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INTRODUCTION: Speech and the Act of Address

> I call those operations social, which necessarily imply social intercourse with some other intelligent being who bears a part in them. A man may see, and hear, and remember, and judge, and reason; he may deliberate and form purposes, and execute them, without the intervention of any other intelligent being. They are solitary acts. But when he asks a question for information, when he testifies a fact, when he gives a command to his servant, when he makes a promise, or enters into a contract, these are social acts of mind, and can have no existence without the intervention of **some other intelligent being, who acts a part in them.** Between the operations of the mind, which, for want of a more proper name, I have called solitary, and those I have called social, there is this very remarkable distinction, that, in the solitary, **the expression of them by words**, or any other sensible sign, is accidental. They may exist, and be complete, without being expressed, without being known to any other person. **But, in the social operations, the expression is essential. They cannot exist without being expressed by words or signs, and known to the other party.**
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> Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man

> "My own relation [Einstellung] to my words is wholly different from other people's."
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> Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations

This book is an exploration of what a picture of speaking and telling looks like that concentrates on the fact of the relational nature of telling, the fact that in its primary instances, one speaker addresses another and thereby purports to

give the other person a reason to believe what he said. I call this situation the primary instance, and indeed much of the discussion to follow will concern two people in each other's presence, but I do not mean for that focus to suggest the denial of the institutional, indeed impersonal, character of language itself, or the fact that the sources of the words we hear and see in daily life are often far removed from us in space and time, or indeed not locatable at all. Our everyday encounters with language, even with what we might think of as testimonial uses of language, do not always involve encounters with persons. A familiar and inescapable fact of the contemporary scene is the confrontation with words, statements, claims, demands, solicitations and warnings whose origins are not available to us. These are, in an important sense, phenomena of speech without authors, certainly not authors we could confront or question, and often enough 'utterances' we have no reason to think anyone believes or has the standing to claim. Even in those cases where we rely on written signs to guide us in matters of life or death, these messages are often anonymous in their origins and circulation. We don't imagine there is any specific speaker to complain to when a road sign is ambiguous or leads us astray, let alone with regard to the inscriptions whose authors, if they ever had any, are long gone.

There is in addition, the enormous variety of "uses" and contexts of speech, both spoken and written, which lie outside the picture of one speaking telling something to another. Words are recited and preserved, performed in songs and incantations, practiced and repeated by rote, issued forth in cries of

pain or surprise, and carried along in stories, jokes, and curses. In none of these is anyone being asked to believe anything. And yet for all that, much is expressed, communicated and circulated in such verbal activities. In many such contexts, the speaker may think of himself as alone, apart from the fact that language itself is a social phenomenon. One's operations with words may be as solitary as playing with the items in a coin collection, even though money is also a social phenomenon. Many operations with words, then. do not immediately involve another person at all, and many of those that do address themselves to another person do not involve any attempt to convey information to another person. The category of meaningful speech is far wider than that of the communicative, and the category of the communicative is itself wider than the case of conveying information from one person to another. And yet, it is natural for philosophers and others concerned with the act of speaking and communication to take as central the case of one person telling something to another person. What does it mean to consider it the primary case, when it is hardly the universal case?

Part of what it means lies in the idea that for a speaker to be in a position to <u>say</u> anything, his words have to be seen to <u>count</u> for other people in certain ways. At a general level, the sounds or marks he makes must be accepted by others as belonging to a language which they share.[1] More specifically, the speaker must be credited with the ability to make what he says count as claim <u>about</u> something, something concerning the world he shares with other speakers.

[1] Cavell, <u>The Claim of Reason</u>, Chapter VII

Without that, the sounds produced could not progress beyond the status of cries or other manifestations of his state. If being a speaker means at a minimum the ability to say, assert, or claim something, then there is a further way, beyond the complexities of sharing a language, in which this capacity involves the recognition of a certain status, which in turn means that the speaker's ability to say something depends on other speakers. The idea of status and recognition here has several dimensions, including semantic competence and epistemological standing, but also dimensions associated with practical life, that is, moral, political and a certain sense of the economic, and I want to begin by placing the discussion to follow in some of these contexts.

The political dimension of the capacity for speech has several aspects, and finds expression in the relation between the very notion of saying something and such acts as making a claim, an assertion of oneself (along with the fact asserted), as well as the explicitly political acts of contracting, agreeing and refusing. The very language of authority and political rights describes these relations in terms of exercise of the specific capacities of a speaking animal. Joel Feinberg,[2] for instance, in a classic discussion of the notion of rights, links the very notion of rights to their assertion, to their embodiment in a claim of one party on another, and the recognition of that claim.

> AEven if there are conceivable circumstances in which one would admit rights diffidently, there is no doubt that their

[2] 'The Nature and Value of Rights'

> characteristic use and that for which they are distinctively well-suited, is to be claimed, demanded, affirmed, insisted upon.@

The language employed here is familiar enough, but what is worth emphasizing here is that the notion of political right is being related not to a particular content of what is claimed or asserted, but rather, the stance of the speaking subject itself. The very capacity to say, assert, make claims, is described as having a political dimension in that it is a power essentially addressed to others, and internally related to their recognition. A political subject is a speaking subject, but also conversely: to be a speaking subject is to claim a certain authority, not just to "give voice" to oneself, but to make a claim upon others, and to be recognized as exercising the capacity to commit oneself publicly, to bind oneself to specific others. A person may have full command of the vocabulary, syntax and grammar of a language and not be credited with the authority to tell anyone anything at all. Before a certain age, for instance, a young child is not in a position to promise, congratulate, or even announce an intention, despite having the verbal forms available to him, just as a full-grown adult speaker may not be credited with the authority to perform the speech-act of passing sentence or granting clemency.[3]

The idea of an internal relation between the very notion of the political and the capacity for speech has a much longer history, however, than the modern discourse of political rights. A classical tradition as far back at least to Aristotle makes the capacities of the speaker a condition on political life. In the Politics,

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[3] Feinberg: ATo respect a person then, or to think of him as possessed of human dignity, simply is to think of him as a potential maker of claims.@

Aristotle relates the idea of what distinguishes 'man' as the '*zoon politikon'* to the human being as the animal who speaks, in terms which distinguish the merely expressive capacities which we share with the other animals (including vocal expression) from an assertive capacity distinctive of speech.

> It is also clear why a human being is more of a political animal than a bee or any other gregarious animal. Nature makes nothing pointlessly, as we say, and no animal has speech except a human being. A voice is a signifier of what is pleasant or painful, which is why it is also possessed by the other animals (for their nature goes this far: they not only perceive what is pleasant or painful but signify it to each other). But speech is for making clear what is beneficial or harmful, and hence also what is just or unjust. For it is peculiar to human beings, in comparison to the other animals, that they alone have perception of what is good or bad, just or unjust, and the rest.
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> (Hackett translation).
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> **Aristotle Politics 1253a10ff**

The other gregarious animals, who live together in flocks, or schools, or herds, express themselves in various ways, and may even be said to communicate in various ways. The 'gift of speech', however, is said to make something else possible, which goes beyond "mere voice", the expression of pleasure and pain, and presumably beyond even the strategic display of states of fear or postures of threat. Aristotle does not explain what it is about mere voice that falls short of the ability to "make clear what is beneficial or harmful, and hence also what is just or unjust", or what it is in the human capacity for speech that enables it. But the contrast with the expression of states of pleasure and pain suggests that speaking in the sense that is relevant to political life, must go beyond the

indication or registration of states of the creature, and lay claim to standards of the beneficial or the harmful, the just and the unjust, and in that way relate itself to the responses of others.

It is in the Modern period, and with Hobbes in particular, that very idea of the political, that is, the possibility of a commonwealth, is tied to status and capacities of the speaking subject.[4] For Hobbes and others, it is only a creature who can talk, who can then bind himself to others and thus exercise the ability to form covenants, and thus separate itself from the chaos of the state of nature. The very notion of a person for Hobbes is tied to the capacities most characteristically expressed in speech. Chapter XVI of Leviathan is entitled 'Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated' and begins with the following definition.

> "A person is he whose words or actions are considered, either as his own,or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction.
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> When they are considered as his own, then is he called a natural person: and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then is he a feigned or artificial person."

In this passage, speech is seen as something that is essentially "one's own," defining one as a person, but at the same as something that is essentially transferrable, and this in two related ways. A person's very speech may be

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[4] Two recent studies which have illuminated this connection in Hobbes are Anat Biletzki's, Talking Wolves: Thomas Hobbes on the Language of Politics and the Politics of Language (Kluwer, 1997), and Philip Pettit's, Made From Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind and Politics (Princeton, 2008)

transferred to an artificial person who may then be said to speak in his place, to speak for him; and speech is the privileged medium (though not the only one) by which a person transfers what is his to another person, whether it be property, or a right, or as above his place to speak itself. A person is an Author, which means both an origin of something which expresses the person as such (as his solitary actions do), and is also, as a speaker, someone exercising the capacity to authorize, where that means delegate or transfer something of one's own. Hence the connection of the notion of the Person with the notion of Author describes a movement in two different directions: from the words back to their origin in the person, as expressive of him (much as an animal's cry is expressive of its internal state), and outwards from the speaker as origin, to other persons toward whom he exercises the authority to transfer or delegate his voice. Hence the internal connection in Hobbes between speech as authoring (originating) and speech as covenanting, that is, voluntarily binding oneself to others.

> Signs of contract are either express or by inference. Express are words spoken with understanding of what they signify: and such words are either of the time present or past; as, I give, I grant, I have given, I have granted, I will that this be yours: or of the future; as, I will give, I will grant, which words of the future are called promise. Lev, XIV, p. 82

Or as he puts it later in the same chapter, "all contract is mutual translation": the words must be "spoken with understanding of what they signify", and that understanding cannot be private to the speaker (that is, one sense of something's being "one's own") but must be shared by the other party to the contract for any contracting to take place. Again the specifically human capacity

of "authoring" must be understood as a relational power which in its very nature involves more than one person; that is, a capacity to originate something, a kind of utterance, which is nonetheless dependent for its completion on the understanding of another person. It is for this reason that Hobbes takes covenanting to be the exercise of a capacity proper to creatures with speech:

> To make covenant with brute beasts is impossible, because not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept any translation of right, not can translate any right to another: and without mutual acceptation, there is no covenant. (Lev. XIV)

There may be animals other than the human, either here in our world or elsewhere, who can contract with each other, but Hobbes' point would be that if they can, then they must have an expressive capacity that is not merely expressive (Aristotle's "mere voice"), but which includes the capacity to 'personate', to delegate one's voice, and thereby not only give voice to one's sentiments, but engage the understanding of another, and thereby "translate" something of one's own to another. One way to put the thought would be that being a speaker means being credited with the sense that the word's one "authors" are "one's own", and that this entails being credited with the capacity to transfer one's word to another and have that count.

This very language of ownership, counting, crediting, claiming and accepting take us to what might be called the political economy of speech. The metaphoric relations between words and money have long been a topic of investigation for philosophers, literary scholars and others, and it can easily seem

that the connections between the systems of language and money are pervasive enough, and the two systems themselves are abstract enough, that the sense of one discourse being metaphorical for the other becomes quite unclear.[5] Is it any more or less metaphorical to say that we credit someone's account when it is a story he has told us rather than a promise to pay for his groceries at the end of the month? Which domain is being used to illuminate the other when we speak of "giving one's word" or "accepting (or refusing to accept) a claim at face value"? Both the realms of property and everyday conversation are constituted by claims, counter-claims, and the negotiation of different forms of entitlement.[6] Words, like money, function as a medium of exchange; not only circulating among people (since viruses do that too), but specifically functioning as signs, that is, something perceptible which points to something else, something beyond the perceptible sign itself. Both conversational exchanges and monetary exchanges are made possible by the fact that the tokens themselves have their meaning and value as parts of an institution; that is, something transpersonal that precedes the individuals in the particular exchange itself. The institution makes possible a certain encounter between the parties to the exchange, but at the same time it relates them to others who are not present on the scene, but are removed from them in time and space. Though the other parties to the institutions of either speech or money are not physically present in the encounter of any two persons

[5] The theme itself can be traced back to antiquity. In recent times, two founding discussions are Marc Shell's The Economy of Literature (Johns Hopkins, 1978) and Jacques Derrida's 'White Mythology' (in Marges de la Philosophie, Paris, 1972). A recent study is Marcel Henaff's The Price of Truth: Gift, Money, and Philosophy (Stanford, 2010).

[6] The idea of a system of entitlements and commitments is, of course, central to Robert Brandom's vision of language and other "social operations of the mind".

on the street or marketplace, these transpersonal others must nonetheless make their presence felt. For the very meaning of the words and the value of the currency exchanged are constituted by their being taken to have that meaning or value. The entire structure is constituted by the mutually sustaining acceptance of the forms of value by the participants in the institution itself, without which the tokens themselves become worthless. And since what distinguishes money from barter, and speech from spontaneous gesture, is that the value of the token is tied to its continued convertibility with other parties beyond the two people in the initial exchange, this structure of acceptance must be assumed by the two parties to extend to other anonymous parties, whom they will never meet.

This institutional character of the economic and the realm of speech can give rise to a set of related anxieties; ontological, epistemological, and what we may call proprietary. The value of money and of words may be as real and consequential as an act of war or credit crisis, but such phenomena themselves illustrate how the reality of such things is itself constituted by appearance, by a mutually supporting network of congruent appearances and acceptance of appearances. In a sense, they are no more and no less than what they are taken to be. This extends to the realm of social power quite generally, for as Hobbes says "Reputation of power is power" (Lev. 10.5).[7] This general form of fact can seem by turns either metaphysically impossible, or a structure of folly and illusion and therefore inherently unstable, or as in Pascal, anticipating certain modern thinkers, a structure of folly and illusion and for that very reason as

[7] In the Behemoth, Hobbes goes further and says "the power of the mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people". This is quoted by Pettit on p. 94

stable as can be.[8] In this book, I will not be addressing the ontological issues concerning the constitution of social institutions, but beginning in Chapter Two, the importance of manifest appearance to the understanding of speech will begin to come into focus. For now, what I have in mind by the epistemological anxiety stemming from institutional character of language is just the fact that the parties to either form of exchange know that the meaning and value of their different currencies are dependent on a structure of appearance and acceptance that involves not just the two of them, but also on an undefined group of others who are participant in the same institution, the same language, and who must be assumed to be playing their role for the action the two of them are performing to mean what they take it to mean. But they will never meet these other parties to the convention, even though their relational activities implicate them with each other, and hence it is hard to see how the two speakers can know what it seems they need to know in order to be entitled to the confidence that they are performing the acts they take themselves to be performing. The connection of the capacity to speak with the political ability to make claims and assert oneself that we began with naturally suggests a picture of speaking as the expression of a form of authority, but the relational character of a particular speech-act and institutional character of language itself highlight the constitutive and epistemic dependence of the act itself on the context outside the two interlocutors.

The "proprietary" aspect of words relates the economic to the expressive.

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[8] "The power of kings is founded on the reason and the folly of the people, but especially on their folly. The greatest and most important thing in the world is founded on weakness. This is a remarkably sure foundation, for nothing is surer than that the people will be weak. Anything founded on sound reason is ill-founded, like respect for reason." Pensees 26.

Hobbes and others characterize a speaker's words as "his own" in a fundamental sense, but as with the fact that the very reality of property and currency depends on a transpersonal system of acceptance, it may be asked in what sense one's words can ever be "one's own". In what sense can I make them count for what I want them to count for, and in what sense can something I do insure that they will be accepted by the other person at the value I mean to give them? As with the currency in my pocket, if the other person does not do his part in the exchange, refuses to take them as face value, then the words I pronounce are worthless, not simply devalued. Hobbes' description of the person as "authoring" his words and his actions is meant, of course, to be cognate with the notion of 'authority', and at the same time to suggest the idea of expressing a power by being the origin of what is authored. The relation of this notion of authority to an idea of power is complicated by the fact that, as we have seen, for Hobbes himself as well as others in this tradition, an assertion of power of this kind must at the same time be an assertion of dependency, for political power, as opposed to brute physical power, depends on its being recognized and accepted as such. And the relation of this notion of "authoring" ones words with being their originator is likewise complicated by the fact that the words one speaks and the language they belong to all precede the speaker and are not his creation. They are not "his", and he is not their origin, in the way that his non-verbal, non-relational actions are "his", and originate from him, and therefore "express" him.[9] How then are they to be thought to "express" him when they don't belong to him

[9] One theme to be explored in later chapters is the contrast between relational and non-relational notions of 'expression'.

in the first place, and how does a speaker make them his own, especially when in his very production of speech he must make his performance of the words conform to the expectations of others if he is to make himself understood? Spoken words are of course one species of action, and we may presume some antecedent clarity to the notion of a person's actions being "his own" and, therefore, expressing that person, but for the reasons just briefly mentioned both this family of notions of authority, origin, and expression must be understood differently in the case of verbal actions. Exchange, transfer, and delegation, everything that goes into what Hobbes calls 'personating', are intrinsic to acts of speech and the powers they express, whereas they are not intrinsic to actions generally. A speaker may give his word to another, transfer his authority to another, whereas it is unclear what sense could be given to the idea of 'transfer' of other of his actions, like opening a door, without turning them into a kind of verbal act. A theme to follow up here is that the very complexities and ambiguities in the proprietary notion of a person's words as "his own", as contrasted with other actions of his, are what make possible the forms of commitment and entitlement that belong to ordinary speech acts like telling.

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The story developed here concerns how a speaker's assertion to another person comes to count a reason for that person to believe what he is told. It is an account of what is distinctive about this kind of act, and how this act must be

understood by it's participants. In this sense, rather than being concerned directly with epistemological questions, I am concerned here with the stage-setting for the ordinary speaker's telling each other this and that, and being believed or disbelieved. Of course, that description of the project is already committed to the epistemological claim that people do commonly come to know things through being told by others; and the further claim that the act of telling on the part of the speaker, and its acceptance by the person he is telling is part of the reason for belief the addressee takes himself to have been given, and that the speaker and his addressee are not wrong in this understanding of their action and belief. I mean for this to sound platitudinous, but it is hardly beyond controversy in philosophy. Philosophical interest in testimony is often inspired by very general epistemological concerns that tend to downplay or displace the relational character of the act of telling that interests me here. As mentioned at the beginning, it is undeniable that much of what we pick up from the speech of others, and what we reliably infer from the spectrum of verbal behavior around us, is not dependent on the forms of commitment that are part of telling someone something. There are three ways in particular in which the idea of speech as addressed to another person drops out of consideration in recent discussions. We may think of the interaction with the speech of other people as akin to ordinary sense perception, as something we relate to much as we do to natural signs.[10] In this comparison, the role of the human interlocutor and his relation to

[10] Quine and Ullian are explicit about this in The Web of Belief (p. 51). See also Ruth Millikan, "Coming to believe something by being told it is so, in the typical case, is the formation of a direct perceptual belief. Forming a belief about where Johnny is on the basis of being told where he is is just as direct a process (and just as indirect) as forming a belief about where Johnny is on the

his words and his addressee is rendered incidental to the phenomenon. In retreat from this, other accounts bring the speaker back into the picture, but only as it were as a psychological source: the audience needs access to the speaker's beliefs, because it is they that will, in fortunate circumstances, enable him to infer to some truth about the world. Here the speaker is present in the picture, but only as a believer and not as a speaker, and the specific nature of his act of addressing and telling is rendered irrelevant. (This point will be developed further later in this Introduction.) And finally, we may think of the broad class of utterances as a set of phenomena, available for epistemic assessment apart from their character as assertions or claims addressed by one person to another. The hearing of an utterance of any sort (a sudden cry, the recitation of some lines in a play) can, after all, be in the right circumstances the occasion for learning something, even learning something that is congruent with the semantic content of the words uttered. The epistemology of testimony can be conducted at a level of generality at which an utterance is treated as a perceptible phenomenon in the world, and the problem for the epistemologist is to determine under what circumstances such an encounter can be seen to yield true beliefs. And it is indeed true that at that level of description, for a range of interesting cases it need not matter to the reliability of the result that the hearer encounters an utterance that is believed or even understood by its speaker, or presented as an assertion at all. In the view presented in this book, I will be attempting to show in some detail that the very idea of a "form of life" consisting in telling,

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basis of seeing him there." (Varieties of Meaning), p. 120 Tyler Burge's comparison of the entitlement of testimony and of preservative memory similarly downplays the role of the interlocutor in testimony.

being told, being believed or disbelieved, requires the context of host of related notions, among which the ideas of understanding what one is saying (and reciprocally: understanding what is being said), and knowing which speech-act is being performed, are central. Certain epistemological projects can incline the philosopher to abstract the topic of testimony from the basic phenomena of assertion or telling, but I think that to do so risks losing touch with that distinctive topic altogether.

The account developed here depends throughout on understanding the practice of speaking, telling and believing from within the perspective of the participants themselves. When one person tells another person something, and thereby presents himself as giving that person a reason to believe something, it must be possible to make sense of the practice in a way that makes sense to the people in the exchange themselves. This is an explanatory demand that is often controversial in philosophy, when it is not simply dismissed. It is not a reasonable demand for every topic or question that is properly a subject of philosophic interest. If it has proper application anywhere, however, that would be in the domain of human practices. Practices such as paying money or enacting legislation are what they are in virtue of the understanding of these practices by the participants themselves. An 'outside' or anthropological perspective on them is nonetheless possible, and some practices may be integrated with beliefs which are so far removed from reality that the 'outside' perspective will retain little from the participants own understanding of it. Such

explanatory displacement comes at a price, however. For if the upshot is that the participants themselves are thoroughly deluded about their practice, then we are owed an account of the source, nature, and depth of the delusion itself. If the diagnosis deserves to be taken seriously, it cannot be simply the expression of frustration with some human phenomenon that remains stubbornly unreduced. A further risk of such explanatory displacement is that the effacement of the participant's perspective on the practice itself, creates an obligation for the 'outside' perspective to explain how it nonetheless remains an account of that practice, and not simply a change of subject.

In the ordinary act of telling someone that there is no more milk in the refrigerator, a speaker says some words and presents them to his audience as a reason to believe that there is no more milk there. For the speaker to succeed in this action, the other person has to understand him, must understand what he is doing with these words. This understanding, however, must take a special form. For there is a sense in which a psychiatrist or anthropologist or neuro-scientist may understand someone better than he understands himself. But the understanding the speaker needs in the above example is to be understood by his audience as he understands himself, in terms of the act he takes himself to be performing. In telling his audience something, the speaker seeks to be understood as he understands himself. If he does not succeed in this, he will not have told his audience anything ('though his audience may well have learned something from his performance). The speaker needs to be understood as saying something, and as making a claim in doing so. The idea of a claim or an

assertion is central to the speaker's understanding of how what he is doing is to provide his audience with a reason to believe something. And likewise, the audience needs to understand the speaker as claiming or asserting something for him to understand himself as having been told something, and hence as being in a position to believe or disbelieve this person. Every hearer is himself a speaker as well, and the complementarity of these roles is also part of their understanding of the acts of asking, telling, doubting, believing and questioning.

A person's words and actions may provide another person with reason to believe various things that may have nothing to do with the speaker's own understanding of what he is doing or what it means. And here epistemological internalists and externalists may disagree as to whether someone needs to have an appreciation of the relevant reasons in order to be justified or entitled to what he ends up believing in response to the other persons words and actions. On the other hand, it is a different question whether there is any reason left to think of the situation as involving such concepts as testimony or believing or disbelieving the speaker if the speaker's understanding of what he is doing in speaking is removed from consideration, or if the speaker's understanding of what he is up to is thought of as accidental to the reason for belief his audience obtains. I believe not, but the case for that will emerge in the course of the first few chapters.

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In several ways it can be natural for philosophers to think about speech and communication in the light of the "problem of other minds". Person A wishes Person B to know something that he knows, and hence needs to convey that information to B. Or perhaps he wishes to mislead B into believing something that isn't true at all. So A needs to do something, either to bring this knowledge out into the open where B can find it, or to produce something that will act upon the beliefs of B, altering them in some desired direction. And here may begin the influence of a certain picture of what he needs to do and why he needs to do it. In the case of communication of knowledge that he possesses, he needs to externalize it somehow so that B may become aware of it, since B cannot see into A's mind where the knowledge is presently located. If B could read his mind, there would be no need for A to do or say anything. From B's point of view, when he desires to know what A knows, he needs this knowledge of A's to be made visible or audible somehow. Since B may not always trust A's expertise on various subjects, and hence may not credit him with knowledge, B's concern is to gain access to A's beliefs about some matter, and once in possession of these B can then make up his own mind as to whether these beliefs are to be trusted (and thus count as knowledge after all). In either case, A's knowledge or A's beliefs are inaccessible to B unless something in A's behavior makes them evident.[11]

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[11] Reid: When we see the sign, and see the thing signified always conjoined with it, experience may be the instructor, and teach us how that sign is to be interpreted. **But how shall experience instruct us when we see the sign only, when the thing signified is invisible**? Now is this the case here; the thoughts and passions of the mind, as well as the mind itself, are

Naturally, there are many different ways for a person's knowledge or beliefs to be evident in his behavior. Famously, the man grabbing an umbrella on his way out probably believes it may rain today, and someone else observing this behavior may both learn of this belief of his, and gain a reason of his own to take an umbrella. We may thus think of the umbrella-grabbing as an Indicative Sign of the man's state of mind, revealing to an observer his probable belief that it may rain (and yes, also his desire to stay dry, and not the one without the other). Here it is an intentional act of the person that serves as an Indication of his attitude. Of course inadvertent acts and unconscious reactions can just as easily serve as signs of a person's state of mind, even as signs of a person's knowledge, and detectives and others make a practice of noticing and interpreting such signs. If their status as indications required their always being intentional acts (let alone: intentional with respect to the specific aim of indicating something about themselves), a detective like Sherlock Holmes would have little opportunity for displaying his ingenuity.

But speech is special in various ways, or at least speech that is part of the family of acts such as asserting, telling, asking or promising. Speech of these forms is both necessarily an intentional act (and not, e.g., a mere reaction like blushing), and intentional with respect to the aim of communicating something. It is speech within this family of acts that is our focus here, and I will sometimes use the word 'speech' and its cognates without qualification to refer to this family.

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invisible, and therefore their connection with any sensible sign cannot be first discovered by experience; there must be some earlier source of this knowledge. (EIP VI, v [449b–450a]; see also EIP VI, vi [460a]). **Woltersorf** 168

This is not to deny that there are other forms of talk, other verbal phenomena, which are not communicative acts or not even actions at all. Talking in one's sleep is arguably not an action at all (unless dreaming or snoring are also actions), and the words that may be produced by stimulation of some region of the brain are not actions of the person (not accidental or inadvertent actions either). Speaking in tongues , or the processes involved in "automatic writing", if seen as actions at all, are only so in a qualified sense (and indeed the idea that the source is not in the agent but somewhere else is important to the people who go in for that sort of thing). Any of these may be indicatively revealing, however, and may enable one to conclude something about the state of mind of the person. More familiarly, ordinary speech can be as spontaneous as a cry of pain or surprise, and manifest the state of mind of the person apart from any intent to do so. In a broad sense, then, we may see all these as forms of making visible (or audible) something about the mind of the person in question, but these forms of making visible do not depend on the indicative verbal sign being produced with communicative intent, or even being part of an action of the person at all. In a given case, the epistemic value of the sign as indication may indeed only be enhanced by the assumption that it was not part of an action of the person, communicative or otherwise. These are the types of indication that the detective's mode of intelligence will be particularly interested in.

Verbal behavior that is part of the family of telling and asserting, however, must be seen as an intentional act of the person for it to be the kind of thing it is, and for it to have the distinctive epistemic role that it has. It is essential to the

way that someone's assertion provides a reason to believe something (about the speaker's beliefs, or about the topic of his assertion) that it be seen as an intentional act of the person. Someone may pronounce the same words in his sleep, or under hypnosis, or as a result of stimulation of the brain, and these words will not count as him asserting or telling anything. If we were at first mistaken about this, and assumed that what we just heard was someone's assertion, and then learn our mistake about the actual provenance of the words we just heard, we see that we don't after all have the kind of reason for believing something that we thought we had. We might have a different kind of reason (the sort that might be the conclusion of the reasoning of the doctor or detective), but we don't have the kind of reason that is presented as being on offer when someone tells us something, makes a declaration to us.

So, when communicative speech does provide its audience with a reason to believe something (viz., the content of what is asserted, in the case of assertion), it does so in a way that is dependent on the assumption that the utterance is part of an intentional act of the person, and specifically a communicative intentional act. That is, the verbal behavior must not only be intentional (as talking in one's sleep is not), but must be intentional "under the description" of a communicative act of some sort. That is, a piece of verbal behavior might be fully intentional, as when someone reads aloud from a list of French verb conjugations, without being intentional with respect to any communicative aim of his. A person's utterance is something the person does,

and as such, it will be intentional only when described certain ways and not others. (This distinction matters as well to more precise characterization of just how an utterance must be intentional to be the kind of reason for belief that telling and asserting provide. That is, a person may indeed accidentally or inadvertently tell someone something, and in that sense the telling is not intentional, or not fully so. But for the utterance to be even an inadvertent act of telling someone something, it must be seen to be intentional as an assertion (and not, that is, as either "automatic" as in hypnosis, or intentional in the manner of reading out a list of verbs.)

When we turn out to have been wrong in either of these assumptions (it was not an act of the person at all, it was not a communicative act) the person's utterance loses the epistemic import for us that we thought it had. We thought someone had asserted, threatened, or promised something, but we now see that she had done no such thing, and so we don't have the reason to believe or to fear that we thought we had. Naturally, as above, we may retain another kind of reason to believe something, a reason proceeding from the broad class of indicative signs stemming from things people do, but we lack the kind of reason associated with being told something and believing that person. There is nothing of that sort on offer here, after all.

How can what I have called the "epistemic status" of a piece of speech depend in this way on the assumption that it is part of an intentional action of the person, and indeed intentional as a specifically communicative act? How can

there be this kind of epistemic dependence at all? That is, if some phenomenon (a symptom, an utterance) is genuinely a reason to believe something, then (it may seem) this must be an objective fact about it, independent of anyone's beliefs or intentions with respect to it, including the person who produced the sign. If the specific epistemic import of an act of telling or asserting is dependent on its character as act and as communicative act, how then does the exercise of agency contribute positively to this epistemic import?

The picture of speech from the point of view of the traditional problem of "other minds" suggested that the import of speech is to make manifest our internal states of belief, intention, desire, etc. Without speech we would have nothing but our natural gestures to reveal to each other what is in our minds. This picture encourages a restricted importance to the idea of intentional action in this context: an act of the person is required in order to produce a visible or audible sign of his state of mind, for the other person to see or hear. Something must make one's state of mind manifest to the other person, but this picture suggests that a passively produced sign will often be just as good, and in many cases a more reliable sign than the one produced with communicative intent. So the intentional character appears as external to the nature of the sign as indication, and may even interfere with its reliability.

This picture also suggests that the verbal sign, once produced, is as it were left behind as a phenomenon in the world, like a footprint or any other clue that a person might either deliberately or inadvertently leave behind in the course of his comings and goings. Whatever its epistemic status might be does not

depend on the producer's retaining any special relation to it after it is produced. Later we will have occasion to discuss how if this were so, then the speaker's relation to the epistemic import of his own words would be the same as anyone else's. This would follow from the idea that the epistemic import of his words is an objective fact, independent of anyone's beliefs or intentions with respect to them. Thinking doesn't make it so, and genuine evidential value isn't something that can be breathed into one's words by an act of will. As an objective fact then, the epistemic import of the speaker's words would be something that he himself might speculate about, inquire into, or report on. The denial of this, and the denial that 'believing someone' can describe a relation in which one can stand toward oneself is, I believe, something contained in Wittgenstein thought that "My own relation to my words is wholly different from other peoples." [12]

If the epistemic import of the sign as phenomenon must be a fully objective fact, independent of anyone's wishes or attitudes with respect to it, this suggests not only a certain picture of the nature of the sign in question (i.e., that of an object or phenomenon one encounters), but also a certain view of the character of the act in question, that makes the utterance what it is. For on this view it can only be a notion of agency as production that is in question: the speaker produces a phenomenon (a sound, a sign), which then has an independent existence in the world, with certain consequences for the epistemic states of other people. Later we will see the need to invoke a different

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[12] A striking exception to the thought that I can stand in any relation to myself that I can stand to others is that of belief. Why apparently can I not, in grammar, believe myself?
Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 390

conception of agency to account for the epistemic status of the utterance, and the role of the speaker in constituting that status. If a passively or inadvertently produced sign will be just as good as an indication of the other person's state of mind, and if an intentionally produced sign involves an additional risk for the other person, since it may after all be produced with deceptive intent, this suggests that the ideal situation would be if could dispense with all such mediation altogether. Any of these external signs, intentional or not, communicative or not, are on this view simply forms of mediation between one person and the state of mind of another person. Whether I wish to know the mind of another because that gives me access to his beliefs and thus potentially to knowledge of the world I am interested in, or whether I am interested in his states of mind because I wish to know him, in either case it seems that his words can only be for me a second-best, as compared to an ideal of transparent, unmediated access to the contents of his mind.

The importance of the verbal sign was always only its visibility, it audibility, as the indication for something not itself visible or audible. Hence ideally it should be dispensable. And yet this does not always seem to be so, not even ideally. We may think of contracts or apologies, for instance. They too require some overt enactment, embodied in something like a signed piece of paper, a gesture, or an explicit declaration. One person has not contracted with another even if he is gifted with the ability to read minds, and knows with certainty the facts of the other person's conditional intent. Nor have they contracted if each of them were similarly gifted. Rather, they must each do something, an act is

required, and what they do must take the form of something manifest, public, like a document or a gesture. Similarly, A may know with perfect certainty that B is aware with perfect certainty of A's remorse for his behavior the night before, but for neither of them need this knowledge mean that an apology could only be superfluous. We might say, in such cases, that a token needs to be produced and shown, but the point of the token isn't simply to be proof of either the other person's remorse or conditional intent, since the parties in question could have no doubts on these scores without that obviating the need for a declaration of some kind. In this way the conception of the relevant agency in terms of production intersects with the picture of the relevant notion of sign to be that of a thing or phenomenon, an indication of some sort. The sign, then, is the thing produced, which is then subject to epistemic assessment like any other phenomenon we encounter.

So, sometimes at least, the overt act is not dispensable. In these acts, the point of the visible sign is not that of something mediating between one person and his epistemic goal: knowledge of another person's state of mind. The importance of the document or the gesture does not lie in being a visible, indicative sign for something else that is not visible. (Or not entirely anyway: the person's sincerity has its own importance, of course, and Chapter Two will take up the meaning of the assumption of sincerity in such cases.) Rather, in cases like that of contract or apology, the document or gesture is important not as a dispensable indication of something else, but rather as a constituent element in an act the two people perform, an act that is of its very nature visible

and overt. The document or gesture is not a phenomenon left behind like a clue (pointing beyond itself), but rather is an element in an act that relates the two people to each other. In this sense, unlike the relation of smoke and fire, the visible document or gesture is not a mediator at all, between its visibility, materiality, and something else which it points to.

In thinking about the role of speech in the context of testimony, that is, speech that purports to present a reason to believe something, these very considerations may suggest that this dimension of communicative speech, and the contrasts that have been drawn between acts of speech and indicative signs, cannot really be relevant to the topic. One thought would be: If mutual mind-reading could not substitute for the document or gesture, and what matters instead in these cases is the performance by two people of an act that relates them in a certain way, this shows that these more specifically relational aspects of communicative speech have nothing to do with knowledge or with the specifically epistemic role of speech. If certainty (epistemic certainty, that is) about either the remorse or the conditional intentions of another person still does not provide what is accomplished by an overt act involving a gesture or a document, that could only mean that the overt act has nothing to do with knowledge-conveying function of speech, indeed nothing to do with the communicative function of speech, at least as narrowly conceived.

That would be a hasty conclusion, however. For one thing, when person A does make the gesture or signs the document, person B does learn something

about A; he learns, for instance, that he has contracted with him. This is a genuine piece of knowledge which, by hypothesis anyway, could not have been available to B in any other way. So, I am suggesting, the Indicative picture of speech that we began with already begins with an artificially restricted sense of what the properly epistemic interests of speech might be. That is, these interests are seen as confined to knowledge of the state of mind of the other person, which in fortunate, ordinary cases of true beliefs and honest intentions allows us to conclude reliably to some fact in the world, and hence be knowledge-conducing. But the relevance of overtness or enactment can still play a properly epistemic role, without for that being an indicative role. The difference is that here the "making visible", or what I will later call being "manifest" is intrinsic rather than extrinsic to the particular epistemic role it plays. Secondly, it would be hasty to conclude that because this dimension of speech focuses on the establishment of a specific form of relation between persons, rather than a relation of indication between a sign and what it indicates (this indicated object at the other end being the epistemic goal, it would seem), that we are therefore dealing with a dimension of speech that is not part of its role as a conveyor of knowledge. It will be argued later that the specific form of agency exercised overtly in these verbal acts of relation is the very form of agency that constitutes an utterance as any kind of assertion or other illocution in the first place, and thus as even a candidate for belief or disbelief.

In Chapter Three we will develop the idea that the relevant notion of 'agency' here is not that of production, but rather the agency expressed in the

exercise of what is called a "normative power".[13] It is of the nature of "normative powers" generally to be relational, that is, expressed in the establishment (or cancelling) of forms of relation between people. The importance of the aspect of speech as an intentional act (and which distinguishes speech from other indicative signs) is not that of making something happen, but rather the agency expressed in performing an act toward (or with regard to, etc.) another person. Any account of speech and testimony has to say something about why it matters to the epistemic status of a piece of speech that it was produced intentionally and with awareness. That is, any story of the transmission of knowledge in this way owes an account of the importance of the intentional character of communicative speech, and thus an account of the kind of agency involved. The Indication picture and the Productive conception of agency that goes with it, suggests the wrong account of this importance, and confronts a host of paradoxes. The general thought to be developed here will be that only by focusing on the relational aspect of speech, rather than its status as indicative sign, can we understand how an utterance comes to be a reason to believe something, of the kind that we commonly give and receive in telling and being told.

We have briefly seen how the Indicative picture suggests a wrong answer to the question why it should matter to the status of the verbal sign that it was produced intentionally. It suggests that either it shouldn't matter at all, or that it may just as often have negative rather than positive import that the sign was

[13] Taking this idea from Joseph Raz, and as developed by others including Stephen Darwall and Tamar Schapiro.

produced intentionally. The relational picture, by contrast, in taking the agency in question to be the exercise of a normative power rather than the production of an effect, and seeks to describe this agency as a constitutive element of the status of the utterance as a reason to believe something, rather than the production of something that then has some epistemic import on its own. The claim will be that we need to see this agency as relational in order to account for how it could be a constituent element in the epistemic status of the utterance, and not something extrinsic to it (bearing some causal, productive relation to the phenomenon.)

Just as any account must say something about the importance of the fact that a piece of verbal behavior must be seen as intentional for it to have the status of an assertion or testimony, any account must also say something about the related fact that a piece of verbal behavior must be seen as done with awareness for it to have the status as an assertion. The discussion of the Indicative picture has already suggested a tendency to down-play the importance of agency and awareness in the probative value of verbal signs. (In this way, the Indicative picture is the empiricist version of the "hermeneutics of suspicion", and the role of "signs" and their decipherment in that discourse.) But the point is not the denial that, e.g., the inadvertent gasp can be more reliable or more revealing than the carefully composed speech, but rather that the basic phenomena of asserting and telling present a distinctive form of reason for belief, and that these acts depend for their very being on having been done intentionally and with awareness. Once an act of assertion is granted to have taken place,

then of course it may be profitably reflected upon for what it reveals of the person unconsciously and inadvertently. But even those 'external' interpretive reflections must begin with the assumption that an assertion about something has been made, which requires that it be made intentionally and with awareness, 'though not, of course, intentional under every possible description of it.

[RM1]

The point is that we must not confuse the claim that there are forms of Indicative epistemic import that apply to any (i.e., intentional, or "automatic", "hypnotic") verbal behavior (all of which is perfectly true), with the denial that the speech-acts of assertion and the like must be done with awareness to be done at all. The latter thought simply doesn't follow from the former one. The claim about the conditions for assertion and the like is not deniable, nor is the idea that these acts present themselves as carrying a distinctive kind of reason to believe, one that their unconscious variants could never have. So the claim to be developed here will be that we need a relational story, one which distances itself from the indicative picture, to account for the importance of the speaker's awareness and understanding of what he is doing to the story of telling, along with a corresponding awareness and understanding on the part of his interlocutor. The indicative story will either give no answer here, or a negative answer, or a wrong answer.

The condition of awareness and understanding on such an account will mean several things. For the utterance of person A to be an assertion, something that gives B a reason to believe what is asserted, A has to be credited

with knowledge of at least the following kinds.

- He must know what he is doing, in the most basic sense of knowing that he is saying something.

- He must know what he is saying. He must understand the language he is speaking, otherwise no words he speaks can amount to an assertion.

- He must know that he is saying these words to assert something, and not simply reciting some lines, or paraphrasing someone else. He must know in general which illocution he is performing with these words.

- If he is telling someone that P, he must know that he is presenting his utterance as a reason for that person to believe something; specifically to believe the content of what he is saying. Hence he must take himself to be in a position to provide another person with such a reason for belief.

Two aspects in particular of this knowledge that the speaker must be assumed to have will come up for attention later. One is that to make sense of this assumption of knowledge, and the role this assumption plays in constituting as assertion as a reason to believe, we must understand this as practical knowledge, rather not theoretical or observational knowledge. We can begin to see this if we reflect on the fact that, for example, a speaker's uncertainty about whether he is indeed asserting something with his words (rather than something else) will normally be part of what compromises the characterization of it as an assertion. A speaker may waver between claiming outright that the cat is on the mat, and supposing, speculating, surmising or imagining the same state of

affairs, and the wavering in question is at one at the same time a matter of how he means to commit himself and what illocution he means to be performing. For the speaker to claim outright that the cat is one the mat is for him to commit himself outright to that proposition, and he knows his illocution in knowing his commitment. This is one dimension of the practical nature of the knowledge a speaker must be presumed to have in performing ordinary actions of assertion and telling.

A second aspect of the knowledge a speaker must be presumed to have of what he is doing concerns the relational aspect of illocutions generally. There is a particular challenge for any story which stresses the fact that speech-acts such as assertion involve two parties, a speaker and a hearer, who must each play their part in any successful act of telling. The simple act of telling involves an interlocking system of authority and dependence. The speaker has not managed to perform the act of telling or promising if there is no recognition of what he is up to by the other person, as would be if the telephone line went dead, or if he is speaking a language the other person cannot understand. The proper understanding of "uptake conditions" for ordinary speech acts will occupy us later. For now I want to point out a problem that emerges. On a relational story, the speaker's knowledge of what he is doing and what he is in fact accomplishing is highlighted in the case of illocutions in a way that goes beyond the background conditions of knowledge that were briefly described earlier. For it is characteristic of the form of the illocutionary acts (as contrasted with the perlocutionary acts, such as to 'convince', or 'annoy') that the speaker may accomplish it by naming

the very act in question and claiming in that announcement to have thereby done it. The speaker may say, for example, "I hereby congratulate, warn etc", and deliver this as a knowledgeable claim about what he is then and there doing. This is itself a claim that he is making, and thus he will at least be presenting himself as speaking from knowledge when he does so. But how can the speaker claim to know that he has done the thing in question? This needs an answer, since it is the relational story itself that stresses the dependence of the speech act on the correlative role being played by the speaker and the addressee of the speech act. The speaker has to, in an important sense, defer to the addressee for the accomplishment of his act, and this deference is intrinsic to it. It is not something he could in principle overcome. If so, how can the speaker claim to know that he has done the thing in question ("hereby") in the very saying of it? How is any such claim to knowledge on the part of one of the parties consistent with the relational nature of the act in question?

Later, we will have occasion to ask the converse question: how could any such relational acts be accomplished apart from the claim to knowledge of accomplishment on the part of the speaker? Nothing could happen if the speaker could only, as it were, offer any of his claims or other illocutions in a tentative, speculative spirit, so that none of his words could be known by him to be acts of telling, warning, etc.; or if he could only know these things observationally, and after having first spoken and waited upon the result. --- What will be needed is an account of practical knowledge that is relational practical knowledge, that involves two parties and not just one. A speculation to

be explored later is that the felt need for some such notion is what has inclined many philosophers to think that to account for successful acts of promising or contracting we must imagine that a kind of unified agent has been produced, that the deference and otherness of the relational pair has been overcome in a higher unity. I want to argue that this is quite generally a mistake, and that any account of relational acts of such as promising or illocutions generally must resist the lure of a greater Unity and preserve the distinctness of the relata. This requirement obviously sharpens the demand for an account of what the speaker can legitimately claim to know when he announces what he has "hereby" done.

The ideas of owning, giving and receiving take us back to the themes of the political economy of speech, and specifically the understanding of the importance of such things as the overt gesture or document in these exchanges. As has already been suggested, the very meanings of manifestation and mediation are different in what I've been calling the indicative and the relational models (which goes with the difference in the respective notions of "act" in the two models). We saw earlier, in contrasting Indicative signs with speech acts such as contracts, promises, and apologies that in these latter cases the overt gesture or document is somehow intrinsic to the act in question, and not just the external sign of the accomplishment of something that actually takes place elsewhere (e.g., in the minds of the participants). One may still ask how the

overt gesture or document (the embodiment, or manifestation) could matter to the actual reason-giving force of the act in question other than in the manner of an Indicative sign. It may be hard to see how the overt word, gesture or document could be anything other than a further level of physical mediation between the parties involved.

We have criticized the idea of "mind-reading" because in describing a condition of immediate awareness of the mental life of another, it fails to describe the relation of two participants in the act of communicating with each other. In eliminating all intervening medium of communication, the picture of mind-reading does not present an ideal case, but rather leaves the idea of actual encounter or act of communication out of the picture altogether. However, we have only stepped half-way outside of this picture if in reaction to this criticism we draw the conclusion that what is then required is a visible or audible act that which serves as a palpable, mediating sign between the interlocutor and the mind of the speaker. In this way the indicative model is still controlled by terms of the original telepathic fantasy. As an indicative sign, the appearance of smoke may be said to mediate between an observer and the fact of fire somewhere. The phenomena of smoke and fire themselves are phenomena which are each describable independently of each other, but which stand in certain causal relations to each other. By contrast, the words and actions which are part of an encounter between two people are not mediating between them in this sense at all. Consider how, in ordinary life two people may have knowledge of each other's states of mind, without ever encountering each other. For instance, in

Middlemarch, compare the knowledge that Dorothea and Casaubon have of each other when he first learns of his illness:

> ADorothea told him that she had seen Lydgate, and recited the gist of her conversation with him about the Hospital. Mr. Casuabon did not question her further, but he felt sure that she had wished to know what had passed between Lydgate and himself. AShe knows that I know,@ said the ever-restless voice within; but that increase of tacit knowledge only thrust further off any confidence between them.@ Middlemarch Chapter 44, end.

The realization of the telepathic idea of transparence to another mind would not remedy this situation or bring it any closer to the ordinary situation of encounter, for the two knowledges in question would still be held privately. By contrast, an encounter between people requires some kind of act which relates them to each other. But it must be possible to describe the act as relating them to each other, rather than as interposing a further thing between them, in the manner of smoke and fire. For the description of an encounter must, as it were, be sufficient unto itself, and not the description of a concrete, palpable substitute for something whose genuine reality takes place off-stage. The signed document or the handshake are visible enactments of agreement, forms of externalization, and as such they relate the two parties to each other. That is, the meaning of the act is not that a piece of paper now exists which substitutes as indicative sign for a non-relational form of mind-reading which is unfortunately unavailable to them. Rather, a document or a handshake is enacted as part of the performance of an act which relates the two parties to each other, and establishes a new space of normative roles for them as a pair of partners. These forms of relation are not logically independent of each other, but rather define various correlative roles,

such as those of buyer and seller. The sense of externalization is thus not that of a visible, mediating indication of something else, but rather as the performance of the relational act itself, an act which does not simply take place in the open, but which is addressed the one to the other

A related way in which the story to be developed here involves a wholly different notion of manifestation (the importance of something overt, demonstrated), lies in the central aspect of the Illocutionary according to which the Presentation is the Deed itself. That is, for person A to have presented himself to person B as promising or asserting that P just is for A to have promised or asserted P to B. At the level of the illocutionary (that is, the explicitly relational), there is, in a sense, no room for an Appearance / Reality distinction, and that is central to understanding the very notions of Appearing or Manifesting in this context. Person A may be perfectly duplicitous or insincere, with no intention of fulfilling his promise; nonetheless in virtue of his presenting himself as promising to B (and B's picking up on this in the appropriate way) he has well and truly promised. He cannot remove himself from responsibility by saying "Look, I only pretended to promise (tell you) that P. Privately, I never meant it.". Nothing about a difference between what he presented himself as doing (in the right context, etc.) and what he privately intended at the time detracts from the fact that he did indeed promise or tell, and that, of course, is B's complaint.

This feature of the illocutionary will naturally seem senseless on the

indicative model. The acts of promising or telling were only of interest insofar as they were reliable indicators of the speakers intentions or beliefs. Absent that, these verbal forms could only have a ceremonial meaning. By contrast, the relational story will say that this fact about the conditions for accomplishment of illocutions generally shows that the Indicative notion of Manifestation or externalization is hopeless in this context. The relational story will also say that the reason that there is not this room for an Appearance / Reality distinction follows directly from the relational nature of the phenomenon itself. What an illocution accomplishes is the incurring of responsibilities and obligations on the part of the Speaker, responsibility with regard to the person being promised or told. It is the exercise of a normative power, the assumption of a certain role by the speaker and the corresponding entitlement of the addressee to certain forms of answerability from the speaker, including complaint in the event of non-compliance. What will be argued is that it is of the nature of the exercise of such normative powers that they are effected through the presentation of one person to another. The realm to be explored is where acts are accomplished, one person toward another, through the sheer recognition by one person of the other person's manifested intent to perform. Chapter Three discusses this in connection with Jennifer Hornsby's 'reciprocity condition', where recognition of what the speaker means to be doing is sufficient for the accomplishment of that act itself. The claim to be made out will be that this condition of accomplishment could only apply to relational acts.