### CS 5173/4173 Computer Security

Topic 3.1 Secret Key Cryptography – Algorithms

## **Key Sizes**

- A Key should be selected from a large potential set to prevent brute force attacks
  - If a key is of 3 bits, what are the possible keys?
    - 000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110,111
  - Given a pair of (plaintext, ciphertext), an attacker can do a brute force search to find the key
  - If a key is of n bits, how many possible keys does a brute force attacker need to search?

## Key Sizes (Cont'd)

- Secret key sizes
  - 40 bits were considered adequate in 70's
  - 56 bits used by DES were adequate in the 80's
  - 128 bits are adequate for now
- If computers increase in power by 40% per year, need roughly 5 more key bits per decade to stay "sufficiently" hard to break

### Notation

Notation	Meaning
Х⊕У	Bit-wise exclusive-or of X and Y
XIY	Concatenation of X and Y
K{ <i>m</i> }	Message m encrypted with secret key K

### Two Principles for Cipher Design

#### Confusion:

Make the relationship between the <plaintext,</li>
 key> input and the <ciphertext> output as
 complex (non-linear) as possible

#### Diffusion:


Spread the influence of each input bit across many output bits

## **Exploiting the Principles**


- Idea: use multiple, alternating permutations and substitutions, e.g.,
  - $-S \rightarrow P \rightarrow S \rightarrow P \rightarrow S \rightarrow ...$
  - $P \rightarrow S \rightarrow P \rightarrow S \rightarrow P \rightarrow ...$
- Do they have to alternate? e.g....
  - $-S \rightarrow S \rightarrow S \rightarrow P \rightarrow P \rightarrow P \rightarrow S \rightarrow S \rightarrow ...?$
  - Consecutive Ps or Ss do not improve security
- Confusion is mainly accomplished by substitutions
- Diffusion is mainly accomplished by permutations

## Secret Key... (Cont'd)

 Basic technique used in secret key ciphers: multiple applications of alternating substitutions and permutations



### Basic Form of Modern Block Ciphers




# Feistel Ciphers

## Feistel Ciphers

- Feistel Cipher has been a very influential "template" for designing a block cipher
- Major benefit: Encryption and decryption take the same time
  - they can be performed on the same hardware
- Examples: DES, RC5


### One "Round" of Feistel Encryption

- 1. Break input block *i* into left and right halves L<sub>i</sub> and R<sub>i</sub>
- 2. Copy  $R_i$  to create output half block  $L_{i+1}$
- 3. Half block  $R_i$  and key  $K_i$  are "scrambled" by function f
- 4. XOR result with input half-block  $L_i$  to create output half-block  $R_{i+1}$



### One "Round" of Feistel Decryption

- Just reverse the arrows!
- Why?



### Feistel Cipher: Decryption (cont'd)


### Encryption


$$-L_{i+1} = R_i$$
  
-  $R_{i+1} = L_i \oplus f(R_i, K_i)$ 

### Decryption


$$-R_i = L_{i+1}$$

$$-L_i = R_{i+1} \oplus f(R_i, K_i)$$
  
=  $L_i \oplus f(R_i, K_i) \oplus f(R_i, K_i) = L_i$ 






### Complete Feistel Cipher: Encryption




### Feistel Cipher: Decryption




## The Swap Operation


 For the Feistel cipher, why do we need the final swap step?




#### Without Swap




Without swap, we cannot decrypt to A and B!




With Swap



#### With Swap (two rounds)



#### What's wrong with this scheme?



### Parameters of a Feistel Cipher

- Block size
- Key size
- Number of rounds
- Subkey generation algorithm
- "Scrambling" function f

### Summary


- Decryption is same as encryption, only reversing the order in which round keys are applied
  - Reversability of Feistel cipher derives from reversability of xor
- Function f can be anything
  - Hopefully something easy to compute
  - There is no need to invert f

## DES (Data Encryption Standard)


- Standardized in 1976 by NBS
  - proposed by IBM,
  - Feistel cipher
- Criteria (official)
  - provide high level of security
  - security must reside in key, not algorithm
  - not patented
  - efficient to implement in hardware
  - must be slow to execute in software

### **DES Basics**

- Blocks: 64 bit plaintext input,
   64 bit ciphertext output
- Rounds: 16
- Key: 64 bits
  - every 8<sup>th</sup> bit is a parity bit, so really <u>56</u> bits long




## **DES Top Level View**



### Initial and Final Permutations

- Initial permutation given below
  - input bit #58→output bit #1, input bit #50→
     output bit #2, ...


58	50	42	34	26	18	10	2
60	52	44	36	28	20	12	4
62	54	46	38	30	22	14	6
64	56	48	40	32	24	16	8
57	49	41	33	25	17	9	1
59	51	43	35	27	19	11	3
61	53	45	37	29	21	13	5
63	55	47	39	31	23	15	7



## Initial... (Cont'd)

- Final permutation is just inverse of initial permutation, i.e.,
  - input bit  $#1 \rightarrow$  output bit #58
  - input bit  $\#2\rightarrow$  output bit #50

**—** ...



## Initial... (Cont'd)


- Note #1: Initial Permutation is fully specified (independent of key)
  - therefore, does not improve security!
  - why needed?
- Note #2: Why is final Permutation needed?
  - to make this a Feistel cipher
    - i.e., the decryption is the reverse of encryption

### Key Generation: First Permutation

First step: throw out 8 parity bits,
 then permute resulting 56 bits


7 columns

57	49	41	33	25	17	9
1	58	50	42	34	26	18
10	2	59	51	43	35	27
19	11	3	60	52	44	36
63	55	47	39	31	23	15
7	62	54	46	38	30	22
14	6	61	53	45	37	29
21	13	5	28	20	12	4



*Parity bits left out:* 8,16,24,...

### KeyGen: Processing Per Round



### KeyGen: Permutation with Discard

• 28 bits → 24 bits, each half of key

Left half of  $K_i$  = permutation of  $C_i$ 

14	17	11	24	1	5
3	28	15	6	21	10
23	19	12	4	26	8
16	7	27	20	13	2


Bits dicarded: 9,18,22,25


Right half of  $K_i$  = permutation of  $D_i$ 

*Bits discarded:* 35,38,43,54


41	52	31	37	47	55
30	40	51	45	33	48
44	49	39	56	34	53
46	42	50	36	29	32


## One DES (Feistel) Round





### DES Round: f (Mangler) Function





## f: Expansion Function

• 32 bits **\(\rightarrow\)** 48 bits

	— these	bits a	re <mark>rep</mark>	eated —	
32	1	2	3	4	5
4	5	6	7	8	9
8	9	10	11	12	13
12	13	14	15	16	17
16	17	18	19	20	21
20	21	22	23	24	25
24	25	26	27	28	29
28	29	30	31	32	1

## *f*: S<sub>1</sub> (Substitution)

Each row and column contain different numbers

I2/I3/I	4/I5	<b>→</b> 0	1	2	3	4	5	6	•••	F
11/16	0	E	4	D	1	2	F	В		
<sup>1</sup> 6 →	1	0	F	7	4	Е	2	D		
	2	4	1	Е	8	D	6	2		
	3	F	С	8	2	4	9	1		

Example: input = 100110, output = 1000 input = 101101, out put =?

## f: Permutation

#### • 32bits → 32bits

16	7	20	21
29	12	28	17
1	15	23	26
5	18	31	10
2	8	24	14
32	27	3	9
19	13	30	6
22	11	4	25

#### **DES** Implementation

- That's it!
- Operations
  - Permutation
  - Swapping halves
  - Substitution (S-box, table lookup)
  - Bit discard
  - Bit replication
  - Circular shift
  - XOR
- Hard to implement? HW: No, SW: Yes

## Principles for S-Box Design

- S-box is the only non-linear part of DES
- Each row in the S-Box table should be a permutation of the possible output values
- Output of one S-box should affect other Sboxes in the following round

#### Desirable Property: Avalanche Effect

- Roughly: a small change in either the plaintext or the key should produce a big change in the ciphertext
- Better: any output bit should be inverted (flipped) with probability 0.5 if any input bit is changed
  - What is the expected number of different bits between two length-n random bit streams?
    - 0.5n (Bernoulli distribution)
- *f* function
  - must be difficult to un-scramble
  - should achieve avalanche effect
  - output bits should be uncorrelated

#### DES Avalanche Effect: Example

- 2 plaintexts with 1 bit difference:
   0x000000000000000 and
   0x800000000000000
   encrypted using the same key:
   0x016B24621C181C32
- Resulting ciphertexts differ in 34 bits (out of 64)
- Similar results when keys differ by 1 bit

## Example (cont'd)

An experiment: number of rounds vs. number of bits difference

Round #	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Bits changed	1	6	21	35	39	34	32	31	29

						15	
42	44	32	30	30	26	29	34

## DES: Keys to Avoid Using

- "Weak keys": These are keys which, after the first key permutation, are:
  - 28 0's followed by 28 0's
  - 28 1's followed by 28 1's
  - 28 0's followed by 28 1's
  - 28 1's followed by 28 0's
- Property of weak keys
  - Easy clue for brute force attacks.
  - Sixteen identical subkeys.
  - Encrypting twice produces the original plaintext.

## Weak keys

- Alternating ones + zeros (0x0101010101010101)
- Alternating 'F' + 'E' (0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFE)
- 0xE0E0E0E0F1F1F1F1
- 0x1F1F1F1F0E0E0E0E
- DES weak keys produce sixteen identical subkeys

## More Keys to Avoid!

- "Semi-weak keys": These are keys which, after the first key permutation, are:
  - 1. 28 0's followed by alternating 0's and 1's
  - 2. 28 0's followed by alternating 1's and 0's

...

- 12. Alternating 1's and 0's followed by alternating 1's and 0's
- Property of semi-weak keys
  - For a semi-weak key pair  $(K_{1}, K_{2})$ ,  $K_{1}\{K_{2}\{m\}\} = m$  and  $K_{2}\{K_{1}\{m\}\} = m$

#### Semi-weak key pairs

- 0x011F011F010E010E and 0x1F011F010E010E01
- 0x01E001E001F101F1 and 0xE001E001F101F101
- 0x01FE01FE01FE01FE and 0xFE01FE01FE01
- 0x1FE01FE00EF10EF1 and 0xE01FE01FF10EF10E
- 0x1FFE1FFE0EFE0EFE and 0xFE1FFE1FFE0EFE0E
- OxEOFEE0FEF1FEF1FE and OxFEE0FEE0FEF1FEF1
- $K_1\{K_2\{m\}\} = m \text{ and } K_2\{K_1\{m\}\} = m$

#### **DES Key Size**

- 56 bits is currently too small to resist brute force attacks using readily-available hardware
- Ten years ago it took \$250,000 to build a machine that could crack DES in a few hours
- Now?


#### Cryptanalysis of DES

- Differential cryptanalysis exploits differences between encryptions of two different plaintext blocks
  - provides insight into possible key values
- Linear cryptanalysis requires known plaintext / ciphertext pairs, analyzes relationships to discover key value
- No attacks on DES so far are significantly better than brute force attacks, for comparable cost

#### Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

- Selected from an open competition, organized by NSA
  - winner: Rijndael algorithm, standardized as AES
- Some similarities to DES (rounds, round keys, alternate permutation+substitution)
  - but not a Feistel cipher
- Block size = 128, or 192, or 256 bits
- Key sizes = 128 (10 rounds), 192 (12 rounds), or 256 (14 rounds)

#### **AES-128 Overview**



# Does AES Have Avalanche Property?

# **Examples of AES Encryption**

Input String	Key	Output String (HEX)
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP	11223344556677889900AABBCCDDEEFF	BC4784A37D6F46452656B993D53393F5
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP	01223344556677889900AABBCCDDEEFF	855866490543FDF6504FC84088FEDCA0
ABCDEFFHIJKLMNOP	11223344556677889900AABBCCDDEEFF	372CCA446C0D391C4381392344630EE1

Input String(HEX)	Key	Output String (HEX)		
000000000000000000000000000000000000000	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	66E94BD4EF8A2C3B884CFA59CA342B2E		
000000000000000000000000000000000000000	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0545AAD56DA2A97C3663D1432A3D1C84		
000000000000000000000000000000000000000	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	A17E9F69E4F25A8B8620B4AF78EEFD6F		

#### **AES Assessment**

- No known successful attacks on full AES
  - Best attacks work on 7–9 rounds
- For brute force attacks, AES-128 needs much more effort than DES

#### Attacks on AES

- Differential Cryptanalysis: based on how differences in inputs correlate with differences in outputs
  - greatly reduced due to high number of rounds
- Linear Cryptanalysis: based on correlations between input and output

## Attacks on AES (Cont'd)

- Side Channel Attacks
- Timing Attacks: measure the time it takes to do operations
  - some operations, with some operands, are much faster than other operations, with other operand values
  - provides clues about what internal operations are being performed, and what internal data values are being produced

## Attacks on AES (Cont'd)

- Side Channel Attacks
- Power Attacks: measures power to do operations
  - changing one bit requires considerably less power than changing many bits in a byte