

## Supplementary online appendix to *Incumbent Takeovers*

The supplementary online appendix provides additional information on incumbent takeovers. We provide details regarding exclusions from the constituent dataset, such as duplicates and false positives, as well as details regarding original codings, such as the list of all incumbent takeovers that we have coded from the Freedom House annual country reports, among other. We provide descriptive statistics about the time in office of leaders, their time to takeover, disagreement between different indicators about the timing of takeover events, as well as other measures. We discuss the observable events that typically accompany the incumbent takeovers, and include analyses that map incumbent takeovers to available scales of the concentration of power and constraints. Finally, for each leader included in the data, we visualize the onset of the takeover and provide information on estimates from each of the constituent indicators used.

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# 1 Supplementary Figures and Details

## 1.1 Time coverage of constituent datasets

Figure 1 visualizes the time coverage of the constituent indicators used. Almost all indicators cover the period from 1950–2010. This also means that the number of incumbent takeovers in the resulting data set prior to 1950, as well as following 2010, may be affected by less comprehensive data availability. However, even for these two periods, we have full coverage by three indicators that we can rely on. Additionally, for the 1972–2019 period, we supplement the coverage through codings of Freedom House Country Reports (explained in the *Coding Freedom House cases* section), and for the 1918–45 period, we supplement the coverage of non-democratic regimes by drawing from (Boix, Miller and Rosato, 2013) and (Djuve, Knutsen and Wig, 2020), as explained in *Coding BMR data* section.




Figure 1: Time Coverage by Various Indicators.

## 1.2 Disagreement between indicators

As discussed in the paper, the indicators we use to compile our candidate dataset focus on particular variants of incumbent takeovers, and among those that code similar types, conceptual and operational differences often exist. To illustrate, all indicators agree that Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus carried out an incumbent takeover soon after winning elections in 1994. However, some set the date to 1995 (Haggard and Kaufman, 2012; Marshall and Marshall, 2014), others, including our coding of the FH reports, to 1996 (Baturo, 2019; Coppedge et al., 2019; Svolik, 2015), and still others to the very beginning of his tenure (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010; Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014). We acknowledge in the paper that it is a researcher’s decision whether to regard such cases as one event, different takeover events, or as cases of protracted takeovers cross-spanning several years. We believe that this disagreement provides important information that tells us something about the degree of uncertainty as to when a particular takeover has taken place. Thus, we retain the information provided by each indicator in our dataset, and include the range determined by different indicators, to allow researchers to pursue different approaches. We also make it possible for researchers to analyze such cases as the Lukashenko example relying on one takeover event.




Figure 2: *Differences in takeover estimates (years)*. Note: The plot displays the difference between the earliest and latest year of recorded takeover events, taken from 12 sources, per leader's tenure. Observations with only one takeover event per leader are excluded.

Years in office	13.4	(10.1)
<i>excl. still in office</i>	12.9	(10.0)
<i>In more democratic regime</i>	10.5	(7.2)
<i>In non-democracy</i>	15.3	(11.1)
Years to the first recorded takeover	3.6	(4.0)
<i>In more democratic regime</i>	3.9	(3.5)
<i>In non-democracy</i>	3.4	(4.3)
Average difference between earliest and latest event	3.4	(3.9)
<i>In more democratic regime</i>	3.0	(3.3)
<i>In non-democracy</i>	3.8	(4.2)

Table 1: *Descriptive Statistics*

Note: Average and standard deviation per category are reported. Takeovers are divided into two groups depending on the *Polity2* score at the time of entry into office of a leader at the time. Takeovers in more democratic and transitional regimes if *Polity2* is above 0; non-democracies otherwise.

For an illustration, Figure 2 highlights the extent of disagreements between indicators and plots the average differences in estimates of when takeover occurs, per individual leaders. On average, as can be seen from Table 1 (it includes includes the average and standard deviation for tenure in office, time to takeover, and differences in estimates), and excluding leaders for which only one takeover observation is available, the timing varies by just over three years, even though a small number of political leaders “display” a stronger extent of uncertainty as to when they perpetuate the takeover. As discussed in the paper however, this uncertainty about point estimates is accounted for in the interval estimates that are included in the data.

We code takeover spells in the following way. For rulers with only one point estimate and no interval estimates available, we code the year of that point estimate as the onset and treat it only as a one-year discrete event. For rulers with point estimates available for different years, we treat the first of these estimates as the onset year and the last as the end year of the takeover event. Where only (recoded) interval estimates and no point estimates from other sources are available, we use the end year of the interval as the end year of the takeover spell. The only




Figure 3: *Takeover Events, 1918–2019.* Note: Total number of takeover events per country is reported. One and the same leader may be recorded to have more than one takeover, as explained in text.

exception is those leaders who commit an incumbent takeover in the beginning of their rule, then later on introduce multiparty elections and liberalize somewhat, only to commit a sort of second takeover, almost always in the form of tenure extensions. The spells of the twenty rulers that have such trajectories span the global liberalization period around the end of the cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

### 1.3 Additional details about takeover estimates

**More than one takeover per leader:** One and the same leader can experience more than one takeover event during her/his time in office. While in the paper we emphasize the first, and often the only event (the onset of incumbent takeover), as the most important one for understanding and measuring incumbent takeovers, we also keep record of distinct takeover events that occur in different years. For example, one and the same leader may shut down the parliament illegally, followed by the promulgation of a pro-executive constitution, in turn followed by subsequent term-limit change. The map in Figure 3 displays the number of incumbent takeover events in total, per country for the whole period. In contrast to the map included in the main paper where on average the number of takeovers per country was three, and very rarely exceeded five events, here, because one and the same leader may experience more than one event, the total number per country is higher. The geographic pattern, however, remains largely similar to the one with onsets depicted in the main paper.

**Average time to takeover for the whole sample:** In the paper we included the histogram of the distribution of time to first/only takeover, separately for leaders who enter office in more democratic as well as in nondemocratic regimes. Here, Figure 4 plots time to first/only takeover for the whole sample, without dividing it into separate regime types. From this figure we can see that the majority of takeovers occur during the first three years of leader’s tenure, on average. Additional details are also included in Table 1.




Figure 4: *Time from entry into office to onset of incumbent takeovers (years). Note: Per cent of leaders experiencing takeover in the year of first/only takeover; 0 if prior to the end of first year in office*




Figure 5: *Takeovers Over Time, Alternative Indicators. Note: The number of takeover events over time, based on the type of regime at the time of leader's entry into office, from V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2019) (left sub-plot). Two liberal democracy regimes are included in the category of electoral democracy. The right sub-plot is based on Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013). The subplot at the bottom is the number of takeover events per year, as percentage to the number of member-states in place that year. Lowess smooth lines (solid) and raw counts (dashed) lines.*

## 1.4 Takeovers, alternative democracy measurements, and statehood

**Takeovers and regime types at entry:** Instead of relying on *Polity2* scores at entry into office as in the paper, for robustness we include two time sub-plots, based on alternative measurements of democracy, Coppedge et al. (2019) and Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013), included in

Figure 5. The time patterns remain similar to the one with onsets depicted in the main paper: the number of incumbent takeovers peaked during the Cold war; then it declined in the post-Cold war period, but this decline is primarily on the account of fewer incumbent takeovers among leaders who came to power in regimes already regarded as authoritarian regimes. Indeed, from [Coppedge et al. \(2019\)](#) data we can see that the number of takeovers in electoral autocracies remains flat, and in electoral democracies—increases over time. The pattern is similar from [Boix, Miller and Rosato \(2013\)](#) data. In turn, the bottom sub-plot in Figure 5 plots the number of takeover events in each year as a percentage to the number of states in the international system that year, from [COW \(2017\)](#). Because of the increasing number of states in the system over time, the post Cold war decline in takeovers that is visible from other indices is even starker here; the number of takeovers that occur in more democratic regimes remains flat over time.

## 2 Coding details

We supplement the candidate dataset with additional new coding from the Freedom House data, from the GWF data, and from [Boix, Miller and Rosato \(2013\)](#) [Djuve, Knutsen and Wig \(2020\)](#). In this section we provide full details. Additionally, we explain how the dataset was further prepared to ensure that the duplicates are excluded.

### 2.1 Coding Freedom House cases

We supplement the candidate dataset with additional new coding of our own of takeovers in the period 1972–2019, making extensive use of Freedom House data and the accompanying annual Country Reports. First, we identified the countries that were down-ranked from either “free” to “partly free” or from “free” or “partly free” to “not free” (for a similar approach, see [Svolik \(2019, 20–23\)](#)). During the period, Freedom House downgraded 70 countries from “free” to “partly free” and 130 countries from either “free” or “partly free” to “not free”. Subsequently, we read the annual reports for these particular 200 country years and assigned aggregate categories for general reasons behind downgrading. From 1993 on, whenever a rating is changed, a country report usually includes a very short paragraph that explains the main reason (or two or three reasons) for the downgrade. To exemplify, Djibouti’s downgrade in 2010 is justified in the following way in the 2011 country report: “Djibouti’s political rights rating declined from 5 to 6 and its status from Partly Free to Not Free due to constitutional changes that will allow President Ismael Omar Guelleh to run for a third term in office” ([Freedom House, 2011, 196](#)).<sup>1</sup> In turn, Russia’s transition under President Vladimir Putin from Partly Free to Not Free in 2004 is explained with “the virtual elimination of influential political opposition parties within the country and the further concentration of executive power.” ([Freedom House, 2005, 519](#)).<sup>2</sup> In the majority of the cases prior to 1993, we are also able to categorize the main reasons for downgrades as the main political developments are summarized in the beginning of country reports, even if they do not include separate explanations for ratings changes. For such cases, we also read the whole report and consulted additional literature to make sure that we coded the right reason for the downgrade.

Overall, we identify six types of downgrades: “coup d’état” (coup and coup attempts), “election irregularities” (elections are delayed or disputed), “insurgency and conflict” (civil war, foreign occupation, or other types of insurgency), “crime and corruption” (growing climate

<sup>1</sup>Also see <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>.

<sup>2</sup>See <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>.

of lawlessness and insecurity and/or increasing corruption), “civil rights violations” (violations of individual, opposition, and/or minority rights), and “incumbent takeover”. In addition, a few cases of transition were either due to multiple reasons that are difficult to separate, or we were unable to gauge the exact reason.<sup>3</sup>

Figure 1 in the paper reports the frequencies for each of these categories. Important for the subject under study in this paper, “incumbent takeover” happens in connection with 10 “partly” and 32 “non free” transitions. Also noteworthy, alongside coups d’état, incumbent takeover is the most common reason behind transitions to “unfree” status. One-fourth of transitions to non-democratic rule result from such events. It is also a very common reason for transitions from “free” to “partly free” (14 per cent). For all 42 cases we code as incumbent takeovers, Freedom House refers explicitly to the fact that a significant accumulation of executive power has occurred. For example, this is the case whenever the incumbent suspended or violated the constitution (including violating term limits), illegally dismissed parliament, or whenever a series of executive actions lead country experts to underline the concentration of executive power as the reason for down-ranking.<sup>4</sup> Still, some of the cases cut across more than one category. We mitigate this challenge by only assigning “incumbent takeover” to cases whenever there is more emphasis on the actions of the executive as opposed to other reasons.<sup>5</sup>

In summary, Table 2 lists the incumbent takeovers coded from the Freedom House data. Altogether, we found that 42 out of 200 Freedom House regime downranks can be primarily attributed to instances of such executive power concentration.

## 2.2 The lists of changes to the GWF data

Table 3 lists the changes to the GWF data, coded by the authors, and explained in the paper. The list includes political leaders of regimes that [Geddes, Wright and Frantz \(2014\)](#) define as personalist or personalist hybrids. This non-democratic type indicates that their incumbent leaders have at some stage personalised and consolidated their power at the expense of other institutions or actors. However, because the categorisation is time-invariant, from these data we cannot infer when the likely takeover takes place. We therefore made extensive use of biographical and historical accounts (e.g., [Lentz, 1994](#)), to gauge when the historians and scholars of particular regimes believe these leaders have consolidated their power and significantly reduced the autonomy of other political actors, particularly when such consolidation was accompanied by observable institutional changes.

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<sup>3</sup>For example, in 1988 Jordan was down-ranked as the government imposed an austerity regime when an economic crisis hit the country and unrest followed, but the report is unclear as to why the country became “unfree” ([Gastil, 1989](#), 410) (see <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>). In a few cases, such as in 1993 in the United Arab Emirates, the change was made “as a result of change in methodology” ([Freedom House, 1995](#), 581) (see <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>).

<sup>4</sup>As when Hungary became unfree in 2018 “due to sustained attacks on the country’s democratic institutions by the Prime Minister”. See <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>.

<sup>5</sup>For example, we categorize Uganda in 1991 as “insurgency and conflict”. Even though the country report mentions executive power, there is more emphasis on the overall violence and that the regime “became more repressive” and on “counter-insurgency efforts begun last year in the eastern and western parts” ([Freedom House, 1992](#), 450) (see <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>). In contrast, in 2009 Jordan became “not free” “due to King Abdullah’s dismissal of the parliament and his announcement that elections would not be held until the end of 2010” ([Freedom House, 2010](#), 342) (see <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>). We categorize this case as “incumbent takeover” as opposed to “delayed/disputed election” because the dismissal of parliament is listed as the main reason in the report.



Leader	Event	Change
Banzer Suarez (1971-1978), Bolivia	1974	F/PF to NF
Burnham (1966-1985), Guyana	1974	F/PF to NF
Ahidjo (1960-1982), Cameroon	1976	F/PF to NF
Bordaberry (1972-1976), Uruguay	1976	F/PF to NF
Sabah As-Sabah (1965-1977), Kuwait	1976	F/PF to NF
Ratsiraka (1975-1993), Madagascar	1976	F/PF to NF
Aristides Pereira (1975-1991), Cape Verde	1976	F/PF to NF
Pinto da Costa (1975-1991), Sao Tome and Principe	1977	F/PF to NF
France-Albert Rene (1977-2004), Seychelles	1979	F/PF to NF
Zia (1977-1988), Pakistan	1979	F/PF to NF
Maurice Bishop (1979-1983), Grenada	1980	F/PF to NF
Gouled Aptidon (1977-1999), Djibouti	1981	F/PF to NF
Ayatollah Khomeini (1979-1989), Iran	1981	F/PF to NF
Ahmed Abdallah (1978-1989), Comoros	1985	F/PF to NF
Moi (1978-2002), Kenya	1987	F/PF to NF
Khalifah Ath-Thani (1972-1995), Qatar	1989	F/PF to NF
Niyazov (1990-2006), Turkmenistan	1992	F/PF to NF
Karimov (1990-2014), Uzbekistan	1992	F/PF to NF
Moi (1978-2002), Kenya	1993	F/PF to NF
Milosevic (1989-2000), Serbia, Yugoslavia	1993	F/PF to NF
Nazarbaev (1990-2014), Kazakhstan	1994	F/PF to NF
Elias Hrawi (1989-1998), Lebanon	1995	F/PF to NF
Lukashenko (1994-2004), Belarus	1996	F/PF to NF
Akayev (1990-2005), Kyrgyzstan	2000	F/PF to NF
Preval (1996-2001), Haiti	2000	F/PF to NF
Putin (2000-2008), Russia	2004	F/PF to NF
King Gyanendra (2001-2008), Nepal	2005	F/PF to NF
Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2005-2010), Kyrgyzstan	2009	F/PF to NF
Abdullah Ibn Hussein El-Hashimi (1999-2014), Jordan	2009	F/PF to NF
Guelleh (1999-2014), Djibouti	2010	F/PF to NF
Maduro (2013-2019), Venezuela	2016	F/PF to NF
Erdogan (2003-2019), Turkey	2017	F/PF to NF
Gandhi, I. (1966-1977), India	1975	F to PF
Jayewardene (1977-1989), Sri Lanka	1983	F to PF
Aquino (1986-1992), Philippines	1990	F to PF
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (1993-1997), Bolivia	1995	F to PF
Hugo Chavez (1999-2013), Venezuela	1999	F to PF
Abdoulaye Wade (2000-2012), Senegal	2008	F to PF
Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014), Ukraine	2010	F to PF
Danilo Medina (2012-2015), Dominican Republic	2015	F to PF
Orban (2010-2019), Hungary	2018	F to PF
Vucic (2017-2019), Serbia	2018	F to PF

Table 2: *Concentration of Executive Power in Freedom House Transitions*

*Note:* Based on Freedom House annual Freedom in the World country reports, 1972–2019. 158 transitions that are not concentration of executive power are not included.

## 2.3 Coding BMR data for the period 1918–45

As explained in the paper, to make sure that non-democratic takeover cases are not systematically underrepresented for the period of 1918–45, we checked all authoritarian country years that do not already figure among the indicators we rely on. First, we identify all authoritarian country years in the period. For this, we rely on the democracy-autocracy measure available in the dataset from (Boix, Miller and Rosato, 2013). 63 countries are coded as non-democracies for at least one year during this period, and many countries have different rulers across those years recorded as authoritarian. We therefore used the historical regime dataset provided by (Djuve, Knutsen and Wig, 2020), to identify the relevant regime spells and their leaders. This amounts to 190 potential cases in total. Among these leaders, we find that 28

Leader	GWF		Takeover
Daud (1973-78), Afghanistan	1973	1978	1977
Taraki (1978-79), Afghanistan	1978	1979	1979
Kocharian (1998-2008), Armenia	1998	2008	1999
Mujib Rahman (1971-75), Bangladesh	1971	1975	1975
Ershad (1982-90), Bangladesh	1982	1990	1986
Lukashenko (1994-), Belarus	1994	2019	1996
Barrientos Ortuna (1964-69), Bolivia	1964	1969	1966
Banzer Suarez (1971-78), Bolivia	1971	1979	1974
Yameogo (1958-66), Burkina Faso	1960	1966	1959
Lamizana (1966-80), Burkina Faso	1966	1980	1974
Campaore (1987-2014), Burkina Faso	1987	2018	1989
Kolingba (1981-93), CAR	1981	1993	1986
Bozize (2003-13), CAR	2003	2013	2010
Lon Nol (1970-75), Cambodia	1970	1975	1971
Ahidjo (1958-82), Cameroon	1960	1982	1962
Tombalbaye (1959-75), Chad	1960	1975	1963
Habre (1982-90), Chad	1982	1990	1984
Pinochet (1973-90), Chile	1973	1989	1974
Rojas Pinillia (1953-57), Colombia	1953	1958	1954
Youlou (1958-63), Congo	1960	1963	1959
Debat (1963-68), Congo	1963	1968	1968
Nguesso (1997-2019), Congo	1997	2019	2002
Batista (1952-59), Cuba	1952	1959	1954
Mobutu (1965-97), DRC	1965	1997	1970
J. Kabila (2001-19), DRC	2001	2019	2006
Velasco Ibarra (1944-47), Ecuador	1944	1947	1946
Nasser (1954-70), Egypt	1954	1970	1956
Sadat (1970-81), Egypt	1970	1981	1971
Hernandez Martinez (1931-44), El Salvador	1931	1944	1936
Mengistu (1974-91), Ethiopia	1974	1987	1977
Jammeh (1994-2017), Gambia	1994	2017	1996
Shevardnadze (1992-2003), Georgia	1992	2003	1995
Rawlings (1981-2001), Ghana	1981	2000	1982
Castillo (1954-57), Guatemala	1954	1958	1955
Vieira (1980-99), Guinea-Bissau	1980	1999	1984
Lescot (1941-46), Haiti	1941	1946	1942
Sukarno (1949-66), Indonesia	1949	1966	1960
Suharto (1966-98), Indonesia	1966	1999	1968
Karrim Kassem (1958-63), Iraq	1958	1963	1959
Nazarbaev (1990-2019), Kazakhstan	1991	2019	1995
Kim Il-Sung (1948-94), Korea North	1948	1994	1956
Bakiyev (2005-10), Kyrgyzstan	2005	2010	2007
Doe (1980-90), Liberia	1980	1990	1985
Qaddafi (1969-2011), Libya	1969	2011	1970
Abacha (1993-98), Nigeria	1993	1999	1994
Ayub Khan (1958-69), Pakistan	1958	1971	1960
Zia (1977-88), Pakistan	1977	1988	1978
Musharraf (1999-2008), Pakistan	1999	2008	2001
Torrijos (1968-81), Panama	1968	1982	1969
Estigarribia (1939-40), Paraguay	1939	1940	1940
Odria (1948-56), Peru	1948	1956	1950
Ceausescu (1965-89), Romania	1965	1989	1967
Habyarimana (1973-94), Rwanda	1973	1994	1974
Rhee (1948-60), South Korea	1948	1960	1952
Ngo Dinh Diem (1954-63), South Vietnam	1954	1963	1955
Al-Bashir (1989-2019), Sudan	1989	2019	1993
Al-Hafiz (1963-66), Syria	1963	1965	1964
Al-Assad H. (1970-2000), Syria	1970	2000	1971
Sarit Thanarat (1958-63), Thailand	1958	1963	1959
Olympio (1958-63), Togo	1960	1963	1961
Jimenez (1950-58), Venezuela	1950	1958	1952

Table 3: *List of Changes to the GWF data*

Leader	Takeover		Type
Nadir (1929-33), Afghanistan	1929	–	royal dictatorship
Saavedra (1921-25), Bolivia	1925	–	election rigged, suspended or delayed
Liles (1926-30), Bolivia	1930	–	term limits extended
Ibanez (1927-31), Chile	1927	–	parliam. suspended/unconst. dissolved
Machado (1925-33), Cuba	1928	–	term limits extended
Velasco Ibarra (1934-35), Ecuador	1935	–	parliam. suspended/unconst. dissolved
Arroyo del Rio (1940-44), Ecuador	1941	–	emergency or martial law
Pats (1933-40), Estonia	1934	–	exec. power concentration, various
Orellana (1921-26), Guatemala	1926	–	exec. power concentration, various
Ubico (1931-44), Guatemala	1931	1937	exec. power concentration, various
Bertrand (1913-19), Honduras	1919	–	election rigged, suspended or delayed
Lopez Gutierrez (1920-24), Honduras	1924	–	term limits extended
Horthy (1920-43), Hungary	1933	1937	exec. power concentration, various
Reza Shah (1921-41), Iran	1925	1933	royal dictatorship
El Choury (1943-52), Lebanon	1948	–	term limits extended
Smetona (1926-40), Lithuania	1928	–	parliam. suspended/unconst. dissolved
Choibalsan (1939-52), Mongolia	1939	–	purge or repression, various
La Guardia (1941-45), Panama	1945	–	exec. power concentration, various
Leguia (1919-30), Peru	1919	1929	exec. power concentration, various
Benavides (1933-39), Peru	1936	–	parliam. suspended/unconst. dissolved
Pilsudski (1926-35), Poland	1926	–	exec. power concentration, various
Antonescu (1940-44), Romania	1941	–	purge or repression, various
Ataturk (1923-38), Turkey	1925	–	opposition banned, i.e., one party
Stalin (1924-53), USSR	1924	1929	purge or repression, various

Table 4: *List of Takeovers from BMR data*

incumbent takeovers are already included in our main dataset. For the remaining 162 cases, we used the Encyclopedia of heads of state, 1900-1945 as well as broader searches in journal articles, online dictionaries, etc. to determine which rulers commit an incumbent takeover and when they do so. In total, we identified 24 additional cases of incumbent takeover, which we also include in our final dataset. Table 4 lists these cases.

## 2.4 Excluding NELDA duplicates

Many tenure changes can be categorized as having occurred in different years. However, here the difference does not stem from uncertainty over when this event happened, but from differences in coding. For instance, [Hyde and Marinov \(2012\)](#) (in NELDA) and [Baturó \(2019\)](#) largely cover the same events. However, while the former measure tenure extension from the time of election when tenure change takes effect, [Baturó \(2019\)](#) measures it from the time when constitutional change is made (via referendum, act of parliament, or the court decision). We believe that the year of change is closer conceptually to the incumbent takeovers analysed in this paper than the year of re-election that follows. On this basis, we excluded 56 NELDA years (coded as the year of re-election) that categorise term limit events that we already have from [Baturó \(2019\)](#).

## 2.5 Excluding false positives from the GWF indicator

In the candidate dataset, we included all leaders of regimes coded as personalist and personalist hybrids based on the assumption that an incumbent takeover must have happened in order for the ruler’s regime to be (re-)categorized as such. In many cases, regime and leader spells coincide. However, some personalist regimes have more than one leader. For example, Russia under Boris Yeltsin and then Vladimir Putin is coded as one personalist regime, as is Togo under

Gnassingbe Eyadema and Faure Gnassingbe or Turkmenistan under Saparmurat Niyasov and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow. Within this group, we found a number of cases where the succeeding leader seemingly does not accomplish a takeover but merely “inherits” personalism in the same regime spell. To identify these false positives, we remove second and subsequent leaders in the same personalist regime spell unless they also, at least once during the same spell, figure among any of our other indicators (including our own coding) in the cleaned dataset. Following this consensus rule, we include Putin of Russia because four other indicators code an incumbent takeover during his time in office. In contrast, we remove Gnassingbe of Togo and Berdimuhamedow of Turkmenistan because no other indicator records their own takeover.

<b>Incumbents experiencing takeovers, total</b>	<b>279</b>
<i>Takeovers in more democratic regimes</i>	<i>107</i>
term limits extended	30
exec. power concentration, various	23
election rigged, suspended or delayed	18
parliam. suspended/unconst. dissolved	15
purge or elite repression, various	8
emergency or martial law	6
opposition banned, i.e., one party	4
royal dictatorship, various	3
<i>Regime that follows a more democratic regime*</i>	<i>73</i>
personal or personal hybrid	32
other non-democratic regime	16
democracy	25
<i>Takeovers in non-democracies</i>	<i>172</i>
term limits extended, incl. for life	38
exec. power concentration, various	38
purge or elite repression, various	24
opposition banned, i.e., one party	22
parliam. suspended/unconst. dissolved	20
election rigged, suspended or delayed	14
emergency/martial law	12
royal dictatorship, various	4
<i>Regime that follows in non-democracies*</i>	<i>145</i>
personal or personal hybrid	105
other non-democratic regime	40

Table 5: *Regime Takeovers by Incumbent Executive*

*Note:* Events are divided into 8 categories (reported as frequencies), whenever it is possible to ascertain. When one source is available per event, that event is categorised. When different sources account for different events of elements, the first or the most common is chosen. Regime categorisations based at the type of political regime in the first year in office (not at the time of takeover). Takeovers in more democratic and transitional regimes if *Polity2* equals or above 0; dictatorships otherwise. \*GWF covers up to 2010. There exist missing observations for several countries not included in GWF: e.g., Comoros, Eq. Guinea, Djibouti, Seychelles.

### 3 Incumbent takeovers, operationalisation, and concentration of power

In the paper, we define an incumbent takeover as an event perpetuated by a ruling executive that significantly reduces the formal and/or informal constraints on his/her power. In essence, in-




Figure 6: *Type of Takeover*. Note: Events are divided into 8 categories (frequencies), whenever it is possible to ascertain. When one source is available per event, that event is categorised. When different sources account for different events of elements, the first or the most common is chosen. Regime categorisations based at the type of political regime in the first year in office (not at the time of takeover).

cumbent takeover is about significant, non-provisional, concentration of power in the executive. Operationally, incumbent takeovers are those that are commonly understood in the literature to define and characterise instances of self-coups, executive coups, or *autogolpe*—the closing of parliaments, the avoidance of term limits, and rewriting constitutions in the executive favour by fiat, among other.<sup>6</sup> When incumbents are successful, the concentration of power in the executive will increase following these events. Incumbent takeovers are thus characterised by dismissals of parliaments and term limits changes—discrete, easy-to-observe and categorise events. They are however also characterised by other events that may be open to interpretation as to whether they indeed constitute incumbent takeovers, such as cases of abolishing or manipulating elections, or rewriting electoral and constitutional rules to entrench the incumbency

<sup>6</sup>Przeworski et al. (2000, 21) define autogolpe as when incumbents illegally closed down the legislature and rewrote rules in their advantage. Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), in extension of Przeworski et al. (2000) (PACL), include the same events as PACL, but also those when the incumbent extends the term he was elected for (pp. 5-6 of the data appendix). Svolik (2015, 730) defines that “an incumbent takeover occurred when a democratically elected incumbent undermined key tenets of democracy, most often by abolishing or manipulating elections.” In turn, Svolik (2019) does not distinguish between rapid, or slow, illegal, and within legal means “incumbent-driven subversions of democracy.” Luhrmann and Lindberg (2019, 1104–1105) refer to “autogolpes, where the chief executive comes to power by legal means but then suddenly abolishes key democratic institutions such as elections or parliaments.” In Przeworski et al. (2013), autocoup is when “the ruler illegally changes constitutional rules to reduce the chances of the opposition to oppose policies in the legislature or to win elections. The definition comprises any event in which the incumbent illegally closes the legislature OR closes the legislature legally AND changes electoral rules (including banning parties) or adopts laws that extend his tenure (Philippines in 1972).” Likewise, Djuve, Knutsen and Wig (2020) in Historical Regimes Dataset (HRD) include “a self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader”, which in turn is characterised by changes in term limits, constitutional change (and other changes), and fraudulent elections (Table A.4 in their appendix).

advantage. Because scholars of democratic breakdown and backsliding go beyond dismissals of parliaments when defining what executive coups are, we equally attempt to gauge the fact of incumbent takeovers from other events, institutional and constitutional changes, beyond illegal closures of parliament.

Table 5 and Figure 6 describe the most distinct characteristics of incumbent takeovers included in the dataset.<sup>7</sup> As can be seen, incumbent takeovers can be operationalised as instances of *continuismo*—extensions of presidential term limits, as institutional changes that strengthen the executive, typically constitutional changes (excluding cases of *continuismo*), dismissal or suspension of parliaments, election subversion in favour of the sitting incumbent, as well as other observable events. In other words, the predominant majority of takeover events included in our data are those events that other scholars of executive coups and self-coups will agree with. While many incumbent takeovers are complex events that in principle may include multiple actions and institutional changes perpetuated by the executive at the time, we attempt to categorize incumbent takeovers into 8 main categories, whenever it was possible to ascertain. When one source is available that describes a particular event, we follow the description in that source. When different sources account for different events or elements of takeover that take place per individual leader, the first or the most common type of event is chosen.

Also, we separate events that occur in more and less democratic regimes, based on the type of political regime in the first year in office (not at the time of takeover). We categorize takeovers to occur in more democratic and transitional regimes if *Polity2* at the time of entry into office has a positive score; and we categorize events to occur in dictatorships if leaders assume office in regimes with negative *Polity2* scores at the time of entry into office. The fact that all eight main categories feature events occurring in more and less democratic regimes underlines the validity of our unifying approach that examines takeovers across different regime types. In the paper we discussed the logic of including takeovers that occur in democracies and non-democracies. Also, even though many of the authors who study executive coups, imply that incumbent takeovers and self-coups occur in democracies, there are numerous cases in their data that cannot be categorised as cases of democratically elected leaders subverting institutions.<sup>8</sup> With a possible exception of the opposition ban that tends to occur in less democratic regimes, other events tend to occur in different settings. Indeed, as we discussed in the paper, tenure extensions may occur in a democratic Venezuela in 1999 and in a more authoritarian Uganda in 2005 or in Taiwan in 1960, while the parliament shutdown may occur in a democratic Ecuador in 1970 or Peru in 1992, as well as in autocratic Thailand in 1971 or Jordan in 2001. Even the category of “royal dictatorship”—a complex event that is typically characterised by a series of actions perpetuated by the sitting monarch to strengthen his authority at the expense of parliament or the cabinet—in principle may occur across regime types if a particular king assumes throne when the regime is a constitutional monarchy or in the period of liberalisation, such as, for example, Fuad (1922–36) of Egypt or Boris III (1918–43) of Bulgaria.

Because an incumbent takeover is an event, typically manifested in such changes as *con-*

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<sup>7</sup>Table 5 reports the type of regime that follows the takeover year. While the number of personal and personal hybrid regimes is high, this is also due to the fact that the predominant majority of personalist regime spells begin from the first year in office of incumbent leaders.

<sup>8</sup>For instance, [Przeworski et al. \(2013\)](#), include as autocoups the cases of South Korea 1972, Nicaragua 1971, Iraq 1958, Jordan 1957, 1974 and 2001. However, these regimes are non-democracies at the time. Because it is difficult to separate events that can occur in more and less democratic settings, in HRD some events that are defined as self-coups, occur in regimes that are already non-democratic, e.g., such as Russia in 2012, where there was a “directed transition, but the development overall deemed severe enough to be dubbed self-coup” (supplementary appendix to [Djuve, Knutsen and Wig \(2020\)](#)).




Figure 7: *Difference in Power Concentration Scores.* Note: Difference in scores between takeover year and previous year.

*tinuismo*, or a pro-executive constitution and/or related institutional change in favour of the incumbent, illegal dismissal of parliament, postponement or cancelation of an election, crack-down on the opposition, elite purge, as well as other rapid-like observable events that lead a significant concentration of power of the executive, in principle we can observe these events across different regime types. We do not necessarily claim conceptual equivalence for what incumbent takeover means fully in democracy and what it means in non-democracy. Indeed, in a democracy incumbent takeover is likely to encompass a loss of vertical accountability alongside that of horizontal accountability, while in a non-democracy incumbent takeovers are primarily about horizontal accountability. Instead, we claim a degree of measurement equivalence, that the same events that tend to increase the concentration of power and reduce horizontal accountability, can occur in different regime types.

While we regard incumbent takeover as an event (whether a point estimate or an interval, if it can be characterised by a series of events), because such an event increases the power of the incumbent, incumbent takeovers can also be mapped to a scale that either measures the constraints on the executive, or vice versa, the degree of power of the executive. For robustness, we therefore can study whether existing interval scales of the power concentration relate to incumbent takeovers. Specifically, we take “executive constraints” (*XCONST*) from *Polity IV* (Marshall and Jaggers, 2011), “political constraints” (*polcon iii*) (Henisz, 2002), as well as the Horizontal accountability index (*horacc*) and the Presidentialism index, “systemic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision making tasks”—from Coppedge et al. (2019). In particular, the horizontal accountability index is available across regime types and it measures the extent to which state institutions, such as legislative and judicial branches, hold the executive branch accountable



(Luhmann, Marquardt and Mechkova, 2019). We then estimate the difference between the levels of these four scales when measured one year before an incumbent takeover and in the year of the takeover.

Figure 7 visualises the results. As can be seen, on all four scales the majority of observations do not register change in the concentration of power during incumbent takeover. This is partly due to the fact that 17 per cent of all leaders in the data experience takeovers during the first year in office, so there will be no recorded change for such leaders. The second reason is that the concentration of power scales, particularly *polcon iii* and *XCONST*, in many cases do not vary over time significantly, and do not always reflect important institutional changes. Still, the overwhelming majority of incumbent takeovers that reflect changes in the concentration of power have the correct sign of change (the Presidentialism index has the opposite direction to other indices, so that higher values stand for more power while on other indices higher values mean more constraints).<sup>9</sup> It is not entirely clear how sensitive these indices are to observed institutional and constitutional changes that typically accompany takeovers. For example, a *continuismo* by Juan Peron of Argentina in 1949 is not reflected in either *XCONST* or *polcon iii* scales, and is registered by  $-0.026$  decline on the Horizontal accountability index, in contrast to a *continuismo* by Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia in 1964 that is registered by declines of  $-1$  on *XCONST*,  $-0.145$  on *polcon iii* and  $-0.1$  on the Horizontal accountability index. In turn, Bouteflika of Algeria's *continuismo* in 2008 is reflected as a positive, even if very minor, change on *polcon iii* and the Horizontal accountability index but not on *XCONST*. Still, the majority of changes that would be recognised as such by the students of respective countries are reflected in accountability scales, whether in democracies or non-democracies; For example, Fujimori's autogolpe in Peru in 1992 is captured by significant  $-5$ ,  $-1.577$  and  $-0.221$  drops on the three scales in question, respectively.

The underlying change in terms of an overall power concentration, which occurs during the incumbent takeover, can not only vary in its magnitude, but also in terms of the starting point and as a result, the total distance traveled to its end point, along different parts of the continuum. Hypothetically, if the concentration of power can be represented as an underlying scale from the low concentration to high concentration, a more democratic leader such as de Gaulle of France of the Fourth Republic would "travel" from a very low concentration to the middle values on the scale, and someone like Menem in Argentina would move from a slightly higher concentration of power in the beginning of his first (and, according to the constitution at the time, only, term), to the value arguably comparable to that of de Gaulle after a change in France. In contrast, we can also imagine that someone like Hitler would move from the levels above average to a very high degree of power concentration, while authoritarian leaders such as Mengistu or Gaddafi would move from the levels above the average to the very high amounts of power.<sup>10</sup> Figure 8 plots the amount of change in the power concentration (measured as the difference in scores between the year of takeover and the previous year), depending on the values of that concentration in the previous year. Because the Horizontal accountability index is the interval variable, its values are grouped into four equal categories, first from the minimum to its 25th percentile, then to its median, then to its 75th percentile, and to its maximum. Figure 8 reveals that in terms of changes on *XCONST* variable that has a seven-point scale, incumbent takeovers on average reduce the executive constraints by one point (or just one standard deviation in the estimation sample). The changes are most significant among the more democratic leaders (*XCONST* of seven), who thus travel a longer distance during their takeovers.

The second sub-plot included in Figure 8 displays changes across the Horizontal account-

<sup>9</sup>E.g., 90 per cent on *XCONST*, 85 on *polcon iii*, 82 per cent on *horacc*.

<sup>10</sup>We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for directing our attention to this important point.






Figure 8: *Changes in Power and Prior Power Concentration Scores* . Note: Changes in scores between takeover year and previous year on the vertical axis. Values of Power Concentration Scores on the horizontal axis. Because the Horizontal accountability index is the interval variable, its values are grouped into four equal categories.

ability index; it additionally labels the outliers. Again, the longest distances on the underlying latent scale of power, here measured as horizontal accountability, are those taken by more democratic leaders who perpetuate takeovers, such as Fujimori of Peru or Bordaberry of Uruguay, who both perpetuated classic *autogolpes*. The distances are also significant for other democratically elected leaders who took over their regimes, such as above-mentioned Hitler or Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea. Some dictators, like Gaddafi of Libya, equally stand out, however. As noted previously, a very small number of political leaders who perpetuated incumbent takeovers do not register negative changes on the available scales, such as dos Santos of Angola. Indeed, it is conceivable that the expert coders who assign scores to these indices viewed the 1992 presidential election in Angola, after a long spell of civil war, positively. However, an inconclusive election and ensuing instability was used by the incumbent to keep postponing further election and thus to avoid the presidential term limits altogether.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup>In the first round in 1992, dos Santos gained 49.5 percent, short of majority which necessitated a second round. However, when his opponent withdrew from the race and armed hostilities resumed, the elections were postponed to 2002, then to 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009, until the new constitution promulgated in 2010 scrapped direct elections for the presidency altogether. As a result, the incumbent relied on the events in 1992 to remain in office, without subjecting himself to elections, for two decades, which is much longer than a two-term limit would have permitted.




Figure 9: *Difference in Power Concentration Scores, Different Takeover Events.* Note: Average difference in scores between takeover year and previous year, per event type.

While the assessment of the magnitude of change on the underlying power concentration scale is an important venue for further research, at the moment we are limited by the fact that the available indices tend to be relatively time-invariant, as reflected in Figure 7. Still, the results displayed in 8 underline the validity of the incumbent takeover approach—more democratic leaders “travel” longer distances than dictators who already have lower constraints. At the same time, many paradigmatic dictators who are known for amassing large amounts of power, and doing so rather rapidly, such as Hitler, Nguema, Gaddafi, to name a few, also “travel” long distances during incumbent takeovers.

Instead of assessing the sensitivity of existing scales to observed incumbent takeovers, it is more informative to observe whether there are differences in how changes in scale reflect different types of events, on average. Figure 9 plots average changes in the concentration of power, as measured by *XCONST* (top) and the Horizontal accountability index (bottom), per category. Results indicate that expert coders who assess various measures of executive constraints in constructing these indices, in terms of the magnitude, appear to assign higher concentration of executive power from the establishment of, or a reversal to the royal dictatorship, as well as

equally visible dismissals of parliaments (first top categories on both scales), while cases of *continuismo*, as well as rigged and suspended elections, tend to change the power concentration less. At face value, this ranking makes sense since *continuismo* bundles the cases of the so-called grandfathering when presidents claim that their second term should be regarded as first when a new constitution is promulgated, as well as more dramatic removals of term limits (such as during the constitutional crisis in Niger in 2009), while cases of election manipulation can range in degree. Also, it is important that both scales measure the magnitude of changes in the similar order across categories.

In summary, incumbent takeovers are discrete and observable events, even though they can be mapped to scales of the concentration of power.<sup>12</sup> Scales of the concentration of power do not always reveal what the appropriate threshold for incumbent takeover— a qualitative change in the perception of the amount of power that the leader has, change in elite norms and behaviours of conducting politics; scales may also be either time-invariant, or have too many “thresholds” to choose from. Similar, [Svolik \(2012, 61–62\)](#) underlines that understanding when the leader’s takeover, or transition to personal rulership, occurs, is a defining dichotomy in the trajectories of dictatorships. Likewise, [\(Przeworski et al., 2000, 21\)](#) points out that having the data as to when an *autogolpe* occurs allows researchers to study factors leading to such qualitative change.

## 4 Leaders and takeovers, full descriptive details

Finally, in the last section of the appendix, we include Figures 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 that visualize leaders’ time in office and the timing of takeovers during their tenure, allowing for the possibility that different indicators may disagree about the year of that takeover. Figures visualize all leaders included in the dataset. In turn, Table 6 includes takeover details from all 13 indicators, for all leaders included in the dataset.

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<sup>12</sup>Depending on one’s research question, sometimes higher-level scales may be more informative, than binary indicators, such as takeovers, for example. When we study liberalisation or autocratisation, it is more informative to rely on *Polity2*, Freedom House, or *polyarchy* from V-Dem, than on dichotomous measures. When we study breakdown of democracy or dictatorship, it is of course necessary to turn to the binary measures. Similar, scales that measure checks and balances, executive constraints, and concentration of power, among other, exist. Indices are taken from various constituent indicators; they may also miss what is the most important; they also require more assumptions. Just as a binary measurement of democracy is necessary, in some research situations, it is also important to have a binary measure of incumbent takeover (which may be accompanied by the interval, as the case of these data). A binary measure is thus crucial if we want to study how long before the ruler establishes pre-eminence among other political elites, what are the factors leading to this change, as well as the consequences of such change.




Figure 10: *Leaders and Takeovers 1A*. Note: Light grey is time in office prior to first takeover, black is time in office from first or only takeover, dark grey is time from the latest takeover, as indicated by a different data source from that of the first takeover.




Figure 11: *Leaders and Takeovers 1B*. Note: Light grey is time in office prior to first takeover, black is time in office from first or only takeover, dark grey is time from the latest takeover, as indicated by a different data source from that of the first takeover.




Figure 12: *Leaders and Takeovers 1C*. Note: Light grey is time in office prior to first takeover, black is time in office from first or only takeover, dark grey is time from the latest takeover, as indicated by a different data source from that of the first takeover.




Figure 13: *Leaders and Takeovers 1D*. Note: Light grey is time in office prior to first takeover, black is time in office from first or only takeover, dark grey is time from the latest takeover, as indicated by a different data source from that of the first takeover.




Figure 14: *Leaders and Takeovers 1E*. Note: Light grey is time in office prior to first takeover, black is time in office from first or only takeover, dark grey is time from the latest takeover, as indicated by a different data source from that of the first takeover.



Table 6: Incumbent Takeovers, *Autogolpes*, Tenure Extensions

Ruler	Takeover Year(s)	PT	PACL	PIPE	MM	S	HK	B	N	CGV	FH	V-Dem	GWF	BMR	x
Nadir (1929-33), Afghanistan	1929	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1929	-
Daud (1973-78), Afghanistan	1977	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1977	-	-
Taraki (1978-79), Afghanistan	1979	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1979	-	-
Karzai (2001-14), Afghanistan	2009	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2009	-	-
Zog I (1925-39), Albania	1928	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1928	-	-	-
Berisha (1992-97), Albania	1996	-	-	-	1996	1996	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x
Bouteflika (1999-2019), Algeria	2008	-	-	-	-	-	-	2008	2009	-	-	2008	-	-	x
Dos Santos (1979-2017), Angola	1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	1992	-	1992-2008	-	-	-	-	x
Peron (1946-55), Argentina	1949-51	-	-	-	-	-	-	1949	1951	-	-	-	1951	-	x
Frondizi (1958-62), Argentina	1960	1960	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Menem (1988-99), Argentina	1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993	1995	-	-	-	-	-	x
Ter-Petrosyan (1991-98), Armenia	1994-95	-	-	-	1995	-	1995	-	-	-	-	-	1994	-	x
Kocharian (1998-2008), Armenia	1999	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1999	-	-
Dollfuss (1932-34), Austria	1933	-	-	-	-	1933	-	-	-	-	-	1933	-	-	x
H. Aliyev (1993-2003), Azerbaijan	1993-2	-	-	-	1993	-	-	2002	-	-	-	-	1993	-	x
I. Aliyev (2003-), Azerbaijan	2003-9	-	-	-	-	-	-	2009	-	-	-	-	2003	-	x
Hamad (1999-), Bahrain	2011	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2011	-	-	-
Mujib Rahman (1971-75), Bangladesh	1975	-	1975	1975	-	-	-	-	-	1971-74	-	-	1975	-	x
Ershad (1982-90), Bangladesh	1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1986	-	-
Lukashenko (1994-), Belarus	1995-4	-	-	-	1995	1996	1995	1996	2001	1994-2008	1996	1996	1996	-	x
Maga (1960-63), Benin	1961	-	-	-	-	1961	-	-	-	-	-	-	1960	-	-
Kerekou (1972-91), Benin	1972-84	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1984	-	-	-	1972	-	x
Saavedra (1921-25), Bolivia	1925	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1925	-
Liles (1926-30), Bolivia	1930	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1930	-
Villaruel (1943-46), Bolivia	1945	-	-	-	-	-	-	1945	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Urriolagoitia (1949-51), Bolivia	1951	-	-	1951	1951	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x
Paz Estenssoro (1960-64), Bolivia	1964	-	-	-	-	-	-	1964	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barrientos Ortuño (1964-69), Bolivia	1966-68	1968	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1966	-	x
Banzer Suarez (1971-78), Bolivia	1974-78	-	-	1978	-	-	-	-	-	-	1974	1974	1974	-	x
Sanchez de Lozada (1993-97), Bolivia	1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1995	-	-	-	-
Morales (2006-19), Bolivia	2008-17	-	-	-	-	-	-	2008	2009	-	-	2017	-	-	x
Vargas (1930-45), Brazil	1937	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1937	-	-	-
Stamboliiski (1919-23), Bulgaria	1920	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1920	-	-	-
Boris III (1918-43), Bulgaria	1935	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1935	-	-	-
Yameogo (1958-66), Burkina Faso	1959	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1959	-	-

*Continued*

Table: Continued

Ruler	Year(s)	PT	PACL	PIPE	MM	S	H	B	N	CGV	FH	V-Dem	GWF	BMR	x
Lamizana (1966-80), Burkina Faso	1974	-	-	-	-	-	-	1974	1978	-	-	-	1974	-	x
Sankara (1983-87), Burkina Faso	1983	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1983	-	-
Campaore (1987-2014), Burkina Faso	1989-98	-	-	-	-	-	-	1997	1998	-	-	-	1989	-	x
Bagaza (1976-87), Burundi	1984	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1984	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nkurunziza (2005-20), Burundi	2010-15	-	-	-	-	-	-	2015	-	-	-	2010	-	-	x
Dacko (1959-66), CAR	1960-64	-	1962	-	-	-	-	1964	1964	1960-61	-	1962	1960	-	x
Bokassa (1966-79), CAR	1972-77	-	-	-	-	-	-	1972	-	-	-	1977	1966	-	x
Kolingba (1981-93), CAR	1982-86	1982	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1986	-	x
Bozize (2003-13), CAR	2010	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2010	-	-
Sihanouk (1941-55), Cambodia	1949	-	-	1949	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lon Nol (1970-75), Cambodia	1971-72	1972	-	1971	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1971	-	x
Hun Sen (1985-), Cambodia	1997	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1997	-	-	-
Ahidjo (1958-82), Cameroon	1960-76	-	1963	-	-	-	-	-	-	1960-63	1976	-	1962	-	x
Biya (1982-2014), Cameroun	1983	-	-	-	-	-	-	2008	2011	-	-	-	1983	-	-
Pereira (1975-91), Cape Verde	1976	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1976	-	-	-	-
Tombalbaye (1959-75), Chad	1960-63	-	1962	1962	-	-	-	1962	1969	1960-61	-	-	1963	-	x
Habre (1982-90), Chad	1984	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1984	-	-
Deby (1990-), Chad	2002-8	-	-	-	-	-	-	2005	2006	2002-08	-	-	1990	-	x
Ibanez (1927-31), Chile	1927	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1927	-
Pinochet (1973-90), Chile	1974	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1974	-	-
Xi Jinping (2012-), China	2018	-	-	-	-	-	-	2018	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ospina Perez (1946-50), Colombia	1949-52	-	-	1949	-	1949	-	-	-	1949-52	-	-	-	-	x
Rojas Pinillia (1953-57), Colombia	1954	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1954	-	-
Lleras Restrepo (1966-70), Colombia	1968	1968	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uribe (2002-10), Colombia	2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Abdallah (1978-89), Comoros	1985-89	-	-	-	1989	-	-	1989	-	-	1985	-	-	-	x
Youlou (1958-63), Congo	1959-63	-	-	-	1963	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1959	-	x
Debat (1963-68), Congo	1965-68	1965	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1968	-	x
Ngouabi (1969-77), Congo	1969-70	-	-	-	-	-	-	1970	-	-	-	1969	-	-	x
Nguesso (1997-), Congo	2002-9	-	-	-	-	-	-	2002	2009	-	-	-	2002	-	x
Gbagbo (2000-2011), Cote d'Ivoire	2001-8	-	-	-	-	-	-	2005	-	2001-8	-	-	2000	-	x
Machado (1925-33), Cuba	1928	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1928	-
Batista (1952-59), Cuba	1952-54	-	-	1952	-	-	-	-	1954	-	-	-	1954	-	x
F. Castro (1959-2011), Cuba	1959	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1959	-	-
Mobutu (1965-97), DRC	1967-70	-	-	-	-	-	-	1967	1984	-	-	-	1970	-	x
L. Kabila (1997-2001), DRC	1997	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1997	-	-

Continued

Table: Continued

Ruler	Year(s)	PT	PACL	PIPE	MM	S	H	B	N	CGV	FH	V-Dem	GWF	BMR	x
J. Kabila (2001-19), DRC	2002-16	-	-	-	-	-	-	2002	-	-	-	-	2006	-	x
Gouled (1977-99), Djibouti	1981-82	-	1982	-	-	-	-	1992	-	1977-81	1981	1981	-	-	x
Guelleh (1999-), Djibouti	2010	-	-	-	-	-	-	2010	2011	1992-08	2010	-	-	-	x
Balaguer (1986-96), Dominican Rep.	1994	-	-	-	-	-	1994	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mejia (2000-2004), Dominican Rep.	2002	-	-	-	-	-	-	2002	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medina (2012-19), Dominican Rep.	2015	-	-	-	-	-	-	2015	-	2015	-	-	-	-	x
Trujillo (1930-61), Dominican Rep.	1930	-	-	-	-	-	-	1952	-	-	-	1930	1930	-	x
Balaguer (1966-78), Dominican Rep.	1966-78	-	-	-	1966	-	-	-	1978	-	-	-	1966	-	x
Velasco Ibarra (1934-35), Ecuador	1935	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1935	-
Mosquera (1938-39), Ecuador	1938	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1938	-	-	-
Arroyo del Rio (1940-44), Ecuador	1941	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1941	-
Velasco Ibarra (1944-47), Ecuador	1946	-	-	1946	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1946	-	x
Velasco Ibarra (1968-72), Ecuador	1970	1970	1970	1970	1970	-	-	-	-	1968-69	-	1970	1970	-	x
Correa (2007-2017), Ecuador	2008-15	-	-	-	-	-	-	2008	-	-	-	-	-	-	x
Fuad (1922-36), Egypt	1930	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1930	-	-	-
Nasser (1954-70), Egypt	1956	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1956	-	-
Sadat (1970-81), Egypt	1971-80	1973	-	-	-	-	-	1980	-	-	-	-	1971	-	x
Hernandez (1931-44), El Salvador	1936	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1936	-	-
O. Bolanos (1949-56), El Salvador	1950-59	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1950-59	-	-	-	-	-
Romero (1977-79), El Salvador	1977	-	-	-	1977	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
M. Nguema (1968-79), Eq. Guinea	1969-73	-	-	1971	1969	-	-	1973	-	1968	-	1971	-	-	x
Afwerki (1993-), Eritrea	1997	-	-	-	-	-	-	1997	-	-	-	-	1993	-	-
Pats (1933-40), Estonia	1934	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1934	-
Mengistu (1974-91), Ethiopia	1974-77	1974	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1977	-	x
Bainimarama (2007-), Fiji	2013	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2013	-	-	-
Kekkonen (1956-81), Finland	1973	-	-	-	-	-	-	1973	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Petaïin (1940-44), France	1940	-	-	-	-	1940	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
De Gaulle (1958-69), France	1958	-	-	-	1958	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mba (1957-67), Gabon	1960-67	-	1967	-	-	-	-	1961	-	1960-66	-	-	1960	-	x
Bongo (1967-2009), Gabon	1968	-	-	-	-	-	-	1997	2005	-	-	1968	1967	-	-
Jammeh (1994-2017), Gambia	1996	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1996	-	-
Shevardnadze (1992-2003), Georgia	1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1995	1995	-	x
Hitler (1933-45), Germany	1933	-	-	-	-	1933	-	-	-	-	-	1933	-	-	x
Nkrumah (1952-66), Ghana	1957-64	-	-	-	-	1958	-	1964	-	1957-63	-	-	1960	-	x
Acheampong (1972-78), Ghana	1975	1975	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rawlings (1981-2001), Ghana	1982	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1982	-	-

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Table: Continued

Ruler	Year(s)	PT	PACL	PIPE	MM	S	H	B	N	CGV	FH	V-Dem	GWF	BMR	x
Metaxas (1936-41), Greece	1936	-	-	-	-	1936	-	-	-	-	-	1936	-	-	x
Bishop (1979-83), Grenada	1980	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1980	-	-	-	-
Orellana (1921-26), Guatemala	1926	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1926	-
Ubico (1931-44), Guatemala	1931-37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1931	-
Castillo (1954-57), Guatemala	1955	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1955	-	-
Lucas Garcia (1978-82), Guatemala	1981	1981	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Serrano Elias (1991-93), Guatemala	1993	1993	-	1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993	-	-	x
Conte (1984-2008), Guinea	1995	2006	-	-	-	-	-	2001	2003	1995-2007	-	-	1984	-	x
Vieira (1980-99), Guinea-Bissau	1984	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1984	-	-
Kumba Iala (2000-2003), Guinea-Bissau	2002	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2002	-	-
Burnham (1966-85), Guyana	1974-78	-	-	-	1978	-	-	-	-	-	1974	-	-	-	-
Lescot (1941-46), Haiti	1942	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1942	-	x
Magloire (1950-56), Haiti	1950	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1946-62	-	-	1950	-	-
Pierre-Louis (1956-57), Haiti	1956-62	1956	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1946-62	-	-	-	-	x
Fignole (1957-57), Haiti	1957-62	1957	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1946-62	-	-	-	-	x
F. Duvalier (1957-71), Haiti	1961-64	1964	-	1961	-	-	-	1961	1964	1946-62	-	-	1957	-	x
Preval (1996-2001), Haiti	1999-3	-	-	-	1999	1999	1999	-	-	1994-03	2000	-	1999	-	x
Bertrand (1913-19), Honduras	1919	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1919	-
Lopez Gutierrez (1920-24), Honduras	1924	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1924	-
Carias (1933-1949), Honduras	1936	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1948	-	-	1936	1933	-	-
Hernandez (2014-), Honduras	2015	-	-	-	-	-	-	2015	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Horthy (1920-43), Hungary	1933-37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1933	-
Orban (2010-), Hungary	2018	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2018	-	-	-	-
I. Gandhi (1966-77), India	1975	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1975	-	-	-	-
Sukarno (1949-66), Indonesia	1957-63	-	-	1959	-	1957	-	1963	-	-	-	1957	1960	-	x
Suharto (1966-98), Indonesia	1968	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1968	-	-
Reza Shah (1921-41), Iran	1925-33	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1925	-
Shah Reza (1941-79), Iran	1952	-	-	1952	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Khomeini (1979-89), Iran	1981	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1981	-	-	-	-
Karim Kassem (1958-63), Iraq	1959	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1959	-	-
Salem Aref (1963-66), Iraq	1963-65	1965	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1963	1963	-	x
Hassan Al-Bakr (1968-79), Iraq	1968	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1968	-	-
S. Hussein (1976-2003), Iraq	1979	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1979	1979	-	x
Mussolini (1922-43), Italy	1923-25	-	-	-	-	1925	-	-	-	-	-	1923	-	-	x
Hussein bin Talal (1952-99), Jordan	1957	-	-	1957	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Abdullah II (1999-), Jordan	2001-9	-	-	2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	2009	-	-	-	x

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Table: Continued

Ruler	Year(s)	PT	PACL	PIPE	MM	S	H	B	N	CGV	FH	V-Dem	GWF	BMR	x
Nazarbaev (1990-2019), Kazakhstan	1991-98	-	-	-	-	-	-	1995	1999	1991-2008	1994	-	1995	-	x
Kenyatta (1963-78), Kenya	1969	-	1969	-	1969	-	-	-	-	1963-68	-	-	-	-	x
Moi (1978-2002), Kenya	1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993	-	-	-	-
Kim Il-Sung (1948-94), Korea North	1956	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1956	-	-
Sabah As-Sabah (1965-77), Kuwait	1976	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1976	-	-	-	-
Akayev (1990-2005), Kyrgyzstan	1998-2000	-	-	-	-	2000	-	1998	-	-	2000	-	1990	-	x
Bakiyev (2005-10), Kyrgyzstan	2007-9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2009	-	2007	-	x
Ulmanis (1934-40), Latvia	1934	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1934	-	-	-
El Choury (1943-52), Lebanon	1948	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1948	-
Hrawi (1989-98), Lebanon	1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1995	-	-	-	-
Jonathan (1966-86), Lesotho	1970	1970	1970	1970	-	1970	-	-	-	1966-84	-	1970	-	-	x
Lekhanya (1986-91), Lesotho	1990	1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tubman (1944-71), Liberia	1949	-	-	-	-	-	-	1949	1951	-	-	-	1944	-	-
Doe (1980-90), Liberia	1985	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1985	-	-
Taylor (1997-2003), Liberia	1997	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1997	-	-
Qaddafi (1969-2011), Libya	1970	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1970	-	-
Smetona (1926-40), Lithuania	1928	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1928	-
Ratsiraka (1975-93), Madagascar	1975-76	1975	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1976	-	1975	-	x
Ratsiraka (1997-2002), Madagascar	1998	1998	-	-	-	-	-	1998	-	-	-	-	-	-	x
Banda (1963-94), Malawi	1964-71	-	1966	1970	-	-	-	1971	-	-	-	1966	1964	-	x
Taore (1968-91), Mali	1981	-	-	-	-	-	-	1981	-	-	-	-	1968	-	-
Ould Daddah (1959-78), Mauritania	1960-66	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1966	-	-	-	1960	-	x
Ould Taya (1984-2005), Mauritania	1984	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1984	-	-
Choibalsan (1939-52), Mongolia	1939	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1939	-
Vujanovic (2003-18), Montenegro	2013	-	-	-	-	-	-	2013	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hassan II (1961-99), Morocco	1963-65	1963	-	1965	1965	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x
Ne Win (1962-88), Myanmar	1962	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1962	-	-
Nujoma (1990-2005), Namibia	1998	-	-	-	-	-	-	1998	2004	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mahendra (1955-72), Nepal	1960	1960	-	1960	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1960	-	-	x
Gyanendra (2001-08), Nepal	2002-5	-	-	2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	2005	2002	-	-	x
A. Somoza (1937-56), Nicaragua	1946-55	-	-	-	-	-	-	1947	1947	1946	-	-	1937	-	x
L. Somoza (1956-63), Nicaragua	1963	-	-	-	-	-	-	1963	-	-	-	-	1956	-	-
Somoza Debayle (1967-79), Nicaragua	1971-72	-	-	1971	-	-	-	1972	-	-	-	-	1967	-	x
Ortega (1979-90), Nicaragua	1981	1981	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ortega (2007-), Nicaragua	2009-14	-	-	-	-	-	-	2009	2011	-	-	-	-	-	x
Kountche (1974-87), Niger	1974	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1974	-	-

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Table: Continued

Ruler	Year(s)	PT	PACL	PIPE	MM	S	H	B	N	CGV	FH	V-Dem	GWF	BMR	x
Seibou (1987-93), Niger	1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mainassara (1996-99), Niger	1996	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1996	-	-
Mamadou (1999-2010), Niger	2009	-	-	-	2009	-	-	2009	-	-	-	2009	-	-	x
Abacha (1993-98), Nigeria	1994	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1994	-	-
Chaudhri M. Ali (1955-56), Pakistan	1956	-	1956	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ayub Khan (1958-69), Pakistan	1958-60	1958	-	1958	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1960	-	x
Bhutto (1971-77), Pakistan	1975	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1975	-	-
Zia (1977-88), Pakistan	1978-79	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1979	-	1978	-	x
Sharif (1997-99), Pakistan	1998	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1998	-	-	-
Musharraf (1999-2008), Pakistan	2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2001	-	-
La Guardia (1941-45), Panama	1945	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1945	-
Arias (1949-51), Panama	1951	1951	-	1951	-	1951	-	-	-	-	-	-	1949	-	x
Remon (1952-55), Panama	1953	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1953	-	-
Robles (1964-68), Panama	1968	1968	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Torrijos (1968-81), Panama	1969-78	-	-	-	-	-	-	1978	-	-	-	-	1969	-	-
Nortega (1983-90), Panama	1983	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1983	-	-
Estigarribia (1939-40), Paraguay	1940	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1940	-	-
Higinio Morinigo (1940-48), Paraguay	1948	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1948	-	-	-	-	-	-
Stroessner (1954-89), Paraguay	1959-67	1959	-	-	-	-	-	1967	1973	-	-	-	1954	-	x
Leguia (1919-30), Peru	1919-29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1919	-
Benavides (1933-39), Peru	1936	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1936	-
Odria (1948-56), Peru	1950	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1950	-	-
Fujimori (1990-2000), Peru	1992-2000	1992	-	1992	1992	1992	1992	1993	2000	1990-2000	-	1992	1992	-	x
Marcos (1965-86), Philippines	1969-76	-	1972	1972	1969	1972	-	1972	1977	1965-71	-	1972	1972	-	x
Aquino (1986-92), Philippines	1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990	-	-	-	-
Pilsudski (1926-35), Poland	1926	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1926	-
Jaruzelski (1981-90), Poland	1981	1981	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Salazar (1932-68), Portugal	1933	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1933	1932	-	-
Khalifah Ath-Thani (1972-95), Qatar	1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1989	-	-	-	-
Carol (1930-40), Romania	1938	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1938	-	-	-
Antonescu (1940-44), Romania	1941	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1941	-
Ceausescu (1965-89), Romania	1967	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1967	-	-
Yeltsin (1991-99), Russia	1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1993	-	-
Putin (2000-), Russia	2004-12	-	-	-	-	2004	-	2008	-	-	2004	2012	2000	-	x
Kayibanda (1961-73), Rwanda	1962-65	-	1965	-	-	-	-	-	-	1962-4	-	-	-	-	x
Habyarimana (1973-94), Rwanda	1974-78	-	-	-	-	-	-	1978	1983	-	-	-	1974	-	x

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Table: Continued

Ruler	Year(s)	PT	PACL	PIPE	MM	S	H	B	N	CGV	FH	V-Dem	GWF	BMR	x
Kagame (1994-), Rwanda	2003	-	-	-	-	-	-	2003	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pinto da Costa (1975-91), Sao Tome and Principe	1977	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1977	-	-	-	-
Senghor (1960-80), Senegal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wade (2000-2012), Senegal	1962-76	-	-	-	1962	-	-	1976	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Alexander I (1921-34), Serbia	2008	-	-	-	-	-	-	2008	2012	-	2008	-	-	-	x
Tadic (2004-12), Serbia	1929	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1929	-	-	-
Vucic (2017-), Serbia	2012	-	-	-	-	-	-	2012	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rene (1977-2004), Seychelles	2018	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2018	-	-	-	-
Stevens (1968-85), Sierra Leone	1979	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1979	-	-	-	-
Lee Kuan Yew (1959-90), Singapore	1971-78	-	-	-	1971	-	-	1978	1985	1968-77	-	1971	-	-	x
Siad Barre (1969-91), Somalia	1965-67	-	-	-	1965	-	-	-	-	1965-7	-	-	-	-	x
Rhee (1948-60), South Korea	1979-84	-	-	-	-	-	-	1979	-	-	-	-	1969	-	-
Hee Park (1961-79), South Korea	1952-54	-	-	-	-	-	-	1954	1956	-	-	-	1952	-	x
Ngo Dinh Diem (1954-63), S. Vietnam	1969-72	-	1972	1972	1972	-	-	1969	1971	-	-	1972	-	-	x
Franco (1939-75), Spain	1955	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1955	-	-
Bandaranaike, S (1970-77), Sri Lanka	1939	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1939	-	-
Jayewardene (1977-89), Sri Lanka	1977	-	-	-	-	1977	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kumaratunga (1994-2005), Sri Lanka	1982-83	-	-	1982	-	-	1982	-	-	-	1983	-	-	-	x
Rajapaksa (2005-15), Sri Lanka	2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2005	-	-	-	-	-	-
Abboud (1958-64), Sudan	2010	-	-	-	-	-	-	2010	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nimeiri (1969-85), Sudan	1959	1959	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Al-Bashir (1989-2019), Sudan	1971-73	1973	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1971	-	-
Subhuza II (1968-82), Swaziland	1993-5	-	-	1999	-	-	-	1998	-	-	-	-	1993	-	-
Shishakli (1949-54), Syria	1973	1973	-	1973	1973	-	-	-	-	1968-72	-	1973	-	-	x
Kuwatli (1955-58), Syria	1952	-	-	1952	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Al-Azm (1962-63), Syria	1957	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1957	-	-
Al-Hafiz (1963-66), Syria	1962	1962	-	1962	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x
Al-Assad H. (1970-2000), Syria	1964-65	1965	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1964	-	x
Chiang Kai-shek (1950-75), Taiwan	1971	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1971	-	-
Rakhmonov (1992-), Tajikistan	1960	-	-	-	-	-	-	1960	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nyerere (1961-85), Tanzania	1999-3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1999	1999	-	-	-	1992	-	x
Plaek Pibulsongkram (1946-57), Thailand	1962-64	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1961-4	-	1962	-	-	x
Sarit Thanarat (1958-63), Thailand	1947	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1947	-	-
Thanon (1963-73), Thailand	1959	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1959	-	-
Olympio (1958-63), Togo	1971	1971	-	1971	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1971	-	-	x
	1960-61	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1960	-	-	1961	-	x

Continued

Table: Continued

Ruler	Year(s)	PT	PACL	PIPE	MM	S	H	B	N	CGV	FH	V-Dem	GWF	BMR	x
Eyadema (1967-2005), Togo	1969-79	1969	-	-	-	-	-	1972	2003	-	-	-	1967	-	x
Al-Amin (1943-57), Tunisia	1952	1952	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bourguiba (1957-87), Tunisia	1975	-	-	-	-	-	-	1975	-	-	-	1975	-	-	x
Ben Ali (1987-2011), Tunisia	2002	-	-	-	-	-	-	2002	2004	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ataturk (1923-38), Turkey	1925	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1925	-
Menderes (1950-60), Turkey	1957	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1957	-	-	-
Erdogan (2003-), Turkey	2017	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2017	2017	-	-	x
Niyazov (1990-2006), Turkmenistan	1992-99	-	-	-	-	-	-	1994	-	-	1992	-	1990	-	x
Stalin (1924-53), USSR	1924-29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1924	-
Obote (1962-71), Uganda	1966-70	1966	1970	1966	1966	1966	-	-	-	1962-70	-	1966	1966	-	x
Amin (1971-79), Uganda	1971-76	1971	-	-	-	-	-	1976	-	-	-	-	1971	-	x
Obote (1980-85), Uganda	1980	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1980	-	-
Museveni (1986-), Uganda	1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	2005	2006	-	-	-	1986	-	-
Kravchuk (1990-94), Ukraine	1993	-	-	-	-	-	1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yanukovych (2010-14), Ukraine	2010	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2010	-	-	-	-
Terra (1931-38), Uruguay	1933	-	-	-	-	1933	-	-	-	-	-	1933	-	-	x
Pacheco Areco (1967-72), Uruguay	1971-72	-	-	-	1971	1972	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x
Bordaberry (1972-76), Uruguay	1973-76	-	1973	1973	-	-	-	-	-	-	1976	-	-	-	x
Karimov (1990-2016), Uzbekistan	1992-2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1995	2000	-	1992	-	1990	-	x
Jimenez (1950-58), Venezuela	1952-57	1952	-	-	-	-	-	1957	1957	-	-	-	1952	-	x
Chavez (1999-2013), Venezuela	1999-9	-	-	-	-	-	-	1999	-	-	1999	2009	2005	-	x
Maduro (2013-), Venezuela	2017	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2017	2017	-	-	x
AL-Sallal (1962-67), Yemen	1965	1965	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Saleh (1978-2012), Yemen	1978	-	-	-	-	-	-	2001	-	-	-	-	1978	-	-
Tito (1945-80), Yugoslavia	1974	-	-	-	-	-	-	1974	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Milosevic (1989-2000), Yugoslavia	1990-2000	-	-	-	-	-	-	1997	2000	1990	1993	-	1991	-	x
Kaunda (1964-91), Zambia	1968-73	-	1973	1973	1968	-	-	-	1983	1964-71	-	1973	-	-	x
Chiluba (1991-2002), Zambia	1996	-	-	-	1996	-	1996	-	-	-	-	1996	-	-	x
Mugabe (1980-2017), Zimbabwe	1980-87	-	1980	-	1987	-	-	-	2008	-	-	1983	-	-	x

Note: PT is "autogolpe" in Powell and Thyne (2011); PACL: "transition to authoritarianism caused by incumbent chief executive", 1950-1990, Przeworski et al. (2000, 21); PIPE is "autocoup" in Przeworski et al. (2013); MM is "subversion by ruling executive", 1946-2013, in Marshall and Marshall (2014, 15-6), S is "incumbent takeover" in (Svolik, 2015, 730); HK is "elite reaction or intra-elite reversion" (excl. military coups), 1980-2000, in Haggard and Kaufman (2012); B is "tenure extension," 1945-2018 in Baturo (2019) (1st extension, if there are more than one, is reported in this table); N is NELDA9: "the incumbent extended his or her term in once or eligibility to run" in Hyde and Marinov (2012); CGV is "consolidation of incumbency advantage" in 1946-2008, in Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010); FH is transition a result of executive power concentration (explained in text), V-Dem is "self-coup" in Coppedge et al. (2019), GWF is the onset of personal or personal hybrid regime, Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), BMR is the onset of personal or personal hybrid regime, recorded from political regimes of the world, from from (Boix, Miller and Rosato, 2013) and (Djuve, Knutsen and Wig, 2020), as explained in text. X stands for an agreement on the executive takeover between at least two indicators.



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