

## B Classic Collision Attack on Reduced Saturnin

When searching trails for classic rebound attack on **Saturnin**, we just tweak the target of the model in Section 3 by removing the factor of the complexity of inbound part. Namely, the new target for  $r_{in} = 2$  is

$$\sum Prob_r^i + \sum x_0^{i,j}. \quad (29)$$

As discussed in [23] and also in Section 6.1, when  $r_{in} = 3$ , the classic time complexity to solve Jean et al's 3-round inbound part is too large to be useful in the classic rebound attack. Hence, we only consider the case  $r_{in} = 2$ . The probability of the outbound phase has to be larger than  $2^{-n/2}$ .

**Classic collision on 5-round Saturnin.** We find a 5-round trail as shown in Figure 16. The probability to collide the plaintext and ciphertext is  $2^{-64}$ . The inbound part covers 2 round from state  $Y_1$  to state  $Z_3$ . The attack procedures are:

1. For fixed  $\Delta Y_1$ , and compute the  $\Delta X_2$ .
2. For each 64-bit value  $X_2[0, 4, 8, 12]$ , compute  $X'_2[0, 4, 8, 12]$ ,  $Y_3[0, 4, 8, 12]$  and  $Y'_3[0, 4, 8, 12]$ . Insert  $X_2[0, 4, 8, 12]$  into table  $L_0[\Delta Y_3[0, 4, 8, 12]]$ .
3. Similarly, build table  $L_1, L_2, L_3$ .
4. For each  $\Delta Z_3$ ,
  - (a) Compute  $\Delta Y_3$  and access  $L_0, L_1, L_2, L_3$  to get the pair  $(X_2, X'_2)$ .
  - (b) Check if the pair  $(X_2, X'_2)$  leads to a collision.

Since in Step 4, we have  $2^{64}$  possible differences for  $\Delta Z_3$ , we are expected to check  $2^{64}$   $(X_2, X'_2)$ . Since the probability of the outbound phase is  $2^{-64}$ , we are expected to get one collision. The time complexity is about  $2^{64}$  and the memory is about  $2^{64} \times 4 = 2^{66}$ .

**Classic free-start collision on 6-round Saturnin.** As shown in Figure 17, the inbound phase covers two rounds from state  $Z_1$  to  $Z_3$ . The trail in Figure 17 is much easier than Figure 10 and there are no conditions on the key. Hence, we just randomly pick a difference for the key  $\Delta K$  and a key pair  $(K, K')$  with  $K \oplus K' = \Delta K$  to perform the rebound attack. Then, the probability of the outbound phase is  $2^{-16-64} = 2^{-80}$  (note that the difference in both plaintext and ciphertext is equal to the difference in  $K$ ). The procedures are:

1. Chosen a fixed difference for the key, i.e.,  $\Delta K$  and a fixed pair  $(K, K')$ .
2. For each  $\Delta Y_1$ , compute  $\Delta X_2$ ,
  - (a) Build super S-box tables  $L_0, L_1, L_2, L_3$ .
  - (b) For each  $\Delta X_4$ ,
    - i. Compute  $\Delta Y_3$ ,
    - ii. Access  $L_0, L_1, L_2, L_3$  to get the the pair  $(X_2, X'_2)$ ,
    - iii. Check if  $(X_2, X'_2)$  leads to a collision.

We have  $2^{16+64} = 2^{80}$  possible differences for  $(\Delta Y_1, \Delta X_4)$ . Since the probability of the outbound phase is  $2^{-80}$ , we are expected to find one collision. The time complexity is about  $2^{80}$  and the memory complexity is  $2^{66}$ .