Due: Tuesday 9/24 at 11:59pm.

Policy: Can be solved in groups (acknowledge collaborators) but must be submitted individually.

Make sure to show all your work and justify your answers.

Note: This is a typical exam-level question. On the exam, you would be under time pressure, and have to complete this question on your own. We strongly encourage you to first try this on your own to help you understand where you currently stand. Then feel free to have some discussion about the question with other students and/or staff, before independently writing up your solution.

Note: Leave the self-assessment sections blank for the original submission of your homework. After the homework deadline passes, we will release the solutions. At that time, you will review the solutions, self-assess your initial response, and complete the self-assessment sections below. The deadline for the self-assessment is 1 week after the original submission deadline.

Your submission on Gradescope should be a PDF that matches this template. Each page of the PDF should align with the corresponding page of the template (page 1 has name/collaborators, question begins on page 2.). **Do not reorder, split, combine, or add extra pages**. The intention is that you print out the template, write on the page in pen/pencil, and then scan or take pictures of the pages to make your submission. You may also fill out this template digitally (e.g. using a tablet.)

First name	
Last name	
SID	
Collaborators	

Q1. [19 pts] Games

Alice, Eve, and Bob are playing a multiplayer game. Each game state consists of three numbers where the left value represents Alice's score, the middle value represents Eve's score, and the right value represents Bob's score. Alice makes the first move, followed by Eve, and finally Bob. All scores for a single player are **between 1 and 9 inclusive**. In all pruning scenarios, **remember that we do not prune on equality.**

Rather than trying to maximize their individual scores, Alice and Bob decide to work together to maximize their combined score, hoping that this will allow them to score higher. At each of Alice's and Bob's nodes, they will choose the option that maximizes **left value** + **right value**.

(a) Eve overhears their plan and decides that instead of maximizing her own score, she will try to minimize Alice and Bob's combined score. Alice and Bob are aware of Eve's strategy. Let the value of a node be the sum of the left and right scores of the node. Answer the following questions based on the game tree shown below.




Figure 1: Game tree where Alice is the root maximizer, Eve is the minimizer, and Bob is the bottom maximizer. Eve's score at each node (center cell) is not shown for simplicity.

(i) [1 pt] Solve the game tree shown in figure 1. What is the value of the root node?

6
12
13
Depends on the value of X only.
Depends on the value of Y only.
Depends on the values of both X and Y.
None of the above.

See diagram below.

(ii)	[2 pts] Without prunir	ng, which of the following	are possible values	for the right minin	nizer?
		6	7	8	
	child, we must conside $max(1 + 1, 2 + 4) = 6$	der the bounds on Y . Give S and at most it is $\max(1 + 1)$	ven that $1 \le Y \le -9, 2 + 4 = 10$. So	9, we know that a the value of the le	+3,6+1) = 8). For the left at minimum, the left child is eft child is between 6 and 10. ands on its values are between
(iii)					ha beta pruning on the game es of X and Y , do not select
	☐ A ☐ B ☐ C	☐ D ☐ E ☐ F	○ N		
	maximum value that t value possible. Since	he maximizer of E and F	can have is max(1 + ne the entire right ch	-9, 2+4) = 10 assorbed of the right min	Int subtree, we know that the uming Y takes on the highest nimizer. Therefore, G and H and by 9.
(iv)	- 1 -	ollowing nodes may or ma revious part which are gua	•	_	es of <i>X</i> and <i>Y</i> ? Do not select values for <i>X</i> and <i>Y</i> .
	☐ A ☐ B ☐ C	D E F	○ N □ H	None of the above.	
	we consider only	the possible values of X .	In the left subtree,	the left child of the	les are pruned or not, so here minimizer has a value of 12 his case occurs if $9 + X > 12$




Figure 2: Part a solutions

Q1(a) Self-Assessment - leave this section blank for your original submission. We will release the solutions to this problem after the deadline for this assignment has passed. After reviewing the solutions for this problem, assess your initial response by checking one of the following options:

- O I fully solved the problem correctly, including fully correct logic and sufficient work (if applicable).
- O I got part or all of the question incorrect.

If you selected the second option, explain the mistake(s) you made and why your initial reasoning was incorrect (do not reiterate the solution. Instead, reflect on the errors in your original submission). Approximately 2-3 sentences for *each* incorrect sub-question.

(b)	new Eve's of th	strategy is to choose the os turn, she will choose the o	ption that maximizes he option that maximizes mi same game tree shown	er own score minus Alice addle value – (left value -	wants to maximize her own score. Her and Bob's combined score. That is, at + right value). Alice and Bob are aware an choose any number between 1 and 9
	(i)	[1 pt] <i>True/False</i> : Compascore for Eve in any leaf		part (a), Eve's new strateş	gy will result in an equal or higher final
		True			
		Alice and Bob's scores, so in her own score so her ne chose option 1 in the form	this is equivalent to chow strategy is to choose the case. Then $-V_1 > -V_1$	posing the maximum between E_1 only considered and she would not show the she would not show the she was also show the she was a she will be shown to	egy. In part a, Eve is trying to minimize een $-V_1$ and $-V_2$. In part b, Eve factors $-V_1$ and $E_2 - V_2$. WLOG, assume Eve hange her choice using strategy b if E_2 Eve's score can only be higher.
	(ii)	[1 pt] <i>True/False</i> : Compacombined score for Alice			gy will result in an equal or higher final
		● True ○ False			
		like her own score, Eve l	pecomes an un-optimal	adversary since she does	and Bob. By considering other factors n't always choose the option that most ally be the same or increase.
	(iii)	[3 pts] Which of the follow to their strategy?	ving leaf nodes could pos	ssibly be the game outcom	e if all players play optimally according
		ПА	C	ПЕ	$\prod G$
		В	D	☐ F	□н
		use the same bounds on the will only choose the path we know based on the bounds subtree is 10 (left maxmin	those values that we dete that maximizes the value ands of the depth 2 maxi- mizer can provide betwee tree (12 or between 13 ar	rmined in part a. Additions from the bottom maxin mizers that the best value in 6 and 10 while right mained 18) so none of the leaf	s strategy is not changin, so we can still nally, we know that the root maximizer nizers. Regardless of what Eve chooses, that the root can achieve from the right ximizer is 8). 10 is less than all possible values of the right subtree are possible
		leftmost maximizer is guathat the right maximizer of	ranteed to choose B . Since ould choose either C or	nce we don't know the va D. From the left minimi	that A will never be chosen because the lue of the right maximizer, it's possible zer's perspective, it is possible to select. Therefore, B , C , and D are all valid
	(iv)	[2 pts] Is it possible to pro	ine in this scenario?		
		 Yes because scores in 	each cell are bounded b	etween 1 and 9.	
		Yes but not for the re			
			ob, and Eve are all acting	g as maximizers.	
		O No but not for the re		.1	
			io where we are guarant		e bounded between 1 and 9, it is possible Consider the following example which
		Let $E_B = 9$ and $E_C = 1$ b will choose node B giving from her left subtree. From the maximizer will only of than $9 + 8 = 17$. However, score values. Therefore, the	e Eve's value at node B ag it the scores $[7, 9, 5]$. In the right side, the mathoose D if the left and reer, the maximum possible value Eve gets from D	From Eve's perspective, seximizer will look at node right scores in D (which value of Eve's score and D must be $E_D - (D_L + D_L)$)	Also let $X = 8$. The leftmost maximizer he will see the value $9 - (7 + 5) = -3$ and C which gives $[9, 1, 8]$. We know that we will call D_L and D_R) sum to greater it node D is 9 due to the bounds on all D_R and D_R which is less than the exchange that D is D and D so node D can be

pruned.

Q1(b) Self-Assessment - leave this section blank for your original submission. We will release the solutions to this problem after the deadline for this assignment has passed. After reviewing the solutions for this problem, assess your initial respons by checking one of the following options:
I fully solved the problem correctly, including fully correct logic and sufficient work (if applicable).
I got part or all of the question incorrect.
If you selected the second option, explain the mistake(s) you made and why your initial reasoning was incorrect (do not reiterate the solution. Instead, reflect on the errors in your original submission). Approximately 2-3 sentences for <i>each</i> incorrect sub-question.

(c) Eve is fed up with Alice and Bob teaming up and quits the game. Alice and Bob continue playing and decide to use brand new strategies that incorporate Eve's score for fun. This new game setup can be represented in the diagram below. In each of the following scenarios, Alice and Bob are aware of each other's strategies.




Figure 3: Game tree where Alice is the root and Bob controls the nodes in the middle level. Black triangles above a cell indicate that the cell's value contains the current player's score. (As a reminder, Bob's score is the right value and Alice's score is the left value.)

- (i) [2 pts] Alice and Bob agree to use the following strategy: each player maximizes their own score **plus** the average of the remaining two scores at each node. Assume that you can assign any value between 1 to 9 (inclusive) to all the leaf node scores. Is it possible to prune in this scenario?
 - O Yes.
 - No because Alice and Bob are both acting as maximizers.
 - O No because Alice and Bob are both acting as expectimax nodes.
 - O No but not for the above reasons.

Let $[S_1, S_2, S_3]$ refer to the scores in a node. Alice is trying to maximize $S_1 + \frac{1}{2}(S_2 + S_3)$ and Bob is trying to maximize $S_3 + \frac{1}{2}(S_1 + S_2)$. Jointly, they both end up maximizing $\frac{1}{2}(S_1 + S_2 + S_3)$ and the extra terms (Alice maximizing an additional $\frac{1}{2}S_1$ and Bob maximizing an additional $\frac{1}{2}S_2$) are not adversarial in any way. Therefore, Alice and Bob are both maximizing the same values so it is not possible to ever prune against the current best α value. Also, note that since we do not prune on equality, we would not prune all nodes after seeing [9, 9, 9] despite it being the maximum possible score given the bounds.

- (ii) [2 pts] Alice and Bob decide to follow a new strategy: each player maximizes their own score **minus** the average of the remaining two scores at each node. Assume that you can assign any value between 1 to 9 (inclusive) to all the leaf node scores. Is it possible to prune in this scenario?
 - Yes.
 - O No because Alice and Bob are both acting as maximizers.
 - O No because Alice and Bob are both acting as expectimax nodes.
 - No because Alice and Bob are maximizing different values which are not directly adversarial.
 - O No but not for the above reasons.

Let $[S_1, S_2, S_3]$ refer to the scores in a node. Alice is trying to maximize $S_1 - \frac{1}{2}(S_2 + S_3)$ and Bob is trying to maximize $S_3 - \frac{1}{2}(S_1 + S_2)$. We can disregard the S_2 term here since it only serves as an equal shift in both players' values. What we can see then is any increase to Alice's score (either due to increase in S_1 or decrease in S_3) will always result in a decrease in Bob's score. Therefore, Alice and Bob are playing an adversarial game and it is possible to prune. The following graph provides a specific example.




Figure 4: Part c solutions

Q1(c) Self-Assessment - leave this section blank for your original submission. We will release the solutions to this proble after the deadline for this assignment has passed. After reviewing the solutions for this problem, assess your initial respon by checking one of the following options:
I fully solved the problem correctly, including fully correct logic and sufficient work (if applicable).
○ I got part or all of the question incorrect.
If you selected the second option, explain the mistake(s) you made and why your initial reasoning was incorrect (do not retire the solution. Instead, reflect on the errors in your original submission). Approximately 2-3 sentences for <i>each</i> incorresub-question.