

# Redback Operations

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## Task 1 - Research ML Algorithms to improve Efficiency in incentives Problems

### Research

Incentive allocation is a common problem in incentive allocation system. For our gaming system Each activity that user does will produce Coins, the number of coins gathered through that activity will vary according to the effort of the user and on the kind of activity itself (one game might produce more coins than the other because it involves more physical effort).

Web development team also intends to count steps of the users who are walking/running through the mobile application it is building and will hand out coins based on the number of steps. This will also include levels.

Such allocation problems can be easily formulated as integer programming problems, which can be further relaxed to be linear. Although such problems have simple structures, their problem size can easily grow large (e.g., there can be many incentives, or a large population of gamers). To improve the efficiency of such large system we take help from an algorithmic approach as described below.

### Problem Solution

- There is a total of  $m$  riders.
- For each rider  $i = 1, m$ , there are  $k_i$  distinct types of coins that might be assigned to that rider. Note that  $k_i$  can be different for different riders.
- For each rider  $i$  and coin type  $j$ , there is an associated positive cost  $c_{ij}$  and an associated positive value  $v_{ij}$  where  $i = 1, \dots, m$ ; and  $j = 1, \dots, k_i$ .
- Each rider is assigned at most one coin.
- There is a budget  $C$ , that limits the total cost that may be incurred in a feasible assignment.
- We define  $x_{ij}$ , where  $i = 1, \dots, m$ ; and  $j = 1, \dots, k_i$ , as a binary variable indicating whether passenger  $i$  is assigned a coin of type  $j$ .
- The aim is to maximize the total value of the coins assigned.

We can replace riders with gamers.

The pseudo code for solving the dual LP to get the primal coin allocation looks like the following:

**pre-process:** shortlist coins such that the costs, values and efficiencies of feasible coins for each rider are in increasing order; further shortlist coins and calculate breakpoints for each rider based on (E).

**prepare breakpoints:** for each rider, maintain a priority queue of coins and their associated costs, values and breakpoints (based on the breakpoints from largest to smallest, which has the nice property of being the same as ranking costs or values from smallest to largest); we have m queues where each item in a queue looks like (breakpoint, coin, value, cost, rider index).

**initialize:** set slope  $S = C$  (budget); and an active list L that includes m breakpoints, each being the item with the largest breakpoint from each of the m queues.

**while**  $S > 0$  and  $\text{length}(L) > 0$  **do**

breakpoint = pop largest from L (we know which rider this breakpoint refers to);  
update  $S = S + \text{cost from last breakpoint of this rider} - \text{cost from breakpoint of this rider}$ ;

**if** there are remaining coins in the breakpoint rider's queue then next  
    breakpoint = pop largest from the breakpoint rider's queue; push next  
    breakpoint to L;

**end**

**end**

**allocate:** once the while loop is done, we find the last breakpoint right before the one in the final active list L (if available) for each rider, and assign the corresponding coin for this last breakpoint; riders without available last breakpoints do not receive coins.

We are going to get at most one variable with a fractional solution in this relaxation, which is acceptable in exchange for the efficiency of solving this problem:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{maximize} && \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^{k_i} v_{ij} x_{ij} \\ &\text{subject to} && \sum_{j=1}^{k_i} x_{ij} \leq 1, \text{ for each } i = 1, \dots, m; \\ & && \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^{k_i} c_{ij} x_{ij} \leq C; \\ & && x_{ij} \geq 0, \text{ for each } i = 1, \dots, m, j = 1, \dots, k_i \end{aligned}$$

Pre-processing shows

$$0 < v_{i1} < v_{i2} < \dots < v_{ik_i}, 0 < c_{i1} < c_{i2} < \dots < c_{ik_i}, \text{ and } 0 < \frac{c_{i1}}{v_{i1}} < \frac{c_{i2}}{v_{i2}} < \dots < \frac{c_{ik_i}}{v_{ik_i}}$$

Coins eliminated in the pre-processing step are dominated by at least one coin in the feasible set. In other words, the cost, value and efficiency of feasible coin for each given gamer are in increasing order.

We define the following dual variables:

Let  $y_i, i = 1, \dots, m$ , be the dual variable corresponding to the constraint bounding each rider  $i$  to at most 1 coin.

Let  $\lambda$ , be the dual variable corresponding to the budget constraint.

Then the dual (D) is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{minimize} && \sum_{i=1}^m y_i + C\lambda \\ & \text{subject to} && y_i + c_{ij}\lambda \geq v_{ij}, \text{ for each } i = 1, \dots, m, j = 1, \dots, k_i \\ & && y_i \geq 0, \text{ for each } i = 1, \dots, m \\ & && \lambda \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Let  $D(\lambda)$  denote the dual linear program (D) for a fixed value of  $\lambda \geq 0$ . In considering this LP, note that the optimization problems for each rider  $i = 1, \dots, m$ , is an independent (trivial) problem: we simply set

$$y_i^*(\lambda) = \max \left\{ 0, \max_{j=1, \dots, k_i} (v_{ij} - \lambda c_{ij}) \right\}$$

and hence the optimal value to  $D(\lambda)$  is

$$\lambda C + \sum_{i=1}^m \max \left\{ 0, \max_{j=1, \dots, k_i} (v_{ij} - \lambda c_{ij}) \right\}$$

We denote this expression as (E) for the rest of the post and minimize  $\lambda$  to solve (D), that minimizes this expression (E).

### Solution of Dual LP

The below algorithm shows the compact form of the dual given as finding  $\lambda$  to minimize (E) provides a direct way to solve this LP.

Let's focus on one gamer  $i$  and the corresponding term in (E). We observe the following:


- Consider the two lines  $v_{ij} - \lambda c_{ij}$  and  $v_{ik} - \lambda c_{ik}$  for  $j < k$ . The two lines intersect at  $\hat{\lambda} = \frac{v_{ik} - v_{ij}}{c_{ik} - c_{ij}}$
- Given our sorting properties of the data, we know that both the numerator and the denominator are positive, and  $\max \{v_{ij} - \lambda c_{ij}, v_{ik} - \lambda c_{ik}\}$  corresponds to option  $k$  in the interval  $[0, \hat{\lambda}]$  and corresponds to option  $j$  in the interval  $[\hat{\lambda}, \frac{v_{ij}}{c_{ij}})$   
(For larger  $\hat{\lambda}$ , we are in the case that both terms  $ez$ , are nonpositive and hence contribute 0 to (E).)

Therefore, we want to create a list of breakpoints for gamer  $i$  by checking each of the intersections of the  $k_i$  lines, starting with the intersection of  $j=1$  and  $j=2$ . The key point here is that we only keep breakpoints that are monotonically decreasing. After this process, we may assume without loss of generality that each rider  $i$ , who is now left with  $g_i$  ( $g_i \leq k_i$ ) incentives, has a list of eligible coins and breakpoints that satisfy

$$\lambda_{i1} > \lambda_{i2} > \lambda_{i3} > \dots > \lambda_{ig_i}, \text{ where } \lambda_{i1} = \frac{v_{i1}}{c_{i1}} \text{ and } \lambda_{ij} = \frac{v_{ij} - v_{i,j-1}}{c_{ij} - c_{i,j-1}} \text{ for } j = 2, 3, \dots, g_i;$$

$$0 < v_{i1} < v_{i2} < \dots < v_{ig_i}, 0 < c_{i1} < c_{i2} < \dots < c_{ig_i}, \text{ and } 0 < \frac{c_{i1}}{v_{i1}} < \frac{c_{i2}}{v_{i2}} < \dots < \frac{c_{ig_i}}{v_{ig_i}}.$$

The figure below provides a graphical explanation.



**Fig.:** Graphical illustration of the elimination and breakpoint creation step.

Given a gamer who starts with 4 eligible coins indexed by 1, 2, 3 and 4, we first draw the lines  $v_{ij} - \lambda c_{ij}$  ( $j = 1, 2, 3, 4$ ) to construct the function  $y_i(\lambda)$ . Coin 2 is then eliminated because its line does not contribute to the frontier of  $y_i(\lambda)$ , which means that the constraint corresponding to it is never tight at optimality, i.e., coin 2 will never be chosen. We are left with coins 1, 3, and 4 in our eligible set, and we reindex them to be coins 1, 2 and 3 for simplicity. We have three breakpoints  $\lambda_{i1}$ ,  $\lambda_{i2}$  and  $\lambda_{i3}$ , where coin 1 is chosen for  $\lambda$  in  $[\lambda_{i2}, \lambda_{i1}]$ , coin 2 is chosen for  $\lambda$  in  $[\lambda_{i3}, \lambda_{i2}]$  and coin 3 is chosen for  $\lambda$  in  $[0, \lambda_{i3}]$ . In this example,  $k_i = 4$  and  $g_i = 3$  after the elimination process.

Now consider what we have learned about the objective function (E). For a fixed rider  $i$ , the corresponding term in the summation gives rise to a piecewise linear function with the  $g_i$  breakpoints. Hence, in considering the sum in (E), we again get a piecewise linear function with the union of these breakpoint values (over all choices of  $i$ ) as the resulting breakpoints. Let  $0 = \rho_0 < \rho_1 < \dots < \rho_n$  be the union of these breakpoints. Between any pair of breakpoints, the function  $D(\lambda)$  is an affine function (i.e., it is of the form  $\alpha\lambda + \beta$ ); furthermore,  $D(\lambda)$  is convex with the slopes in these pieces are an increasing function of  $\lambda$ . For  $\lambda$  sufficiently large (bigger than  $\rho_n$ ), the slope is clearly  $C$ ; at  $\lambda = 0$ , the slope is

$$C - \sum_{i=1}^m c_{ig_i}$$

which we can assume is negative. Otherwise, we would simply assign each rider their maximum value coin (which is also their maximum cost coin), since that does not exhaust the budget, and hence is clearly optimal. In all other cases, there is a breakpoint  $\rho^*$  for which the slope for  $\lambda < \rho^*$  is negative, and for  $\lambda > \rho^*$  is positive. In that case,  $D(\lambda)$  is minimized when  $\lambda = \rho^*$ .

### From optimal dual to optimal primal LP solution

Let's try optimal dual solution. We have already assumed that the slope of  $D(\lambda)$  at  $\lambda = 0$  is negative, and hence  $\lambda^* > 0$ . To compute the optimal primal solution, we do use the complementary slackness conditions for primal and dual LP optima, which gives us the following:

Since  $\lambda^* > 0$ , we know that the budget constraint in the primal must hold with equality, i.e.,  $\sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^{k_i} c_{ij} x_{ij} = C$

Similarly, we know that if  $x_{ij} > 0$ , then the corresponding dual constraint must hold with equality, i.e.,  $y_i + c_{ij}\lambda = v_{ij}$ . In other words, for the optimal  $\lambda^*$ , the corresponding  $j^*$  for rider  $i$  is an option for which the maximum is attained.

The case in which each breakpoint corresponds to a distinct unique rider is easy to understand. In this case, the optimal value  $\lambda^*$  for (D) is the breakpoint corresponding to exactly one rider  $i^*$ , and is between breakpoints for every other rider. Thus, for all other riders other than rider  $i^*$ , there is a unique maximum  $j_i$  attained in the term corresponding to  $i$  in the sum (E); hence, the corresponding option must be set equal to 1 for that rider. This argument can be extended to the case when the optimal breakpoint corresponds to multiple riders. The correctness of the algorithm follows directly from showing this pair of primal and dual linear programming solutions are both feasible for their respective optimization problem, and satisfy the complementary slackness conditions.

## Task 2 - Research Fuzziness in relation to Algorithms and Game Systems

### Research

Fuzzy logic has been studied since 1920 in the form of infinite value logic. It was introduced as fuzzy logic in 1965 (Zadeh, 1965). Fuzzy models are based on vagueness of human logic. Instead of the logic being pure Boolean (0 or 1), the truth variable can lie anywhere between complete false (0) and complete truth (1).

The popularity of games is increasing and with more interest more games are being developed to new challenges to keep the gaming community engaged. Challenges provide a player to test themselves and be aware of their limits. The game developers aim is to engage the players to the maximum by continuously altering the difficulty level (Rani, Sarkar, & Liu, 2005). This is achieved by real time feedback of the state of the player, their skill and engagement. Some talented beginners may drift away from the game if they get too bored if the game is easy. Similarly, if the game's perceived difficulty of a challenge becomes frustrating for a young, inexperienced player or a very intolerant player than a pro, they may move away from the game (Adams & Rollings, 2010).

The solution to this problem is to use Dynamic Difficulty Adjustment, which adapts the user's actions to modify the game's difficulty. A balanced game approach is to maintain the perceived difficulty of challenges remain constant or steadily increase so that the player has a feeling of being challenged by the game as he progresses through it as the players skills keep increasing due to in game experience.

Adaptive-network-based Fuzzy Interface System (ANFIS) suggests a method of transforming human knowledge or experience into rules using a set of fuzzy if-then rules. The games difficulty level is a parameter of input parameters. A graphical presentation of Takagi-Sugeno-Kang (TSK) Fuzzy Model where the rule is (SUTANTO, 2014):

$$\text{IF } X_1 = A_i \text{ and } X_2 = B_i, \text{ THEN } y = f(X_1, X_2)$$

For e.g., if we consider a simple model, the terrain (level) toughness/damage can be considered as an incentive and Rider Exhaustion/damage as a penalty, then can have 5 possibilities for each input and thus 25 rules as per TSK form of

*IF (Terrain Toughness/Damaged Rating = X) AND (Rider Exhaustion Rating = Y) THEN DIFFICULTY = Z*

Table 1: The Fuzzy TSK Rule for Normal Mode

Terrain Toughness Rating	Rider Exhaustion Rating	Difficulty
Very Good	Very Good	Very Hard
Very Good	Good	Hard
Very Good	Fair	Normal to Hard
Very Good	Bad	Normal
Very Good	Very Bad	Normal
Good	Very Good	Very Hard
Good	Good	Hard
Good	Fair	Normal


Good	Bad	Easy to normal
Good	Very Bad	Easy
Fair	Very Good	Hard
Fair	Good	Normal
Fair	Fair	Easy to Normal
Fair	Bad	Easy
Fair	Very Bad	Very Easy
Bad	Very Good	Normal
Bad	Good	Easy to Normal
Bad	Fair	Easy
Bad	Bad	Easy
Bad	Very Bad	Very Easy
Very Bad	Very Good	Easy
Very Bad	Good	Very Easy
Very Bad	Fair	Very Easy
Very Bad	Bad	Very Easy
Very Bad	Very Bad	Very Easy

For a hard game we can have 9 rules from 3x3 options of the inputs


*Table 2: The Fuzzy TSK Rule for Hard Mode*

<b>Terrain Toughness Rating</b>	<b>Rider Exhaustion Rating</b>	<b>Difficulty</b>
Very Good	Very Good	Very Hard
Very Good	Good	Hard
Very Good	Fair	Normal
Good	Very Good	Very Hard
Good	Good	Hard
Good	Fair	Normal
Fair	Very Good	Normal to Hard
Fair	Good	Normal to Hard
Fair	Fair	Normal


The membership function of the inputs is as below




*Fig. 1: The Membership Function for input "Terrain Toughness" in Normal*



**Fig. 2:** The Membership Function for input “Rider Exhaustion” in Normal




**Fig. 3:** The Membership Function for input “Terrain Toughness” in Hard




**Fig. 4:** The Membership Function for input “Rider Exhaustion” in Hard

More complex input parameters can be considered as players stamina, speed, obstacle types, obstacle periods, item type, Item period etc to decipher the difficulty level. This results in the complexity if the game been adapted as per input stimuli this resulting is a better player experience.






*Fig. 5: Fuzzy Logic Interface system*



*Fig. 6: Schematic diagram of the Dynamic Difficulty Adjustment system*

Based on the predicted difficulty level the game dynamically adjusts the complexity level of the game and maintain balance between Anxiety and boredom.



*Fig. 7: The balance between difficulty and ability, producing Csikszentmihalyi's idea of flow (Adams & Rollings, 2010, p. 339)*

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