me and said that he would go to meet A.I. Mikoyan and that "the meeting we discussed will almost certainly be arranged").

Thompson also strongly recommended that A.I. Mikoyan visit Rusk, regardless

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from meeting with Johnson, and to seriously negotiate with him about further paths of development of Soviet-American relations. Thompson confidentially and persistently emphasized that in practical terms, a conversation with Rusk might yield more than with Johnson, although establishing first contacts with the new president is undoubtedly necessary and useful.

Responded to Thompson that I will convey his considerations to A.I. Mikoyan.

2. Thompson personally deeply regrets the death of Kennedy, with whom he had established good trusting relations, and they understood each other with half a word. Thompson has met several times with the new president Johnson, but these meetings so far have been more formal in nature.

Thompson indicated that Johnson was familiar with a significant portion of Kennedy's personal correspondence with N.S. Khrushchev, but unlikely with all correspondence. He knows nothing, for example, about the verbal agreement regarding missiles in Turkey and Italy reached during the Cuban crisis. Johnson was present at many confidential meetings with the president on foreign policy issues, sometimes spoke up, but more often simply remained silent and then agreed with the president. Johnson thus has a general familiarity with many US foreign policy problems, but knows them superficially and has not shown much taste for details of foreign policy issues so far.

In this regard, Thompson said in strictly confidential terms, one should expect a significant strengthening of Rusk's role in foreign policy. Rusk has long been in good, almost friendly relations with Johnson. Both are from southern US states. Given Johnson's dislike for diplomatic details, Thompson expects as a result of all this that in foreign policy matters, the relationship between Johnson and Rusk will, in his view, resemble

the relationship between Eisenhower and Dulles, when the former simply entrusted foreign policy matters to his Secretary of State. True, Rusk is not Dulles, and Johnson is not Eisenhower. Johnson has a more firm, ambitious and hot-tempered character than Eisenhower, but to some degree the nature of his relationship with Rusk in foreign policy will be similar.

In Thompson's opinion, supporting his consideration about the growing influence of Rusk and the State Department in general is also the fact that Johnson intends to focus now mainly on domestic policy and Congress, where he was previously Senate leader, primarily in terms of preparing for the election campaign. And he, Johnson, is firmly determined to run for US president.

Regarding foreign policy, Johnson gave instructions to Rusk yesterday to continue Kennedy's line on major foreign policy issues. Thompson heard all this from Rusk himself.

Thompson asked that his statements be treated as strictly confidential.

Regarding his own role, Thompson noted that it would apparently somewhat decrease in terms of his direct contacts with the president; this would mainly be handled by

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now, by all accounts, Rusk himself. Of course, he, Thompson, will remain as before the main advisor to Rusk (with whom he has good personal relations) on Soviet-American relations.

President Johnson generally intends to keep, except for some changes, Kennedy's cabinet. Johnson's immediate assistants in the White House will be his own people, with whom he has long worked.

Regarding Robert Kennedy, about whose further political fate all kinds of speculation are now being made in the capital, he, Thompson, knows that the personal relations between R. Kennedy and Johnson are quite peculiar: they are far from friendship, but they respect each other as experienced, knowledgeable and influential people in the Democratic Party.

In 1960, R. Kennedy barely managed to persuade Johnson to withdraw his presidential candidacy from this party in favor of the now deceased Kennedy and agree instead to the post of vice president. Thompson noted in this connection that this morning he heard from a close friend of Johnson that Johnson yesterday dropped a remark about whether to consider offering R. Kennedy to run in 1964 together with him as vice president. Thompson does not rule out such a possibility in general, although it is definitely difficult to talk about it now. The "Johnson - R. Kennedy" electoral ticket would help Johnson, whose positions are weak in industrial regions and especially in the eastern part of the country, where influential states are located and where the late president's positions were strong. On the other hand, R. Kennedy would thus increase his chances of being elected president in the next election in 1968.

Thompson reported that during a recent trip to Finland, Johnson sent Kennedy a telegram asking whether he should visit Leningrad for 2-3 days, about which he had heard much. On Thompson's advice, Kennedy gave a negative response, as Johnson's visit to Leningrad alone would be incomprehensible to both the Soviet government and US allies. Thompson asked, however, not to reference this anywhere, adding that what he said does not imply any hint that Johnson might soon go to Moscow, as he now needs much time to sort out affairs.

When Thompson expressed his concern about recent events, it was felt that something was bothering him personally as well: during the conversation he dropped a remark that it was he who was the ambassador in Moscow who allowed Oswald's return entry to the USA¹¹■.

Agreed with Thompson to continue maintaining mutual contact.

A. Dobrynin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 328. L. 111 - 118. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

99Signal Copy

****No. 33****

Materials regarding the trip of First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to J.F. Kennedy's funeral

No later than November 25, 1963

****No. 1****

Representatives of foreign states arriving in Washington to participate in the funeral of the late US President John F. Kennedy

Great Britain Prince Philip Alec Douglas-Home Prime Minister; Harold Caccia Permanent Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Harold Wilson Leader of the Labour Party; France Charles de Gaulle President Maurice Couve de Murville Minister of Foreign Affairs General Charles Ailleret Head of Joint Chiefs of Staff Etienne Burin Des Roziers Head of President de Gaulle's Personal Secretariat Jean Auburtin President of Paris Municipal Council

Frg

Heinrich Lübke President Ludwig Erhard Chancellor Gerhard Schröder Minister of Foreign Affairs von Hassel Minister of Defense The FRG delegation includes Willy Brandt, Mayor of West Berlin Italy Attilio Piccioni Minister of Foreign Affairs; General Emiliano Scotti Presidential Advisor on Military Affairs; G. Roberti Representative of Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Canada Lester B. Pearson Prime Minister; Japan Ikeda Prime Minister; Masayoshi Ohira Minister of Foreign Affairs;

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India Mrs. Pandit head of Indian delegation at the General Assembly session;

Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Minister of Foreign Affairs;

Uae

Mahmud Fawzi Minister of Foreign Affairs; Brazil Castro Minister of Foreign Affairs Argentina Carlos H. Perette Vice President Spain General Agustin Muñoz Grandes Vice Premier; Greece Queen Frederica; Venizelos Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Turkey Ismet Inonu Prime Minister; Iran Prince Gholamreza Abbas Aram Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ireland Eamon de Valera President Holland

Crown Princess Beatrix Jozef Luns Minister of Foreign Affairs Belgium Baudouin, King Paul-Henri Spaak Minister of Foreign Affairs Portugal L.S. Pinto Chairman of the United Chambers; Austria Alphons Gorbach Chancellor; Bruno Kreisky Minister of Foreign Affairs; Vatican Egidio Vagnozzi Apostolic Nuncio to the USA

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Luxembourg Prince Jean Eugene Schaus Minister of Foreign Affairs;

Finland Veli Merikoski Minister of Foreign Affairs;

Denmark Otto Krag Prime Minister;

Sweden Prince Bertil Tage Erlander Prime Minister Olav Palme Minister without Portfolio

Norway Harald, Crown Prince Einar Gerhardsen Prime Minister

Israel Golda Meir Minister of Foreign Affairs

Jordan A. Atallah Minister of Foreign Affairs

Morocco Ahmed Reda Guedira Minister of Foreign Affairs

Tunisia Bahi Ladgam President of National Assembly Mongi Slim Minister of Foreign Affairs

Algeria Amar Ouzegane Minister Abdul Kadar UN Ambassador

Ethiopia Haile Selassie Emperor

Congo (Leopoldville) Masangu Vice Premier

Tanganyika Erakto A.M. Mangenya Permanent Representative to UN

Liberia William Tolbert Vice President; Rudolf Grimes State Secretary;

Philippines Diosdado P. Manapagal President

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South Korea Park Chung Hee president Kim Hyeon Chul prime minister South Vietnam Prince Nguyen Ngoc To minister Jamaica Alexander Bustamante prime minister Nicaragua Alfonso Ortega Urbana minister of foreign affairs

****No. 2****

Representatives of socialist countries arriving in Washington to participate in the funeral of the late US President John F. Kennedy

Polish People's Republic Piotr Jaroszewicz deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; Romanian People's Republic Militia deputy minister of foreign affairs; Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Haek deputy minister of foreign affairs; K. Duda ambassador to USA;b Yugoslavia Petar Stamboli prime minister; Ko a Popovi minister of foreign affairs

****No. 3****

Ceremony funeral of the late US President John F. Kennedy November 25, 1963 in Washington

11:00 - casket with the body of the deceased in a car accompanied by the widow and R. Kennedy is transported to the White House territory, where the funeral procession forms. 11:15 - heads of foreign states, governments and government delegations, who arrived for the funeral, are invited to arrive at the White House territory (through the southwest gates) and take their places in the funeral procession.

a Written in blue ink above the line. b Crossed out in blue ink.

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The funeral procession forms in the following order:

- the President's widow, his brother R. Kennedy and other close relatives;
- President L. Johnson;
- heads of foreign states, governments and government delegations who arrived for the funeral;
- U.S. state, political and public figures, friends of the deceased.

The cortege with the body of the deceased, accompanied by military escort and funeral procession (on foot), will proceed from the White House along Pennsylvania Avenue, 17th Street, Connecticut Avenue and Rhode Island Avenue to St. Matthew's Cathedral.

Heads of foreign states, governments and government delegations who do not wish to participate in the funeral procession may proceed directly to St. Matthew's Cathedral with members of their delegations and take their designated places.

Other delegation members should proceed directly to the cathedral and take their seats no later than 11:45.

Heads of embassies and missions meet at the State Department at 10:30 (entrance through the main entrance), from where they proceed to the cathedral. Due to limited parking space, the State Department suggests that heads of embassies and missions, if possible, share vehicles with their colleagues to follow to the cathedral and thus reduce the number of vehicles.

Admission to St. Matthew's Cathedral will be by invitation cards and passes only. Members of foreign delegations can obtain passes at corresponding regional departments of the State Department. Passes for heads of embassies and missions will be handed to them at the main entrance to the State Department at 10:30.

12:00 - 12:45 - requiem mass at St. Matthew's Cathedral with participation of all members of the funeral procession, foreign delegations and diplomatic corps members.

12:45 - 13:00 - at St. Matthew's Cathedral the funeral procession forms: heads and members of foreign delegations take places in vehicles to proceed to Arlington Cemetery. The procession forms in the following order:

- the President's widow and close relatives;
- President Johnson and his accompanying persons (including former Presidents Eisenhower and Truman);
- heads of foreign states, governments and government delegations who arrived for the funeral;
- Chief Justice of the United States;

- Dean of the Diplomatic Corps;
- U.S. state, political and public figures, friends of the deceased.

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Heads of embassies and missions, as well as other guests may, if they wish, proceed to Arlington Cemetery using their available means of transport.

All participants of the funeral ceremony proceed on foot to the burial site upon arrival at Arlington Cemetery.

Around 14:00 - brief funeral ceremony at Arlington Cemetery, details of which will be announced additionally.

15:30 - it is proposed (although not yet finally decided)■ the President's widow will host■ a tea■ at the White House for heads of foreign states, governments and government delegations who arrived for the funeral (it is expected that from the Soviet side, besides comrade A.A. Mikoyan, comrades Dobrynin A.F. and Smirnovsky M.N. will also be invited)■.

17:00 - President Johnson hosts a reception at the State Department for heads of foreign states, governments and government delegations who arrived for the funeral (from the Soviet side besides comrade A.I. Mikoyan, comrades■ Dobrynin A.F. and Smirnovsky M.N. will be invited).

GA RF. F. R-5446. Op. 120. D. 1821. L. 22. Copy (2 copies). Typewritten text on paper with watermark "Eagle A Trojan Bond".

****No. 34****

Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and KGB Chairman under the USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastniy regarding the exposure of American press fabrications about L.H. Oswald's connections with the USSR

****No. 03381/GS November 25, 1963■****

Secret. Copy No. 1

The American press has been spreading various slanderous fabrications about some "connections" with the Soviet Union and Cuba of Lee Harvey Oswald, who was accused by American authorities of assassinating US President J. Kennedy, and was then himself killed under mysterious circumstances. Meanwhile, some American press outlets

■ Here and further all corrections made in simple pencil. Words "15:30 - it is proposed (although not yet finally decided)" are crossed out and written "Immediately after burial". ■ Word "host" crossed out and written "receive". ■ Words "tea for" crossed out. ■ Words "Entry through Northwest gates" added. ■ Word crossed out. ■ Note in simple pencil at bottom left "See new document MID No. 3438/cc dated 29.XI.63".

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attempt to justify their insinuations with references to the fact that Oswald was in the Soviet Union from October 1959 to June 1962.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers have prepared a statement for the Soviet press aimed at exposing these fabrications of the American press. The draft statement has been prepared based on the fact that now, when Oswald himself is dead, the true face of those circles who are responsible for President Kennedy's assassination and who are clearly trying to cover their tracks becomes even more apparent. The question of the expediency of such publication requires special consideration taking into account further developments related to the investigation of Kennedy's assassination circumstances.

If American authorities approach the Soviet embassy in Washington with a request to provide them with some information about Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union, corresponding information on this matter could be provided to them.

Draft resolution is attached. Please review.

Gromyko Semichastniy

[Attachment] Secret. Copy No. 1 Draft

Cpsu Cc Resolution

On measures to expose slanderous fabrications of the American press regarding Lee Harvey Oswald's "connections" with the Soviet Union

1. Approve the draft statement for publication in Soviet press in response to the fabrications of the American press (Attachment 1).
2. Approve the draft instructions to the embassy in Washington regarding possible transfer of information about Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in the USSR to American authorities (Attachment 2).

Secretary Cc

Attachment 1

On The Fabrications Of Certain American Newspapers

These days the world has witnessed a monstrous crime. President of the United States John Fitzgerald Kennedy died at the hands of an assassin. This villainous murder has caused legitimate indignation of all honest people, all those interested in preserving and strengthening peace.

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The assassin's bullet struck President J.F. Kennedy at a moment when prospects for international détente were emerging and the first signs of trust were appearing in relations between states. It is known what fierce attacks the late U.S. President faced for his steps aimed at resolving contentious international issues through achieving agreements between states, primarily between the USSR and USA.

And, of course, it is no coincidence that certain circles are now attempting to cover up tracks and conceal the true perpetrators of this heinous crime. As events around President J.F. Kennedy's assassination continue to unfold, the shadow of those who guided the assassin's hand becomes clearer. Now that Lee Harvey Oswald, who was charged with the president's murder, has himself been killed under mysterious circumstances, the absurdity and malicious intent of slanderous fabrications by certain American press organs become even more obvious as they try to establish some "connection" between Oswald and either the Soviet Union or Cuba, using as a pretext the fact that Oswald had spent some time in the Soviet Union.

As it became known, American citizen L.H. Oswald arrived in October 1959 in the Soviet Union as a tourist, as thousands of other U.S. citizens do. While in Moscow, he applied for Soviet citizenship. Since there were insufficient grounds to satisfy such a request, it was declined. After his persistent appeals, Oswald was granted temporary residence in the Soviet Union as a foreign citizen, as is commonly done with other foreigners. He lived and worked in Minsk for some time and there married a Soviet citizen. During his stay in the Soviet Union, Oswald maintained contact with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. In 1962, Oswald decided to leave the Soviet Union and in June departed for the USA with his wife and child, having received the appropriate permission from the American Embassy in Moscow, which he had approached for this permission.

Regarding Oswald's background, according to American authorities, it is also known that he served in the U.S. Marine Corps in Taiwan, the Philippines and Japan, and after discharge from the military began traveling around European countries and, as noted above, appeared as a tourist in the Soviet Union in October 1959.

These are the facts concerning the arrival, stay and departure from the Soviet Union of American citizen L.H. Oswald. All this demonstrates the malicious nature of anti-Soviet insinuations spread by some American newspapers in connection with Oswald's arrest. Everyone who honors the memory of the late President J.F. Kennedy and his approach to resolving acute international problems understands which circles are interested in

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in spreading such slanderous anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban fabrications, and note them with contempt.

Few believed these fabrications even when there were only initial reports about the circumstances of President J.F. Kennedy's assassination. Now, when a new shot has rung out in the Texas city of Dallas, this time at the person who was charged with the assassination of the US President, such fabrications cannot but cause bitter smiles and understandable indignation not only outside the USA, but also among all honest Americans who have the right to expect that retribution will reach the real killers and organizers of this shameful crime. Who does not understand that the physical elimination of Oswald is an additional link in that chain of crimes that leads to the real organizers of President J.F. Kennedy's assassination, who will stop at nothing to confuse the investigation and direct it down a false path.

The killers of the US President and their inspirers should be sought where they are, where the murder was committed - this is what all reasonable people say who share with the American people feelings of grief and indignation about the tragic death of President J.F. Kennedy.

(Tass)

Washington

Sovposol

In case American authorities approach you with a request to provide information available to the embassy about Lee Harvey Oswald, who was in the USSR, you may transmit the following information on this matter.

"According to information available to the embassy, American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald, born 1939, native of New Orleans, Louisiana, arrived in the Soviet Union in October 1959 as a tourist. While in Moscow, he declared to Soviet authorities his desire to remain in the USSR for permanent residence and applied to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a request for Soviet citizenship. This petition by Oswald was rejected by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

In connection with L.H. Oswald's persistent requests, he was granted temporary residence in the Soviet Union with foreign citizen rights. While in the Soviet Union, Oswald lived in Minsk, where he worked at a local radio factory. In April 1961, Oswald married Soviet citizen Prussakova Marina Nikolaevna, born 1941. In June 1962, Oswald decided to leave the Soviet Union and departed

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in the USA with his family, having received permission for this from the US Embassy in Moscow. In early 1963, the Oswald family applied to the USSR Embassy in Washington with a petition to allow them entry into the Soviet Union for permanent residence. This request was rejected."

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 37-42. Original. Typewritten text. Signatures-autographs in blue ballpoint pen and blue ink.

****No. 35****

Coded telegram from First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to the CPSU Central Committee about a reception organized by the widow of the late President Jacqueline Kennedy

Spec. No. 2000 - 2001 November 25, 1963* Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12

Urgent

To Cpsu Cc

Immediately after the memorial service at Arlington Cemetery, we, along with other foreign representatives who participated in Kennedy's funeral, went to the White House, where the widow of the late president Jacqueline Kennedy held a reception. The arriving guests were met by Kennedy family members, while Jacqueline herself appeared only at the end of the reception. Those present passed by the late president's spouse and exchanged handshakes. We noticed that Jacqueline Kennedy, who exchanged only two or three words with those presented to her, appeared very calm and even seemed to be smiling. However, when we were introduced and conveyed our most sincere condolences on behalf of Nina Petrovna, N.S. Khrushchev, Rada and Alexei Adzhubei, as well as on behalf of the Soviet government and people and on our own behalf, Jacqueline Kennedy, with great emotion and barely holding back tears, said:

"I am convinced that Chairman Khrushchev and my husband could have achieved success in the search for peace, and they truly strived for this. Now you must continue this work and bring it to completion."

We replied that we fully share her opinion and agree that both sides should continue to strive for the development of friendly relations between our countries for the benefit of peace throughout the world. We emphasized that we share her grief over the tragedy that has befallen her.

*On the first page at the top is stamped "To Khrushchev N.S." 109Signal Copy

Jackie Kennedy expressed her heartfelt gratitude to N.S. Khrushchev and us for the warm support and for specially coming to the USA to attend her husband's funeral.

She spoke of all this with inspiration and emotion, and throughout the entire conversation held my hand with both of her hands, trying as convincingly as possible to convey her feelings and thoughts regarding the cause of peace, to which her husband dedicated his efforts, and her desire for our countries to complete the work that was started.

She makes a strong impression with her composure.

A. Mikoyan

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 44-45. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 36****

Cipher telegram from First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU regarding conversations during reception with US President L. Johnson with official American representatives

Spec. No. 2002-2004 November 25, 1963 Washington TOP SECRET Copy No. 12

Urgent

To Cc Cpsu

Today during the reception with the President, I had several brief conversations with US officials.

Two points from these officials' statements deserve attention:

1. All of them (Rusk, Thompson, Director of Arms Control Agency Foster, responsible State Department staff), besides expressing great appreciation for the Soviet government's decision to send its special representative to Kennedy's funeral, from their very first words emphasized their confidence that President Kennedy's line in Soviet-American relations, as well as US foreign policy as a whole, will be maintained under the new president - L. Johnson.

2. Thompson specifically raised in conversation with me the question he discussed yesterday with Comrade Dobrynin - about Soviet press commentary regarding President Kennedy's assassination and especially regarding circumstances related to the investigation of this entire matter.

The essence of Thompson's statements came down to the point that the Soviet press's emphasis on the involvement of far-right circles in the attempt on Kennedy (and subsequently in the murder

[Note at bottom of page: *Stamp "to Khrushchev N.S." at top of first page] 110[]

Oswald Lee complicates the position of those in the USA who stand for improvement of Soviet-American relations, since such statements are immediately countered in the American press by claims about "communist and Cuban connections" of Oswald Lee.

I told Thompson that we do not want to create any complications, but we cannot ignore such a situation when the US government has not yet investigated all circumstances of the assassination, while meaningless accusations regarding Kennedy's murder are already being made in the press against us and Cuba.

Thompson replied that he understands this but asks to understand what he said. The government is now investigating all circumstances of the case, Thompson said, and it is in our common interests to take measures so that until the investigation is completed, the Soviet press would limit itself to presenting facts and refrain from "premature conclusions," as this only plays into the hands of the right-wing who use this to inflame anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban hysteria.

It appears that the US government does not want to involve us in this matter, but also does not want to get into a fight with the far right; it clearly prefers to consign this whole matter to oblivion as quickly as possible. Our reaction to these murders has already played its role. The President stated publicly today that a thorough investigation will be conducted.

I believe that in further statements of our press, this moment should be taken into account. This will help weaken attempts to inflame an anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban campaign.

A.Mikoyan

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 46 - 48. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 37****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA regarding the provocative nature of Lee H. Oswald's letter of November 9, 1963 and the advisability of transferring consular correspondence with him to American authorities

Spec. No. 2005 November 26, 1963 No.1122 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12

Urgent

Please pay attention to Oswald's letter of November 9, the text of which was transmitted to Moscow through close neighbors' line.

*On the first page of the cipher telegram at the top is a stamp "To Khrushchev N.S." To the left before the main text is a note by V.N.Malin in black ink "see. No. 36057/2620 from 24.XI.63." This concerns the registration number of the cipher telegram in Section IV of the General Department of CC CPSU (see document No. 23). 111Signal Copy

This letter is clearly provocative in nature: it creates an impression of our close connection with Oswald and our use of him for some purposes. None of the other letters received by the embassy earlier from Oswald ever contained anything similar. He himself was never at our embassy. The suspicion that this letter is a forgery is significantly strengthened by the fact that it is typewritten, while other letters received by the embassy from Oswald earlier were handwritten.

There is a distinct impression that the letter was organized by those who, apparently, have some connection to the president's assassination. It is possible that Oswald himself wrote this letter under dictation, receiving some promises in exchange, and then, as is known, was simply eliminated after its use.

The relevant American authorities undoubtedly know about this letter, as the embassy's correspondence is under constant surveillance. However, they are not using it in any way yet. They haven't yet requested any information about Oswald himself from the embassy. Perhaps they are waiting for another moment.

A question also arises whether there is now some connection between the aforementioned waiting of American authorities and Thomson's considerations (although Thomson himself may not know about this connection) regarding the desirability of certain restraint by the Soviet press¹² and the actual gradual dampening of the whole Kennedy assassination case. Perhaps the central authorities began to lean toward this when they became aware of all the facts and understood the danger of serious international complications in case of further inflaming by interested U.S. circles, including local Dallas authorities, of the

hysteria regarding the president's assassin's connection to the "left" and our inevitable revelatory statements in this case.

Now the main question arises: should we give the American authorities Oswald's last letter if they request our consular correspondence with him (it contains nothing else that could be used for our compromise). Weighing all arguments for and against, we are inclined to have this letter transferred to the authorities in case they request all correspondence, considering that non-transfer of this letter could be used by the organizers of this entire provocation to try to cast a shadow on us.

Please confirm. Coordinated with A.I. Mikoyan.

A. Dobrynin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 82-84. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of the USSR MFA.

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****No. 38****

Coded telegram from First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU regarding meeting with US President L. Johnson

Spec. No. 2006-2011 November 26, 1963 2:125 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12

Urgent

Cc Cpsu

On November 26, 1963, I had a meeting with the new US President Lyndon Johnson at the White House. When we entered his office, President Johnson came to meet us, greeted us and immediately invited us both to be photographed near his work desk. During the photography, the president thanked the Soviet government for N.S. Khrushchev's message of condolence, as well as for sending a special representative to participate in the funeral.

I replied that this fully corresponds with our thoughts and feelings.

Then Johnson handed me a message addressed to N.S. Khrushchev (text transmitted separately)¹²⁶. He noted that his first action after entering the presidential office in the White House today was signing this message to N.S. Khrushchev. The President recalled that we had met with him four years ago at a dinner

hosted by E. Johnston¹²⁷. Recalling details, he told how I jokingly remarked that between Johnston and Johnson there was a difference of only one letter.

After the correspondents left, we sat at another table, and I began a conversation which took place in the presence of: from the Soviet side - A.F. Dobrynin, M.R. Smirnovsky and V.M. Sukhodrev, and from the American side - Harriman, Thompson, Tyler, Bundy and Akalovsky.

I said that before my departure to Washington, N.S. Khrushchev recalled his first meeting with Johnson in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Johnson was among those senators who asked questions to N.S. Khrushchev. After the conversation, Johnson and Fulbright accompanied N.S. Khrushchev to the car. At that time, Johnson, with American humor, told N.S. Khrushchev that it would be good for him to join the American Senate and that he would be an outstanding senator. To this N.S. Khrushchev then replied: No, let each of us better work in their own parliament and fight there for peace. I recall that after this conversation, correspondents asked You how the meeting went

*On the first page at the top stamp "to Khrushchev N.S." 113Reference copy

and You replied that overall the conversation went well and that N.S. Khrushchev is a very strong person who knows how to use all possibilities to prove the correctness of his point of view.

"Therefore," I continued, "contacts and mutual understanding between N.S. Khrushchev and you began even then. This pleases us, and I repeat, we just talked about this with N.S. Khrushchev before my departure to Washington. My own meetings with you also indicate that we can develop contacts and good mutual understanding with each other."

Johnson smiled with satisfaction, showing that he liked these statements. He said that we would leave a poor memory of ourselves in human history if we could not find an answer to the question of how to live peacefully and beneficially together, in peace with each other. This is the main problem of our time. Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, he continued, along with their associates, seem to have moved forward in this direction, but now the main thing is to find an answer to this question, because if we could find such an answer, how much better the world would become. We quite frankly want to cooperate with all peoples, with all countries. We hope that no one will treat us with hostility. For our part, we have no territorial claims against anyone and do not want to dominate anyone.

I know that the main thought that literally occupied Kennedy every day is what steps can be taken to strengthen mutual understanding between peoples. And I fully share his policy. It, this policy, will continue to be respected; and we are ready to go more than halfway to meet any government.

"We," Johnson continued, "have no intentions to invade Cuba. However, the Cuban problem has very serious significance for our people. We hope that with time we will be able to find an answer to the problems facing us, which would allow us to lead our people forward to peace and mutual understanding. This is already happening partially and tension in the world has changed. We face many quite difficult problems, and if there appears a sign that at some point we can achieve improved relations, we will go our part of the way toward this goal.

We are devoted to our system and intend to preserve it, but this does not mean that we want to enslave any other peoples or establish our dominion over them.

I replied that I was pleased to hear these words from the new U.S. President. Your desire, I continued, to live in peace and friendship with other countries fully corresponds to our views.

"Allow me," I said, "to read and convey to you N.S. Khrushchev's message, which I brought for you." Then comrade Sukhodrev read in English the text of the message, which Johnson listened to with great attention.

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Johnson thanked for conveying the message and said that the U.S. government would continue the policy of information exchange and direct communications.

"When I was a boy," Johnson said, "an old man told me that the best judgment can be made based on information, and information can only be obtained through contacts. This points to the importance of direct communication between us," he added.

"I can tell you," Johnson stated, "that there will be no changes in Kennedy's policy. We are glad that Congress and progressive organizations in the USA approved the negotiations and exchange of views that took place between the U.S. President and Chairman N.S. Khrushchev. And we are encouraged that such relations are shared by both your and our peoples.

"Our constant and daily concern," he continued, "will be the pursuit of peace and seeking solutions for all problems and disagreements that exist between us. I would like to note," Johnson added, "that from our people's perspective, the main problem comes down to subversive activities by Cuba, which inevitably leads to tension in our relations.

"Please convey to Chairman Khrushchev," Johnson said, "that I hope we can freely exchange views with him. I also express hope that the exchange of messages between us will remain confidential and that today's message will not be published. I also hope that during the next meeting with him, he will see that we have made progress in strengthening peace and that perhaps we will achieve more than under my predecessor."

I replied that I had listened to Johnson's statements with satisfaction. Then I said: Regarding your comment about the alleged subversive activities by Cuba, I want to note that it is difficult to understand how small Cuba could conduct subversive activities against any state in general, let alone such a large state as the USA. On the contrary, the whole world sees that subversive actions are being conducted against Cuba, that there are numerous, well-financed organizations carrying out such actions. All subversive activity must cease. For my part, I can say that, as I well know, Cuba would most like to see all subversive activity end. During my stay in Cuba¹²■, Fidel Castro told me that he strives to establish good relations with the USA. In connection with the tragedy that befell the USA, Fidel Castro, as is known, made a dignified statement¹²■, in which he spoke as a true humanist. Therefore, I would like to ask you not to succumb to press fabrications, as I believe good relations with Cuba are in your interests as well.

Johnson responded to this by saying that he only wanted to reflect the attitude of the American people and point out the problem that causes Americans the greatest concern. I with all

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responsibility and sincerity, - he continued, - spoke to you about our intentions regarding Cuba. We have no plans to invade Cuba and we have no grounds for invasion of other countries either through subversive activities or by any other means. I repeat, I only wanted to express the position of the American people in hope of your better understanding of this problem.

Then Johnson asked again if he understood correctly that today's exchange of messages was confidential.

Replied that we proceed from such understanding and added that he can be completely sure of this. Emphasized that Johnson can fully rely on Ambassador Dobrynin, and if he, Johnson, wants to convey something of confidential nature to him, no one in Washington will know about it except him, and in Moscow only N.S. Khrushchev and his closest associates will know, and it will never leak anywhere. We consider all this a necessary condition of our contacts.

Johnson replied that he understands this and wants to assure us that we will meet the same attitude from his side. Then he again expressed gratitude that we honored the memory of the late president and specially flew here to participate in Kennedy's funeral. Johnson further expressed hope that he will have the opportunity to meet and talk with Soviet representatives in the future and that these meetings will be fruitful. I expressed hope that new meetings between N.S. Khrushchev and him, Johnson in his new capacity will be useful and fruitful. Said that obviously the new president now has many matters and therefore I don't want to take up too much of his time. Although yesterday in Washington I "turned" 68 years old, I don't lose hope that sometime in the future there will be an opportunity to talk with him in more detail.

Characteristically, his second statement about Cuba was the result of Bundy's intervention, who had passed him some note before this.

The conversation proceeded in a good atmosphere. Johnson spoke cordially and amicably throughout. After the conversation, we went to the terrace, Johnson showed us flowers and shrubs planted by President Kennedy. There, on the terrace, Johnson said that Kennedy's daughter Caroline* was just playing in the garden, and that she would continue studying at the school on the third floor of the White House until the end of the year.

Before the conversation, it was agreed that it would last half an hour, since after us the president was supposed to receive Lübke and Erhard, however, our actual conversation with Johnson lasted about an hour.

A. Mikoyan

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 328. L. 119 - 126. Copy. Typewritten text on the form of the 10th Department of the USSR MFA cipher telegram.

*As in the document text.

116Signal Copy

****No. 39****

Ciphered telegram from First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU with message from US President L. Johnson to N.S. Khrushchev

Spec. No. 2012 November 26, 1963 Washington TOP SECRET Copy No. 12

Urgent

Cc Cpsu

To our No. 2006 Transmitting text of Johnson's message to N.S. Khrushchev

"The White House, Washington. November 26, 1963. Dear Mr. Chairman,

In addition to the public message which I sent you, I wanted you to know that I have been following closely the development of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and that I fully agreed with President Kennedy's policy. I hope that we can achieve success in improving our relations and in resolving many serious problems that face us.

Allow me to say that I fully realize the grave responsibility that our two countries bear for preserving and strengthening peace. I hope that we can work together to achieve this great goal, despite the many and complex problems that divide us. I can assure you that I will dedicate myself to this goal.

Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson To His Excellency Nikita S. Khrushchev Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Moscow." A. Mikoyan

REFERENCE: No. 2006 (incoming No. 54604) dated 26.XI.63 Mikoyan reported about meeting and conversation with President Johnson on November 26.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 328. L. 127 - 128. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

* On the first page at top stamp "to Khrushchev N.S."

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****No. 40****

Coded telegram from First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU about conversations with leaders of foreign states at receptions after J.F. Kennedy's funeral

Spec. No. 2013-2017 November 26, 1963 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12

Urgent

Cc Cpsu

From brief conversations which I had during yesterday's two receptions with leaders of many foreign states, the following deserves to be reported to you:

1. British Prime Minister Home, upon seeing me, approached on his own and greeted me cordially, then began saying how difficult it is to be Prime Minister, with many worries. To my question whether Macmillan had completely left the political arena or not, he replied that doctors recommended him to step away from affairs for 6 months, after which he intends to participate in the work of the House of Commons. I reminded him of words Macmillan told me in Leningrad about having 10 years of active political life left, which he wants to dedicate to the struggle for peace, for truth, though one usually gets beaten from all sides for this. I told this to Home to prompt him to speak about what he himself plans to do. Home shared that he was planning to write a message to N.S. Khrushchev soon. One could understand Home that he also intends to continue in the spirit of the desire expressed by Macmillan.

I told Home that England could play a serious independent role in resolving current international problems, particularly regarding relations with the Soviet Union. He gladly agreed with this thesis, then asked if I knew Butler. I said that I was not acquainted with him, but had just familiarized myself with his interesting message to our minister A.A. Gromyko.

Home asked how we like their ambassador in Moscow Trevelyan. I replied that he makes a good impression. Home spoke of him as a very good and interesting person.

After the reception they called from Home and informed that he invites me to meet with him, to which I gave my consent.

*At the top of the first page is a stamp "to Khrushchev N.S." 118[]

2. There was a conversation at the reception with de Gaulle. Alphand, the French ambassador here, approached me and began reminiscing about how we signed a good trade agreement with him in 1945. De Gaulle was talking to someone at this time. Alphand said that de Gaulle would like to speak with me. Turning to me, de Gaulle, in good spirits, began saying that since 1944, when we last met, I hadn't changed at all, was in good shape, etc. To this compliment, I responded, in other phrases, with a compliment as well, saying that he had preserved himself well. I said that I follow his speeches and political actions, about the content of which I cannot speak favorably, but it is striking how energetically and vigorously the president works. "There is great strength in de Gaulle," I added. He said: please convey greetings to N.S. Khrushchev. I said that when we left Moscow for here, we didn't know de Gaulle would be here. Had we known, N.S. Khrushchev would certainly have asked me to convey special greetings to him.

De Gaulle stated that he warmly remembers his meetings with N.S. Khrushchev. Our relations, he said, should be the very best, as there are no divergent interests between France and the USSR. "Even your wall in Berlin is not against France, it doesn't separate France from the Soviet Union," he added.

I told de Gaulle that N.S. Khrushchev always remembers his conversations with him, from which it follows that there are no contradictions between the interests of our two countries. Moreover, I continued, we cannot understand why every Soviet initiative regarding strengthening peace in Europe and our other measures are always met with the same response from France - "No, no."

"Why measures?" exclaimed de Gaulle, "when there is peace." To this, I remarked that peace exists, but it is not stable. We need lasting peace. De Gaulle was apparently in a hurry, as it later turned out, for a meeting with the president. He said it was difficult to discuss all these issues at the moment and, saying goodbye, again asked to convey greetings to N.S. Khrushchev.

3. As we were walking to the table that had been provided for us, the Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira rose to meet us and greeted us. Then Prime Minister Ikeda approached us, and a conversation took place.

After exchanging greetings, I recalled our conversations in Tokyo and said that the Japanese government was doing little to strengthen our relations. Meanwhile, this is very important because we are neighbors and, whether we want it or not, we will remain neighbors. Strengthening good-neighborly relations between our countries is needed by Japan no less than by us.

Ikeda noted that they are also neighbors with Canada and the USA. I explained that we are not opposed to Japan's friendship with the USA and Canada and want it to be friends with us just as it is with them, to which Ikeda responded: "Return the Iturup and Kunashir islands to us, and everything will be in order." To this, I expressed my bewilderment and asked how it was possible for our

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return the islands to Japan. I told Ikeda that I had been on these islands a few days after the end of the war. I saw your disarmed soldiers there. I saw how few people lived on these islands. If Japan were to build one chemical plant based on imported Far Eastern timber, it could employ the entire population of these islands. Ikeda noted that fishing is of great importance there. I said that both we and the USSR and Japan now fish in all oceans, where Soviet fishing fleets often meet with Japanese ones.

Regarding economic relations, I said that Soviet-Japanese trade is developing. I liked that the Japanese government responded with refusal to the Western proposal about going to Paris for a meeting on trade with socialist countries¹■■■. The statement says that Japan will decide this issue independently.

Ikeda wanted to object to something. But at this time the Foreign Minister intervened, explaining that this was exactly how it happened.

I spoke in favor of expanding trade between the USSR and Japan. Ikeda said that the Soviet Union should buy more in Japan and pay in cash. Japan has no money, and you demand credits, he added.

I said that we don't demand money, but goods on credit, and we pay accurately. I stated that N.S. Khrushchev will soon present a program for accelerated development of our chemical industry¹■■■, and that Japan could receive large orders under this program if it agrees to more favorable credit terms. He said: "Good."

4. The Prime Minister of Sweden, Erlander, approached me. He said that in Sweden they are awaiting N.S. Khrushchev's visit. Erlander thinks it would be good if N.S. Khrushchev came to Sweden in summer¹■■■. In this case, he could familiarize himself with agriculture, which, as is known, interests him.

I agreed with his opinion and noted that the Soviet government has not yet discussed the timing of N.S. Khrushchev's trip to Scandinavia, although the invitation has been renewed. Added that N.S. Khrushchev is indeed interested in agriculture. Moreover, he sets before the Baltic republics, which have climatic conditions similar to Sweden, the task of achieving the same level of agricultural development as they have. The conversation took place in a friendly atmosphere.

5. The conversation with the Yugoslav delegation was friendly in nature. No special issues were discussed.

6. The Emperor of Ethiopia approached me. He recalled his stay in Moscow¹■■■. At the reception, he did not touch upon the issue of our arms sales to Somalia¹■■■. However, after the reception, he passed me an invitation to meet with him for a conversation, which took place today and during which he raised this issue. This conversation is reported separately¹■¹.

7. The President of Israel Zalman Shazar approached me, and then the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel Golda Meir approached. The President spoke in a friendly manner about the Soviet Union, recalling his trip to the Soviet Union as a tourist last year. He spent a whole month in the Soviet Union, visited Moscow and Leningrad. He speaks Russian well, being originally from Minsk, studied in Petersburg. During World War I, he went abroad. Minister Golda Meir also recalled the time when she was an ambassador to the USSR¹■².

8. Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Bhutto, whom I knew from negotiations with him on economic issues that took place several years ago in Moscow¹■³, also approached me. He stated that President Ayub Khan, upon learning that I would be in Washington, instructed him to convey through me to the Soviet government their desire to seriously improve relations between our countries. Times have changed, circumstances are different, he said, and conclusions must be drawn from this. They have no contradictions with us. There are conditions now for good relations. An aviation agreement has been signed¹■⁴. It has for them not so much practical as political significance as a first step toward serious improvement of relations.

He spoke well of the work of Soviet specialists - geologists working in Pakistan. I expressed my agreement regarding the possibility and necessity of improving relations and promised to convey President Ayub Khan's opinion to N.S. Khrushchev.

A. Mikoyan

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 50 - 56. Copy. Typewritten text on the form of cipher telegram of the 10th Department of the USSR MFA.

****No. 41****

Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and KGB Chairman under the USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastniy to the CPSU Central Committee regarding New York Times correspondent G. Tanner's request to permit travel to Minsk to gather information about L.H. Oswald

****No. 3412/GS November 27, 1963****

Secret. Copy No. 1

To Cc Cpsu

The Moscow correspondent of the "New York Times" Tanner, referring to instructions from his editorial office, has approached the Press Department of the USSR MFA with a request to permit him travel

*Bottom right of the page contains a note in purple ink "Accepted by Presidium members of CC 28.XI-63. To be processed. 28.XI-63 V.Malin"

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to Minsk with the purpose of gathering information about the stay of L.H. Oswald there, who was charged with the assassination of President Kennedy. Tanner also requests to provide him with information about Oswald and particularly about the letters which, according to the New York Times editorial office, he sent

to members of the Soviet government.

According to existing procedures, foreign correspondents arrange their departure from Moscow to other USSR cities through the Press Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Visas and Registration of Foreigners (OVIR).

Denying Tanner's trip to Minsk can be interpreted as an attempt to conceal certain circumstances related to Oswald's stay in the USSR.

At the same time, Tanner's trip to Minsk, and possibly other correspondents following his example if permitted, would allow correspondents on site to gather material for tendentious reports by interviewing people who worked with Oswald or had contact with him and his wife, which could provide new fuel for the noise surrounding Oswald's personality and his stay in the USSR. Recently, however, judging by press reactions, after Oswald's death his personality is becoming secondary and anti-Soviet noise is gradually subsiding.

Considering all this, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers consider it inappropriate to delay the decision on Tanner's permission to travel to Minsk. In case Tanner reapplies to the Press Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he could be verbally informed that the facts concerning Oswald's temporary stay in the Soviet Union and his departure from the USSR are known to the US government, and therefore there is no need for any additional information gathering.

In case other foreign correspondents submit requests for trips to Minsk, proceed from the position that approving such trips at present is inappropriate.

Draft resolution attached¹■■■.

Please review.

A.Gromyko V.Semichastniy

[Attachment] Translation from English "New York Times" Moscow Bureau

26 November 1963

Head of Press Department USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Moscow

Dear Mr. Zamyatin,

As you know, the "New York Times" has been very actively calling for clarification of the circumstances surrounding the death of President Kennedy and Lee Oswald, as well as

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to publish all materials related to this tragic event. This morning "Pravda" quoted our editorial article and reports by James Reston and Anthony Lewis from our Washington bureau on this matter.

In the same vein, my newspaper's editor instructed me to shed as much light as possible on the circumstances of Oswald's life in the Soviet Union.

He asked me to travel to Minsk to find out what could be learned about Oswald's years spent there. He also asked me to inquire with Soviet authorities whether they would be willing to provide "The New York Times" with any information they might have about Oswald. It was reported, for instance, that he wrote

personal letters to members of the Soviet government, including Premier Khrushchev.

I would like to request your help in fulfilling this assignment - in obtaining permission to travel to Minsk, in cooperation with local authorities there, and in conveying to the relevant authorities here in Moscow my request to obtain information about Oswald.

I am confident you know our newspaper well enough to understand that we are not chasing sensations, but that this request is made exclusively with the aim of putting an end to rumors and half-truths.

Hoping for a quick response.

I remain sincerely yours, Henry Tanner, head of Moscow bureau of "The New York Times"

Translated by: T. Loginov

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 378. L. 37-38. Original. Typewritten text, signatures - autographs in blue ballpoint pen and blue ink.

****No. 42****

Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and KGB Chairman under the USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastniy to the CPSU Central Committee regarding draft instructions to USSR ambassadors in Cuba and Mexico concerning the transfer of information about L.H. Oswald

****No. 03413/GS November 27, 1963****

Top Secret. Copy No. 1.

Cc Cpsu

1. According to the report from the ambassador in Havana (tel-No. 1498 of November 26 c.y.), comrades Dorticos and R. Castro are concerned that Mexican newspaper "Excelsior" published reports

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with reference to verified sources regarding Oswald's application in late September of this year for visas at the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico.

Since visas were not issued to Oswald, Cuban friends intend, in response to the article in "Excelsior" newspaper, to confirm his visa application, emphasizing that Oswald acted according to a pre-developed plan.

For the purpose of coordinating our positions in this matter, Comrades Dorticos and R. Castro request to inform them of our available data on Oswald and develop unified tactics.

The USSR MFA and KGB consider it expedient to share with Cuban friends our information about Oswald, while noting that until now we have mainly limited ourselves to publishing American reports and press commentary from other countries, which by themselves exposed the provocative nature of American statements about some involvement of the USSR and Cuba in this dirty, criminal affair and that it is hardly expedient for us to change this position at present regarding the publication of any generalizing official

statements.

2. The Soviet Embassy in Mexico¹⁵⁷ considers it expedient to visit the Mexican MFA and, referring to Mexican press reports about Oswald's application to the Soviet embassy for a visa, state that such application did take place and that the visa was denied.

The USSR MFA and KGB believe that the ambassador's proposal should be approved.

Draft resolution is attached¹⁵⁸.

We request consideration.

A. Gromyko V. Semichastniy

[Attachment]

Cpsu Cc Resolution

On Instructions to Soviet Embassies in Cuba and Mexico Regarding Information Transfer About Oswald

1. Approve draft instructions to Soviet embassy in Havana (attachment No. 1).
2. Approve draft instructions to Soviet embassy in Mexico (attachment No. 2).

Cc Secretary

Top Secret Attachment 1 Draft

Havana

Soviet Embassy

1498159. Inform Cuban friends that we have so far avoided making any official or officious statements regarding Oswald's personality and qualifying any of his actions in any way, since the Dallas police authorities through their crude provocative actions, which were reported by American press, themselves

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exposed themselves and clearly demonstrated the tendentious and false nature of their messages about the so-called connections between Oswald and the Soviet Union and Cuba. The clearly premeditated murder of Oswald, organized by the Dallas police authorities themselves and the forces behind them, demonstrated even more clearly that the whole Oswald story is a dark matter, orchestrated by reactionary circles in the USA and Texas police. Therefore, we mainly limited ourselves to publishing American reports

and press commentary from other countries, which by themselves exposed the provocative meaning of American statements about some involvement of the USSR and Cuba in this dirty business. We believe that for now it is hardly expedient to change this position and make any generalizing official statements about which US circles exactly are behind this whole matter.

Regarding Oswald himself, we can report the following information. American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald, born in 1939, native of New Orleans, Louisiana, arrived in the Soviet Union in October 1959 as a tourist. While in Moscow, he declared to Soviet authorities his desire to remain in the USSR permanently and applied to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a request for Soviet citizenship. This petition by Oswald was rejected by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

In connection with L.H. Oswald's persistent requests, he was granted temporary residence in the Soviet Union as a foreign citizen. While in the Soviet Union, Oswald lived in Minsk, where he worked at a local radio factory. In April 1961, Oswald married Soviet citizen Prusakova Marina Nikolaevna, born in 1941. In June 1962, Oswald decided to leave the Soviet Union and traveled to the USA with his family, having received permission from the US Embassy in Moscow, with which he maintained contact. In early 1963, the Oswald family applied to the USSR Embassy in Washington with a request to allow them entry to the Soviet Union for permanent residence. This request was rejected.

Regarding reports about Oswald's alleged membership in the US Communist Party, the statement by the CPUSA Central Committee published on November 23 is obviously known, which categorically denied insinuations that Oswald "has any relation to the Communist Party."

Public statements with generalizing political conclusions regarding Oswald himself and his intentions, and moreover about the forces behind Kennedy's killers, made from our side, may give grounds for new insinuations against the USSR and Cuba, which will only draw attention again to an issue that is currently receding into the background, since the events themselves, and especially Oswald's murder, expose the provocative nature of all actions by Texas authorities.

Explain this to Cuban friends.

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Regarding the fact of Oswald's appeal to the Cuban embassy in Mexico, Cuban friends will, of course, decide for themselves how to proceed.

Top Secret. Copy 1 Appendix 2 Draft

Mexico

Sovambassador

665160. Agree with you that you should visit the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (minister or his deputy) and, referring to press reports, inform that Oswald approached the consular department of the USSR Embassy in Mexico requesting a visa to enter the USSR and that the consular department explained to him the procedure for obtaining entry visas and that he has not contacted the USSR Embassy since then. According to Embassy information, Oswald's request for entry of himself and his family to the

USSR, which he submitted to the USSR Embassy in Washington, was rejected.

You may respond in this spirit to relevant inquiries from Mexican and foreign press representatives.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 377. L. 102-106. Original. Typewritten text, signatures - autographs in blue ink.

****No. 43****

Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and KGB Chairman under the USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastniy to the CPSU Central Committee regarding draft instructions to USSR Embassy in USA to A.F. Dobrynin

****No. 03414/GS November 27, 1963****

Top Secret. Copy No. 1

Cc Cpsu

In connection with telegram No. 2005 from Washington regarding Oswald's letter of November 9 to the USSR Embassy in Washington and other correspondence with him regarding Oswald's entry into the Soviet Union, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents a draft instruction to Comrade Dobrynin.

Draft resolution is attached. Request review.

A.GROMYKO V.SEMICHASTNIY

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 377. L. 119. Original. Typewritten text, signatures - autographs in blue ink.

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****No. 44****

Cipher telegram from First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to the CPSU Central Committee regarding conversation with US Secretary of State D. Rusk

Spec. No. 2021 - 2033 November 27, 1963 Washington TOP SECRET Copy No. 12

Urgent

To Cpsu Cc

On November 26, we visited Rusk and had a conversation in his office at the State Department.

Beginning the conversation, Rusk said that, as President Johnson had already informed us, the US government welcomes our arrival in Washington, although it certainly regrets the reason that prompted this visit. The American people, he added, highly value your arrival.

I replied that I indeed came to the USA with a sad mission. However, we considered it our duty to express our attitude toward the late president and to the American people in connection with their loss.

Rusk further said that he would like to comment on Johnson's statements regarding the continuity between Kennedy's policy and the policy of the new president. President Johnson, Rusk continued, instructed me to inform all other governments that, as Vice President, Johnson fully supported Kennedy, not formally, but from principled positions. This is evidenced by the fact that, as Johnson has already stated, all former cabinet members remain in their posts now. Johnson always worked closely with Kennedy, frequently participating in meetings held at the White House, and was always aware of all international political events. Thus, a State Department representative was constantly present in his office, keeping him informed of all current affairs. Therefore, when we speak of policy continuity, this is not a formal statement, but a reflection of the actual state of affairs. Therefore, we hope to continue seeking solutions to international problems, both large and small, in order to find ways to strengthen peace and thereby achieve the goal shared by the president and Chairman Khrushchev.

I replied to Rusk that I was pleased to hear these statements of his, which sound very convincing. These words are important not because much good has already been done, but because, apparently, a method has been found to solve the problems before us on such a basis that

[*On the first page at the top, stamp "to Khrushchev N.S."]

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excludes their aggravation and, conversely, allows us to move forward, moving away from the danger of war and approaching the strengthening of peace.

I further noted that today I had an interesting conversation with President Johnson, whom I had met before when he was still a senator. I was favorably impressed by both the tone and content of this conversation, which I will, of course, tell N.S. Khrushchev and our other comrades about. It was very useful to get an impression of Johnson as the US President. Therefore, my visit, although it was connected with a sad event in US history, was still useful from the perspective of information about the new president and how he intends to conduct affairs.

You, as Secretary of State, I continued, of course, have a good understanding of all issues. You know our position just as well as we know yours. It creates an impression that the most important problems are either completely stagnant, or if there is any progress in their resolution, it is practically imperceptible.

Rusk replied that between us, of course, there are major disagreements. I don't mean by this, he continued, ideological differences, which are deep and may even be irreconcilable in nature. After all, N.S. Khrushchev often says that we won't be able to convince him to become a capitalist just as he won't be able to convince us to become communists. But in the broader plane of interstate relations, we maintain contacts between ourselves, although we approach some problems from different positions. We believe it is necessary to continue studying and discussing these problems and that we should not show impatience. It is not impossible that we will be able to move forward in resolving some of them. Perhaps we will manage to achieve success in resolving some minor issues, which can also be important from the psychological perspective of people, and maybe we will be able to come to a common opinion on some of these issues even without a formal agreement.

For example, regarding the arms race, it seems to me that there exists quite a real common interest in preventing an unrestrained and endless race, in establishing some limit or even reversing this race even before concluding a formal agreement on disarmament, while continuing to discuss the issue of general disarmament.

It would be possible to try to freeze military expenditures, although, of course, differences in our systems and in the structure of our budgets may not allow us to reach a formal agreement on this issue either. In other words, we must try to prevent the growth of armaments.

Regarding the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Rusk continued, I dare to express confidence that both our governments are against transferring nuclear weapons to third countries, which stems from our understanding of the nature of this

128weapons. Therefore, I do not think that the Soviet Union really believes that we want to transfer these weapons to anyone. The Soviet government is currently concerned about plans to create multilateral nuclear forces, and I fully understand this. However, this is explained by the fact that you are not familiar with the specific measures being planned in this area. By the way, all the details of these measures have not yet been fully developed and continue to be discussed with our allies. When they are finally developed, you will see that we really have no intention of transferring nuclear weapons to others.

We are concerned about China's position in this regard, as we see no prospect of China signing any agreement on this issue.

So, it can be said that over the past 1-2 years, an understanding has emerged that our two countries have common interests, on the basis of which agreements can be reached even without formal agreements, although we should, of course, strive for such agreements whenever possible.

I replied to Rusk that we agree that if it proves impossible to reach a formal agreement on some issues, at least a tacit understanding can be achieved.

However, in the USA over the past three years, the arms race has grown continuously, and we do not see this process slowing down. For our part, we are ready to agree to slow down the arms race based on tacit agreement between the parties. But such intention needs to be confirmed by facts, which we do not see from the American side.

Regarding nuclear non-proliferation, we agree that neither the Soviet Union nor the USA should be interested in transferring these weapons to anyone, however, this common view runs into facts indicating that the USA is pursuing a different policy in this matter. After all, the creation of multilateral nuclear forces means indirect transfer of nuclear weapons to other hands. You say that we don't know some details, but when tested for strength, it is details that often fail, in this sense it cannot be denied that with your intention to create multilateral forces, you are in one way or another involving West Germans in nuclear weapons control.

One cannot help but recall in this connection, I continued, that the 1954 Paris Agreements prohibited West Germany from having an army, building submarines, and possessing nuclear weapons. However, recently the FRG received permission to build a certain number of submarines with displacement of 1 thousand tons, the number of troops in West Germany continues to grow, as does military production. Now plans are being developed to involve West Germany in nuclear weapons control. It's hard to understand why all this is being done. We hear the argument that, they say, the FRG

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must receive this weapon into its hands, as it will feel humiliated if its main allies have this weapon while it does not. But such an argument is untenable.

In the past, I have repeatedly had to exchange opinions with US representatives about the dangerous role that Germany could play in international affairs. In 1936, for example, our ambassador to the USA Troyanovsky introduced me to then-Secretary of State Hull. Hull told me then that Japan and Germany posed a danger to peace and that our two states needed to unite their efforts in the face of this danger. As it turned out later, Hull's predictions proved correct, and during World War II our countries did indeed fight together against Hitler's Germany and Japan.

At one time, President Eisenhower spoke to me in Dulles' presence about his understanding of the danger associated with an armed Germany. And I have already discussed this issue with you, and although not directly, you spoke about how it was not by chance that Germany started two world wars.

West Germany is a rich country with large gold reserves. Why does it need nuclear weapons? Why does it demand them? There is only one answer: to restore former borders, either through blackmail or direct armed aggression. Is it really necessary for the FRG to have nuclear weapons? But the militaristic forces of West Germany will not stop at multilateral forces: they will go further and demand even more rights for themselves. Why should the USA agree to this? By the way, the USA itself indirectly violates the Paris Agreements by allowing West Germans to put their finger on the nuclear weapon button.

We do not understand why this is being done. Apparently, you consider West Germany so strong that you are forced to yield to it, so to speak, to compromise. But this is only a rotten compromise. All this creates serious disagreements between our two countries.

The US government is in every way accelerating the decision on creating multilateral nuclear forces despite the fact that many of your allies do not want to have nuclear weapons at all. It seems to us that this is a political mistake on your part, which you will regret. It may turn out that it will be too late to regret.

As for us, we are not afraid of the Germans, as we have so many weapons that we can destroy West Germany on the very first day if war breaks out. We fear that West Germany might provoke a war in which you will become involved, perhaps even against your wishes.

You may not give nuclear weapons directly to West Germans, but in any case you are putting their hand on nuclear weapons. This is, of course, your business. We are against this, and believe it can only harm the cause of peace.

At the same time we are not at all against Germany, I continued, we are for a peaceful democratic Germany. But we are, of course, against militaristic Germany, and your policy leads

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...to create exactly such Germany. You apparently like that Germans place large military orders in the USA, but this is precisely what leads to the creation of a strong militarized Germany.

Take, for example, the question of concluding a non-aggression pact. Kennedy publicly spoke in favor of concluding such a pact. In conversations with Gromyko, Kennedy and you talked about how it would be possible to find a basis for concluding a non-aggression pact, but then you suddenly completely froze this issue, as it did not please West Germany. So it turns out that US policy is dependent on the wishes of the FRG. In our opinion, such a position does not serve US interests and hinders international détente.

Rusk replied that the USA in this matter proceeds exclusively from its own interests. We are not anyone's mouthpiece, he continued, and speak only for ourselves.

Regarding the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, I have already said that this issue is of very great importance for the USA and the Soviet Union. In due time, I proposed to Gromyko to conclude a very simple agreement consisting of two points. The first would state that the four states currently possessing nuclear weapons commit not to transfer it to any other state, and in the second point all states not possessing nuclear weapons would commit not to receive or produce such weapons on their territory. However, Gromyko proposed to include in such agreement a provision that nuclear weapons should not be transferred to third states either directly or indirectly through military alliances. I then replied that we agree to this since we do not intend to transfer weapons to anyone at all. And I gave him a memo on this issue, which outlined the framework within which we intend to act, and from this memo it followed that the creation of multilateral nuclear forces would not give anyone the opportunity to use nuclear weapons. We could sign such an agreement today.

If the Soviet government is concerned that the creation of multinational forces might supposedly lead to our transfer of nuclear weapons to West Germany, then I can state quite definitely that we have no such intention. There may be some other reasons why the Soviet Union opposes the creation of multilateral nuclear forces. That's another matter, but in any case, the creation of these forces should not interfere with concluding an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In any case, it seems to us that discussion of this issue should continue in order to try to resolve it without waiting for the creation of multilateral forces, especially since not all interested states have yet given their final answer regarding these forces. The conclusion of an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is important because an increasing number of states seek to obtain this weapon, and it is in our common interests to prevent its proliferation.

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He replied that, as far as we know, the USA does not intend to wait for the consent of all its allies to create multilateral forces. True, Turkey and Greece are already involved, but only as a cover for West Germany. After all, these two countries are poor and barely make ends meet, while almost all other US allies are against the creation of these forces.

Rusk said in response to these words that he sees we are well informed about the situation with the creation of multilateral nuclear forces, except for one point. You think, he said, that their creation will allow the West German government to use nuclear weapons at its discretion. This is not the case, and we have no intention of allowing anyone to give orders about the use of nuclear weapons.

Objected that this, however, could happen even against the USA's wishes.

Rusk said that this issue could be discussed later, and added that in any case, the creation of multilateral forces would only marginally increase the amount of nuclear weapons compared to what the USSR and USA currently possess. Consultations that would be carried out within the framework of multilateral nuclear forces would essentially be the same as those already long conducted within NATO.

I would also like to emphasize, Rusk continued, that multilateral nuclear forces will never become a tail that wags the dog. Perhaps I'm not being entirely diplomatic using this expression, but it's a fact.

N.S. Khrushchev repeatedly said, Rusk continued, that the exchange of views with Western powers is complicated by the fact that elections are always happening in some country and governments change. Just now since October in four countries - USA, England, Italy and Germany - governments have changed¹■■■. However, it seems to me that all these changes do not mean a departure from Kennedy's policy, but occur within the framework of this policy. In December of this year, I will consult with the

governments of our European allies, and in the meantime, I think, we should continue considering such issues, perhaps quite minor ones, like cultural exchanges, consular agreement, direct air communication agreement and trade. True, there are some difficulties in this last issue. The Senate is supposed to vote on this issue today, but I haven't yet received information about the voting results.

As for broader issues, we will consult on them with our allies.

Replied to Rusk that would like to add a few words to what was said about multilateral nuclear forces. It turns out strange: we, the communists, are not against American nuclear weapons, although you have many of them, but we constantly talk about Germany. Well, it would seem your American capitalists are better than the German ones. Apparently, this is not happening by chance. We have no mutual territorial claims with the USA and both our

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governments understand what nuclear war means in modern conditions and therefore understand that it cannot be allowed. However, West Germany has territorial claims against the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland¹■■■. True, its government states that it wants to resolve this issue peacefully.

But it is clear that the borders established after World War II can only be changed by force. Discussions about this are playing with fire. That is why we oppose West Germany gaining control over nuclear weapons. We are not at all afraid if NATO's nuclear forces increase, as we have more than enough power to destroy Germany in one day if war breaks out. The main thing is to prevent nuclear weapons from being transferred to supporters of aggression.

We especially don't understand why this needs to be done now, when there is no direct threat of war and when international tensions have even decreased. We don't understand why under these conditions you seek to aggravate the international situation.

As for further discussion of this issue, this could be done after your consultations with allies, which, as you say, will take place in December.

Rusk expressed hope that discussion of this issue would continue, and added that it is not as difficult as we imagine it to be.

At this point Rusk asked to end the conversation, as he was suddenly called by telephone to President Johnson, who had scheduled a meeting with a group of ambassadors that Rusk had to attend.

Apologizing, Rusk suggested continuing, if I wanted, the conversation without him - with his colleagues who were present at the meeting.

I said there was no need for this.

Present at the meeting from the American side were Harriman, Thompson, Davis and Akalovsky; from the Soviet side - Dobrynin, Smirnovsky and Sukhodrev.

A. Mikoyan

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 328. L. 127-128. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of the USSR MFA.

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****No. 45****

Coded telegram from First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU regarding the reaction of White House staff to N.S. Khrushchev's visit to the US Embassy in Moscow

Spec. No. 2034 November 27, 1963 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12

Urgent

To Cc Cpsu

On November 26 at the White House, before we were taken to the President's office, White House Press Secretary Salinger approached comrade Sukhodrev and asked him to unofficially convey to comrade N.S. Khrushchev the most sincere appreciation on behalf of all White House staff and friends of the President for comrade N.S. Khrushchev visiting the US Embassy in Moscow to personally honor the memory of the late President. He emphasized that this gesture made a great and very good impression on all White House staff who knew Kennedy well and worked closely with him. Salinger also expressed gratitude for the condolence telegrams and for our special arrival to the US to participate in Kennedy's funeral. He spoke all this with great sincerity and emotion.

A.Mikoyan

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 57-58. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 46****

Resolution of CC CPSU Presidium "Report of comrade A.I. Mikoyan on trip to USA"

No. P125/39 November 28, 1963

To approve the activities of First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers comrade A.I. Mikoyan, who traveled to the USA in November 1963 to participate in the funeral of US President John F. Kennedy and during meetings with new US President L. Johnson.

* On the first page at top stamp "to Khrushchev N.S."

b At bottom of page note "To be dated November 28, 1967 (instruction of comrade Malin V.N.). Text of decision coordinated with comrade Malin V.N. M.Sokolov 9.1.64"

134Signal copy

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 373. L. 176. Original. Typewritten text.

****No. 47****

Resolution of the Presidium of the CC CPSU "On the request of the New York Times correspondent to permit travel to Minsk to gather information about Oswald"

No. ■126/48 November 28, 1963

1. Consider inexpedient the trip to Minsk of the New York Times correspondent Tanner, as well as other foreign correspondents to gather information about L. Oswald's stay there.
2. In case of repeated inquiry from the Moscow correspondent of the New York Times, instruct the USSR MFA to communicate that the facts concerning L. Oswald's temporary stay in the Soviet Union and departure from the USSR are known to the US government, and therefore there is no need to travel to Minsk to gather information about Oswald.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 378. L. 36. Original. Typewritten text.

****No. 48****

TASS Report "A.I. Mikoyan Returns to Moscow"

November 29, 1963

Yesterday, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan returned to Moscow from Washington. A.I. Mikoyan traveled to the United States of America to attend the funeral of US President John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

At Vnukovo airport, Comrade A.I. Mikoyan was met by Comrades G.I. Voronov, D.S. Polyansky, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers D.F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko, Chairman of the State Security Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastnyi, Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.V. Kuznetsov and V.A. Zorin, General Secretary of the USSR MFA B.F. Podtserob and other officials.

Among those meeting him were US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Foy D. Kohler and diplomatic staff of the American Embassy.

(Tass)

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 85. Typographic text. Pravda. 1963. November 29. No. 333.

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****No. 49****

Resolution of the Presidium of the CC CPSU "On Instructions to USSR Ambassador in the Republic of Cuba for Conversation with Fidel Castro"

No. P126/35 November 29, 1963

Secret

Approve the attached text of instructions to USSR Ambassador in the Republic of Cuba Comrade Alekseev. [Attachment]

To point 35 of protocol No. 126 Top secret

Havana

Soviet Embassy

Visit Comrade F. Castro and, referring to the instruction of the CC CPSU Presidium, communicate the following to him.

As Comrade F. Castro already knows, the Soviet government sent Comrade A.I. Mikoyan to participate in the funeral of the late President Kennedy, who had a meeting in Washington with the new US President L. Johnson.

During this meeting, Johnson told Comrade Mikoyan that he fully shares the policy pursued by his predecessor Kennedy. This policy, Johnson said, will continue to be respected, and we are ready to go more than halfway to meet any government.

Further, Johnson, on his own initiative, raised the question of US attitude toward Cuba. He said: "We have no intentions to invade Cuba. However, the Cuban problem has very serious significance for our people. From the American people's point of view," Johnson continued, "the main problem comes down to subversive activities from Cuba."

To this, Comrade Mikoyan told Johnson that it is difficult for us to understand how small Cuba could conduct subversive activities against any state at all, let alone against such a large state as the USA. On the contrary, the whole world sees, Comrade Mikoyan continued, that subversive actions are being conducted against Cuba, that there exist numerous well-financed organizations carrying out such actions. All subversive activity must cease. Further, Comrade Mikoyan stated that, as he knows well, Cuba wanted most of all for all subversive activity to end. During his stay in Cuba, noted Comrade Mikoyan, Fidel Castro said that he strives to establish good relations with the USA. In connection with the tragedy that befell the USA, F. Castro, as is known, made a dignified statement, in which he spoke as a true

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humanist. Therefore, emphasized t. Mikoyan, I would like to ask you not to succumb to press fabrications, as I believe that good relations with Cuba are in the interests of the USA.

Johnson again emphasized that he spoke with full responsibility and sincerity about US intentions regarding Cuba. He reiterated: "We have no plans to invade Cuba, and we have no grounds for invasion of other countries either through subversive actions or by any other means."

In Moscow, it is believed that the new president will be forced to abide by the non-invasion commitments regarding Cuba that were made by Kennedy in October of last year and which Johnson has now confirmed. These commitments will bind Johnson at least until the next election in the coming year, and if he is re-elected, these commitments will maintain their significance for the subsequent presidential term, which will constrain aggressive US circles in their actions against Cuba. As you remember, we assessed the situation similarly earlier when discussing Kennedy's commitments. We proceeded from the assumption that if Kennedy were re-elected, these commitments would remain in force.

Speaking now about Johnson, we also take into account his statement that he fully shared his predecessor's policy while still vice-president. We believe that it would be most disadvantageous for the United States itself to return to the crisis state that existed in October of last year.

This, of course, does not mean that the US will change its hostile attitude toward Cuba and will not incite Cuban internal counter-revolutionary forces to active demonstrations. Of course, they will do this just as they do with other socialist countries, including the Soviet Union. It can be said that US instigation against Cuba will be directly proportional to the activity of internal counter-revolutionary forces in Cuba itself. To this should be added that the US, of course, will try to send their agents to Cuba.

By the way, they send them to us as well, and we catch these agents, as, indeed, you do. Of course, the forms of subversive activities against us and against Cuba are different. We are stronger and have greater capabilities to take effective measures against such subversive actions. You are in more difficult conditions, and it is harder for you to counter such hostile activities.

We have thought a lot about the situation developing as a result of Kennedy's assassination and the new president L. Johnson's rise to power. It is now becoming evident that Kennedy was removed from the political arena by the most right-wing forces in the US, who were dissatisfied with his course both in domestic and foreign policy. Johnson now declares that in foreign policy he will continue to strive for achieving the same goals that Kennedy pursued. If we assume that Johnson will indeed mainly adhere to his predecessor's foreign policy course

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predecessor, it is still unclear how successful he will be at this. It can be predicted that the pressure from reactionary right-wing forces on the new president will be significantly stronger than under Kennedy, including on the issue of relations with revolutionary Cuba. In this situation, there is a risk that certain forces in the USA will seek a pretext to push President Johnson toward hostile actions against Cuba.

Taking all this into account, we have concluded that, apparently, under current conditions, implementing the agreement about N.S. Khrushchev's visit to Cuba would not be beneficial and would not be in Cuba's interests. Such a trip would evidently contribute to inflaming passions in the USA, could be viewed as a challenge and used by the "rabid ones" to activate hostile actions against Cuba. This may take even sharper forms, as the pre-election campaign is already unfolding in the USA, which itself causes instability in American politics. Even among Americans who are favorably disposed toward Cuba, such a trip in the current situation could cause bewilderment. Based on this situation, we have concluded that under present conditions it would be more expedient to postpone Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's trip to Cuba.

You know that the matter of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's trip to Cuba was decided in Moscow during your stay in the Soviet Union¹■■■. N.S. Khrushchev was preparing for this trip, and he very much wanted to visit Cuba. Of course, if not for recent events in the USA, we would not have even raised the question of postponing this trip. Preparations for this trip were already in full swing and the departure date was even set for December 27.

Tell Comrade F. Castro that in Moscow they would be very happy to see him again in the Soviet Union¹■■■. This could be done in winter, to go hunting together, as was discussed during his stay in the USSR. The established regular air transportation means could allow such a trip to be made incognito, if that would be desirable for Comrade F. Castro. In our opinion, such an incognito trip would be the better form under current conditions. However, of course, we leave the decision of this matter entirely to your discretion.

The Presidium of the CC CPSU and personally Comrade N.S. Khrushchev express hope that Comrade F. Castro and his associates will correctly understand the motives that guided the Presidium in expressing these considerations, which I have been instructed to convey to you.

Execute telegraph.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 377. L.87-91. Original. Typewritten text.

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****No. 50****

Resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee "On Instructions to Sovposol in Cuba Regarding the Transfer of Information about Oswald"

No. ■126/36 November 29, 1963

Approve the draft instructions to Sovposol in Havana (attached).

[Attachment] To item 36 of prot[ocol] 126 Top Secret

Havana

Sovposol

1498. Inform Cuban friends that we have so far avoided making any official or officious statements regarding Oswald's personality and qualifying his actions in any way, since the Dallas police authorities, through their crude provocative actions reported by the American press, have exposed themselves and clearly demonstrated the biased and false nature of their reports about Oswald's alleged connections with the Soviet Union and Cuba. The clearly premeditated murder of Oswald, organized by the same Dallas police authorities and the forces behind them, has even more clearly shown that the whole Oswald story is a dark affair initiated by reactionary circles in the USA and Texas police. Therefore, we have mainly limited ourselves to publishing American reports and press commentary from other countries, which by

themselves exposed the provocative nature of American statements about some involvement of the USSR and Cuba in this adventure. This is the most convincing form of coverage for this case. We believe it is hardly expedient for now to change this position and make any generalizing officious statements about which specific US circles are behind this whole affair.

Regarding Oswald himself, we can provide the following information. American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald, born in 1939, native of New Orleans, Louisiana, arrived in the Soviet Union in October 1959 as a tourist. While in Moscow, he informed Soviet authorities of his desire to remain in the USSR permanently and applied to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a request for Soviet citizenship. This petition by Oswald was rejected by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

In connection with L.H. Oswald's persistent requests, he was granted temporary residence in the Soviet Union as a foreign citizen. While in the Soviet

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Oswald lived in Minsk, where he worked at a local radio factory. In April 1961, Oswald married Soviet citizen Prussakova Marina Nikolaevna, born in 1941. In June 1962, Oswald decided to leave the Soviet Union and traveled to the USA with his family, having received permission from the US Embassy in Moscow, with which he maintained contact. In early 1963, the Oswald family appealed to the USSR Embassy in Washington requesting permission to enter the Soviet Union for permanent residence. This request was denied.

Regarding reports about Oswald's alleged membership in the US Communist Party, in this connection we can only note that in the statement of the US Communist Party Central Committee, published on November 23, allegations that Oswald "has any connection to the Communist Party" were categorically denied.

Public statements from our side with generalizing political conclusions regarding Oswald himself and his intentions may give grounds for new insinuations against the USSR and Cuba, which will only draw attention again to an issue that is currently becoming secondary, as the events themselves, and especially Oswald's murder, expose the provocative nature of all actions by Texas authorities.

We have the impression that US federal authorities themselves are seeking to hush up this case, understanding the absurdity of directing it against the USSR and Cuba and realizing that it can only harm US policy and further undermine their international prestige.

Explain this to Cuban friends.

Regarding the fact of Oswald's appeal to the Cuban embassy in Mexico, Cuban friends will, of course, decide for themselves how to proceed.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 377. L. 97-99. Original. Typewritten text.

****No. 51****

Note from US Ambassador to the USSR F. Kohler to USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko with enclosed message from US Secretary of State D. Rusk

November 29, 1963

Foreign Service Of The

United States Of America

Moscow, November 29, 1963

Dear Mr. Minister,

I enclose the text of a message received today from Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Sincerely,

Foy D. Kohler

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To His Excellency Andrei A. Gromyko Minister of Foreign Affairs Moscow

[Attachment] Received by mail

29.Xi.63

Foreign Service Of The

United States Of America

Moscow, November 29, 1963

Dear Mr. Minister,

Your full message of sympathy, received in these tragic hours, is highly appreciated. As you noted, the late President attached great importance to reducing international tension. I can assure you that President Johnson is firmly determined to pursue this high goal, to which the late President was committed. Our joint efforts will contribute to achieving this goal.

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

To His Excellency Andrei A. Gromyko Minister of Foreign Affairs Moscow

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 86 - 87. Copy. Translation from English. Typewritten text. Copy of N.S. Khrushchev.

****No. 52****

Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On transferring to the Americans photocopies of Oswald's correspondence with the USSR Embassy in the USA"

No. ■126/37 November 29, 1963

To approve the attached text of instructions to the USSR Ambassador to the USA, Comrade Dobrynin A.F.

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[Appendix] To item 37 of protocol 126 Top secret

Washington

Sovposol

2005180. We agree with you. You may give Rask the photocopies of correspondence with Oswald, including his letter of November 9; however, do not wait for a request from American authorities. When transferring the photocopies, state that the letter of November 9 was received by the embassy only on November 18, having apparently been delayed somewhere. Upon receiving this letter, it aroused suspicion at the embassy: either it is a forgery, or it was sent with clearly provocative purposes. The embassy left this letter from Oswald unanswered.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 377. L. 115-116. Original. Typewritten text.

****No. 53****

Brief report of the USSR Embassy in the USA "Circumstances of the assassination of US President John F. Kennedy"

****No. 435 November 29, 1963181****

Washington

Secret

Copy No. 4

On November 22 at 12:30 PM local time, when President Kennedy was driving in an open car through the streets of Dallas (Texas), an assassination attempt was made on him. The President was fatally wounded by two bullets to the head and neck and, without regaining consciousness, died at the local "Parkland" hospital at approximately 1:00 PM the same day. Simultaneously, Texas Governor Connally, who was riding in the same car, was seriously wounded. Besides them, their wives, two Secret Service agents and a driver were in the car, none of whom were injured.

According to Dallas Police Department reports, at the moment of the assassination, three shots were fired from a window on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository building when the presidential motorcade slowed to 8-15 miles per hour while turning into a tunnel at the intersection of Elm and Commerce streets.

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At 13:15 in the Oak Cliff area of Dallas (approximately 2 miles from the site of the assassination attempt on the president), police officer Tippit was killed by three pistol shots. Shortly after, Lee Harvey Oswald, who worked at the aforementioned book depository, was arrested on suspicion of Tippit's murder at a nearby movie theater on Jefferson Street. During the arrest, Oswald offered armed resistance. Three witnesses identified Oswald as the person who shot Tippit when the latter stopped him on the street. However, Oswald refused to admit guilt in the police officer's murder.

That same evening, Oswald was charged with the attempted assassination of President Kennedy and Governor Connally. Oswald did not plead guilty.

On November 24 at 11:20 local time, when Oswald was being transferred to the county jail, he was killed by a pistol shot in the basement of the Dallas Police Department. Jack Ruby (Rubinstein), who shot Oswald, was arrested by police at the scene of the crime.

The Dallas Police Department officially announced that with Oswald's death, his case is considered closed. However, police authorities insist that Oswald is the assassin of President Kennedy and that they have sufficient physical evidence and leads to confirm this.

This accusation is also supported by the US Department of Justice. The department's representative Edwin O. Gutman stated, for example, on November 25, that "there are very strong leads indicating Oswald as President Kennedy's killer."

1.

Based on its investigations, the Dallas Police Department puts forward the following version of circumstances related to President Kennedy's assassination.

It is claimed that Kennedy was killed with a rifle found on the sixth floor of the aforementioned book depository building, which is allegedly confirmed by conducted ballistic tests. Three spent cartridge cases, food remnants, as well as empty boxes and crates behind which the shooter was hiding were also found there.

The police stated that the rifle (of Italian manufacture, 1938 model, with optical sight) belongs to Oswald. To confirm this, they refer to a photograph found in Oswald's home showing him with a similar rifle and pistol analogous to the one involved in Officer Tippit's murder case. An order for the mentioned rifle addressed to Klein's gun shop in Chicago was also discovered. Although the order was made under the name Hidell, it was established that it was written in Oswald's hand, and Oswald's wife allegedly confirmed that he

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indeed there was such a rifle. One of the witnesses saw Oswald carrying a long package on the morning of the president's assassination, which approximately matched the dimensions of the rifle.

On the rifle and on one of the boxes found on the sixth floor of the book depository, there appeared to be Oswald's palm prints. Palm prints were also found on the wrapping paper in which, allegedly, Oswald

brought the rifle into the building. On Oswald's hands, forensic examination revealed traces of gunpowder residue, indicating that he had recently used a firearm.

Witness testimony indicates that Oswald was in the book depository building at the time of the assassination attempt on the president and that he was seen on the sixth floor earlier that morning. Immediately after the assassination attempt, a police officer who searched the book depository saw Oswald inside the building but did not detain him, as the building manager confirmed that Oswald was a local employee.

Since Oswald then turned out to be the only employee who left the book depository immediately after the president's assassination, this raised suspicions and they began searching for him. The aforementioned police officer Tippit apparently tried to detain Oswald based on information transmitted by police radio.

After Oswald's death, one of the main pieces of evidence against him became an alleged map of Dallas found at Oswald's home, which marked the route of the presidential motorcade and showed a possible line of fire.

ii.

However, the presence of several unclear and contradictory points in the data published to date allows American and foreign press to express serious doubts about the nature of the investigation conducted by Dallas police into the circumstances of the case.

These doubts can be summarized as follows:

1. From the very beginning, the investigation effectively focused only on Oswald, and the police claimed that he "had no accomplices" (for example, Police Captain Fritz's statement on November 23), although the police essentially had no grounds to exclude the participation of other persons. Moreover, there were reports in the press that the FBI had an amateur film shot by one of the Kennedy assassination witnesses, which suggests that the president was shot not by one person, but by two. However, a Justice Department representative stated on November 27: "We have no evidence that anyone else was in the room besides Oswald."

2. As stated by local police, FBI agents interrogated Oswald two weeks before Kennedy's assassination, however, they did not inform Dallas police about this, and Oswald was not included in the lists of "dangerous persons" compiled by the Secret Service as

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preparations for the president's arrival. Despite immediate subsequent denials, the FBI later admitted that its agents did indeed try to meet with Oswald two weeks before the assassination, however, they allegedly did not find him at home.

3. Oswald denied that at the time of the assassination he was in the book depository and claimed that he was at the movie theater at that time. Furthermore, American press noted contradictions between the testimony of the landlady of the house where Oswald rented a room, who saw him entering the house right after 12:45 PM on November 22, and police data according to which Oswald was in the book depository building at this time, i.e., 12 blocks away from his home.

4. The circumstances under which the shots at Kennedy and Connally were fired (relatively long distance, moving target, extremely short time period in which the shots were made) and the fact that the bullets hit, with great accuracy, only the clearly pre-selected targets without hitting other people in the car, definitely suggest high marksmanship of the shooter (or shooters) and sufficient technical sophistication of the weapon used.

However, there are highly contradictory data about how well Oswald handled firearms. Perhaps the prevailing opinion now is that Oswald was not a very good shooter.

Furthermore, the rifle from which Kennedy was allegedly killed is of a very outdated model. Tests conducted by the American hunting society and police on a similar rifle indicate that it is practically impossible to make three aimed shots in 5 seconds (i.e., the time in which three shots at Kennedy and Connally were actually made) with reloading after each shot unless using a special pad. In this regard, the press draws attention to the fact that the police still evades answering the question whether such a pad was used during the assassination attempt on the president.

No less doubts are expressed in connection with the circumstances of Oswald's murder.

1. The time when Oswald was to be transferred to the county jail was announced in advance and correspondents were allowed to be present, although the police received numerous anonymous messages that Oswald's murder was being planned during his transfer.

2. Despite police assurances that all measures were taken to clear the premises of unauthorized persons, J. Ruby managed to enter there unhindered, although many police officers knew him by sight and were aware of his dubious past (Ruby was a nightclub owner in Dallas, previously closely connected with Chicago gangsters, had been arrested by police several times in recent years, although he

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and managed to avoid trial). In the room where Oswald's murder took place, there were several dozen police officers; nevertheless, no one made any attempt to prevent Ruby from shooting Oswald point-blank.

On November 27, the Washington Daily News reported from Dallas that Dallas Police Chief Curry "does not rule out the possibility that one or more of his police officers could have helped Ruby in his plan" (i.e., in killing Oswald).

3. Ruby claims that he killed Oswald as a result of an unexpected emotional impulse due to his distress over President Kennedy's assassination. Ruby's lawyers intend to build his defense on the claim that at the time of Oswald's murder, Ruby was allegedly in a state of "temporary insanity." A version is also widely publicized according to which Ruby committed Oswald's murder out of supposedly high patriotic motives. However, his entire criminal biography and testimonies of some people who knew him closely refute this version. Thus, one of his friends, a certain Herbert Kelly, stated that Ruby "was not a patriot," but was known as a "police informant" (which is confirmed by other information).

It is characteristic that District Attorney Wade stated on November 27 that he was not satisfied with the motives put forward by Ruby to justify Oswald's murder. "This," Wade said, "may be a desire for publicity, or something much deeper may be hidden behind it."

The claim that Ruby could have acted in a state of affect also raises doubts. It is known, for example, that Ruby was in the police department building on Saturday and, in particular, was present there when Oswald was shown to journalists.

4. Reports appeared in the press that Oswald had previously met and was acquainted with Ruby, although Ruby's lawyer denies this. The press reported, in particular, that Ruby and Oswald were neighbors and that Oswald was seen in Ruby's nightclub a week before the Kennedy assassination. In connection with this, a question arises whether Oswald and Ruby were accomplices and whether Oswald's murder was an attempt to cover up tracks.

All these questionable points received very wide coverage in both American and foreign press and, apparently, caused serious concern in the U.S. government. This apparently explains the fact that on the evening of November 25, President Johnson ordered the Department of Justice to conduct a broad and thorough investigation of the circumstances of President Kennedy's assassination and subsequent events.

About 50 FBI agents are currently conducting an investigation in Dallas, assisted by representatives of other agencies (Secret Service, State Department, Department of Defense, CIA). A detailed report is expected to be

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prepared by the Ministry of Justice in early December, and this report in full or, at least, its main content should be published.

Simultaneously, an independent investigation in open hearings will be conducted during December by the Senate subcommittee on internal security matters.

iii.

In the official version of the circumstances of Kennedy's assassination, the question of possible motives for the attack on the president essentially remains open. However, immediately after the assassination, American propaganda launched a broad campaign aimed at presenting the case materials to the public in such a way as to create the impression that the president's murder was the work of an individual who was a convinced Marxist, connected with the US Communist Party and actively supporting Castro.

In this connection, the following circumstances were widely and in detail exploited, which became public knowledge with the direct participation of police authorities conducting the investigation.

1. Special emphasis was placed on the fact that Oswald publicly called himself a Marxist (though he denied being a communist) and claimed that he was the secretary of the New Orleans branch of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee." In this context, Oswald's appearance on New Orleans television in August 1963 was reproduced and the fact of his arrest in New Orleans in summer 1963 for distributing "pro-Castro leaflets" was mentioned.

The press widely covered the fact that in 1959 Oswald, having arrived as a tourist to the Soviet Union, stayed there until 1962, married a Soviet citizen and requested Soviet citizenship (however, it is also mentioned that Soviet authorities denied this request).

2. The police claimed that during the search of Oswald's apartment, "communist literature" was found, including brochures, "The Worker" newspaper, "The Militant"¹ weekly published by the Trotskyist "Socialist Workers Party," and letters addressed to Oswald written on CPUSA letterhead, "The Worker" newspaper and Fair Play for Cuba Committee. According to the search conducting assistant prosecutor Alexander, the letters on CPUSA and Fair Play for Cuba Committee letterheads were signed by the same person, whose name he did not disclose. The letters allegedly testify to friendly, repeated and "working"

relationships between Oswald and these organizations. Oswald supposedly also had a notebook with some notes in Russian language and a plan of Moscow's Red Square. The FBI claims to possess extensive private correspondence of Oswald from the past several years, the nature of which has not yet been disclosed. Among the books Oswald was interested in recently, they name various

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American publications on communism, including the biography of Mao Zedong, "Russia under Khrushchev" by A. Vert, "What We Should Know About Communism" by Overstreet, and others.

3. As evidence of Oswald's "leftist" sentiments, the fact is presented that on November 4 of this year, he sent an application requesting membership in the "American Civil Liberties Union", which is considered here an organization of a "very liberal" orientation. Additionally, Oswald's appeal to lawyer Abt, who repeatedly acted as defense counsel in trials against US Communist Party leaders, requesting him to take on his defense, was widely publicized. He allegedly made a similar request to the aforementioned "Civil Liberties Union."

4. Most recently, the fact has emerged and is being widely publicized that from September 26 to October 3 of this year, Oswald was in Mexico City, where he approached the Cuban and Soviet consulates for visas to travel to Cuba and the USSR. Having not received the visas, Oswald was allegedly seriously irritated by this and returned to the USA. There are reports that during this trip, Oswald was under constant surveillance by "some American agency." The press mentioned in this connection that Mexican authorities are currently investigating whether Oswald met with anyone arriving from Havana or traveling to Cuba during Oswald's stay in Mexico.

5. The press raises the question of whether Oswald received financial support from some unknown sources, as Oswald earned very little (\$50 per week) and had been unemployed for a long time, yet at the same time he and his family, as claimed, experienced no material difficulties.

The Communist Party of the USA and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee officially stated that they did not know Oswald and that he was not a member of these organizations. The Communist Party representative explained that the CP leadership receives many letters from Americans who are not party members but are interested in various questions related to its activities. The CP usually responds to these letters. Letters allegedly found in Oswald's possession may belong to this category.

Lawyer Abt also denied any acquaintance with Oswald.

District Attorney Wade stated on November 24 in response to correspondents' questions that "there is no evidence that he (Oswald) was a member of the Communist Party." On November 26, the informed newspaper "Washington Post" wrote that FBI Director Hoover and his assistants are convinced that Oswald had "no connection to the American Communist Party, local Marxist groups that call themselves Trotskyists, or any part of the international communist movement."

It also became known that Oswald, in addition to anti-Soviet statements made during a television interview in August of this year, was writing a book of anti-Soviet content, in which he not only slandered the Soviet Union,

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referring to his "personal impressions," and also hinted that during his stay in the Soviet Union in 1959-62, he was a secret American agent. This was reported to journalists on November 29 by stenographer Polina V. Bates, who was retyping part of this book for Oswald.

At the very initial stage of the investigation, Dallas police stated that they have evidence that the assassination of President Kennedy is part of an "international conspiracy." However, this thesis was not subsequently developed.

On November 23, the State Department officially stated that there is no evidence indicating that any foreign power was involved in the president's assassination.

Nevertheless, in American propaganda in print, radio and television, hints continue to be made from time to time about some connection between Oswald and "pro-Castro" elements, especially in connection with making public Oswald's trip to Mexico.

Compiled by: 1st secretary V. Karpov 2nd secretary V. Komplektov

AVP RF. F. 0129. Op. 47. P. 355. D. 14. L. 22-34. Copy (4 copies). Typewritten text.

Signatures-autographs in blue and black ink.

****No. 54****

Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding meeting with US Secretary of State D.Rusk to transmit photocopies of correspondence with Lee H. Oswald

Spec. No. 2054 - 2056 November 30, 1963 *184 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12

Urgent

Today met with Rusk and handed him photocopies of the embassy's correspondence with Oswald, commenting accordingly on his last letter from November 9 (your spec. No. 1328185).

Rusk expressed gratitude for transmitting these documents, saying that he highly values

*On the first page top stamped "to. Khrushchev N.S." 149Signal copy

the Soviet side's initiative in this matter. Then Rusk inquired whether he could share this correspondence with the special commission recently created by the president, headed by U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren. I replied that we leave it entirely to his discretion to familiarize anyone with these materials, being confident that he will properly evaluate our step and act accordingly.

Rusk again expressed gratitude for the provided photocopies. It was noticeable that Rusk was clearly not prepared for such a step from our side, and at the same time, judging by his general behavior, he was pleased with this development of events.

Rusk asked if it would be possible to clarify in Moscow the reasons why Soviet authorities refused to grant Oswald Soviet citizenship when he still lived in the Soviet Union. He promised to convey his request. I

await instructions regarding the response to Rusk.

In conclusion, Rusk noted that he hopes for cooperation from the Soviet side if Warren's commission has any requests or questions in connection with their investigation. He, Rusk, would then like to approach me in a confidential manner.

Then Rusk said he wanted to use our meeting to unofficially raise some other questions.

1. Rusk informed that yesterday President Johnson received the head of the Federal Aviation Administration Halaby and instructed him to meet with Soviet representatives for final resolution of technical issues related to the future agreement on establishing the New York - Moscow air route. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow has been given corresponding instructions to address the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this matter. Halaby would be ready to arrive in Moscow on December 10-11.

Rusk further noted that this whole idea belongs to him, as, besides the issue itself, he considers it important to show that under the new president, affairs continue in the same direction as under J. Kennedy. President Johnson, according to Rusk, agrees with this.

2. Rusk then recalled his conversations with A.A. Gromyko in New York and Washington, which touched upon the military budget issue. I think, he said, that soon, in 10-15 days, I will be able to inform you (the ambassador) in strictly confidential order about the amount planned by the American government for military expenditures in the budget for the next fiscal year. It will not be larger than the current one, and may even be smaller. Rusk then inquired when we would be reviewing our budget. He didn't ask directly, but it could be understood that he would like to receive some information on this account from us as well in due time.

Rusk emphasized several times that what he said does not mean that the U.S. government is now making some agreement with the USSR government on this matter. It cannot do this for reasons that were already explained in conversations with A.A. Gromyko. Nor can it guarantee that the figures that Rusk intends to

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soon communicate in a strictly unofficial form, will not somehow be changed in the future by the US Congress itself, which according to the constitution and tradition has the corresponding rights. But he, Rusk, continues to think about the usefulness of such unofficial exchange of opinions "on mutual intentions."

3. Recalling his statements in conversations with A.A. Gromyko "about the subversive activities of the Castro government," Rusk asked to convey to him in this regard in a strictly personal, unofficial form, that the three tons of weapons seized recently in Venezuela, as precisely established, came from Cuba (we, said Rusk, verified, in particular, the numbers of rifles purchased by Castro in Belgium at the time and now seized in Venezuela).

I am saying this, Rusk noted, not as some kind of presentation or remark. This cannot be the subject of an official conversation between us, since the Castro government itself exercises power in its country and hardly consults with anyone when making decisions about transferring weapons to one Latin American country or another ("although the Chinese, Rusk threw in as if in passing, might be involved here"). I, Rusk said in conclusion, do not want to exaggerate the significance of this incident in Venezuela at all, it is not that great, but I would simply like to bring this latest example to the attention of A.A. Gromyko, with whom we previously discussed this topic, of course, I do not expect any response in this regard and ask never to mention what I said today in official talks and negotiations.

I told Rusk that the widely known recent events in Venezuela, to speak frankly, once again clearly show to the whole world that the Betancourt regime enjoys no popular support, especially now, on the eve of elections, and therefore isn't it logical to expect – and so, apparently, it actually is – that this regime is ready to resort to any provocation, even of international character, just to stay in power.

Rusk smiled but said nothing more.

Considerable time was devoted to discussing the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, Rusk said nothing new compared to his previous statements on this topic. I again explained our position to him.

Rusk noted during the conversation that the upcoming NATO session in December of this year will be "routine" in nature and, apparently, questions about creating NATO nuclear forces will not be substantially discussed there (Rusk threw in a remark that these issues "are generally discussed through other channels," but did not develop this topic).

The trip of the new President Johnson to the upcoming NATO session, said Rusk, is not planned yet, although not completely ruled out. Apparently thinking aloud, Rusk said, Johnson might instead make a trip to Europe in spring to meet with several heads of US allied countries. But for now, meetings of the new president with other heads are not precisely planned, although there is a principal agreement about such meetings with some of them.

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In conclusion, Rask again asked to consider our conversation unofficial, conducted "as if in a home setting". The entire conversation was one-on-one. No one else was in the office.

Rask looks very tired, eyes red from insomnia ("I currently sleep 3-4 hours a day," noted Rask), but he himself is animated, in clearly good spirits and presents himself as a person confident in his current position, despite the change of presidents.

A. Dobrynin

REFERENCE: No. 1328 (ref. No. 33600) from 29.XI.63 comrade Gromyko reported that the embassy can transfer to Rask photocopies of embassy correspondence with Oswald, including his letter from November 9, without waiting for a request from American authorities.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 118-123. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 55****

Letter from US Attorney General R. Kennedy to First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan expressing gratitude for attendance at J.F. Kennedy's funeral

[November 1963]*

Received by mail in envelope from US Embassy May 16, 1964

Dear Mr. Mikoyan,

I simply wanted you to know how touched I was to receive your condolences regarding my brother's death, and how grateful we all were that you came to Washington and attended the funeral.

The President believed that thanks to your efforts and the efforts being made here, in the United States, we are all on the path to achieving a genuine breakthrough toward peace throughout the world.

* Dated based on letter contents.

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I think that in the coming years, under the leadership role of the Chairman and President Johnson, we will be able to achieve this result.

Thank you again R. Kennedy

Translated by: I. Bubnov

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 163. Copy. Translation from English. Typewritten text. Copy of N.S. Khrushchev

****No. 56****

TASS Report "Statement by U.S. State Department Representative"

December 1, 1963

TP.OV.0630. NEW YORK, December 1 (TASS). Associated Press Agency transmits the following message from Washington, dated November 30:

The State Department representative announced this evening that Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin delivered today, in the second half of the day, to Secretary of State Dean Rusk the Soviet consulate's dossier on Lee Harvey Oswald, who is accused of President Kennedy's murder.

The State Department immediately transferred these documents, written in Russian, to the FBI for use in the investigation.

Until the FBI familiarizes itself with these documents, it is difficult to say whether they contain any new or important information for the ongoing investigation of Kennedy's murder.

State Department Press Officer Richard Phillips stated that the United States had not requested the Soviet Union to provide them with their consulate's dossier on Oswald.

The fact that Dobrynin delivered this dossier to Rusk at the State Department today apparently testified to a desire to amicably assist American authorities in their initiated investigation. Soviet Premier Minister Khrushchev condemned Kennedy's assassination. Moscow press hinted that it was inspired by right-wing forces.

GA RF. F.R-4459. Op. 43. D. 2511. L. 108. Copy. Typewritten text on teletype tape.

153Signal Copy

****No. 57****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the Washington Post publication of information about the transfer of photocopies of correspondence with L.H. Oswald to the American government

Spec. No. 2058-2060 December 1, 1963 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12

Urgent

To our No. 2054

1. Several hours after meeting with Rusk, during an evening reception at Seaborg's, Chairman of the US Atomic Commission, there was a small reception in honor of comrade Petrosyants' delegation. During the reception, Thompson approached me. He said that Rusk told him about the transfer of Oswald's correspondence photocopies. He, Thompson, considers this a very good and far-sighted step by the Soviet government. Thompson wanted to suggest this to us unofficially when A.I. Mikoyan was here, but then refrained, considering the highly delicate nature of the matter.

Then Thompson began talking about how Rusk called him again about two hours after my departure and said that "in some incomprehensible way" one of the correspondents learned about the Soviet side's decision to transfer the said photocopies to the State Department and approached him, Rusk, for confirmation or denial of this fact.

I remarked to Thompson that no correspondent saw me when I was at Rusk's, and that I can guarantee that none of our embassy staff, the vast majority of whom know nothing about this fact anyway, could have spoken with correspondents. Thompson began elaborately and confusingly constructing various versions about how this correspondent came to know about this matter. He also hinted at the possibility of such information coming from Moscow. Thompson avoided, however, naming the correspondent, noting only that this was a serious person and "his information usually has solid foundation." Thompson said nothing more on this topic.

When I returned from the reception, the first editions of the Sunday Washington Post (published Saturday evening) already reported under large headlines about my meeting with Rusk and the transfer of photocopies of embassy correspondence with Oswald (article transmitted via TASS). Today these reports are in all newspapers. Overall, commentary regarding our step is favorable. All emphasize our initiative. Several newspapers specifically indicate that US official authorities are far from any thought of Oswald's connection with the Soviet Union. Regarding the correspondence itself, they report that it apparently

*Top of first page stamped "To Khrushchev N.S." 154Signal copy

represents ordinary consular correspondence with a person applying for a visa to enter another country. No newspaper mentions Oswald's letter of November 9. Apparently, the FBI and State Department have decided not to disclose this letter for now.

We have no doubt that the publication of messages about our transfer of correspondence with Oswald was made on Rusk's own instruction, apparently coordinated with the president. The whole story with the mythical correspondent was invented to somehow explain to us the fact of publishing these messages. American leaders were apparently hesitant to approach us for consent to such publication, fearing our refusal, and they, it seems, considered it useful to communicate this from the perspective of showing to broad circles of the American population the normal business state of Soviet-American relations, despite recent events.

Observing the initial reaction, one can say that the news about our voluntary transfer of correspondence with Oswald has produced an overall positive and favorable impression on American public opinion.

2. Although Rusk strongly emphasized in his conversation with me the unofficial and calm nature of his statements regarding the seizure of Cuban weapons in Venezuela and clearly sought to create an impression of his desire to merely personally inform A.A. Gromyko about "another example of Castro's interference" in Latin American affairs, we get the impression this was done with a specific purpose.

On Tuesday, the Organization of American States (OAS) will consider Venezuela's official complaint regarding "subversive actions of the Castro government," where one of the main pieces of evidence will be the aforementioned seizure of weapons allegedly delivered from Cuba. Venezuela intends to request collective adoption of additional measures against Cuba. According to some data, a proposal will be made for all remaining Latin American countries to sever diplomatic relations with it. The US government, according to the same unofficial sources, intends to support new measures against Cuba within the OAS framework, and also to strengthen the patrolling of its naval vessels in the Caribbean area to "intercept Cuban contraband."

If all this information about new measures being prepared in the OAS against Cuba corresponds to reality, it is logical to assume that the US government and the new president, wishing to soften or prevent possible deterioration of Soviet-American relations due to the indicated measures regarding Cuba, found it expedient to somehow "prepare" us for these measures through Rusk's "unofficial and personal" statements.

I think it would be useful to give in our press a proper assessment of the events now unfolding around Venezuela's accusations against Cuba.

A. Dobrynin 155Signal Copy

MEMO: No. 2054 (inc. No. 55380) dated 30.XI.63 r. Dobrynin informed about the meeting with Reston and providing him photocopies of correspondence with Oswald.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 103 - 106. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 58****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA regarding conversation with Washington Bureau Chief of "New York Times" J. Reston about L.H. Oswald's connections and President USA L. Johnson

Spec. No. 2067 - 2068 December 3, 1963 Washington TOP SECRET Copy No. 12

Urgent

I had a meeting with Reston, head of the Washington bureau of "New York Times," whom I have known for a long time.

1. Reston was interested unofficially in reports that appeared here from American correspondents in Moscow stating that Soviet press began indicating Oswald's connection with American intelligence. Emphasizing the important nature of these communications, if they reflect concrete facts, Reston asked whether these facts relate to the period of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union.

I replied to Reston that the idea of Oswald's connection with American intelligence was expressed, as known, recently by an American stenographer, to whom Oswald came to print excerpts from some future book of his. Apparently, Soviet newspapers could have printed about this fact, though it's difficult to say precisely now, as these newspapers arrive here in Washington with a 2-3 day delay. Reston noted that this might be the same story, although in American press it is presented as independent Soviet accusations, which cannot but provoke new speculation and debate around the circumstances of the president's death.

2. Unofficially, Reston reported that FBI investigators working on Oswald's case have personal instructions from Johnson to thoroughly check possible connections between Oswald and Castro's government and PRC. The matter is that some influential figures in Washington are gossiping behind the scenes, said Reston, about whether Oswald received money and instructions from the Chinese. Such assumptions, but much more frequently, can be heard

*On the first page at top stamp "to Khrushchev N.S." 156[]

in private conversations with many officials regarding Castro. This, Reston said, personally greatly concerns him from the perspective of unpredictable international consequences if Cuba somehow becomes implicated in the Oswald case.

Reston emphasized that Johnson and, especially, Rusk clearly understand the potential danger of such complications, and they have quietly taken several measures to avoid inflaming passions and not give any additional reasons for speculation from their side. Johnson's creation of a commission headed by the Chief Justice Warren reflects American leaders' desire to concentrate the entire Oswald case in one place and prevent various conjectures and fabrications that only damage USA's international prestige.

Reston also reported that investigators have evidence that Oswald knew Ruby, who later killed him, and that they maintained contact. It is still unclear whether Oswald himself was somehow involved with the criminal world that Ruby was connected to, or if there were other reasons. Some people close to Ruby speak about Oswald's attempt to blackmail Ruby for some reason with the aim of obtaining money or holding some money. The FBI is currently investigating these matters.

Reston, who has long known Johnson well, said that Johnson will undoubtedly seek reelection in 1964. Reston characterized him as a person with a strong character, very self-loving, but extremely cautious in politics. He likes informal communication, various anecdotes and sometimes not quite censored stories common among Western cowboys. He is interested in and understands cattle breeding; prize cattle are raised at his ranch. He avoids "theorists" and "philosophers" and generally "overly" educated people, who are called "eggheads" here. Less flexible than Kennedy. Prefers to discuss specific questions and concrete matters, without wasting time on too lengthy planning or detailed analysis of various aspects. He is proud of his poor origins and likes to recall this, emphasizing that he came from the people. Knows how and likes

to drink properly.

Reston believes that until the elections Johnson will conduct Kennedy's foreign and domestic policy almost unchanged (paying more attention to the latter), as Johnson is convinced that such a course gives him the best chances for reelection. With his flair and ability to navigate political moods within the USA, Johnson, Reston noted, has long been well-known among his former colleagues - senators and leaders of both parties.

During the conversation, Reston noted that as far as he could judge, Johnson is positively disposed toward meeting with N.S. Khrushchev during the next year and that in his, Reston's, opinion such a meeting could take place in late spring or early

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157Signal Copy

summer of 1964, if it will be prepared through diplomatic channels. Reston did not specify, however, what these statements were based on.

A. Dobrynin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 107-112. Copy. Typewritten text on the form of cipher telegram of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 59****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA with text of confidential message from US President L.B. Johnson to N.S. Khrushchev

Spec. No. 2073-2074 December 3, 1963 Washington TOP SECRET Copy No. 12

Urgent

Visited Thompson at his request. Thompson conveyed to me the following confidential message from President Johnson to N.S. Khrushchev:

"The White House, Washington December 2, 1963

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am sending you these few personal words simply to express my appreciation that your government has provided us with certain documents concerning Lee Harvey Oswald. We highly value any information that may be useful to us in clarifying all doubts surrounding this deeply tragic event, and I want to express my personal gratitude for your help.

I would also like to take this opportunity to gratefully acknowledge receipt of the substantive and constructive letter delivered to me by Mr. Mikoyan, and to tell you directly what I already told him: that I am deeply convinced of the value of direct and personal correspondence between you and me - in addition to those important matters which, naturally, go through official channels - in all cases when such personal correspondence can be useful in the interests of peace.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending best wishes to you and Mrs. Khrushcheva.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"

*On the first page at the top there is a stamp "to Khrushchev N.S."

158Signal Copy

To His Excellency Nikita S. Khrushchev Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Moscow

While delivering Johnson's message, Thompson verbally reiterated that the new president, like Kennedy, attaches great importance to maintaining personal contact with N.S. Khrushchev and is ready to continue confidential correspondence with him.

At the same time, as if on his own behalf, Thompson asked to keep in mind the desirability of not combining, when possible, in the same messages questions that require familiarization with these messages by a fairly wide circle of people in the White House and State Department, with such questions and considerations that are intended strictly for the president's information only. Regarding messages of the second type, Thompson said that according to Johnson's instructions, only Rusk, Bundy and he, Thompson, will have access to them besides Johnson himself. No one else will be allowed to access them.

I told Thompson that I would convey President Johnson's message to N.S. Khrushchev. To my further remark that it would perhaps be difficult to draw a clear line in the messages that he spoke about, Thompson replied that he agrees with me and that, of course, all this remains entirely at the discretion of the head of the Soviet government.

A. Dobrynin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 329. L. 1 - 3. Copy. Typewritten text on the form of cipher telegram of the 10th Department of the USSR MFA.

****No. 60****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA with the text of J.Kennedy's letter to N.S. Khrushchev expressing gratitude for condolences

Spec. No. 2086 - 2088 December 4, 1963 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 2

Urgent

Met with Thompson today at his invitation. Thompson said that Jacqueline Kennedy, the late president's wife, asked

*On the first page at the top stamp "to Khrushchev N.S." 159Signal copy

to pass through me her personal letter to N.S. Khrushchev.

Thompson noted that she passed this letter to him through Bundy. No one else knows about the letter, although about the fact of the letter's transmission (not about its contents), apparently, President Johnson is informed. Rusk is "not yet aware of this matter." Thompson also said that he personally is not familiar with the contents of the letter itself.

The envelope was slightly sealed in one place. The entire letter was not typed on a machine, but written from beginning to end by Jacqueline Kennedy's own hand, which is usually considered here a sign of

special respect for the addressee. She herself wrote the address on the envelope. The letter is written on small sheets with "White House" letterhead.

The text of the letter is as follows:

"White House, December 1, 1963

Dear Mr. Chairman-President,

I would like to thank You for sending Mr. Mikoyan as Your representative to my husband's funeral.

He looked so distressed when he approached me, and I was very touched by this.

I tried to say something to You through him that same day, but it was such a terrible day for me that I don't know if my words came out the way I wanted them to be.

Therefore now, in one of the last nights that I will spend in the White House, in one of the last letters that I will write on these White House letterheads, I would like to write You this message of mine.

I am sending it only because I know how deeply my husband cared about peace and what a central place in this concern was occupied in his mind by relations between You and him. He more than once quoted Your words in his speeches: "In a future war, the survivors will envy the dead."

You and he were adversaries, but You were also allies in the determination not to let the world be blown up.

You respected each other, and You could deal with each other. I know that President Johnson will make every effort to establish the same kind of relationship with You.

The danger that worried my husband was that war might be started not so much by big men as by small ones.

While big men understand the need for self-control and restraint, small men are sometimes moved more by fear and pride. If only in the future the big men could continue to make the little ones sit down and talk, before they start to fight!

I know that President Johnson will continue the policy my husband so deeply believed in - a policy of control and restraint - and he will need Your help.

I am sending this letter because I realize so deeply the importance of the relationship,

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which existed between you and my husband, and also because you and Mrs. Khrushcheva were so kind in Vienna.

I read that there were tears in her eyes when she was leaving the American embassy in Moscow after signing the book of condolences. Please tell her thank you for this.

Respectfully, Jacqueline Kennedy

In our opinion, it would be good if Nikita Sergeevich, and possibly separately Nina Petrovna, responded to her with a personal letter. It might also be worthwhile to consider the possibility of extending an unofficial invitation, for example, on behalf of Nina Petrovna and Rada, for J. Kennedy to come with her children to visit us, say next summer, and rest at the Black Sea.

Such a step from our side would make a very good impression on American public opinion and on the governing circles of the USA. Moreover, maintaining connections with the Kennedy family would also not be unhelpful.

A. Dobrynin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 113 - 114. Copy. Typewritten text on the cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of the USSR MFA.

****No. 61****

Note from the Chairman of the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastny to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.V. Kuznetsov with attached reference about L.H. Oswald

****No. 3238-s December 4, 1963****

Top Secret

Copy No. 2

To Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Comrade KUZNETSOV V.V.

Herewith I am forwarding a reference on Lee Harvey OSWALD, as well as photocopies of correspondence that he and his wife conducted with the USSR Embassy in the USA. Attachment: 1. Reference on 7 pages.

161Signal copy

2. Photocopies of correspondence materials on 40 pages (for addressee only).

Chairman Of The State Security Committee

V. Semichastny

[Attachment] Top Secret Copy No. 2

Memorandum

Lee Harvey OSWALD, born 1939, was in the USSR from October 16, 1959 to June 1962. OSWALD entered the Soviet Union on a tourist visa issued to him in Helsinki for a five-day period.

Immediately after arriving in Moscow, he showed no interest in getting acquainted with Soviet life, but began negotiations with Intourist employees about his intention to remain permanently in the USSR.

OSWALD justified this desire by stating that, although he does not belong to the Communist Party or any other progressive American organization, he is familiar with Marxist literature and is a convinced opponent of the capitalist system. Since he sees no prospects for his continued residence in his homeland, he intends to settle in the Soviet Union.

On October 17, 1959, that is, on the second day after OSWALD's appearance in Moscow, the Office of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR forwarded to the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR OSWALD's application requesting his admission to Soviet citizenship. Given the complete uncertainty about the applicant's identity, on October 20, 1959, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (comrade GEORGADZE) was notified in writing that the KGB of the USSR considers OSWALD's admission to Soviet citizenship inappropriate.

On October 22, 1959, the chairman of the "Intourist" board comrade ANKUDINOV sent a memo to the KGB stating that on October 20, during a conversation at OVIR, OSWALD was assured that he would receive an answer the next day regarding his request for Soviet citizenship.

On October 21, the staff of the "Berlin" hotel, where the American was staying, informed him that he needed to appear at OVIR, but warned that tickets had been ordered for him and he should prepare to leave the country. OSWALD did not go to OVIR, and was later found in the bathroom of his locked hotel room at the "Berlin" hotel with his wrists cut. A note was found on the writing desk in the room: "I have come such a long way not to find death. I love life."

First aid was provided to the victim on site, and then he was taken to the Botkin Hospital. According to the testimony of the doctors who treated him, OSWALD has

162with sound mental health. His intention to remain in the USSR is unwavering and, if he is again denied asylum, he may repeat his suicide attempt.

After being discharged from the hospital on October 29, OSWALD was again received by the head of OVIR and repeated his request for the right of residence in the USSR.

On November 11, 1959, the deputy chairman of "Inturist" BOICHENKO sent a memo about everything that happened with OSWALD to A.I. MIKOYAN, who instructed comrade SEMENOV (MFA USSR) and comrade SHELEPIN (KGB under CM USSR) to "examine and submit their proposals to the CC CPSU."

In a note from MFA and KGB to the CC CPSU dated November 27, it was stated: "Considering that some foreigners previously granted Soviet citizenship (SITRINEL, AVISHA204), after living for some time in the USSR, left our country, and also taking into account that OSWALD has not yet been sufficiently studied, it is advisable to grant him the right of temporary residence in the USSR for one year, providing him with work and housing. In this case, the question of OSWALD's permanent residence in the Soviet Union and his acceptance into Soviet citizenship could be decided after this period expires"205.

The CC CPSU agreed with this opinion206, and on December 1, 1959, by decree No. 3363-rs, the Council of Ministers of the USSR decided to "grant US citizen Lee Harvey OSWALD, who applied for Soviet citizenship, the right of temporary residence in the Soviet Union for one year, with the question of his permanent residence in the USSR and acceptance into Soviet citizenship to be decided after this period expires."

The same decree determined the conditions for OSWALD's employment in Minsk and the allocation of an apartment for him. The Executive Committee of the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of the USSR was instructed to assign OSWALD a monthly allowance of 700 rubles and allocate 5,000 rubles for apartment furnishing.

In early January 1960, OSWALD arrived in Minsk and was temporarily housed in a hotel. The Council of National Economy directed him, with his consent, to the radio engineering factory, considering that, as OSWALD stated, he had studied radio engineering during his military service in the USA. Since in January the City Council could not provide him with an apartment near the factory, with the American's consent, it was decided that he would receive an apartment after some time in a building that was nearing completion.

According to available materials, all conditions were created at the factory for OSWALD to master the work. A good specialist was assigned to mentor him.

OSWALD during his stay in Moscow and the initial period of residence in Minsk generally behaved loyally toward Soviet reality and expressed no dissatisfaction with the conditions in which he was placed.

In April 1961, OSWALD married twenty-year-old M.N. PRUSAKOVA, an assistant pharmacist at the 3rd Clinical Hospital of Minsk. PRUSAKOVA was born in North-

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Born in Dvinsk, Arkhangelsk region, lost mother early and lived in Leningrad in the family of stepfather, a worker at the Leningrad Coke Gas Plant. After graduating from Leningrad Pharmaceutical College in 1959, moved to Minsk and lived with maternal uncle, an employee of financial department PRUSAKOVA I.V.

Shortly after marriage, in July 1961, PRUSAKOVA was criticized for lack of initiative at the hospital's Komsomol meeting and expelled from VLKSM ranks because she did not participate in any Komsomol work, and during the discussion of her personal case made incorrect statements.

Characteristically, by this time it was already known that OSWALD had become disillusioned with his life plans in the USSR, abandoned his initial intentions to enter a technical university or dedicate himself to translation work. Thus, on January 6, 1961, in one of the conversations OSWALD stated that "he is not convinced that socialism is a more progressive phenomenon, that he does not see ways to objectively evaluate socialism's advantages over capitalism. There can be no objectivity here," he continued, "as every person's judgments are consequences of their upbringing, which entirely determines that person's views. In the USSR there are restrictions that he dislikes and which in his view are negative."

When asked by an acquaintance why he came to the USSR, OSWALD said on January 13, 1961, that he was a lonely person and it didn't matter to him where to live.

During his stay in Minsk, Lee Harvey OSWALD was a member of the factory sports society of fishermen. He also acquired a double-barreled hunting rifle and went hunting two or three times, which took place before his marriage. OSWALD shot very poorly. He willingly accepted game from his hunting companions.

He was a member of DOSAAF*. Had a membership card of this society. It is possible that OSWALD could have taken it with him when departing for the USA.

OSWALD took no part in DOSAAF work, did not undergo any shooting training courses and did not participate in shooting activities.

In December 1960, OSWALD established correspondence with the US Embassy in Moscow and began seeking opportunities to return to America; to resolve this matter, the American consulate invited him to Moscow. In June 1961, OSWALD and his wife visited the American embassy, then began processing their departure from the USSR. OSWALD and his wife concealed their plans from those around them.

Nevertheless, measures were taken to persuade PRUSAKOVA to abandon her intention to go to America, in particular, her uncle had several such conversations with her. However, this yielded no results, and after the case was given official status, the KGB under the Council of Ministers of Belorussian SSR raised the

question before the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR about allowing them to leave the country. Considering that

*Here and further in the text, correctly - DOSAAF.

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Lee Harvey OSWALD did not have Soviet citizenship, his temporary residence permit in the USSR had expired, there was no data that would have compromised him, particularly regarding connections with American intelligence, and also, considering that OSWALD and his wife had no access to classified information at their place of work and residence, the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers did not obstruct their departure.

On March 17, 1963, OSWALD-PRUSAKOVA, who lived with her husband in Dallas (Texas), contacted the consular department of the USSR Embassy in the USA requesting permission to return to the USSR for permanent residence, to settle with relatives in Leningrad. She reaffirmed this petition in a letter dated June 13 of this year, which stated in part: "My husband expresses sincere desire to return with me to the USSR. I strongly request help with this, as there is little comfort for us here and nothing holds us. I cannot work temporarily, even if I found work, and my husband is often unemployed. Living here is very difficult for us. We don't have money for me to travel to the embassy, let alone for hospital payments etc. and for childbirth." (PRUSAKOVA left for the USA with a 3-month-old daughter, and according to information agencies, she recently had a second child).

The letter concludes: "Make us happy again, help us return what we foolishly lost. I want my second child to be born in the USSR."

It is noteworthy that in the first petition from March 17, 1963, PRUSAKOVA wrote that her husband would remain in the USA.

In October 1963, OSWALD contacted the Soviet embassy in Mexico requesting a visa to enter the USSR for permanent residence. Both petitions were reviewed by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since OSWALD-PRUSAKOVA's relatives living in Leningrad did not express desire to accept her, she was denied permission to enter the USSR. OSWALD's petition was rejected for the same reasons.

In November 1963, OSWALD sent a letter to the Soviet embassy in Washington, stating that the FBI was interested in his activities because he allegedly served as secretary of the "Committee for Fair Play for Cuba" in New Orleans. Characteristically, immediately after OSWALD's arrest, American telegraph agencies made hints about his past speeches supporting the Cuban revolution and participation in distributing leaflets in defense of Cuba.

Both during OSWALD and his wife's stay in the USSR and after they left our country, the Committee for State Security showed no operational interest in them.

A. Sakharovsky O. Gribanov

CSA FSB RF. F. 5-os. Op. 10. D. 73. L. 361 - 368. Copy. Typewritten text.

165Signal Copy

****No. 62****

Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and KGB Chairman under the USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastny to the CPSU Central Committee regarding the response to US State Secretary D. Rusk about reasons for denying L.H. Oswald Soviet citizenship

****No. 03496/GS December 6, 1963****

Secret. Copy 1

To Cpsu Central Committee

In conversation with USSR Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin, US State Secretary D. Rusk requested to communicate, if possible, the reasons for refusing to grant Soviet citizenship to American citizen Oswald (telegram from Washington No. 2054207).

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers consider it expedient to instruct the Soviet Ambassador to verbally inform Rusk that American citizen Oswald did not meet the criteria sufficient for satisfying his request for Soviet citizenship.

Draft Resolution attached 208.

Please review.

A. Gromyko V. Semichastny

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 382 L. 4. Original. Typewritten text. Signatures-autograph in blue ink.

****No. 63****

Record of conversation between APN Television News Chief Editor G.K. Bolshakov and artist, chief architect of Washington U. Walton about the assassination of John F. Kennedy

December 9, 1963

Met with Walton at restaurant "Sovetskaya" at his initiative. Walton is a close friend of the deceased US President John F. Kennedy's family, who appointed him chief architect of Washington.

Walton said that he came to Moscow at President Kennedy's request, who

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recommended him to make this trip to familiarize himself with the works of Soviet artists, as well as their creative views and plans for the future. His trip to the USSR was scheduled for an earlier date, however, according to Walton, it was postponed by President Kennedy due to the arrest of Professor Barghoorn in the USSR.

Walton said that he spoke with the president three days before his assassination. Kennedy, he noted, was full of energy and looked confidently to the future. He intended to devote himself entirely to the election campaign, in whose outcome he had no doubt. At this meeting, the President told Walton that he wanted to make a trip to the USSR after concluding another agreement with N.S. Khrushchev in the field of

disarmament.

The assassination of President Kennedy, Walton said, was undoubtedly the result of a major political conspiracy. There may have been only one killer, but there were undoubtedly more accomplices in the president's assassination.

Dallas, Walton continued, is an ideal place for such a crime. The president's assassination there could be blamed on racists, or on Birchers, or on anyone.

The death of Kennedy, as Walton stated, caused confusion in Washington. The assassination shocked Kennedy's inner circle so much that it couldn't come to its senses for a whole day. Robert Kennedy lay in bed all night. For 24 hours after the president's assassination, the country was practically run by Kennedy's national security advisor M. Bundy.

Johnson, according to Walton, is not the person who can implement all of Kennedy's ideas. He is an "agile opportunist" closely connected with big business. Walton expressed concern that as a result of Johnson's arrival in the government, representatives of big business might infiltrate. The most important thing now, in Walton's opinion, is for McNamara to remain as Secretary of Defense, as he fully shares President Kennedy's views on issues of war and peace. It would be bad if his position is taken by some representative of big business. As it seems to me, Walton continued, keeping McNamara as Secretary of Defense is more important than keeping Rusk as Secretary of State.

Walton expressed concern about possible rapprochement between the USA and West Germany, as the US Ambassador in Bonn D. McGhee is "Johnson's man" and, as he knows, has several times expressed disagreement with President Kennedy's policy regarding West Germany.

It is difficult for me, said Walton, to speak firmly now about any plans of President Kennedy's close supporters and, above all, his brother Robert. However, from my stay in the White House in the days after the president's assassination and from conversations with Robert Kennedy, I got the impression that he will remain in the position of Attorney General for some time, and possibly until the end of Johnson's presidential term.

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Walton expressed doubt about whether Robert Kennedy would be able to put forward his candidacy for vice president or president of the USA in the 1964 presidential election. The point is, Walton continued, that in recent years Robert Kennedy has made many enemies, as he played the role of the president's "lightning rod," dealing with such issues as civil rights for Negroes, the application of anti-trust laws, which caused dissatisfaction among certain groups of the American population. Furthermore, certain damage is done to him by the fact that he has never been elected to any office.

Walton suggested that Robert Kennedy, upon leaving his post as U.S. Attorney General, would dedicate himself entirely to political activity and put forward his candidacy in the Massachusetts gubernatorial election. And only after he earns himself some "political capital" will he be able to attempt to put forward his candidacy for U.S. president.

In Walton's opinion, Robert Kennedy is now the most promising political figure on the American domestic political horizon. He, like no other, can bring John F. Kennedy's ideas to life. Therefore, said Walton, it was strange for me to hear here in Moscow an opinion, although I knew about it in Washington, that Robert Kennedy's views are more reactionary than those of his murdered brother. This is incorrect, Walton asserted, because Robert differs from John only in his firmer character, but not in views, as he fully shared his brother's views and more importantly, actively brought them to life.

I, Walton continued, spoke with Robert Kennedy and Jacqueline Kennedy before departing for the Soviet Union. Robert Kennedy asked to convey his best regards to you. He said - go to Moscow and tell them that we on our part will do everything in our power to ensure that U.S. policy toward the USSR undergoes no changes and that the country's leadership remains in firm hands.

Jacqueline Kennedy asked to convey in Moscow that she is personally very grateful to N.S. Khrushchev for sending A.I. Mikoyan to Washington for her husband's funeral. The condolences expressed by A.I. Mikoyan on behalf of N.S. Khrushchev and personally, said Jackie, were the most sincere and heartfelt, and she most vividly remembers them among all the numerous condolences from foreign statesmen.

Walton suggested that I send small Christmas gifts to Robert Kennedy and his family with him. This, he said, would be very pleasant for Robert Kennedy, who considers you his friend.

Walton asserted that Robert Kennedy and Jacqueline Kennedy, as well as the deceased president's entourage would exert possible influence on Johnson, since Kennedy's people stand at the helm of the Democratic Party machine, although Johnson is nominally its leader.

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The assassination of President Kennedy showed us, Walton said, that the vice president must also be our man. Johnson's selection was D. Kennedy's mistake. I still don't understand, Walton continued, why he chose this Texan. When D. Kennedy was selecting a vice-presidential candidate, there were only two candidates - Senators Symington and Jackson. R. Kennedy wrote their names on pieces of paper and threw them in a hat. D. Kennedy pulled out the paper that said "Symington." Why he changed his mind is unclear. This is a bitter lesson for all of us.

Therefore, in the future, the president needs to pay more attention to selecting the vice-presidential candidate, so that he could be a worthy successor. What the Kennedy people are striving for now is, apparently, to secure the vice-presidential position for themselves. These days I heard two candidates' names in the White House - Senator H. Humphrey and President Roosevelt's son[211]. But in my opinion, these are not the candidates.

During the conversation, Walton inquired whether I was planning to write a book about President Kennedy. This step, Walton said, would be well received in our country, since no Russian knew President Kennedy or his family so well. Walton asked me, if possible, to help him arrange a meeting with A.I. Adzhubey[212].

Walton reported that he met with me today because tomorrow, on instructions from the US Ambassador to Moscow Kohler, he is moving to his residence and he didn't want the embassy to know about this meeting. He said that upon returning to Washington, he would only tell R. Kennedy about meeting with me.

Walton said he was reluctant to move to Kohler's residence since he, along with Jackie Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, had opposed his appointment as ambassador to the USSR, and Kohler undoubtedly knows this. In conclusion, Walton said he would call me at work from the city at the end of this week and we would arrange a possible next meeting.

G. Bolshakov

December 11, 1963

Archive of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Copy.
Typewritten text.

****No. 64****

Resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee "On the response to US Secretary of State D. Rusk regarding his inquiry about the motives for rejecting American citizen Oswald's request for Soviet citizenship"

No. ■126/116 December 10, 1963[213]

Approve the draft instructions to the Soviet embassy in the USA on this matter (attached).

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[Appendix] To item 116 of prot[ocol] No. 126 Top secret

Washington

Sovembassy

2054214. In connection with D. Rask's request to inform him of the reasons for Soviet authorities' refusal to grant Oswald Soviet citizenship, you may verbally convey the following to Rask:

"The USSR Constitution and Soviet legislation grant Soviet citizens certain rights and impose corresponding obligations upon them. When considering applications for Soviet citizenship, the competent authorities of the Soviet Union primarily take into account the extent to which the applicant can fulfill the obligations of a USSR citizen and exercise the rights granted to them. The motives for which an individual applies for Soviet citizenship are also taken into consideration.

The Soviet competent authorities who reviewed Oswald's application did not find convincing grounds to conclude that he meets the requirements set forth by the USSR Constitution and legislation for Soviet citizens. The motives that prompted Oswald to submit his application were also unclear. The circumstance that Oswald expressed criticism toward the state of which he was a citizen could not, naturally, be a determining factor in considering his request.

For these reasons, Oswald's application for Soviet citizenship was rejected."

Execute by telegraph.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 382. L. 2-3. Original. Typewritten text.

****No. 65****

Memo from USA Department of USSR MFA "A.I. Mikoyan's Trip to USA for J. Kennedy's Funeral (November 24-28, 1963)"

December 13, 1964

On November 24 of this year, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan departed from Moscow to Washington to participate in the funeral of the US President

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John F. Kennedy. At the airport before departure, A.I. Mikoyan made the following statement to representatives of Soviet and foreign press:

"We are departing for Washington to accompany on his final journey the President of the United States of America John Fitzgerald Kennedy, whose life ended so tragically as a result of a vile assassination attempt.

The Soviet government and its head Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev have instructed me to convey to the family of the late president, the US government leadership, and the entire American people sincere condolences regarding this grave loss." ("Pravda," November 25, 1963).

November 25, 1963

On November 25 in the morning, A.I. Mikoyan arrived in Washington. At the airport, he was met by US Deputy Secretary of State A. Harriman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State L. Thompson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs R. Davis, Soviet Union Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade S.A. Borisov, as well as responsible officials of the Soviet embassy, American and foreign journalists.

At the airport, A.I. Mikoyan made the following statement:

"On behalf of the Soviet government and personally from Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev, I have arrived with a sorrowful mission to participate in the funeral of the outstanding US statesman President John F. Kennedy.

The Soviet people are deeply saddened by the tragic death of the president and share with the American people the grief over this grave loss. In the Soviet Union, John Kennedy was known as a great statesman and was respected. Respect was especially earned by the fact that the president made many efforts and contributed to finding solutions to disputed issues and strengthening mutual understanding between our countries.

I wish to express most sincere condolences to the family of the late president, the US government, and the entire American people." ("Pravda," November 26, 1963).

A.I. Mikoyan, among official representatives of foreign states who arrived in Washington for the funeral, participated in the funeral procession, memorial service at St. Matthew's Cathedral, and burial at Arlington National Cemetery.

After the funeral of US President J. Kennedy, A.I. Mikoyan, together with other heads of states, governments, and government delegations, visited the president's widow Jacqueline Kennedy at the White House. On behalf of the USSR government, its head N.S. Khrushchev, N.P. Khrushcheva, and personally from himself, A.I. Mikoyan expressed deep condolences to her regarding the tragic death of her husband - President Kennedy.

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Jackie Kennedy expressed her heartfelt gratitude to N.S. Khrushchev and A.I. Mikoyan for their warm participation in her grief and for A.I. Mikoyan's special trip to the USA to attend her husband's funeral.

Then A.I. Mikoyan attended a reception held at the State Department building by the new US President Lyndon Johnson in honor of heads of state, governments and government delegations who arrived in Washington for J. Kennedy's funeral. During this reception, A.I. Mikoyan had conversations with Secretary of State Rusk, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State L. Thompson, Director of Arms Control Agency Foster, and responsible staff members of the US State Department. At the same reception, A.I. Mikoyan had conversations with French President Charles de Gaulle, Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie, President of Israel Zalman Shazar, Prime Ministers: of Britain Alec Douglas-Home, of Japan - Hayato Ikeda, of Sweden - Tage Erlander, as well as Foreign Ministers: of Japan - Masayoshi Ohira, of Israel - Golda Meir, and also French Ambassador to the USA Herve Alphand, Yugoslav delegation (Petar Stambolić and Koča Popović) and British Labour Party leader Harold Wilson.

The Emperor of Ethiopia in his conversation with A.I. Mikoyan expressed a wish to meet separately, and his request was granted.

26 November 1963

On the morning of November 26, A.I. Mikoyan met with the new US President L. Johnson at the White House. During A.I. Mikoyan's visit to the White House, the President's Press Secretary P. Salinger made an unofficial request to convey to N.S. Khrushchev the most sincere gratitude on behalf of all White House staff and friends of the president for N.S. Khrushchev's visit to the US Embassy in Moscow to personally pay respects to the late president.

During A.I. Mikoyan's conversation with Lyndon B. Johnson, the American side was also represented by US Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs A. Harriman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State L. Thompson, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs M. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs W. Tyler and interpreter Akalovsky.

From the Soviet side, the meeting was attended by USSR Ambassador to the USA A.F. Dobrynin, member of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Board and Head of the USA Department M.N. Smirnovsky, and interpreter V.M. Sukhodrev.

After the meeting, which lasted about an hour, A.I. Mikoyan stated to correspondents:

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"We had a pleasant conversation with President Johnson, and it should be said that we were satisfied with this conversation, which touched upon matters of mutual interest to both sides.

I speak of a favorable impression, as this is not my first meeting with President Johnson. We met during my visit to the USA in 1959. Even then we had pleasant conversations. And now I am especially pleased with this meeting."

When asked whether a meeting between the head of the Soviet government N.S. Khrushchev and the new US President L. Johnson was possible and likely in the near future, A.I. Mikoyan replied:

"We did not discuss this question, but we hold the opinion that the policy of the Soviet Union and the United States on this matter remains as it has been until now."

To a follow-up question from the correspondent about his personal opinion on this matter, A.I. Mikoyan asked: "And what do you personally think?"

When the correspondent replied that he would prefer to leave this decision to President Johnson's discretion, A.I. Mikoyan remarked: "And I would like to leave this decision to N.S. Khrushchev's discretion." ("Pravda", November 27, 1963)

In the second half of the day on November 26, A.I. Mikoyan met with US Secretary of State D. Rusk and had a one-and-a-half-hour conversation with him. After the conversation, correspondents asked A.I. Mikoyan if he could tell them about its contents.

A.I. Mikoyan replied: "I can, but not as much as you want. We discussed issues that have been touched upon in conversations between representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States more than once. We discussed international situation issues and, in particular, the problem of disarmament. We tried to find methods to move forward the matter of disarmament, which is moving forward very slowly or not moving at all. We found ways to continue negotiations on disarmament." ("Pravda", November 28, 1963)

Answering a question, A.I. Mikoyan also noted that European issues were discussed during the meeting with D. Rusk.

On the evening of November 26, A.I. Mikoyan had a meeting with British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home and Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie, who were in Washington.

That same evening, comrade A.I. Mikoyan spoke before diplomatic staff of the Soviet embassy.

At a press conference on the evening of November 26, a White House representative announced that during the meeting between First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan and US President Lyndon Johnson, various issues affecting

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interests of both countries. The representative declined to comment on which specific issues were discussed at the meeting. The conversation was very friendly. L. Johnson told A.I. Mikoyan that he intended to work in the interests of peace, just as the late President Kennedy had done. "Our country," Johnson said, "is ready to go its part of the way toward resolving any complex problems standing between the two countries."

Responding to a question, the White House representative stated that the new president in his conversation with A.I. Mikoyan "did not insist on meeting with the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev, but did not rule out such a possibility." (TASS, p. 3 - A, 27.XI.1963)

The American press widely commented on A.I. Mikoyan's stay in the USA and his meetings with the president and other officials. The comments were generally favorable. It was noted that the meeting with A.I. Mikoyan was the longest of Johnson's seven meetings with foreign officials who arrived in Washington for Kennedy's funeral. The New York Herald Tribune's correspondent in Washington, Barrett, describing President Johnson's negotiations with foreign diplomats, notes that American circles refute reports about the emergence of new developments in American-Soviet relations. Many speculations were caused by A.I. Mikoyan's remark that "we have found some methods for conducting negotiations" on disarmament. A high-ranking State Department representative said that the US government was "puzzled" by this remark. He attributed it to misunderstanding or the use of an unfortunate expression (TASS, p.14-A, November 27, 1963).

November 27, 1963

On November 27 at 16:55 local time, A.I. Mikoyan departed from Washington to Moscow. Special Assistant to the US Secretary of State L. Thompson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European

Affairs R. Davis, and Deputy Chief of Protocol of the State Department W. Tone■ came to Andrews Air Force Base to see A.I. Mikoyan off.

A.I. Mikoyan was seen off by USSR Ambassador to the USA A.F. Dobrynin, USSR Permanent Representative to the UN N.T. Fedorenko, as well as heads of embassies and diplomatic missions of socialist countries in the USA, American and foreign journalists.

Before departure, A.I. Mikoyan made the following statement for the press:

"I am leaving your country after fulfilling the sad duty assigned to me by the Soviet government. During my brief stay in your capital, I had the opportunity to meet with US President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk. I would like to express my appreciation to them for the useful discussions we had."

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We express hope that the new US government will continue to search for mutually acceptable solutions to disputed issues, as well as the easing of international tension.

Please convey best wishes to the American people. Goodbye. ("Pravda", November 29, 1963)

A.I. Mikoyan returned to Moscow on November 28 of this year.

1st Secretary of USA Department V. Sokolov

AVP RF. F. 0129. Op. 47. D. 355. L. 14. L. 47-52. Original. Typewritten text. Signature-autograph in blue ink.

****No. 66****

Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding meeting with US Attorney General R. Kennedy

Spec. No. 2201-2202 December 25, 1963 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12

Yesterday, on the eve of Christmas holidays, Robert Kennedy visited me on his own initiative.

He said that on the eve of these holidays he wanted to thank the Soviet government and its head N.S. Khrushchev on behalf of Jacqueline Kennedy and himself for "the human sympathy and feelings expressed by them in the grief that has befallen the entire Kennedy family." R. Kennedy especially emphasized the personal respect that the late president had for the Soviet premier, and the hopes he spoke of shortly before his death for significant improvement in Soviet-American relations after the 1964 re-election.

Further referring to the fact that he and I have "special personal relations, strengthened by the Cuban crisis and the trust shown to us by both heads of governments," R. Kennedy asked me to keep in mind that in the future, whatever post he might hold, he would always be ready to meet with me and provide appropriate strong assistance in the interests of both our countries.

*On the first page at the top there is a stamp "to Khrushchev N.S."

175Special copy

R. Kennedy stipulated that, in expressing this thought, he is not intending to offer his services right now. He himself doesn't yet know what he will become, and hasn't had the opportunity to properly think about his future political fate. But he would like us to keep in mind that what he said is a serious intention, because "we, the Kennedys, don't throw words to the wind." Then R. Kennedy said he wants to give me a color photo with his inscription, where they are photographed together with his late brother the president in the White House. He handed over this photo right away.

I thanked R. Kennedy for everything he said, as well as for the photo, indicating that I, for my part, hope to continue maintaining personal contact with him.

During the subsequent conversation, R. Kennedy reported that President Johnson asked him to remain as Attorney General. He, R. Kennedy, agreed to this, at least until Congress passes the Civil Rights Act[216], which causes major debates in the country and in Congress, and in the preparation of which he, as Attorney General and the president's brother, played the most active role.

R. Kennedy confirmed that there is currently quite a strong movement in the Democratic Party leadership in favor of nominating him as the party's vice presidential candidate. R. Kennedy himself hasn't decided this question for himself personally yet. Firstly, President Johnson hasn't told anyone yet whom he would like to have as his vice president. Much will depend on who will be nominated as candidates for president and vice president from the Republican Party at their convention in July 1964. Secondly, the vice president position in the USA is not an active position. For him, R. Kennedy, this will be especially felt after the unique position he held under his brother-president. Perhaps the only attractive aspect of this position is that it gives certain hopes for the future, when the president is no longer eligible for re-election or doesn't want to run again, and an energetic vice president can more easily become a presidential candidate from their party, as happened with Nixon, or become one of the party leaders.

R. Kennedy also reported that the Democratic Party of his home state Massachusetts would like him to run for governor of that state. Such a position, noted R. Kennedy, provides certain political influence in the party on a national scale and is one of the most attractive for politicians. However, there practically all attention would need to be devoted to internal problems of the state itself, which, of course, after Washington, would hardly be particularly interesting.

In any case, said R. Kennedy in conclusion, I will apparently have to think seriously about my future political fate in the relatively near future. Right now though, he joked, I am completely occupied with the affairs of the entire numerous Kennedy family, where I have now become the de facto head after the death of my elder brother.

A. Dobrynin

176Signal Copy

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 329. L. 51 - 54. Copy. Typewritten text on USSR MFA 10th Department cipher telegram form.

****No. 67****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA regarding meeting with US Secretary of State D. Rusk on the matter of transferring additional materials about L.H. Oswald's stay in the USSR

Special No. 485 - 487 March 24, 1964 Washington TOP SECRET Copy No. 12

Urgent

Visited Rusk today at his request.

Rusk said that the US government highly values the cooperation of the Soviet government, which it provided on its own initiative regarding the Oswald case, by instructing the embassy to transfer copies of correspondence between its consular department and Oswald and his wife for the period from 1962 to 1963. The US government would be grateful if the Soviet government could provide any additional available information about Oswald during his stay in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1962. The Warren Commission, investigating the Oswald case, has expressed several requests in this regard, which are attached to the Secretary of State's note.

While transmitting this note along with a copy of Warren Commission chairman's letter, Rusk emphasized that this request is confidential and they understand the somewhat unusual nature of their appeal, but are guided by the act of good will shown initially by the Soviet government. Of course, Rusk added, this only concerns information available to Soviet authorities, as on some points, as the American side understands, it may not be available to the Soviet side. Rusk mentioned in passing that during the preliminary work of the Warren Commission, much data emerged indicating Oswald's significant psychological instability, and that similar data might exist in the Soviet Union from when Oswald lived there.

He then made a remark that, for example, one of the American tourists who visited Oswald in the Soviet Union, apparently in 1959, found him in his room in a semi-conscious state (whether he was drunk or having some kind of seizure, we don't know exactly, said Rusk, as this is very fragmentary information received long

*On the first page at the top stamp "to Khrushchev N.S." 177Signal copy
(time later).

In conclusion, Rusk once again emphasized the confidential nature of the appeal to the Soviet government, expressing hope that it would properly understand the motives for such an appeal.

(The text of the note and a copy of Warren's letter are being transmitted in a separate telegram)²¹⁸.

Before my departure, Rusk inquired whether there was any new information from Moscow regarding the release of American pilots²¹⁹. I gave him a negative response. In parting, Rusk remarked half-jokingly that yesterday, when he spoke at a hearing of one of the congressional committees (on a completely different matter), one congressman, a member of this committee, called Rusk a "peacemaker" for his Sunday press conference. Responding to Rusk in the same tone, that apparently this gentleman from Congress was not particularly convinced by Rusk's presentation of the factual side of the matter, Rusk only noted in response that during the press conference, he made every effort to prevent the press from sensationalizing this incident.

On the way from Rask, the accompanying head of the USSR Division of the State Department, Gatrie, drew attention to a "good" editorial in the Washington Post regarding the RB-66 aircraft incident, implying that the State Department was involved here (the article was transmitted via TASS)220. However, Gatrie avoided any other comments on this matter.

The embassy is now receiving quite many telephone inquiries from newspapers and agencies about the exact date of the pilots' release. Overall, the commentary and reactions in the USA regarding Rask's announcement about the Soviet side's intention to return the pilots are generally maintained in a favorable tone for us.

A.Dobrynin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 155 - 157. Copy. Typewritten text on the form of cipher telegram of the 10th Department of the USSR MFA.

178Signal Copy

****No. 68****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs transmitting note from US Secretary of State D. Rusk and letter from Chairman of the President's Commission on the Investigation of President J.F. Kennedy's Assassination E. Warren requesting information about L.H. Oswald's stay in the USSR

Spec. No. 488-491 March 24, 1964 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 12

Urgent

To our No. 485: I transmit the text of the note delivered today by Rusk, as well as a copy of Warren's letter: "The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to state the following. The Department of State wishes to express its appreciation for the information already received from the Soviet Embassy regarding Lee Harvey Oswald, which contains copies of correspondence between consular staff of the Embassy and Mr. and Mrs. Lee Harvey Oswald during 1962-63. The United States Government would be grateful if the Soviet Government would provide any additional available information regarding Lee Harvey Oswald's activities during his residence in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1962, particularly copies of any official documents concerning him. For the information of the Soviet government, attached is a copy of the letter to the Secretary of State from the Chief Justice - Chairman of the Presidential Commission investigating

President Kennedy's assassination. Attachment: copy of letter from the Chief Justice. Department of State Washington, March 24, 1964." "Copy. President's Commission on the Investigation of the President Kennedy Assassination 200 Maryland Avenue, Northeast Washington, District of Columbia, 20002 March 11, 1964"

*On the first page at the top there is a stamp "to Khrushchev N.S." 179Signal copy

To the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of the State Department, Washington, District of Columbia.

Dear Secretary of State Rusk:

As you know, the commission, of which I am chairman, was tasked by the president to investigate all aspects of President Kennedy's assassination in order to present a comprehensive report to the American people. In particular, we are engaged in collecting all possible information about the life and biography of Lee Harvey Oswald, who, while under arrest in Dallas on charges of killing the president, was, in turn, killed.

The Commission has already heard testimony given by his wife Mrs. Marina Oswald, his mother Mrs. Marguerite Oswald, and his brother, Mr. Robert Oswald. We have also received statements and documents concerning Lee Harvey Oswald from other sources, including Soviet Embassy consular files in Washington, which Ambassador Dobrynin provided to the State Department. This consular file primarily concerns correspondence between the Soviet Embassy's consular department and Mr. and Mrs. Lee Harvey Oswald during 1962-1963.

The Commission found useful material provided by the Soviet Embassy in the consular file covering 1962-63, after Lee Harvey Oswald returned from the Soviet Union with his Soviet-born wife Marina and their infant daughter. However, the Commission lacks material concerning 1959-62, during which Lee Harvey Oswald resided in the Soviet Union. For the Commission's work and to present the American people with a complete report on Lee Harvey Oswald's life and character, it would be particularly valuable if Soviet authorities could provide the United States government with additional details about his activities while living in the Soviet Union, including copies of any official documents that Soviet authorities might find possible to provide.

The Commission is particularly interested in information about the following aspects of Lee Harvey Oswald's life in the Soviet Union:

1. Copies of any documents relating to medical and psychiatric examinations and treatment of Lee Harvey Oswald, especially those connected with his treatment in October 1959 when, according to Lee Harvey Oswald's diary, Intourist guide Rimma Shirokova found him unconscious in his hotel room after his suicide attempt and sent him to the hospital.
2. Copies of any documents relating to medical and psychiatric examinations and treatment of Marina Oswald conducted in her adult life, especially those connected with any treatment around October 1961 when, according to Lee Harvey Oswald's diary, she was treated for nervous exhaustion.

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3. Copies of any documents evidencing drunkenness, disorderly conduct, indecent behavior, or any other abnormal behavior of Lee Harvey Oswald, regardless of whether it was criminal or not.
4. Copies of correspondence between Lee Harvey Oswald and Soviet authorities regarding his request to reside in the Soviet Union and obtain Soviet citizenship.

5. Copies of correspondence between Lee Harvey Oswald or Marina Oswald and Soviet authorities regarding their efforts to leave the Soviet Union.
6. Copies of documents about Lee Harvey Oswald's places of residence and work in the Soviet Union.
7. Copies of any statements, before or after President Kennedy's assassination, which Soviet citizens who knew Lee Harvey Oswald during his stay in the Soviet Union wished to make, and which relate to the above matter or could be of interest to the commission in any way.

The Commission has asked me to write to you regarding the above and, if you agree, to request the Soviet government for any assistance it may deem possible to provide in order to shed additional light on Lee Harvey Oswald.

Sincerely yours, (signed) Earl Warren Chairman.

A. Dobrynin

REFERENCE: No. 485-487 (incoming No. 14153) dated 24.III.64 Comrade Dobrynin reported about the conversation with Ransom on March 24, during which the latter requested additional information about Oswald for the period of his stay in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1962.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 158-162. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 69****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA regarding the visit to the Soviet embassy by L.H. Oswald's mother

Spec. No. 544-546 April 1, 1964 Washington

Top Secret

Copy No. 2

Oswald's mother visited the Embassy. In conversation with counselor Zinchuk, she said that the purpose of her visit was to obtain possible materials about her son's stay in the USSR.

[Stamp on the first page at top: "To Khrushchev N.S."] 181Signal copy

Oswald said that she was convinced of her son's innocence and intended to prove it. Even if her son was involved in President Kennedy's assassination, she added, he could not have "carried out all this shooting alone": there must be other participants in this matter, whom she intended to uncover. Oswald emphasized that she had very strong suspicions, though not yet proven, that her son was an agent of "one of the US government agencies."

To uncover the whole truth, Oswald continued, she needs possibly more complete materials about her son's stay in the USSR. Her attempt to familiarize herself at the State Department with the materials of

consular correspondence with her son transmitted there by the embassy yielded no results: she was made to clearly understand that she should stop attempting to conduct any kind of "independent investigation" of President Kennedy's and her son's murders. However, despite this, Oswald stated that she intended to continue her investigation and see it through to the end, and to publish a well-argued book about the results.

Oswald was told that the embassy could not provide her with any materials. She said to this that she understood the delicate position in which the embassy found itself, especially during the work of the Warren Commission, but hoped that in the future the embassy might perhaps find an opportunity to help her, considering her maternal feelings toward her innocently perished son. No promises were given to Oswald on this account, of course.

Oswald said that some time ago she had made a similar request in a letter addressed to N.S. Khrushchev, but had not yet received a response. She does not rule out that for the successful completion of her investigation she "will have to travel" to the Soviet Union. When asked about what means Oswald uses to conduct her "investigation," she replied that, for example, her trip and stay in Washington is paid for by one of the television companies as a fee for her agreement to appear on this company's program. "Kind people will be found," said Oswald, "who will help me travel to the Soviet Union as well."

To the question about Marina Oswald and her children, Oswald replied that she does not maintain direct contact with them, but she knows that Marina recently rented a new, more spacious house in a town between Dallas and Fort Worth and is now furnishing it. Financially, she is "set for life" as a result of monetary donations received and the sale of some of Lee Oswald's personal belongings; additionally, she receives a monthly pension for her husband in the amount of 148 dollars, and she also has sufficient means to provide education for the children. She does not plan to get a job and apparently will not have any material need for this. (according to data published in the American press, financial assistance to Oswald's wife from various private individuals reached 40 thousand dollars, and the amount received for radio and television appearances and from selling rights to one of the film companies to make a movie using her memories about Oswald totaled 300 thousand dollars).

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From conversations with Oswald, our advisor formed the impression that, unlike the image created by American press, radio and television, she is quite a reasonable and balanced person. At the same time, it is obvious that in undertaking her "investigation," she aims not only to attempt to achieve rehabilitation of her son, but also, in particular, to improve her strained financial situation through publishing her book about him.

Given the delicacy of this entire matter and the position of American authorities, we doubt the advisability of satisfying Oswald's aforementioned request at this time. However, we do not completely rule out such a possibility in the future - depending on our decision regarding a similar official request from the State Department, further developments around the Oswald case, and completion of the Warren Commission's work. In particular, a question may arise about exerting appropriate influence on Oswald's book content (if we have suitable materials, of course) to neutralize possible discussions and rumors about any connections between Oswald himself and the USSR, especially if such assumptions were to openly resurface here. However, judging by the Warren Commission's work, the US government is not interested in the emergence of public discussion on such a sensitive issue for Soviet-American relations and seeks to prevent it. Under these circumstances, providing Oswald's mother with any materials now can only revive unnecessary new noise around the Oswald case. Better to wait.

A. Dobrynin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 139 - 142. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 70****

Memo from USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.V. Kuznetsov and KGB Chairman under the USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastny regarding transfer to USA of photocopies of documents related to L.H. Oswald's stay in the USSR

****No. 1234/GS April 15, 1964****

Secret

Cc Cpsu

US Secretary of State D. Rusk on March 24 of this year handed our ambassador T. Dobrynin a note, in which the US government appeals to the Soviet government

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with a request to provide to its disposal for the Commission investigating the assassination of President Kennedy any possible information regarding the stay of American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald in the Soviet Union during the period from 1959 to 1962 (telegrams from Washington No. 485 and 488224). As known, in November 1963, our embassy in Washington provided to the US State Department photocopies of Oswald's and his wife's correspondence with the consular department of the embassy during 1962-63. This gesture then had a certain positive effect on American public opinion and to some extent undermined the slanderous version of the reactionary US press, which tried to portray Oswald as almost a "communist agent."

Since it would be difficult for us to refuse to satisfy the US government's request to provide it with any additional information about Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR consider it possible to provide the State Department with photocopies of some documents related to this matter.

It is intended to provide photocopies of the following documents:

1. Documents about medical examination and treatment of Oswald and his wife. There is no data about any mental illness of Oswald and his wife in these materials.
2. Documents about Oswald's residence and employment in the Soviet Union and about processing his departure with his wife to the USA. These documents show that Oswald remained to live in the USSR voluntarily and there were no obstacles created for his return to the USA.

Draft resolution is attached225.

Please review.

V. Kuznetsov V. Semichastniy

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 448. L. 113 - 114. Electrographic copy. Typewritten text.

****No. 71****

Resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee "On providing to the US State Department photocopies of documents related to the stay of American citizen Oswald in the Soviet Union"

No. P140/XLI April 23, 1964226

1. Accept the proposal of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR about providing to the US State Department photocopies of some documents related to the stay

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of American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald in the Soviet Union in 1959-1962, according to the attached list (Appendix 1).

Approve the draft instructions to Sovposol in Washington for conversation with US Secretary of State Rusk (Appendix 2).

[Appendices] To item XLI of protocol No. 140 Secret Appendix 1

List

of documents relating to Lee H. Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union, photocopies of which are being transferred to the US State Department

Materials on Lee H. Oswald's residence and employment in the Soviet Union

1. Lee H. Oswald's application to the Visa and Registration Department of the Moscow City Executive Committee Internal Affairs Office for residence permit dated 29.XII.59
2. Lee H. Oswald's receipt acknowledging explanation of legal status of stateless person, dated 5.I.1960
3. Lee H. Oswald's applications to Minsk Police Department for extension of his residence permit, dated 4.I.61 and 4.I.62
4. Lee H. Oswald's receipt for residence permit dated 6.I.1962
5. Application and autobiography written by Lee H. Oswald in connection with employment at Radio Factory in Minsk, also new employee card regarding medical examination and safety instruction, dated 11.I.60
6. Certificate from Lee H. Oswald's workplace dated 15.VII.61
7. Certificate of Lee H. Oswald's residence dated 15.VII.61
8. Character reference for Lee H. Oswald from Radio Factory workplace in Minsk dated 11.XII.1961
9. Extract from Lee Oswald's work book issued by Radio Factory in Minsk

Materials regarding departure of Lee H. Oswald and his wife M. Oswald from USSR

1. Lee H. Oswald's application to OVIR of Minsk City Police Department requesting exit visa from USSR, dated 15.VII.1961
2. Marina Oswald's application to OVIR of BSSR Police Department consenting to departure with her husband Lee H. Oswald from USSR dated 18.VII.1961
3. Marina Oswald's application requesting exit visa from USSR dated 21.VIII.1961
4. Lee H. Oswald's obligation regarding material support of his wife, written in connection with departure to USA, dated 17.VII.1961

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Medical Materials

1. Medical history of Lee H. Oswald from psychosomatic and surgical departments of Botkin Hospital (Moscow), medical history and outpatient medical card from the Second Clinical Hospital of Minsk.
2. Medical card and outpatient treatment card of Marina Oswald from Minsk.

To item XLI prot[ocol] No. 140 Secret Appendix 2

Washington

Sovposol

485227. Visit US Secretary of State Rusk and deliver him a note of the following content:

"The Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents his compliments to the Secretary of State of the United States of America and, referring to his note of March 24 of this year, has the honor to transmit in connection with the US Government's request photocopies of the following documents relating to the stay of US citizen Lee Harvey Oswald in the Soviet Union during the period from 1959 to 1962:

Materials on residence and employment of Lee H. Oswald in the Soviet Union

1. Lee H. Oswald's application to the Visa and Registration Department of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee's Internal Affairs Administration for residence permit dated 29.XII.59
2. Lee H. Oswald's receipt acknowledging explanation of legal status of stateless person, dated 5.I.1960
3. Lee H. Oswald's applications to Minsk Police Department for extension of his residence permit, dated 4.I.61 and 4.I.62
4. Lee H. Oswald's receipt for residence permit dated 6.I.1962
5. Application and autobiography written by Lee H. Oswald in connection with employment at Radio Factory in Minsk, also employee card regarding medical examination and safety instruction, dated 11.I.60
6. Certificate from Lee H. Oswald's workplace dated 15.VII.61
7. Certificate of Lee H. Oswald's residence dated 15.VII.61

8. Character reference for Lee H. Oswald from Radio Factory workplace in Minsk dated 11.XII.1961

9. Extract from Lee Oswald's work book issued at Radio Factory in Minsk

Materials concerning departure of Lee H. Oswald and his wife M. Oswald from USSR

1. Lee H. Oswald's application to OVIR of Minsk City Police Department requesting exit visa from USSR, dated 15.VII.1961

2. Marina Oswald's application to OVIR of BSSR Police Department consenting to her departure
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husband Lee H. Oswald from the USSR dated 18.VII.1961.

3. Marina Oswald's application requesting a visa to leave the USSR dated 21.VIII.1961.

4. Lee H. Oswald's obligation regarding financial support of his wife, written by him in connection with departure to the USA, dated 17.VII.1961.

Medical Materials

1. Medical history of Lee H. Oswald from psychosomatic and surgical departments of Botkin Hospital (Moscow), medical history and outpatient treatment card of Oswald from the Second Clinical Hospital of Minsk.

2. Medical card and outpatient treatment card of Marina Oswald from Minsk.

Execute by telegraph.

RGANI. F. 3. O. 16. D. 448. L. 108-112. Electrographic copy. Typewritten text.

****No. 72****

From the record of N.S. Khrushchev's conversation with New York Times observer D. Pearson and his wife L. Pearson about the investigation of J.F. Kennedy's assassination

Cairo May 24, 1964

On May 24, N.S. Khrushchev received American journalist Drew Pearson and his wife Lucy Pearson in Cairo and, at their request, had a conversation with them. Below is the record of this conversation.²²⁸

After mutual greetings, N.S. Khrushchev asks D. Pearson about what Mr. Warren, whom he met last year in Yalta²²⁹, is doing now.

D. Pearson says that Warren has been assigned a difficult mission. He currently heads the commission investigating President Kennedy's assassination.

N.S. Khrushchev notes that this is indeed a difficult mission. He not only needs to conduct the investigation but also find the killer. And this is not an easy task because there are forces in the USA now, quite influential ones, that are trying to confuse this investigation.

D. Pearson responds that Warren very much wants to identify the true perpetrators of President Kennedy's assassination. He is particularly satisfied with the help and assistance provided by the Soviet government and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in this matter,

a On the first page at the top in blue ink: "Record of conversation not to be distributed. Only MFA USSR compiled information about the conversation to be distributed."

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since Lee Oswald spent some time in the Soviet Union, and information about this period of Lee Oswald's life has certain significance for the investigation.

N.S. Khrushchev says that he has no doubt about Warren's and this commission's good intentions in their pursuit to find the true assassin of President Kennedy. However, the conditions under which this commission works in the USA are very complicated.

D. Pierson notes that there are indeed some fascist elements in the USA that are trying to obstruct this investigation.

N.S. Khrushchev says that in the Soviet Union there were also complicated criminal cases, but we mobilized our entire judicial-investigative apparatus and each time identified the true criminals.

D. Pierson asks whether it's possible to assume that the true killer was indeed Lee Oswald, acting alone. He was a strange person. And if he committed the murder, he could have done it for worldwide sensation and fame.

N.S. Khrushchev responds that it's impossible for such a crime to be committed alone. For Lee Oswald's mind, this crime was too complex. A whole group of people acted here according to a pre-developed plan. One person cannot commit such a crime.

D. Pierson says that Lee Oswald was in some sense a purposeful person. Take the fact that he independently studied Russian language, then traveled to the Soviet Union, obtained residence rights in the Soviet Union.

N.S. Khrushchev notes that studying a foreign language doesn't say anything by itself. Our dump truck drivers and other workers working in Aswan side by side with Arabs learn the language in six months. They communicate with Arabs and explain things to them.

D. Pierson says that he learned Russian not in Russia, but in the USA while serving in the marine infantry. In her opinion, Lee Oswald was a madman who wanted to become great even at the cost of killing the president.

N.S. Khrushchev notes that American press openly writes about Lee Oswald being a police agent, and he certainly didn't act alone. This was a conspiracy. And Ruby, who killed Oswald, is also a police agent, as American press writes about this. The organizers of President Kennedy's assassination are carefully confusing the case. It's not by chance that now, after some time, evidence appears in American newspapers that the shot was made not from the place as officially reported.

D. Pierson notes that this is true, and adds that nobody knows exactly how the bullet that hit the president entered and exited. There are several versions regarding this.

N.S. Khrushchev says that the true killer of the president was certainly not Lee Oswald. He is a fall guy. He was too small for this. And even if he wanted to commit

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such a crime alone, he would not have been able to commit it. Behind all this crime are people who had great opportunities - both material and financial. They are the ones who confuse the entire investigation. It is no coincidence that the murder took place in Dallas. Kennedy essentially became a victim of his

enemies. And, as it seems to me, Warren will not be able to investigate this.

L. Pierson says that there is no doubt that there were strong sentiments in Dallas against President Kennedy's policies, that the president's arrival in Dallas was accompanied by hostility towards him. Remember, continues L. Pierson, how Stevenson was received in Dallas. The presence of forces hostile to the policy of peaceful coexistence creates one of the major problems for any US president. Reactionary right-wing forces exist in the USA, and they could have been involved in Kennedy's murder...

Present at the conversation were N.P. Khrushchev and Head of Press Department of USSR MFA L.M. Zamyatin.

The conversation was recorded by L.M. Zamyatin and V.M. Sukhodrev.

RGANI. F. 52. Op. 1. D. 494. L. 93 - 100. Original. Typewritten text.

****No. 73****

Coded telegram from USSR Plenipotentiary Representative to UN N.T. Fedorenko to USSR MFA about conversation with member of Presidential Commission investigating the assassination of US President J.F. Kennedy J.McCloy regarding investigation progress

Spec. No. 1049 - 1050 June 24, 1964 New York

Top Secret

Copy No. 11

Cc Cpsu

On June 23 at Arthur Dean's reception in honor of delegation headed by academician M.D. Millionshchikov, had the following conversation with McCloy, member of Warren Commission investigating circumstances of President Kennedy's assassination:

First. Noting that the fact of Kennedy's assassination caused various interpretations in USA and other countries, McCloy expressed interest in our point of view.

Footnotes

a At bottom of last page signatures of V.M. Sukhodrev and L.M. Zamyatin in blue ink and date "3/V". b On first page at top stamp "to Khrushchev N.S." c Here and further underlined in document text.

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My attention was drawn to the interlocutor's widely known assessment of Soviet people regarding this event, as it was particularly reflected in the Moscow press. It was also emphasized that much in this connection causes bewilderment and reasonable doubts, since, in particular, to date, as far as one can judge, exhaustive and conclusive facts of the monstrous crime in Dallas have not been made public.

Referring to the fact that, as a member of the Warren Commission, he had recently been directly involved in studying all materials related to the case, McCloy said that commission members studied not only multi-volume files but also familiarized themselves with the situation in Dallas, trying to reconstruct the true picture of Kennedy's assassination. A thorough investigation of all facts related to the case, McCloy emphasized, leads the commission to the only correct conclusion that the true assassin of President Kennedy was indeed Oswald.

Everything indicates, the interlocutor continued, that Oswald acted alone and was not involved in any conspiratorial plot with others. During the investigation, it was established that Oswald attempted to assassinate General Walker²³⁴, was preparing to kill Nixon and others. Oswald was "an extremely unbalanced personality, with unstable psyche, very contradictory beliefs and inconsistent actions."

According to the interlocutor, Oswald, while serving in the Marine Corps, mastered shooting techniques, was a sniper, yielding in this skill only to instructor-level marksmen.

Second. To my remark that the version about the president's assassination by a person acting alone and not connected to certain forces raises doubts, which have been widely reflected in American press and recently published books, McCloy expressed that "any judgments about any conspiracy surrounding Kennedy's assassination are not supported by facts." If one were to follow the path of the assassin's connections with any hidden forces, McCloy continued, then "I carefully weigh my words – threads could lead beyond the USA, especially since, as is known, Oswald lived in the USSR for a certain period, from where he returned with a Russian wife and subsequently behaved very suspiciously in the USA." We know, the interlocutor added, that Oswald's very stay in the Soviet Union was "unusual and he must have been under surveillance by corresponding Soviet security organs." McCloy noted that the American side does not have exhaustive data that would allow reconstructing the complete picture, including the period of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union.

To my remark that our embassy in Washington, as is known, had in its time transmitted materials to the State Department, McCloy said that he is familiar with these materials, but they are "very laconic and do not allow composing a complete picture of Oswald's stay in the USSR."

As if wishing to emphasize his thought again, McCloy stressed that all materials available to the Warren Commission "undoubtedly indicate that

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Oswald acted alone and was not connected to any conspiratorial forces in the USA or beyond.

Third. Explaining the circumstances of Oswald's own murder by Jack Ruby, McCloy noted that Ruby's actions, as evidenced by undisputed facts, "were in no way connected to an attempt to 'cover up traces' of the president's murder." According to the interlocutor, Ruby's actions were "entirely due to his personal adventurism, which was characteristic of Ruby, who had spent his whole life associated with people of low reputation and dishonest activities."

Responding to my question about whether the commission has reliable testimony from Oswald himself, McCloy regretfully noted that "Oswald's testimony was not recorded on tape, and we had to rely on investigators' testimony and their evidence." Oswald himself, McCloy noted, "denied his guilt in Kennedy's murder or other persons' until his last minute."

Fourth. Regarding Marina Oswald's role, McCloy said that "Marina confirmed Oswald's completed attempt on General Walker and the planned attempt on Nixon. She also expressed conviction that Kennedy's killer was indeed Oswald." McCloy emphasized several times that Marina Oswald "is not naive at all, and her

testimony has substantial significance."

Fifth. To my comment about inconsistencies in the testimony of Oswald's wife and mother, based on press reports, McCloy said that the statements and behavior of Oswald's mother cause deep distress to the commission. Oswald's mother, McCloy added, is largely responsible for how her son developed. She abandoned him too early, showing irresponsibility, and recently showed cynicism toward her son. Suffice it to say, McCloy continued, that Oswald's mother, after sending a letter to President Johnson and receiving no response, declared that she was outraged by such presidential behavior: "Johnson owes everything to my son. He would have remained nothing if not for my son." According to McCloy, Oswald's mother demands recognition of her special role in connection with the Dallas tragedy, insisting that she should be "properly rewarded and appreciated, as befits cases when people gain great notoriety." McCloy added that it is unpleasant for him to speak about Oswald's mother since she "reduces everything to litigation and acquiring material benefits from what happened in Dallas." To my question about how to explain such firm behavior of Oswald's mother and her statements contradicting the official version of Oswald's guilt, the interlocutor said that to some extent her behavior is conditioned by the fact that on the eve of Oswald's murder, she had a meeting with him in the police jail, where "Oswald convinced her of his complete innocence."

Sixth. In conclusion, McCloy said that he is aware of Soviet people's views on the Dallas tragedy, who see a certain conspiracy in Kennedy's murder

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and activities of secret forces. Such views, added the interlocutor, are characteristic of Western European countries as well, where there is an almost unanimous opinion that Kennedy was killed by his opponents. However, such views, emphasized McCloy, "are not supported by any evidence or facts."

Academician Millionshchikov participated in the conversation.

From the conversation with McCloy, one gets the impression that the firmness and categorical nature of his statements are dictated by the desire to show the validity of the Warren Commission's conclusions about Oswald being the sole perpetrator in Kennedy's assassination and the non-involvement of any internal or external forces.

There is also no doubt that the Warren Commission and President Johnson are taking measures to dampen the reaction to Kennedy's assassination and prevent the use of this case during the election campaign.

N. Fedorenko

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 169-174. Copy. Typewritten text on cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of USSR MFA.

****No. 74****

Cipher telegram from USSR Ambassador to Great Britain V.M. Vasev to USSR MFA regarding B. Russell's letter to N.S. Khrushchev requesting L.H. Oswald's dossier

Spec. No. 1217 July 24, 1964 London

Top Secret

Copy No. 11

On July 22 of this year, Bertrand Russell sent a confidential letter to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, containing a request to provide Oswald's dossier at his, Russell's, disposal.

Russell also approached the embassy with a request to duplicate through our channels the text of his letter (without attachments) to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's secretariat.

The text of Russell's letter follows.

"To Premier N.S. Khrushchev, Moscow, USSR July 22, 1964

* On the first page at the top stamp "to Khrushchev N.S."

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Dear Premier Khrushchev,

I am confident that you share my deep concern about the circumstances surrounding President Kennedy's death. It is becoming increasingly evident from unofficial information obtained during investigations conducted by Mr. Mark Lane, that Mr. Kennedy was killed not by Lee Harvey Oswald, but by someone else. For your information, certain documents are attached to this letter, including my article titled: "Sixteen Questions Regarding the Assassination."

I have a very important request for you. Would you be able to provide me with the Soviet dossier on Lee Harvey Oswald, which was provided to the American government. My motives in requesting it are that I have very important information concerning the circumstances of the President's death, and before making it public, I would like to have all related materials, especially Soviet information about Mr. Oswald. I write this strictly confidentially, and I await your response with great concern and interest. I hope that in the interests of peace you will find it possible to provide me with this material. If this proves possible, I will follow your advice regarding whether or not to disclose the fact of its transfer to me.

With best wishes, Sincerely yours, Bertrand Russell.

Vasev

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 186 - 187. Copy. Typewritten text on the cipher telegram form of the 10th Department of the USSR MFA.

****No. 75****

Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and KGB Chairman under the USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastny to the CPSU Central Committee regarding the response to B. Russell

****No. 2337/GS July 29, 1964****

Secret. Copy No. 1

To Cpsu Cc

On July 22 of this year, Bertrand Russell addressed Comrade N.S. Khrushchev through the USSR Embassy in London with a request to provide him with a copy of the Soviet materials dossier on Lee Oswald, which had previously been transferred by the Soviet government to the US government.

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Russell justifies his request by claiming that he has important information regarding the circumstances of Kennedy's assassination, obtained from unofficial sources. Russell intends to publish this information after he receives additional materials, particularly the Soviet dossier on Lee Oswald (telegram from London 1217).

Since the fact of providing Russell with Soviet dossier materials on Oswald may become known in the USA and cause an undesirable reaction from the American government, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers consider it inadvisable to satisfy B. Russell's request.

Draft Resolution is attached.

Please review.

A. Gromyko V. Semichastny

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 511. L. 62. Original. Typewritten text. Signatures-autographs in blue ink.

****No. 76****

Resolution of the CPSU CC Presidium "On the response to Bertrand Russell regarding his request for providing dossier materials on Lee Oswald"

No. P153/5 August 1, 1964

Agree with the opinion of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers regarding the inadvisability of providing Bertrand Russell with dossier materials on Lee Oswald.

Approve the draft instructions to the embassy in England* on this matter (attached).

[Attachment] To point 5 of prot[ocol] No. 153 Secret

London

Sovembassy

1217. Transferring dossier materials concerning Lee Oswald to Bertrand Russell is deemed inadvisable.

Inform B. Russell verbally that regarding the matter of transferring dossier of Soviet materials related to entry and temporary stay in the Soviet Union

* In the original printed as "London", crossed out and "England" written above in blue ballpoint pen by M.V. Sokolova.

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US citizen Lee H. Oswald, we cannot proceed without considering possible consequences of such a step from the perspective of state relations with the USA.

Express hope that Russell will correctly understand the motives compelling us under present circumstances to refrain from satisfying his request.

Execute by telegraph.

RGANI. F. 3. O. 16. D. 511. L. 60-61. Original. Typewritten text.

****No. 77****

Message from US Ambassador to USSR F. Kohler to N.S. Khrushchev regarding the submission of the President's Commission report on the investigation of President J.F. Kennedy's assassination

September 28, 1964

American Embassy Moscow, USSR

Your Excellency,

It gives me great pleasure to submit for your personal use a copy of the report of the President's Commission on the Investigation of President Kennedy's assassination, which was presented to the President of the United States on September 24, 1964, and published on September 27, 1964. For your convenience, I am also enclosing a Russian translation of the Commission's summary of findings and conclusions.

I am convinced that you will agree that the report of the special Presidential Commission is a document of exceptional significance. As you know, the Commission included distinguished American citizens under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Its conclusions regarding the circumstances surrounding the tragic events of last November represent the result of the most thorough and impartial investigation of all available information.

I am convinced that the conclusions of this high Commission will command universal respect and put an end to many unfounded rumors and conjectures regarding the tragic death of President Kennedy, which were so widely circulated throughout the world.

Sincerely yours, Foy D. Kohler.

[At the bottom of the first page of the translation (p.194) printed "Translation Bureau MFA USSR 29.IX.64. Yu.Vinogradov" and handwritten note in black ballpoint pen "Com.Khrushchev N.S. read. 30.9.64 V.Lebedev."]

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To His Excellency

N.S. Khrushchev,

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Moscow USSR

[Attachment]

Embassy Of The United States Of America

19/21 Tchaikovsky Street Moscow September 28, 1964

Warren Commission Finds

That Oswald Alone Committed Kennedy Assassination

Washington, September 27, 1964.

The special commission of prominent American citizens concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald, acting alone and not as "part of any domestic or foreign conspiracy," committed the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22 of last year.

Examining Oswald's motives, the commission could not reach a definitive conclusion, however, noted such various factors as his bitterness toward any authority, his persistent desire to secure a place in history, his inclination toward violence, and his clearly expressed antagonism toward the United States.

The Commission, headed by Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States, also found that Oswald killed Dallas police officer J.D. Tippit when the latter approached him forty-five minutes after President Kennedy's assassination.

Furthermore, the commission tentatively established that Jack Ruby "acted independently" when he shot Oswald, whom he did not know, and killed him at the Dallas city police station, two days after the President's death.

The Commission forwarded its report to President Johnson last Thursday and the White House published this extensive document on Sunday evening.

The report sharply criticized the negligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, and Dallas city police, and recognized the need to improve measures for protecting American presidents.

The Commission's investigation was the most thorough, complete, and objective in history. More than twenty-five thousand individuals were interviewed and about four thousand special reports were studied, comprising tens of thousands of pages.

In conclusion, the commission found that Oswald knew neither Ruby nor Tippit, and the latter two did not know each other.

The voluminous report, consisting of eight hundred and eighty-eight pages, was the result of a ten-month investigation by a seven-member commission headed by Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the USA. The commission's work was the only

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official and complete investigation of events.

Here, briefly, are the contents of the twelve conclusions reached by the commission and listed in the report:

1. The shots that killed President Kennedy and wounded Texas Governor John Connally were fired from a sixth-floor window at the southeast corner of the building, which housed a school book depository.
2. The totality of evidence indicates that three shots were fired. One of the shots missed its target, but the commission is not certain which shot it was.
3. There is convincing evidence presented by experts indicating that the same bullet that penetrated the President's neck also caused wounds to Governor Connally. This was the first of two bullets that hit the President.
4. The shots that killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally were fired by Lee Harvey Oswald.
5. Oswald killed Dallas police officer J.D. Tippit approximately forty-five minutes after the President's assassination.
6. Eighty minutes after the President's assassination, and thirty-five minutes after Tippit's murder, Oswald resisted arrest in a Dallas movie theater, attempting to shoot another Dallas police officer.
7. Oswald was not subjected to physical violence by the police, although force was necessary to arrest him. He was subjected to "hostile attacks" due to "unrestricted access" granted to local journalists through which he had to pass during his transfer from the jail cell to another part of the building. Numerous statements, "sometimes erroneous," by police officers after his arrest would have presented "serious obstacles" to ensuring a fair trial for Oswald.
8. Jack Ruby killed Lee Harvey Oswald. There is no evidence indicating that any police officer assisted him in this. However, the Dallas police made a mistake by attempting to transfer Oswald to another prison "in full public view."
9. The commission found no evidence indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald or Jack Ruby were part of any conspiracy, domestic or foreign, to assassinate President Kennedy. Furthermore, the commission found no evidence indicating that any foreign government hired Oswald, persuaded or encouraged him, the report states.
10. Throughout the investigation, the commission found no evidence that would indicate a conspiracy, subversive activity, or disloyalty toward the United States government by any federal, state, or local officials.

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11. Oswald acted alone. Regarding his motives, the report contains no definitive conclusion, but notes various factors, such as his bitterness toward any authority, his persistent desire to secure a place in history, his inclination toward violence, and his clearly expressed antagonism toward the United States.

12. It is necessary to improve measures taken to protect the President.

The conclusions reached by the commission should dispel all rumors and speculations regarding whether the President's assassination could have been connected to any conspiracy. A group of prominent American citizens, all of whom are lawyers, devoted thirty-one pages of the report's appendix to refuting point by point various theoretical speculations that had been expressed. Each of these speculations underwent thorough examination during the exhaustive investigation.

The commission was appointed on November 29 of last year by President Johnson to gather facts concerning the assassination of President Kennedy and the killing of Lee Oswald, and to report on them to "the American people and the entire world."

When last Thursday the commission presented its report to President Johnson, he noted that the commission members in their work were guided by "firm determination to establish and publish the complete truth about these terrible events."

"This is our duty," he said, "to the good name of the United States of America and to all people around the world who respect our nation and especially, to the memory of President Kennedy."

In the concluding section of the extensive report, the commission indicates that the conclusions it reached are based on all factual data obtained by it, without any limitations on the investigations conducted.

The report states: The Commission "conducted its own independent investigations, and all government agencies fully fulfilled their obligations regarding cooperation in the commission's investigations."

"These conclusions," the commission report further states, "represent the reasoned and considered judgment of all commission members and are presented after an investigation, the results of which satisfied the commission that it had succeeded in establishing the true events that took place during President Kennedy's assassination, as far as was possible through prolonged and thorough examination of the facts."

The report contains a brief description of events from the moment of President Kennedy, Mrs. Kennedy and their accompanying persons' arrival by plane on November 22 at "Love" airport in Dallas, up until Oswald's killing by Jack Ruby two days later. This is followed by the main conclusions made by the commission and its recommendations regarding how to improve measures for ensuring the President's security.

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Further in the report, with extensive detail using photographic illustrations, entire chapters are devoted to individual important events, including excerpts from witness testimonies and data concerning: the President's assassination itself, shots from the Texas School Book Depository building, the killer, Oswald's arrest and death, investigation of conspiracy information, Oswald's background, his possible motives, and the President's security arrangements.

Nearly half of the entire report consists of appendices, which present data about how the special commission was created, its composition, and what methods it used in its work. The appendices also contain medical reports, autopsy results, the report on Lee Oswald's interrogation by Dallas police, biographies of Oswald and Jack Ruby, and even an analysis of Oswald's financial situation from June 13,

1962 until the day of the assassination.

The report also states that on the morning of the day when the assassination occurred, President Kennedy discussed the risks faced by the President during public appearances with Mrs. Kennedy and Presidential aide Kenneth O'Donnell.

"According to O'Donnell's words, cited in the commission's report, the President noted: If someone really wanted to shoot the President of the United States, it would not be very difficult to do so, they would just need to get into a tall building with a rifle with a telescopic sight. And nothing could be done to protect against such an attempt."

The Commission provides an enormous amount of evidence, eyewitness accounts, and witness statements to support its main conclusions.

The fact that the killer's shots were fired from a window in the southeast corner of the sixth floor of the school book depository was partially established by eyewitness testimony of those who saw the rifle shots being fired from this window. The "nearly whole" bullet found on Governor Connally's stretcher at Parkland Hospital and two bullet fragments discovered in the President's car were fired from a 6.5-millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found on the sixth floor of the book depository, which "excludes any other weapon." Three used cartridges found near the window were ejected from the same rifle. The nature of bullet wounds found on President Kennedy and Governor Connally, and the location where the President's car was at the moment of shooting, indicate that the shots were fired from above and behind relative to the President's car.

The number of empty cartridges was one of the factors that led the commission to conclude that "In all probability, the report states, all wounds inflicted on President Kennedy and Governor Connally were caused by two bullets, while another bullet, according to the report, likely missed the President's car entirely without hitting

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of the automobile, nor those sitting in it." According to the most accurate calculation, all three shots were fired during a time period constituting "approximately four and eight-tenths to just over seven seconds."

The Commission had several unshakeable reasons that led it to conclude that Oswald was the President's assassin.

The rifle which fired the shots "belonged to Oswald and was in his possession." He brought it to the warehouse building on the morning of the assassination. At the time of the assassination, he was at the window from which the shots were fired. Shortly after the assassination, the rifle was found on the sixth floor, and the paper bag in which he brought the rifle to the warehouse building was found near the window. Based on expert testimony and their analysis of films taken during the motorcade investigation, the Commission concluded that a shooter possessing the "capabilities" that Oswald had could fire that number of shots in the established time period. On April 10, 1963, he attempted to kill Major General Edwin A. Walker, "thereby demonstrating his inclination toward murder." The report emphasizes that no evidence was found that Oswald or Ruby were participants in "any conspiracy - domestic or foreign - that aimed to assassinate President Kennedy."

In connection with this, the Commission "thoroughly investigated" all circumstances surrounding the planning of the motorcade route, Oswald's hiring at the Texas School Book Depository on October 15, 1963, the method of bringing the rifle into the building, the placement of book boxes near the window, Oswald's escape from the building, as well as witness testimonies of the assassination.

The Commission also investigated Oswald's financial situation, his acquaintances, and personal habits, particularly for the period after his return to America from the Soviet Union in June 1962.

The Commission concluded that there was no basis to believe that Oswald "was in the service of any foreign government or was subject to persuasion or encouragement from any foreign government," or that he was an agent of a foreign government.

The Commission investigated all of Oswald's attempts to "identify himself" with various political groups in the United States, such as the Communist Party, the so-called Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and the Socialist Workers Party. The Commission found, however, no evidence that the connections established by Oswald had any relation to the assassination.

The report further states that no one confirms the suggestion that Oswald was "an agent, informant" of the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, or any other governmental agency.

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"The Commission did not establish any direct or indirect connection between Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby," states the report. "It also could not find any credible evidence that they knew each other, although a thorough investigation was conducted into numerous rumors and suggestions about connections between them. There is also no evidence that Ruby and Officer Tippit knew each other, or that Oswald and Tippit knew each other.

Ruby was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death for the murder of Oswald. He appealed the verdict.

The Commission deeply examined Oswald's motives that led to his terrible crime, without finding, however, an exhaustive answer. The Commission expressed the following consideration on this matter:

"The motives that drove Oswald to murder were undoubtedly based on many factors, and the commission does not consider it possible to attribute to him any single motive or group of motives. It is evident, however, that the motivation that guided Oswald was largely conditioned by his hostile attitude toward the surrounding environment. He evidently was unable to establish reasonable relationships with other people. He was in a state of constant dissatisfaction with the surrounding world."

"Long before the murder, he expressed hatred toward American society and actively demonstrated his protest. Oswald's aspiration toward what he considered an ideal society was doomed to failure from the very beginning. He wanted to secure a place in history, to play the role of a 'great man' who would gain universal recognition as a person ahead of his time. His adherence to Marxism and communism was, apparently, also an important factor in his motivation. He had also previously proved his ability to act decisively, regardless of consequences, when such action facilitated achieving his goal at that moment." All these factors and many others, based on which Lee Harvey Oswald's character developed, created a person capable of killing President Kennedy.

Regarding Officer Tippit's murder, the report states that two witnesses were eyewitnesses to the murder, and seven witnesses heard the shots and saw how the shooter fled the crime scene.

All nine "positively identified" Lee Oswald as this person. The bullets found at the scene of the policeman's murder were fired from a revolver that was in Oswald's possession during his arrest. The revolver found on him was purchased by Oswald and belonged to him. Along the escape route of the person who shot and killed the policeman, Oswald's jacket was found.

Regarding the questioning of Oswald and his detention in jail, the commission states that he was not subjected to any physical impact by police representatives. He was informed that they could not force him

to give testimony, and that

201Special copy

any of his statements could be used against him in court. He was also informed of his right to an attorney. The Dallas Bar Association offered Oswald their services, which he declined at the time.

The Commission states that the "unrestricted access" granted to press and radio representatives to that part of the prison through which Oswald had to pass to reach other parts of the building created chaotic conditions that were not conducive to proper interrogation and protection of the arrestee's rights.

Furthermore, according to the Commission, numerous and sometimes erroneous statements made by local police authorities to journalists "would have created serious obstacles to an impartial judicial examination of the Oswald case."

The Commission recommends making changes to Presidential protection measures based on the facts discovered during this investigation.

The report states that the complexity of the President's office has increased so much in recent years that the Secret Service was unable to develop and provide sufficient personnel and necessary equipment "to fulfill its important mission."

The Commission believes there is a lack of communication and coordination of information between the Secret Service and other federal agencies related to Presidential security.

Although some measures prepared by the Secret Service, such as at "Love" airport and in the Dallas Trade Mart building, were "well executed," nevertheless, the Commission believes that the methods for detecting an assassin in the building along the President's motorcade route were inadequate.

Within these "limitations," the Commission says, agents directly responsible for the President's security responded immediately when the assassin's shots were fired.

Further, the Commission expressed "satisfaction" that after several months of work, the Secret Service prepared a document containing plans for improving the technical aspects of the Secret Service and expanding its capabilities.

The Commission proposes that the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a special assistant with duties to oversee the Secret Service's work. It also proposes that a committee consisting of government members, including the Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General, or National Security, be assigned responsibility for supervising the protective activities of the Secret Service and other federal agencies assisting in Presidential protection.

In a special addendum intended to put an end to the proposals and rumors generated by the assassination, the Commission notes that "myths" have traditionally surrounded all tragic assassinations in history.

202"When there is an element of mystery in such dramatic events, erroneous conclusions often arise as a result of sensational assumptions," states the commission's report.

The Commission says that many questions arose regarding the facts, due to "genuine confusion or disinformation - surrounding some of the early reports about rapidly developing events."

Investigation of a "large number" of rumors and assumptions was conducted in almost all parts of the United States and in most continents of the world, according to the report. A special addition, the report continues, was intended to bring clarity to the most widely circulated public perceptions about the facts.

Here are some examples of assumptions and the commission's conclusions:

Assumption: The shots that killed the President were fired from a railroad bridge over a three-level highway viaduct.

Commission conclusion: The shots that struck the President's neck and head and wounded Governor Connally were fired from behind and above. There is no evidence that any of the shots were fired at the President from any other location than the Texas School Book Depository building.

Assumption: A rifle cartridge was found on the bridge.

Commission conclusion: No cartridge of any kind was found on the bridge and no witness came forward who claimed to have found one.

Assumption: More than three shots, possibly up to five or six, were fired at the President and Governor Connally.

Commission conclusion: "The weight of evidence indicates that three shots were fired, two of which struck President Kennedy. There is persuasive evidence from experts that one of these two bullets also struck Governor Connally. Some witnesses claimed they heard more than three shots but, as fully described in Chapter 3 of the report, the vast majority heard three shots."

Assumption: The throat wound received by the President was the result of a shot fired from the front according to doctors at Parkland Hospital.

Commission conclusion: "Doctors at Parkland Hospital initially believed that the throat wound could have been either an entry or exit wound, but they did not conduct an examination to determine entry and exit wounds. Subsequently, when medical examination data were obtained, doctors at Parkland Hospital concluded that it was an exit wound."

Assumption: Oswald could not have known the motorcade route before he arrived at work on November twenty-second.

Commission conclusion: "The motorcade route was published in both city newspapers"

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Dallas was on November nineteenth and was, therefore, known at least seventy-two hours before Oswald reported to work on November twenty-second.

Allegation: There is evidence that a second rifle was found on the roof of the Texas School Book Depository building or on the overpass.

Commission's conclusion: "No second rifle was found in any of the known locations or anywhere else. The shots that struck President Kennedy and Governor Connally were fired from the rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository."

Allegation: Oswald could not have had time to make all the movements attributed to him from the time he left the Texas School Book Depository until his meeting with Tippit.

Commission's conclusion: "Time tests of all of Oswald's movements established that these movements could have been made in the time available to him."

Allegation: Oswald received training at a special school for political assassins run by Russians in Minsk.

Commission's conclusion: "Commission investigators found no evidence to support this allegation or the existence of such a school in Minsk during Oswald's stay there. Oswald belonged to a hunting club near Minsk, but there was no indication that it was anything other than an ordinary hunting club."

Allegation: Ruby and Oswald were seen together at the Carousel Club.

Commission's conclusion: "All allegations that Oswald was seen in Ruby's company, or in anyone else's company at the Carousel Club, have been thoroughly investigated. None of them merits any credence."

Allegation: Oswald or his accomplices arranged his escape by airplane from an airport in the Dallas area.

Commission's conclusion: "Investigation of such allegations showed they have no substance whatsoever. The Commission found no evidence that Oswald had any prearranged plans for escape after the assassination."

This information bulletin is distributed by the US Embassy in Moscow. The USSR Embassy in Washington enjoys the same privileges.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 195. Original. Typewritten text in English on US State Department letterhead with watermarks. Signature-autograph in black ink. Ibid. L. 194. Original. Translation from English. Typewritten text (1 copy). Ibid. L. 196-203. Copy. Translation from English. Copy reproduced on photocopier.

204Special copy

Section Iii

"We Are Understanding Of The Intention To Create The John F. Kennedy Memorial Library"

Documents on providing materials for the Presidential Library and Museum of John F. Kennedy

February 26 - August 28, 1964

****No. 78****

Letter from the U.S. Attorney General R. Kennedy to N.S. Khrushchev regarding assistance in collecting materials for the J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library

February 26, 1964

Dear Mr. Chairman,

As I recently explained to Ambassador Dobrynin, the main memorial to my brother will be a library, which will be erected in his honor in Boston, Massachusetts, near Harvard College, where he spent his young years. He chose the site for the library before his death and intended to make the library his personal

headquarters after his presidency.

The John F. Kennedy Library will serve several purposes. It will be a memorial to President Kennedy. It will be a museum containing items associated with the memory of President Kennedy and his time, for visitors, we hope, from all over the world. It will be an archive containing papers and documents necessary for studying President Kennedy's life and times; this too, we hope, will attract scholars and students from around the world. And it will be an institute designed to continue one of my brother's main life mottos - his efforts to unite the world of science and the world of action, the world of ideas and the world of power.

One distinctive feature of the library should be an oral history program. As you know, documents alone do not reflect the full historical reality of a situation (and this is especially true in our age, when typewriters multiply the number of documents, while the telephone reduces their importance). For this reason, we are organizing a program of recorded interviews. The program's goal is to obtain and record

[Original on letterhead with the emblem of the U.S. Department of Justice and the inscription "Office of the Attorney General Washington, D.C." On the reverse of the last page is the note "To file. O.Troyanovskiy. 13.VII.64." The note is crossed out in pencil.]

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material on tape which otherwise would not have been recorded on paper and would subsequently be lost forever to future historians.

This program has already begun in Washington; but we believe it would be incomplete if it were limited only to the United States. We want all significant figures and their views to be fully represented; and since very few things concerned President Kennedy more than international peace and our relations with your great country, we consider you, Mr. Chairman, an irreplaceable witness to his policies and hopes. Therefore, I am asking whether you would agree to participate in this effort. Conditions could be arranged to suit you - the choice of interviewer (I have in mind, for example, Mr. Edward R. Murrow, whose independent and courageous work in American television, I am sure, you are familiar with, or Ambassador Thompson, or, quite possibly, you may prefer a Soviet citizen); time, place, etc. I hope you would wish to express your impressions about President Kennedy, his policies, his achievements, his mistakes, his failures with complete openness. Future history would be immeasurably enriched if your views about the Vienna meeting, Berlin crisis, Cuban crisis, test ban negotiations and other episodes of the last three years were recorded on tape, as well as your assessment of the direction in which international affairs were moving and what might have happened if President Kennedy had remained alive.

Of course, much of the material that would be recorded on tape in the oral history program - and this could especially apply to your case, should you agree to participate - would be too confidential to be immediately released to the public. Therefore, each program participant has complete control over access to their interview and may set any conditions they wish, such as sealing the tape completely for any period they may desire. I want to give you my most categorical personal assurances that your interview, should you decide to participate, will be in complete security.

No one will have access to it - neither scholars, nor government officials, nor congressional committees, nor journalists, nor members of the Kennedy family - except under conditions you may wish to set. I give you my word on this. The library's purpose is to collect historical material not for the present generation, but for our descendants. I have no doubt that future historians, American, Soviet, or of any other nationality, will be in your debt if you would add your own testimony to this collection of memories about President Kennedy and his time.

Always sincerely yours, Robert F. Kennedy

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Please accept my best wishes to you and your family. All members of the Kennedy family deeply appreciated your kindness during the time of my brother's death. Thank you. Robert Kennedy*.

To His Excellency Nikita S. Khrushchev Chairman of the Council of Ministers Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Moscow

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 125 - 127. Original. Translated from English. Typewritten text. Ibid. L. 128 - 129. Original. In English. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.

****No. 79****

Letter from the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library Y.Black to USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin regarding the creation of the library

February 27, 1964

John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Incorporated

Lyndon B. Johnson Honorary Chairman Reply should be sent to: Eugene R. Black Chairman Eugene R. Black Robert F. Kennedy President 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza Jacqueline B. Kennedy Vice-President New York, New York, 10005 Edward M. Kennedy Vice-President

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

From many countries, we receive letters requesting information regarding plans to perpetuate the memory of the late President of the United States. I thought you might be interested in the enclosed statement regarding the construction of the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, which will be built in Boston, Massachusetts, on a site located on the banks of the Charles River, provided by Harvard University. President Kennedy chose this location because he wanted the library to be close to where he spent his youth, and also because he wanted it to become part of the university campus located there.

*In the original, the paragraph was written by R.Kennedy by hand in black ink. 207Signal Copy

The family of President Kennedy and his close colleagues are working to make the library construction possible. Some governments and private citizens from other countries have shown interest in participating in this project. I hope that you will inform me about any interest in your country, official or unofficial, which may be expressed in this direction.

Sincerely yours, Eugene Black

To His Excellency Mr. Anatoly F. Dobrynin Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1125 16th Street N.W. Washington 25, D.C.

Translated by V. Kuleshov

[Attachment]

The John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library

The John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library will be constructed in Boston, Massachusetts, on a site along the Charles River, donated free of charge by Harvard University. President Kennedy personally selected this site because he wanted the Library to be near the places where he spent his youth, and because he wanted the Library to be part of the university campus. Such location of the Library will not only allow close ties with Harvard University but will also provide easy access to it from other colleges and universities in the Boston area.

The Library will be a memorial to President Kennedy. It will be an attempt to express through architecture the spirit and style of the 35th president. But it will be something significantly more than a memorial, as a true memorial should also express President Kennedy's living concern for the unfinished business of his country and the whole world. The Library will therefore include, besides a strict and beautiful memorial hall, several working components: a museum, archive, and Institute. The architect will face the task of uniting these elements into a single harmonious project encompassing the various functions of the Library and glorifying the memory of President Kennedy.

The Museum will display items telling about President Kennedy and his time - photographs, panoramas, scientific objects and other various exhibits, narrating about the problems, achievements, and atmosphere of Kennedy's time. The Museum will not be a static display of items in glass cases. Modern

208electronic and presentation tools so that viewers can actively perceive the events that the exhibits narrate. For example, a room can be created where visitors can enter a booth, select any Kennedy speech or an important episode from the events of his time and then watch a film or listen to an audio recording of the actual event. The Museum's goal will be to enable visitors, especially students and young people, to gain the most direct and tangible understanding of historical events from the recent past.

The Archive will collect personal documents of President Kennedy, his family and associates, as well as copies of state archival documents necessary for understanding the problems faced by his administration and the actions taken; recordings of interviews with his colleagues and contemporaries. There will also be a collection of books, journals, newspapers and printed documents relating to President Kennedy and his time. It is hoped that this Archive will become a center for studying mid-20th century America, its main domestic and foreign policy problems, its ideas about itself and its destiny. The Archive will have necessary facilities for research work, including study rooms, state-of-the-art equipment for ongoing history lecture programs, for making copies of documents, working with microfilms and full utilization of recorded materials and visual aids.

The Institute will strive to contribute to one of the main tasks that concerned President Kennedy - to continue his tireless effort to bring together the world of ideas and the world of practical affairs, the world of science and the world of solutions, as, for example, occurred in the early years of the American republic. No other goal inspired him so consistently, and no other cause could better serve his memory. The institute will be led by a person combining academic reputation with practical experience in state affairs. The institute's purpose will be to engage young Americans and young people in other countries in understanding and practicing democratic political life and public service. It will be a living institution responding to the needs of the time, and therefore its resources and programs should not be strictly regulated in advance; however, it can be assumed that the Institute will seek to bring together intellectual and public affairs in many ways - through lectures and seminars conducted by professors, politicians and officials from all parties from both the United States and other countries; through creation of departments possibly headed by joint appointment professors from Harvard and other nearby universities; through organizing meetings for senior students interested in political life and state affairs; through establishment

of scholarships for students and scholars, both American and foreign; through a program

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inviting teachers to deliver lecture courses; through organizing scientific groups and conferences with participation of scientists and practitioners to address important problems; through publication programs; through awarding prizes for literary works and public service, as well as through many other means. The Institute will not be bound by any program or policy, except for the spirit of free and rational research inherent to President Kennedy himself

X X X

According to the 1955 law P.248, permitting the establishment of presidential libraries, the libraries themselves must be built through fundraising by subscription and then transferred to the United States government. The General Services Administration (National Archives) will thereafter assume responsibility for maintaining the buildings, as well as for operating the memorial hall, museum and archive. The legislation, however, does not provide for the creation of an institute, and this project, being the most distinctive part of this concept, will require significant donations.

According to calculations, the construction of the Kennedy Library with its memorial hall, museum and archive, and the establishment of the institute will require a sum of 10 million dollars.

Translated by Yu. Sokolikov I. Bubkov

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 135 - 138. Original. Translation from English, typewritten text.

■ 80

Memorandum from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko to N.S. Khrushchev regarding the advisability of providing materials for the J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library

■ 1268/GS April 19, 1964

Secret. Copy ■ 1

To Comrade N.S. KHRUSHCHEV

As a memorial to President J. Kennedy in the USA (Boston, Harvard University area), it is proposed to build the "Kennedy Library" with a memorial hall,

Footnotes

* On the reverse of the last attachment page, there is a note in blue ballpoint pen "Into file. O. Troyanovsky 13.VII.64". The note is crossed out in regular pencil.

b At the top of the page, there is a resolution in blue ballpoint pen "Distribute and include in the agenda of the Presidium CC meeting (as indicated by N.S. Khrushchev) 25.V.64 O.Troyanovsky".

210research institute, museum and archive. The Library is being created on the initiative of the Kennedy family and with President Johnson's approval. Funds for the Library's construction (10 million dollars) are being collected through donations from various organizations and private individuals.

The Library intends to house numerous exhibits, documents, archival and printed materials related to Kennedy's name and his state and socio-political activities. It is planned to organize a special department that will store recorded statements by prominent figures from the USA and foreign states about J. Kennedy.

In this connection, the late president's brother Robert Kennedy has written a letter to you requesting that you agree to record your statements about President Kennedy so that this recording can be included in the Library's collections.

Considering that among broad circles of the American population, J. Kennedy's name is associated with the line of improving Soviet-American relations and that the Kennedy family will likely continue to play a role in the political life of the USA, it would seemingly be desirable to respond somehow to R. Kennedy's request.

For example, it would be possible to prepare for transmission to the "Kennedy Library" a brief recording of your speech with memories about President Kennedy, in which to talk about your impressions and meeting with J. Kennedy in Washington and Vienna, give a brief assessment of Kennedy as a person and as a statesman in light of his statements during the meeting in Vienna, as well as those of his speeches which expressed a sober assessment of the actual balance of power in the world and a realistic approach to solving certain unresolved international problems.

If this is deemed inappropriate, then perhaps it would be worth sending a response from you to R. Kennedy's appeal, with the intention of composing a reply letter in such a way that it could itself become one of the exhibits of the "Kennedy Library."

In the letter, one could give a brief assessment of J. Kennedy as a person and statesman in the spirit of what was contained in the telegrams of condolence regarding the president's death.

It should be noted that in connection with plans to create the "Kennedy Library," other appeals have also been received. For instance, the US President's Press Secretary Salinger, who has now resigned, asked through an embassy staff member in Washington to clarify whether we could provide the Library with any available photomaterials about J. Kennedy. An appeal about the USSR's possible contribution in this or another form besides the creation of the "Kennedy Library" was also received from Eugene Black - a prominent American financier and political figure who has now become chairman of the fund for the construction of this Library.

In response to these appeals, according to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we could provide the Library with a Soviet chronicle-documentary film in two parts about your meeting

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with J. Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961, and also to select for transfer to the Library's collection some materials from Soviet press which reflect Kennedy's foreign policy activities as US President, especially in the field of Soviet-American relations (for example, newspapers containing President Kennedy's speeches, communique about the meeting in Vienna, photo materials, etc.).

Please review.

A. Gromyko

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 165-166. Copy. Typewritten text.

****No. 81****

Resolution of the Presidium of CC CPSU "Note from USSR MFA (c.Gromyko) dated April 19, 1964 No. 1268/■■■"

No. ■146/X May 28, 1964

In principle to agree with the proposals of USSR MFA (c.Gromyko), outlined in the last paragraph of the note dated April 19, 1964 No. 1268/■■■ regarding possible USSR contribution - transfer to the "Kennedy Library" being organized in USA of a documentary chronicle film about comrade N.S. Khrushchev's meeting with J. Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961 and some Soviet press materials.

Instruct USSR MFA and International Department of CC CPSU to prepare proposals on this matter.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 474. L. 45. Copy. Typewritten text on letterhead "Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE".

****No. 82****

Note from Head of International Department of CC CPSU B.N. Ponomarev and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko to CC CPSU regarding transfer of documentary materials to J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library

****No. 1845/■■■ June 12, 1964****

Secret. Copy No. 1

To Cc Cpsu

In accordance with the instruction (No. ■146/X dated 28.V.64), we present proposals regarding the response to Robert Kennedy's appeal concerning our participation in creating John F. Kennedy Memorial Library in Boston.

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It seems appropriate to send R. Kennedy a reply letter on behalf of Comrade Khrushchev N.S., which would contain a brief assessment of J. Kennedy as a person and statesman, prepared based on Comrade Khrushchev N.S.'s public statements on this matter. The letter should indicate that, in connection with R. Kennedy's request, the following items will be transmitted to the Kennedy library through the USSR Embassy in Washington: a Soviet documentary film about Comrade Khrushchev N.S.'s meeting with J. Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961, a tape recording of the concluding part of Comrade Khrushchev N.S.'s speech on June 15, 1961, in Moscow about the results of the Vienna meeting, which discusses impressions from conversations with President Kennedy, as well as some TASS photo chronicles and Soviet press materials.

It should be noted that Robert Kennedy has also approached Comrade Mikoyan A.N., Gromyko A.A., Adzhubei A.I., and Dobrynin A.F. with a similar request to contribute to the creation of the Kennedy Library

and record their memories of the late president. It seems appropriate to instruct Ambassador Dobrynin, when delivering Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's letter, to convey to Robert Kennedy that the materials being transferred represent our common contribution to the creation of J. Kennedy's memorial library.

Draft resolution is attached²⁵⁷.

Please review.

B. Ponomarev A. Gromyko

[Attachment]

Draft Appendix No. 1*

To Mr. Robert F. Kennedy Attorney General of the United States of America, Washington

Dear Mr. Kennedy,

I received your letter in which you inform about plans to create a library in Boston in memory of your brother John F. Kennedy. You express a wish that we participate in the implementation of these plans. We regard with understanding the intention to create John F. Kennedy's memorial library and are ready to contribute to this cause. Through the Soviet Embassy in Washington, you will be provided with certain Soviet documents and materials relating to President Kennedy's foreign policy activities, especially in the area of Soviet-American relations.

_____ *The text of the letter is crossed out with a blue ballpoint pen cross by cross.

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John F. Kennedy, as I have already said, will undoubtedly go down in history as an outstanding statesman. Being in the high and very responsible position of President of the United States in our time, he proved himself as a person of broad views who sought to realistically assess the world situation and find ways to resolve unresolved international problems through negotiations. I cherish the memory of personal meetings with J.F. Kennedy, during which we frankly exchanged opinions on matters of interest to both sides. It is appropriate to note that, although the main problems dividing the world today remain unresolved, nevertheless under President Kennedy we managed through joint efforts to achieve a notable shift for the better in the international situation and in relations between our great powers. Evidence of this is primarily the conclusion of the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. The signing of this treaty was a convincing confirmation that, no matter how complex modern international problems are, solutions can be found. Achieving such solutions in the interests of maintaining and strengthening universal peace was and remains the most important task of all governments, their duty to the peoples.

Respectfully,

N. Khrushchev

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 496. L. 146-147. Original. Typewritten text. Signatures - autographs in blue ink and blue ballpoint pen.

****No. 83****

Resolution of the Presidium of the CC CPSU "On the response to Robert Kennedy's appeal regarding our participation in the creation of the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library"

No. P149/34 June 29, 1964

1. Approve the draft response letter from Comrade Khrushchev N.S. to R. Kennedy's appeal (Appendix 1).
2. Approve the draft instructions to the Soviet Embassy in the USA (Appendix 2).
3. Task the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Cinematography and the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Broadcasting and Television to prepare for transmission to R. Kennedy through the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs a Soviet chronicle-documentary film in two parts about the meeting of Comrade Khrushchev N.S. with J. Kennedy in Vienna

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in June 1961, as well as the tape recording of the concluding part of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's speech on June 15, 1961 in Moscow, which discussed the results of the Vienna meeting.

To instruct TASS and the editorial offices of "Pravda" and "Izvestia" newspapers to select and transfer through the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Kennedy library collection some materials from TASS photo chronicles and Soviet press.

4. Expenses associated with the preparation of materials for transfer to the John F. Kennedy library shall be charged to the Reserve Fund of the USSR Council of Ministers.

[Appendix]

To item 34 prot[ocol] No. 149 Appendix 1

Dear Mr. Kennedy*,

I received your letter²⁵⁹, in which you inform about plans to establish a library in Boston in memory of your brother John F. Kennedy. You express the wish that we also participate in some form in the implementation of these plans. We understand the intention to create the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library and are ready to contribute to this cause. Through the Soviet Embassy in Washington, you will be provided with certain Soviet documents and materials relating to President Kennedy's foreign policy activities, especially in the field of Soviet-American relations.

John F. Kennedy, as I have already said, will undoubtedly go down in history as an outstanding statesman. Being in the high and very responsible position of U.S. President in our time, he proved himself as a person of broad views who sought to realistically assess the world situation and find ways to resolve unsettled international problems through negotiations. I cherish the memory of personal meetings with J.F. Kennedy, during which we openly exchanged opinions on matters of interest to both sides. It is appropriate to note that, although the main problems dividing the world today remain unresolved, nevertheless under President Kennedy we managed through joint efforts to achieve a certain shift for the better in the international situation and in relations between our great powers. Evidence of this is primarily the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. The signing of this treaty was convincing confirmation that, no matter how complex modern international problems may be, solutions can be found. Achieving such solutions in the interests of maintaining and strengthening universal peace was and remains the most important task of all governments, their duty to their peoples.

* On the first page under the main text is printed: "To Mr. Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States of America, Washington."

215Special copy

Remembering now about President J.F. Kennedy, I would particularly like to draw attention to his speech at American University in Washington on June 10, 1963. This statement can be called courageous and more realistic than what the Soviet Union and other socialist countries often heard from American shores. Although this statement by the U.S. President contained contradictory elements and paid tribute, unfortunately, to the so-called policy of "containing and rolling back communism," overall it proceeded from recognizing the inevitability and necessity of coexistence between states with different social systems.

Today I would not want to dwell in detail on the negative aspects of this statement by J.F. Kennedy because, I repeat, it contained the main idea: in this statement, the President said: "Let us review our attitude toward the Soviet Union"; he said that "peace need not be impracticable, and war need not be inevitable."

President Kennedy understood that it was in the interests of the United States itself and the improvement of international politics as a whole for the United States to seek positions that would ensure peaceful coexistence of states with different social structures. This statement reflected a more correct understanding that disputed issues between states cannot be resolved through war, because no sensible person, especially if they recognize the opposing side as their equal in military power, would start a war.

This speech by J.F. Kennedy, as one might suppose, was somewhat preparatory, as the president was outlining a platform for a future election campaign. Although everyone knows that President J.F. Kennedy was a person of ideology opposite to ours, representing interests of a state standing on a political platform opposite to ours, in this speech he was already outlining more realistic principles for relations between countries with different social structures and, thus, if we extend his thought - between two social systems.

The President said that not competition in the arms race and demonstration of military force in international politics, not politics "on the brink of war," but peaceful coexistence and competition between two systems would help the world avoid total war, which "makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces." "War makes no sense," J.F. Kennedy stated, "when one nuclear bomb has almost ten times the explosive force of all the allied air forces in World War II."

Unfortunately, only a few months passed after this important statement by President J.F. Kennedy, and he was gone. I return to the thoughts expressed in this,

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drawing attention to itself, statement also because no matter how tragic this or that loss was, the living are obligated to work in the name of peace, in the name of preventing a global thermonuclear war, which would be an enormous catastrophe for humanity.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America are an important link in the system of international relations of many countries worldwide. Much depends on our great powers, possessing nuclear weapons of enormous destructive force, in reducing international tensions, establishing such relations between states where existing disputes would be resolved by peaceful means, based on a realistic understanding of existing things.

President J.F. Kennedy departed from life in a situation when his activities in high state office, as I mentioned above, were beginning to be marked by certain agreed constructive decisions related to establishing better mutual understanding between our countries. It is in this sense, in the sense of activities aimed at strengthening peace and reducing international tension, that we understood with appreciation the statements of US President Lyndon Johnson, who proclaimed continuity of the foreign policy of the late President John F. Kennedy.

Respectfully,

N. Khrushchev

June 29, 1964

Secret Appendix 2

Washington

Sovposol

Forward to Robert Kennedy the letter from comrade N.S. Khrushchev (sent by separate telegram)²⁶⁰, which contains the response to R. Kennedy's appeal regarding our participation in creating the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library. By diplomatic mail, we are sending you the following to forward to R. Kennedy: a chronicle-documentary film about the meeting of comrade N.S. Khrushchev with J. Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961, a tape recording of the concluding part of comrade N.S. Khrushchev's speech on June 15, 1961, which discussed the results of the Vienna meeting, and some materials from the Soviet press.

Since R. Kennedy made similar requests to comrades Mikoyan A.I., Gromyko A.A., Adzhubei A.I. and to you, when delivering comrade N.S. Khrushchev's letter, make it clear to Robert Kennedy that the materials being transferred are our common contribution to creating the J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 496. L. 139, 145. Original. Typewritten text. L. 140-144. Copy. Typewritten text.

217Signal Copy

****No. 84****

Cover Note from the Head of USA Department of USSR MFA M.N. Smirnovsky to Temporary Chargé d'Affaires of the USSR in USA G.M. Kornienko regarding transfer of materials for J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library

****No. 325/usa July 31, 1964****

Secret. Copy No. 2

To The Temporary Chargé D'Affaires Of The Ussr In Usa

Comrade KORNIENKO G.M.

Herewith we are sending you materials intended for the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library. In accordance with the instructions you have, please transfer these materials to Robert Kennedy.

Attachment: specified materials and their inventory (for embassy's information). Head of USA Department s/s M.SMIRNOVSKY

[Attachment] to 325/usa

Inventory

of materials transferred by Soviet Embassy for J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library in Boston

Inventory of materials being transferred to John F. Kennedy Memorial Library collection

A. Film "Vienna Meetings" (about the meeting of N.S. Khrushchev with J. Kennedy in June 1961) in Russian language. In two parts, on non-flammable film.

B. Tape with recording of the concluding part of N.S. Khrushchev's radio and television address in Moscow on June 15, 1961 (Printed text of this recording is attached for embassy's information).

C. Seven photographs from TASS Photo Chronicle:

1. "Vienna. June 3, 1961. Meeting of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers

N.S. Khrushchev and USA President J. Kennedy at USA Ambassador's residence in Austria. TASS Photo Chronicle. Photo by V.Egorov Photo No. 483938". (N.S. Khrushchev and J.Kennedy sitting together on a couch in armchairs).

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2. "Vienna. June 4, 1961. Meeting between Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev and US President J.F. Kennedy at the USSR Embassy in Austria. On the right - USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko.

TASS Photo Chronicle. Photo by V. Egorov. Photo No. 483952." (N.S. Khrushchev and J.F. Kennedy are sitting on a couch at the table. A.A. Gromyko is sitting at the table on the right).

3. "Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko visited the US Embassy in the USSR on November 23, 1963, and expressed their condolences regarding the death of US President John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

TASS Photo Chronicle. No. 563432. Photo by V. Koshevoy and N. Sitnikov." (N.S. Khrushchev stands next to Ambassador F. Kohler in front of J.F. Kennedy's photograph).

4. "Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko visited the US Embassy in the USSR on November 23, 1963, and expressed their condolences regarding the death of US President John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

In the photo: N.S. Khrushchev signs the book of condolences. TASS Photo Chronicle. No. 563440. Photo by V. Koshevoy and N. Sitnikov."

5. "Moscow. November 23. Muscovites read the announcement about the tragic assassination of US President John Kennedy.

TASS Photo Chronicle. Photo by M. Redkin. Photo No. 563454."

6. "Moscow. November 25, a delegation from the Institute of Soviet-American Relations headed by Institute Vice-President N.P. Khrushcheva visited US Ambassador in Moscow Mr. Foy D. Kohler and expressed deep condolences regarding the tragic death of US President Mr. John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

In the photo: At the Ambassador's residence. From left to right - N.P. Khrushcheva and Ambassador Foy D. Kohler with his wife. TASS Photo Chronicle. Photo by V. Mastukov. Photo No. 563635."

7. "Moscow. November 25, a delegation from the Institute of Soviet-American Relations headed by Institute Vice-President N.P. Khrushcheva visited US Ambassador in Moscow Mr. Foy D. Kohler and expressed deep condolences regarding the tragic death of US President Mr. John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

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In the photo: Mr. Foy D. Kohler and N.P. Khrushchev at the ambassador's residence. TASS photo chronicle. Photo by V. Mastukov. Photo ■ 563632».

G. The following materials of the Soviet press:

1. Telegram from N.S. Khrushchev to J. Kennedy dated November 9, 1960, with congratulations on his election as President of the USA.

"Pravda," November 10, 1960.

2. Reply telegram from J. Kennedy to N.S. Khrushchev expressing gratitude for the congratulations.

"Pravda," November 12, 1960.

3. Telegram from N.S. Khrushchev and L.I. Brezhnev to USA President J. Kennedy dated January 20, 1961, with congratulations on his assumption of office.

Text of J. Kennedy's speech on January 20, 1961, at his presidential inauguration. "Pravda," January 21 and 22, 1961. "Izvestia," January 21, 1961.

4. Report on President J. Kennedy's first press conference on January 25, 1961.

"Izvestia," January 26, 1961.

5. Abbreviated text of President J. Kennedy's message on the state of the country.

"Pravda," January 31, 1961. "Izvestia," January 31, 1961.

6. Text of announcement about the upcoming meeting between N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy in Vienna.

"Pravda," May 20, 1961.

7. Announcement about N.S. Khrushchev's departure to Vienna and schedule of meetings between N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy.

"Pravda," May 28, 1961.

8. Report on the meeting of N.S. Khrushchev with J. Kennedy in Vienna on June 3, 1961.

Report on breakfast in honor of N.S. Khrushchev at J. Kennedy's in Vienna. "Pravda," June 4, 1961.

9. Statement on the meetings between N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy in Vienna.

"Pravda," June 5, 1961.

10. Full text of J. Kennedy's radio and television address on June 7, 1961, about his trip to Europe and meeting with N.S. Khrushchev in Vienna.

"Pravda," June 9, 1961.

11. Texts of memoranda presented by N.S. Khrushchev to President J. Kennedy during their meeting in Vienna.

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"Pravda", June 11, 1961

12. Text of N.S. Khrushchev's speech on radio and television on June 15, 1961 about the meeting with President J. Kennedy in Vienna on June 3-4, 1961.

"Pravda", June 16, 1961

13. Telegram from N.S. Khrushchev and L.I. Brezhnev to President J. Kennedy dated July 3, 1961 with congratulations on the U.S. national holiday.

Reply telegram from J. Kennedy. Notice about reception at U.S. Embassy in Moscow. "Pravda", July 4 and 5, 1961

14. Summary of J. Kennedy's speech at UN on September 25, 1961.

"Izvestia", September 26, 1961

15. Interview of President J. Kennedy with "Izvestia" newspaper's editor-in-chief A.I. Adzhubei.

"Izvestia", November 28, 1961

16. Message from President J. Kennedy to N.S. Khrushchev dated March 7, 1962 regarding the study and use of outer space.

Message from N.S. Khrushchev to J. Kennedy dated March 20 on the same matter. "Pravda", March 22, 1962

17. Telegram from N.S. Khrushchev to President J. Kennedy dated June 12, 1962 regarding the formation of coalition government in Laos.

Reply telegram from J. Kennedy to N.S. Khrushchev dated June 13, 1962. "Pravda", June 13 and 14, 1962

18. Text of agreement between N.S. Khrushchev, J. Kennedy and H. Macmillan regarding the resumption of negotiations on cessation of nuclear weapons testing.

"Pravda", June 11, 1963

19. Text of President J. Kennedy's speech at American University in Washington on June 10, 1963.

"Izvestia", June 12, 1963 "Pravda", June 13, 1963

20. Answers of USSR Council of Ministers Chairman N.S. Khrushchev to questions from chief editors of "Pravda" and "Izvestia" newspapers regarding U.S. President J. Kennedy's speech at American University in Washington on June 10, 1963.

"Pravda", June 15, 1963

21. N.S. Khrushchev's answers to questions from "Pravda" and "Izvestia" correspondents regarding the agreement on banning nuclear weapons tests in three spheres.

"Pravda", July 27, 1963

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22. Message about the signing on August 5, 1963 in Moscow of the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in space and under water.

Speech by N.S. Khrushchev at a reception in the Kremlin on the occasion of signing the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in three spheres on August 5, 1963. "Pravda", August 6, 1963.

23. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on ratification of the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

"Pravda", September 26, 1963.

24. Message from N.S. Khrushchev to President J. Kennedy dated October 10, 1963 on the occasion of the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests entering into force.

"Pravda", October 11, 1963.

25. Message about the assassination of President J. Kennedy.

"Pravda", November 23, 1963. "Izvestia", November 23, 1963.

26. Telegram from N.S. Khrushchev to Lyndon Johnson dated November 23, 1963 on the occasion of J. Kennedy's assassination.

Telegram from N.S. Khrushchev to Jacqueline Kennedy dated November 23, 1963. Telegram from N.P. Khrushcheva to Jacqueline Kennedy dated November 23, 1963. Message about N.S. Khrushchev's visit to the U.S. Ambassador's residence in the USSR on November 23, 1963. "Pravda", November 24, 1963.

27. Response from President L. Johnson to N.S. Khrushchev's telegram dated November 23, 1963.

"Izvestia", November 26, 1963.

AVP RF. F. 0129. Op. 48. P. 366. D. 22. L. 23-29. Copy. Typewritten text.

****No. 85****

Letter from U.S. Attorney General R. Kennedy to N.S. Khrushchev expressing gratitude for assistance in establishing the J.F. Kennedy memorial library

August 28, 1964

Office of the Minister of Justice Washington, District of Columbia

Dear Mr. Chairman, I am extremely grateful for your kind letter in response to my request regarding your assistance in establishing a library in memory of my brother. We are very appreciative of

222[Reference copy]

documents, magnetic tapes and films that were received by us from your embassy in Washington and which will constitute a significant part of the collection that will become the John Kennedy Memorial Library. Your letter, which pays warm tribute to President Kennedy's efforts to improve relations between our two countries and ensure genuine and guaranteed peace, is in itself an important contribution to the library.

As you know, the pursuit of genuine peace was the primary concern of President Kennedy, as it is of President Johnson now. Your confirmation of this common goal is encouraging. I can assure you that despite the major problems that divide us, we intend by all means to work towards reducing the possibility of war. I took the liberty of showing your letter to President Johnson, who joins me in expressing gratitude to you for your contribution to the library.

To His Excellency Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Moscow, USSR

Note: The letter bears a handwritten note: "Thank you. Bob Kennedy". Translation made at the USSR Embassy in the USA.

Certified: Yu. Sokolov

AVP RF. F. 129. Op. 50. P. 163. D. 30. L. 29. Original. Typewritten text. Translation from English. Ibid. L. 28. Copy. Typewritten text in English.

223Signal Copy

Section Iv

"I Request To Be Accepted Into Citizenship Of The Soviet Union"

documents regarding L.H. Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union October 13, 1959 - May 28, 1962

****No. 86****

L.H. Oswald's Application Form for Entry Visa to the USSR

October 13, 1959

Application Form

for persons wishing to obtain a visa for entry to the USSR or transit through the USSR (Write clearly, must use ink or typewriter. Provide complete answers to questions)

Questions | Answers

1. Surname, first name and patronymic. (Person | Oswald, Lee Harvey

having several surnames or pseudonyms | ■■■■■■■■, ■■, ■■■■■■ must indicate them in full; married women | or widows must indicate maiden name and | husband's surname). |

2. Date, month, year and place of birth. | 18.10.1939 New Orleans, LA, USA

| 18 Oct. 1939 New Orleans, LA, USA

3. Nationality. | American ■■■■■■■■■■■■

4. Current citizenship or allegiance. | American ■■■■■■■■■■■■

5. Current place of work, | Student ■■■■■■■■

position held and main | profession. |

Footnotes

* Application form blank. All questions are repeated in Finnish language. On the left side is written "Consulate, Consular Department, USSR Mission" in Finnish.

b Here and further the form is filled out by L.H. Oswald in English in blue ballpoint pen in printed letters. Next to the text, an embassy employee wrote the translation in Russian in blue ink.

2246. Purpose of travel, duration of intended stay in the USSR and route:

Helsinki - Viborg - Moscow 5 days Tourist Trip to Moscow by train for period 15/10 - 22/10

NOTE: Persons applying for transit visa through USSR must have entry or transit visa of the country to or through which the person is traveling when leaving USSR

7. If children under 16 are traveling with you, indicate surname, first name, patronymic and age of each:

No

8. Have you been to USSR before (if yes, indicate when, where and purpose):

No

9. Surnames, first names, patronymics and addresses of close relatives in USSR:

No

10. Your permanent residence address:

Hotel Klaus Kurki Helsinki, room 601 3124 West 5 st., Fort Worth, Texas, USA

Date form completed: Applicant's signature: 13 oct 1959 Lee H Oswald

CA KGB RB. F. 266. L. 4. Original. Handwritten text. Typographical form.

****No. 87****

L.H. Oswald's Petition to the Supreme Soviet of USSR for acceptance into Soviet citizenship

October 16, 1959

To the Supreme Soviet of USSR

I, Lee Harvey Oswald, request to be accepted into citizenship of the Soviet Union. My visa expires October 15 expires October 21. I must be granted asylum before this date expires. And for now I await decision about acceptance into citizenship. At present I am a citizen of the United States of America. I want to accept Soviet citizenship because: I am a communist and worker, I lived in a decadent capitalist society where workers are slaves. I am twenty years old, I completed three years of U.S. Marine Corps school, served

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in the occupation forces in Japan²⁶⁵, saw American military imperialism in all its forms.

I do not want to return to any country outside the Soviet Union. I am ready to renounce my American citizenship and take on the obligations of a Soviet citizen.

I saved money that I received as a private in the American army for two years, in order to come to Russia and explain my desire to obtain Soviet citizenship. I no longer have enough money to live here for an extended period, or to travel to any other country. I have no desire to go to any other country. I request that my application be urgently considered.

Sincerely yours, Lee Harvey Oswald.

Address: Moscow, Hotel "Berlin" Room 320 Lee Harvey Oswald. Translated by L. Postnikova

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 63. D. 65. L. 101. Original. Translated from English. Typewritten text. Ibid. L. 102. Original. Handwritten text in English. Blue ballpoint pen.

****No. 88****

Note from Deputy Chairman of KGB under the Council of Ministers of USSR A.I. Perepelitsyn to Secretary of Presidium of Supreme Soviet of USSR M.P. Georgadze regarding the inadvisability of accepting L.H. Oswald into Soviet citizenship

****No. 4870/P October 20, 1959a****

to No. 435 from October 17, 1959 Secret Copy No. 1 To Secretary of Presidium of Supreme Soviet of USSR Comrade Georgadze M.P

The Committee for State Security under the Council of Ministers of USSR considers the acceptance of Lee Harvey Oswald into Soviet citizenship inadvisable.

a On KGB letterhead under the Council of Ministers of USSR.

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Appendix: statement266.

Deputy Chairman of the Committee for State Security under the Council of Ministers of USSR

A. Perepelitsyn

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 63. D. 65. L. 100. Original. Typewritten text. Signature-autograph in blue ink.

****No. 89****

Note from Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR M.P. Georgadze to CC CPSU regarding L.H. Oswald's petition for Soviet citizenship

No. 310s October 21, 1959

To The Central Committee Of Cpsu

American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald, who arrived in USSR as a tourist on October 15 of this year, has appealed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR with a petition for USSR citizenship.

According to the statement, Lee Harvey Oswald, born in 1939, native of USA, after completing 3-year U.S. Marine Corps school served in occupation forces in Japan. In his statement, Oswald writes: "I want to acquire Soviet citizenship because I am a communist and a worker, I lived in a decadent capitalist society where workers are slaves. I have no desire to go to any other country."

Oswald's visa for stay in USSR expires on October 21 of this year.

The Committee for State Security under the Council of Ministers of USSR considers granting Soviet citizenship to Oswald inadvisable.

In our opinion, there are no grounds for satisfying Oswald's petition for Soviet citizenship and permission for permanent residence in the Soviet Union.

Comrade Voroshilov K.E. agrees with this opinion.

We request instructions, M. Georgadze

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 63. D. 65. L. 99. Original. Typewritten text. Signature-autograph in blue ink.

**Text highlighted in italics is written in blue ink. **Below the text on the left in purple ink is a note "Postponed. With comrade Georgadze's proposal agreed (without recording in protocol). 23.X.59. Keep in CC Presidium archive. 23/X-59. V. Malin."*

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****No. 90****

Forwarding Note from Deputy Chairman of the Board of VAO "Intourist" V.K. Boichenko to the Central Committee of the CPSU with attached reference regarding L.H. Oswald's stay in Moscow

****No. 124-3/1299-s November 11, 1959****

Secret

Copy No. 1

To The Central Committee Of The Cpsu

Attached is a reference regarding the stay of American tourist L.H. Oswald in Moscow. Attachment: on 1 page.

Deputy Chairman of the Board of VAO "Intourist" V. Boichenko

[Attachment]

Reference

regarding the stay of American tourist L.H. Oswald in Moscow

From October 21 to 28, Oswald was receiving treatment at the Botkin Hospital, following a suicide attempt by cutting a vein in his arm.

His treating physician Prof. Tratakovsky, in conversation with an "Intourist" interpreter, stated that Oswald's psyche is healthy, but that he possesses great willpower and in case he is again denied his request for permission to remain in the USSR, he may repeat his suicide attempt.

In the hospital ward where he was kept, there was simultaneously another American receiving treatment, who was visited by his friend - a U.S. Embassy employee. The latter was interested in Oswald, asking if he had registered at the U.S. Embassy and what had happened to him. According to Oswald, he did not tell him anything.

On October 24, the embassy called and inquired when Oswald would be discharged from the hospital.

After discharge from the hospital, Oswald was placed in the "Metropol" hotel. On October 29, he was received at OVIR. There he again repeated his request - to allow him

in the USSR and grant him Soviet citizenship. The head of OVIR allowed him to wait in Moscow until receiving a final answer from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR regarding his application.

In a conversation with the interpreter, Oswald stated that if the Supreme Soviet refuses him, he will not leave the USSR anyway and will appeal to the Supreme Soviet again and again until he achieves his goal. "I don't think the Supreme Soviet would be so cruel to me," he said.

On November 5, Oswald, in conversation with the interpreter, said that on October 31 he visited the US Embassy and declared his renunciation of American citizenship and informed them that he would petition the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to accept him into Soviet citizenship. The embassy staff member who received him "showed no particular joy and said that it was his business," and immediately reported this to

journalists.

On November 1, 2 and 3, several journalists visited him at the hotel, including Stevens, but he refused to talk with them.

Acting Chief of EMO P. Baranova Senior Referent Below

November 6, 1959

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 63. D. 65. L. 97. Original. Typewritten text. Signatures-autographs in blue ink.

****No. 91****

Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and KGB Chairman under the USSR Council of Ministers A.N. Shelepin regarding L.H. Oswald's petition for Soviet citizenship

****No. 3471-Sh November 27, 1959****

Secret

To Cc Cpsu

American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald, who is in the USSR as a tourist, has appealed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a petition for acceptance into Soviet citizenship and permission to permanently reside in the USSR.

Lee Harvey Oswald, born in 1939, a student graduate of an electrical engineering school, arrived in the USSR on October 15 of this year. Upon arrival in Moscow, Oswald initiated a petition for acceptance into Soviet citizenship. Since by the time his visa expired the matter of satisfying Oswald's request had not been resolved, and he was supposed to leave the USSR, Oswald attempted to commit suicide by cutting
229Signal copy

himself a vein. At present, after treatment, he continues to insist on being granted Soviet citizenship and refuses to leave the USSR. On October 31 of this year, he visited the US Embassy in Moscow and declared his renunciation of American citizenship.

Considering that certain foreigners previously granted Soviet citizenship (Sitrinell, Afshar), after living for some time in the USSR, left our country, and also taking into account that Oswald has not yet been sufficiently studied, it is advisable to grant him the right of temporary residence in the USSR for one year, providing him with work and housing. In this case, the question of Oswald's permanent residence in the Soviet Union and his acceptance into Soviet citizenship could be decided upon the expiration of this period.

Draft resolution is attached. We request consideration.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Chairman of the Committee of the USSR for State Security A. Gromyko A. Shelepin

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 12. D. 609. L. 45. Original. Typewritten text. Signatures - autographs in blue pencil and blue ink.

****No. 92****

Resolution of the Presidium of the CC CPSU "On the matter of petition by American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald for admission to Soviet citizenship"

No. P251/14 December 1, 1959

1. To agree with the proposal of the USSR MFA and Committee for State Security under the Council of Ministers of the USSR to grant the United States citizen Lee Harvey Oswald, who has petitioned for admission to Soviet citizenship, the right of temporary residence in the Soviet Union for one year, and to decide the question of his permanent residence in the USSR and admission to Soviet citizenship upon expiration of this period.
2. To obligate the Belorussian sovnarkhoz to employ Oswald as an electrical technician, and the Minsk City Soviet of Workers' Deputies to allocate a separate small-sized apartment.
3. To instruct the Executive Committee of the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of the USSR to allocate five thousand rubles for apartment furnishing for Oswald, and also to issue an allowance of 700 rubles per month for one year.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 12. D. 609. L. 44. Original. Typewritten text.

*At the bottom of the page there is a note in blue pencil "For. M.Suslov".

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****No. 93****

Extract from Order No. 6 for the Minsk Radio Factory of the Electrical Engineering and Instrument-Making Industry Administration of the SNKh BSSR

regarding the appointment of L.H. Oswald as Grade 1 Adjuster at the Minsk Radio Factory

Minsk January 12, 1960

§ 9. Appoint Comrade Oswald Lee Harvey as Grade 1 Adjuster of the experimental workshop, effective January 13, 1960

p.p. Factory Director D. Yudelevich

Extract is true: Senior Inspector of Personnel Department of Radio Factory Sokolovskaya April 1, 1964

CA KGB RB. F. 266. L. 111. Copy. Typewritten text. Certified by signature-autograph and round blue seal of the Personnel Department of Minsk Radio Factory of the Electrical Engineering and Instrument-Making Industry Administration of the SNKh BSSR.

****No. 94****

Letter from L.H. Oswald to the Consular Section of the US Embassy in the USSR requesting information about his possible return to the USA

December 1, 1960

Dear Sirs!

I would like to receive information regarding the status of my American citizenship, especially concerning my return to the USA and the problems that would need to be resolved if I wished to return to America.

I ask only to be informed. I believe we can discuss this matter fully before any steps are taken by me or anyone else.

I would also like this correspondence to be kept secret, as the "popularity" which I acquired in October 1959, when I submitted my application to renounce American citizenship, only led to complications.

You can send any personal letters for me to the embassy at the address indicated below.

Thank you, Lee Harvey Oswald.

Minsk ul. Kommunisticheskaya d. 4, apt. 24*

*In the original, the address is written by L.H. Oswald in Russian. 231Signal Copy

CIA KGB RB. D. 266. L. 158. Original. Handwritten text. Translation from English. Black ink. Ibid. L. 156-157. Original. Handwritten text in English. Blue ink.

****No. 95****

Extract from Order No. 70 for the Minsk Radio Factory of the Electrical Engineering and Instrument-Making Industry Administration of the SNKh BSSR regarding the dismissal of L.H. Oswald from the Minsk Radio Factory

Minsk May 17, 1962 § 23. Dismiss from the factory the adjuster of the experimental workshop comrade Oswald Lee Harvey effective May 18, 1962, according to submitted application

p.p. Factory Director D. Yudelevich Extract is true: Senior Inspector of Personnel Department Sokolovskaya April 1, 1964

CIA KGB RB. D. 266. L. 110. Typewritten text. Certified by signature-autograph of Sokolovskaya and round blue seal of the Personnel Department of Minsk Radio Factory of the Electrical Engineering and Instrument-Making Industry Administration of the SNKh BSSR.

****No. 96****

Extract from the house register of building No. 4 Kommunisticheskaya Street regarding the residence of L.H. Oswald May 28, 1962*

OSWALD LEE HARVEY, born 1939, native of New Orleans, American, was temporarily registered on April 7, 1960 at the address: Minsk, Kommunisticheskaya Street, building No. 4, apt. 24, checked out May 28,

1962. Verified by: Building Manager Nitsa. April 1, 1964

CIA KGB RB. D. 266. L. 109. Copy. Typewritten text. Certified by signature-autograph and round blue seal of Building Management No. 3 of the District Housing Administration of the Executive Committee of Lenin District Soviet of Workers' Deputies of Minsk.

*Dated according to document content.

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First of all, let us reconsider our attitude toward peace itself. Too many of us consider it impossible. Too many consider it unrealistic. But this is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable, that we are at the mercy of forces we cannot control.

We must not accept such a view. Our problems are man-made and therefore can be solved by man. And man can be as great as he wants to be. There is no human problem beyond human capabilities. Reason and spirit have often solved what seemed unsolvable, and we believe they can do it again.

I do not mean an absolute, infinite concept of universal peace and goodwill, which some dreamers and idealists fantasize about. I do not reject the value of hopes and dreams, but we only cause disappointment and distrust if we make them our sole and immediate goal.

Let us focus instead on a more practical, more achievable world, based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution of human institutions - on a series of concrete actions and effective arrangements that would be in the interests of all concerned. There is no single simple key to this peace, no grand or magical formula that one or two powers can adopt. Genuine peace must be the product of many nations' actions. It must be dynamic, not static, adapting to meet the challenge of each generation. For peace is a process - a way of solving problems.

With such peace, conflicts and competing interests will still exist between nations, just as they exist within families and countries. World peace, like community peace, does not require that each person love their neighbor - it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to just and peaceful settlement. And history teaches us that enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last forever. However fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, the tide of time and events will often bring surprising changes in relations between nations and neighbors.

So let us persevere in our pursuit. Peace need not be impracticable, and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly, making it seem more manageable and less remote, we can help all people to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move steadily toward it.

Secondly, let us reexamine our attitude toward the Soviet Union. It is discouraging to think that their leaders may actually believe what their propagandists write. It was disheartening to read a recent authoritative Soviet text on military strategy and find on one page after another wholly baseless and incredible statements - such as the assertion that "American imperialist circles are preparing for various types of wars... that there exists a real threat of a preventive war being unleashed by American imperialists against the Soviet Union... and that the political aims of the American imperialists are to enslave European and other capitalist countries... (and) achieve world domination... by means of aggressive wars."

As was said long ago, "the wicked flee when no man pursueth." Yet it is sad to read these Soviet statements and to realize what a great gap they represent. But it also serves as a warning - a warning to the American people not to fall into the same trap as the Soviet Union, - to see only a distorted and hostile view, to regard conflict as inevitable and reconciliation impossible, and to view all communication merely

as an exchange of threats.

No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered lacking in virtue. As Americans, we find communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still admire the Russian people for their many achievements - in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture and in acts of courage.

Among the many traits our peoples share, there is no stronger trait than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique among the major world powers is the fact that our nations have never been at war with each other. And no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Russian people suffered in the course of World War II. At least 20 million lost their lives. Countless millions of homes and farms were burned or ravaged.

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A third of the entire country's territory, including almost 2/3 of its industrial base, was turned to ruins - losses equivalent to the devastation of the entire country east of Chicago.

If total war begins again today - regardless of how it might start - our two countries would be its first targets. It seems ironic, but this is a real fact: the two strongest world powers face the greatest danger of destruction. Everything we have created, everything we have worked for, would be destroyed. And even in the Cold War, which carries such a heavy burden of danger for many countries, including our closest allies, our two countries bear the heaviest burden. Both countries spend enormous sums on creating weapons of mass destruction, and these funds could have been better used to fight poverty, ignorance, and disease. Both countries are caught in a vicious cycle where suspicions on one side lead to new weapons being created as a countermeasure.

Frankly speaking, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, are mutually deeply interested in a just and lasting peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements that contribute to achieving this goal meet USSR's interests as well as ours, and we can expect that even the most hostile states will accept and fulfill those treaty obligations that serve their interests.

So, let us not turn a blind eye to our disagreements, let us also turn our attention to our common interests and to the means by which these disagreements can be resolved. And if we cannot now put an end to our differences, we can at least help create a world in which diversity can exist. After all, what ultimately unites us is the fact that we all live on this planet. We all breathe the same air. We all care about our children's future. And we are all mortal.

Third, let us re-examine our attitude toward the Cold War. We should remember that we are not engaged in debate, trying to pile up one controversial point after another. We are here not to distribute blame or point fingers. We must deal with the world as it is, not as it might have been if history of the last 18 years had been different.

Therefore, we must persistently pursue peace in the hope that constructive changes within the communist bloc may bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it would be in the communists' interest to agree to establishing genuine peace. And above all, while defending our vital interests, nuclear powers must avoid such confrontations that force an adversary to choose between humiliating retreat or nuclear war. Adopting such a course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy - or of a collective death wish for the world.

To achieve these goals, America maintains weapons that are not used for provocative purposes, are carefully controlled, intended for deterrence and can be used selectively. Our armed forces are disciplined

and restrained. Our diplomats are instructed to avoid actions that could cause unnecessary irritation, as well as purely rhetorical hostile declarations.

While we can seek to reduce tensions, we cannot at the same time diminish our vigilance. We do not need to resort to threats to prove our resolve. We have no need to jam foreign radio broadcasts out of fear that our faith will be shaken. We do not want to impose our system on any people who do not wish to accept it, but we want and can peacefully compete with any other system in the world.

Meanwhile, we seek to strengthen the United Nations, help resolve its financial problems, make it a more effective instrument for peace, transform it into a genuine system of international security - a system capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, ensuring the security of both large and small nations, and creating conditions under which arms can ultimately be abolished.

At the same time, we seek to keep peace within the non-communist world, where many countries - all our friends - have been divided over issues weakening Western unity, provoking communist intervention or threatening to erupt into war.

Our efforts in Western New Guinea, in Congo, in the Middle East, and on the Indian subcontinent have been persistent and patient despite criticism from both sides. We also seek to set an example by trying to resolve smaller but significant disagreements with our closest neighbors in Mexico and Canada.

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Speaking of other countries, I want to bring clarity to one issue. We are bound by alliances with many countries. These alliances exist because our tasks and their tasks are significantly intertwined. Our obligation to protect Western Europe and West Berlin, for example, remains unchanged due to the identity of our vital interests. The United States will not make any deals with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations not only because they are our partners, but because their interests and our interests coincide.

Our interests, however, coincide not only where it concerns protecting the borders of freedom, but also where it concerns the search for paths leading to peace. We hope - and such is the goal of our allies - to convince the Soviet Union that it too should allow each country to independently choose its future, if this choice does not interfere with the choices of others. The attempt of communism to impose its political and economic system on others is today the main cause of international tension. There can be no doubt that if countries can refrain from interfering in the self-determination of other countries, peace will be much more reliably secured.

This will require new conditions for creating a world order - a new context for international discussions. This requires greater mutual understanding between the USSR and our country, and greater mutual understanding will require more contacts and connections.

One of the steps in this direction is the proposed agreement on establishing a direct link between Moscow and Washington with the aim of preventing each side from dangerous delays, misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the other side's actions that may occur during a crisis.

We are talking in Geneva about other first-step measures, measures to control weapons, designed to limit the arms race intensity and reduce the risk of accidental war. However, in Geneva our main, long-term goal is achieving universal and complete disarmament, which should proceed in stages, parallel to implementing political measures to create new institutions of peace that would take the place of weapons. The efforts of our government toward disarmament have been directed since the 1920s.

The last three governments have persistently sought disarmament, and no matter how unclear the prospects may be today, we intend to continue our efforts - continue so that all countries, including our own country, could better understand what the real problems and real possibilities are in the field of disarmament.

The single important area of these negotiations where an end is already in sight - but where a new beginning is still acutely needed - is the treaty on banning nuclear tests. Concluding such a treaty is so close and at the same time so far away - it would stop the rapidly developing arms race in one of the most dangerous areas. This treaty would put nuclear powers in such a position where they could more successfully deal with one of the most terrible threats facing humanity - the further spread of nuclear weapons. This would strengthen our security, it would reduce the possibility of war. This goal is certainly important enough to demand our tireless efforts. At the same time, we must not succumb to the temptation to abandon all efforts, the temptation to give up our vitally important guarantees.

Therefore, I want to use this opportunity presented to me and announce two important decisions made at this meeting:

Firstly, Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan and I have agreed to hold high-level negotiations in Moscow in the near future with the aim of reaching the quickest possible agreement on a comprehensive treaty banning nuclear tests. Given historical experience, we should not indulge in too much hope, but all our hopes are the hopes of all humanity.

Secondly, in order to demonstrate our good intentions and serious confidence in this matter, I declare that the United States does not intend to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and other countries will not conduct them either. We will not resume such tests first. Such a statement is not a substitute for a formal binding treaty, but I hope it will help us achieve such a treaty. Moreover, such a treaty cannot serve as a substitute for disarmament, but I hope it will help us achieve disarmament.

And in conclusion, my fellow Americans, let us review our position on issues of peace and freedom here, within the country.

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The character and spirit of our own society must justify and support our efforts abroad. We must demonstrate this in dedicating our own lives, serving without pay in the "peace corps" abroad and in the planned national service corps here, within the country - and many of you, completing your studies today, will have the exclusive opportunity to do this.

However, wherever we may be, we must all live daily according to some faith that peace and freedom must go hand in hand. In too many of our cities today, peace is unreliable because freedom is incomplete.

The duty of executive authorities at all levels - local, in states and at the national level - is to ensure and protect this freedom for all citizens by all means at their disposal. The duty of legislative bodies at all levels - everywhere where this power is currently insufficient, is to make it sufficient.

And finally, it is the duty of all citizens to respect the rights of all others and to respect the law of the country.

It cannot be said that all this has no relation to world peace. As the Bible tells us, when man's ways please the Lord, he makes even his enemies to be at peace with him. And isn't peace ultimately primarily a question of human rights - the right to live one's own life without fear of destruction, the right to breathe the air that nature gives us, the right of future generations to healthy existence?

While achieving protection of our national interests, let us also protect human interests. And arms control, undoubtedly, responds to both these interests. No agreement - no matter how beneficial it might be for all, no matter how carefully it might be formulated, can provide absolute guarantee against the danger of deception and evasion. However, it can - if it is sufficiently effective in its implementation, and if it has sufficient verification methods - provide much greater security and much less risk than an uncontrolled, unregulated arms race, the consequences of which are impossible to predict.

The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want war. We are not now waiting for war. The current generation of Americans has had enough - more than enough - of war, hatred, and oppression. We will be ready for war if others want it. We will be vigilant to try to stop it. But besides that, we must play our role to create a peaceful world where the weak are safe and the strong are just. We are powerless before this task and do not think that there is hope for success. With a sense of confidence, without feeling fear, we strive not for a strategy of destruction, but for a strategy of peace. (newspaper "Pravda", 1963. July 13. p. 164).

Footnotes

3 N.S. Khrushchev's answers to questions were published on June 15, 1963 (newspaper "Pravda", 1963, June 15, No. 166; newspaper "Izvestia", 1963, June 13, No. 142).

4 The question of German unification had been discussed since 1949, that is, since the creation of two German states - FRG and GDR. The leadership of the USSR and USA proposed various projects that did not satisfy both sides. This was complicated by the fact that K. Adenauer's government in West Germany refused to recognize independent East Germany. Thus, after establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1956, the "Hallstein Doctrine" was adopted, according to which the FRG government threatened to break relations with any state that would recognize the GDR. The East German leadership until 1962 adhered to the policy of uniting both states. Only in March 1962, after the GDR government adopted the "National Document", it was declared that unification with the FRG was possible only after socialism's victory there, which effectively meant abandoning such unification plans. Moreover, since the end of 1958, the Soviet leadership came forward with the initiative to transform West Berlin into an independent state entity - a demilitarized free city. However, this demand was not supported by Western powers. Along with this, since mid-1962, new approaches began to be discussed in the FRG aimed at rejecting harsh confrontation with the East. Thus, in June 1963, Social Democrat E. Bahr formulated a new doctrine - "Change through rapprochement", the essence of which was that it was necessary to change policy towards rapprochement with the GDR.

5 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) - a military-political organization created on the basis of a treaty signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington. Initially, NATO members were the USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal. In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined NATO, and in 1955 - FRG. The Warsaw Treaty (Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance) on creating collective defense was signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, between the USSR and European socialist countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Romania). The treaty formalized the creation of a military-political alliance (Organization

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of the Warsaw Treaty), which existed until February 25, 1991. The Non-Aggression Pact project between the states - members of the Warsaw Treaty and the states - members of the North Atlantic Treaty was

submitted by the USSR to the Committee of Eighteen States on Disarmament in Geneva on February 20, 1963. The project was published on February 21, 1963 (newspaper "Pravda", 1963. February 21, No. 109).

From 1895 to 1945, Taiwan, after China's defeat in the Japanese-Chinese War of 1894-1895, became part of Japan. After Japan's defeat in 1945, the armed forces of the Republic of China restored control over Taiwan. After the defeat of the Kuomintang in the civil war, the remaining troops of the Chinese Republic and a significant number of civilian refugees evacuated to the island. The USA in 1950, in connection with the beginning of the Korean War and the participation of Chinese PVA troops, began to actively support the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan. In December 1954, a Mutual Defense Treaty was signed between the Republic of China and the USA.

With the beginning of the Cold War, the USA began to apply a new type of economic sanctions against the USSR and socialist bloc countries. They were aimed at blocking access to advanced technologies and high-tech products. On March 26, 1948, the US Department of Commerce restricted the export of strategic materials, equipment and supplies to the USSR and Eastern European countries and the PRC.

At the end of February 1949, these restrictions were enshrined in the new Export Control Act (previously the export control law was adopted in 1940, aimed mainly against Axis countries). To implement restrictive measures in 1949, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) was created by the USA, which supervised the supply of goods and technologies from Western countries to the USSR and its allies. COCOM included 16 countries (USA, Canada, Australia, Great Britain, Belgium, Denmark, France, FRG, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey). Six more states cooperated with the committee (Austria, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland), but formally were not its members. In the mid-1950s, Japan became a member of COCOM. The committee's task was to develop and observe the strategy of "controlled technological lag." All technologies were divided into three categories: completely prohibited for sale; allowed for sale in limited quantities, without export restrictions, but with control over their final use. Even this third category had limitations. Products from the third list (for technology not manufactured in socialist countries) could be sold only four years after mass production began. All contracts for the supply of products, including technologies, to socialist countries worth over 100 million dollars were subject to COCOM approval. Any member state of the committee could veto the deal, suggesting it to other committee participants. Along with these decisions, in 1951 the USA tightened economic restrictions on exports to socialist countries in connection with the war in Korea (1950-1953) and terminated the 1937 trade agreement with the Soviet government, depriving the USSR of most-favored-nation status. As a result, customs tariffs on Soviet goods increased by 4.6 times compared to the level of taxation of goods from other countries. The American Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act. According to this document, the USA could deny economic support (for example, deny most-favored-nation treatment in trade) to any state that did not join the embargo against the USSR and "countries under its influence" and continue to supply them with strategic goods.

This refers to mutual visits of foreign trade specialists to study organization, techniques and practices of foreign trade activities. The visits were planned for 30 days each. The Soviet delegation headed by the chief of the Main Currency Department of the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR V.S. Alkhimov was in the USA from May 15, 1963, the US delegation in the USSR - from July 15.

The conversation record was prepared on August 8, 1963, at 12 noon it arrived at the Secretariat of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, was sent on August 13 as No. P1310 to members and candidate members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, secretaries of the CPSU Central

Committee.

The information message about N.S. Khrushchev's reception of D. Rusk was published on August 6, 1963 (newspaper "Pravda". 1963. August 6. No. 218).

The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) was established by the United Nations Organization in 1961. It began work on March 14, 1962, in Geneva (Switzerland) and met regularly until August 26, 1969. It included participants who were active in 1960-1961 in the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament (USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, USA, Great Britain, France, Canada, Italy), as well as Brazil, Burma, India, Mexico, Ethiopia, United Arab Republic, Nigeria, Sweden. Within the committee, issues of disarmament, measures to strengthen trust and control over nuclear tests were considered.

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12 On July 16 and 26, 1963, meetings were held between N.S. Khrushchev and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State A. Harriman. They discussed issues of coordinating a treaty on banning nuclear weapons tests in three environments and other disarmament issues.

13 U.S. Secretary of Interior S. Udall, heading a delegation of American hydropower engineers from August 29, 1962, familiarized himself with the operation of hydroelectric power stations in the USSR. He was the first minister to visit the USSR after the Caribbean crisis. The last day of his stay, October 6, he met with N.S. Khrushchev in Pitsunda. Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Nobel Prize laureate G. Seaborg was in the USSR from May 19 to 31, 1963, to sign a new Agreement between the State Committee on Atomic Energy of the USSR and the Commission on the peaceful use of atomic energy. On May 29, he was received by L.I. Brezhnev. On July 30, 1963, N.S. Khrushchev received a delegation of American agricultural specialists headed by U.S. Secretary of Agriculture O. Freeman.

14 The Soviet delegation headed by N.S. Khrushchev was on an official visit to the USA from September 15 to 27, 1959. During the visit, N.S. Khrushchev visited Washington, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Des Moines, Pittsburgh, and Camp David. During the visit on September 16, N.S. Khrushchev and a group of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies visited the U.S. Congress, where they met with Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman W. Fulbright and Senate Majority Leader L. Johnson.

15 In a conversation with German writer Emil Ludwig on December 13, 1931, when asked why everything American is so respected in the USSR, I.V. Stalin replied: "You exaggerate. We have no special respect for everything American. But we respect American efficiency in everything - in industry, in technology, in literature, in life; we never forget that the USA is a capitalist country. But among Americans there are many healthy people both spiritually and physically, healthy in their approach to work, to business. We sympathize with this efficiency, this simplicity. Despite America being a highly developed capitalist country, there is something democratic in its industry, which cannot be said about the old European capitalist countries, where the spirit of feudal aristocracy still lives." (Bolshevik 1932, April 30, No. 8).

[Continued in next part due to length]

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supported by the USA and South Vietnam, with the Pathet Lao movement (see note 40), which relied on the DRV and subsequently began receiving aid from the PRC and USSR. A civil war began in the country. To resolve the Laotian issue on the initiative of the USSR and Great Britain, an International Conference was convened, which began work on May 16, 1961, in Geneva. Representatives of the PRC, DRV, Republic of Vietnam, Poland, USA, France, India, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Thailand, and three Laotian

groupings participated in the conference, which in June 1962 agreed to form a national government: Prince Souvanna Phouma (from the neutralists), Prince Souphanouvong (from the Patriotic Front of Laos), Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan (from the right). The signing on July 23, 1962, of agreements including the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and the Protocol to the Declaration, in which the conference participants declared their readiness to respect the "sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos," not to interfere in its affairs and not to draw it into any military alliances. The Declaration provided for the complete cessation of civil war on the territory of Laos, the withdrawal of foreign troops and their service personnel from the country. Control over the implementation of agreements was assigned to an international commission of representatives from India, Poland, and Canada. The agreements were immediately violated. From April 1963, direct military actions began between the PFPL forces and the royal government forces with active military-technical and direct military support from allies (DRV, PRC, USSR on one side, USA, South Vietnam on the other).

[Notes 22-31 follow with various historical references and explanations]

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from Germany are collected by each state in its occupation zone, however, considering the greatest destruction on the territory of the Soviet Union, the USSR additionally was to receive from the western zones 25% of dismantled capital equipment not necessary for the German peacetime economy (of which 15% in exchange for equivalent deliveries of coal, petroleum products, metals and other raw materials). Also, the territory of Germany, on which the Kaliningrad region was formed, was separated from the USSR. After the actual formation of two German states, the USSR ceased collecting reparations from the GDR territory. According to the Paris Peace Treaties signed on February 10, 1947, by the Allied powers with former Nazi allies (Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland), these states were also to pay war reparations to compensate countries that suffered from their actions - USSR, Yugoslavia, Greece, Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia. Finland fully paid reparations to the USSR by 1952. After the formation of people's democratic governments in Hungary and Romania, the volume of reparations on their request was reduced by 50%, and then practically ceased.

32 Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani army Muhammad Ayub Khan on October 7, 1958, by order of President Pakistan Iskander Mirza carried out a coup, during which martial law was introduced. After the coup, he was appointed head of the Martial Law Administration. On October 27, he forced Iskander Mirza to resign and leave the country. That same day he was proclaimed the new President of Pakistan and head of government. In 1960, he legitimized his position through a referendum.

33 In 1950, for the first time in Guatemala, a peaceful transfer of power occurred: Jacobo Arbenz Guzman won victory in presidential elections. The democratically elected president began implementing a reform package that was supposed to improve the position of ordinary Guatemalans. In particular, during his rule, unused and redistributed lands in favor of peasants were nationalized from the American United Fruit Company. After the first land expropriation, the US State Department filed a protest with the Guatemalan government and demanded compensation from the Arbenz government for damages caused. Simultaneously, the CIA began preparing operations to overthrow the legitimate president. In March 1954 at the X Inter-American Conference, legal grounds for intervention against Guatemala were obtained when the American delegation led by Secretary of State J.F. Dulles managed to push through the conference the anti-communist "Caracas Declaration." Under the pretext of fighting the "communist threat" in Latin America, this resolution sanctioned joint intervention by Latin American countries against Guatemala. In mid-June 1954, armed groups of mercenaries entered from Honduras and Nicaragua territory, numbering about 27 people under pressure from which, acting in coordination with US intelligence services, President

Arbenz was forced to resign. Power in the country fell into the hands of a junta led by Colonel Carlos Armas, who canceled the social and economic reforms of his predecessor.

34 This refers to Ngo Dinh Diem in 1955 becoming, based on the results of a nationwide referendum, the first president of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), actively cooperating with the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Vietcong). On November 2, 1963, killed during a military coup.

35 This refers to the American War of Independence (American Revolutionary War) 1775-1785.

36 This refers to the Civil War in Spain (July 1936 - April 1939). As a result of victory, the dictatorship of Generalissimo Francisco Franco was established in the country. On December 27, 1950, the USA announced the appointment of an ambassador to Madrid, which became official recognition of Franco's regime.

37 The meeting of foreign ministers of the USSR, PRC, USA, Great Britain and France with participation of representatives from Indochina countries was held in Geneva from April 26 to July 21, 1954, on the question of Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Republic of Vietnam. On July 21, agreements were signed which formulated the foundations for ceasefire and principles of political settlement in Indochina: cessation of military actions, demilitarization and neutralization of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, ban on arms supplies, military equipment and military materials to these countries. To monitor compliance with the Geneva agreements, an International Commission was created consisting of representatives from India, Poland and Canada. According to the "Agreement on cessation of military actions in Vietnam," regrouping of forces to designated zones for each side should be completed within 80-300 days: for DRV - northern Vietnam, for French forces - southern Vietnam. To separate the fighting sides, a temporary demarcation line was established, not to be moved south of the 17th parallel. Political settlement in Vietnam was envisioned based on general free elections. The deadline was set for July 1956. Implementation of Geneva agreements on general elections in Vietnam was disrupted due to their proclamation in October 1955 by Republic of Vietnam and President Ngo Dinh Diem's refusal to conduct them. American representatives refused to join the Final

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declaration and published a unilateral declaration in which they acknowledged the Geneva agreements and pledged to refrain from their violation. However, on the day of signing the Agreements on July 21, 1954, President D. Eisenhower stated that the USA did not consider itself bound by them.

39 Presumably, this refers to the agreement concluded in June 1944 between the People's Commissariat of Rubber Industry of the USSR and the firm "Dupont de Nemours & Co." regarding the provision of technical documentation and familiarization of Soviet specialists with chloroprene (synthetic) rubber production processes.

40 During the first and only meeting between N.S. Khrushchev and J.F. Kennedy, held on June 4, 1961, in Vienna, along with the Berlin question, the Laos issue was discussed. Although no official agreements were reached at the meeting, Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed that neutral Laos corresponds to the interests of both states. The parties agreed to a ceasefire and neutralization of Laos. These arrangements were formalized in the final documents of the International Conference in Geneva, held from May 16, 1961, to July 23, 1962 (see note 21).

40 See note 21. Pathet Lao (translated as "Laotian State") - general name for military-political forces of socialist and communist orientation in Laos in 1950-1970s. The first organization called Pathet Lao was the United National Front of Laos (Neo Lao Itsala), formed in 1950 to fight against French colonizers. In

1956, on the base of Neo Lao Itsala, the Patriotic Front of Laos (PFL, Lao Haksat) was created. Pathet Lao forces became one of the sides in the civil war in Laos (1960-1973), conducting military operations against the royal Laos army. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam had a strong influence on the organization, arming and supporting the organization. Since 1968, the DRV army largely replaced Pathet Lao forces. After the war ended in 1973, the PFL entered the coalition government. In 1975, Pathet Lao forces carried out an armed coup, taking power into their hands.

42 Not published. See document No. 6. On August 12, 1963, A.A. Gromyko presented a draft letter to N.S. Khrushchev with a cover note without number, which particularly stated: "In case of Your approval, the text of the letter will be coordinated with other members of the CC Presidium who are in Moscow" (RGANI. F. 3. Op.16. D. 322. L. 57. Original. Typewritten text. Signature-autograph with blue ink). On the draft letter (Ibid. L.58-59) there is a note: "Tov. Khrushchev read. 'Agreed' 16/VIII-63 G. Shuisky". Note from August 16 with the draft resolution attachment per V.N. Malin's instruction was sent on the same day as No. 1119 to CC Presidium members for voting with the note "Urgent. According to the voting list 'for' voted: L.I. Brezhnev, G.I. Voronov, A.P. Kirilenko, N.V. Podgorny, D.S. Polyansky.

43 The adopted resolution was sent to N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhnev, A.A. Gromyko.

44 The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, signed by the USSR, USA, and Great Britain on August 5, 1963, was opened for signing by other states on August 8. On the same day, the treaty was signed by representatives of 22 states, including all European people's democracies except Albania. Italy, Belgium, Finland, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UAR, Israel, India, Mexico, and 11 other states signed the treaty on August 9.

45 Patrick Bouvier Kennedy - the last child of the Kennedys. Died on August 9, 1963, 39 hours after birth.

46 The instruction in question has not been established.

47 Not published. See document No. 8. Note with draft resolution attachment per V.N. Malin's instruction was sent on October 7, 1963, as No. ■1588 to CC members and candidates and CC CPSU Presidium members. According to the voting list "for" voted: L.I. Brezhnev, A.N. Kosygin, N.V. Podgorny, D.S. Polyansky, N.M. Shvernik.

48 The adopted resolution was sent to N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhnev, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov.

49 The messages were published (newspaper "Pravda", 1963, October 10, No. 284; CC CPSU newspaper, 1963, October 10, No. 243).

50 The coded telegram arrived at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 23, 1963, at 5:15. Copies of the coded telegram were sent to CC CPSU Presidium members (N.S. Khrushchev - two copies), candidates for CC Presidium membership, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov.

51 From September 17, 1963, A.A. Gromyko was in the USA, participating in the work of the XVIII session of the UN General Assembly. During his stay in the USA, he met with President J.F. Kennedy, US Secretary of State D. Rusk and other officials. Meetings with J.F. Kennedy took place on September 20 and October 10.

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52 By November 1963, the Republican Party had not yet definitively decided on a party candidate for the upcoming 1964 presidential election. The main candidates were New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller (representing the liberal wing of the party) and Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater (representing the

conservative wing). The president's assassination shocked Republican primaries: in connection with mourning, N. Rockefeller suspended his campaign for a month, and candidates who had not yet voted declined to openly nominate their candidacy.

53 As vice president in President D. Eisenhower's administration (1953-1961), R. Nixon ran for president from the Republican Party in the 1960 election but was defeated by Democrat J.F. Kennedy.

54 On June 11, 1963, J.F. Kennedy delivered a radio and television address on civil rights. In it, referring to the events of that day at the University of Alabama, where Governor D. Wallace of Alabama tried to prevent two first Black students from entering the university, he called for recognizing civil rights as a moral cause. On June 19, J.F. Kennedy submitted a civil rights bill to Congress, which he supported. On November 23, L. Johnson after moving to draft "Remarks to Joint Session" addressed a joint session of both houses of Congress with the words "No memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President Kennedy's memory than the earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill." The Civil Rights Act, prohibiting discrimination based on race, skin color, gender, or ethnic origin, was passed by Congress (10 February 1964) and the US Senate (19 June 1964). Signed by US President L. Johnson on July 2, 1964.

55 In January 1963, J.F. Kennedy introduced a bill to Congress that provided for reducing the maximum income tax rate from 91 to 65 percent and reducing the corporate tax rate from 52 to 47 percent. The bill also included provisions to help poor people and invalids. During consideration in Congress, the bill was blocked by Republicans who understood that its adoption could play a key role in J.F. Kennedy's victory in the presidential election. After J.F. Kennedy's death, L. Johnson, agreeing to reduce the overall federal budget, pushed the bill through the chambers. On February 26, 1964, the US Revenue Act was signed by the president.

56 This refers to the ideological polemic that began in 1963 between the CPSU Central Committee and the CPC Central Committee. By the end of the 1950s, negative tendencies began to appear in Soviet-Chinese relations, active bilateral cooperation began to transform into confrontation between the two largest socialist states. In ideological terms between the USSR and the PRC, different understandings of the problems of war and peace, forms and methods of struggle between socialism and capitalism, ways of building socialism emerged. On April 3, 1963, the newspaper "Pravda" published "Letter of the CPSU CC to the CPC CC" dated March 30. It followed from it that in relations between two socialist states there may be "different understanding of certain issues of internal construction and the international communist movement" (newspaper "Pravda", 1963, April 3, No. 93). The letter also spoke about the upcoming bilateral consultative meeting. Despite this, the PRC responded to criticism by publishing its letter "On the General Line of the International Communist Movement." It spoke about the need to strive for the victory of world revolution, and also made attacks on the CPSU's program provisions. This was followed by a return Statement of the CPSU Central Committee of June 19, which indicated that due to the upcoming party delegation of the USSR and PRC, the Chinese side's letter cannot be published (newspaper "Pravda", 1963, June 19, No. 170). The unsuccessful course of Soviet-Chinese bilateral consultations held from July 5 in Moscow led to the fact that the Soviet leadership was forced to publish both the CPC CC letter and give it a response in the form of a detailed letter. On July 14, both documents were published: "Open Letter of the CPC CC" addressed to "party organizations and all communists of the Soviet Union" (newspaper "Pravda", 1963, July 14, No. 195). The CPSU CC letter of July 14 became the foundation for criticism of Chinese leadership during 1963-1964. The CPC responded to the "Open Letter of the CPSU CC" by publishing in China 9 polemical articles. Following the last letter of the CPSU CC published in the "People's Daily" newspaper several articles that became a comprehensive subject for public criticism of

the CPC from the CPSU: "The emergence and development of disagreements between the CPSU leadership and us" (September 6); "On the question of Stalin" (September 13); "Is Yugoslavia a socialist country?" (September 26); "Apologists of neo-colonialism" (October 22); "Two lines on the issue of war and peace" (November 19); "Diametrically opposed policies of peaceful coexistence" (December 12); "CPSU leaders are the greatest splitters of our time" (February 4, 1964) and others.

57 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed by the USA, USSR and Great Britain on January 27, 1967,

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determined that "states - parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction."

58 The consular convention between the USSR government and the US government was signed on June 1, 1964.

59 Preliminary negotiations on concluding an air transport agreement between the USSR and USA were conducted from the late 1950s. After relations cooled following the U-2 spy plane incident in May 1960, negotiations were suspended, resuming in late 1960. The text of the agreement was approved in August 1961, but due to the Berlin crisis (1961) and Caribbean crisis (1962) the agreement was not signed. The bilateral air transport agreement between the USSR and USA was signed in Washington on November 4, 1966.

60 On October 21, 1963, a delegation headed by the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR B.A. Borisov was sent to the USA for negotiations with the State Department, Departments of Trade and Agriculture regarding wheat purchases for the USSR. On November 21, negotiations were interrupted at the Soviet side's initiative due to American firms' unwillingness to sell grain at fixed prices and the necessity of delivery on American ships. The grain deficit was eliminated through increased supplies from Canada and Australia.

61 This refers to the draft statement text delivered by A.A. Gromyko during the meeting with J.F. Kennedy on October 10, 1963. The Soviet side proposed publishing the statement text when signing the Non-Aggression Pact between Warsaw Pact member states and NATO member states (see note 5).

62 The initial plan for creating multilateral nuclear forces (MLF, in published documents another name is also used – combined NATO nuclear forces) was prepared by US State Secretary C. Herter in late 1960 and presented to NATO's five nuclear powers. Other NATO countries' contribution consisted of purchasing American "Polaris" missiles for MLF, which would be under collective command. The MLF's purpose was to strengthen NATO's European members' control over their own defense while maintaining centralized control over nuclear weapons use; raise the FRG's status in NATO by involving it in nuclear planning and thereby reduce the danger of West German nuclear forces plans emerging. In early 1963, the US completed developing a detailed MLF creation plan. Ultimately, the American project proposed that MLF would consist of 25 surface ships, each carrying 8 Polaris missiles, with mixed crews comprising citizens of at least three NATO member states. Control over nuclear missile launches was assigned to representatives of MLF member countries. Decisions in this committee were to be made unanimously, allowing the US to retain its veto right on nuclear weapons use. Western Germany showed the greatest interest in MLF, seeing in NATO collective nuclear forces plans an opportunity to join nuclear planning and thus raise its status in the North Atlantic alliance. USSR leadership strongly objected to plans for FRG and other nuclear weapons involvement. Great Britain and France, based on their own interests, also did not

support the MLF plan. Great Britain proposed an alternative Atlantic Nuclear Forces (ANF) plan, while France, opposing both MLF and ANF, proposed creating European nuclear forces. Under these conditions, hesitation and objections regarding MLF gradually increased in the US. By the end of 1964, practically all negotiations on MLF creation were terminated.

63 The Caribbean Crisis of 1962 (called the "Cuban Missile Crisis" in the US and the "October Crisis" in Cuba) was the most acute military-political crisis in Soviet-American relations during the Cold War period. The crisis was provoked by the rise to power in 1959 in Cuba of F. Castro's government, which took a course toward rapprochement with the USSR, as well as the deployment of US and NATO medium-range missiles around USSR borders. In May 1962, the CPSU Central Committee Presidium decided to deploy missiles in Cuba. In early July 1962, a Soviet-Cuban secret agreement was drafted in Moscow on deploying Soviet missiles in Cuba. To deliver and place R-12 and R-14 missile systems, air defense equipment, other equipment, and also a military grouping of Soviet forces in Cuba, Operation "Anadyr" (July 17 - October 22, 1962) was carried out and the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba (GSFK) was formed. N.S. Khrushchev planned to inform J.F. Kennedy about the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba in November 1962, during their upcoming meeting at the UN General Assembly, but American intelligence put the American side before an accomplished fact. On October 14, 1962, American reconnaissance confirmed the presence of Soviet missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads on the island. On October 22, J.F. Kennedy made a television address announcing Soviet missiles in Cuba, about the US threat, and the introduction (from October 24) of a "quarantine" of Cuba aimed at preventing the deployment of "Soviet 244[]

offensive weapons." On October 25-26, with assistance from UN Acting Secretary-General U Thant, the Soviet and American sides exchanged messages about readiness to reach a compromise: USSR - to remove missiles from the islands, and USA - to provide guarantees of non-invasion of Cuba. However, on October 27, in a message from the US President (text was transmitted over Moscow radio), Khrushchev put forward an additional condition - dismantling of American missiles in Turkey; on the same day, a Soviet missile shot down an American reconnaissance aircraft. That evening, R. Kennedy (main negotiator from the American side) warned Soviet Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin about strong pressure on J. F. Kennedy to decide on destroying Soviet missile installations in Cuba by air strikes if Moscow does not agree to their withdrawal within 24 hours. On the same day, at an emergency meeting of the CPSU Presidium, Soviet leadership decided to dismantle and withdraw missiles from Cuba, which was urgently communicated via radio (simultaneously with telegram to Soviet Embassy in USA). In turn, J. F. Kennedy sent a final confidential message to N. S. Khrushchev to remove American missiles from Turkey and Italy. He publicly declared that neither USA nor other Western hemisphere countries would attack Cuba. In November-December 1962, missiles, launch equipment, warheads, equipment and significant military personnel of GSVK were sent back to USSR. On November 20, President J. F. Kennedy announced the lifting of Cuba "quarantine."

64 This refers to sharp deterioration in Soviet-American relations after the incident with American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, shot down on May 1, 1960, near Sverdlovsk. During the opening of the Four Powers Disarmament Conference (USSR, USA, England, France) in Paris on May 15, 1960, N.S. Khrushchev came forward with accusations against the American side and proposed to D. Eisenhower to apologize for this provocation. Having received no response from the American side, the Soviet delegation left the conference.

[Continues to page 245]

Footnotes

73 Note with draft resolution as indicated by V.N. Malin was distributed on October 23, 1963, No. P1680 to members and candidate members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, secretaries of the CC CPSU.

74 Not published. See document No. 11.

75 Resolution was adopted at the meeting of the Presidium of CC CPSU, distributed to L.I. Brezhnev, Yu.V. Andropov, A.A. Gromyko and V.E. Semichastniy.

76 See note 4.

77 Refers to the adopted resolution No. 1884 (XVIII) "Question of general and complete disarmament" of October 17, 1963. It welcomed the intention expressed by USSR and USA not to place any "objects carrying nuclear weapons" in orbit. Text of resolution was published on October 18 in TASS report "Space will be free from nuclear weapons" (Pravda newspaper, 1963, October 18, No. 291).

78 See note 59.

79 Coded telegram received by USSR MFA on November 23, 1963, at 07:30. Copies of coded telegram were distributed to Presidium CC CPSU members, candidate members, CC CPSU secretary B.N. Ponomarev, USSR Council chairman V.E. Semichastniy, head of Personnel and Diplomatic Organs Department of CC CPSU A.S. Panyushkin, A.A. Gromyko, V.V. Kuznetsov.

80 Committee for Fair Play for Cuba (Fair Play for Cuba Committee) - organization founded in January 1960 by American journalist C. Haberman. At Senate hearings in 1961, Committee was characterized as surrounding for Castro government propaganda and acting as its advertising agent. In 1961-1962, Committee had several dozen branches in USA and Canada, regularly organized trips to Cuba. By December 1963, Committee ceased its existence, mainly due to participation in Committee work by L.H. Oswald. FBI investigation regarding Committee ended in 1964.

81 Refers to KGB residency at USSR Council. Text of letter - see document No. 23.

[Continues to 246 at bottom of page]

[Translation continues with remaining numbered items through 94 on the page]

95 See document No. 12. 96 See documents No. 42 and 50. 97 Cipher telegram received at USSR MFA on November 24, 1963 at 03:30. Copies of the cipher telegram were sent to members of the CPSU CC Presidium, candidates for membership in the CPSU CC Presidium, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov. 98 Cipher telegram received at USSR MFA on November 24, 1963 at 6:00. Copies of the cipher telegram were sent to members of the CPSU CC Presidium, candidates for membership in the CPSU CC Presidium, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov. 99 Cipher telegram received at KGB under USSR Council of Ministers on November 24, 1963 at 8:00. As directed by V.E. Semichastniy, copies of the cipher telegram were sent to N.S. Khrushchev (2 copies), L.I. Brezhnev, A.I. Mikoyan, N.V. Podgorny, M.A. Suslov and A.A. Gromyko. 100 Cipher telegram received at USSR MFA on November 24, 1963 at 12:45. Copies of the cipher telegram were sent to members of the CPSU CC Presidium, candidates for membership in the CPSU CC Presidium, B.N. Ponomarev, A.A. Gromyko, V.E. Semichastniy and V.V. Kuznetsov. 101 This refers to Robert (Bobby) Baker, who since 1943 worked in the U.S. Congress, beginning as a page. When L. Johnson became majority leader in the Senate in 1955, he appointed R. Baker as secretary of the majority. In the early 60s, Baker began to be investigated for corruption and providing services in transferring bribes to Senate members. He also provided services in organizing

politicians' leisure, including meetings with women, at the organized Quorum Club. Baker introduced the club's hostess E. Rometsch to J.F. Kennedy. Director E. Gurev considered Rometsch an East German spy. Information about this connection in 1963 was reported by Baker to L. Johnson and was widely covered in the press. Although officially his only earnings was the salary of majority secretary, in 1963 he became a millionaire. All these events drew the attention of the Ministry of Justice. R. Kennedy discovered that Baker was connected to several "Mafia bosses" and also tried to prove that L. Johnson was involved in corruption schemes. On October 7, 1963, Baker was forced to resign and the press circulated reports that the White House insists on investigating the Baker case to put L. Johnson in a difficult position: "Kennedy wants to use the Baker case to cross out Johnson from the list next year." Only in 1967 was Baker found guilty on seven counts of theft, fraud and tax evasion and sentenced to three years in prison, but served only sixteen months. 102 This refers to U.S. Secretary of the Navy Frederick Korth, who resigned on October 14, 1963 after a conflict with U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara. At the same time, information spread in Congress and the press regarding the R. Baker case (see note 101), that F. Korth, who before his presidential appointment as president of Continental National Bank (Texas), made a corrupt decision by awarding a contract worth 7 billion dollars to a Texas firm for creating the experimental tactical fighter F-111. On October 31 at a press conference J.F. Kennedy stated that all these "fabrications" were unfounded. 103 See document No. 20. 104 The note was sent to the Secretariat of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers on November 24, 1963, No. 3500/gS-ns. 105 L.H. Oswald was discharged from active duty on September 11, 1959 for health reasons due to the need to care for his mother and enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. 106 The quote attributed to V.I. Lenin, allegedly said by him in 1887 after the execution of his older brother Alexander. According to the memoirs of Lenin's sister M.I. Ulyanova, Vladimir Ilyich said the following: "No, we will take a different path. Not this path should be taken." The phrase "We will take a different path" gained circulation after the publication in 1924 of V.V. Mayakovsky's poem "Vladimir Ilyich Lenin." 107 See document No. 87. 108 See document No. 91. 109 This refers to the USSR Council of Ministers decree from December 1, 1959, No. 3363-rs. 110 Not for publication. See document No. 28. 111 The adopted resolution was sent to N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhnev, A.I. Mikoyan, A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, O.A. Troyanovsky. 112 The USSR MFA variants (1 and 2 copies) were accompanied by a cover sheet with the following text:

1. Message from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers to L. Johnson dated November 24, 1963
(Delivered to L. Johnson

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26 November 1963 A.I. Mikoyan, who arrived in Washington for J.F. Kennedy's funeral (AVP RF. F. 0129. Op. 47a. P. 430. D. L. L. 47. Typewritten).

113 Official diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and USA on November 16, 1933.

114 The coded telegram was received by USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 25, 1963 at 11:50. Copies of the telegram were distributed to members of the CPSU CC Presidium, candidates for membership in the CPSU CC Presidium, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov.

115 In 1961, two American squadrons 865 and 866 with 15 medium-range PGM-19 "Jupiter" missiles each were deployed in Southern Italy in Bari province, and squadron 867 (15 missiles) in Turkey near Izmir. The deployment of missiles in Turkey caused serious concern in the USSR due to very short preparation time for launch and proximity to main targets in European USSR territory. Following the Caribbean Crisis (see note 63) and in accordance with agreements from late 1962, dismantling and withdrawal of missiles from Turkey began, followed by Italy, which was completed in April 1963 and mid-1963 respectively. "Jupiter"

missiles were removed from service and utilized in connection with putting UGM-27 "Polaris" missiles on combat duty.

116 L. Thompson was US Ambassador to USSR from July 1957 to July 1962.

117 On November 26, 1963, a note per V.N. Malin's instruction was distributed to members and candidates for membership of the CPSU CC Presidium, CPSU CC secretaries under No. ■1870.

118 The coded telegram was received by USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 26, 1963 at 11:25. Copies were distributed to members of the CPSU CC Presidium, candidates for membership in the CPSU CC Presidium, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov.

119 Refers to N.S. Khrushchev's wife – N.P. Khrushcheva.

120 Refers to N.S. Khrushchev's daughter and grandson – R.N. and A.A. Adzhubei.

121 The coded telegram was received by USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 26, 1963 at 11:30. Copies were distributed to members of the CPSU CC Presidium, candidates for membership in the CPSU CC Presidium, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov.

122 The coded telegram was received by USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 27, 1963 at 09:40. Copies were distributed to members of the CPSU CC Presidium, candidates for membership in the CPSU CC Presidium, B.N. Ponomarev, A.A. Gromyko, V.E. Semichastniy and V.V. Kuznetsov.

123 See document No. 23.

124 See document No. 32.

125 The coded telegram was received by USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 27, 1963 at 11:45. Copies were distributed to members of the CPSU CC Presidium, candidates for membership in the CPSU CC Presidium, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov.

126 See document No. 39.

127 As a guest of USSR in USA, M.A. Menshikov and A.I. Mikoyan made a trip across USA from January 4 to 21, 1959. During his stay in USA, A.I. Mikoyan met multiple times with US Secretary of State J. Dulles, and from January 17 – with US President D. Eisenhower, and also visited US Congress.

128 Likely refers to conversations with F. Castro during the Caribbean Crisis, when A.I. Mikoyan was in Cuba from November 2 to December 1, 1963. Before that, at Cuban government's invitation, A.I. Mikoyan visited Cuba February 4-13, 1960 in connection with opening the Soviet Exhibition of Science, Technology and Culture achievements in Havana and signing the Soviet-Cuban trade agreement.

129 Refers to F. Castro's radio and television address on November 23, 1963. The speech summary was published on November 25, 1963 (Pravda newspaper, 1963, November 25, p. 329).

130 A.I. Mikoyan was born on November 13 (25), 1895. The following memories of V.M. Sukharev about celebrating A.I. Mikoyan's birthday have been preserved: "Mikoyan's assistants, two Vasilii Vasilievich, knowing their boss's birthday was approaching, decided to celebrate it. The stewardesses organized a snack, opened a bottle of red wine, prepared a bouquet of flowers in advance. When everything was ready, they asked one of them to go to Mikoyan's salon and say that the assistants request him to come out. The flight attendant protested:

"How can I disturb Mikoyan?"

"Go, if anything we'll cover for you," the assistants assured her.

She left, Mikoyan was working with some papers. As the stewardess later recounted, he looked up at her in surprise and said: "Have they gone mad there?" But he got up anyway and went out. He saw a tray with a bottle of wine, a bouquet, and immediately understood everything. Having undergone surgery not long before this, he asked to dilute his wine with water. "Well no," Anastas Ivanovich told us, "better drink cognac." That's how we celebrated. We celebrated his birthday in the sky, en route to Washington (Sukhodrev V.M. Language is my friend. M., 2008. p. ...).

131 The coded telegram arrived at USSR MFA on November 27, 1963, at 11:45. Copies of the telegram were sent to members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, candidates for membership in the Presidium of the CC CPSU, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov. 132 See document No. 38. 133 See document No. 31. 134 The coded telegram arrived at USSR MFA on November 27, 1963, at 17:15. Copies of the telegram were sent to members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, candidates for membership in the Presidium of the CC CPSU, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov. 135 In October 1963, G. Macmillan was hospitalized due to worsening prostate disease. Initially, he was diagnosed with an inoperable prostate tumor, but on October 10 surgery was performed, after which he lived another 23 years. According to most British researchers, the illness provided a convenient pretext for G. Macmillan to leave the post of Prime Minister. 136 British Prime Minister G. Macmillan was in the USSR on a return visit from February 21 to March 2, 1959. During the visit, G. Macmillan visited Kiev (February 26-28) and Leningrad (February 28 - March 1). A.I. Mikoyan accompanied G. Macmillan in Leningrad. 137 A. Douglas-Home did not send messages to N.S. Khrushchev in late 1963. 138 This refers to the letter of November 13, 1963, from Richard Butler, who was appointed Foreign Secretary on October 20. 139 A.I. Mikoyan's meeting with A. Douglas-Home took place on the same day, November 26, 1963. 140 This refers to the five-year agreement on trade relations and the status of USSR trade representation in France, concluded on December 29, 1945. 141 This refers to meetings during the official visit of the head of the Provisional Government of the French Republic Ch. de Gaulle to the USSR. The visit took place December 2-10, 1944. During the visit, the Franco-Soviet treaty of friendship and mutual assistance was signed. 142 See note 24. 143 The Berlin Wall (Berliner Mauer) - a complex of engineering and technical structures and fortifications with an equipped restricted zone on the state border of GDR with West Berlin. By 1989 it consisted of concrete barriers with an average height of 3.6 m and total length of 106 km (in Berlin proper - 43.1 km), metal mesh fencing, electrical warning systems, which were supplemented by frames and anti-tank fortifications in some sections. The implementation of state border regime with West Berlin and installation of border barriers began on August 13, 1961, following recommendations of the meeting of secretaries of communist and workers' parties of Warsaw Pact countries (3-5 August 1961) and based on the decision of GDR People's Chamber of August 11, 1961. These measures were justified by the need to strengthen GDR security under deteriorating international situation and protect the country's economic interests. It existed until 1989. 144 This refers to conversations during the stay of the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan during the Soviet industrial exhibition in Tokyo in August - September 1961. On August 15, A.I. Mikoyan gave a major speech at the exhibition opening. 145 The main obstacle to achieving full-scale political and economic settlement of all issues with Japan during this period was the discussion about the ownership of several islands in the southern part of the Kuril archipelago (Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and several uninhabited islands of the Lesser Kuril Chain - all part of the Sakhalin Region; in Japan they are called "northern territories"). On February 7, 1855, Japan and Russia signed the Shimoda Treaty, according to which Japan

withdrew Iturup, Kunashir and the islands of the Lesser Kuril Chain, while the northern part of the Kurils remained under Russian control. Sakhalin was declared a joint possession - "undivided" territory. In 1875, the Saint Petersburg Treaty on the exchange of territories was signed, according to which Russia transferred all Kuril Islands to Japan, and Japan renounced its claims to Sakhalin. Following the results of the Russo-Japanese War, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty (1905) was signed, according to which Japan's possession extended to southern Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel. At the Yalta Conference on February 11, 1945, the "Agreement of the Three Great Powers on Far Eastern Issues" was signed, which provided for the USSR's entry into war with militaristic Japan two-three months after the end of the war in Europe. This agreed upon a number of conditions, including international legal recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic, return of Southern Sakhalin to the USSR and transfer of the Kuril Islands to it. After Japan's defeat in the war, signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender (September 2, 1945) and issued the Potsdam Declaration on August 26, 1945, Japanese sovereignty was limited to the islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido, as well as less significant islands of the Japanese archipelago (by decision of the allies). All Kuril Islands by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 2, 1946, were included in the USSR. At the San Francisco Conference in September 1951, Tokyo signed a peace treaty with 48 participating countries of the anti-fascist coalition, thereby renouncing "all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands". However, this document does not specify which state Japan renounces these territories to. Given the absence of PRC representatives at the conference and several other problems, the Soviet delegation refused to sign the peace treaty, considering it non-legitimate. After the failure of negotiations in San Francisco, the USSR and Japan attempted to develop a peace treaty through bilateral consultations. On October 19, 1956, in Moscow, the Joint Declaration on the Termination of the State of War between the two governments and the restoration of diplomatic and consular relations was signed. In Article 9 of the document, the Soviet government agreed to transfer to Japan the islands of Shikotan and several uninhabited islands of the Lesser Kuril Chain (called Habomai in Japan), provided that their actual transfer under Japanese control would occur after the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Declaration was ratified by both states on December 8, 1956. However, in response to the conclusion of the 1960 Japanese-American security treaty, the USSR annulled its obligations to transfer the islands. In a memorandum of the Soviet government dated January 27, 1960, it is stated that these islands will be transferred to Japan only upon the condition of withdrawal of all foreign troops from its territory.

146 See note 7.

147 Refers to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which took place on December 9-13, 1963. The Plenum adopted the resolution "Accelerated development of the chemical industry - the most important condition for raising agricultural production and increasing the people's welfare."

148 During the official visit to Denmark, Sweden and Norway, which took place June 16 - July 4, 1964, N.S. Khrushchev visited Sweden June 22-28.

149 From June 29 to July 13, 1959, the first official visit of the negus (king) Haile Selassie I to the USSR took place, during which a Soviet-Ethiopian trade and economic agreement was signed.

150 In August 1963, Prime Minister of Somalia Ali Shermarke visited the USSR. During his visit, agreements on further development of trade and economic cooperation, including military-technical cooperation, were concluded. By the end of 1963, there was a significant deterioration in relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. This was connected with counterinsurgency operations by Ethiopian troops against rebels in Ogaden province, populated mainly by ethnic Somalis. In early February 1964, the Ethiopian-Somali border war began (First Ogaden War).

151 Not published as not related to the topic of this collection of documents.

152 Golda Meir was Israel's ambassador to the USSR from September 1948 to April 1949.

153 A.I. Mikoyan met with the head of the Pakistani economic delegation, Minister of Fuel, Energy and Natural Resources Z.Bhutto on December 24, 1960.

154 The Agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of Pakistan on air communications was signed on October 7, 1963 in Karachi.

155 Not published. See document No. 47. Note with attached draft resolution as per V.N. Malin's instructions was distributed on November 27, 1963 as No. P1881 to members and candidate members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, secretaries of the CC CPSU.

156 The cipher telegram is not found in the Archive. At this time, L.I. Alekseev was the USSR Ambassador to the Republic of Cuba.

157 At this time, S.T. Bazarov was the USSR Ambassador to Mexico.

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158 Note with attached draft resolution as directed by V.N. Malin was distributed on November 28, 1963 as No. 122-23 to Presidium members of CC CPSU for voting. According to the voting sheet, "for" voted: L.I. Brezhnev, G.I. Voronov, A.P. Kirilenko, A.N. Kosygin, N.V. Podgorny, D.S. Polyansky and N.M. Shvernik. This version of the draft resolution was adopted. See document No. 50.

159 Cipher telegram not found in Archive.

160 Cipher telegram not found in Archive.

161 See document No. 37.

162 Not published. See document No. 52. Note with attached draft resolution as directed by V.N. Malin was distributed on November 28, 1963 as No. 122-22 to Presidium members of CC CPSU for voting. According to the voting sheet, "for" voted: L.I. Brezhnev, G.I. Voronov, A.P. Kirilenko, A.N. Kosygin, N.V. Podgorny, D.S. Polyansky and N.M. Shvernik.

163 Cipher telegram received at USSR MFA on November 28, 1963 at 06:15. Copies of cipher telegram were distributed to CC CPSU Presidium members, candidates for CC CPSU Presidium membership, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov.

164 See note 127.

165 A.I. Mikoyan does not accurately convey the content of the Paris agreements. In accordance with the final act of the London Conference of Nine Powers (Belgium, Canada, France, FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, Great Britain and USA) of October 3, 1954, it was recommended to terminate the occupation regime of FRG and integrate FRG and Italy into the Western European Union and NATO. At the Paris meeting on October 23, 1954, a series of agreements was signed, including Protocol No. III "On Arms Control" to the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Cooperation and Collective Self-Defense of March 17, 1948 (Brussels Treaty). According to this document, the FRG government undertook obligations not to produce atomic, biological and chemical weapons on its territory. It was also determined that "certain additional types of weapons," which included long-range missiles, guided missiles, anti-tank mines, warships, except small vessels for defense purposes (for submarines - no more than 350 tons displacement), shall not be produced on FRG territory, unless the Supreme Commander of NATO Forces makes a recommendation to change or cancel the content of this weapons list, it can be changed (amended) by decision of the

Western European Union Council adopted by majority of 23 votes. In late 1950s FRG began designing and building small submarines with displacement of about 350-450 tons for coastal defense. By 1967, 7 submarines of Project 201 and 205 were commissioned. Submarines with displacement over 1000 tons began construction in FRG in early 2000s. The Paris agreements also contained a ban on creating FRG army, but conversely allowed creation of armed forces consisting of 12 infantry divisions, Air Force and Navy.

166 This refers to the meeting on October 12, 1936 of A.I. Mikoyan with K. Hudson. A.I. Mikoyan, heading a delegation of food industry workers, spent over two months in USA from August 16, 1936 studying American food industry.

167 See note 127.

168 On October 16, 1963, FRG Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer resigned, on October 18 - British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, after April parliamentary elections in Italy a temporary coalition government headed by Giovanni Leone was formed, which resigned on December 4.

169 In accordance with decisions of Yalta and Potsdam conferences, several territories that were part of Germany until 1938 were separated from it: East Prussia (divided between USSR and Poland), Pomerania and Silesia (Poland), Transcarpathian Silesia (Czechoslovakia). Minor territories were also incorporated into Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg.

170 Cipher telegram received at USSR MFA on November 28, 1963 at 06:15. Copies of cipher telegram were distributed to CC CPSU Presidium members, candidates for CC CPSU Presidium membership, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov.

171 Resolution "Communication of Comrade Mikoyan A.I. about trip to USA" was backdated and not put to vote. The file contains original draft resolution, insignificantly different from final version: "To approve activities conducted by First Deputy Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers Comrade Mikoyan A.I. during stay in USA in connection with funeral of US President John F. Kennedy." Bottom of page marked with date November 28, 1967 (indication

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t.Malin V.N.). The text of the decision was coordinated with t.Chernukh V.N. M.Sokolova 6.1.64 g.). The text of the resolution was crossed out with a simple pencil cross by cross. (RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 373. L. 177. Original. Typewritten text).

172 The resolution was adopted by poll. The decision of the Presidium of the CC CPSU was sent to L.I. Brezhnev and A.A. Gromyko.

173 The edited draft resolution has the outgoing number of MFA USSR - No. 3433/TC dated November 29, 1963. Attached to the resolution is A.A.Gromyko's note dated November 29, 1963 "Comrade. Malin V.N. For processing" (RGANI. F.3. Op.16. D. 377. L. 92. Original. Typewritten text. Signature-autograph in blue ink). On the first page of the resolution is a note "Text of instructions approved by members of the CC CPSU Presidium 29.XI.63. Format. 29.XI-63 V.Malin". The adopted resolution was sent to N.S.Khrushchev, L.I.Brezhnev, A.I.Mikoyan, Yu.V.Andropov and A.A.Gromyko.

174 Fidel Castro was in the USSR on a friendly visit from April 27 to June 3, 1963. Having arrived at Olenya airfield (Murmansk), F.Castro during his visit visited Moscow, Volgograd, Tashkent, Irkutsk, Bratsk HPP, Krasnoyarsk, Sverdlovsk, Leningrad, Kiev, Moscow, Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, Tbilisi.

175 F.Castro accepted the invitation and was in the USSR (Moscow, Zavidovo, Kalinin, Kiev) with an official friendly visit from January 13-22, 1964.

176 The edited draft resolution has the outgoing number of MFA USSR - No. 3434/TC dated November 29, 1963. Attached to the resolution is A.A.Gromyko's note dated November 29, 1963 "Comrade. Malin V.N. For processing" (RGANI. F.3. Op.16. D. 377. L. 100. Original. Typewritten text. Signature-autograph in blue ink). On the first page of the resolution is a note "Text of instructions approved by members of the CC CPSU Presidium 29.XI-63. Format. 29.XI-63 V.Malin". The adopted resolution was sent to L.I. Brezhnev, A.I.Mikoyan and A.A. Gromyko.

177 The cipher telegram is not in the Archive.

178 Translation of the note as directed by A.A.Gromyko was sent on November 30, 1963 under No. 3547/TC-nc to members and candidate members of the CC CPSU Presidium, CC CPSU secretaries and V.N.Malin.

179 The edited draft resolution has the outgoing number of MFA USSR - No. 3435/TC dated November 29, 1963. Attached to the resolution is A.A.Gromyko's note dated November 29, 1963 "Comrade. Malin V.N. For processing" (RGANI. F.3. Op.16. D. 377. L. 117. Original. Typewritten text. Signature-autograph in blue ink). On the first page of the resolution is a note "Text of instructions approved by members of the CC CPSU Presidium 29.XI-63. Format. 29.XI-63 V.Malin". The adopted resolution was sent to L.I. Brezhnev and A.A. Gromyko.

180 See document No. 37.

181 A brief note was sent to A.A.Gromyko, V.V. Kuznetsov, V.A.Zorin and to the USA Department of the USSR MFA. Published according to the copy sent to the USA Department.

182 This refers to the newspapers "The Worker" and "The Militant". During the meeting of the Presidential Commission investigating the assassination of US President J.F.Kennedy (see note 186), it was established that L.H.Oswald asked his wife to take a series of photographs in the backyard of their house, where he posed holding a rifle in one hand and the above-mentioned newspapers in the other.

183 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) - a non-profit, non-governmental organization in the USA that proclaimed as its goal "the protection and defense of private rights and freedoms guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United States". Founded in 1920.

184 The cipher telegram was received by the USSR MFA on December 1, 1963 at 09:40. Copies of the cipher telegram were sent to members of the CC CPSU Presidium, candidates for CC CPSU membership, E.N. Ponomarev, A.A. Gromyko, V.E. Semichastniy and V.V. Kuznetsov.

185 Instructions to A.F.Dobrynin (see document No. 52) were transmitted by the USSR MFA on November 29, 1963 at 15:35 by Special cipher telegram No. 1328 (AVP RF. F. 059. Op. 48. P. 23. D.102. L. 108-109).

186 The Presidential Commission for investigating the assassination of US President J.F.Kennedy (unofficial name "Warren Commission") was established by US President L.Johnson on November 29, 1963. The Chairman of the Supreme Court E.Warren was appointed as chairman of the commission, representatives of Democratic and Republican parties in both houses of Congress (R.Russell-mI., J.S.Cooper, H.Boggs, J.Ford), former World Bank President J.J.McCloy and CIA Director A.Dulles were members of the commission. The commission's final report was presented to L.Johnson on September 24, 1964 and published on September 27.

187 See note 59.

188 In November 1963, approximately three tons of light firearms and ammunition were discovered on Paraguara beach (Falcon state).

189 This refers to attempts since May 1962 by representatives of the Communist Party of Venezuela and the Revolutionary Left Movement to develop urban guerrilla and partisan movement aimed at armed overthrow of R. Betancourt's center-left government. In November 1963, on the eve of presidential elections and after the government's disclosure of the Cuban plot to overthrow the government and weapons discovery (see note 188), numerous armed actions took place in Caracas and other cities (bomb explosions, attacks on banks, shootouts with police) organized by opposition movements. In response, Betancourt suspended civil liberties in the country and began mass arrests of communists. Despite this, presidential elections were held on December 1, in which Betancourt's associate Raul Leoni won.

190 The NATO Council of Ministers session was held on December 15-16, 1963 in Paris.

191 The translation of the letter was distributed no later than June 30, 1964 under No. 6891-AM to members and candidate members of the CPSU CC Presidium, CPSU CC secretaries and A.A. Gromyko.

192 This refers to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev.

193 The coded telegram arrived at the USSR MFA on December 2, 1963 at 06:30. Copies of the coded telegram were sent to CPSU CC Presidium members, candidate members B.N. Ponomarev, A.A. Gromyko, V.E. Semichastniy and V.V. Kuznetsov.

194 See document No. 54.

195 The delegation of the USSR State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy headed by A.M. Petrosyants visited the USA from November 17 to December 2, 1963 with a return visit to familiarize themselves with work on the peaceful use of atomic energy.

196 On the same day, TASS channels transmitted the following message titled "On Investigation of Kennedy Assassination Circumstances." The report stated: "NEW YORK, December 1 (TASS). Under the headline 'Russians Help Investigate Oswald Case; They Present Available Evidence' the New York Times publishes the following Jack Raymond correspondence:

Washington, November 30. The Soviet Union, showing unusual willingness to cooperate, today handed over to the State Department documents which, in their opinion, could help investigate the circumstances of President Kennedy's assassination.

All these documents, written in Russian, were transferred to the Department of Justice. Specialists immediately began translating them.

The Soviet measure apparently reflects the Kremlin's concern about Oswald calling himself a 'Marxist' and the fact that he lived in Russia, as well as his other connections with the Soviet Union that could present the Soviet Union in an unfavorable light in American public opinion.

Soviet leaders presumably fear that reports about connections between the alleged killer and the Soviet Union could be used to aggravate tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States.

After the president's assassination, Soviet officials continuously emphasized their sympathy for the American people and their grief over the loss of the American leader with whom, in their opinion, they could solve world problems.

Oswald came to the Soviet consulate in Mexico on September 27. He asked for a visa to enter the Soviet Union. Before this, he had come to the Cuban consulate and asked for a visa to visit Cuba en route to Moscow.

Cuban authorities told him they would only give him a transit visa if he first obtained a Soviet visa. Reports say he left the Cuban consulate in an agitated state.

Reports from Mexico say he was told at the Soviet consulate that his request for a visa to Russia would be sent to Moscow and that this would take some time. Reports say that when leaving the Soviet consulate, he was agitated.

253Signal Copy

The position of the Soviet Union, which passed Oswald's file, sharply contrasts with the reaction of the Cuban government, which issued a sharp diplomatic protest to the Mexican government regarding Mexico's attempts to obtain information about Oswald's statement.

A threat arose that Cuba would sever diplomatic relations with Mexico, claiming that Mexicans violated diplomatic norms by taking a Cuban consulate employee under protection to obtain information regarding Oswald's visa application.

Today's demarche by Mr. Dobrynin increases hopes for an orderly, broad, and unhurried investigation of the circumstances of President Kennedy's assassination and the assassination of his alleged killer. (GA RF, F.P-4459. Op. 43. D. 2511. L. 114-115. Typewritten text).

197 Organization of American States (OAS) - established in 1948 in Bogota (Colombia), where representatives of 21 states signed the OAS Charter. According to the charter, OAS was created to maintain peace and justice among its member states. The highest body is the General Assembly, and the permanent body is the Permanent Council. In 1962, OAS suspended Cuba's membership in the organization. On December 3, 1963, the OAS Council appointed an investigative commission, as a consultative body, to consider the accusations made by Cuba. As a result of the commission's work, which supported evidence, a series of actions were documented that, in the committee's opinion, were sponsored by Cuba and aimed at undermining Venezuelan institutions and overthrowing Venezuela's democratic government through "terrorism, sabotage, invasions and partisan warfare." Based on the report of July 24, 1964, OAS adopted a resolution on Cuba, obligating all member organizations to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba, suspend all trade with Cuba, except for humanitarian food and medicine supplies, and cease air and sea communications with Cuba.

198 Cipher telegram arrived at USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 4, 1963, at 10:40. Copies of the cipher telegram were distributed to members of the CPSU CC Presidium, candidates for membership in the CPSU CC Presidium, B.N. Ponomarev, A.A. Gromyko, V.E. Semichastniy and V.V. Kuznetsov.

199 Cipher telegram arrived at USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 4, 1963, at 12:50. Copies of the cipher telegram were distributed to members of the CPSU CC Presidium, candidates for membership in the CPSU CC Presidium, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov.

200 Photocopy of L. Johnson's original letter is stored in AVP RF (F. 0129. Op. 47a. P. 430. D. 1. L. 64).

201 Cipher telegram arrived at USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 5, 1963, at 08:35. Copies of the cipher telegram were distributed to N.S. Khrushchev and A.A. Gromyko.

202 Photocopy of Jackie Kennedy's original letter is stored in AVP RF (f. 0129, op. 47a, p. 430, d. 1, l. 65-66).

203 Referring to N.S. Khrushchev's wife and daughter - N.P. Khrushcheva and R.N. Adzhubei.

204 Referring to US citizen Harold Citrinell and Iranian citizen Ali Fereidine Afshar. Citrinell, while on a tourist trip to Moscow with his family in March 1958, filed an application to remain for permanent residence in the USSR. He was directed to live in Kharkov. In May 1959, he returned with his family to the USA. Iranian Majlis deputy, Professor A.F. Afshar, while in Paris in November 1958, appealed with a request for political asylum and traveled to Moscow. Despite the Soviet government's positive decision in early 1959, he returned to France.

205 See document No. 91. 206 See document No. 92. 207 See document No. 54.

208 Not published. See document No. 64. Note with attached draft resolution as indicated by V.N. Malin was distributed on December 7, 1963, under No. 126-65 to CPSU CC Presidium members for voting. According to the voting sheet, all Presidium members voted "in favor," except for F.R. Kozlov and M.A. Suslov.

209 On October 31, 1963, Yale University Professor F. Barghoorn, who was in the USSR on a tourist trip, was arrested in Moscow for conducting intelligence activities. In connection with the arrest, a wave of protests arose in the USA, particularly in scientific and university communities. On November 14 at a press conference, US President J.F. Kennedy stated that Professor Barghoorn did not

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any intelligence activities, and announced the termination of negotiations with the USSR on cultural and scientific exchanges for 1965-1966, as well as the suspension of other activities, including the grain agreement. The USSR public figures group headed by AMN USSR President N.N. Blokhin in the USA was subjected to an actual boycott. On November 15, F. Barghoorn was released and expelled from the USSR.

210 This refers to members of the John Birch Society, an American right-wing radical organization formed in December 1958 in Indianapolis (Indiana). It stands on a platform of anti-communism and limiting state influence, return to traditional Christian values. In the 1960s, it opposed the civil rights movement. The organization was named in honor of American pastor and Air Force intelligence officer J. Birch, killed in August 1945 by Chinese communists.

211 This refers to Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr.

212 Meeting of W. Walton with Izvestia newspaper's editor-in-chief A.I. Adzhubey took place on December 19, 1963.

213 The adopted resolution was sent to L.I. Brezhnev, N.V. Podgorny, A.A. Gromyko and V.E. Semichastniy.

214 See document No. 54.

215 The coded telegram was received by USSR MFA on December 27, 1963 at 20:15. Copies were distributed to Presidium members of CC CPSU, candidates for Presidium CC CPSU membership, A.A. Gromyko, and V.V. Kuznetsov.

216 This refers to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting discrimination based on race, skin color, gender or ethnic origin. It was introduced in June 1963 but not supported by House representatives. After J. Kennedy's assassination, the law was supported by L. Johnson and passed by Congress (February 10, 1964) and Senate (June 19, 1964). Signed by US President on July 2, 1964.

217 The coded telegram was received by USSR MFA on March 25, 1964 at 09:40. Copies were distributed to Presidium members of CC CPSU, candidates for Presidium CC CPSU membership, A.A. Gromyko, V.E. Semichastniy and V.V. Kuznetsov.

218 See document No. 68.

219 On March 10, 1964, reconnaissance aircraft RB-66 violating GDR border was shot down by Soviet fighters, three crew members were detained. On March 27, the pilots were handed over to the American side.

220 The article in question is not established.

221 The coded telegram was received by USSR MFA on March 24, 1964 at 22:10. Copies were distributed to Presidium members of CC CPSU, candidates for Presidium CC CPSU membership, A.A. Gromyko, V.E. Semichastniy and V.V. Kuznetsov.

222 See document No. 67.

223 The coded telegram was received by USSR MFA on April 2, 1964 at 20:45. Copies were distributed to N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhnev and V.V. Kuznetsov.

224 See documents No. 67 and 68.

225 Not published. See document No. 71. Note with draft resolution as indicated by V.N. Malin was distributed on April 6, 1964 to members and candidates for CC CPSU Presidium membership, CC CPSU secretaries under No. 1585.

226 The draft resolution was reviewed at CC CPSU Presidium meeting. The adopted resolution was sent to L.I. Brezhnev, N.V. Podgorny, A.N. Kosygin, A.I. Mikoyan, A.A. Gromyko, V.V. Kuznetsov and V.E. Semichastniy.

227 See document No. 67.

228 From May 9 to 25, 1964, N.S. Khrushchev was in United Arab Republic with a return friendship visit. Meeting announcement published May 25 (Pravda newspaper, 1964, May 25, No. 146).

229 As in text. On August 16, 1963, N.S. Khrushchev, while vacationing in Gagra, received New York Times board chairman D. Pearson and public figure A. Meyer making a tourist trip. Meeting announcement published August 17 (Pravda, 1963, August 17, No. 229).

230 Former US Democratic Party presidential candidate in 1952 and 1956, US Ambassador to UN Adlai Stevenson frequently visited various states, promoting UN in speeches and at seminars. During trips he faced opposition and protests from groups skeptical of UN, especially John Birch Society (see note 210) and retired generals movement

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Edwin Walker (see note 234). On October 25, 1963, during Stevenson's speech in Dallas, protesters spat at him, and one woman hit him on the head with a placard.

211 The following part of the conversation is omitted, in which N.S. Khrushchev assesses the current state of Soviet-American relations. The full text of the conversation is published in the collection of documents of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, 1954 - 1964. Black protocol records of meetings: Stenograms. Resolutions.: in 3 volumes. Vol. 2. Resolutions. 1959-1964. M.: ROSSPEN, 2008. P. 956-960.

212 The coded telegram arrived at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 25, 1964, at 06:15. Copies of the coded telegram were distributed to members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, candidates for membership in the Presidium of the CC CPSU, B.N. Ponomarev, A.A. Gromyko, V.E. Semichastniy and V.N. Kuznetsov.

213 This concerned the delegation of the USSR Academy of Sciences headed by Vice-President of the Academy, Academician M.D. Millionshchikov, sent to the USA for three weeks in June 1964, to participate in the first meeting of the research group on disarmament and international security, established within the Pugwash movement. The Soviet delegation's trip was postponed twice: first time they were supposed to leave in November 1963, second time - in January 1964.

214 General Edwin Walker was known for his conservative anti-communist views. Since 1961, he had been retired. In early 1962, he lost primary elections for the post of Texas governor. In October 1962, he was arrested for inciting riots at the University of Mississippi, which occurred in protest against the admission of African American students to the university. By order of the US Attorney General R.Kennedy, he was placed in a psychiatric hospital for 90-day observation, but as a result of protests by psychiatrists and lawyers, was released after 5 days. On April 11, 1963, E. Walker reported that on April 10 an attempt was made on his life in his own home, but he avoided serious injuries as the bullet, fired from outside, hit the window frame and shattered into fragments. The Warren Commission concluded that L.H. Oswald was the one who shot at the general.

[Continued text follows on page]

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corresponding security organs of the Soviet Union. However, the American side does not possess this data, although it could have substantial significance for reconstructing the complete picture of Oswald's behavior.

To my remark that, as is known, the USSR Embassy in the USA had transmitted relevant documents concerning Oswald to the State Department in its time, McCloy replied that he is familiar with these documents, but they are too laconic and do not contain materials characterizing Oswald's behavior in the Soviet Union in the part that could interest the investigative bodies. As if wishing to clarify his thought, McCloy emphasized that the materials in Warren Commission's possession about Oswald undoubtedly point to the fact that Oswald actually acted exclusively alone and was not connected with any conspiratorial forces either within the country or outside the USA.

3. Explaining the circumstances of Oswald's murder by Jack Ruby, the interlocutor indicated that Ruby's actions, as evidenced by undoubted facts, to some degree were connected to attempts to "erase traces of Kennedy's murder in Dallas." Ruby's actions were entirely conditioned by his personal adventurism, which characterized Ruby throughout his life, connected with people of dubious reputation and gun-related activities. McCloy emphasized that the Commission establishes no connection between the fact of Kennedy's murder and Ruby's shooting of Oswald. At this, McCloy briefly told about how he, McCloy, together with other Commission members studied in detail the situation at the scene.

Answering my question about what testimony Oswald gave, the Warren Commission interlocutor acknowledged that, unfortunately, Oswald's interrogations in Dallas police prison were not recorded on magnetic tape, and therefore one has to rely only on notes and oral reports of Dallas investigative agents. However, noted McCloy, according to available materials, Oswald until the last moment did not admit guilt and denied that he was the killer of President Kennedy or other persons.

4. Characterizing Marina Oswald's role, the interlocutor stated that "Marina confirmed the attempted assassination of General Walker by Oswald and the planned attempt on Nixon. She also testified about the fact that Kennedy's killer was indeed Oswald." At this McCloy emphasized several times that Marina Oswald is "not at all naive, and her testimony has substantial significance."

5. To my remark that inconsistencies are found in Marina Oswald's and Oswald's mother's testimonies, judging by press materials, McCloy said that the statements and behavior of Oswald's mother cause deep disappointment in the Commission. Oswald's mother is largely to blame for how her son was formed and for the tragic consequences this led to. She showed too little concern about maternal care for her son, showed irresponsibility, and recently, in her cynical attitude toward her son, it's enough to refer to the fact that, continued McCloy, Oswald's mother, having written a letter to President Johnson and receiving his response, declared that "Johnson owes everything to my son. He would be nothing if not for my son's act..." Oswald's mother, continued McCloy, demands recognition of her special role in connection with the tragedy in Dallas, and demands that she be properly honored and rewarded, as befits in those cases when people acquire great fame and popularity. McCloy added that it is unpleasant for him to speak about Oswald's mother because she essentially reduces everything to publicity and extracting material benefit from what happened in Dallas.

At the end of the conversation, McCloy noted that he understands with sympathy the attitudes and views on the events in Dallas from Soviet people, who see in Kennedy's murder a certain conspiracy and the possibility of dark forces. Similar views, said McCloy, are quite characteristic for European countries as well. One can say that in Europe there exists barely a single respectable opinion that Kennedy's murder was carried out by political opponents of that regime which was established during his time in the White House. However, noted the interlocutor, such views cannot be supported by any documentary or factual evidence.

Present during the conversation were I.D. Millionshchikov and spouse McCloy (RGANI. F. 5. Op. 50. D. 397. L. 188-191. Copy (2 copies). Typewritten text. Second copy made with blue ink pen).

236 The coded telegram was received at USSR MFA on July 24, 1964 at 21:15. Copies of the coded telegram were sent to members of the CC CPSU Presidium, candidates for CC CPSU Presidium membership, A.A. Gromyko, P.E. Semichastny and V.V. Kuznetsov.

237 Mark Lane - one of the leading researchers, author and proponent of the conspiracy theory regarding J.F. Kennedy's murder. He wrote about 10 books on this topic, the main one being "Rush to Judgment: A Critique of the Warren Commission's Inquiry into the Murders of President John F. Kennedy, Officer J.D. Tippit and Lee Harvey Oswald", 1966.

257Signal copy

238 No attachments were found in the archive. This refers to B. Russell's article "16 Questions About the Murder" published on September 6, 1964 in "Minority of One."

239 See document No. 74.

240 Not published. See document No. 76. The note with draft resolution attachment as indicated by V.N. Chernukha was sent on July 30, 1964, No. 152-54 to Presidium CC CPSU members for voting. According to the voting sheet, "for" voted: G.I. Voronov, A.P. Kirilenko, N.V. Podgorny, D.S. Polyansky, N.S. Khrushchev and N.M. Shvernik.

241 The adopted resolution was sent to N.V. Podgorny, A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, V.E. Semichastniy and G.S. Stepanov.

242 See document No. 75. 243 See document No. 74. 244 Not found in the archive.

245 Attached to R. Kennedy's letter translation is a note dated March 21, 1964 "To Comrade Troyanovskiy O.A. Instructions of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev regarding Robert Kennedy's letter. Comrade Troyanovskiy together with MFA staff to study the questions raised by Robert Kennedy. Need to think carefully and have our say. Need to work on this question. G. Shutskiy" (RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 124. Original. Typewritten text, signed with blue ballpoint pen). Below the document in ballpoint pen: "Materials and letter from N.S. Khrushchev to R. Kennedy via O.A. Dobrynin. In archive. O. Troyanovskiy. 13.VII.64"

[Translation continues with same format and style through line 259 at bottom of page 258]

260 The original message from N.S. Khrushchev was sent to the USSR Ambassador to the USA A.F. Dobrynin on July 3, 1964 with cover note No. 1835/GS from the General Secretary of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs B.F. Podtserob: "I am forwarding to you seven copies for delivery of the original letter from USSR Council of Ministers Chairman N.S. Khrushchev addressed to Mr. Robert F. Kennedy, US Attorney General, dated June 29, 1964. Please inform the USSR MFA General Secretariat of receipt." (AVP RF F. 0129. Op. 50. D. 163. L. 26. L. 19. Copy (2 copies). Typewritten text).

261 The Institute of Soviet-American Relations was established in Moscow on August 31, 1961 to replace the Soviet-American Friendship Society as a public organization within the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies. The President of the Institute was President of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences N.N. Blokhin.

262 The text of the letter was also transmitted to A.F. Dobrynin by cipher telegram at the USSR MFA on September 17, 1964 (received in Moscow at 08:30). Copies of the cipher telegram were sent to members and candidate members of the CPSU CC Presidium: B.N. Ponomarev, A.A. Gromyko and V.V. Kuznetsov (RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 192-193. Copy. Ex. N.S. Khrushchev).

263 See document No. 83.

264 The letter by L.H. Oswald was enclosed in an envelope on which addresses and addressee were written in blue ballpoint pen in English. On the same envelope, the addresses and addressee were written in Russian by another person, and also written: "Very urgent!" (RGANI. F. 5. Op. 63. D. 65. L. 103. Original.).

265 L.H. Oswald served at the naval aviation base in Atsugi (Japan) from September 1957 to December 1958.

266 See document No. 87.

267 The cover note with attached reference was also sent to V.K. Boichenko, A.I. Mikoyan, B.A. Borisov, A.A. Soldatov, G.A. Zhukov and to the management of VAO "Inturist".

268 Not published. See document No. 92. The note with attached draft resolution as directed by V.N. Malin was sent on November 28, 1959 as No. 251-8 to members of the CPSU CC Presidium. According to the voting sheet, all Presidium CC members voted in favor.

269 The resolution was adopted by poll and sent to A.A. Gromyko, A.N. Shelepin, G.A. Miterev, M.P. Georgadze, G.S. Stepanov, CC CP of Belarus, Chairman of the Belorussian Council of National Economy A.M. Tarasov.

270 See document No. 91.

271 Along with the letter is stored an envelope on which L.H. Oswald wrote the addressee and sender in Russian in black ink. The envelope also has a poorly legible calendar postal stamp.

259Name Index*

A

Abbas Aram Abt John Jacob Avshar - see Afshar Ali Fereydin Adenauer Konrad Adzhubei A.I. Adzhubei R.N. Ayere Charles Aiken (Eiken) George David Ayub Khan Muhammad Akalovsky Alex Alexander William F. Alekseev A.I. Alennikov O. Alkhimov V.S. Alfanz Erve Andropov Yu.V. Ankudinov V.M. Arbenz Guzman Jacobo Armas (Castilio Armas) Carlos Atallah (Atalla) Antuan Afshar Ali Fereydin Acheson Dean

B

Bazarov S.T. Bundy McGeorge Bundy William Baranova P. Barkhorn (Barghorn) Frederick Charles Barrett

* In the name index, modern transcription of names or surnames is given in parentheses, different spellings of surnames and names in published documents are given after a comma, in separate cases, when different spellings of surnames significantly differ from each other, references are provided - see FIO.

260Butler Richard Austin Beatrice, Crown Princess Beite Polina V. Belov Bertil, Prince Berch John Betancourt Romulo Blokhin N.N. Black Eugene Robert Boggs Hailey Baudouin, King Boychenko V.K. Ball George Bolshakov G.K. Borisov S.A. Brandt Willy Brezhnev L.I. Bubnov I.D. Boun Um, Prince Bustamante Alexander Bhutto Zulfikar Ali Baker, Baker Robert (Bobby)

V

Vagnocchi Egidio Vasev V.M. Venizelos Sofoklis Verta A. Wilson Harold Vinogradov Yu.N. Voronov G.I. Voroshilov K.E.

G

Gaek Irzhi Harold, Crown Prince

261Harriman Averell William Garst Roswell Gatrie Donald Keith Georgadze M.P. Gerter Christian Archibald Gerhardsen Einar Hitler Adolf Golanreza, prince Goldwater Barry Morris Gomulka Vaclav Gorbakh Alphonse Goryunov D.P. Grimes Joseph Rudolf Grandes Agustin Munyez Greenfield James Lloyd Grishin V.V. Gromyko A.A. Hoover John Edgar Guedina Ahmed Reda Gutman Edwin O.

D

Dallas Allen Dallas John Foster de Valera Imon de Gaulle Charles de Castro Zhuzu de Rozier Etienne Buren Dej-Georgiu George Demichev P.N. Johnson Lyndon Baines Johnson Hiram Warren Johnston Eric Allen Dean Arthur Hobson Dirksen Everett McKinley

262Dobrynin A.F. Dortikos Osvaldo Douglas-Hume Alexander Duda Karel Diem Ngo Dinh (Ziem Ngo Dinh) Davis Chester R.

E

Egorov V.V. Efremov L.N.

Zh

Jean, Prince Zhivkov Teodor Zhukov G.A.

Z

Zamyatin L.M. Zinchuk A.I. Zorin V.A.

I

Ikeda Hayato, Ikeda Hayato Ilyichev L.F. İnönü Ismet

K

Kadar Abdul Kadar Janos Cousins Norman Campanella Tommaso Karpov V.P. Castro - see de Castro Juzue Castro Raul Ruz Castro Fidel Ruz Kachia (Kaccha) Harold Anthony Kelly Herbert Kennedy John Fitzgerald Kennedy Jacqueline (Jacqueline) Bouvier

263Kennedy Corolina (Carolina) Kennedy Patrick Bouvier Kennedy Robert Francis Kennedy Edward Moore Kilduff-junior Carrie (Kerry) Jesse Edward Kim Hyun Chul (Kim Hen Chol) Kirilenko A.P. Kozlov F.R. Koler Foy David Komplektov V.G. Connally John, Connolly John, Connally (Connolly) John Bowden Kornienko G.M. Kort Fred (Frederick) Herman Kostin Kosygin A.N. Koshevoy V.I. Krag Jens Otto Kreisky (Kraisky) Bruno Couve de Murville Maurice Kuznetsov V.V. Kuleshov V.A. Cooper John Sherman Kuusinen O.V.

L

Ladgam (Ladham) Bakhi Lane Mark Lemay (Limey) Curtis Emerson Lenin V.I. Leone Giovanni Leoni Raul Otero Lippmann Walter Loginov E.F. Loginov T. Luns Josef (Joseph)

264Lyubke Heinrich Ludwig Emil Louis Antoni (Entoni)

M

Magapagal Diosdado, Managapal Diasado P. (Makapagal Diosdado) Mazurov K.T. Mackie James David McCloy John Jay McCoun John Alexander Macmillan Harold McNamara Robert Strange Malin V.N. Mangenya Eracto A.M. (Erasto Endro Mbagu) Mao Zedong Marx Karl Masangu (Masangu-a-Mwanza Jacques) Mastjukov V.M. Mayakovsky V.V. Meir Golda (Golda), Meir Golda Meyer Agnes Elizabeth Menshikov M.A. Merikoski Veli Mzhavanadze V.P. Mikoyan A.N. Milita Millionshchikov M.D. Mirza Iskander Ali Miterov G.A. Marrow (Marrou) Edward Rosko

N

Ngo Dinh Zieme (Dieme) Nguan Ngok To, prince Nixon Richard Milhouse Nitze Paul

265Nitsa Novotny Antonin Norodom Cantol

O

O'Donnell Kenneth (O'Donnell Kenneth Patrick) Oberten Jean Overstreet Harry Allen Ozegein (Uzegan) Amar Oira Masaeshi - see Ohira Masayoshi Ortega Urban (Urbina) Alphonso Oswald (Clavie) Margaret Francis Oswald Lee Harvey, Oswald Lee Harvey, Oswald Lee Harvey Oswald Marina Oswald Robert Edward Lee Ohira Masayoshi

P

Palme Olav (Ulof) Pandit Vijaya Lakshmi Panyushkin A.S. Park Chang Hi (Park Chon Hi) Pastor J.O. Pain Perepelitsyn A.I. Perette Carlos H. (Carlos Umberto) Petrosyants A.M. Pinto L.S. Pierson Lester Bowles Pierson Levi Pierson Drew (Andrew Russell) Picchioni (Picchioni) Attilio Podgorny N.V. Podtserob B.F. Polyakov V.I. Polyansky D.S.

266Ponomarev B.N. Popovich Konstantin "Kocha" Prusakova M.N. - see Oswald Marina

R

Rusk David Dean Russell Bertrand Russell Richard Brevard Rashidov Sh.R. Redkin M.S. Reston James Barrett Roberti G. Rockefeller Nelson Aldrich Romanov A.V. Rometch Ellen Ruby Jack (Jacob Leon), Ruby Jack, Rubinstein Jack, Rubinshtein Jack Rudakov A.P. Roosevelt Franklin Delano Roosevelt Jr.

Franklin Delano Raymond Jack

S

Symington Stuart Saltonstall Leverett Atolvill Sapukov P.A. Semenov V.S. Semichastniy V.E. Siborg Glenn
Theodor Sitnikov N.M. Sitrinell Harold, Sitrinell Harold Scotti Emeliano (Emiliano) Slim Mongo (Mongi)
Smirnovskiy M.N. Smolyanichenko V.V. Sokolikov Yu. Sokolov V.

267Sokolov Yu.M. Sokolova M.V. Sokolovskaya Soldatov A.A. Sorensen Theodore Spaak Paul-Henri
(Paul-Henry) Sparkman (Sparkman) John Jackson Stalin I.V. Stamboli■ Petar Stell Ch. Stepanov G.S.
Stessel Walter John Stevenson Adlai Ewing Suvanna Phouma, prince Suslov M.A. Sufanuvong, prince
Sukhodrev V.M. Salinger Pierre Emil

T

Taber Robert Bruce Tyler W. Tanner Henry Tarasov A.M. Taylor Maxwell Davenport Tippit Jay D. Titov
V.N. Talbert William (William) Richard Thompson Jr. Llewellyn E. Tones W. Tratakovsky Trevellyan
Humphry Troyanovsky A.A. Troyanovsky O.A. Toon Malcolm

268U

U Tan Ulbricht Walter Ulyanov A.I. Ulyanova M.I. Walker (Voker) Edwin Anderson Wallace George Corley
Walton William Edwin Warren Earl, Warren Earl Ustinov D.F. Wade Henry

F

Fawzi Mahmud (Mohammed) Fedorenko N.T. Philip, Prince of Edinburgh Phillips Richard Firoza Khan
Nuna Ford Gerald Rudolf Foster William Chapman Franco Francisco Frederica, Queen Freeman Orville,
Freeman Orville Fritz Will Fulbright James William Fumi Nosavan

H

Hailedla Haile Selassie I Halabi Najib Kharlamov M.A. Hassel von Ulrich Hastie (Hostie) James Patrick Ho
Chi Minh Hodges Luter

269Khrushchev N.S. Khrushcheva N.P. Hall Cordell Humphrey Jr. Hubert Horatio

Ts Tsedenbal Yumjaagiin

Ch Chernukha V.N.

Sh Shao Yujin Shazar Zalman Shvernik N.M. Shelepin A.N. Shermark Abdirashid Ali Shirokova Rimma
Schreder Gerhard Shuyskiy G.T.

Shch Shcherbitskiy V.V.

E

Eisenhower Dwight David Erlander Tage Erhard Ludwig

Yu Yudelevich D.L. Udall Stewart Lee

Ya Yaroshevich Petr

270Geographic Index*

A

Australia, Australian Union Austria, Austrian Republic Iowa - state, United States of America Alabama -
state, United States of America Albania, People's Socialist Republic of Albania Algeria, People's
Democratic Republic of Algeria Alaska - state, United States of America America - see United States of
America England - see Great Britain Argentina, Argentine Republic Arizona - state, United States of
America Arctic - northern polar region of Earth Arkhangelsk Oblast - administrative-territorial unit within
RSFSR Aswan - city, center of muhafaza (administrative-territorial unit) Aswan, United Arab Republic
Atlantic, Atlantic Ocean Atsugi - city in Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan

B

Bari - province, Italian Republic Belgium, Kingdom of Belgium Berlin - city, capital of German Democratic
Republic Burma, Union of Burma Bogota - city, capital of Republic of Colombia Bulgaria, People's
Republic of Bulgaria Greater Berlin - province, Weimar Germany, Nazi Germany Bordeaux - city,
administrative center of Gironde Prefecture, French Republic Boston - city, capital of Massachusetts state,
United States of America Brazil, Federal Republic of Brazil Brooklyn - administrative district of New York,
United States of America

* Names of countries, republics and administrative-territorial units are given for the period 1950-1960s.

271B

Vatican, Vatican City-State

Washington - city, District of Columbia, capital of the United States of America

Weimar - city, German Democratic Republic

Great Britain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Vienna - city, capital of the Austrian Republic

Hungary, Hungarian People's Republic

Venezuela, Republic of Venezuela

Verdun - city, department of Meuse, French Republic

Volgograd - city, administrative center of Volgograd region, RSFSR

East Germany - see German Democratic Republic

East Prussia - province of Prussia, was part of unified Germany until 1945. From 1946 - Kaliningrad region of RSFSR, some parts included in Lithuanian SSR and Polish People's Republic

Vientiane - city, capital of Kingdom of Laos

Vietnam - see Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Republic of Vietnam

G

Havana - city, capital of Republic of Cuba

Gagra - city, Abkhazian ASSR, Georgian SSR

Halle - capital of Halle district, German Democratic Republic

Guatemala, Republic of Guatemala

Germany

German Democratic Republic (GDR)

Holland - unofficial name of Kingdom of Netherlands

Honduras, Republic of Honduras

Greece, Hellenic Republic

D

Dallas - city, capital of Texas state, United States of America

Denmark, Kingdom of Denmark

Des Moines - administrative center of Iowa state, United States of America

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)

North Vietnam - see Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Dijon - city, administrative center of Côte-d'Or prefecture, French Republic

272E

Europe - part of the world, together with Asia forms the continent of Eurasia United Arab Republic, Arab Republic of Egypt

G

Geneva - city, capital of canton Geneva, Swiss Confederation

W

West Germany - see Federal Republic of Germany Western Europe - European subregion, group of European states united by political and cultural-geographical characteristics Western New Guinea - unofficial name of the western part of New Guinea island West Berlin - special political entity that existed from 1949 to 1990 on the territory of American, French and British occupation sectors of Berlin

I

Izmir - city, administrative center of Izmir province, Turkey Israel, State of Israel Indiana - state, United States of America Indianapolis - city, capital of Indiana state, United States of America India, Republic of India Hindustan - peninsula in southern Asia Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Iran, Shahanshah State of Iran Irkutsk - city, administrative center of Irkutsk region, RSFSR Ireland, Republic of Ireland Iceland, Republic of Iceland Spain, Kingdom of Spain Italy, Italian Republic Iturup - island, belongs to Greater Kuril Islands Chain

K

Caucasus - geographical region in Eurasia, located south of East European Plain, on the border of Europe and Asia Cairo - city, capital of United Arab Republic Cambodia, Kingdom of Cambodia Canada, state of Canada Karachi - city, administrative center of Sindh province, in 1947-1959 capital, Islamic Republic of Pakistan

273Caribbean region, Caribbean Region - region of the world between North and South America. Group of countries surrounding the Caribbean Sea, or located on the islands of the Caribbean Sea

Kiev - city, capital of Ukrainian SSR

Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan)

China, People's Republic of China, PRC

Columbia - District of Columbia, United States of America

Congo, Republic of Congo

Korea - see South Korea, Republic of Korea

Krasnoyarsk - city, administrative center of Krasnoyarsk Territory, RSFSR

Cuba, Republic of Cuba

Kunashir - island, belongs to the Greater Kuril Ridge

Kuril Islands, Kuril Archipelago - chain of islands between Kamchatka Peninsula and Hokkaido Island

Camp David - country residence of US presidents, state of Maryland, United States of America

Kyushu - island, belongs to Japanese archipelago

L

Laos, Kingdom of Laos

Latin America - general name for countries located in southern part of North America (including Central America and West Indies) and in South America.

Leipzig - city, administrative center of Leipzig District, German Democratic Republic

Leningrad - city, administrative center of Leningrad Region, RSFSR

Leopoldville - city, since 1966 - Kinshasa, capital of Republic of Congo

Liberia, Republic of Liberia

Lille - city, administrative center of Nord-de-France region, France

London - city, capital of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Los Angeles - city, administrative center of the same-name district, state of California, United States of America

Louisiana - state (administrative-territorial unit) United States of America

Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

M

Magdeburg - city, capital of Magdeburg District, German Democratic Republic

Lesser Kuril Ridge - group of islands in Pacific Ocean

Morocco, Kingdom of Morocco

274Marseille - city and commune of the same name, French Republic Massachusetts - state, United States of America Mexico, United Mexican States Mexico City - city, capital of United Mexican States

Minsk - city, capital of Belorussian SSR Mississippi - state, United States of America Mongolia, Mongolian

People's Republic Moscow - city, capital of USSR and RSFSR Murmansk - city, administrative center of

Murmansk region, RSFSR Maine - state, United States of America

N

Netherlands, Kingdom of Netherlands Nicaragua, Republic of Nicaragua Nimes - administrative center of Gard department, French Republic New Zealand New Orleans - city in state of Louisiana, United States of America Norway, Kingdom of Norway New York - city, United States of America New York - state, United States of America

O

United Arab Republic, UAR Ogaden - province of Ethiopia Olenya - airfield in Murmansk region RSFSR

P

Pakistan, Islamic Republic of Pakistan Paris - city, capital of French Republic Petersburg see Leningrad Pittsburgh - city in state of Pennsylvania, United States of America Pitsunda - urban-type settlement, Abkhazian ASSR, Georgian SSR Poland, Polish People's Republic Pomerania - historical region on the south Baltic Sea, Forward Pomerania since 1946 part of German Democratic Republic, main part within Polish People's Republic Portugal, Portuguese Republic

275Potsdam - city, administrative center of Potsdam district, German Democratic Republic

R

Reims - city in the Champagne-Ardenne region, French Republic Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnam Rouen - city, center of Normandy region, French Republic Romania, Romanian People's Republic

S

Saxony - state of Saxony, German Democratic Republic San Francisco - administrative center of San Francisco district, state of California, United States of America Sakhalin Oblast - administrative-territorial unit within RSFSR Sverdlovsk - city, administrative center of Sverdlovsk Oblast, RSFSR Severodvinsk - city, Arkhangelsk Oblast, RSFSR Shikoku - island of Japanese archipelago Silesia - historical region in central Europe, in 1945 divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia, small part remained in German Democratic Republic Scandinavia - subregion of northern Europe, located on Scandinavian Peninsula and Jutland Peninsula Soviet Union - see Union of Soviet Socialist Republics United States of America, United States, United States of America Somalia, Somali Republic Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Middle East - region centered in Western Asia United States of America (USA)

T

Thailand, Kingdom of Thailand Taiwan - island off the coast of East Asia; state Chinese Republic (Taiwan)
Tanganyika, Republic of Tanganyika Tashkent - city, capital of Uzbek SSR Tbilisi - city, capital of Georgian
SSR Texas - state, United States of America Teschen Silesia - historical region of southeastern Silesia,
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and Polish People's Republic Tokyo - city, capital of Japan Tunis,
Republic of Tunisia

276 Turkey, Republic of Turkey

Thuringia - historical region of Germany; administrative districts of Erfurt, Gera and Suhl, German
Democratic Republic

U

Ural - geographical region stretching between the East European and West Siberian plains

F

Falcon - state, Venezuela

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)

Philippines, Republic of the Philippines

Finland, Republic of Finland

Florida - state, United States of America

Fort Worth, Fort Worth (Fort-Worth) - city, administrative center of Tarrant County, state of Texas, United
States of America

France, French Republic

H

Habomai - Japanese name for islands that are part of the Lesser Kuril Chain

Kharkov - city, administrative center of Kharkov region, Ukrainian SSR

Helsinki - city, capital of the Republic of Finland

Hokkaido - island of the Japanese archipelago

Honshu - island of the Japanese archipelago

Ch

Charles River - river in Massachusetts, United States of America

Black Sea - sea of the Atlantic Ocean, between Europe and Asia Minor

Black Sea Coast of Caucasus - part of the northeastern coast of the Black Sea

Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Chicago - city, center of Cook County, state of Illinois, United States of America

Sh

Switzerland, Swiss Confederation

Sweden, Kingdom of Sweden

Shikotan - island, belongs to the Lesser Kuril Islands

E

Erfurt - city, center of administrative district Erfurt, German Democratic Republic

Ethiopia, Ethiopian Empire

277■ Southeast Asia - geographical region of Asia

Yugoslavia, Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Southern Italy - economic-geographical region of Italy

South Korea, Republic of Korea

South Vietnam - see Republic of Vietnam

South Sakhalin - part of the island on eastern coast of Asia

■

Yalta - city, Crimean region, RSFSR (1946-1954), Ukrainian SSR (1954-1991)

Jamaica, State of Jamaica

Japan, State of Japan

278List of Published Documents

Section I

"Responsibility for the fate of peace lies with these two leaders" documents on Soviet-American relations at the highest level during the US presidential campaign June 13 - October 25, 1963

1. Note from First Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev to members and candidate members of the CC CPSU Presidium, CC CPSU secretaries regarding draft responses to questions from chief editors of "Pravda" and "Izvestia" newspapers in connection with US President J.F. Kennedy's speech at American University on June 10, 1963 June 13, 1963

2. Resolution of CC CPSU Presidium "Draft responses of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to questions from chief editors of 'Pravda' and 'Izvestia' newspapers regarding US President J.F. Kennedy's speech of June

10, c.y." June 14, 1963

Attachment: draft responses

3. Record of conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and US Secretary of State D. Rusk August 5, 1963

4. Record of conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and US Secretary of State D. Rusk August 9, 1963

5. Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko to CC CPSU regarding draft message from N.S. Khrushchev to US President J.F. Kennedy August 16, 1963

6. Resolution of CC CPSU Presidium "On Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's letter to US President J.F. Kennedy" August 16, 1963

Attachment: draft letter

7. Note from First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.V. Kuznetsov to CC CPSU regarding draft message from N.S. Khrushchev to US President J.F. Kennedy and UK Prime Minister H. Macmillan October 5, 1963

8. Resolution of CC CPSU Presidium "On messages from Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to US President Kennedy and UK Prime Minister Macmillan regarding the entry into force of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in Three Environments" October 9, 1963

Attachment: text of messages

9. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to CC CPSU regarding US President J.F. Kennedy administration's course on relations with USSR after signing the Moscow Treaty October 22, 1963

27910. Note from First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.V. Kuznetsov regarding the draft information for First Secretaries of the Central Committees of Communist and Workers' Parties about A.A. Gromyko's meetings with J.F. Kennedy, D. Rusk and A. Douglas-Home

October 23, 1963

11. Resolution of the Presidium of the CC CPSU "On information for First Secretaries of the Central Committees of fraternal parties of GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia and Cuba regarding conversations of USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Comrade A.A. Gromyko with US President Kennedy, US Secretary of State Rusk and British Foreign Minister Home in New York and Washington"

October 25, 1963 Attachment: draft information

Section II

"The death of J.F. Kennedy is a heavy blow for all people who hold dear the cause of peace and Soviet-American cooperation"

Documents on Soviet representatives' participation in J.F. Kennedy's funeral and USSR-USA cooperation in investigating the crime November 22, 1963 - September 28, 1964

12. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA regarding the arrest by police of Lee H. Oswald, suspected in the assassination of US President J.F. Kennedy

November 22, 1963

13. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA regarding possible condolences to US leadership in connection with J.F. Kennedy's death

November 22, 1963

14. TASS reports "Assassination of US President John Kennedy" and "L. Johnson assumed presidential powers of USA"

November 22, 1963

15. Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko to CC CPSU regarding draft telegrams on behalf of N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhnev, N.P. Khrushcheva and A.A. Gromyko to American leadership in connection with J.F. Kennedy's assassination

November 22, 1963

16. Note from US Ambassador to USSR F. Kohler to USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko regarding J.F. Kennedy's assassination

November 23, 1963

17. Resolution of the Presidium of CC CPSU "On measures in connection with the assassination of US President J.F. Kennedy"

November 23, 1963 Attachments: telegram texts

18. Cover note from USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.A. Zorin to Head of General Department of CC CPSU V.N. Malin with attached draft CC resolution on measures regarding the departure of First Deputy Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to USA for J.F. Kennedy's funeral

November 23, 1963

28019. Resolution of the Presidium of the CC CPSU "On measures in connection with the funeral of US President John F. Kennedy"

20. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the accusation of L.H. Oswald in the murder of J.F. Kennedy and possible cooperation between Soviet and American governments on this matter November 23, 1963

21. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the transmission through First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan of a confidential message from N.S. Khrushchev to US President L. Johnson November 23, 1963

22. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs about conversation with US President's Special Representative for Soviet Affairs L. Thompson about future Soviet-American relations November 23, 1963

23. Coded telegram from KGB resident in Washington to KGB under USSR Council of Ministers with the text of L.H. Oswald's last letter to Soviet embassy November 23, 1963

24. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the mood in the White House in connection with J.F. Kennedy's assassination November 23, 1963

25. Record of N.S. Khrushchev's conversation with US Ambassador to USSR F. Kohler during embassy visit November 23, 1963

26. Note from KGB Chairman under USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastny to USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko about L.H. Oswald November 23, 1963

27. Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko to CC CPSU with attached draft of confidential message from N.S. Khrushchev to US President L. Johnson November 24, 1963

28. Resolution of CC CPSU Presidium "On confidential message from Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to US President" November 24, 1963

Attachment: draft message

29. TASS Report "Departure of First Deputy Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to Washington" November 24, 1963

30. TASS Report "Foreign representatives at Kennedy's funeral" November 24, 1963

31. Message from US President L. Johnson to N.S. Khrushchev with gratitude for condolences November 24, 1963

32. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs about conversation with US President's Special Representative for Soviet Affairs L. Thompson about Soviet-American relations November 24, 1963

33. Materials for the trip of First Deputy Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to J.F. Kennedy's funeral [no later than November 25, 1963]

2811. Representatives of foreign states arriving in Washington to participate in the funeral of the late US President John F. Kennedy

2. Representatives of socialist countries arriving in Washington to participate in the funeral of the late US President John F. Kennedy

3. Funeral ceremony of the late US President John F. Kennedy on November 25, 1963 in Washington

34. Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and Chairman of the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastnyi on exposing the fabrications of American press regarding L.H. Oswald's connections with the USSR

November 25, 1963 Attachments: draft resolution of CC CPSU "On measures to expose slanderous fabrications of American press regarding 'connections' of Lee Harvey Oswald with the Soviet Union" draft communication "Fabrications of certain American newspapers" draft instructions to Soviet embassy in Washington

35. Coded telegram from First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU about reception organized by widow of late President Jacqueline Kennedy

November 25, 1963

36. Coded telegram from First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU about conversations during reception with US President L. Johnson with official American figures
November 25, 1963

37. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs about provocative nature of L.H. Oswald's letter dated November 9, 1963 and advisability of transferring consular correspondence with him to American authorities

November 26, 1963

38. Coded telegram from First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU about meeting with US President L. Johnson

November 26, 1963

39. Coded telegram from First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU with message from US President L. Johnson to N.S. Khrushchev

November 26, 1963

40. Coded telegram from First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU about conversations with heads of foreign states at receptions after J.F. Kennedy's funeral

November 26, 1963

41. Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and Chairman of KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastniy to CC CPSU regarding request of "New York Times" correspondent G. Tanner to permit travel to Minsk for collecting information about L.H. Oswald

November 27, 1963

282Appendix: translation of letter

42. Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko

and Chairman of KGB under USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastniy to CC CPSU regarding draft instructions to USSR embassies in Cuba and Mexico concerning transmission of information about L.H. Oswald November 27, 1963 Attachments: Draft resolution of CC CPSU "On instructions to Soviet embassies in Cuba and Mexico regarding transmission of information about Oswald" draft instructions to Soviet embassy in Havana draft instructions to Soviet embassy in Mexico

43. Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko

and Chairman of KGB under USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastniy to CC CPSU on draft instructions to USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin November 27, 1963

44. Coded telegram from First Deputy Chairman of USSR Council

of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU regarding conversation with US Secretary of State D. Rusk November 27, 1963

45. Coded telegram from First Deputy Chairman of USSR Council

of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU regarding reaction of White House staff to N.S. Khrushchev's visit to US Embassy in Moscow November 27, 1963

46. CC CPSU Presidium Resolution "Comrade Mikoyan A.I.'s

Report on Trip to USA" November 28, 1963

47. CC CPSU Presidium Resolution "On request from New York Times

correspondent to permit travel to Minsk to gather information about Oswald" November 28, 1963

48. TASS Report "A.I. Mikoyan returned to Moscow" November 29, 1963

49. CC CPSU Presidium Resolution "On instructions to USSR Ambassador

in Republic of Cuba for conversation with Fidel Castro" November 29, 1963 Attachment: text of instructions to Soviet embassy in Havana

50. CC CPSU Presidium Resolution "On instructions to Soviet embassy

in Cuba regarding transmission of information about Oswald" November 29, 1963 Attachment: draft instructions to Soviet embassy in Havana

51. Note from US Ambassador to USSR F. Kohler to USSR Minister

of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko with attached message from US Secretary of State D. Rusk November 29, 1963 Attachment: translation of message

52. CC CPSU Presidium Resolution "On providing Americans with

photocopies of Oswald's correspondence with USSR Embassy in USA" November 29, 1963

283Appendix: text of instructions to the Soviet Embassy in USA

53. Brief memo from USSR Embassy in USA "Circumstances of

US President John F. Kennedy's assassination" November 29, 1963

54. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR

Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding meeting with US Secretary of State D.Rusk to transfer photocopies of correspondence with Lee H. Oswald November 30, 1963

55. Letter from US Attorney General R. Kennedy to First Deputy Chairman

of the USSR Council of Ministers A.I. Mikoyan expressing gratitude for attendance at J.F. Kennedy's funeral [November 1963]

56. TASS Report "Statement by US State Department Representative" December 1, 1963

57. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR

Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Washington Post publication about transfer of correspondence photocopies with L.H. Oswald to American government December 1, 1963

58. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR

Ministry of Foreign Affairs about conversation with New York Times Washington bureau chief J. Reston regarding L.H. Oswald's connections and US President L. Johnson December 3, 1963

59. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR

Ministry of Foreign Affairs with text of confidential message from US President L. Johnson to N.S. Khrushchev December 3, 1963

60. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR

Ministry of Foreign Affairs with text of J.Kennedy's letter to N.S. Khrushchev expressing gratitude for condolences December 4, 1963

61. Note from KGB Chairman under USSR Council of Ministers

V.E. Semichastny to First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.V. Kuznetsov with attached memo about L.H. Oswald December 4, 1963 Appendix: memo

62. Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko

and KGB Chairman under USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastny to CC CPSU regarding response to US Secretary of State D.Rusk about reasons for denying L.H. Oswald Soviet citizenship December 6, 1963

63. Record of conversation between APN Television News Chief Editor

G.K.Bolshakov and artist, chief architect of Washington U.Walton about J.F. Kennedy's assassination December 9, 1963

64. CC CPSU Presidium Resolution "On response to US Secretary of State

D.Rusk regarding his inquiry about motives for rejecting American citizen Oswald's request for Soviet citizenship" December 10, 1963 Appendix: draft instructions to Soviet Embassy in USA

28465. Reference from USA Department of USSR MFA "A.I. Mikoyan's trip to USA for J.F. Kennedy's funeral (November 24-28, 1963)" December 13, 1964

66. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA regarding meeting with US Attorney General R. Kennedy December 25, 1963

67. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA regarding meeting with US Secretary of State D. Rusk on transfer of additional materials about L.H. Oswald's stay in USSR March 24, 1964

68. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA with transmitted note from US Secretary of State D. Rusk and letter from Chairman of Presidential Commission investigating US President J.F. Kennedy's assassination E. Warren requesting information about L.H. Oswald's stay in USSR March 24, 1964

69. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR MFA about visit to Soviet embassy by L.H. Oswald's mother April 1, 1964

70. Memo from USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.V. Kuznetsov and KGB Chairman under USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastny on transfer to USA of photocopies of documents related to L.H. Oswald's stay in USSR April 15, 1964

71. Resolution of CC CPSU Presidium "On transfer to US State Department of photocopies of documents related to American citizen Oswald's stay in Soviet Union" April 23, 1964

Attachments: list of documents draft instructions to Soviet embassy in USA

72. From record of N.S. Khrushchev's conversation with "New York Times" columnist D. Pearson and his wife L. Pearson about J.F. Kennedy assassination investigation May 24, 1964

73. Coded telegram from USSR Representative to UN N.T. Fedorenko to USSR MFA about conversation with Presidential Commission member investigating US President J.F. Kennedy's assassination J. McCloy about investigation progress June 24, 1964

74. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to Great Britain V.M. Vasev to USSR MFA with B. Russell's letter to N.S. Khrushchev requesting L.H. Oswald's dossier July 24, 1964

75. Memo from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and KGB Chairman under USSR Council of Ministers V.E. Semichastny to CC CPSU about response to B. Russell July 29, 1964

76. Resolution of CC CPSU Presidium "On response to Bertrand Russell regarding his request for dossier materials on Lee Oswald" August 1, 1964

Attachment: draft instructions to Soviet embassy in England

28577. Message from US Ambassador to USSR F. Kohler to N.S. Khrushchev regarding the submission of the Presidential Commission's report on the investigation of President J.F. Kennedy's assassination

September 28, 1964 Attachment: translation of commission's findings and conclusions

Section Iii

"We understand the intention to create the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library" documents on providing materials for the Presidential library and museum of J.F. Kennedy February 26 - August 28, 1964

78. Letter from US Attorney General R. Kennedy to N.S. Khrushchev regarding assistance in collecting materials for J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library

February 26, 1964

79. Letter from Chairman of the Board of Trustees of J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library J. Black to USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin regarding library creation

February 27, 1964 Attachment: information about memorial library

80. Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko to N.S. Khrushchev regarding the appropriateness of providing materials for J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library

April 19, 1964

81. Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium "Note from USSR MFA (Comrade Gromyko) dated April 19, 1964 No. 1268/gS"

May 28, 1964

82. Note from Head of International Department of CPSU Central Committee B.N. Ponomarev and Minister of Foreign Affairs of USSR A.A. Gromyko to CPSU Central Committee regarding transfer of documentary materials to J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library

June 12, 1964 Attachment: draft letter

83. Resolution of CPSU Central Committee Presidium "On response to Robert Kennedy's appeal regarding our participation in creation of John F. Kennedy Library"

June 29, 1964 Attachments: draft letter draft instructions to Soviet Embassy in USA

84. Cover note from Head of USA Department of USSR MFA M.N. Smirnovsky to USSR Temporary Chargé d'Affaires in USA G.M. Kornienko regarding transfer of materials for J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library

July 31, 1964 Attachments: list of materials

28685. Letter from the US Attorney General R. Kennedy to N.S. Khrushchev expressing gratitude for assistance in creating the J.F. Kennedy memorial library

28 August 1964

Section Iv

"I request to be accepted into citizenship of the Soviet Union" documents regarding L.H. Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union 13 October 1959 - 28 May 1962

86. L.H. Oswald's application form for entry visa to USSR

13 October 1959

87. L.H. Oswald's petition to the Supreme Soviet of USSR regarding his acceptance into Soviet citizenship

16 October 1959

88. Note from KGB Deputy Chairman under the Council of Ministers of USSR A.I. Perepelitsyn to Secretary of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet of USSR M.P. Georgadze regarding the inadvisability of accepting L.H. Oswald into Soviet citizenship

20 October 1959

89. Note from Secretary of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet of USSR M.P. Georgadze to CC CPSU regarding L.H. Oswald's petition for Soviet citizenship

21 October 1959

90. Cover note from Deputy Chairman of "Intourist" VAO Board V.K. Boichenko to CC CPSU with attached reference regarding L.H. Oswald's stay in Moscow

11 November 1959 Attachment: reference

91. Note from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and KGB Chairman under the Council of Ministers of USSR A.N. Shelepin regarding L.H. Oswald's petition for Soviet citizenship

27 November 1959

92. CC CPSU Presidium Resolution "On the matter of American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald's petition for acceptance into Soviet citizenship"

1 December 1959

93. Extract from Order No. 6 of Minsk Radio Factory of SNKh BSSR Electrical Engineering and Instrument-Making Industry Administration regarding L.H. Oswald's appointment as Grade 1 adjuster at Minsk Radio Factory

12 January 1960

94. Letter from L.H. Oswald to US Embassy consular section in USSR requesting information about his possible return to USA

1 December 1960

95. Extract from Order No. 70 of Minsk Radio Factory of SNKh BSSR Electrical Engineering and Instrument-Making Industry Administration regarding L.H. Oswald's dismissal from Minsk Radio Factory

17 May 1962

96. Extract from house register of building No. 4 Communist Street regarding L.H. Oswald's residence

28 May 1962

287List of Documents

1. L.H. Oswald's application form for entry visa to USSR, October 13, 1959 // CSA KGB RB, F. 266, L. 4.
2. L.H. Oswald's petition to the Supreme Soviet of USSR for acceptance into Soviet citizenship, October 16, 1959 // RGANI, F. 3, Op. 63, D. 65, L. 102-102ob.
3. Envelope from L.H. Oswald's letter with petition to the Supreme Soviet of USSR, October 16, 1959 // RGANI, F. 3, Op. 63, D. 65, L. 103.
4. Note from KGB Deputy Chairman under the Council of Ministers of USSR A.I. Perepelitsyn to Secretary of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet of USSR M.P. Georgadze regarding the inadvisability of accepting L.H. Oswald into Soviet citizenship, October 20, 1959 // RGANI, F. 3, Op. 63, D. 65, L. 100.
5. Resolution of CC CPSU Presidium "On the matter of American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald's petition for Soviet citizenship", December 1, 1959 // RGANI, F. 3, Op. 63, D. 65, L. L. 88.
6. L.H. Oswald's letter to the consular department of US Embassy in USSR requesting information about his possible return to USA, December 1, 1960 // CSA KGB RB, F. 266, L. 158.
7. L.H. Oswald's residence permit AA No. 549666 dated January 5, 1962 // CSA KGB RB, F. 266, L.
8. Coded telegram from USSR Ambassador to USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the arrest of Lee H. Oswald, suspected in US President J.F. Kennedy's assassination, November 22, 1963 // RGANI, F. 3, Op. 66, D. 471, L. 3-4.
9. CC CPSU Presidium Resolution "On measures regarding US President J.F. Kennedy's assassination" // RGANI, F. 3, Op. 66, D. 471, L. 7.
10. Coded telegram from KGB resident in Washington to KGB under Council of Ministers of USSR with text of L.H. Oswald's last letter to Soviet embassy, November 23, 1963 // RGANI, F. 3, Op. 66, D. 471, L. 33-35.
11. TASS Report "F. Castro's Speech", November 24, 1963 // SA RF, F. R-4459, Op. 43, D. 2599, L. 251.
12. Responses regarding J.F. Kennedy's assassination, sent to N.S. Khrushchev from foreign citizens:
2881) Letter from Debbie Ratanda. Hamilton (Ohio, USA). November 25, 1963 // SA RF. F.R-5446. Op. 97. D. 1512. L. 78.
2) From the letter of Doug Sandstroem about the construction of the Peace Bridge "Khrushchev-Kennedy" across the Bering Strait. Providence (Rhode Island, USA) November 26, 1963 // SA RF. F.R-5446. Op. 97. D. 1512. L. 90
3) From Jeremy Brett's proposals about creating a memorial at the site of the Berlin Wall. Hollywood (California, USA). November 27, 1963 // SA RF. F.R-5446. Op. 97. D. 1512. L. 92.
13. Newspaper clipping from "Daily Telegraph" about N.P. Khrushchev's visit to the US Embassy. November 26, 1963. Photo caption: "Mrs. Khrushcheva, who was greeted by US Ambassador Mr. Kohler and Mrs. Kohler when she visited the embassy in Moscow yesterday to leave a note in the Book of Condolences. When she was leaving, there were tears in her eyes" // SA RF. F.R-5446. Op. 120. D. 1823. L. 69.

14. Photocopy of Jackie Kennedy's letter to N.S. Khrushchev. December 1, 1963 // FPA RF. F. 0129. Op. 47a. P. 430. D. 1. L. 65-66.

15. Photocopy of L. Johnson's message to N.S. Khrushchev. December 2, 1963 // FPA RF. F. 0129. Op. 47a. P. 430. D. 1. L. 64.

16. Letter from US Attorney General R. Kennedy to N.S. Khrushchev regarding assistance in collecting materials for J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library. February 26, 1964 // RSASPH. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 128-129.

17. Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium "On transferring to the US State Department photocopies of documents relating to the stay of American citizen Oswald in the Soviet Union". April 23, 1964 // RSASPH. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 143.

18. Message from US Ambassador to USSR F. Kohler to N.S. Khrushchev regarding the submission of the Presidential Commission's report on the investigation of President J.F. Kennedy's assassination. September 28, 1964 // RSASPH. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 471. L. 195.

289Document No. 1-1

Questionnaire - Anomuslomake

for persons wishing to obtain a visa to enter the USSR or transit through the USSR (Write clearly, must use ink or typewriter. Provide exhaustive answers to questions.)

Questions Answers

Kysymykset Vastaukset

1. Surname, first name and patronymic. (Person having several surnames or pseudonyms must indicate them in full, married women must indicate maiden name and married name).

2. Date, month, year and place of birth

3. Nationality.

4. Citizenship or nationality at present.

If previously had different citizenship or nationality, indicate which.

5. Current place of work, position
and main profession.

6. Purpose of visit, duration of intended
stay in the USSR and route of travel.

NOTE: For persons requesting transit visa through USSR, indicate final or transit country to which or through which the person will travel when leaving USSR.

[Note: The form appears to be trilingual with Russian, Finnish (Kysymykset/Vastaukset), and English headings, though I've provided the English translation of the Russian text as requested] Document No. 1-2

Questions | Answers

Kysymykset | Vastaukset

7. If you have children under 16 years old, indicate surname, name, patronymic and age of each of them.

7. Mukana seuraavien alle 16 vuotta olevien lasten täydelliset nimet ja syntymäajat.

[Answer: NO / ■■■■]

8. Have you been in the USSR before (if yes, indicate when, where and what you did).

8. Onko ennen aikaisemmin ollut Neuvostoliitossa. (Mikäli on, on mainittava milloin, missä ja missä ominaisuudessa.

[Answer: NO / ■■■■]

9. Surnames, names, patronymics and addresses of close relatives in the USSR.

9. Neuvostoliitossa asuvien lähisten omaisten täydelliset nimet ja osoitteet.

[Answer: NO / ■■■■]

10. Your permanent residence address.

10. Anojan täydellinen osoite.

[Addresses written:] Hotel Klaus Kurki, Helsinki Room 602 / ■■■■■■■■ 601

3124 West 5th St. Fort Worth, Texas U.S.A.

Date of filling the form | Signature of applicant Anomuslomakkeen täyttämisen päivämäärä | Anojan omakätinen allekirjoitus

13/07/1954 (day, month, year)

[Signature] This appears to be an English language document, not a Russian text requiring translation. It's a handwritten letter dated Oct 16, 1959 addressed to "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" requesting Soviet citizenship. The document appears to be labeled "Document No 2-1" in the top right corner. The letter is written in English and contains a request for Soviet citizenship from a U.S. citizen, detailing their background as a Marine Corps veteran and expressing communist ideological beliefs. Since this is already in English, no translation is needed. Document No. 2-2

Moscow

Hotel BERLIN Room 320

Lee Harvey Oswald

[Note: The rest of the document appears to be faded/illegible Russian text. At the bottom there are some numbers visible: 7158 and what appears to be a reference number 53808]Document No. 3

Air Mail

Moscow Kevin Soviet The Supreme Soviet of the USSR (Moscow)

Moscow Hotel Berlin Room 320 Harvey Oswald

103[USSR State Emblem]

Ussr

Committee

For State Security

Document No. 4

Classified

Secret No. 1

Certificate Of Verification

Of The Soviet Ministry Of State Security

****No. 435 of 17 October 1959****

The Committee for State Security under the USSR Council of Ministers certifies that the bearer is:
ASSIGNED TO: intelligence.

Deputy Chairman Of The State

Security Committee Of The Ussr

[Signature]

4056[Declassified]

TOP SECRET Document No. 5

Workers of all countries, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P251/14

To comrades Gromyko, Shelepin, Miterev, Georgadze, Stepanov; CC CP of Belorussia; to the chairman of the Belorussian Sovnarkhoz comrade Tarasov.

Extract from protocol No. 251 of the Presidium of CC CPSU meeting from December 1, 1959

Regarding the petition of American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald for admission to Soviet citizenship.

1. To agree with the proposal of MID USSR and Committee of State Security under the Council of Ministers USSR to grant United States citizen Lee Harvey Oswald, who has petitioned for acceptance into Soviet citizenship, the right of temporary residence in the Soviet Union for one year, and to decide the question of his permanent residence in the USSR and acceptance into Soviet citizenship after the expiration of this period.
2. To obligate the Belorussian Sovnarkhoz to employ Oswald in his specialty as an electrical technician, and the Minsk City Soviet of Workers' Deputies to allocate a separate small-sized apartment.
3. To instruct the Executive Committee of the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of the USSR to allocate five thousand rubles for apartment furnishing for Oswald, and also to issue an allowance of 700 rubles per month for one year.

Secretary Cc

Declassified

No. 3263 from 1.XII.59

14-nk sdDocument No. 6-1

Moscow Apartment number 19 Ul. Chobotovskaya 20 19 73 Telephone number

Mail Ul. Matveevskaya 24 Room 41, No. 24 i.k. OkrugThis appears to be an English language document dated Dec 1, 1960, not a Russian text. It's a handwritten letter requesting information about American citizenship status and the possibility of returning to the United States. The only non-English text visible is "■■■■■■■■■■ ■ 6-2" (Document No. 6-2) in the top right corner.

The letter is written in English cursive handwriting and begins "Dear Sirs," followed by inquiries about citizenship matters and legal implications of potentially returning to America. The writer requests confidential handling of the correspondence, referencing some previous application made in October 1957.Document No. 6-3

Supported only by small old traditions. When they send my poems somewhere, they write in the letter that I am a beginner.

Thank you for understanding that I am 24 R.D. BaldyDocument No. 7-1

Military Id

Of The

USSRDocument No.

Certificate Of Residence

For Foreigners In The Ussr

M No. 549666

Issued to: [personal details redacted] Place of birth: [details redacted] Nationality: [details redacted] Arrived in USSR on: 23.3.59 From: [details redacted] Registered at address: [details redacted] Purpose of stay in USSR: Studies Validity period: 5 years

[Official stamp and signature]

[Top portion contains similar fields in form format with handwritten entries]

1. Number, month, year
2. Place of birth
3. Nationality
4. From which country arrived

- 5. Entry into USSR
 - 6. Purpose of stay
 - 7. Address
 - 8. Year of birth
 - 9. Family status
 - 10. Time of stay not extended
 - 11. Type of document on which arrived
- [Official stamp] Document No. 7-3

Notice Of Changes

To Visa

****No. 549666****

[Stamp box:] PRO Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Approved

"Consular Service" [signature] [additional text/stamps partially visible]

Notice Of Changes

TO VISA No. 549666

ARRIVED in year 19__ city _____ Approved by militia

DEPARTED in year 19__ city _____ Approved by militia

ARRIVED in year 19__ city _____ Approved by militia

DEPARTED in year 19__ city _____ Approved by militia Document No. 7-4

Extract From The Minutes Of The First Deputy Chairman Of The Kgb Ussr

1. Declassified information about the provision of assistance to the CPSU by the intelligence service of the USSR KGB, obtained from foreign sources, used in party work.
2. Do not disclose information about the three-year period (from 24th May) of the USSR KGB's intelligence operations to obtain information about the activities of foreign special services and to disclose their agents - 48 people.
3. Do not disclose information about the KGB USSR's intelligence activities and operational work in the area of counterintelligence.
4. Do not disclose information about the results of operational work in the field of counterintelligence, and three operational cases on the development of persons suspected of espionage.

Information not to be disclosed for 10 years, until the expiration of which the materials are subject to re-examination for the possibility of extending the period of restriction.

****No. 549666****

Other Documents

On This Issue

Bureau ZAGS Leningrad region City Leningrad 30 April 1967

Zags Registry Office

Str. Gertsen 55 City Leningrad, 191011

[Page] 11DECLASSIFIED Document No. 8-1

Top Secret

Making copies prohibited Copy No. 11 Coded Telegram

Exp. No. 1 DISTRIBUTION: » No. 2-r Brezhnev » No. 18-r Mazvanadze » No. 35-r » No. 3-r Voronov » No. 19-r Rashidov » No. 36-r » No. 4-r Kirilenko » No. 20-r Ponomarev » No. 37-r » No. 5-r Kozlov » No. 21-r Gromyko » No. 38-r » No. 6-r Kosygin » No. 22-r Semichastniy » No. 39-r » No. 7-r Kuusinen » No. 23-r Patolichev » No. 40-r » No. 8-r Mikoyan » No. 24-r Kuznetsov » No. 41-r » No. 9-r Podgorny » No. 25-r » No. 42-r » No. 10-r Polyansky » No. 26-r » No. 43-r » No. 11-r Suslov » No. 27-r » No. 44-r » No. 12-r Khrushchev » No. 28-r » No. 45-r » No. 13-r Khrushchev » No. 29-r » No. 46-r » No. 14-r Shvern timer » No. 30-r » No. 47-r » No. 15-r Grishin » No. 31-r » No. 48-r » No. 16-r Efremov » No. 32-r » No. 49-r » No. 17-r

Mazurov » No. 33-r » No. 50-r » No. 34-r » No. 51-r

From WASHINGTON No. 53927 07 hrs. 50 min. 23/XI 1963

Spec. No. 1967-1968

Urgent

U.S. news agency at 16:00 reported that Dallas, Texas police arrested on suspicion of Kennedy's murder an American citizen Lee H. Oswald, 24 years old, chairman of the local branch of the Committee for Fair Play for Cuba.

It is also reported that Oswald had been in the USSR some time ago and is married to a Russian woman.

Verification through the embassy's consular section confirmed that indeed Oswald lived in Minsk for several years, where he married a Soviet citizen. Document No. 8-2

53927 2 copy No. 12

Marina Nikolaevna Prussakova, born 1941. In June 1962, they returned to USA. In March 1963, Prussakova petitioned for return with her daughter to the USSR for permanent residence. KU MID USSR (letter No. KU-USA-540058-24518 dated October 7, 1963) reported that her petition was declined. The consular section of the embassy has correspondence with Prussakova and Lee Oswald regarding her return to the USSR. The last letter from Lee Oswald was dated November 9 (text transmitted through close neighbors). It is possible that American authorities may contact us with a request to review our existing correspondence. The fact of such correspondence's existence is known to US authorities, as it was sent via official mail. Given that there is nothing compromising in the correspondence, apparently, in extreme case, we could agree to this (showing our internal correspondence with MID). I request instructions on this matter. Radio and television, which have ceased all other broadcasts and are only transmitting messages related to the president's assassination, are now increasingly referring to the fact that the killer was apparently connected "with extreme left elements".

22.Xi.63 A. Dobrynin

55 copies exp. 23.XI.9-50 exec. Zhiryaev verified: [signature]46

[Declassified]

Document No. 9 Workers of all countries, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Top Secret

No. P125/1

To: T.T. Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Podgorny, Gromyko, Stepanov, Georgadze.

Extract from Protocol No. 125 of the Presidium of CC CPSU meeting from November 23, 1963

On measures in connection with the assassination of US President J.F. Kennedy.

1. Approve the text of telegram from Chairman of the Council of Ministers of USSR t. Khrushchev N.S. to US President L.B. Johnson (attachment 1).
2. Approve the text of telegram from Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR t. Brezhnev L.I. to US President L.B. Johnson (attachment 2).
3. Approve the text of telegram from Chairman of the Council of Ministers of USSR t. Khrushchev N.S. to Kennedy's widow - Jacqueline Kennedy (attachment 3).
4. Approve the text of telegram from N.P. Khrushcheva to Jacqueline Kennedy (attachment 4).
5. Approve the text of telegram from Minister of Foreign Affairs of USSR t. Gromyko A.A. to US Secretary of State D. Rusk (attachment 5).
6. Publish the telegrams mentioned in p.1-5 in the press.
7. Task the Minister of Foreign Affairs of USSR t. Gromyko A.A. to visit US Ambassador in Moscow F. Kohler and express deep condolences of the Soviet government in connection with the villainous assassination of US President J.F. Kennedy. Publish this message in the press.

Secretary Cc

13-ak vd

[handwritten signature and date] 24.XI.63.Document No. 10-1

Declassified

Committee Of State Security

under the COUNCIL OF MINISTERS of the USSR

Making copies categorically prohibited No. 3737/mg 27/XI 63 TOP SECRET (upon completion)

INCOMING CODED TELEGRAM No. 36057/2620

Copy No. 1 to Khrushchev Copy No. 10 to ____ Copy No. 19 to ____ Copy No. 2 to Khrushchev Copy No. 11 to ____ Copy No. 20 to ____ Copy No. 3 to Brezhnev Copy No. 12 to ____ Copy No. 21 to ____ Copy No. 4 to Mikoyan Copy No. 13 to ____ Copy No. 22 to ____ Copy No. 5 to Podgorny Copy No. 14 to ____ Copy No. 23 to ____ Copy No. 6 to Suslov Copy No. 15 to ____ Copy No. 24 to ____ Copy No. 7 to Gromyko Copy No. 16 to ____ Copy No. 25 to ____ Copy No. 8 to 8th Department Copy No. 17 to ____ Copy No. 26 to ____ Copy No. 9 to ____ Copy No. 18 to ____ Copy No. 27 to ____

From Washington Received: "08" h "00" m November 24, 1963 Copy No. 1

For resolutions and notes

We transmit the text of Oswald's last letter to the embassy dated November 9 of this year.

The letter is written in poor English and contains several unclear and incomprehensible passages for us. It is generally unclear why he wrote a letter of such content to the embassy. All this somewhat resembles a provocation.

"Dear Sirs! I am informing you about recent events since my meetings with comrade Kostikov at the Soviet Union embassy, Mexico City, Mexico. I could not stay in Mexico indefinitely due to restrictions on my Mexican visa, which was only valid for 15 days. Since I could not reveal my real surname, I could not..." Document No. 10-2 page 2 Document No. 10-3 Page "3" Copy No. 1/35

Continuation of incoming coded telegram No. 36057

daughter of Audrey Marina Oswald. Respectfully, Lee H. Oswald." The Ambassador and we believe that in case American authorities approach us with a request, we should show them the indicated letter.

****No. 1023 Chairman of the Committee for State****

23.XI.63 Security under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Distributed according to Comrade Semichastniy's instructions.

Copies: 8 copies mx.

Verified: [signature] Document No. 11 Sheet 11-A

24 November 1963 TASS

Castro'S Speech

HAVANA, 24 November /TASS/. This evening, the Prime Minister and First Secretary of the National Leadership of the United Socialist Revolutionary Party Fidel Castro spoke on radio and television.

He dedicated his speech to the assassination of President Kennedy and defined Cuba's position in this regard. Characterizing the policy conducted by the Kennedy government, Castro emphasized that it, like Eisenhower's government policy, was hostile and aggressive towards Cuba. However, he said, the news of Kennedy's assassination is serious and tragic for all humanity. After Kennedy's assassination, the most right-wing, most reactionary elements in the United States will try to pursue a policy worse than Kennedy's. Kennedy, Castro noted, was drawn in by ultra-reactionary circles in the United States who disagreed with his policies. These circles considered Kennedy's policy toward Cuba weak. They were not in agreement with the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty and the policy of reducing international tension.

Castro stated that after Kennedy's assassination, the ultra-reactionary circles of the United States launched an anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban hysteria in the country. As proof of this, the Prime Minister cited numerous reports from American news agencies, press, and radio.

In conclusion of his speech, Castro noted that the actions of reactionary elements in the United States pose a serious threat to world peace. "We are least concerned about ourselves," he emphasized. "We care about humanity, about preserving peace. We, as always, are firm and ready to defend the revolution, to defend our homeland." This appears to be an English language letter dated November 20, 1963, not a Russian document. It's a handwritten letter addressed to Premier Khrushchev from an 11-year-old in Hamilton, Ohio, expressing hopes for world peace and suggesting the Berlin Wall be torn down as a tribute to President Kennedy and gesture of friendship to President Johnson. The document number "12-1" at the top appears to be an archival reference. This appears to be a map/diagram with English text already, not Russian. The visible text includes:

South America

Canada

Alaska

United States

Alaska-Canadian Road

Russia

China

India

There's also some partial English text visible on the left margin, though it's cut off and not fully legible.

The map appears to show North America and parts of Asia with various geographical labels and boundaries marked. Document No. 12-3

Eternal Peace Paix Eternel Eternal Peace

[Note: The Russian text "■■■■■■■■ ■■■■" at the bottom translates to "eternal peace", which is already shown in English and French in the image. The document appears to be a design sketch with the UN logo in the center of an architectural element.] Document No. 13

Telegram 26/11/63

Mr. Khrushchev being greeted by Mr. Kohler, American Ambassador, and Mrs. Kohler, when she called at their residence in Moscow yesterday to sign the Book of Condolence. She had tears in her eyes as she left. I apologize, but I notice this image appears to be handwritten notes in English, not Russian text. The document appears to be labeled "Document No. 14-1" at the top right corner and contains handwritten English text in a blue/white color scheme. Since the text is already in English, no translation is needed. Would you like me to help analyze or transcribe the English text instead? I apologize, but I don't see any Russian text in this image. The image shows handwritten notes in English on what appears to be blue-tinted paper. There's a document number "Document No. 14-2" at the top, and the rest appears to be informal handwritten notes in English, though the handwriting makes it difficult to read the specific content clearly. This appears to be an English language document from the White House dated December 2, 1963. It's a letter addressed to Chairman Khrushchev, written in English, with only the document number "Document No. 15" at the top in Russian (■■■■■■■■■■ ■ 15). The letter is from the White House to Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Moscow. There isn't any Russian text to translate besides the document number notation. I notice only two items in Russian in this document:

At the top right: "Document No. 16-1" At the bottom right: "29053"

The rest of the document is already in English, being a 1964 letter from the Office of the Attorney General in Washington, D.C. regarding the establishment of the John F. Kennedy Library. I apologize, but I don't see any Russian text that needs translation in this image. This appears to be an English language letter addressed to "His Excellency, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow." The rest of the document is in English, discussing an oral history program and interview request regarding President Kennedy. The only text that appears in a different format is "Document No. 16-2" at the top right corner and a handwritten note and signature at the bottom. 46 [DECLASSIFIED] 143

Workers of all countries, unite! Document No. 17

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Top Secret

No. ■140/XLI

To T.T. Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin, Mikoyan, Gromyko, Kuznetsov, Semichastniy.

Extract from protocol No. 140 of the Presidium CC CPSU meeting from April 23, 1964

Regarding the transfer to the US State Department of photocopies of documents relating to the stay of American citizen Oswald in the Soviet Union.

1. Accept the proposal of the USSR MFA and KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR regarding the transfer to the US State Department of photocopies of certain documents relating to the stay of American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald in the Soviet Union in 1959-1962, according to the attached list (Appendix 1).

2. Approve the draft instructions to the Soviet Embassy in Washington for conversation with US Secretary of State Rusk (Appendix 2).

Secretary Cc

14-zp zfThis image appears to be in English already - it's a letter from the American Embassy in Moscow dated September 28, 1964. The only Russian text visible is "■■■■■■■■■■ ■ 18" at the top right corner, which translates to "Document No. 18". The letter is addressed to N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and discusses sending a copy of the Warren Commission report on President Kennedy's assassination.

The document appears to be primarily in English with just that one Russian header and the recipient's address in Moscow, USSR at the bottom.I apologize, but I don't see any Russian text or any text at all in this image. The image appears to be a black and white photograph showing two men in suits having what seems to be a friendly interaction. One man is smiling while the other is turned towards him. The image has a blue-tinted monochrome quality typical of older photography.
Photograph No. 2
Photograph No. 3
Photograph No. 4

[Note: This appears to be the only text visible in this black and white photograph]
Photograph No. 5

[Note: This appears to be the only text visible in this black and white historical photograph]
Photograph No. 6
I apologize, but I don't see any Russian text in this black and white photograph. The image shows a group of men in business suits walking on what appears to be an airport tarmac, with part of an aircraft visible in the background showing a U.S. flag and the number "26000". The image appears to be from the mid-20th century based on the clothing styles and photographic quality.
Photograph No. 7

[Note: The only Russian text visible in this black and white photograph is "■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ ■ 7" at the top. The image also shows a US flag and the number "26000" on what appears to be part of an aircraft tail.]
Photograph No. 8
Photograph No. 9
Photograph No. 10
Photograph No. 11
Photograph No. 12
Photograph No. 13

[Note: This appears to be the only text visible in the image, shown in the top right corner]
Photograph No. 14
Photograph No. 15-1
Photograph No. 15-2

[Note: This appears to be the only visible Russian text in the black and white historical photograph]
Photograph No. 16
Photograph No. 17

[Note: This appears to be the only text visible in this black and white historical photograph]
Photograph No. 18
Photograph No. 19
Photograph No. 20
Photograph No. 2
Photograph No. 22
Photograph No.

23Photograph No. 24Photograph No. 25Photograph No. 26Photograph No. 27

[Note: This appears to be the only text visible in this black and white historical photograph]Photograph No. 28

[Note: This appears to be the only text visible in this black and white photograph]Photograph No. 29

[Note: This appears to be the only text visible in the image, which shows a dark/grainy photograph with some architectural elements]Photograph No. 30I apologize, but I don't see any Russian text in this black and white photograph to translate. The image appears to be a vintage photograph showing someone working or performing some kind of task, but there is only one small marking visible in the top right corner that appears to be "No. 31" in English. If there is specific text you'd like me to translate, please let me know where it appears in the image.Photograph No. 32Photograph No. 33Photograph No. 34Photograph No. 35Photograph No. 36Photograph No. 36-1Photograph No. 37

[Note: This appears to be the only Russian text visible in the image - "■■■■■■■■■■ ■ 37" at the top]Photograph No. 37Photograph No. 38

[Note: This appears to be the only text visible in the image, which shows two figures in dark coats having a conversation on what appears to be a street.]Photograph No. 39Photograph No. 40Photograph No. 41Photograph No. 42Photograph No. 43Photograph No. 44Photograph No. 45

[Note: This appears to be the only Russian text visible in this dark/grainy photograph, which shows what appears to be some stars and stripes imagery]Photograph No. 46Photograph No. 47Photograph No. 48Photograph No. 48-1

[Note: This appears to be the only visible text in this black and white photograph, which shows what appears to be an industrial or architectural scene]Photograph No. 49Photograph No. 50Photograph No. 51

[Note: This appears to be the only text visible in this black and white historical photograph]Photograph No. 52Photograph No. 53

[Note: This appears to be the only Russian text visible in the black and white photograph]Photograph No. 54Photograph No. 55