

Identify, Exploit, & Defend SAP Environments

Showcasing the True Power of Open-Source

Waseem Ajrab, NO MONKEY
Julian Petersohn, Fortinet



**Core Business
Application Security**



Speakers



Waseem Ajrab



Julian Petersohn




Agenda




PROJECT GOALS



OWASP CBAS



SAP SECURITY IN 2024



LIVE DEMO



SAP ATTACK SURFACE
DISCOVERY



SAP SECURITY
VERIFICATION STANDARD



SAP Complexity...

Is it a blessing or curse?!



SAP Complexity - Application Level



9,
5

12

40

44

50

67

84



Office


Windows 10





SAP Business Suite 319 Million Lines of Code (!)



SAP ERP 6.0 Entry Points








SAP Goes to Cloud



Row	Identifier	Task	ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES	
			Responsibility	Comments
SAP Enterprise Cloud Services RISE with SAP S/4HANA Cloud, private edition and SAP ERP, tailored option				
410		Disaster Recovery	Optional Services	
411	BASIC_1.9.01	Implement disaster recovery set-up according to architecture blueprint and contractual specifications. Test managed service internal data center and technical system infrastructure.	Optional Services	
412	BASIC_1.9.02	Develop and use disaster recovery procedures for database and file system replication only	Optional Services	
413	BASIC_1.9.03	Ongoing management of disaster recovery architecture monitoring of data replication to secondary site including troubleshooting	Optional Services	
414	BASIC_1.9.04	Ongoing management of disaster recovery architecture, maintenance and change management for systems at secondary site to ensure system consistency including troubleshooting	Optional Services	
415	BASIC_1.9.05	Develop and maintain disaster recovery procedures for those areas and aspects of the service which are in customer responsibility	Excluded Tasks	
416	BASIC_1.9.06	Execute failover during disaster recovery test (DB, application and names)	Optional Services	
417	BASIC_1.9.10	Execute failover during disaster recovery test (DB, application and names) - additional test	Additional Service	
418	BASIC_1.9.09	Execute online disaster recovery tests (data center and technical system infrastructure only); primary systems remain accessible	Additional Service	
419	BASIC_1.9.07	Execute productive failover in case of an officially declared disaster by service provider - all HA/DR architecture scenarios	Optional Services	
420	BASIC_1.9.11	Mixed High Availability (HA)/Disaster Recovery (DR): Execute productive failover for a specific SID and invert replication vector	Optional Services	
421	BASIC_1.9.12	Mixed High Availability (HA)/Disaster Recovery (DR): Execute productive failover for a specific SID and invert replication vector - additional customer requests	Additional Service	
Operations Extension				
422		Analyze Technical Issue - SAP Basis / Customer Client	These services provide possible extensions to areas of Incident, Change and Event Management beyond the standard scope of services.	
423	BASIC_1.15.01	Change Management: Changes of technical system configuration not included in Standard Services as per R&R Definition	SAP Cloud Application Services ("CAS") available at additional charge. Needs to be performed by customer if applicable and if the SAP CAS Service is not used.	
424	BASIC_1.15.02	Event management: Monitor technical/functional event types not included in Standard Service as per R&R Definition	SAP Cloud Application Services ("CAS") available at additional charge. Needs to be performed by customer if applicable and if the SAP CAS Service is not used.	
425	BASIC_1.15.03	Service Request Fulfillment: Perform Service Request Fulfillment for technical/non-functional task not included in Standard Service as per R&R Definition	SAP Cloud Application Services ("CAS") available at additional charge. Needs to be performed by customer if applicable and if the SAP CAS Service is not used.	
426	BASIC_1.15.04		SAP Cloud Application Services ("CAS") available at additional charge. Needs to be performed by customer if applicable and if the SAP CAS Service is not used.	



SAP Goes to AI



SAPwned: SAP AI vulnerabilities expose customers' cloud environments and private AI artifacts





SAP Security Myths



ZERO TRUST




IAM &
AUTHORIZATION




ENFORCING
CONTROLS ONLY
ON PRODUCTION



SAP BASIS TEAM
TAKES CARE OF
SECURITY




SAP SYSTEMS ARE
ISOLATED AND
NOT PUBLISHED



GERMAN MADE =
SECURE BY
DEFAULT



72% of beer production in the world
depends on SAP!






Project Goals



- Provide a security standard to secure SAP systems
- Provide the necessary tools to verify security measures
- Provide a single point of trusted security advisors
- Enabling regulators and auditors to assess enterprise business solutions



OWASP Core Business Application Security

Security Assessment /
Penetration Testing

Deception

Adversary Simulation

Attack Surface
Management

HoneySAP

SAPKiln


pysap

SAP Attack Surface
Discovery


SAP Security Verification Standard

Security Posture Validation & Baseline Controls







SAP Security in - a small period of - 2024




Exposed SAP Router




Exposed SAP Dispatcher Service




Exposed SAP RFC Gateway Services






Attack Vector - SAPRouter





- 8793 public reachable SAPRouter worldwide
- Leaks version string within the error message
- Leaks the internal hostname of SAProuter Server within the error message

```
\x00\x00\x01\x11NI_RTERR\x00(\x00\x00\xf0\x00\x00\xf9*ERR*\x001\x00connection timed
network interface)\x00749\x0040\x00D:/dep
/base/ni/nirout.cpp\x007966\x00RTPENDLIST
route received within 5s (CONNECTED)\x009
00:54:08 2024\x00\x00\x00\x0064024\x00SAP
HRSAPSCM\x27\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00*ERR*\x0
```



- 93 SAPRouter allows to dump Connection table
- Leaked internal services & IP addresses
- Provided a way for possible further attacks

```
[+] :3299 - 
[+] :3299 - 
[+] :3299 - 
[+] :3299 - Working directory : /usr/sap/saprouter
[+] :3299 - Routtab : ./saprouttab
:3299 - Connected to saprouter
:3299 - Sending ROUTER_ADMIN packet info request
:3299 - Got INFO response
=====
[SAP] SAProuter Connection Table for [REDACTED]
=====
Source      Destination     Service
-----      -----      -----
10.1. [REDACTED] 192.168. [REDACTED] sapdp00
10.1. [REDACTED] 192.168. [REDACTED] sapdp00
10.1. [REDACTED] 192.168. [REDACTED] sapdp00
```



Other Attack Vectors

SAP Dispatcher Information leak


```
[sap-dispatcher-detect:instance_details] [tcp] [info] :3200 ["DEV/SCORDN-DEV_DEV_00"]
[sap-dispatcher-detect:instance_details] [tcp] [info] 3200 ["SMA/ROUTER_SMA_00"]
[sap-dispatcher-detect:instance_details] [tcp] [info] 3200 ["HGJ/SAPGAMJA_HGJ_00"]
[sap-dispatcher-detect:instance_details] [tcp] [info] 3200 ["IDS/linux-72wg_IDS_00"]
```

SAP Message Server Internal Configuration leak



```
[sap-message-server-internal-service-aclinfo-dump] [tcp] [high] :3900
[sap-message-server-check-monitor-status:Parameter] [tcp] [info] :3900 ["ms/monitor =0"]
[sap-message-server-check-admin-port:Parameter] [tcp] [info] :3900 ["ms/admin_port =0"]
```


Usage of Default Credentials

```
[*] Testing None:3200
[*] Not discovering clients, using 000,001,800 or client supplied in credentials file
[+] Valid credentials found: Client: 000 Username: SAP* Password: PASS Status:
[+] Valid credentials found: Client: 800 Username: SAP* Password: PASS Status:
[+] Valid credentials found: Client: 000 Username: DDIC Password: 19920706 Status:
```




Attack Flow






Live Demo



SAP Attack Surface Discovery



SAP Attack Surface Discovery




- Identification and discovery of SAP services
 - Identify exposed ports
 - Fingerprint services
- Demonstrate the risk of exposed SAP applications
- Provide visibility to non-SAP researchers and other





Where are we?

- Containerized environment
- Nuclei Templates
- Wiki section per service
- Collaboration with hunter.how
- Inclusion of Shodan queries




Services added so far:

- SAPRouter
- SAP Cloud Connector
- SAP Message Server
- SAP Dispatcher
- SAP Web Dispatcher
- SAP Start Service
- SAP RFC Gateway
- SAP Internet Graphics Server
- SAP ASE (DB)






Roadmap




- Add more service i.e. SAP HANA, Web Services, SAP JAVA P4, etc
- Add more tools & references to the services
- Extend intergations with hunter.how
- Create integration with Pysap & SAPKiln projects





SAP Security Verification Standard



Security Function	Category	Technology	Maturity Level	IPAC	Defender	Prerequisite
Protect (PT)	Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control (PT.AC)	SAP ABAP	1	Access (A)	Technology	PT-PA-IP-M01-001


Description

SAP standard users are required to be managed and securely configured to avoid any misuse to SAP systems. This includes changing default passwords and restricting standard users.

Implementation

The below standard users, found in ABAP systems, are required to be managed and securely configured: (The Verification of Control section will help organizations have the basic requirements to secure these users)


1. SAP*
2. DDIC
3. SAPCPIC
4. TMSADM
5. EARLYWATCH
6. Users creates by the SAP solution manager



Verification of Control

- SAP*
 - Must exist in all clients
 - Must be locked in all clients
 - Default password must be changed
 - Must belong to the group SUPER in all clients
 - No profile should be assigned (especially SAP_ALL)
 - login/no_automatic_user_sapstar profile parameter must be set to 1
- DDIC
 - Default password must be changed
 - Must belong to the group SUPER in all clients
- SAPCPIC
 - Delete if user not required
 - If required, default password must be changed
 - Must belong to the group SUPER in all clients
- TMSADM
 - Default password must be changed
 - Should only exist in client 000
 - Must belong to the group SUPER in client 000
 - Authorization profile S_A.TMSADM should only be assigned
- EARLYWATCH
 - The user should not exist in any client
- Other users created by the SAP Solution Manager (SOLMAN_BTC, CONTENTSERV, SMD BI RFC, SMD RFC, SMDAGENT_SAPSolutionManagerSID, SMD_ADMIN, SMD_AGT, SAPSUPPORT, SOLMAN_ADMIN)
 - Default password must be change





Security Function	Category	Technology	Maturity Level	SAP Operational Area	Prerequisite
Detect (DT)	Anomalies and Events (DT.AE)	SAP HANA	2	Access (A)	

Description

HANA audit trails should be written to either the system or tenant database. In the standard configuration, the audit trail parameters can only be changed in the system database.


Implementation

The parameter "default_audit_trail_type" must be set to either the value SYSLOGPROTOCOL or CSTABLE. The value "SYSLOGPROTOCOL" means that the log is written to the system database, while the value "CSTABLE" means that the log is written to the tenant database. This is done in the "global.ini" file in the "auditing configuration" section of the HANA database.

- ALTER SYSTEM ALTER CONFIGURATION ('global.ini', 'SYSTEM') set ('auditing configuration' , 'default_audit_trail_type') = 'SYSLOGPROTOCOL';
- ALTER SYSTEM ALTER CONFIGURATION ('global.ini', 'SYSTEM') set ('auditing configuration' , 'default_audit_trail_type') = 'CSTABLE';

Verification of control

Check that the "default_audit_trail_type" parameter in the "global.ini" file in the "auditing configuration" section is assigned either the value SYSLOGPROTOCOL or CSTABLE.




Pysap





Features



- Dissection and crafting of the following network protocols:
 - SAP Network Interface (NI)
 - SAP Diag
 - SAP Enqueue
 - SAP Router
 - SAP Message Server (MS)
 - SAP Secure Network Connection (SNC)
 - SAP Internet Graphic Server (IGS)
 - SAP Remote Function Call (RFC)
 - SAP HANA SQL Command Network (HDB)
- Client interfaces for handling the following file formats:
 - SAP [SAR archive files](#)
 - SAP Personal Security Environment (PSE) files
 - SAP SSO Credential (Credv2) files
 - SAP Secure Storage in File System (SSFS) files
- Library implementing SAP's LZH and LZC compression algorithms.
- Automatic compression/decompression of payloads with SAP's algorithms.
- Client, proxy and server classes implemented for some of the protocols.
- Example scripts to illustrate the use of the different modules and protocols.




OWASP CBAS Mapping




Want to have your own SAP?

- Deployment of:
 - SAPRouter
 - SAP Cloud Connector
 - SAP System (S/4HANA)





Q&A



Discord