

occurrent emotion that immediately and patently impinge on the way we see the world. Within the category of emotions I mean also to include more enduring psychological states and sentiments, which can imperceptibly colour our view of things. As Robert Musil puts it, 'Not just the way we see red when we get angry—that too, moreover; it is only erroneously that one considers it something that is an occasional exception, without suspecting what deep and general law one has touched upon!—but rather like this: things swim in emotions the way water lilies consist not only of leaves and flowers and white and green but also of "gently lying there"' (1995: 1561).

What I want to do today is to consider what is involved when we seek to understand our own and others' lives backwards, reflecting on earlier thoughts, feelings and emotions, and responding emotionally to them. The idea I want to put forward is that everyday explanation of what we think, feel, and do is narrative in form, presenting what happened from a possible multiplicity of perspectives: not just the perspectives of those involved in what happened, but also the perspective of the narrator—the person who is giving the explanation. Seeing our everyday explanations in this light enables us also to see how emotional responses to value can be recognised in this potential multiplicity of perspectives. Things swim in emotions. In this respect, everyday explanation is extremely close to fictional narrative, and this is because they are both species of the same genus—the genus *story*.

Recently, there has been a lot of very fertile philosophical work, and work in literary theory, concerning the nature of fictional narrative, the point of view in fiction, and our emotional responses to fiction¹. In a way, my project can be seen as an attempt to apply the fruits of this work back onto everyday explanation, in support of the more general idea that everyday explanation, like fiction, is narrative in form, and that the perspective of the narrator is essential here, just as it is in fictional narrative.

This will be my main burden. But I want to end, in disagreement with a rather fashionable view found in literary theory (and sometimes also in philosophy), by insisting that everyday explanation and fiction, although members of the same genus, differ so far as

¹ See, for example, Currie (1990 and 1997), Walton (1990), Lamarque and Olsen (1994), Genette (1980), Ricoeur (1984, 1985, 1988), Bal (1997), and the collection of papers in Hjort and Laver (1997). Accounts of what might happen in the future, or of what might have happened in the past, can also be narrative in form, but these sorts of narrative are not my concern here.

concerns the possibility of truth: in fiction, the question of truth and falsity does not arise; whereas factual narratives can be true or false, and their being narrative in form, and thus presenting what happened from a perspective, does not imply otherwise.

II

Let me begin with a very compacted summary of the central idea. Then I will get into the detail. A narrative or story is something that can be told or narrated; it need not be narrated, though: it can be just 'thought through', as when one remembers or imagines a sequence of events. It is more than just a chronicle of a bare sequence of events, but a representation of those events that is organised, shaped and coloured in a certain way, thereby giving coherence, meaningfulness, and emotional import to what happened². A narrative can report or otherwise indicate the perspective or point of view—including the thoughts, feelings and emotions—of one or more of the characters internal to the narrative, of whom one might be the internal narrator—Sherlock Holmes or Watson in the *Sherlock Holmes* stories for example. This sort of perspective I will call *internal*. (Stories can sometimes be told in a way that presents no internal perspective, but I will not dwell on this type of story here.) Then, at a level that is external to the narrative, the narrator voices his or her own *external perspective*. This external perspective is necessarily distinct from the internal perspective even where, as in first-person autobiographical narratives, the two perspectives are those of one and the same person. And the external perspective is always there, always shaping and colouring the narrative, and thereby indicating the narrator's own evaluation of what happened, and his or her emotional response thereto, as well as inviting from the audience a similar sort of response.

I should at this stage point out a complication that I will, in general, pass over, although I will briefly come back to it later. Sometimes, where we are concerned with a written narrative, the person whose narrative voice that we hear (that is, the voice of the person who in fact *reads*) might be a different person from the nar-

² Cf. Aristotle *Poetics*, and Ricoeur (1984). For a detailed discussion of the idea of perspective or point of view in literature, see Bal (1997). Bal, like Genette (1980), uses the term 'focalisation'. Although I have learnt much from Bal, I have found that I can express what I need without the use of this technical expression.

rator (that is, the person who in fact *wrote* the narrative), or it might be the same person at a significantly different time. In such a case, the narrative voice could, in effect, alter the shaping and colouring achieved by the external perspective as it emerges directly from the text. For example, I could read my childhood diary in an ironic tone of voice when I, the original author, did not intend this irony. But let me leave this complication to one side for the moment.

It follows from the fact that a narrative involves these two levels of perspective that an adequate *understanding* of a narrative requires gaining a grasp of emotional responses at both levels: those of the external narrator, and those of one or more of the people involved in the narrative. This latter sort of understanding, often going under the name of simulation or imaginative identification, is familiar from the Verstehen tradition, and, more recently, from the work of Robert Gordon, Alvin Goldman, Jane Heal and others, where simulation theory has been put forward in contrast to, or at least in addition to, what has been the more entrenched view in philosophy of mind, that understanding involves deployment of a theory of mind³. I do not want to take issue here with the debate between simulation theory and theory theory, nor with the debate *within* simulation theory; I suspect that there are many ways of gaining a grasp of someone's thoughts and feelings, and no single theory should seek for hegemony in this area. But what I do want to emphasise is that understanding a narrative involves more than just grasping internal perspectives—the thoughts and feelings of characters in the narrative—however that particular task is achieved. It also involves grasping at the external level the *narrator's* perspective, and this seems to me to have been neglected on all sides of the recent debate. Perhaps one reason for this neglect is that the focus in the debate has been on our ability to *predict*, and how the competing theories can

³ See, for example, Gordon (1995) and Goldman (1992) for accounts of imaginative simulation, and Heal (1998 and 2000) for accounts of what she calls co-cognition, as a distinct sort of simulation. I do not wish to suggest that co-cognition and imaginative identification (through empathy—centrally imagining from the other's perspective—or through putting yourself in the other's shoes) are the same thing. See Heal (2000, esp. Fn 5 and 7) for a discussion of the relation between the two. Although both processes are ways of getting a grasp of the thoughts of others, co-cognition would seem to be restricted to thoughts as propositional attitudes, capable of bearing rational relations to each other, and thus cannot cover, for example, feelings or moods. In fact, I am not sure what the relation is between these two processes; perhaps co-cognition is necessary but not sufficient for imaginative identification. But nothing that I say in what follows hangs on these issues.

account for this ability. This is all very interesting, but we should not lose sight of the fact that the role of the external perspective is very different when we seek to predict from what it is when we seek to *explain* what has already happened⁴. In everyday explanation, the role of the narrator's external perspective is essential; and it is, accordingly, essential to grasp that perspective if one is adequately to understand such a narrative.

All that was by way of summary. Now let me try to bring out in more detail the role of these different levels of perspective, and the essential role of the external perspective, by considering in turn first-person and third-person explanations and narratives. In first-person explanation, of course, it is human—all too human—to take one's own side. That is to say, we tend to offer explanations involving our own internal perspective on what happened and not that of the other people involved. Thus, in order to explain what we did, we tend to appeal to how the situation struck us, whereas we tend to explain the actions of others by appeal to their fixed character traits. So typically we have 'I acted as I did because my experience was terrifying' and 'She acted as she did because she is a timid person'. This tendency is known in social psychology as *agent-observer divergence*⁵. Thus, in these typical cases, the perspective of the external narrator, as expressed in the narrative voice, and the perspective that is internal to the narrative, are perspectives of one and the same person. It would, however, be seriously mistaken to think that the need to distinguish the external and internal perspectives is accordingly less important than it is in third-person narratives, just because they are the perspectives of one and the same person. To show this, let me begin with a fairly straightforward example of an everyday explanation in the first person.

⁴ See Footnote 7 below for a brief further discussion.

⁵ See, for example, Storms (1973) and Regan and Totten (1975). But we can, of course, imagine ourselves as others would see us. Anyone who has seen a replay of a video of himself making a presentation will be familiar with this sort of phenomenon: we suddenly see ourselves as the audience would have seen us, and exclaim: 'I didn't know I was such a nervous person'. (Agent-observer divergence has been reversed in experimental conditions by Storms (1973).) An example of Hume's nicely captures the idea of how we can shift perspective: 'A man will be mortified if you tell him he has a stinking breath; though it is evidently no annoyance to himself. Our fancy easily changes its situation; and, either surveying ourselves as we appear to others, or considering others as they feel themselves, we enter, by that means, into sentiments which no way belong to us, and in which nothing but sympathy is able to interest us' (*Treatise*, Book III, part III, Section 1).

- (1) 'Last night, in the dark, I tripped over because a suitcase had been left in the hall whilst I was out shopping.'

Here the explanation involves an external perspective, which is mine with the knowledge that I now have about the presence of the suitcase, whilst, at the internal level, the internal perspective is mine at the time of the experience of tripping over. The presence of these two distinct perspectives of mine can be seen through consideration of how I go about recreating what happened in imagination—in particular in my visual imagination—in order to be able to relate the story. What I do not do is recreate now in imagination exactly how things seemed to me then. To do this, I would have to 'abstract' the presence of the suitcase in the hall from what I now know, and then imagine myself *centrally*, or 'from the inside', unwittingly tripping over something that I did not observe. This is not so easy to do—at least in a way that is unalloyed by what I now know. In such circumstances, it is, at least typically, easier for me to imagine myself *acentrally*, that is for me-now to imagine, at this level not from a point of view within the imagined scene, me-then tripping over a suitcase which was unseen by me-then⁶. In this sense, what I do in this imaginative process is, so to speak, stand back from my earlier self, acentrally imagining the scene unfold. Accordingly, as I am myself standing back in this way, and not centrally imagining myself as I then was, the story that I relate does not invite you either to imaginatively identify with me as I then was, although this is something you could try to do. Rather, the story invites you to do what I now do, which is to acentrally imagine me-then tripping over a suitcase which was unseen by me-then. If you do this, you will have, in a sense, come to stand beside my later self, sharing the same external perspective⁷.

⁶ This acentral imagining is equivalent to what Currie (1995) calls impersonal perceptual imagining. (He argues, surely rightly, that impersonal perceptual imagining is what is typically involved with cinema audiences.) The contrast between central and acentral imagining is set out in Wollheim (1984).

⁷ There is, I think, an asymmetry in the first-person case between thinking back over how things went and thinking forward when planning or predicting how things will go. In thinking back I tend, for the reasons I have given, to imagine myself acentrally. Whereas in thinking forward I tend to imagine myself centrally or from the inside. Contrast, for example, on the one hand going back in your imagination over a job interview which has taken place, and on the other hand, planning a job interview which is yet to take place. This point does not apply to all forward thinking though. If one tries to think forward far enough, or to think about oneself as a signif-

The point generalises to other autobiographical narratives. What is typical when one is autobiographically recounting something with the benefit of hindsight is for the explanation to include things that it would not if the narration were a present-tense stream-of-consciousness account, just as the narrative of my tumble invites the audience to imagine the presence of the suitcase before imagining me tripping. And thus the explanation includes *what wasn't known then*. Nicola King, at the beginning of her book, *Memory, Narrative, Identity*, brings out the import of this last phrase with great starkness where she recounts how she heard a talk given by a survivor of Auschwitz, Leon Greenman. In the talk, she says, 'Greenman describes the moment when, after arriving at Auschwitz, he saw his wife being taken away on a truck—to the gas chamber, although, as he said, he "didn't know that then"'. This phrase, she continues, 'haunted his narrative, repeated several times: it marked the moments when emotion broke through what was otherwise a rather detached, deadpan delivery. His memory of that moment seems to have been deeply affected by what he didn't know at the time of the event⁸'.

I will now turn to the role of the different levels of perspective in third-person explanations and stories. Consider, for example, the following third-person account of something that, in fact, happened, where I am the narrator and you are the audience:

- (2) 'Two strangers, a woman and a man, were the only passengers on a tube train late one night. The man, in a shabby Macintosh, smelling of drink, stood up, and, towering over the woman, who was frozen to the spot, began to shout at her and spray her with saliva.'

⁸ King (2000: 1). A central theme of King's book is to contrast two views of the way in which the past is recollected, both of which she finds in the writing of Freud. In one view, the past is understood on an archaeological model, where the past is initially hidden, and is waiting to be rediscovered through excavation. In the other view, 'memory inevitably incorporates the awareness of "what wasn't known then"' (2000: 12); so memory is more of a reconstruction than an excavation and rediscovery. Here, in this later view, Freud's concept of *Nachträglichkeit* (translated roughly as 'afterwardsness') is to the fore.

icantly different sort of person, one tends to imagine acentrally. Trying to imagine being twenty years older, you see yourself in the wheelchair, with a rug on your lap and saliva trickling down your chin. You thereby feel repelled as well as ashamed. Trying to imagine being ten million pounds richer, you feel admiration as well as pride. (I have in mind here Hume's 'square' of passions; see Book II of his *Treatise*.)

This very short narrative involves perspectives on two levels: that of the woman at the level that is internal to the narrative; and that of me, the narrator, at the level that is external to the narrative. So far as concerns the internal level, it is clear from the second sentence that I, as narrator, am inviting you, the audience, to grasp the *woman's* perspective, rather than the man's, and thus to think about how things were for her, and, so far as you are able, to imaginatively identify with her feelings of fear and revulsion at the man's behaviour. Your focus of attention is drawn to her perspective through the way that the narrative is presented by me⁹: and, in this example, this effect is achieved without my directly ascribing, as part of the narration, any thoughts, feelings or emotions to the woman. One could put it like this: I, the narrator, *show* her state of mind, rather than specifically *stating it* as part of the narrative itself. Next, and distinctly, I, the narrator, invite you to share in my own external perspective on what happened, imagining what happened acentially, and in doing this I also invite you to respond emotionally as I do, with compassion at her plight. Again, though, this is achieved without my actually stating that I feel compassion for her or that I think that compassion is deserved; no overtly emotional terms are used.

So, if the narration is successful, you, the audience, will gain a grasp of, and come to share in, emotional responses at two distinct levels of perspective: the emotional responses of the woman, internal to the narrative (namely fear and revulsion), and the emotional responses of me the narrator, external to the narrative (namely compassion). Success is a matter of degree at both levels of perspective. The extent to which you imagine feeling fear and revulsion, or even actually feel these emotions, will depend in part on how much you are like the woman, and in part on how much you imaginatively enter into the situation as it faced her. And the extent to which you feel compassion will depend in part on how compassionate an audience you are, and in part on how much you consider compassion to be appropriate in this instance. Success at both levels will also depend on how evocative of these emotions the narrative is; a longer story, better told, would have more success.

In this story, then, there is what I will call *concordance* between

⁹ Cf Carroll (1997). Carroll rejects what he considers to be Plato's idea, that the audience identifies with the characters in the text, so that their emotions 'are transferred to the audience'; he emphasizes, in contrast, the idea that the audience has an emotional response to the text. I am in agreement with him about the latter idea, but to my mind he downplays the importance of imaginative identification; as audience one can respond emotionally in *both* ways.

the emotions at the two levels: between the fear and revulsion felt by the woman, which you grasp through gaining insight into her perspective, and the compassion that the narrator and audience feel towards her emotions. This need not be the case. For example, another story might be told about the incident on the tube train where the internal perspective is shifted to that of the man, so that you are invited to imaginatively identify with him rather than with the woman:

(3) 'Two strangers, a woman and a man, were the only passengers on a tube train late one night. The man had been drinking all evening, and, as sometimes happens to us when we have had too much to drink, suddenly, and for no good reason, he became very angry with the woman, and got up and began to tell her in no uncertain terms just what he thought of her disapproving glances.'

Here, the internal perspective has shifted to that of the man, so that you the audience are invited to imaginatively identify with his anger. But the external perspective remains the same, continuing to present the story in a way that invites just the same emotional response as before: compassion with her horror and not with his anger. Thus in this example we have *discordance* of emotional response between the two levels.

Equally, there might be discordance between external and internal levels in a first-personal story. In relating my own drunken behaviour one night, I might now invite you to imagine how it was for me then, in fits of hysterical laughter, trying to retrieve my keys from the gutter; but still I now invite you also to share in the embarrassment that I now feel at my earlier behaviour.

Discordance of emotions can occur between perspectives at the *same* level, as well as between internal and external levels of perspective. At the internal level, of course, there can be discordance where the perspective of more than one character is presented. For example, in Act I of *The Winter's Tale*, there was discordance between the perspective of Leontes—involved jealous rage—and that of the other characters. At the external level, there can be discordance in a number of places. First, there can be discordance between the narrator's response, which the audience is invited to grasp, and the response of the audience itself. For example, my narrative might invite compassion, yet you fail to feel compassion¹⁰.

¹⁰ Currie calls this a failure of 'emotional congruence' (1990: 213), although on his account, this is with the fictional or implied narrator, not with the actual narrator. See Livingston and Mele (1997) for a rejection of the notion of the implied narrator. I too have no need for it. Indeed, the postulation of an implied narrator without an actual author precludes the possibility of failed authorial intentions.

Second, there can be discordance amongst different members of the audience. For example, some members of the audience might respond with compassion and some with amusement. Third, there can be discordance between the perspective of the narrator of the written text and the perspective expressed through the spoken narrative voice. This is what happened in the example I gave earlier of my ironic reading of my own childhood diary. Fourth, a narrative can present an external emotional perspective that was not intended by the author. For example, I might give an account of my behaviour at a cocktail party that unintentionally reveals my arrogance and vanity. Fifth, a narrative can fail to present an emotional perspective that was intended by the external narrator. For example, I might tell the story of the woman on the tube intending to invite compassion, but failing in that intention. And finally, there can be emotional discordance where a narrative is insincere. For example, I might tell the story of the woman on the tube in a way that intentionally indicates and invites compassion, whilst myself feeling no such emotion. Perhaps I am trying to give the impression that I am compassionate in order to make a good impression on my audience; perhaps I really think she was just a silly old woman. If you, the audience, see through my insincerity, you will respond emotionally to me, and to the discordance between what I indicate that I feel and what are my real feelings. One should not forget that we tell stories with all sorts of motives in mind other than to communicate the content of the story: to curry favour, to amuse, to impress, to shock, to deceive, and so forth.

We have, then, a picture of narrative, perspective and emotional response that is at the same time quite complicated and yet, I hope, utterly familiar to each of us. In hearing a narrative related, whether fiction or everyday explanation, a member of the audience can latch on to possibly multiply divergent perspectives and thus on to possibly multiply divergent emotional responses: that of one or more of the people involved in the narrative, that of the external narrator of the written text, that of the speaker of the narration, and that of others in the audience. And we can, more or less, hold all of these perspectives in our minds pretty much at the same time—at least well enough to gain an insight into the concordant or discordant emotional responses across all of these possible locations.

How is it that narratives can be *explanations*, which can give *understanding* of why things happened as they did? Let me be brief here, reserving a fuller answer for another place. The essential idea is that a narrative can throw light on the particularity of what happened within, and beyond, the particular narrative under consideration, and it can do this without aspiring to be anything like a full

causal explanation. This sort of explanation is what Collingwood (1946) calls *idiographic*; as the OED defines this term, it is ‘concerned with the individual, pertaining to or descriptive of single and unique facts and processes’ (in contrast to *nomothetic* explanation, which is ‘concerned with the study of general or scientific laws’)¹¹. Idiographic explanations can be replete with sentences that are, or that imply, causal statements; and causal statements will imply that there is a causal law under which these events fall. So, even though narrative explanations do not set out to be full causal explanations, the events that they describe are still part of the causal nexus, and thus can fall under general or scientific laws. For example, the narrative in (1) explains why I tripped over: the hall was dark; the suitcase was left in the hall; it was unseen by me; and so on. And the narrative in (2) would explain why, later that evening, the woman got home in tears: after hearing the explanation, one could say ‘Now I understand why she was so upset’.

How are we to explain our emotional responses to narratives, both in those instances where there is concordance amongst the diverse perspectives, and where there is discordance? The idea here is that each perspective involves not only emotions, but also evaluative thoughts, and concordance or discordance between evaluative thoughts can explain concordance or discordance between emotional responses.

III

Each perspective involved in the narration of a story potentially involves an emotional response to value¹². To illustrate how this works, let me return to the story (2) of the encounter on the tube train between the woman and the drunken man. It is, I hope, by

¹¹ Thanks to Neil Mason for telling me about Collingwood here.

¹² In what follows, I will remain neutral on the metaphysics of value. I am in effect advocating what Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson (2000) have recently called an ‘ecumenical’ stance between those who agree that there is an intimate relation between emotion and value, but who disagree on weighty metaphysical issues about value: cognitivism, non-cognitivism, realism, and projectivism; see for example Wiggins (1987), McDowell (1985), Blackburn (1998), and Gibbard (1990). Also see Goldie (2000) and Goldie (forthcoming b). The agreements in this area seem to be much more important than the disagreements: it is agreed by the contestants that value properties are anthropocentric; it is agreed that the phenomenology involves experience of value properties as monadic; it is agreed that recognition of value is related internally to certain motivations; and it is agreed that first-order ethical discourse allows talk of correctness, and of justification, and of openness of opinion to correction.

now familiar that this narrative indicates or suggests the woman's internal perspective, and thus invites you, the audience, so far as you are able, to imaginatively identify with her thoughts and feelings of fear and revulsion at the man's behaviour. But not only are you invited to do this; you are also invited to assume, still at this internal level of perspective, that the woman took her emotional response to be justified and appropriate: she considered the man's behaviour to be both frightening and revolting—that is, *to be an appropriate object of both fear and revulsion*. This need not be the case; it is possible to experience an emotion and at the same time believe that the emotional response is inappropriate; for example, I might fear the dark but believe the dark not to be an appropriate object of fear. But this is not the case in this narrative. In this narrative, we can discern, at the internal level of perspective, both her emotions (fear and revulsion) and her evaluative thought (that the man's behaviour was frightening and revolting), which makes her emotions appropriate by her lights. Then, moving to the external level, the narrator's external perspective in this case endorses her emotional response, thereby indicating that her fear and revulsion were indeed appropriate and that this is because the man's behaviour was indeed frightening and revolting. And this explains why the narrative invites the reader or audience, through acentral imagination, to join the narrator in feeling compassion for her, for she is an appropriate object of compassion. So we have emotions and evaluative thoughts at this external level too—emotions and thoughts that are, in this case, concordant with those at the internal level.

We can now see that a narrative will be appropriate only if the external emotional responses that are invited through the narrative are *really* appropriate to what happened. Other narratives, inviting other external emotional responses, will be inappropriate. For example, it would be an inappropriate narration of the incident on the tube if it suggested that compassion with the woman's horror was not appropriate, and that it was all really rather amusing and harmless.

This notion of what makes a narrative appropriate thus leaves room for the possibility that a narrative can be appropriate whilst inviting you to imaginatively identify, at the internal level, with an inappropriate emotional response of a character, one which that character mistakenly considers to be appropriate. To take a gruesome example, I might tell a story of a camp guard at Auschwitz, inviting you to imaginatively identify with his pride at a job well done as he finishes neatly sorting out all the clothes, shoes and jewellery of those who have been gassed, and you might, at least to some extent, succeed in getting inside this man's mind. Yet the nar-

rative could still be appropriate, because, at the same time, and at the external level, my narrative could reveal that it was really a terrible and evil job well done, and thus that his pride was utterly inappropriate. Stories told in this way, inviting one to imaginatively identify with bad people who do not think they are bad, can be very upsetting to read: one feels, so to speak, torn between two perspectives.

This account of narrative and perspective, and of emotion and evaluative thought, can now be applied in principle to narrative as a genus, and thus to fiction as well as to everyday explanation. We respond emotionally to fictional stories, when we know them to be such, in two distinct ways. One mode of response, which is not my concern here, is to see the characters *as characters*, crafted by the author. We might, for example, judge Vronsky in *Anna Karenin* to be insufficiently characterized by Tolstoy for the purposes of the story. Another mode of response, which *is* my concern, is our response to the characters *as persons*. Here the question of appropriate emotional response arises just as it does in everyday explanations¹³. When we respond in this way to Vronsky, we judge him as we do a real person, and, in the fiction, we respond emotionally as we would to a real person: for example, we are genuinely shocked at his lack of feeling at the death of his horse¹⁴.

Shared external emotional responses to fiction are, in many ways, as important to us as are shared external emotional responses to what happens in the real world. And it is largely for this reason that fiction is such a central part of a child's moral education. Children are brought up on stories, and the paradigms of moral thought that we find in fables, fairly stories, parables, and *contes moraux* provide a guide to appropriate emotional responses and to values. For example, the parent or carer, in reading the story of Cinderella to the child, guides the child towards a grasp of the values which the story illustrates, and he or she does so by guiding the child to what is, hopefully, the appropriate external emotional response. And Jesus, in narrating the parable of the prodigal son, not only invites us to identify

¹³ Walton (1990) and Lamarque and Olsen (1994) discuss these two different sorts of reader response.

¹⁴ That there is emotion, and that it is genuine, should be acceptable to all sides of the debate on the paradox of fiction. Walton (1997), for example, finds that he needs to respond to his critics of his earlier work (1990): 'It goes without saying that we *are* genuinely moved by novels and films and plays, that we respond to works of fiction with real emotion' (1997: 38). I discuss this aspect of the paradox of fiction, and other apparent contrast between our emotional responses to real life and to fiction, in Goldie (forthcoming a).

in imagination with the elder son's indignation at what he thought was his father's unfair treatment, but also invites us to see, at the external level, that this angry response really was not appropriate.

One might at this point be worried by the well-known argument that, in fiction, we surely cannot experience, as I claim we do, the same kinds of emotion as we do in real life, because in fiction there is no direct connection between the reader's or audience's emotion and action¹⁵. In real life the direct connection will be one where an emotion involves (I oversimplify here, but it does not affect the central point) a belief and a desire, which lead to an intention, and which in turn can explain and putatively justify the action. For example, I hear a story on the evening news of how a remote tribe is starving as a result of a drought. I feel compassion. Compassion involves a belief that someone is suffering, and a desire to do something to alleviate the suffering, and this desire in turn explains the intention to give money to Christian Aid, and this intention in turn explains the donation itself. Giving money on this occasion is what one *ought* to do—assuming, of course, that compassion really was appropriate. Whereas, if I were to read a *fictional* story of a starving tribe, I might feel compassion, but I will not reach for my cheque book, at least on *their* account. This is true, but nevertheless, in fiction there *is* a connection, albeit hypothetical and thus less direct, from emotion to action. In fiction, the hypothetical connection to action is from emotion to what one ought to do if the story were fact and not fiction, and if one could act. Thus, in reading what I know to be a fictional narrative of a starving tribe, I would determine that, if the story were factual, which it is not, and if I could act, which I cannot, then what I ought to do is give money on their account. The mere fact that there is this difference in the connection between emotional response and action is not sufficient to warrant the worry that our external emotional responses to fictional stories are radically distinct from, or less genuine than, our real life emotional responses. Moreover, to a considerable extent, a similar sort of less direct connection between emotion and action can be found in thoughts and imaginings about what is hypothetical, and the worry about emotion does not arise here¹⁶. For example, in wonder-

¹⁵ Again, see Walton (1990) and (1997), and Currie (1990). This point is closely related to the so-called paradox of fiction.

¹⁶ Currie refers in this context to what he calls *Moran's constraint*: any solution to the paradox of fiction 'should also deal with the large number of cases of what is essentially the same phenomenon that arises in other areas'; Currie (1997: 64). He names the constraint after its inventor, Richard Moran (1994).

ing whether or not to do something rather depraved in the privacy of my own bedroom, I might imagine myself being seen doing it by a neighbour through a gap in the curtains. As a result I might imagine feeling shame and embarrassment at being seen, and I might even actually *feel* shame and embarrassment at the *thought* of being seen. The connection between emotion and action in this case, then, might be for me to determine that I ought not to do this depraved act, because if I did do it I would be ashamed and embarrassed to be seen doing it. Alternatively, I might just decide that I ought to make sure that the curtains are tightly pulled.

IV

I now want to end by briefly considering another worry that might seem to be pressing. The worry is this: How can we distinguish, as distinct species of story, between, on the one hand, everyday explanation and historical explanation, and, on the other hand, the fictional story? Of course the former relate to events that took place in historical time. But are they not condemned, in virtue of what I have said is their essential narrative structure and perspectival form, to float free of the events which they seek to portray and of any possibility of truth, at best achieving some sort of internal coherence and satisfying aesthetic form? Here are some expressions of this view: Hayden White: '... there has been a reluctance to consider historical narratives as what they most manifestly are: verbal fictions, the contents of which are as much *invented* as *found* ...' (1978: 82, cited by Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 304). Christopher Nash: 'the text is so seamlessly interwoven with all utterances—from which what we call reality itself is inseparable—that questions not merely of "fictionality" versus "truth" but of referentiality versus non-referentiality dissolve altogether...' (Nash, 1990: 210, cited by Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 231). Stanley Fish: 'One might object that (my position) has the consequence of making all discourse fictional; but it would be just as accurate to say that it makes all discourse serious, and it would be better still to say that it puts all discourse on a par' (Fish 1980, cited in Walton 1990: 100)¹⁷. There is here, I think, a particularly post-modern sort of exaggeration—in fact, a double exaggeration, although, as with so many post-modern

¹⁷ Where Richard Rorty stands on these matters is not so easy to determine, but at one point Rorty suggests that truth is 'a compliment paid to sentences that seem to be paying their way and that fit with other sentences that are doing so' (1989: xxv).

exaggerations, we should not lose sight of what might be correct in these views, once they are suitably watered down.

We should begin by noticing that what stories have in common, whether or not of the fictional kind, is their structural dimension, being narrative in form and perspectival. But where they differ is in their referential dimension, where some sorts of story and not others aspire to be true¹⁸. A story is fictional not in virtue of its content being false¹⁹, but in virtue of its being narrated, and read or heard, as part of a practice of a special sort: one which invites the reader or audience to imagine or make believe that what is being narrated actually happened, even when it is known that it did not. Thus the question of reference and of truth does not arise within the 'fictive stance'²⁰: it is, simply, irrelevant. Fiction, of course, can aspire to be true to life, and to be much else besides, but to aspire to be true to life is not to aspire to be true in the sense that I am concerned with here.

The contrast would disappear if one were to assimilate a narrative and what the narrative is about—for example, if one were to say that a particular life (or a particular illness) *is* a narrative. But this would be a mistaken assimilation; rather, one should say that a life *can be narrated*, so that the narrative is *about the life*, and thus there remains, in the real life case but not in the fictional case, the possibility of reference and of truth.²¹

If it is right, then, that metaphysical notions of reference and truth have no application in fiction, but do have application in historical and everyday explanation, there also arises, but only in this latter area, the epistemological notion of evidence²². Explanations

¹⁸ Cf Walton (1990: 98–102).

¹⁹ A story's being false is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being fictional. Cf Lamarque and Olsen (1994: 31).

²⁰ See Lamarque and Olsen: 'a reader is invited to *entertain* sense and *make-believe* truth and reference' (1994: 77). Cf Currie (1990: 30): 'The author intends that we make-believe the text (or rather the constituent propositions) and he intends to get us to do this by means of our recognition of that very intention'. Also cf Walton (1990: 70–3).

²¹ This contrast does not require a substantial notion of truth: it remains in place with a minimalist notion, so, for example, the real life narrative in (1), 'Last night, in the dark, I tripped over because a suitcase had been left in the hall whilst I was out shopping' will be true if and only if last night, in the dark, I tripped over because a suitcase had been left in the hall whilst I was out shopping. And, to repeat, *this* notion of truth does not arise within the fictive stance.

²² In what follows, I am much indebted to Richard Evans' *In Defence of History* (1997), and to Lamarque and Olsen (1994).

can be verified by appeal to the evidence that is evinced in their support, and competing explanations can be tested one against the other. (It will, however, not be epistemically possible in every case to establish whether a part, or even all of a particular explanation is true; but unless one is a verificationist, this does not imply that there is no room for truth in these cases.) What might evidence consist of? Well, it could consist of all sorts of thing: what others say now about what happened then; written documents that were produced at the time of what happened; tube timetables; aeroplane tickets. That is, roughly, the historian's primary sources. Now here comes the characteristically post-modern exaggeration. It goes as follows. All these documents are just more texts, multiply open to interpretation, and the historian's much-prized distinction between primary and secondary source is a distinction without a difference. This is, in fact, doubly an exaggeration. It exaggerates first the degree to which at least some evidence is open to interpretation. If someone's story is that he was in London on some particular day, and the flight tickets and hotel bills show that this person was in Paris, then the story is, simply, false in that respect. Secondly, it exaggerates in quite another direction: the implication is that we did not realise, until it was kindly pointed out to us, that evidence is indeed open to interpretation. But we already know this: we are, in effect, already epistemological holists, examining each piece of evidence with due care, and considering it only in the light of all sorts of other evidential considerations. For example, if there are minutes of the meeting, which were taken at the time, and which are put forward as evidence in support of a story about what happened that day, we know that we should enquire just who produced those minutes, and consider whether there are special reasons to doubt what they relate. Was the minute-taker unobservant, a fool, the sworn enemy of one of the protagonists, or did he have some other special 'agenda' of his own?

So, within the general constraints of interpretation, there is a perfectly good commonsense notion that there can be evidence which can be appealed to in support of those species of story that aspire to be true. The idea of perspective, and of diversity of emotional response to value, need not threaten the possibility of reference, of truth, and of evidence.

However—and here is the grain of truth in the post-modern exaggeration, suitably watered down. When we are trying to give an explanation of what happened, there is no possibility that our explanation can cease to be narrative in structure or to be perspectival.

We cannot, like Charles Dickens' Gradgrind, hope to give just the 'bare facts', an impersonal, non-perspectival chronicle of events, a schedule of comings and goings, of tube timetables and of plane tickets, 'as if', to quote Nietzsche's remarks at the beginning of this paper, 'reality stood unveiled before you only, and you yourselves were perhaps the best part of it'²³.

Bibliography

- Aristotle, 1987. *Poetics*, tr. S. Halliwell, (London: Duckworth).
- Bal, M. 1997. *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative*, 2nd. Edition, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
- Blackburn, S. 1998. *Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Carroll, N. 1997. 'Art, Narrative, and Emotion', in M. Hjort and S. Laver (eds), *Emotion and the Arts* (New York: Oxford University Press), 190–211.
- Collingwood, R. 1946. *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Currie, G. 1990. *The Nature of Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Currie, G. 1995. *Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy and Cognitive Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Currie, G. 1997. 'The Paradox of Caring: Fiction and the Philosophy of Mind', in M. Hjort and S. Laver (eds), *Emotion and the Arts* (New York: Oxford University Press), 63–77.
- D'Arms, J. and Jacobson, D. 2000. 'Sentiment and Value', *Ethics* 110, 722–48.
- Evans, R. 1997. *In Defence of History* (London: Granta Books).
- Fish, S. 1980. 'How to Do Things with Austin and Searle', in his *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
- Genette, G. 1980. *Narrative Discourse*, tr. J. Lewin, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
- Gibbard, A. 1990. *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
- Goldie, P. 2000. *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Goldie, P. forthcoming a, 'Imagination and Emotion in Fiction', in *Imagination and the Arts*, M. Kieran and D. Lopes (eds), (London: Routledge).
- Goldie, P. forthcoming b, 'Can We Trust Our Emotions?', in *Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality*, P. Cruse and D. Evans (eds), (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Goldman, A. 1992. 'In Defence of the Simulation Theory', *Mind and Language* 7, 104–19, reprinted in M. Davies and T. Stone (eds), *Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate* (Oxford: Blackwell), 1995.
- Gordon, R. 1995. 'Simulation without Introspection or Inference from Me to You', in M. Davies and T. Stone (eds), *Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications* (Oxford: Blackwell), 1995.
- Heal, J. 1998. 'Co-cognition and Off-line Simulation: Two Ways of Understanding the Simulation Approach', *Mind and Language* 13, 477–98.
- Heal, J. 2000. 'Other Minds, Rationality and Analogy', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supp. vol. 74, 1–19.
- Hjort, M. and Laver, S. (eds), 1997. *Emotion and the Arts* (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Hume, D. 1978, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- King, N. 2000. *Memory, Narrative, Identity: Remembering the Self* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
- Lamarque, P. and Olsen, S. 1994. *Truth, Fiction, and Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Livingstone, P. and Mele, A. 1997. 'Evaluating Emotional Responses to Fiction', in M. Hjort and S. Laver (eds), *Emotion and the Arts* (New York: Oxford University Press), 157–76.
- McDowell, J. 1985. 'Values and Secondary Qualities', in T. Honderich (ed.), *Morality and Objectives: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie* (London: Routledge), 110–29.
- Moran, R. 1994. 'The Expression of Feeling in Imagination', *Philosophical Review* 103, 75–106.
- Musil, R. 1995. *The Man Without Qualities*, tr. S. Wilkins and B. Pike, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf).
- Nash, C. 1990. 'Literature's Assault on Narrative', in C. Nash (ed.), *Narrative in Culture: The Uses of Storytelling in the Sciences, Philosophy, and Literature* (London: Routledge).
- Regan, D. And Totten, J. 1975. 'Empathy and Attribution: Turning Observers into Actors', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 32, 850–56.
- Ricoeur, P. 1984. *Time and Narrative*, vol. 1, tr. K. McLaughlin and D. Pellauer, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Ricoeur, P. 1985. *Time and Narrative*, vol. 2, tr. K. McLaughlin and D. Ricoeur, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Ricoeur, P. 1988. *Time and Narrative*, vol. 3, tr. K. McLaughlin and D. Ricoeur, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Rorty, R. 1989. *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

²³ Many thanks to audiences at The University of Hertfordshire, The Erasmus Summer School on Social Ontology in Rotterdam, and at the Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference on the emotions at Manchester University, for their comments and suggestions. Special thanks also to Matthew Kieran, Adam Morton, David Papineau, and Elisabeth Schellekens for their help. The mistakes are all mine, I am afraid.

- Storms, M. D. 1973. 'Videotape and the Attribution Process: Reversing Actors' and Observers' Points of View', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 27, 165–75.
- Walton, K. 1990. *Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundation of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
- Walton, K. 1997. 'Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime: On Being Moved by Fiction', in M. Hjort and S. Laver (eds), *Emotion and the Arts* (New York: Oxford University Press), 37–49.
- White, H. 1978. *Topics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press).
- Wiggins, D. 1998. 'A Sensible Subjectivism', Chapter V in his *Needs, Values, Truth* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Wollheim, R. 1984. *The Thread of Life* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

XIII. Passion and Politics¹

SUSAN JAMES

The sudden resurgence of interest in the emotions that has recently overtaken analytical philosophy has raised a range of questions about the place of the passions in established explanatory schemes. How, for example, do the emotions fit into theories of action organized around beliefs and desires? How can they be included in analyses of the mind developed to account for other mental states and capacities? Questions of this general form also arise within political philosophy, and the wish to acknowledge their importance and find a space for them has led to some fruitful developments. Among these are a new sensitivity to ways in which attributions of emotion can create and sustain unequal power relations², an interest in the underlying emotional capacities that make politics possible³, a concern with the kinds of emotional suffering that politics should aim to abolish⁴, and analyses of the emotional traits it should foster.⁵ While these and comparable explorations have enormously enriched contemporary political philosophy, a great deal of mainstream work continues to ignore or marginalize the emotions, so that their place remains uncertain and obscure. There is no consensus as to what kind of attention should be paid to them, or indeed whether they

¹ I received many helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper at the conference held in Manchester from which this book originated, from the members of the Birkbeck Graduate Philosophy Seminar, and from the members of the Departmental Philosophy Seminar at the University of Sheffield. I owe special thanks to Raymond Geuss, Lucy Selman, Robert Stern and Quentin Skinner for their probing questions.

² On this Nietzschean theme see for example Elizabeth Spelman's account of the way that subordinate races, and women, are not regarded as entitled to righteous anger but are dismissed as prone to childish tantrums or hysteria. 'Anger and Insubordination' in A. Garry and M. Pearsall (eds), *Women, Knowledge and Reality*, 1st edn. (London, 1996), pp. 263–73.

³ See for example Jessica Benjamin, *The Bonds of Love* (New York, 1988); Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition* (Cambridge, 1995).

⁴ See for example Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (Cambridge, 1989); Judith Shklar, *Ordinary Vices* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984); Avishai Margalit, *The Decent Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 1996).

⁵ A notable example of this concern is Rawls's discussion of self-respect in Part III of *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).