Self-Consciousness

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conception of material reality, through which Williams interprets it and which has impeded the development of a true materialism. Williams forgets a peculiarity of the nature of man that affects the way in which we know it: the nature of man is *our* nature. If we inquire into the nature of knowledge, we inquire into our own nature. And knowledge of ourselves must, in the case that is fundamental in the sense that only in virtue of it do we know ourselves, be unmediated first person knowledge. Such knowledge is not based on observation. The science of man, of which the theory of knowledge forms a part, is not an empirical science. It is pursued not by observing men and drawing inferences from these data but by articulating what we know of man by being men.[32]

32. Michael Thompson discusses the implications of this form of knowing man for ethical theory in "Apprehending Human Form."

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The Second Person

We have given an account of self-consciousness in terms of a certain form of predication. Thoughts that exhibit this form articulate knowledge from spontaneity, i.e., from reasoning under a formally represented order. Predicated in this way are concepts of thought, practical and theoretical. We have not yet touched on how these concepts are applied to someone else. And it may seem that we can leave this question alone, for it is clear that the way in which I know that someone else is doing something intentionally or believes that something is the case is different from the way in which I know these things of myself. Having distinguished the manner of knowing that sustains first person reference, it seems we have finished our task.

In fact we have not. It is often said that certain concepts, e.g., concepts of experience and action concepts, are self-ascribed in a special manner, different from the way in which they are ascribed to someone else. Equally frequently is it added that, yet, the same concepts are ascribed in these different ways. It is not obvious how both can be true. If ways of predicating what seems to be one concept are simply different, then we must conclude that the corresponding expression is ambiguous.[1] It does not help to insist that the expression must bear a uniform sense in its first person and its second person use.[2] We seek to understand how it can, which we do only if we recognize the first person use and the second person use of the expression as guises of one form of predication. Therefore, an account of self-consciousness that only says how action concepts and concepts of experience are applied to oneself is incomplete. We do not

1. Compare Donald Davidson, "First Person Authority", pp. 7–8.

2. This is as far as P. F. Strawson's argument in the chapter "Persons" of *Individuals* takes us. See pp. 99–101.

comprehend first person predication until we see that and how it is one side of a form that has two sides, the other side being the manner in which the same concepts are predicated of someone else. In this chapter, we describe the application of concepts of thought to someone else in a way that reveals its unity with the first person use of these concepts.

We shall proceed as follows. In the first section, we inquire into the form of explanation of someone else's actions and beliefs, equivalently, into the kind of causality such explanations represent. As in the case of first person reference, the form of knowledge that sustains reference to a second person transpires from the way in which her self-conscious acts are explained. In the preceding chapters we argued that, in first person explanation, explaining the act *is* judging it to conform to an order of reason in virtue of its cause. It may seem that this is not true of second person explanation. Perhaps the cause must *appear to the acting subject* to be something that reveals her act to conform to the relevant order. But as she may have skewed ideas of this order, representing the causality cannot *be* representing her to conform to this order. Yet, this view of second person explanation cannot be true, for it excludes that the same concepts figure in first person and in second person thought. In fact, explanations of the form on which action concepts and the concepts of belief and experience applied to someone else depend explain self-conscious acts in terms of their subject's *knowledge* of the relevant order of reason and, therefore, in terms of *the order itself.* In the second section, we shall consider what this means for the way in which I know another self-conscious subject. There is a sense, which we shall explain, in which I know a second person *from spontaneity.* Second person knowledge is not receptive, but spontaneous; it is not from the senses, but from thought. In the third section, we describe how this form of knowledge underwrites a distinct form of reference, the linguistic expression of which is the *second person pronoun,* "you". Anticipating this result, we speak throughout the chapter of the other subject as a second person. As the words indicate, the third person comes after the second person.

Second Person Explanation

Since first person thoughts about actions and beliefs essentially are terms of explanations of a certain form, the kind of predication they exhibit and the kind of knowledge they articulate transpires from this form of explanation. In the same way, we arrive at an account of the form of predication, or form of knowledge, that constitutes second person thought by inquiring into the form of explanation of someone else's actions and beliefs.

Causality of Thought and Causality of Reason

Actions and beliefs are terms of explanations such that she whose acts are explained in this way concludes on the ground of the given cause that she believes something it is right to believe or is doing something it is good to do. The explanation represents a *causality of thought,* a causal nexus that involves the subject's thinking that her act conforms to an order of reason in virtue of its cause. Hence, when she herself gives the explanation, she thinks of it as showing that she is doing or believes something that she should do or believe; she thinks her act conforms to the relevant order in virtue of the cause that she gives. For her, the explanation, representing a causality of thought, represents, as we may put it, a *causality of reason:* a causal nexus sustained by the relevant order of reason.

Let us dwell for a moment on the notion of a causality of reason, as it may seem strange. In fact, it is perfectly familiar. John McDowell expounds it in a passage we quoted in Chapter 3:

> The concepts of propositional attitudes have their proper home in explanations of a special sort: explanations in which things are made intelligible by being revealed to be, or to approximate to being, as they rationally ought to be. This is to be contrasted with a style of explanation in which one makes things intelligible by representing their coming into being as a particular instance of how things generally tend to happen. ("Functionalism and Anomalous Monism", p. 328)

McDowell contrasts revealing something to conform to an order of reason with representing it as an instance of how things generally tend to happen. However, an order of reason is general, too; there is no limit to the number of acts that may exemplify, and to the number of subjects whose acts may be explained by, such an order. So the first style of explanation, as well, explains what it does by subsuming it under something general. The styles differ not in that one invokes something general while the other does not. They differ in respect of the general item each invokes: an order of reason in contrast to a law of the kind described by the natural sciences. Now, in explanations of the latter style, in one sense an event is

explained by a preceding event; in another sense, it is explained by the law it exemplifies. Gilbert Ryle gives this example: we say, "The glass broke because *the stone hit it*", and also, "The glass broke when the stone hit it, because *it was brittle*".[3] Here, the explanation refers to a disposition; it can also appeal to a law. Indeed, it is more fitting to say, "The glass broke when the stone hit it, because *glass is brittle*". Since a law is a "because", we may call it a cause. It is a cause of events that are explained by being shown to instantiate it. Some think that a causal nexus of events as such exemplifies a law,[4] and if this is so, then there is a sense in which the ultimate cause of events is always a law, for then a law always underlies the causality of an event. By contrast, when we explain in the first of McDowell's styles, the general item underlying the causal nexus is an order of reason; the act is explained by being shown to exemplify—not a law of the natural sciences, but—an order of reason. In a parallel manner of speaking, we call this order the ultimate cause of the act.

We said action explanations and belief explanations represent a causality of thought, which is conceived by the subject as a causality of reason. As we noted above, McDowell makes an apparently stronger claim. He says the causality of second person explanations not only is conceived by the second person to be, but *is* a causality of reason. In the logically fundamental case, I explain why someone is doing or believes something by revealing her to *conform* to an order of reason. Now, even if we agree that this is how I conceive of the explanation of my own acts, must we not, precisely for that reason, say that I explain why someone else acts as she does by showing her act to *seem to her to conform* to the relevant order? This is what Donald Davidson suggests.

> There is a certain irreducible—though somewhat anaemic—sense in which every rationalization justifies: from the agent's point of view, there was, when he acted, something to be said for the action. ("Actions, Reasons, Causes", p. 9)

A self-conscious subject thinks of first person explanations of her own acts as representing a causality of reason. But this view of things is a distortion inflicted by the lens of the first person. In truth, her act is explained by a cause in the light of which it appears to her to conform to an order of

3. *The Concept of Mind*, p. 50.
4. Compare, e.g., Donald Davidson, "Laws and Cause".

reason. It is irrelevant to the causality of the cause whether the act indeed conforms to this order. She cannot help but think it does; she necessarily thinks good and true what appears to her so. Therefore she sees her thought that depicts her act as conforming to the relevant order of reason as reflecting, and thus as itself accounted for by, this order. However, what explains her act is not this order, but rather her idea of it. Robert Brandom and Richard Moran articulate this view in the following passages.

> Norms (in the sense of normative statuses) are not objects in the causal order. [. . .] Normative statuses are domesticated by being understood in terms of normative attitudes, which *are* in the causal order. What is causally efficacious is our practically taking or treating ourselves and each other as having commitments. (Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, p. 626)

> The reasons that explain an action are states of mind of the agent, which may themselves be either veridical or mistaken. When a belief that is an explanatory reason is a false belief, this need not affect its explanatory validity in the slightest. (Moran, *Authority and Estrangement*, p. 128)

Moran maintains that a false belief provides as good an explanation as a true one; its truth or falsity is irrelevant to its explanatory power. This must be an instance of a principle other instances of which are: misleading sensory impressions explain why someone believes what she does as well as veridical ones; that someone believes that p explains why she believes that q given that she believes that p entails q whether or not it does entail it. The relevant principle is that second person explanations describe a causal nexus that does not depend on the fact that the act conforms to the relevant order of reason in virtue of its cause so long as it appears to do so to its subject.

We have come upon two opposing descriptions of the form of explanation of someone else's actions and beliefs. According to McDowell, I explain why someone else is doing something by revealing her to conform to an order of reason; this order is the ultimate cause of her act. According to Brandom, I explain her act by revealing her to conform to what she takes to be required by the relevant order—not a rational order or normative statuses, but her ideas of the order or her normative attitudes are the

ultimate cause of her act. "Ultimate" is crucial here: since a causality of reason essentially passes through a representation, normative attitudes figure essentially in the explanation of self-conscious acts on any account. The issue is whether they are the ultimate cause or whether they are in turn to be traced to the order they represent.

In the next subsection, we shall reject Brandom's account because it undermines the unity of first person and second person thought. In the following subsection, we argue that McDowell's account is true. In fact, this account is contained in what we said about action explanation and belief explanation; it follows from the fact that these represent a causality of thought. For, not only is a causality of thought conceived by the subject of the thought to be a causality of reason; in the fundamental case, it *is* a causality of reason.

Normative Attitudes as Ultimate Causes

Let us begin by recognizing that people often act and judge on the basis of false beliefs. Consider an example of G. E. M. Anscombe's: A man is pumping water to replenish the water supply while the pipes are broken and the water is running into the ground. He erroneously thinks that pumping is a way to fill the tank and good to do on that account. Yet we refer to his thinking this to explain why he is pumping. Such cases are common, and irrelevant. The claim we are discussing is that second person explanation by the subject's knowledge of, and thus by, an order of reason is fundamental in the sense that reference to a second person and the application of concepts of practical and theoretical thought to someone else depend on—in McDowell's words, "have their proper home in"—this form of explanation. If this is right, then explanation by knowledge of the order, and thus by the order itself, is constitutive of the concepts deployed in explanation by false belief, which thus is logically, or metaphysically, secondary.

Brandom does not rest his claim that normative attitudes are the ultimate causes of action and belief on the fact that people act on false beliefs, draw conclusions from false premises, and base beliefs on misleading impressions. He propounds a metaphysical thesis (for which this fact would provide no basis): explanations of self-conscious acts refer to the subject's representation of an order of reason, to normative attitudes, and not to the order she represents, or normative statuses, because the latter are not the kind of thing that may be the cause of anything. This may seem only

sane. Must we not reject the extravagant notion that reason is the ultimate cause of thought and action in favor of a causality of "normative attitudes" and "states of mind"? But here we forget ourselves, and what we know ourselves to be. I think of another subject only if I deploy concepts under which I bring myself in first person thought. And the seemingly sane view entails that thoughts ostensibly about someone else's actions and beliefs do not employ the same concepts as corresponding first person thoughts do. If there is no causality of reason, then there is no second person thought.

Second person explanations may bear a normative sense, when I say, e.g., "She believes that p because she inferred it from q" or "She believes that p because she saw it". If they do not describe a causality of reason, then this normative significance is reducible. Explaining, e.g., "She believes that p because she inferred it from q", I make two speech acts with one form of words: I explain that she moved from believing that q to believing that p, and I assert that q is true and entails p (I endorse her move). In the same way, with "She believes that p because she saw it" I explain that she formed a belief because she suffered certain impressions, and contend that these were veridical (I endorse the belief she acquired on account of these impressions). As applied to someone else, then, the concept of moving is prior to the concept of inferring, and the concept of being appeared to is prior to the concept of perceiving; an inference is a moving, and a perception an appearance, that satisfies further conditions. If this is the true account of second person explanation, then the normative sense of a first person explanation disappears when it is transposed into the second person. The irreducibility of its normative sense is not a feature of the explanation, which is given in the first person, but an illusion effected by its being given in the first person.

Thus we explain the illusory appearance of a causality of reason as the distorted conception of a causality of normative attitudes by the subject of these attitudes.[5] Now, who embraces this doctrine? *A self-conscious subject rejects it.* She rejects it in the unmediated first person representation of her self-conscious acts. Explaining why she believes something by representing it as right to believe, or why she is doing something by repre-

5. Peter Bieri's account of freedom in *Das Handwerk der Freiheit* represents my unmediated conception of the cause of my own acts as necessarily illusory in this way. Given what we said in Chapter 4, this entails that Bieri fails to make contact with his announced topic, the concept of freedom, which designates the character of an act of whose causes its subject has spontaneous knowledge.

senting it as good to do, she denies Brandom's account of the cause of her acts. She denies it *in giving these explanations,* which cite a normative order as the ultimate cause, not a normative attitude.

A self-conscious subject rejects Brandom's teaching in her unmediated first person thought. But will not she be sufficiently enlightened to frame a disengaged view of herself and see herself as others do? If she cannot embrace the doctrine in identification-free first person thought, she should be able to apply it to herself via an identity judgment, reasoning as follows:

> When I say, "She believes that *p* because ____", my statement can be decomposed into an explanation why she believes that *p* and an assessment that *p* is, or is likely to be, true. If she says the same about me, her statement can be decomposed in like manner. But she thus explains what I explain saying, "I believe that *p* because ____". So although this is not how I see things when I think of myself without mediation, I recognize that the true cause of my belief is not a normative order, but a normative attitude.

But this line of reasoning is invalid. Its first premise, that someone else's thought about me, "She believes that *p* because ____", conjoins explanation and assessment as independent elements, entails that the second premise, that, in thinking this, she brings me under the same concept under which I bring myself thinking "I believe that *p* because ____", is false. If her speech act "She believes that *p* because ____" reduces to a nonnormative explanation conjoined with an act of endorsement, then she does *not* explain what I explain using these same words. She does not employ the concept of belief I apply to myself, for *that* concept is posterior to the concept of knowledge, which is not true of the concept she applies to me. It is perfectly useless to insist, now, that it must be the same concept. This is true, but we cannot revert to this truth to defend an account that contradicts it.

The doctrine that mental states and normative attitudes as opposed to an order of reason are the ultimate cause of self-conscious acts ignores a condition under which I apprehend someone else as a subject of states of mind and normative attitudes. One misses this condition if one fails to attend to the way in which self-consciousness is implicated in the apprehension of another subject. A second person thought represents its object as *the kind of subject one knows oneself to be.* And self-knowledge is, fundamentally, articulated in unmediated first person thoughts; something is

self-knowledge only if it is knowledge of the object of such thoughts. Therefore, first person knowledge (not of the causes in the particular case, but) of the nature of the causes of action and belief cannot be challenged from the allegedly superior point of view of a second or third person; such a challenge only proves that its allegedly superior point of view provides no view upon action and belief and self-conscious subjects. *Self-consciousness is sovereign in respect of the nature of acts of self-consciousness.* We self-conscious subjects know that Brandom misrepresents the cause of our acts. If someone is to apprehend us as the self-conscious subjects that we are, her thought must bear a different form. And so must ours if we are to think about her.

An Order of Reason as Ultimate Cause

A first person explanation of action and belief, representing a causality of thought, is taken by her who gives it to represent a causality of reason. That the relevant thought of the subject may be false does not show that this does not hold of second person explanation, as well; it does not disprove that here, too, in the fundamental case, explaining the act *is* representing it to conform to an order of reason. Indeed, this is how it must be. For, we know about our own self-conscious acts—know it spontaneously, by being their subject—that they exhibit a causality of reason. And since our own acts cannot bear a different metaphysical nature from those of someone else, it follows that what in Chapters 2 and 3 came into view as a causality of thought must be a causality of reason.

In order to see why a causality of thought, in the fundamental case, is a causality of reason, or, in other words, why the subject's normative thought that constitutes the causality of her self-conscious act is, fundamentally, not a mere thought, but knowledge, we must reflect anew on the notion of a causality of thought. We shall restrict our discussion to intentional action. The abstract structure shared by practical and theoretical thought makes the application of our considerations to the latter straightforward.

In Chapter 2, we found that a thought of the subject linking her movement and its cause in such a way as to reveal the former to be good is the causality in virtue of which her movement is an intentional action. Kant captures this in the formula that intentional action is action according to a representation of a law. Both finite ends and infinite ends are laws in the relevant sense. A finite end unites potentially infinitely many actions that

serve it and that a subject pursuing it may derive from it by instrumental reasoning. An infinite end unites potentially infinitely many actions that manifest it, any of which a subject adhering to this end may derive from it, representing the action as manifesting this end and thus her practical life-form. Now, when someone is acting according to a representation of an end, finite or infinite, then the representation of the end is the cause of her action. But this does not suffice. It is not sufficient that the representation cause the action in any old way in order for the subject to be acting *according to* the representation. The causality must be such that the action accords with the end not per accidens, but in virtue of being caused by the representation of the end. And the causality is a source of accord and thus the causality of a representation according to which someone acts only if the representation of the end causes the action *by way of the subject's deriving the action from the end.* Hence, as Kant puts it, the will is practical reason: "Da zur Ableitung der Handlungen von Gesetzen Vernunft erfodert wird, so ist der Wille nichts anders, als praktische Vernunft."[6] We expressed the same idea by saying that intentional action is subject to a causality of thought.

An end represented in unmediated first person thought—that is, an end self-consciously sought or, for short, a *self-conscious end*[7]—is the object of a representation with this kind of causality: a representation that is such as to figure as cause in explanations describing a causality of thought. In other words, a representation of a self-conscious end is the kind of representation according to which its subject may act. Of course, a representation may cause actions without them being in accord with it in virtue of being caused by it. We imagined someone who is falling ill because he wants to lose weight. His falling ill is caused by his representation of the end, and it accords with the end (as he will lose weight by falling ill), but *causation and accord have come together per accidens.* As the causality of the representation in respect of the action is not the source of the action's accord with the end, it is not on account of its power to cause actions in this way that a representation is of an end. A representation is of an end in virtue of being fit to cause actions in a way that ensures accord with the end. For example, something is an act of wanting to make coffee in virtue of its power to cause actions that, as so caused, serve the end of making

6. *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,* p. 412. Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason.

7. A self-conscious end is not only represented; it is represented as an end. Compare Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica,* IaIIae, qu. 6, art. 2.

coffee. And something is an act of wanting, for example, justice, in virtue of its power to cause actions, which, as this is their cause, are just. Of course, the representation of an end may be prevented from actualizing this power in many ways. The point is that, if we abstract from this power, we lose the concept of a representation of an end.

Now, if someone's wanting to make coffee in this way explains why she is doing what she is doing, then she is making coffee. And if someone's love of justice thus explains why she is acting as she is, then she is acting justly. *Acting on account of wanting to do A,* in the manner constitutive of the concept of wanting to do something, is *doing A.* And *acting from an infinite end X,* in the manner constitutive of the concept of adhering to an infinite end, is *acting so as to manifest X.* A representation of an end is such as to cause the reality of the end in an action. It is the nature of a representation of an end to be productive—not of any old thing, but—of its object. And when it does produce its object, the subject's thought, which is the causal nexus of representation and action, is *true.* Moreover, since its truth is a constituent of the proper causality of the representation, it is no accident that a subject of representations of ends has suitable true thoughts. So when such thoughts are true, they are nonaccidentally true, or knowledge.

It might seem that we have not addressed the objection, which says that a causality of thought is not a causality of reason because the thought that represents the action as in accord with the relevant order of reason may be false. For, we considered a case where the representation of an end causes a movement without mediation by a thought of the subject, while the cases we ought to consider are those in which, on account of ignorance or stupidity, the subject's thought deriving the action from the end is false, so that the action does not accord with the end, or only per accidens. Instead of discussing the man who is falling ill because he wants to lose weight, we must discuss the man who is pumping water because he wants to replenish the water supply, though he is not replenishing the water supply, as the pipes are broken. Here, the representation of the end does not cause the reality of the end; the representation is not productive of its object. However, it is clear how such cases are to be understood: as cases in which unfavorable circumstances interfere with the causality that is proper to the representation.

In the preceding chapter, we discussed receptive knowledge, a representation that nonaccidentally conforms to its object because it is *receptive of its object.* It may happen that I take a representation to be receptive of its

object when it is not. An argument from illusion concludes that therefore the first concept of a theory of knowledge must be that of a representation that is caused by whatever it is caused, which may or may not be its object, and which is knowledge if it satisfies further conditions. But this undermines the very idea of a material subject of theoretical knowledge. We must begin with the concept of an act of a power of receptive knowledge, a power to represent an object by being affected by it. Then we can understand a sensory representation that merely seems to be receptive in terms of the same power, by negation and subtraction: it results from unfavorable circumstances, circumstances that impede the proper exercise of the power.[8] We must treat the concept of a representation that is *productive of its object* in the same way. It may happen that I take a representation to be productive of its object when it is not, as when I am pumping water into broken pipes. An argument from illusion would claim that, therefore, the principle concept of a theory of the will, of action theory, must be that of a representation of an end that causes whatever it causes, which may or may not realize the end. Then an explanation why the end was realized must appeal to circumstances external to the representation. But this destroys the idea of a representation that causes actions so as to accord with it, which is the idea of a self-conscious end. Instead, we must proceed from the concept of an act of a power to represent ends in a way that is productive of their reality. A representation that merely seems to be productive (as his representation of replenishing the water supply seems to him who is pumping water into broken pipes) is to be explained in terms of the same power, by negation and subtraction: it results from unfavorable circumstances, from circumstances thwarting the proper exercise of the power.

It is impossible to recognize that a subject's thought of her action as serving or manifesting an end is, fundamentally, knowledge, if one thinks of the representation of an end and the thought of an action as suitable for it as joint causes of the action, the causality being of the same kind as the causality that governs the movements of nonrational or even inanimate substances. According to this view, being caused by the representation of the end and being in accord with the end are in principle only externally related. Then, of course, a true thought is as good a cause as a false one: while with true belief there is accord and with false belief there is not, accord is in any case not internal to the power of the representation to cause

8. Compare the discussion of fallible powers in Chapter 5.

the action. By contrast, if the relevant thought of the subject is not a further cause, additional to the representation of the end, but the causality of this representation, then such thoughts cannot in general be mere thoughts. If an action progresses toward a finite end through a thought that puts means to this end, then this thought is knowledge. And if an action gives an example of an infinite end through a thought that subsumes it under this end, then, again, this thought is knowledge. In action according to a representation, the representation of the end and its reality in the action are inseparable.[9] Action and representation depend on their unity, on the nexus of accord. Therefore, the thought that is the accord is knowledge and constitutes the subject's grasp of the relevant order of reason. Causality of thought is causality of reason.

Second Person Knowledge

Actions and beliefs are subject to explanations that explain an act by revealing it to conform to an order of reason. Action concepts as well as the concepts of belief and experience depend on this form of explanation; the representation of a second person as acting intentionally or as believing that something is the case essentially is a term of explanations of this kind. We shall now argue that this entails that knowledge of another subject is not receptive knowledge. In a sense we shall explain, second person knowledge is from spontaneity.

Knowledge of Self-Conscious Acts Mediated by Spontaneous General Knowledge

We are claiming that knowledge of someone else's beliefs and actions is spontaneous. This may seem obviously wrong. Cannot we see that someone is doing something intentionally, and cannot we hear her say what she thinks? And are not seeing and hearing modes of sensory representation? G. E. M. Anscombe writes:

> The greater number of the things which you would say straight off a man did or was doing will be things he intends. [. . .] I am sitting in

9. Kant's definition of an end entails this: "Zweck [ist] der Gegenstand eines Begriffs, sofern dieser als die Ursache von jenem (der reale Grund seiner Möglichkeit) angesehen wird" [An end is the object of a concept insofar as the latter is regarded as the cause of the former (the real ground of its possibility]. (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*, §10, p. 220.)

> a chair writing, and anyone grown to the age of reason in the same world would know this as soon as he saw me, and in general it would be the first account of what I was doing. (*Intention*, §4, p. 8)

And John McDowell:

> There can be facts that are overtly available (so that conviction that they obtain need not be a matter of speculation as to something hidden behind what is overtly available), but awareness of which is an exercise of a perceptual power that is not necessarily universally shared. Command of a language is partly constituted by just such a perceptual capacity. [. . .] I mean the idea of a perceptual capacity to be taken seriously. Some may think that it can amount to no more than this: in learning a language, one learns to put a certain theoretical construction on the facts that one "really" perceives to obtain [. . .]. But this is not what I mean. [. . .] I mean to be offering a more radical alternative: one that rejects the assumption [. . .] that our genuine perceptual intake can be exhaustively described in terms that do not beg the question of the status, as knowledge, of what we ascribe to people when we say they understand utterances. ("Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding", pp. 331–332)

Saying that we perceive thought, theoretical and practical, has a negative point. It is to reject the idea of a realm of phenomena that can be apprehended without being recognized as manifestations of thought and yet exhaust our evidence for the existence of thought in someone else. In the fundamental case, I apprehend the sensible reality of someone else's act of thinking, an intentional action or a speech act, without passing through the observation of something that does not involve recognition of it as an act of thinking. Thus McDowell contrasts perception with theoretical construction and Anscombe calls the relevant awareness of what someone is doing "straight off". As this negative claim rejects but does not give an account of the form of knowledge of someone else's self-conscious acts, it does not touch our thesis that such knowledge formally differs from knowledge of a nonrational reality in being spontaneous.[10]

10. It will transpire that we have no sympathy for the view McDowell attacks. According to this view, someone else's thoughts are further away from us than states and events of which we know by observation. On the view we shall propound, thoughts of another subject are nearer to us than anything we know from receptivity.

When we hear someone speaking and understand what she is saying, then, McDowell says, we perceive her thinking. Now, in perceiving thinking—we say "perceiving" to emphasize the negative point—spontaneity is involved in a way in which it is not in perceiving nonrational operations. For, the representation of self-conscious acts essentially involves subsuming them under an order of reason, and this affects the way in which such acts are known. In order to see this, it will be helpful to remember how, in general, knowledge of laws underlies the apprehension of substances. For, the character of the knowledge of self-conscious acts reflects the character of the laws by which they are governed and through which they are apprehended.

David Hume held that the senses deliver impressions that in themselves bear no connections among them. If they appear connected, then this reflects subjective habits to associate them in certain ways. In particular, the unity of a substance, which holds together changeable states, and the unity of a movement, which joins a state from which with a state to which, cannot be found in what is given to the senses. It is a construction put on impressions that on their part do not depend on these forms of unity. Kant argues that we must abandon this conception of sensibility. Our sensibility delivers intuitions that necessarily exhibit the forms of unity described by the pure concept of a changing substance, for it is only by exhibiting this unity that intuitions represent its object as in time. It is incoherent to maintain, as Hume did, that the unity of a changing substance is a projection of habits acquired by the repeated experience of the succession of certain impressions. For, an experience of temporal succession is an experience whose object falls under the category of substance. Kant further claims that, if the unity of a substance is not constructed from impressions devoid of this unity, but is always already contained in receptive intuitions, then an intuition of a given substance and its changes presupposes knowledge of general laws. Substances are apprehended through their kind, which contains the principle of their temporal unity as it is the logical subject of general statements that describe the laws according to which substances of this kind change.[11] Hume insists that, if he is right, then there is no such thing as gaining general knowledge from observation. And in this, he is right: given his notion of sensibility, the assertion of a law on the basis of experience can only be the expression of a

11. I develop and defend this reading of the Analogies of Experience in *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*.

habit. By contrast, if we appreciate Kant's critique, we see how knowledge of general laws can, as it must, be based on experience. For we now recognize that experience is always already fraught with (perhaps implicit and inarticulate) general knowledge. Hume saw that it is not possible to acquire general knowledge from confrontation with particulars the apprehension of which does not include the application of general knowledge. Knowledge of particular substances and knowledge of laws according to which they move and change come on the scene together. There is no possessing the one without the other.

These, Kant's, reflections are perfectly general; they hold of any material substance and its movements, in particular of movements of such a substance that are intentional actions and speech acts. We found in Chapter 2 that most if not all verbs that on occasion describe intentional actions are action verbs, i.e., they depend for their sense on explanations by a causality of thought, which is, as we have seen now, a causality of reason. Anscombe makes a corresponding point about speech acts.

> The tree waves in the wind; the movements of its leaves are just as minute as the movement of my hand when I write on a blackboard, but we have no description of a picked-out set of movements or a picked-out appearance of the tree remotely resembling "She wrote 'I am a fool' on the blackboard." (*Intention,* p. 83)

The unity of an act of writing depends on the thought it expresses, which therefore is not attached to an independently apprehended reality. The same holds for oral speech acts. When a tree waves in the wind, subtle sounds can be heard, but we have no description of them remotely resembling "She said 'I am a fool' ". If the unity of an act depends on a thought of which, therefore, it is the sensible reality, then it depends on an order by being subsumed under which the act is conceived as an act of thinking. Such an order is an order of reason—a power of receptive knowledge or a practical life-form.

Perceiving nonrational substances and their movements includes subsuming them under a general order. Therefore we can, as we must, acquire knowledge of such an order from receptivity. When the substance is a self-conscious subject and her operations self-conscious acts, then, too, we apprehend the subject and her acts through a general order. But here we may know the order *as the order that governs our own acts.* Then we know it not from receptivity, but from spontaneity, not by observing what

people do and believe, but by reflecting on what to do and believe. If we apprehend someone's acts through an order we know from self-consciousness, our knowledge of her acts is not based on observation alone, but depends on spontaneous knowledge, knowledge articulated in unmediated first person thought.

The Impossibility of Receptive Knowledge of an Order of Reason

When the order of reason through which I explain someone else's acts is my own, then I know this order, and thus her acts, from spontaneity. Now, Kant writes:

> Nun kann ich von einem denkenden Wesen durch keine äußere Erfahrung, sondern bloß durch das Selbstbewußtsein die mindeste Vorstellung haben. (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft,* A 347/B 405)[12]

Kant says the representation of a thinking subject cannot arise from experience, but only through self-consciousness. He does not mean that the representation of a thinking subject does not involve experience, but rather that experience alone is not the source of the representation of a thinking subject. When I abstract from everything I know from spontaneity, I shall not find a thinking subject in anything given to me by the senses. So Kant not only says that a self-conscious subject can be known through self-consciousness; he says, a self-conscious subject can be known *only* in this way. This is true if and only if an order of reason, through which alone a self-conscious subject is apprehended, cannot be known otherwise than from spontaneity. If the order of her acts is not the same as the order under which I know myself to be, and yet I know her self-conscious acts, then I must know this order of reason from receptivity, and my representation of her acts must rest on experience alone. Ruling this out, Kant rules out receptive knowledge of an order of reason.

At the end of Chapter 2, and again at the end of Chapter 3, we left open a question we promised to take up in the present chapter: whether the concept of an order of theoretical reason, or the concept of an order of practical reason, signifies a form, which contains the idea of a manifold of instances, or a content, so that we can speak of *the* order of reason,

12. Now I cannot have any representation whatsoever of a thinking being through any outer experience, but only through self-consciousness.

practical or theoretical. Philippa Foot and Michael Thompson maintain that there is no such thing as *the* practical life-form. That concept, they think, signifies a kind of order, of which there may be indefinitely many instances. And Kant maintains that there is no such thing as *the* power of receptive knowledge; any such power owes its specific character to the nature of the receptive faculty on which it depends, and the concept of such a faculty is the concept of a kind of which there may be indefinitely many instances. Now, Kant's claim that a self-conscious subject can be represented only through self-consciousness entails that there is no such thing as *knowing* that a subject exists who falls and brings herself under an order of reason different from ours. There is no representing an order different from ours as *actual*.

We shall argue that this is right: there is no knowledge of an order of reason, and of acts falling under it, from receptivity. For, in order to be able to represent an act of thinking, I must be able to represent its object. And I cannot represent the object of a theoretical thought that is an act of a power of receptive knowledge different from mine. Nor can I represent the object of a practical thought that is an act of a practical life-form different from mine.

With regard to theoretical thought, the argument is straightforward. Powers of receptive knowledge differ on account of the nature of the receptive faculty on which they depend. But if my receptive faculty bears a different form from yours, then I do not receptively represent the objects that you receptively represent. For example, if my receptive faculty is such that its objects are spatial and temporal, and yours is such that its objects are not spatial and temporal, but of a different form, then there is no community of receptively represented objects between us. But if I can have no receptive knowledge of the objects of which you do, then I cannot know that you have receptive knowledge of these objects. I cannot represent you as a subject of receptive knowledge.

There is no such thing as knowing that someone thinks theoretical thoughts that manifest a different power of knowledge from my own, because I do not *receptively represent* objects represented in such thoughts. Something analogous holds with regard to practical thought: I do not *productively represent* the objects productively represented in a thought that manifests a different practical life-form from my own. A practical life-form is a unity of infinite ends. And the representation of infinite ends is productive in that it is such as to cause actions that accord with the represented end. Someone's representation of justice, say, is the cause of her acting justly, and this is no accident, for the causality of her representation is mediated by a thought deriving her action from this end. Thus her knowledge that she is acting as justice requires is spontaneous; it includes and is included in its object. Now, if you bear a different practical life-form from mine, then I do not represent the infinite ends that constitute your practical life-form. More precisely, I do not represent them as ends; my representation does not have the causal power just described, by virtue of which it would be of an end. Hence, I do not have spontaneous knowledge of actions that accord with your infinite ends; I do not productively represent anything that manifests your practical life-form.

Clearly, if I do not receptively represent objects represented in acts of a power of receptive knowledge different from mine, then I do not represent them at all. By contrast, it may seem that, if I do not productively represent the objects productively represented in acts of a practical life-form different from mine, I may still represent them receptively. Let us imagine an infinite end *X*, an element of your practical life-form, which we imagine to be different from mine. We are supposing that, in spite of the fact that I do not represent *X* as an end, I may know from receptivity that you are acting so as to manifest *X*. "*X*" is a term like "justice". We shall give no example of such a term, as we gave no example of a form of receptivity different from ours. Our question is whether we could understand it and apply the concept it designates to movements, given that we deploy it only in acts of receptive knowledge.

Your acting as *X* requires includes your representation of yourself as conforming to the demands of *X*. Hence, in order to apprehend you as *acting so as to manifest X*, I must apprehend you as *thinking that you are acting in this way*. More precisely, apprehending the one must *be* apprehending the other. Now, if I am to apprehend you as thinking of yourself as acting in accordance with *X*, I must think what you think; the same concept that you deploy in thinking of your action must figure in my thinking. I must possess the concept you possess in order to represent instances of that concept, which are instances of its spontaneous application by you. But this is impossible. Since for me the concept is receptive, an explanation how I come to possess it must make reference to instances of the concept that affect my senses. However, we just said that I receptively represent an instance of the concept only if I apprehend you as applying this very concept. Therefore we cannot appeal to the fact that I receptively

represent something as an instance of X in explaining how it is that I apprehend your thinking of it as such an instance. If I am to acquire a concept from receptivity, i.e., from its instances, and the concept is one you apply spontaneously, that is, instances of it are acts of your applying it, then my possessing the concept is a condition under which alone I can acquire it. That is, there is no acquiring such a concept from receptivity.

I do not productively represent the objects productively represented in a thought that manifests a different practical life-form from mine. Since there is no acquiring the relevant concepts from receptivity alone, I do not represent these objects at all. Thus I cannot know anyone to represent these objects and, hence, to be a bearer of this practical life-form.

Thompson and Foot may agree that there is no receptive knowledge of acts of a practical life-form, as Kant agrees that there is no receptive knowledge of acts of a power of receptive knowledge. While they may agree that, therefore, there is no such thing as ***knowing*** acts of an order of reason under which I do not bring myself, they may hold we can nevertheless *entertain the idea* of such acts. We need not decide whether this is coherent. (Surely, the idea of a concept essentially unfit for deployment in knowledge is difficult.) For, we are interested in the way in which I ***know*** someone else as a subject of self-conscious acts, which way of knowing underwrites second person *reference*.

The Nexus of Second Person Knowledge and Its Object

In Chapter 4, we distinguished receptive knowledge from spontaneous knowledge as follows. My receptively knowing an object is a distinct reality from the object I thus know, wherefore the object must be given to me and I must receive it. By contrast, my spontaneously knowing an object is the same reality as the object I know; there is neither need nor room for mediation by a receptive faculty. Now, there is a sense in which second person knowledge is spontaneous: I apprehend acts of a second person through an order of reason under which I fall and that I know from spontaneity. It follows that there must be a sense in which the object of second person knowledge does not exist independently of second person knowledge of it. Of course, my knowing that you are doing or believe something is not your doing or believing it; you may do or believe something without my knowing it. And yet, my knowledge of your self-conscious acts is not as external to its object as my knowledge of the states and

movements of a nonrational substance. Second person knowledge and its object are internally related in that they have *the same ultimate cause*.

Consider second person knowledge of theoretical thought. In the fundamental case, I know that someone believes something by explaining why she believes it in a way that reveals her to believe something it is right to believe in the sense defined by a power of knowledge. In thus explaining why someone believes such-and-such, I not only represent her as manifesting a power of knowledge; I manifest the same power. For example, when I explain why you believe something by showing that you conform to the order of valid inference, I exercise my grasp of this very order and thus manifest the same power to draw inferences that I recognize in you. And if I know that you believe that p because you perceived it, then I know that you perceived that p, and thus know that p. As knowledge from the senses is the fundamental form of receptive knowledge, my knowing what I know you to know through your power to gain knowledge from the senses is, in the fundamental case, an act of the same power. So the same power of receptive knowledge accounts for my explanation why, and thus for my knowledge that, you believe what you do, and accounts for your believing it. The power whose presence in you accounts for your belief is the same as the power whose presence in me accounts for my knowledge of your belief. Second person knowledge of belief is not identical with its object, but it has the same ultimate cause: a shared power of receptive knowledge.

This inner nexus of second person knowledge and its object did not go unnoticed, but the awareness of it has been distorted by the lack of the concept of a causality of reason. It has been claimed to be an artifact of the necessary method of interpretation that, for the most part, I find myself agreeing with her whom I interpret. If I am to understand someone else at all, I largely have to read my opinions into her, especially very dear opinions like the truths of my logic. Now, it is true that I will for the most part agree with someone whom I understand. But this agreement is not the fundamental phenomenon; it has a cause, and this cause, not the agreement, is the source of understanding. Our agreement manifests the presence of the same order of reason in both of us; we agree because our thoughts have this common cause. Were it not for this common cause, our agreement would be either an accident or the product of my projecting my opinions onto you. In neither case would agreement be connected to understanding.

Second person knowledge of action, too, has the same ultimate cause as its object. In the fundamental case, I know that someone is doing something intentionally by explaining why she is doing it in a way that reveals it to be good to do in the sense defined by our practical life-form. (We can now say "our", as we have excluded that I bring someone under a practical life-form that is not mine.) A practical life-form is articulated into infinite ends, which in turn are the principle of unity of finite ends. Suppose I explain your action by an infinite end and think, "She is doing *A* because she is (wants to be) *X*". As an action manifests an infinite end only if it manifests the practical life-form of which it is an element, it follows that, if my explanation is true, then I know that your doing *A* manifests this practical life-form. This means that my explanation, if it is true, manifests my knowledge of this form. But my knowledge of this practical life-form is spontaneous and a manifestation of this very life-form. So in explaining your action by an infinite end, I manifest the practical life-form that you, according to the explanation, manifest in the action I explain. The same holds of explanations by a finite end, "She is doing *A* because she wants to do *B*". I trace your action to the order of what is a means to what, which is, according to the results of Chapter 2, an aspect of our practical life-form. In explaining your action by reference to this order, I manifest knowledge of it, and since the order is formally represented and known from spontaneity, my knowledge of the order manifests its actuality in me. Again, the same order manifests itself in your action and my knowledge of your action. A shared practical life-form is the ultimate cause of second person knowledge and its object.

Second Person Reference

Demonstrative thought depends on an act of receptivity; it has an object in virtue of a receptive representation of this object, a representation that is of this object by being effected by it. Demonstrative reference is *perceptual*. First person thought, by contrast, does not depend on an act of receptivity; it is a spontaneous representation and is of an object in virtue of being identical with it. First person reference is *intellectual*. Since there is a sense in which second person knowledge is spontaneous and, in consequence, not of an independent object, it follows that there is a sense in which second person reference is not perceptual, but intellectual, not mediated by a sensory nexus, but by a nexus of thought. We shall now explicate this sense.

Thought for Two

We have been calling a thought of a subject like oneself a *second person* thought, anticipating a claim we shall now defend, that, fundamentally, a thought about another self-conscious subject is a thought whose linguistic expression requires the use of a second person pronoun. In what follows, we shall mean by "second person thought" a thought expressed by a second person pronoun, in contradistinction to a third person pronoun. One might suppose that a second person thought is a third person thought satisfying certain conditions that pertain to the context of its expression, but do not affect the thought expressed. Richard Heck thinks this is a matter of course:

> Consider the indexical "you". As a matter of its standing meaning, an utterance of "you" refers to the person addressed in that utterance. But in the sense that there is such a thing as a self-conscious, first-person belief, there is no such thing as a second-person belief, or so it seems to me. Of course, I can identify someone descriptively, as the person to whom I am now speaking, and may have beliefs whose content involves that descriptive identification. But that is not what I mean to deny: I mean to deny that there is any such thing as an essentially indexical second-person belief. The phenomenon of the second-person is a linguistic one, bound up with the fact that utterances, as we make them, are typically directed to people, not just made to the cosmos. [. . .] The word "you" has no correlate at the level of thought [. . .] I don't really know how to argue for this claim: it just seems right to me, even obviously so.—"You", on this view, acts as if it were a special kind of demonstrative, one that always refers to the addressee. So if you want an analysis of "you", try "That person to whom I am speaking". ("Do Demonstratives Have Senses?", pp. 12 and 15n)

Thinking, as such, Heck believes, is to the cosmos. It is accidental to thought that we find occasion to address our thoughts to other people. This seems right to Heck, even obviously so. But obvious it is not. John McDowell writes:

> Suppose someone says to me, "You have mud on your face". If I am to understand him, I must think an "I"-thought, thinking something to this effect: "I have mud on my face: that is what he is saying."

> Frege's strategy for keeping the special and primitive way in which I am presented to myself out of communication suggests nothing better than the following: the "I"-sense involved here is the sense of "he who is being addressed". But this would not do. I can entertain the thought that he who is being addressed has mud on his face, as what is being said, and not understand the remark; I may not know that *I* am he who is being addressed. ("*De Re* Senses", p. 222)

In the first chapter, we encountered an attempt to explain first person reference as reference to her who is uttering "I". Although this specifies the referent of a given use of the first person pronoun, it does not specify its sense, for I might fail to recognize that I am uttering "I"; "I am uttering 'I'" is not a tautology. Analogously, second person reference cannot be explained as reference to her who is being addressed; this specifies the referent, but not the sense of a given use of the second person pronoun. "I am addressing you" is not a tautology, but something that she who is being addressed may fail to realize, and which she realizes if and only if she thinks, "He is addressing *me*". This proves that "you" cannot be explained as "that person to whom I am speaking".

In order to understand your saying "This *S* is *F*", I must perceive, with you, the object to which you refer; I must share in your perceptual relationship with the object. Now, since an object perceived is not as such the subject perceiving it, so that an object perceived is apprehended as other, understanding a demonstrative never includes recognition that I am its object. I can understand your assertion about myself, "This man is *F*", while failing to recognize that I am this man. If I acquire knowledge by testimony from these words, it is knowledge that this man is *F*. I come to know that I am *F*, if indeed I do, by way of an identity judgment not contained in the assertion. By contrast, I understand your assertion "You are *F*" addressed at me only if I recognize that I am its referent. I acquire first person knowledge from these words without mediation by an identity judgment. This proves that second person reference is not a kind of demonstrative reference. It is not perceptual. Second person reference does not reach its object through a receptive representation of this object. If it did, I would grasp a second person thought about myself by sharing in this relationship, which I do not. Second person reference must be intellectual.

This does not mean that perception of the subject referred to plays no role in second person thought. It means that its role is subordinate to an intellectual relationship and can only be understood through it.[13] For example, I may recognize that you are addressing me by noticing that you are looking at me. But noticing that you are looking at me is not noticing, on the one hand, that you perceive a certain man and, on the other hand, that I am this man. Rather, it is noticing without mediation, "She is looking at *me*". This mode of perception presupposes and cannot explain second person reference. And so it is with any sensory nexus that may be deemed essential to second person reference. Such a sensory nexus will be of a peculiar kind, an account of which will depend on an account of second person thought.

When you say "This *S* is *F*", I understand you by perceiving, as you do, the object to which you refer. When I am this object, then this is so per accidens. Since I understand a second person thought addressed to me by framing a first person thought, your nexus to me by which you refer to me second personally is not perceptual. The relevant nexus must differ from perception in that my recognition that you bear this nexus to an object must be, when I am this object, an ***immediate*** recognition that you bear this nexus to *me*. This means that my knowledge of this nexus, when I am its term, is spontaneous, and that is, that your nexus to me by which you think second personally about me is such as to provide me with knowledge of this very nexus. But then the nexus is a self-conscious act on my part. It is my thinking a certain thought.

What thought joins me to you in such a way as to enable you to think second personally about me? If my thinking this thought is to join me and you, it must be a thought about you. But how does it represent you? Thinking this thought, I know without mediation that you are addressing me. Hence, it is not enough that I be thinking of you as the man who perceives me, for this thought would depend on an identity judgment that I am the one whom you perceive (as it is not in virtue of being perceived by you that I know that I am perceived by you). It equally will not do to say that I am thinking of you as the man who is addressing me, although this will be true. For, an account of what it is to address someone presupposes a specification of the thought we are seeking. Now, my thought about you must represent you as thinking about me; that is, it must, by virtue of its form, represent you as a self-conscious subject like myself. This fixes its form: it is a thought of the very kind we are in the process of elucidating, a second person thought. It is by thinking second personally about you

13. Here I was greatly helped by a conversation with Michael Thompson.

that I am positioned to take up your second person thought addressed to me in an unmediated first person thought.

So our result is this: your nexus to me by which I am the object of your second person thought consists in my thinking a second person thought about you. Your second person thought reaches me through my thinking back at you in the same way, second personally.

But what if a second person thought is not taken up? I may fail to recognize that you are addressing me. And this does not seem to mean that there is no one you have addressed, or that you do not know whom you have addressed. So I do not need to think back in order for your thought to have me for its object. But how is it that you know whom you address? You do not know this by perceiving me. If that were the case, I would understand your thought by sharing in this perception, which I do not. If you know that you are addressing me, then this is because you are anticipating my thought returning to you. It is by apprehending my power to think about you as you think about me that you think about me second personally. This apprehension is not of a property you attach to an object to which you refer independently. It is internal to the way in which you refer to me. But then there is a sense in which your thought comes to fruition only as my power to return it is actualized. Without my response, your second person reference to me is ungrounded in the way in which your attempted demonstrative reference is ungrounded when there is no object where you take yourself to perceive one. As the perceived object completes your demonstrative reference and makes it possible as the reference to that object that it is, so my second person reference to you completes your second person reference to me and makes it possible as the reference to me that it is.

We said the nexus to me by which your second person thought refers to me consists in my thinking a second person thought about you. Since the relation is symmetric and my second person thought reaches you through yours, we can say that second person thought is thought for two. It takes two to think one. Compare Aristotle's claim that one and the same act is the act of a passive capacity of one thing and the act of an active capacity of another thing; for example, the statements "the fire is heating the water" and "the water is being heated by the fire" describe one act. Analogously, one and the same act is an act of your active power to think second personally about me and an act of my active power to think second personally about you. The same act manifests the power in both of us to refer to the other. Indeed, we are defining second person reference as the form of reference of which this holds true.

Since there is a sense in which knowledge of someone else's self-conscious acts is spontaneous, reference to another subject must be intellectual. Now, second person reference, reference whose linguistic expression is the second person pronoun, is intellectual, which suggests that it is the fundamental form of reference to a self-conscious subject.[14] Demonstrative thought is sustained, in general, by a faculty of receptivity and, in particular, by an act of this faculty. First person thought is sustained, in general, by a power of spontaneity and, in particular, by an act of such a power. In the preceding section, we found that thought about another subject is sustained, in general, by a shared order of reason. Hence, what sustains it in particular will be an act that manifests an order of reason, and manifests it as shared. Since the presence of an order of reason in a subject is a power of spontaneity, and since an act of spontaneity is a thought, reference to a self-conscious subject is an act that manifests the same spontaneous power in the thinker and in her of whom she thinks. It is an act of thinking by two. This is second person reference as we described it, which thus emerges as the fundamental manner of referring to another subject.

We could have concluded already from the last section of Chapter 4 that reference to a self-conscious subject is not demonstrative. Reference to a material substance includes application to it of a material substance concept, which specifies the principle of its unity. In the case of nonrational substances, this concept is empirical. It is received from its instances, and its fundamental application is in thoughts that depend on receptivity, demonstrative thoughts "This N . . .". By contrast, the concept that specifies the unity of a self-conscious subject is a reflective concept. As it is not received from its instances, its first application is in acts of sponta-

14. Jürgen Habermas seems to argue that second person thought is fundamental because it enables cooperation, which he maintains is the function of language: "Erst der Imperativ der gesellschaftlichen Integration — die Nötigung zur Koordination der Handlungspläne unabhängig entscheidender Interaktionsteilnehmer — erklärt die Pointe sprachlicher Verständigung." ("Von Kant zu Hegel. Zu Robert Brandoms Sprachpragmatik", pp. 175–176.) This argument confronts a dilemma. Either acting together is thinking (practical) second person thoughts or it is not. If it is not, as Brandom maintains ("Facts, Norms, and Normative Facts", pp. 362–363), then nothing about the second person follows from a proof that cooperation is the function of language. If it is, then a proof that language is essentially a power of joint action will have to take the form of a proof that it is essentially a power of second person thought. It will provide no independent basis for that claim.

neous knowledge, "I, an *N*, . . .". Now, the same concept must be capable of *spontaneous* application to someone else if it is to be applied to someone else at all. Hence, there must be a manner of thinking about someone else through this concept that is not demonstrative and does not rest on an act of receptivity. And indeed there is. A material substance concept applied in first person thought is applied spontaneously to another subject in a second person thought, "You, fellow *N*, . . .".

Thought of the Self-Conscious

Second person thought requires and includes first person thought, for I apprehend a self-conscious subject through an order under which I subsume my own acts and that I represent first personally. We will now see that it is equally true that first person thought requires and includes second person thought. The same power is exercised in both ways of thinking.

Second person thought is thought for two. If it is essential to self-consciousness, then self-consciousness is a manner of being for two: it essentially manifests itself in mutual recognition of self-conscious subjects as self-conscious. The slogan that self-consciousness is recognition has no content on its own; its meaning derives from the argument it encodes. One argument propounds recognition as a way to manage the "Kantian paradox".[15] We discussed this paradox in Chapter 4. It bears on the conditions of self-consciousness as follows. It is a condition of my self-consciousness that I conceive of my acts as being subject to an order of reason. Since autonomy requires that I be the source of the authority of any order to which I am subject, I must have instituted this order. However, instituting the order must be a self-conscious act. But then this act depends on that of which it is to be the origin: an order of reason. A self-conscious subject must be, and yet cannot be, the source her own self-consciousness; she must be, and yet cannot be, the source of the order being under which she is self-conscious. The solution of this paradox in terms of recognition, put blandly, maintains that, what one cannot do alone, two can do together, if each does for the other what none can do for herself. If I give you your law and you give me mine, then every law is

15. Compare Robert Brandom, "Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism", pp. 216–222.

instituted in a self-conscious act, and every self-conscious act is under a law.

If there is a paradox, then this does not solve it. If "*p* because *p*" does not give grounds for thinking that *p*, then neither does "*p* because *q*; *q* because *p*". A larger circle may be more difficult to discern, but it is no less a circle. In the same manner, if it is incoherent to represent a self-conscious act of *A* as the source of *A*'s self-consciousness, then it is equally incoherent to represent a self-conscious act of *A* as the source of *B*'s self-consciousness, whose self-conscious act is to be the source of *A*'s self-consciousness. In Chapter 4, we distinguished two ways in which acknowledgment and authority may be thought to be linked in laws of autonomy: acknowledgment may be the source of a law's authority or the manner in which its authority manifests itself. The first idea is paradoxical and therefore does not explicate any notion of autonomy; the second idea follows from our account of first person knowledge. We can draw a parallel distinction of ways in which mutual recognition and a shared order or reason may be linked: mutual recognition may be the source of, or it may manifest a shared order. Again, the first notion is empty, while the second follows from our account of second person thought.

It is clear that an order of reason may manifest itself in mutual recognition of subjects who fall under it. But now we are asking whether it must, that is, if being self-conscious is a manner of being for two. We shall now give an argument for this claim, which rests on the results of the present chapter. In general, a thought about a particular substance and its movements subsumes its referent under a concept that designates a general order that is the principle of unity of the substance. The thought represents its referent as an element of a manifold, the manifold of instances of the order that constitutes the unity of its object. The idea of this manifold is contained in any thought about any of its elements, and a power to think about a particular material substance is a power to think about an indefinite number of substances that exhibit the same principle of unity and fall under the same order. For example, someone thinks a thought about a particular tree only if she has it in her to think about other trees, which she distinguishes from that one. Of course, it may be that only one tree is left upon the earth or that she will ever encounter only one. Then she lacks occasion to exercise her power to think about other trees than this one. Still, her thinking about this tree is an act of a power other acts of which, were there occasion for them, would be thoughts about, not this,

but other trees. Now, this equally holds of first person thought. A first person thought represents an act as manifesting an order of reason. An order of reason is general; it induces a manifold, the manifold of those whose acts can be explained by being subsumed under it. An unmediated first person thought contains an idea of this manifold and places its referent among its members. In first person thought, I represent myself as one of a kind, which means that, thinking first person thoughts, I deploy the general idea of a subject of that kind, and thereby have the idea of other subjects of the order that governs my actions and beliefs. Of course, I may be the last man, or stranded on a lonely island, in which case I will have no occasion to exercise my power to think about other subjects. But even then my first person thinking would be an act of a power other acts of which, if there were any, will be thoughts about other self-conscious subjects. Now, we argued above that the fundamental mode of referring to another subject is second personally. Hence, as the power of first person thought is a power to think about other subjects, it is a power of second person thought. A self-conscious subject is a subject of second person thought, which manifests the same self-conscious order operating in both thinkers, who thus recognize each other as united under this order.

In the first chapter, we explained self-consciousness as a power of knowing a subject in a way that sustains unmediated first person thoughts. In this last chapter, we find that the same power is a source of second person knowledge. So mutual knowledge of self-conscious subjects is not an addition to their self-consciousness. A formally represented order that sustains first person thought and its way of knowing as such sustains second person thought and its way of knowing. An order that is a source of self-consciousness as such is a source of mutual knowledge of its instances. Subjects united under an order of reason know each other through this order.

The Act of Thinking Expressed by "You . . ." and "I . . ."

Gottlob Frege held that I alone could think about me in the manner in which I do so when I think about myself in a way whose expression requires a first person pronoun.[16] He did not simply mean that only I could refer to me by means of a first person pronoun. Rather, he meant that

16. "Der Gedanke", p. 39.

there could be no linguistic expression by which someone else would express the thought I express by a first person pronoun, because no one but me can think that thought. Frege's thesis is often treated as routine. Compare, for example, Richard Heck:

> If I utter the sentence "I am a philosopher", then I thereby give voice to my self-conscious knowledge that I am a philosopher. [. . .] If someone else were to think that very same Thought, she would thereby think that I, Richard Heck, am a philosopher. But then that Thought could not be the content of my self-conscious knowledge that I am a philosopher; it could only be the content of a piece of third person knowledge that someone else (or, indeed, I) might have about me. [. . .] The self-conscious Thought that I am a philosopher is one that only I can entertain. ("Do Demonstratives Have Senses?", pp. 9–10)

Heck says that only he can think the thought he expresses by "I . . .", for, otherwise, this thought would not be self-conscious knowledge, but knowledge someone else might have about him, Richard Heck. This is no argument. It assumes that only first person sentences express self-conscious knowledge, which is the thesis in question. John McDowell writes on Frege's thesis:

> Frege's trouble about "I" cannot be blamed simply on the idea of special and primitive senses; they result, rather, from the assumption [. . .] that communication must involve sharing of thoughts between communicator and audience. That assumption is quite natural, and Frege seems to take it for granted. But there is no obvious reason why he could not have held, instead, that in linguistic interchange of the appropriate kind, mutual understanding—which is what successful communication achieves—requires not shared thoughts but different thoughts that, however, stand and are mutually known to stand in a suitable relation of correspondence. ("*De Re* Senses", p. 222)

In the text preceding this passage, which we quoted earlier, McDowell explains that I understand your "You . . ." by thinking something I would express by "I . . .". He now implies that I do not thereby think what you think. She who can think a thought expressed by "You . . ." is not its ref-

erent, and she who is not its referent cannot think a thought expressed by "I . . .". McDowell does not pause to contemplate why this should be so. He treats it as something anyone who reflects on the matter immediately recognizes.

However, his own text raises doubts. McDowell says there is no obvious reason not to hold that understanding requires not shared thoughts but different thoughts mutually known to stand in a suitable relation. But there is such a reason: the capacity to know that thoughts stand in a certain relation depends on the capacity to share them. Understanding you, who are addressing me with "You . . .", McDowell proposes, I know that your thought stands in a certain relation to a thought I think, and which I would express by "I . . .". But how do I represent your thought in knowing this? If I do not think your thought, how then does it figure in my thinking? Figuring there it must, if I am to know that you are thinking it. I can represent your thought as the thought you express by "You . . ."; but if that is the only way in which it figures in my thinking, then I do not understand you. Perhaps I represent it as a thought of the kind I express by "You . . .", differing from that one in being about me?[17] But if I do not understand your "You . . .", I have no notion of a thought that is expressed by "You . . ." and yet is about me. Since I acquire this notion by reflecting on acts of understanding you, we cannot appeal to my possessing it in an account of such acts. Or perhaps I represent your thought as the thought that bears a suitable relation of correspondence to the thought I express by "I . . ."? Now I am to reach your thought through a relation it bears, not to a thought I express by "You . . .", but to a thought I express by "I . . .". But this changes nothing: I possess the notion of a thought that bears the relevant relation to my thought only if I understand you; my understanding you is the source of my possessing that notion, not the other way around.

Neither Heck, nor McDowell says why only its referent can think a thought expressed by "I . . .". Indeed, the thesis is false. What we said in this section disproves it. In Chapter 3 we found that, in suitable cases, "Today . . ." said yesterday and "Yesterday . . ." said today express the same act of thinking. These cases are fundamental in that, without them, there would be no such thing as an act of thinking expressed by either phrase. And when ". . . today . . ." yesterday and ". . . yesterday . . ." today express the same *act of thinking,* then they express the same *thought.* Therefore, it would be misleading to contrast "yesterday"-thoughts with "today"-thoughts; in the fundamental case, a "yesterday"-thought is a "today"-thought. What holds of "today" and "yesterday" holds of "I" and "you". We said that my thinking second personally about you and your receiving my second person thought, thinking back at me second personally, is one act of thinking, an act of thinking for two. But you receive my thought thinking an unmediated first person thought. Hence, my "You" addressed at you and your "I" that receives my address express the same act of thinking. This case is fundamental in that, without it, there would be no such thing as thoughts expressed by "You . . ." and, consequently, by "I . . .". As "You . . ." said by me to you and "I . . ." said by you in taking up my address, express the same *act of thinking,* they express the same *thought.* Therefore, it is wrong to oppose second person thought to first person thought. This is a difference in the means of expression, not in the thought expressed. Second person thought is first person thought. It is thought of the self-conscious.

17. This is a version of the argument from analogy.