ALETHIC HOLDINGS

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I take you to have good reason, all things considered, to stop biting your nails and, as a result, I ask you to please stop biting them. In so doing, I can be said to be performing a speech act whose function it is to hold you to reasons for acting that you already had prior to my performance. Call this function 'an alethic holding', such that we can call any speech act playing this function an 'alethic speech act'.[1]

This paper explores the very idea that there are such speech acts. First, I place alethic holdings within the broader terrain of kinds of performances that strive to hold other's responsible (§I). Second, I explicate the precise sense of 'holding' to reason that constitutes an alethic act (§II-IV). Third, I criticise an account that has been advanced to explain how a speech act can achieve this holding function based on the idea of a vocatival call (§V), and advance an alternative account based on the idea of the second-personal form of a judgment (§VI-VII). Finally, I return to the terrain of holding other's responsible sketched at the outset and suggest that it looks different once this account of alethic speech acts is in view (§VIII).

I

First, some scene-setting, designed to situate the notion of alethic holdings within a broader philosophical context.

A notable feature of everyday interactions between persons is our partaking in a practice of holding ourselves and each other accountable to deontic norms concerning what is right and wrong for us to do. For example, we cajole others and demand their compliance with various obligations, permissions and prohibitions; we experience and express sentiments of blame and resentment when

[1] The phrase 'alethic holding' and much of the inspiration for this paper, is due to Kukla and Lance's book 'Yo and Lo' (Harvard UP, 2008). Their own account of alethic speech acts is discussed below in § V and VI. Kukla and Lance do not use the phrase 'alethic speech acts' but allow for various different speech acts – such as imperatives, entreaties and suggestions - to have an alethic function. I am using the phrase 'alethic speech acts' to refer to the set of speech acts that have this alethic function.

faced with non-compliance; and we occasionally reproach and even punish performances for which there is a perceived disparity between what ought to have been and what was. Even if one thinks that the existence and scope of such deontic norms is somehow capable of transcending our actual performances involving them, one should still acknowledge that this practice of holding each other accountable to those norms is philosophically significant. Not least, this is because it is through the interpersonal and intrapersonal trafficking in them that these deontic norms are capable of gaining traction in the world.

Let me situate this practice within 'the topology of the terrain of holding other's responsible' insightfully drawn by Coleen Macnamara.[2] Her sketch aims to capture the interrelation between three different senses in which one can be said to another responsible:

> The picture I am urging here is one of three concentric circles of participant attitudes and activities. The largest circle is populated by all those attitudes and activities that go hand in hand with regarding another as a responsible agent rather than an object. The next circle just inside is measured by all the ways we engage a responsible agent around her good, bad, virtuous, vicious, right or wrong conduct. And the inner-most circle is occupied by those attitudes and activities that serve to hold another responsible for her conduct. (Macnamara 2011: 97)

The outer circle captures all those attitudes, emotional proclivities and activities that comprise the participant stance adopted in regarding another as a responsible agent. This stance is directed primarily at a person, including – though not limited to – those attitudes and activities that are directed towards specific actions of that person. For example, that attitude of falling in love with someone falls within this outermost circle but not within the other two. The middle circle is limited to those attitudes and activities from the broader circle that are directed towards another's actions, including – though not limited to – those that appraise another's actions or hold them accountable for these actions. For example, debating the virtues associated with a given performance falls within this middle circle but not within the inner one. The smallest circle is limited to those actions that hold a person responsible for a given performance. For example, the act of rebuking non-performance falls within all three circles.

This innermost circle can be divided into those two sub-sections just noted: appraisal of a person's conduct and holding that person accountable for that content. Suppose that every time you continue to bite your nails despite knowing the good reasons not to do it and despite your being

[2] Coleen Macnamara 2011 Holding Others Responsible. *Philosophical Studies* 152 (1):81-102.

aware of my disapproval, I experience certain emotional responses, including resentment, indignation and disapproval. Even if I don't express these reactive attitudes to you in an attempt to get you to stop biting your nails, I am nonetheless appraising your action and holding you responsible for them in a distinctive sense. Suppose I now express those attitudes, and do so not just to give outer expression to inner attitudes, but with the communicative intent of rebuking your conduct and sanctioning your errant nail biting performances in some manner. Now I am holding you responsible for your actions in a different sense; I am not just appraising them but holding you accountable for them. More specifically, my aim in such a communication is not that of trying to cause a future reduction in your nail biting by deterrence (though that may well be a welcome result), but of trying to enforce the norm by getting you to recognise the normative impropriety of your past conduct.

Appraisal and accountability are thus 'two faces of holding others responsible for their conduct'. In addition to the central role played by communicative expression in the accountability, but not the appraisal, face, there are other basic differences between these two faces. One, noted by Macnamara, is that the accountability face is limited to the deontic realm (colloquially: the realm of right and wrong), whereas the appraisal face includes the evaluative realm (colloquially: the realm of good and bad) too. Another, not noted by Macnamara, is that the accountability face is voluntary in a way in which the appraisal face need not be: whether to communicatively express a reactive attitude with the intent of rebuking is the result of a deliberative decision on the part of the rebuker that such an action is a worthwhile undertaking, for which there need not be a counterpart in the experience of reactive attitudes in the appraisal case. (This is not to say that the accountability face can be reduced to appraisal plus a decision to communicate the appraisal to the one appraised, for one can verbalise a resentment without this striving to have the effect of a rebuke. Rather, the deliberate intention to rebuke in the accountability case ensures a very different sense of holding responsible, one that aims at ensuring compliance with normative oughts).

This paper focuses on one kind of performance that falls within the accountability face of holding someone responsible. As a preliminary gloss, an alethic holding refers to the holding of one person A by another person B to the first-personal recognition by A of the deontic norms that are taken to mark a given future performance of A's as obligatory or permissible or prohibited, via the production by B of a speech-act with this function. Alethic holdings thus stand to rebuke (the example of the accountability face just canvassed) as preventative medicine stands to curative medicine. The latter (rebuke) is an act that responds to a prior violation, not just by condemning (this would be the appraisal face), but through censure designed to communicate reproof to the offender so as to get

her to recognise the wrong done. In contrast, the former (alethic holding) operates before any infraction has taken place, and involves the production of a speech act that functions to hold another to compliance with an ought-claim taken to apply to their future performances through the recognition of the ought-claim itself.[3]

I have followed Macnamara's sketch of the terrain closely here, and have provided a preliminary gloss on alethic acts based on their placement within this terrain. The gloss is preliminary in that extended reflection on such acts will lead us, by the end of the paper, to modify our view of the terrain itself. In the next three sections I begin this extended reflection, by making explicit the precise sense of holding to reason that is characteristic of an alethic act.

II

You have had repeated infections of the skin round the nail bed; your nails are looking warn and unappealing; and the act of chewing causes you to mumble your words in conversations and frequently distracts your audience from what you are saying. I take these facts to be, all things considered, good evidence for the truth of the normative judgment that I would express by uttering 'you ought to stop biting your nails'. Put in terms of practical reasoning, I use these facts as evidence in the course of deliberating what ought to be done: I weigh the evidence and judge that the overall weight of the evidence (including facts such as those just noted) supports the claim that you ought to stop biting your nails.

In everyday talk, it is common to replace the term 'evidence' as used in the previous paragraph with 'reasons', such that I can be said to take these facts as reasons for endorsing the judgment 'you ought to stop biting your nails'.[4] Indeed, some have argued that a fact is a reason for one to perform (or not perform) a particular act just in case this fact is evidence that one ought to perform (or not perform) this act.[5] I will go along with this in the ensuing discussion, and talk of reasons not just as considerations that count in favour of an action, but – more pointedly - as evidence that supports

[3] I have followed Macnamara closely here, as her sketch allows for clear placement of alethic holdings within this broader terrain, something Macnamara herself notes. As will emerge, some aspects of Macnamara's account that arise from this placement, including her focus on the deontic and the parallel with the punitive, will be modified once a full account of alethic holdings has been presented.

[4] Grammatically, the term 'evidence' appears to me to function as a mass noun whereas 'reason' as a count noun. ('I have two evidence for that' vs 'I have two reasons for that'). I also use the term 'reason' in the singular (and without a capital) to refer to what the balance of reasons, all things considered, supports.

[5] See Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2008). Reasons: Explanations or Evidence? Ethics 119 (1):31-56; Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2009). Reasons as Evidence. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42

the truth of the judgment that you ought to Φ.[6] In our case, I take you to have good reason, all things considered, to stop biting your nails.

Just because I judge that you ought to stop biting your nails does not mean to say that I want to hold you to this. Perhaps I do not want to get involved in light of other more pressing concerns or think that I do not have the right to interfere or suspect that interference is futile. Suppose, however, that I not only judge that you ought to stop biting your nails but that I desire to hold you to this, via the production of a speech act with this function.

In the way that the notion of a speech act is used here, a speech act is characterized in terms of its 'functional design',[7] i.e. by the function achieved by an ideal performance of that act in a given context. This function is not reducible to what the actor intends the act to achieve, nor to what any instance of so acting will actually or conventionally achieve. As a result, it is not the fact that my desire to hold you to the judgment that you ought to stop biting your nails produced the speech act that makes the performance an instance of an alethic holding, but that the performance instantiates a speech act of the type which has this functional design. On this way of thinking about speech acts, one cannot read the function of a speech act off from the grammatical form of a given token utterance, even though certain forms may typically be associated with particular speech acts types. Further, it is possible for a token performance to instantiate many types of speech acts, in that the tokening strives to achieve multiple functions. There are thus various token expressions I could produce for my performance to instantiate the type of speech act that we are calling an alethic holding. I could, for example, ask you to 'please stop biting them' or tell you that 'you should not bite them'. Whilst these tokenings may be very different, not least in that they may instantiate different types of speech acts, they are both are instances of the alethic holdings in that they, in terms of their functional design, strive, amongst whatever else they may strive for, to achieve the function characteristic of an alethic holding.

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[6] To stress: this is not to take a stand on whether this is the correct explanation of the term 'reason' in other terms - as opposed to, say, one that explains reason as an explanation of an ought claim - or even whether the term reason is basic and admits no explanation in other terms, (For the former, see J. Broome, "Reasons," in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, ed. Jay Wallace, Michael Smith, Samuel Scheffler, and Philip Pettit (Oxford UP, 2004), 28–55; For the latter, see, e.g. T. Scanlon What we Owe to Each Other (Harvard UP, p. 17)). My goal here is to bring introduce some language with which to talk about alethic holdings, and this can be done without mentioning the notion of reasons (evidence and ought-claims will suffice), so there is no need to take a stand on this issue here. The point in the text is that there is, in everyday English usage, a sense of the term 'reason' where it is interchangeable with evidence (in the manner indicated in the text), and I will help myself to a somewhat regimented form of that usage in the discussion of alethic holdings.

[7] Kukla and Lance, op. cit., p. 13.

We have said, somewhat casually, that the function in question is 'to hold you to reasons for acting that you already had'. More carefully, we can now say that my speech act functions to ensure your recognition (in a sense yet to be defined) of the deontic norms governing your future performances to which I judge, based on good reasons, you are already bound.[8] In fact, the term 'reason' in the casual slogan does double duty. It not only points to the kind of justificatory grounding for the deontic norm to which I want to hold you, but it also highlights the kind of engagement with the deontic norm to which I want to hold you, viz. reasoned engagment. In holding you to reason via an alethic speech act, I am not aiming to get you to perform a specified action per se, but for you to first-personally recognise the deontic obligation to perform that I take you to have. So, in tying your hands behind your back, I may be said to be holding you to perform in a particular way that conforms to the normative judgment ('you ought not to bite your nails'), but I would not be said to holding you to reason, for this achieves conformity with the judgment precisely by bypassing your faculty of Reason, your capability to reflectively recognise and respond to reasons. So, even more carefully, an alethic act functions to ensure first personal recognition by your faculty of Reason of the deontic norms governing your future performances to which I judge, based on good reasons, that you are already bound.

III

Here are two ways of trying to fulfil the desire of holding you to reason that, whilst engaging with your faculty of Reason, are not instances of an alethic holding. This is offered as a stipulation: my immediate aim is to carve out the conceptual space occupied by such holdings through a contrast with two seemingly similar acts that have different functions.

[8] It is common in the literature to invoke a distinction between reason 'in the standard, normative sense' and another sense of reason dubbed 'motivating reasons', and these are most often treated as different kinds of reasons from normative ones: the former operates in the context of action explanation and the latter in the context of normative deliberation. I confess to struggling with this distinction, though it is clear that my use of reason in the text is supposed to invoke normative and not motivating reasons. As I understand this, a motivating reason would be an explanation of why you are motivated to stop biting your nails, one that necessarily invokes some mental state of yours as part of the explanation. (This is not to the same as those reasons that are treated by you as normative – i.e. motivating reasons as I use them are not what Scanlon (1998: 19) calls 'operative reasons', i.e. those considerations you took to count in favour of acting, and on which you acted). Explanatory reasons do not count in favour of the truth of the normative claim that you ought to stop biting your nails, even though they may be cited to explain your stopping to bite them.

A straightforward way to fulfil the desire would be to bring to your attention those considerations that count in favour of you stopping to bite your nails. I could arrange for you to come across web links to relevant articles regarding the dangers of nail-biting, or pictures of the parts of your nails that are unattractive or excerpts from you student feedback forms that mention your nail-biting habits as a distraction. Here I am holding you to those reasons in an epistemic sense: by bringing those reasons to your attention and thereby attempting to raise their salience in your doxastic deliberations. Through this, I intend you to recognise that you ought not to bite your nails.

This is not what is meant by an alethic holding: whilst I am informing you of those reasons that you already have for stopping to bite your nails, I am not holding you to them in a robust sense that involves precluding certain outcomes, and it is this robust sense that is the hallmark of an alethic act. Suppose that both of us were in the same epistemic state regarding the reasons in favour of the claim that you ought not to bite your nails and I knew this, there would still be a reason for me to perform an alethic speech act, but not an epistemic act of mere informing you. More generally, the notion of 'holding' in an alethic speech act is not the same as engaging in any act that attempts to draw your attention in an epistemic sense to reasons for an ought-claim to which you are bound, nor to the ought-claim itself. At least, there is more to holding you to the norm than such epistemic aims, so that if this is all your speech act is doing, it is not yet performing the function of an alethic speech act.

Another way of fulfilling this desire would be to, e.g., issue a command: 'Stop biting them!'. For the command to be successful as a command, it requires that you stand in a relationship of authority to me which on which I rely in commanding, and in virtue of which you can be said to have a reason to comply. Whilst commanding may be a way of holding you to reason, it is not what is meant by an alethic holding, since I am here performing an action that now gives you a new reason to stop biting your nails, rather than holding you to reasons that you had all along. That is, my commanding now creates a new reason for you judging that you ought not to bite your nails, one that is unconnected with the previous reasons you already had for being so obligated.

Compare this with yet another way I could be said to hold you to not biting your nails, such as by painting your nails with a foul tasting gel or by giving you a financial incentive not to bite them. This too may be a way of holding you to reason but is not what is meant by an alethic holding, since I am here performing an action that now gives you a new reason to stop biting your nails, rather than holding you to reasons that you had all along. You always had a reason not to consume a foul tasting gel or to reap financial gain when possible, but this reason was not connected to desisting from nail

biting prior to my actions.[9] Here I fulfil my desire of holding you to not biting your nails by giving you a new reason, and is thus not an instance of an alethic holding in the sense that we are interested in here.

The sceptical reader may be excused for exasperation at this point: not only have we delayed saying what alethic acts are, it is hard to see how there can be conceptual room for an act that fulfils this desire that is not a form of the two ways just canvassed. First, says the skeptic, if there are speech acts that function alethically, then an alethic act of mine that holds you to recognising that you ought not to bite your nails will always give you a new reason for judging that you ought to not bite your nails, in addition to whatever else it does. If so, it will not be substantively different from commanding. Moreover, it is hard to see why the distinction between giving you new reasons and holding you to old reasons is significant, once it has been conceded that my desire is to get you to recognise that you ought not to bite your nails. Suppose at time T that there are good reasons for judging that you ought to Φ and at T1 my acts create new reasons for the judgment. The ought-claim at T and T1 has not changed; my reasons for judging it to be true have just become stronger. If so, why should one be interested in an act that holds you to recognising the ought claim based only on the old reasons?

In the next section, I attempt to give a positive description of the function of alethic speech acts that, inter alia, addresses these sceptical concerns.

IV

A central challenge involved in making sense of the idea of alethic speech acts lies in the seeming difficulty of taking seriously both the notions of Reason and Holding. On the one hand, what I am trying to secure through my speech act is your reflective recognition of a deontic obligation, recognition that necessarily involves the deliberative engagement of your faculty of Reason. On the other hand, I am trying to 'secure' it: the metaphor of holding is to be taken seriously, so that in performing the speech act I have a grip on your deliberation in a robust sense that precludes certain outcomes. Here, however, is the tension. Through deliberation, we may say that reason has a grip over us, but the notoriously peculiar aspect of being bound by the force of the better reason is that this does not involve 'enslavement to some alien force'.[10] Yet, if I am capable of holding you to

[9] One could say that the following conditional claim was true prior to my action: I have reason to desist from biting my nails if they are coated in foul tasting gel. This conditional reason was, however, inactive so to speak until my action activated it, and made it no longer a conditional reason.

[10] J. McDowell, Having the World in View, (Harvard UP, 2008), p. 104.

reason in some robust sense, your act of deliberating is precisely beholden to an alien force and is thus not an exercise of the faculty of Reason at all. To take both Reason and Holding seriously, then, requires us to make sense of the possibility of me, through my speech act, having some kind of force over your deliberations regarding the deontic obligation to perform that does not somehow involve this force being alien to you.

If it is indeed Reason to which I am holding you, then one of the outcomes to which my holding you, however robustly, cannot preclude is your ability to contest the propriety of the ought-claim. I may give you what I take to be good reason, all things considered, for judging that you ought not to bite your nails and I may try to hold you to recognising that you ought not to bite your nails, but none of this precludes the possibility that you disagree. Unless you are capable of challenging the deontic norms, then the norms are precisely alien to you; you can be subject to them, but you will not recognize their binding force as legitimate. An alethic speech act, one that functions to hold you to recognise an ought-obligation, cannot then be said to hold you to any particular outcome in your deliberations, lest they cease to be exercises of Reason.

There is, however, another possibility of making sense of the idea of me holding you to reason, in a robust sense that precludes certain outcomes, without this involving alienation. Think of deliberating in the practical cases under consideration here as an on-going process from input to output, with the input being those considerations the deliberator takes as pertinent to arriving at a given judgment, and the output being a potentially revisable judgment on the matter, even if the judgment is to suspend deliberation or to disengage from it. If an alethic speech act cannot hold you to arriving at a given output in the process for considerations just rehearsed, those considerations do not preclude my holding you to beginning that process. When I ask you to please stop biting your nails or say that you ought to stop biting your nalis, I am – amongst other things - holding you to engage first-personally with ought-claim 'you ought to stop biting your nails'. I cannot hold you to a given outcome of that engagement: you may agree ('yeah, I really ought to stop'), disagree ('you just don't get the profound pleasure of nail biting'), withhold assent ('gee, I am just not sure it's so clear cut'), or opt out of deliberating altogether ('I just don't have time to deal with that right now'). But what I can hold you to is to engage with this ought-claim in deliberation. You may actively reject it but you cannot passively ignore it.

Contrast this with a case of reason-giving in the epistemic sense noted earlier. I can present you with all sorts of reasons for your deliberations by manipulating your local environment such that you will come across such reasons. It is likely that your encounter with these reasons will trigger deliberation as to whether you ought not to bite your nails. It is, however, possible that you will ignore those

reasons, either in the sense that you fail to notice them or they that passively drop out of your deliberations without a decision to do so. In such a case, I am placing those reasons in the public sphere in a way that I hope will trigger your active deliberation. This differs from an alethic holding: here I perform a speech act that ensures active engagement with the ought-claim, in a way that rules out passively ignoring this. I hold you to this in a robust sense that precludes certain outcomes, namely not engaging actively in deliberation with whether you ought not to bite your nails.

This is also different from creating new reasons for you not to bite your nails, such as by commanding you not to. A succesful command will give you a new reason for the ought-claim, one that may even function to create this obligation even in the absence of other reasons. This may make compliance more likely, but it does not hold you in the robust sense to recognising the ought claim. Whilst our skeptic is correct that an alethic act may also function to give you a new reason for the truth of the ought-claim, this is separate from its alethic function which is to hold you to deontic obligations for reasons that were already there. Contra the skepic, the real issue here is not whether the reason for my compliance are new or old reasons, but whether one is being held to active engagment with the deontic norms taken to govern one's actions.

It is worth stressing the limitations of the discussion thus far. It is one thing to outline the function that is supposed to be played by alethic speech acts; it is another to claim that there are such speech acts. The discussion thus far has made conceptual space for such an act, by distinguishing alethic acts from the act of informing somone of their deontic obligations and from the act of giving someone new deontic obligations. On this outline, an alethic holding refers to the holding of one person A by another person B to the first-personal deliberative engagement by A with the deontic norms that are taken by B to mark a given future performance of A's as obligatory or permissible or prohibited, via the production by B of a speech-act with this function. For all that has been said, there may not be acts capable of fulfilling such a function.

The best way of defending the claim that there are speech acts capable of so functioning is to provide an account of such speech acts. An account of a speech act is one that answers the question 'how can a token performance achieve this function?' To use more familiar examples, an account of the speech act of promising or commanding aims spells out, using more familiar terms, how promises or commands are capable of achieving their function. Without such an account, promises or commands can appear mysterious: it seems almost magical that acts such as these are capable of having their normative powers of obligating and entitling. The same is true of alethic holdings: the ability of a speech act to hold you to reason in the robust sense of precluding non-engagement with a norm can seem utterly mysterious: just how can tokening something achieve that? An account of

alethic acts aims to remove the mystery by spelling out, using other less puzzling terms, how an alethic act can achieve this function. In the remainder of this paper, I will consider two accounts of alethic acts.

V

In a path-breaking book, Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance (henceforth K&L) develop a framework for thinking of speech acts as moves within a social practice that function to transform the normative status of producer and target of the speech act, and usually others as well.[11] Thinking of speech acts in this manner permits a kind of functional characterization of a given speech act type, in terms of their 'input' – i.e. the distinctive kind of entitlement that licenses a performance of that speech act type, and their 'output' – i.e. the distinctive kind of changes in normative status that the given act type 'strives' to achieve. In the course of providing a typology of different types of speech acts using this functional characterisation, K&L introduce the idea that some speech acts can be said to have an alethic function (they serve "hold its target responsible for living up to commitments that she *already* has..." [111]), and proffer what, in my terms, could be said to be an account of such holdings, i.e. an explanation of how an instance of such a performance can achieve this function. In this section, I will outline this account and argue that it is not successful.[12]

For K&L, a token utterance is an instance of particular kind of speech act in virtue of its 'striving' to play the pragmatic function associated with that speech act. In this case, my uttering 'please stop biting them' or 'you should not bite your nails' has various functions and instantiates more than one type of speech act. In particular, K&L contend that, in addition to whatever other function it has, my utterance has a vocatival dimension: i.e. it is an instance of a speech act type called a 'vocative'.

To get a better grip on the idea of a vocative, consider the pure hail: a friend yells out: 'Hey'. This hail serves to recognise my presence, a recognition achieved by requesting my recognition of her hail through an act directed back to her. My response is an act of acknowledgement that recognizes the hail as having being made appropriately, as having reached its target and as appropriately requesting the act of acknowledgment in return. The input to a vocative is agent-relative: not everyone is

[11] 'Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance, Yo!' and 'Lo!': The Pragmatic Topography of the Space of Reasons by (Harvard University Press, 2009). I have explored aspects of this book before in J. Wanderer (2010) 'Inhabiting the Space of Reasoning' *Analysis 70(2)*:367-378 [2010].

[12] To stress: sucess here is judged in my own terms. That is, I aim to show that their account cannot fulfil the function for alethic speech acts just outlined. As will emerge, it is possible that K&L have in mind a different function.

entitled to hail me. The output of a vocative is agent-relative in the particularly strong sense that the vocative is individuating and second-personal (143). A vocative is individuating in that even if many people are hailed by a single utterance ('Hello Wisconsin'), the vocative is essentially from, and attaches to, one and only one individual – it calls for your recognition that *I* have been recognized by *you*. It is second-personal in that it not only strives to make me aware of your recognition of me but that it makes a demand on me to acknowledge my recognition through responding to you in a way that expresses my recognition that you are holding me to so respond.

My uttering 'you should not bite your nails' is not a pure hail, though it functions as a vocative too. This vocatival dimension calls on you to first personally recognise the propriety of my recognizing you in this manner, i.e. as one so obligated. At the core of their account of alethic holdings is the idea that an alethic act achieves its function of holding you to first-personal uptake of an ought via the vocatival dimension that introduces an interpersonal dimension to that normative context. Prior to my utterance, you ought not to bite your nails. Following my utterance, you now not only ought not to do this, but you ought not to do it for *me*, so that violating this ought is not just wrong, but it is now also a wrong directed at me. It is this vocative that introduces an interpersonal dimension and it is this interpersonal dimension that allows my utterance to play its alethic function.

How does the introduction of a vocative here allow me to hold you to the norm that you ought not to bite your nails? On one reading, it is simply by adding an interpersonal dimension to a given ought-claim alone that allows it to function thus: my call and your recognition of this call bind us together in an interpersonal relationship that functions, inter alia, to hold you to the ought claim. But it is hard to see how it is that through this addition alone I can be said to hold you to the norm in any robust sense (i.e. one that precludes certain possibilities). According to K&L, my call achieves two things: it creates an additional reason for the ought-claim and gives direction to subsequent action, such that your subsequent response is now directed towards me. Whilst both of these may give me more reasons for judging that I ought not to bite my nails, it does not hold me to this in any robust sense. If I was capable of ignoring the ought-claim before, I remain capable of ignoring the claim after. The point is general: I cannot be said to hold you to a norm by adding another norm to hold you the first one, since if I was not held by the first I am not held by the second. It can increase the strength, and alter the nature, of the reasons for the norm and thereby increase the likelihood of compliance, but, as we have seen, this is different from the idea of holding.

It is tempting to conclude that K&L simply do not intend a robust notion of holding of the kind described in the first part of this paper. There is, however, some suggestion in a later section of their book that K&L recognise the need for something more robust. Discussing the role played by

vocatives in initiating and maintaining membership in a discursive community via mutual recognition, they note:

> " Vocatives can have a certain kind of inescapability. *Rejecting or resisting* an identity or a norm is not the same as completely failing to recognize the claim it makes. ...When I challenge a hail – by denying its appropriateness altogether or by denying the specificities of what it demands from me – I still acknowledge its attempt to make a claim on me. *I treat it as a second-personal speech act that calls for some acknowledgment out of a range of possible responses from me; given the nature of norms, contestation and refusal always count as part of this range.* Thus by recognizing the hail as having targeted *me*, rightly or wrongly, I already give it an acknowledgment that in an important sense falls within the range of responses that affirms the correctness of the original recognition." [186]

Talk of vocatives as inescapable strongly echoes the robust notion of holding that I am after here. First, it suggest that it is a speech act that precludes certain outcomes. Further, the outcomes precluded are similar to those already noted, namely non-recognition of the demands of the vocatival call itself. Once you have recognised the vocatival call, you have engaged with what it demands, however much you would rather not have so engaged, since rejecting that demand is a form of engagement with that demand. It can be rejected but not ignored.

If, however, if it is indeed the more robust sense of holding that is intended by the term 'alethic holding', then it is hard to see how this can be achieved by adding the vocatival dimension when this extends to anything beyond the pure case. According to K&L,

> "[E]ach vocative, no matter how mundane, is both *alethic* and *constative*. The vocative is alethic insofar as it calls upon us to uphold norms that already bind us, by calling us to recognize ourselves as really the one subject to those norms ... When we hail someone, part of what we are doing is calling her attention to the norms that *already* bind her in virtue of her position in normative space. At the same time, the vocative is constative, at least in the minimal sense that the speech act itself places a new normative demand on its target, namely the demand for acknowledgment. It thereby shifts the total normative position or 'scorecard' of the person it hails." [184].

Applied to our case, I am calling out to you not just as a potential hailee, but as one who has a deontic obligation to stop biting their nails. My utterance plays an alethic function: it calls on you to recognize yourself as a potential hailee already bound by the norms delineating appropriate response. And it plays a constative function: it creates a new obligation on you to respond to me.

Together, they give you, the one hailed, a new norm to recognize your prior normative status prior to the addition of this new norm i.e. as one who ought to stop biting your nails.

Unlike the case of recognition of the pure vocative, however, recognition of the impure vocative is escapable. In the pure case, inescapability is achieved by the relatively minimal normative demands of the call. In hailing you, I call on you to recognise the propriety of my recognition that you are available to be recognised. Your mere awareness of the call itself serves to bring you into engagment with the normative demand of the call, so that even if you want to contest the propriety of the call, you can only do so from a position of having recognised, and thus engaged with, this normative demand. In such a case, the call is at least partly succesful in achieving its function: you have recognised my recognising, though judged it inappropriate. In the impure case under consideration here, my call strives to hold you to recognising the propriety of my recognition of you as one with an obligation not to bite your nails. Your awareness of the call itself need not bring you into engagment with the normative demand of the call, beyond that of the pure vocative.

What is striking about K&L's discussion of alethic holdings is that, despite highlighting the centrality in our discursive practices of acts that strive to recognise and call for recognition, their *account* of alethic holdings as interpreted here does not seem to venture far from the two possibilites we considered earlier, as either adding new oughts or informing of old ones. If one reads their account along the lines of the first interpretation advanced, then their account is a special version of the idea of holding as adding a new deontic obligation, albeit one that introduces a second-personal dimension. If one reads their account along the lines of the second interpretation advanced, then their account is a special version of the idea of holding as informing of an extant deontic obligation, albeit where the act of informing captures the attention of the one informed via the trick of the pure vocative. Neither option, however beefed up, provide a satisfactory account of alethic speech acts in our sense.

VI

According to K&L, it is the second-personal dimension of a speech act that allows a given speech act to achieve its alethic function. Further, this second personal dimension of a speech act is construed by them solely in terms of the role played by a tokening of that act in an interpersonal transaction. In the next section I will defend the first of these claims; in this section I will criticise the second, by providing an alternative construal of this second personal dimension.

On K&L's construal, the second personal dimension of a speech act is thought of in terms of the performance of a speech act directed at and recognised by another.

> Second-personality, one would think, is a feature that a *transaction* such as a speech act can have. A second-personal claim is one that I make *to you*. Transactions can have such a second-person voice because they can have a direction and a transitive object. In this work, we have used the notions of first- and second-personality to describe how claims and speech acts are *directed* and *received*... [125].

As a result of this focus on transactions, the idea of second-personality is one that operates for K&L solely at the level of talk and not thought. Unvoiced thoughts, even if they involve judgments that use the grammatical second person pronoun, cannot be said to be second-personal, since they are not transactions.

There is, however, another way of using the notion of the second-person that could apply to both thought and talk. On this alternative, to say that a given judgment, whether in speech or in thought, is second personal is to say something about its *form.*[13] More specifically, to say that a judgment is second-personal is to say that the judgment essentially deploys a second-personal way of thinking of something, and not, in the first instance, to say anything about how a speech act is directed and received. To focus on form rather than transaction is not to deny that there is an important pragmatic difference between thinking a thought with a second-personal form and performing a second-personal speech act: unvoiced claims clearly can neither establish or maintain interpersonal relationships, nor transform normative statuses, in the way that voiced claims can. The point, rather, is that both voiced and unvoiced judgements share a common form, and it this shared form that is essential to the former achieving its pragmatic function.

Discussions of forms of thinking are far more familiar for the first-personal case. *I judge: 'I ought not to bite my nails'*. It is common to acknowledge that here we have a distinctive first-personal form of thought.[14] In referring to oneself with 'I', one is thinking of oneself in a unique way that is not reducible to any other way of thinking of something, such as with the use of a demonstrative 'this'.

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[13] In what follows, I take no stand on the relationship between thought and talk, allowing for the priority of either or neither. Thus, whilst I will talk of a judgment being expressed in a speech act, this should thus not be taken to imply that the latter is best treated as a public expression of a conceptually prior mental thought.

[14] The literature is notoriously both vast and difficult, including seminal work by Anscombe ("The First Person"), Geach ("On Beliefs about Oneself"), Perry ("The Problem of the Essential Indexical"), Castañeda ("On the Phenomeno-Logic of the I") and Lewis ("Attitudes De Dicto and De Se"). In what follows, I am drawing primarily on the work of Evans in Chapter 7 of The Varieties of Reference – together with McDowell's "De Re Senses" and Rödl's "Self-Consciousness".

My judgements: 'This man ought not to bite his nails' and 'I ought not to bite my nails' are not the same form of thinking about something, even when I am this man. In familiar philosophical parlance, when I am this man, we can say that the terms 'I' and 'this man' have the same reference but they differ in sense, and it is the notion of sense that is designed to capture the idea of a form of thought. The first personal form of thought comes out in the fact that I am thinking about the object in such a way that it is not accidental that the I in 'I judge' and the I in 'I ought...' refer to the same person. In contrast, when I judge 'This man ought not to bite his nails', it is not in virtue of this form of reference to the object that the judger and this man are identical, even if I am this man, since I may be able to grasp the thought that this man ought not to bite his nails but not realise that I am this man. A first personal form of thought is one whose content is a judgment regarding how things stand with a given object, where one refers to that object in a distinctively first-personal way, such that in thinking of the object in this way one is capable of judging how things stand with it. This distinctive way of knowing grounds first personal reference, and in the ideal case I thereby know how things are with that object; I know that I ought not to bite my nails.

There has been far less discussion of the second-personal case, possibly on the tacit assumption that the second personal one does not involve a distinctive form of thought since second personal reference is reducible to other ways of referring to something. *I judge: 'you ought not to bite your nails'.* The assumption is that I am referring to you by way of a description or a demonstrative, such as by glossing 'you' here as 'that woman' or as 'the person to whom I am speaking'. If one grants that some sort of reductive account is available, this means that there is no such thing as a second-personal form of thinking of something. As a result, it may well make sense to claim that the very notion of second-personality is best thought of as a feature of a transaction rather than a form of thought, such that any distinctiveness associated with second-personal claims arises from the transactional use in directed speech acts and not from the form of judgment that they express.[15]

I judge: 'you ought not to bite your nails'. The assumption just canvassed is that 'you' here is reducible to some other way of referring to an object, such as 'the one to whom I am speaking'. Sebastian Rödl has argued that 'you' is not so reducible.

> [S]econd person reference cannot be explained as reference to her who is being addressed; this specifies the referent, but not the sense of a given use of the second person pronoun. 'I am addressing you' is not a tautology but something that she who is being addressed may

[15] This is, of course, not K&L's motivation, since they deny the applicability of the notion of a form of thought to the first personal case as well, treating both first and second-personal as transactional.

> fail to recognise, and which she realises if and only if she thinks, 'He is addressing me'. This proves that you cannot be explained as 'that person to whom I am speaking'. 188[16]

I can fully understand your claim, 'the person to whom I speaking ought not to bite their nails' without realising that I am that person. If as a result I judge: 'I ought not to bite my nails', then this is due to me making an additional identity judgment: 'I am the person to whom you are speaking'. In contrast, when I fully understand your judgment 'you ought not to bite your nails', I recognise that I am its referent without such an identity judgment; I cannot grasp what you are saying without judging that you are predicating something of *me*.

One may harbour the suspicion that Rödl's argument here is too quick. After all, the argument moves from the form of reference in a judgment by one person to what is involved in grasping a verbal expression of that judgment by another person. This move is suspicious for two reasons. First, in moving from judger to audience, we are invoking an interpersonal transaction, and it may be that the requirements on the audience stem from the peculiarities of the transaction and not the form of the judgment itself. Second, and more worryingly, it does seem hard to generate the same kinds of concerns whilst remaining solely with the judger and not the audience. *I judge: 'you ought not to bite your nails'*. Here, using 'the person to whom I am speaking' as a gloss for 'you' does seem to capture the distinctive way I am referring to the object of my thought, since I could not be in a position to judge that the person to whom I am speaking out not bite their nails and not judge that you ought not do so. Put differently, it is hard to imagine one judging that the person to whom I am speaking ought not to bite their nails is true, but not that you ought not to bite your nails is true, or vice versa.

To see that the suspicion is not grounded, consider the first personal case again. I judge: 'the person speaking now ought not to bite his nails', when I am the person speaking now. As we have noted, this will not do as a reductive gloss on 'I ought not to bite my nails', since it is possible that I could grasp the former but not the latter if I do not realise that I am the one speaking. In determining that this is possible, we think of an unusual case in which I speak and I identify that someone is speaking, but not that I am speaking. Such cases will typically involve imagining me taking an alienated view on my act of speaking; perhaps I am daydreaming and hear the pronouncement but not realise that I am its source or perhaps I am suffering from some neuropsychological disorder that leaves me blurting out pronouncements unawares. In such cases, my grounds for judging that someone is speaking are typically the same as any other observer; I precisely lack the first-personal awareness of my performance characteristic of agency. Contrast this with another gloss. I judge: 'the person

[16] Sebastian Rödl, *Self-Consciousness*, Harvard University Press, 2007. This section (and much of the next) is an attempt to think through some of the ideas provoked when wrestling with Chapter 6 of Rödl's book.

judging now that he ought not to bite his nails ought not to bite his nails', where I am the person judging now. Here it is far harder to imagine that I grasp that thought but not also judge that I ought not to bite my nails, since it hardly seems possible to adopt such an alienated view of my own act of judging. In such a case, it is better to say that 'the person judging now' is a satisfactory gloss on the term 'I' but it is not a reductive one for it is simply another way of capturing the unique way of referring to something that is characteristic of a first personal form of thought.

We were suspicious that the gloss 'the person to whom I am speaking' does capture the distinctive way I am referring to the object of my thought using 'you', and that this implied – contra Rödl – that there was no distinctive second personal form of thinking. This case, however, strikes me as similar to the case of 'I' and 'the person judging'. That is, 'the person to whom I am speaking' is indeed a satisfactory gloss on 'you', but it is not a reductive one for it is simply another way of capturing the unique manner of referring to something that is characteristic of a second personal form of thought. When I think of the object of my judgment as the person to whom I am speaking, I am not merely thinking of the object as standing within the reach of the vocal sounds I produce, but as a fellow deliberator. It is hard to imagine me taking an alienated attitude towards you as an object of my judgement, whilst treating you as the person to whom I am speaking. Contrast this with another gloss for 'you' considered above; I judge: 'that woman ought not to bite her nails'. Here it does seem possible to take an alienated attitude towards you as an object of my judgement whilst treating you as 'that woman'. As a result, it is possible for me to judge that that woman over there ought not bite her nails but not judge that you ought to do so, without the intervention of an additional identity judgment that you are that woman over there.

Rödl is right. There is a second person form of thinking of something that is shared by my unvoiced thought about you using 'you' and my voiced speech act directed at you using 'you'. In thinking of you in this manner, I represent you as one towards whom I cannot take an alienated attitude, in that I treat you not just as an object capable of being affected by my actions but as a fellow deliberator capable of reasoned engagement with me. The term 'fellow deliberator' here does not simply mean a person capable of shared deliberation, for referring to you thus would not serve to distinguish you in my thinking from any other potential deliberator; I would not *know which* object I am referring to. In using 'you', I am referring to you through my representation of your capacity for active engagement with this thought. I think of you as the person who could judge 'I ought not to bite my nails' in response to my judgment. In referring to you thus, I am using a distinctive second-person form of reference that is intimately tied with the capacity to use the pronoun 'you'.

Various token acts may share this second personal form of reference, even if they do not explicitly invoke the grammatically second-personal pronoun in their linguistic expression. For example, not only may utterances of 'you ought not to bite your nails' or 'you should not bite your nails' contain a second personal form of thought, so too could my uttering 'please stop biting them'. I find the following example especially revealing for thinking about second-personal form of reference. You ask me: 'Should I bite my nails?'; I respond: 'No'. My response makes no explicit use of the second-personal pronoun, yet it is second personal in the sense used here. How do I refer to you in this response? Your query overtly displays your capacity for first-personal deliberative engagement the ought-claim, as made explicit by your use of the term 'I', and I refer to you in my response by representing this very capacity. My 'no' thus a second-personal form of thought, and differs only from the cases we have been considering here only in that the capacity represented is actual and not potential.

In sum, a second personal form of thought is one whose content is a judgment regarding how things stand with a given object, where one refers to that object in a distinctively second-personal way. In second-personal reference, I refer to the object through my representation of your capacity for active engagement with this judgment, and thus us a fellow deliberator from whom I cannot take an alienated attitude. Second-personal reference is such that in thinking of the object of my judgment in this way one is capable of judging how things stand with that object. This way of judging grounds second personal reference, and in the ideal case, I thereby know how things are with that object. I know that you ought not to bite your nails.

VII

I say: 'you ought not to bite your nails'. This performance instantiates multiple pragmatic functions, including that of a vocative which calls for recognition from you of the act, a recognition that is itself addressed back to me. Additionally, the speech act is second personal because the judgment expressed by the act has a second-personal form, in which I refer to you through my representation of your capacity for active engagement with this judgment. On the account proffered here, it is this second-personal form of thought, and not just the vocatival aspect of the transaction between us, which ensures this speech act plays the functional role of an alethic holding.

In order to understand my speech act, you must recognise this second personal form or else you have not grasped what I have said. If you took my use of the second personal pronoun to refer demonstratively for example, then you will not have understood what I said, since it would be

possible for you to have 'grasped' my thought by thinking that that person ought not to bite her nails, without realising that that person is you. But this would be to misunderstand my judgment, which requires your recognition that you are its referent, recognition which you would express by use of the term 'I'. At least this is so, on a plausible understanding of understanding that requires grasp of sense and not just reference.[17] So, in grasping my judging: 'you ought not to bite your nails', you think 'I ought not to bite my nails'. It is important not to treat your response here as a mere linguistic trick of substituting one expression for another, but as an actualisation of your capacity to actively engage with the claim that constitutes the way in which I have referred to you. In other words, I judge that you ought not to bite your nails, referring to you by representing your capacity to engage with this judgment. You grasp my thought by exercising that capacity, for anything short of that would not be understanding my judgment.

It may be tempting to say of your grasping my thought in this manner that this is 'one act of thinking; an act of thinking for two'.[18] This pithy slogan admits various readings. I want to endorse one, according which you and I are co-deliberators on a shared subject matter, and to reject another, according to which you and I are co-deliberators about ourselves.

On the account developed thus far, once you have understood my claim, you and I are thinking a thought with the shared content: 'you/I ought not to bite your/my nails', and not two different contents that are related by our grasp of the meaning of the terms 'you' and 'I'. To say that the content of thought is shared is to say that the ability to think thoughts with this content is internal to the relationship between us and is thus something unavailable to anyone else. An overhearer of your utterance cannot have a thought with this content, though she may be able to make sense of what was said by having related thoughts that allow her to track who is being referred to. As a result, the sense of the concepts 'you' and 'I' are indeed shareable: shareable by you and I through my making and you grasping a judgment with second-personal form.

It is worth distinguishing this notion of shared content from another. Think of a case with two people involved in an exchange of goods and consider their judgments at the moment of exchange. X judges that he is exchanging goods with Y; Y judges that she is exchanging goods with X. Here, X thinks a thought about X and Y; and Y thinks a thought about X and Y. In X's judgment, X refers to X with a first person form of reference and Y with a second person one; In Y's judgment, Y refers to Y using a first person form of reference and X with a second person one. Here we can say that X and Y make judgments with the shared content: 'I am exchanging goods with you'. Note that I have not

[17] It is of course precisely cases such as these that are taken to put pressure on this plausible understanding of understanding; the argument in the text suggest that such revision is unnecessary.
[18] Rödl, op. cit. p. 197.

expressed the shared content as 'I/You am exchanging goods with I/you', i.e. in a way that would parallel our case. In the exchange case, the judgements of both X and Y is *about* both X and Y, which is why we could express the same judgment in we-terms: 'We are exchanging goods with each other'. One could say that this is a judgment primarily involving first-person plural form, such that X and Y refer to themselves and each other in we-terms, which includes referring to each of themselves in the first and second person. In contrast, in our case, my judgment and your judgment are *about* one person: you/I, which is why it is not possible to express the shared content ('you/I ought not to bite your/my nails') in we-terms. (In grasping my thought, neither you nor I are judging that we ought not to bite our nails, but that you/I should). In the exchange case, the subject matter of the deliberation is ourselves and thus the content of the judgment primarily involves a first-person plural form of reference to this subject matter. In our case, the shared subject matter of the deliberation is you/I and thus the content of the judgment involves a second/first person (singular) form of reference to this subject matter.

This is not to say that we-talk is inapplicable to our case. Not only do I refer to you second-personally through my representation of your capacity for active engagement with this judgment, you too think of me second personally through your representation of my capacity for active engagement with this judgment. There is thus a sense in which we think of each other as co-deliberators on this matter, and are capable of expressing this in a further judgment using the term 'we'. This is not part of the content of the judgment made/grasped by each of us, but an understanding of this is presupposed by our ability to make/grasp that judgment. So, whilst neither my judgment ('you ought not to bite your nails') nor yours ('I ought not to bite my nails') can be said to have first-person plural form, you and I are aware of ourselves as co-deliberators on a shared subject matter and can frame this in a separate we-judgment. So, my making the judgment that you ought not to bite your nails and your grasping that judgment can be described as an act of thinking for two, in the sense that we are capable thinking of ourselves as co-deliberators on a shared subject matter (using first/second person form of thought), but not as co-deliberating about ourselves (using a first person plural form of thought).

It is the fact that my judgment has second-personal form that is essential to that act achieving its alethic function. I judge that you ought not to bite your nails, referring to you by representing your capacity to engage with this judgment, and you grasp my thought by exercising that capacity. In exercising this capacity, you engage deliberatively with the ought-claim. That is, the very act of understanding what I am saying involves active engagement by your faculty of Reason with the claim that you ought not to bite your nails. To say that you engage is not to say that you endorse the claim.

The point is that as result of understanding the second-personal form of my claim, it registers as an input to your deliberative process. This is precisely what the 'I' in your thought ('I ought not to bite my nails') denotes – active, first personal engagement with the claim. Such engagement does not determine the outcome of deliberations: you may assent, reject, withhold assent or disengage. What it does do is ensure that if you ignore the claim, then it is a form of active rejection and not passive ignoring. There are many potentially relevant inputs to my ongoing deliberations that do not register as salient despite being within my cognitive reach. I can be said to ignore such features in the passive sense of overlooking them. Once I have understood your claim by thinking 'I ought not to bite my nails', my claim cannot be overlooked in this sense.

What role does the vocatival call play in an alethic act on this account? Suppose I judge that you ought not to bite your nails but do not voice this. If you know me well and are capable of knowing what I think despite me not articulating this in language, it is possible for you to share my thought in the sense just noted, i.e. as capable thinking of ourselves as co-deliberators on a shared subject matter. One would not say, however, that my unvoiced act of thinking is an alethic act, since I am not trying to hold you to reason here by judging that you ought to not bite your nails without voicing this. So, on this account, an alethic act must be voiced. More specifically, it is the vocatival aspect of the act that is necessary for the act to play its alethic function, for it is through such calls that acts have direction and are received, and both the acknowledgment and the call for acknowledgment in response are essential parts of how a token act achieves the function of an alethic holding for just the reasons articulated by K&L. But, on this account, this vocative alone is not enough to explain how the call achieves its alethic function without mention of its second-personal form, for it is the form that explains the robust sense of holding that is the hallmark of alethic acts.

VIII

A primary aim of this paper has been to proffer a functional characterization of an alethic speech acts and to defend an account of such acts that explains how a token performance is able to achieve this function. According to the functional characterization proffered, an alethic speech act performed by one person B serves to hold another person A to first personal deliberative engagement with the deontic norms that are taken by B to mark a given future performance of A's as obligatory or permissible or prohibited. To say that A is held by B to such deliberative engagement is to say that the possibility of A passively ignoring such norms is precluded, though A may actively reject them.

The account of alethic holdings uses two notions to explain how B's performance is capable of achieving this. The first is the *vocatival* dimension of the speech act, with which I recognises you and call on you to recognise that recognition in return. Through the vocative, you and I are bound in an interpersonal relationship and my response is addressed back at you. The second is the notion of the *second-personal form* of a speech act, whose content is my judgment regarding how things stand with a given object, where that object is referred to through my representation of your capacity for active engagement with this judgment. In grasping such a judgment, you grasp that I am referring to you through an actualisation of your capacity to actively engage with the claim, such that in exercising this capacity you engage deliberatively with the claim I have made. It is because my speech act has both a vocatival function and second-personal form that I am able to hold you to deliberative engagement with my ought-claim in the precise sense explicated above.

This account of alethic acts is not a beefed-up version of either of the two other options canvassed earlier. In holding you to deliberative engagement with the norms in this manner, I am neither just informing you of the norms nor am I adding new norms, even though I may also be doing both of these as well. What I am doing is *sharing* those norms with you, in the precise sense just articulated, i.e. by getting you to think of us as co-deliberators on a shared subject matter. It is because we are sharing that my holding you to such norms in the robust sense does not involve your submission to an alien force and is thus not external to your faculty of Reason. In contrast, extant accounts that do not take second-personal form seriously tend to adopt an almost gladiatorial tone when thinking of holding you to reason as anything beyond an act of informing you of those reasons, such that holding is portrayed as an attempt to impose something alien on you in the form a command or a demand to which you ought to comply. For example, it is common for those wishing to provide a grounding for the normative force of the call of the consciousness of another to invoke the speech act of a 'summons' as a model. Even if a summons is understood without the legal overtones of a subpoena, it still appeals to a performance that functions by creating new reasons for your act rooted in the authority of something alien, even if the result is to forge a new interpersonal relation.[19] Adding an RSVP to an invitation may not be coercive but it still is an imposition.[20]

[19] Here is Allen Wood on Fichte use of the term 'summons' (Aufforderung). "This term in German is broader in its meaning than the English 'summons' – which perhaps suggests a command of some kind, such as a legal subpoena to appear in court. The term Rechtsaufforderung does cover that notion, but Aufforderung means something much less official and usually not in the least tinged with coercion...German dictionaries report that the meaning of auffordern ranges all the way from bitten (request or beg) to verlangen (demand or require). Fichte's use here seems rather closer to the former end of the spectrum than to the latter. For he specifically emphasizes that an Aufforderung (as he means it) leaves us free either to do or not do as we are summoned (or invited) to do." Allen Wood, Fichte's Intersubjective I, Inquiry 49: 73. To request or beg, however, still involves placing new normative demands on another. Coercive it may not be, but is still an imposition.

It is in rejecting the propriety of understanding 'holding' here along the lines of *imposing* norms in favour of an understanding of 'holding' as *sharing* norms that points to a modification of Macnamara's sketch of the terrain of holding others responsible with which we begun. On this sketch, alethic acts fall within the accountability face of holding others responsible for their actions, where this is contrasted with the appraisal face. In the appraisal face, one appraises another's performance in light of their living up to various norms but, unlike the accountability face, one does not necessarily attempt to hold them to these norms.[21] As Macnamara puts it, the key characteristic of the accountability face "is found in the metaphor of holding someone to the oughts that bind them. And this notion, I want to urge, is best understood on the model of enforcement."[22] This focus on enforcement pervades her discussion of all acts that fall within the accountability face, including alethic acts that are seen as a kind of advance act of reproof, in that, like reproof, "it is a communicative act that imposes burdens" where "the burdens imposed are of course not welfare burdens, but normative burdens."[23]. On the account offered here, in contrast, alethic acts can indeed be placed within the accountability face, but the key characteristic of this face ceases to that of enforcement. The accountability face on this account includes all those communicative acts that are designed to hold others to normative demands, in the sense of precluding certain outcomes. This may, as in the case of reproof or punishments, take the form of enforcement via the addition of burdens. Or it may, as in the case of alethic acts, take the form of sharing those norms. Taking seriously the possibility of sharing norms via speech acts as a form of holding you to reason requires more than just viewing such acts as adding "a new, relational, dimension to the normative material your friend faces"[24] via a vocatival call. It requires taking seriously the notion of the second personal form of such judgments. Or so I have argued here.

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[20] Cf. S. Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint (Harvard UP; 2006), page 256.

[21] In distinguishing the accountability from the appraisal face, Macnamara limits the former to concern with deontic norms, and we have have followed her in this in our discussion. The account of alethic acts proffered here, however, suggests that such acts need not be limited to cases involving deontic norms. As a result, one should take the focus here on specifically deontic norms to be the result of the fact that our case involves such norms alone, and not an principled limitation stemming from the idea of alethic acts.

[22] Macnamara, op. cit., p. 90.

[23] Macnamara, op. cit., p. 91.

[24] Macnamara, op. cit., p. 91.