

## **Political Resurrection in the Twentieth Century**

The Fall and Rise of Political Leaders

Leslie Derfler

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POLITICAL LEADERS

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
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## PREFACE

In war one dies only once. In politics, one dies only to rise again.

—Talleyrand

The political history of the twentieth century takes into account several former heads of government who achieved the pinnacle of political power, fell from or relinquished power, and then—after a period in the political “wilderness”—regained it. Included among them are Winston Churchill (Great Britain), Charles de Gaulle (France), Indira Gandhi (India), Juan Perón (Argentina), Olof Palme (Sweden), Yitzhak Rabin (Israel), Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), and Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Canada).<sup>1</sup> Churchill’s career, including the years spent in opposition *after* his fall from power in 1945 (as contrasted to what is commonly regarded as his wilderness years before his rise *to* power), is doubtless the best known. For that reason, he is not included among the three leaders discussed in this book: De Gaulle, Perón, and Trudeau. While their careers are familiar to scholars, general readers may not be aware of de Gaulle’s involvement in an authoritarian movement that sought to transcend existing political parties and place emphasis on French nationalism and imperialism. Nor are many aware of the extent of Péron’s ability to manipulate his movement during 18 years of foreign exile, keeping it united and maintaining himself as its leader; or of Trudeau’s repeated and successful campaigns rejecting the demands of Quebec’s nationalist leaders to separate the province from the rest of Canada. I have also selected these three precisely because of their geographical diversity and because additional information about them has become available.

Each of the three sections will open with a sketch of the subject’s earlier career: the climb to and exercise of power. This part will be subtitled “creation.” The three remaining parts describe the fall (“termination”), time spent out of office (“interment”), and return to political power (“resurrection”).

By placing greater emphasis than that customarily accorded by biographers not on their stay in, but on the time spent out of, office, on the “interment” that preceded their political “resurrection,” I will seek answers to such questions as the following: What did these heads of government do after their fall from power—because of electoral defeats or simple decisions to resign—and before they recovered it? Had they abandoned the idea of staging a political comeback? How did their “interments” affect their political outlooks? What lessons, if any, were learned from the fall? What accounted for their return to high political office, their “resurrections.” To what extent did mistakes made by their successors facilitate their reentry? I will conclude by comparing the political “rise,” “fall,” “interments,” and “resurrections” of the three in an attempt to unearth explanations for their political restorations and for the course of action taken once leadership was regained.

The leaders have been the subject of numerous biographies, although even the most recent studies were published years ago and do not contain recently obtained material or newly conceived interpretations. Moreover, they minimize the time spent and activities undertaken during the years (in the case of Trudeau, months) out of office and before their return to it; in opposition, exile, or retirement. Nor is there any comparative biography that places emphasis on the space between a “fall” and a subsequent “rise.” Yet much of what happened during this period, both in terms of the abilities displayed by each as well as the shortcomings of their successors, helps explain their “resurrections.”

In addition, it may be precisely the time spent out of high office that is of greatest interest to the biographer more concerned with the leader’s story than with the political impact generated by the leader’s career; that is, more concerned with the “life” than with the “times.” Certainly, this period would contain the meat and drink of the narrative historian’s tale and may appeal to the interests of an audience wider than that of scholars alone: De Gaulle’s expectation of a popular demand recalling him as premier after his sudden and unexpected resignation, his readiness to create a new national movement to regain office, and the more moderate, politically adept approach he took once back in it; Perón’s apparent loss of political moorings after Eva’s death, which, added to the economic difficulties besetting Argentina, contributed to his ouster by the military; Trudeau’s quest to secure individual rather than collective rights for different linguistic groupings but within the framework of a single and united Canada.

I started out by searching for commonalities among the eight and believe I found a few. But as I learned about their lives, I came to appreciate the importance of how such things as a prime minister's (Trudeau's) failing marriage left him unable to meet the challenges of an economy in crisis or how the impassioned rhetoric of a president's (Perón's) wife allowed him to pose as the moderate arbiter to her outspoken militancy and as a unifier of the nation. Because these things cannot be quantified or even measured, they contribute little to theoretical concept building. Still, I think they count, perhaps for a lot. The more I learned, the greater appeared the role of the unforeseen, the contingent, the uniqueness of the events. Consequently, the examples offered, those of de Gaulle, Perón, and Trudeau describing their respective rise to and fall from power, interim period in the political wilderness, and return to high office, not only provide material making for a more general level of analysis, but also reaffirm the individuality of the passage from rise to resurrection.

The book is designed both for general readers and for scholars, and I have cited sources for most direct quotations and interpretations. Each account makes use of the latest renditions, which are based on recently made available archival and documentary sources. For instance, every reference to Argentina in the post-World War II period reports stories of Perón's government welcoming escaped Nazis to Argentina (stories strengthened by the well-publicized captures of several high-ranking ones). Recent studies not only confirm the validity of these accounts, but also provide details previously unknown.

What the book is not is a history of France in de Gaulle's lifetime, or Argentina during Perón's, or Canada during Trudeau's, although historical background is included to provide the necessary context. Nor does it display any explicit methodological apparatus, reveal references to the literature on regime change, or offer much in the way of structural analysis. It is rather the biographical dimension on which emphasis is placed; on the individual lives, particularly as they affected the respective rise, fall, and returns. Because it anticipates the "interment" and the "resurrection" that follows, the "creation" segment required greater length than anticipated. To take but one example, it was Perón's readiness to act as an arbiter to soften Eva's inflammatory outbursts—for instance, her call for workers' militias that so worried the military—that did much to create his image as unifier and compromiser during his first term in office.

I am again grateful to the library staff of Florida Atlantic University for securing materials, to Zella Linn for office help; to my teachers—and

students—from both of whom I learned much; and especially to the authors of the excellent biographies that made this study possible and to whom I dedicate it; and, above all, to my wife, Gunilla Derfler, for untiring support—and patience. It hardly needs to be added that in view of the range of personalities and places considered, errors have surely emerged, and that I alone am responsible for them.

# I

## CHARLES DE GAULLE: “THE CROSSING OF THE DESERT”

There were three Gaullist adventures: the Free French movement during World War II and the general's tenure as head of a postwar provisional government (1940–early 1946); the failed attempt at a restoration by his Rally (*Rassemblement*) of the French People (RPF) movement (1947–1955); and the return to power, the establishment of a new (Fifth) Republic, and his presidency (1958–1969). The two ascents, 1940 and 1958 (and conceivably a third on May 30, 1968, when he restored his shattered prestige by reasserting authority in the wake of the student-workers uprising), were each staged for maximum effect. Each followed an appeal to the fears of the French people: defeat at the hands of the Germans in World War II; the threat of civil war following a military uprising in the wake of the war in Algeria; and the (alleged) danger of a Communist insurrection during the “events” associated with the general strike of 1968.

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# 1

## DE GAULLE

### CREATION

Within months of the allied landings in Normandy in the summer of 1944, Charles de Gaulle returned to Paris, the idol of France and commander of five hundred thousand armed men. As the provisional leader of a new government, he could have created what amounted to a temporary dictatorship by general consent. Determined, however, to restore what he called “republican order” and “let the people pronounce,” he refused to live in the Elysée Palace, the traditional residence of the head of state. He was, he said, only the head of the government, and with French soil cleared of enemy troops and two and a half million prisoners of war and deported laborers (all potential voters) back from German prison camps, an election would confirm his leadership. Because few favored going back to the discredited Third Republic, because the Right was discredited by Vichy, and because of de Gaulle’s immense popularity, no referendum to ratify his transitory government was considered necessary. On September 9 the general announced the establishment of a provisional French government, one recognized by the United States and Great Britain a month later. When, however, the Americans, the British, the Russians, and the Chinese met that autumn at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington to draw up plans for a United Nations Organization, France was excluded. Considering himself insulted by comments that his country’s role in the war had been that of a small power, de Gaulle left for Moscow to sign a friendship treaty with the Soviets. It would last for 11 years and be terminated well after France entered NATO.

These acts were emblematic of a career that placed emphasis on a reverence for the French nation, however much he deplored its weaknesses; on a basic democratic outlook (although he regretted what he saw as its excesses); on a willingness to confront allies viewed as unappreciative of his country or his person; and on a conviction based on

much reading of history that ideologies were transient and that only national interests endured.

When World War II broke out, de Gaulle's doctrine of mechanized warfare was dramatically vindicated, both by the Germans, who used it to conquer France, and by de Gaulle himself, who with a pickup armored division dealt the Germans their only major setback during the invasion. Paul Reynaud, head of the government, named de Gaulle, newly promoted to brigadier general, as undersecretary of state for national defense. Neither man was able to get the British to commit more forces to France, but both tried to keep the government in the fight, advising it to move to North Africa when Paris seemed certain of capture. When, however, Reynaud succumbed to the advice of Marshal Philippe Pétain and the commander of the French armed forces, General Maxime Weygand, to ask for an armistice and then resigned in favor of Pétain, de Gaulle, alone and unknown, left for London. In absentia, he was tried and condemned to death for treason by Pétain's Vichy government. It was then that he began to win attention, and ultimately Churchill's recognition, as wartime head of what would be called the Free French. Churchill persuaded a hostile cabinet to let the general talk on British radio, and de Gaulle's June 18 speech contained his famous rallying cry that only a battle, not the war, was lost. Thereafter, and in large measure because of his speeches, he and his Cross of Lorraine gradually became symbolic of Free France. Unlike other refugees from Nazi-occupied Europe who fought Hitler under British leaders, de Gaulle had the Allies recognize that despite the existence of the Vichy regime France possessed an independent force capable of fighting German tyranny.

De Gaulle's leadership of the Free French revealed an authoritarian approach. Members had to swear a personal oath of loyalty. François Mitterrand explained his reluctance to join: "De Gaulle had a strategy of eliminating anyone and anything that might prevent him from becoming master of France." The heads of the internal resistance movements who were summoned to Algeria never returned: they were made members of different Free French committees of one thing or another, and were "not heard from again."<sup>1</sup> De Gaulle's Council of Defense, which at the end of October 1940 rejected Vichy as the legal government, held only advisory powers. When a national committee was created on September 24, 1941, as the government for Free France, its members were appointed by and responsible to the general, who signed decrees and required that diplomatic representatives be accredited directly to him.



The establishment of a consultative assembly and the promise of a role for a representative legislature gave the movement a facade of liberal governmental institutions. Its claims to legitimacy were reinforced when it asserted civilian control over the military and began to win over Resistance groups within France. This, in turn, enabled de Gaulle to gain full recognition from the Allies, although both Churchill and Roosevelt, resentful of his arrogance and what they perceived as a bias against the United States and Great Britain, on one occasion plotted to remove him as leader of the Free French.

In his memoirs of World War II, Churchill wrote, "I understand and admired, while I resented, his arrogant demeanor. Here he was—a refugee, an exile from his country under sentence of death, in a position entirely dependent upon the goodwill of the British Government, and also now of the United States ... He had no real foothold anywhere. Never mind! He defied all."<sup>2</sup>

For biographer Jean Lacouture, de Gaulle emerged from the war as a clearly heroic figure, but without the rough edges rounded off. "Armored with pride and rigidity, [this] great intellectual beast of prey ... virtuoso of domination [inflicts] sarcastic badgering on his subordinates, treats his associates unfairly, [shows] obsessive distrust, makes unreasonable demands on his allies, and displays a superiority complex."<sup>3</sup> In addition to having underrated air power, he made other mistakes. American historian Robert Paxton noted that

after his momentous appeal from London on June 18, 1940 he failed, for many months, to rally more than two other French senior officers to his side ... His first attempt to install his Free French forces in French territory, at Dakar in the fall of 1940, was humiliatingly rebuffed by the authorities there who remained loyal to Marshal Petain.

Lacouture added that he needlessly alienated many of his first supporters in wartime Britain by "overweening and even provocative" steps. His irritating stridency and verbal excesses over restoring French power in Lebanon and Syria, as Paxton put it, nearly led to a complete break with the indispensable Churchill in 1942. (The latter's recognition of the general before the liberation of France had been personal, as leader of the Free French and not as the head of a government in exile.) In the bombardment of Damascus in May 1945, de Gaulle and his representatives in the Levant "acted clumsily, provocatively, and brutally."<sup>4</sup> Despite these faults, noted future prime minister Michel Debré, most notably his preference for deciding rather than negotiating, de Gaulle's World War II leadership of the Free French ranks him

as the greatest French statesman of modern times. As historian Pierre Nora has written, “[he] transformed magically the most crushing of French military defeats into a kind of victory.”<sup>5</sup>

His “dictatorship” lasted from the liberation of Paris in August 1944 until October 1945, when a constituent assembly was elected. The Free French Consultative Assembly, again, an appointed and not an elected body, had been brought from Algeria in 1944 and enlarged by adding members both of the Resistance movements within France and of the old political parties. Still, to demonstrate that it was not a national assembly the general decreed that it sit in the Luxembourg Palace, not the Palais Bourbon, which was reserved for the new national assembly whenever it was elected. As he had promised, de Gaulle prepared for a general election—he was determined to remain within the bounds of “Republican legality”—and in the interim his officials fanned out through the country to replace prominent Vichyites deposed from office. Some of his wartime followers hoped he would organize and lead a new, broad centrist party, committed to realizing the ideals of the Resistance, but he quickly put an end to such hopes. Refusing his name to any party or to form one of his own, he would remain above parties.

The task of governing in a postwar period had been too much for Clemenceau and had escaped Churchill. De Gaulle, on the other hand, ruled over a provisional government without much interference. Although lacking experience of peacetime government and not having much interest in economic or social issues, the general was in a unique position to take advantage of his immense popularity, and the country agreed that morale and national prestige had to be reestablished. With the liberation he both restored and reestablished the authority of the state; French forces would share in the invasion of Germany; the Communists would be kept quiet by being given places in the government; and Resistance forces were integrated into the regular army.

However, he was less successful in his economic policies. France lacked raw materials and transportation remained paralyzed. Industrial productivity reached only 40 percent of the 1938 level, food was in short supply, and a black market thrived. De Gaulle acknowledged the need for economic planning and the partial “socialization” of the French economy. It was carried out in the automobile industry (Renault) and in air transport and credit, with the general playing a leadership role in the nationalization process. Old ideas of corporatism were given a boost when he created factory councils of workers and employers, intended as the first step toward the association of capital and labor. Economic planning, however, really came into force

after de Gaulle's resignation with the return of Jean Monnet from the United States, where he acted as a Gaullist liaison during the war.

It was inflation that threatened economic chaos. But the reforms urged by his finance minister Pierre Mendès-France, specifically to issue new banknotes to reduce the volume of inflated currency and deprive profiteers of ill-gotten gains, were rejected, as were proposals for price controls and devaluation. De Gaulle feared upsetting hoarders of old money and accordingly opposed controls. Although no advocate of feminism, he granted women the vote in 1944 in part because of their role in the Resistance. High-ranking Vichyites and collaborators were purged, although the general commuted most of the death sentences, most notably that of Marshal Pétain. No reprieve, however, was issued for Pierre Laval. To prevent the Communists from taking power, de Gaulle appointed all but the most despicable Vichyites to office. In the purge, he favored exemplary punishment, as with Laval, but made it clear that "France needs all her children, even if some of them made mistakes." Although a great many cases came before him, he refused to delegate the task, and of the death cases that he judged, reprieved over two-thirds.<sup>6</sup>

The chief question was whether the Third Republic should be revived or a brand new constitution, which meant a new (Fourth) Republic, should be adopted. Many politicians both in the Consultative Assembly and the Council of Ministers (the cabinet), favored the establishment of a strong assembly, similar to that of the Third Republic. De Gaulle opposed: in his view France had been brought to defeat and subjected to occupation by the bickerings and cross-purposes of an all-powerful legislature. He pointed out that from 1875 to 1940 the United States had only 14 governments, Great Britain only 20, but France, 102. This was not government but chaos, and only a strong executive, with its powers fully separated from those of the legislature, could be effective. In the first national referendum (October 1945) since Napoleon III's 1870 plebiscite securing confirmation of his empire, nearly all voters (96 percent) agreed with the general that there should be no return to the Third Republic and that a new constitution must be drafted. A constituent assembly elected to do precisely that met on November 9, 1945, and four days later it unanimously elected de Gaulle as France's first postwar premier.

Discredited by their association with Vichy, conservatives polled only 15 percent of the votes for this assembly. Three big parties, oriented toward the left, dominated. Christian Democrats, organized as

the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) and created (with some help by de Gaulle) just before the election, formed the new party of the Catholic Left. They favored social reform and a greater role for the state in the economy. However, they were not Marxists, and together with democratic socialists shared a mutual distrust of Soviet intentions. The old guard of the Socialist Party (SFIO), while repudiating revolution, retained its Marxist rhetoric. The Communists, thanks to their role in the Resistance (after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941) and to the prestige held by the USSR for its wartime victory, emerged as the largest party with over five million votes and 168 seats in the assembly. De Gaulle had allowed their chief, Maurice Thorez, to return from his wartime stay in Russia, and, as mentioned, he himself had visited Moscow to sign a 20-year alliance. Recognizing the party's strength, the general appointed Communist ministers, but refused them such crucial posts as war, foreign affairs, and interior (security).

These three large parties provided three-quarters of the delegates and dominated the constituent assembly. In preparing a draft constitution it debated two choices: the American or—to a lesser extent—the British model with a strong executive, or its opposite, an assembly-type government resembling the National Convention of 1792–1794, which had governed through its committees. De Gaulle favored the former; the Communists, the latter; and both were suspected of ulterior motives. As former premier Léon Blum put it, the Communists were “a party of foreign nationalists” and not true Frenchmen, while de Gaulle stood for democracy but did not embody it. An alternative, between the two, would have the proposed constitution embody many, but not all, of the institutions of the discredited Third Republic.

Although the obvious choice for premier, de Gaulle had announced neither his candidacy nor his program. “They will take me as I am or not at all,” he said proudly. Communists and Socialists were not happy with the general, but when the Socialists made it clear they would support him, the fractious deputies in a show of unity unanimously named de Gaulle to head a provisional government. Jacques Duclos, speaking for the Communists, in announcing his party's support, acclaimed, “We will vote with the other(s).” Everyone then rose, and with tears in their eyes sang the Marseillaise. Winston Churchill, who dined with de Gaulle at the Matignon (the residence of the premier) that night, offered enthusiastic congratulations. Plutarch, Churchill said, “had lied” when he wrote that “ingratitude toward great men is the mark of a strong people.” But de Gaulle correctly noted that those who voted for him had applauded past deeds and were not providing a mandate for future change.<sup>7</sup>

## DE GAULLE

### TERMINATION

De Gaulle would remain in power for less than three months. The country rejected his recommendations for the Fourth Republic's institutions, specifically those calling for a strong executive, in favor of a government constitutionally resembling that of its predecessor. The general thereupon launched a campaign against the new regime that strengthened suspicions of his authoritarianism. Aware that the constituent assembly supported a return to what he perceived as an assembly-type, or parliament-dominated, system, to widespread astonishment de Gaulle resigned as head of the government in late January 1946.

Why did he do it? De Gaulle's struggle with the parties was not new. He had fought the Communists over the October referendum and during the formation of his government. He was aware of the reservations of the MRP (Christian Democrats); he had found the SFIO (Socialists) overbearing; and as it became clear that France's new governmental structure was emerging out of—and resembling—the wreckage of the old, he had been thinking of leaving the government since October. When the general told his wife, “We will retire to Canada. I'll go fishing and you can cook whatever I catch,” he had considered putting an ocean between himself and the parties. This feeling hardened when a Socialist leader, André Philip, called for a reduction in military expenditures. De Gaulle took it as a personal betrayal from a former comrade in London. Mounting the tribune in a New Year's Day address to the members of Parliament, grim-faced and rigid, he said that if the credits were not voted “the Government will not function for one hour more.” He warned, “If you do not take account of the absolute necessity for authority, for dignity, for responsibility of the Government, you will put yourself in a situation where

one day or another you will bitterly regret the course you have taken.” In the dead silence that followed, he left the chamber. The credits were voted after de Gaulle promised that he would submit measures to reform the army within six weeks. He then left for a vacation on the Riviera, the first, he said, in seven years, but he had already made up his mind to resign. He was back in Paris on January 14, 1946. Two days later he was present in the chamber when Edouard Herriot, who had presided over France’s last assembly in June 1940 and had abstained in the vote that turned full powers to Marshall Pétain, protested against giving decorations to soldiers killed fighting Americans in North Africa in November 1942. An embittered de Gaulle replied that the attitude of soldiers who died bravely obeying orders was less open to criticism than that of “a man who had lunched with Laval” on the eve of the liberation of Paris. And de Gaulle added, alluding to Herriot’s abstention in 1940: “I have never had anything to do with Vichy or with the enemy [Germany] except at the point of a gun.”<sup>1</sup> The general had scored a verbal victory, but the deputies supported Herriot.

De Gaulle told the Socialist minister of transportation, Jules Moch, of his intended decision to resign and the reasons for it. He would not submit to the criticisms of the parties and of irresponsible politicians. Since he could not govern as he wished, that is, unhindered by disputatious legislators, then “rather than let [my]self get tied up (*ligoter*) . . . rather than see my power dissipated (*démembrer*), I will depart.” To explain his resignation, de Gaulle had wanted to go on radio, but under pressure from President Auriol, who feared it risked dividing the country, he canceled his talk.<sup>2</sup>

The “divorce,” according to Lacouture, took on a “spiritual” as well as a “political” dimension when on January 20, 1946, de Gaulle summoned his ministers to meet at noon at the defense ministry on the Rue Saint-Dominique. They had always met at the Matignon, and aside from the two or three who had been previously informed, wondered why they were summoned. With his dramatic sense of history, he had deliberately chosen the place. It was there that he had reestablished the French state; there his mission would come to an end. Wearing his brigadier general’s uniform, he shook each man’s hand with a few courteous words. Then before they could sit down, he said softly but clearly: “The regime of parties has reappeared. I disapprove of it. But, unless I establish a dictatorship by force, which I do not wish to do and which would doubtless turn out badly, I cannot prevent this from happening. Therefore I must retire.” He thanked them for the help they had given him and asked them to remain at their

posts until a new government was formed. There was overwhelming silence and his listeners seemed stunned. After pausing long enough to hear the words of remonstrance or regret that failed to come, de Gaulle bowed and said goodbye. Then clapping the two-starred *kepi* on his head, he wheeled smartly as though on parade and left them. Thorez, in awe, said, "That departure does not lack grandeur."<sup>3</sup>

His admirers found the explanation for the general's resignation in his realization that if he mixed in partisan politics, "win or lose, his fame would be tarnished, his honor defiled, and his value to France destroyed." They could cite a remark he had made in September 1944, when he had seemed to anticipate leaving: "I shall retire. It is necessary to disappear. Some day France may have need of a pure image. One must leave that image for her." And he added whimsically that "if Joan of Arc had married, she would no longer have been Joan of Arc." In reality he had no intention to retire and wanted only to stage a retreat prior to a subsequent counterattack.<sup>4</sup> Only he had no idea it would take so long.

Certainly, De Gaulle did not believe that he was gone for good. Three days after the announcement to his ministers, he wrote to a friend that "my departure is only an episode" and "before coming to any conclusions, wait for the ending." Several associates agreed that he would be back soon, and rumors of army unrest fueled their expectations. An embittered de Gaulle told some close friends that before six months had gone by he would be recalled by popular acclaim.<sup>5</sup> He had sounded even more optimistic when he told Francisque Gay, one of his ministers, "Before a week is up they'll be sending a delegation asking me to come back." His biographers agree that he planned his act to serve as a psychological shock to bring the squabbling parties together, plead with him to return, and give him authority to dictate a restructuring of the political system.<sup>6</sup> At the nearby town of Marly he waited for the delegations of supplicants to appear. When none came, he sent an aide to make sure that no police barriers had been erected to keep people away. Even when it became clear that his resignation had not provoked public demonstrations in favor of his return, he remained convinced that the "regime of the parties" could not endure. He would bide his time, and popular pressure would soon bring him back to power.

When aware that he was mistaken in this view, de Gaulle held fast to his choice of tactics. Like a true army man, he knew that a plan of reconquest was difficult to put into practice when the commanding officer lacked control both over terrain and timing. Better to go with the tide and take advantage of opportunities as they arose. His departure

constituted a retreat, not a surrender, but the return would require another crisis. Twelve years later he wrote in the concluding volume of his war memoirs:

Every Frenchman, whatever his tendencies, had the troubling suspicion that with the General had vanished something primordial, permanent and necessary which he incarnated in history, and which the regime of parties could not represent . . . They supposed such legitimacy could remain latent in a period without anxiety. But they knew it could be invoked by common consent as soon as a new laceration threatened the nation.<sup>7</sup>

Still, the resurrection could not be left to chance. He would reinforce his “latent legitimacy” by making constant references both to his existing political agenda and to the war years, to keep them—and his role in them—in the public mind. Commemorations of Free France and the Resistance, the reactions of Resistance fighters to the return of Vichy supporters to public life, visits to sites where martyrs had fallen, and de Gaulle’s own monument, his war memoirs would all help, as the general intended, to keep his image alive, preserve his stature as a leader, and convince France of the need to return to the “path of her great historical and moral destiny.”<sup>8</sup>



### 3

## DE GAULLE INTERMENT

The dozen years dating from de Gaulle's "irrevocable" resignation on January 20, 1946, until his return to power on June 1, 1958, when the National Assembly appointed him as the Fourth Republic's last premier, the last to head the regime he had always condemned, are poorly known.<sup>1</sup> Of this twelve and a half year "interment," six are related to the life and death of the Rally of the French People (*Rassemblement du peuple française* or RPF). Yet de Gaulle scarcely speaks of the rally in his memoirs, giving it a dozen (purely factual) lines in the last volume of his *Mémoires de guerre* and about 30 (somewhat warmer) lines in the first volume of his *Mémoires d'espoir*. Contemporary references to it are found in a single collection of texts, *La France sera la France* (France Will Be France), compiled by a then obscure colleague, Georges Pompidou, for the 1951 election. Not until 1970, when a multivolume edition of de Gaulle's "*discours et messages*" was published, did all his speeches of the period appear in print.<sup>2</sup> Even his most comprehensive biographer, Jean Lacouture, passes over the period quickly. In his 1,255-page biography of de Gaulle, he assigns just 36 pages to the years between 1946 and 1958, from the time the general resigned as head of France's postwar government until his political restoration in the wake of the Algerian crisis and the mutiny within the French army. De Gaulle's followers describe these years as the "crossing of the desert." The phrase, however, suggests a certain inevitability that the crossing was destined to succeed. More appropriate is use of a less fateful reference, *L'attente* (Waiting), the title, in fact, of the second volume of de Gaulle's *Discours et Messages* (Speeches and Messages).<sup>3</sup>

Although studies of the *Rassemblement* have been published, the period remains something of a "grey area." The most likely reason is that his failed attempt to launch a supraparty movement does not fit the heroic saga of de Gaulle and France. The general owes his image

to the man of June 18, 1940, the man who saved his country from civil war, the man who founded the Fifth Republic, and not to the man who created the RPF. Scholars seem to agree. In a colloquium on “De Gaulle and His Century” held in Paris in 1990, only one paper of over 150 addressed the years between 1946 and 1958, and that was the work of a Soviet historian.<sup>4</sup>

After the general’s resignation, the de Gaulles had to find a home. They had lived at the Matignon since the Liberation, but it now belonged to the new premier, Félix Gouin, who was installed by the governing coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Communists. Colombey-les-Deux Eglises had been in the path of the advancing Germans, and La Boisserie, their country house purchased in the village by de Gaulle in 1934, was left half ruined. He had lacked the time to begin the work of restoration, which at best would take many weeks.

Neither de Gaulle nor his wife wanted to reside in a Paris hotel where they believed they would be under intense scrutiny. Anne, the younger daughter who was afflicted with Down syndrome, required care, and in any case they preferred the countryside and the rest it promised. Yet because he anticipated being recalled, de Gaulle did not want to live too far from the capital; he feared that would be seen as running away. A happy solution was found in the rental from the Service des Beaux Arts of a pavilion of Marly-le-Roi, an old Louis XIV hunting lodge on the edge of the forest, in a park near Versailles. Although small and uncomfortable, it ensured peace and privacy while work on La Boisserie went on.

If supportive visitors came there and to the spartan office rented on the Rue de Solférino in Paris, most politicians were pleased to see de Gaulle gone. One commented, “There is one great man who is impossible, but there are many middling men who will do well enough.”<sup>5</sup> But the resignation left his most faithful friends, such as the writer André Malraux and Edmond Michelet, an early member of the Resistance and an influential member of the MRP in the government, shattered. Maurice Schumann, the spokesman of the Free French in London, was in despair. They came to see him, as did people out of politics seeking testimonials as to their loyalty and making their availability known. Alarmed by the steady stream of visitors and fearing a possible coup, the new government sent security agents to Marly “for his protection.”

Yet de Gaulle managed to relax, and regained his health and vigor. He was able to laugh, something, he said, he had not done “for seven years,” and even play practical jokes on the security agents following

him. Even so, he was showing signs of boredom, and resented the apparent willingness of the public to assign him to oblivion. Even some of his former ministers were serving in the government put together by his successor. Only meetings with his Resistance comrades, when plans for a political comeback were discussed, provided a measure of relief.

When La Boisserie was ready in May 1946 (a tower for use as a study with a view of the woods had been added to the simple, narrow stone house), the de Gaulles returned to the home they treasured. While her husband prepared a formal flower bed in the form of a Cross of Lorraine, Madame de Gaulle worked in the neglected garden. On showing his creation to Louis Terrenoire, a close associate and information minister in a future de Gaulle government, the general commented, "Some day when I die I will be buried here, and perhaps on this hill the Government will see fit to raise a tall marble Cross of Lorraine, which is all the memorial I want." He envisaged La Boisserie as becoming the Mount Vernon of France.<sup>6</sup>

De Gaulle's living style, in contrast to the grandeur shown when in high office, was a simple one, rendered inevitable by the pay of a retired army officer and a few small state benefits. When Michelet, still minister of the armies, informed him that the government proposed a promotion bringing with it an increase in his pension, de Gaulle brushed it off: if not granted during the "epic struggle," then to offer it in retirement was "ridiculous." He exchanged his big Cadillac (given to him by the Americans after the liberation) for a small French car, and his wife took driving lessons. His son Philippe, a married naval officer, gave him a grandson, and his older daughter Elisabeth married an officer, Captain Alain de Boissieu, who became his father-in-law's aide-de-camp.

Michel Debré, an important Gaullist personality and future premier, described a visit made to Colombey the last day of July 1946. He was struck by the "sobriety" of the house, which seemed "closed in" on itself. Silence reigned in the modestly furnished interior. Some eighteenth-century portraits of magistrates in the family adorned the wall. De Gaulle spent his time meditating, reading, and handling his correspondence. Debré urged him to remain politically active, to consider speaking with Georges Bidault and other MRP leaders about the possibility of election to the presidency of a better-structured regime. When de Gaulle reminded him that he had made his views clear, and if the politicians did not want to listen so much the worse for them, Debré pleaded with the general not to close the door, insisting that "France needs you."<sup>7</sup>

Scarcely a three-hour drive from Paris, the house was indeed small and rather unattractive, hardly a Chambord or a Chenonceaux; only

the tower suggested the status of a chateau, and the entire estate comprised only three acres. Yet an invitation was considered an honor. The (infrequent) guest, usually an old associate, was greeted by a knitting Madame de Gaulle who would ask about the roads and the weather. At exactly 1 P.M. de Gaulle would emerge from his study to shake hands and welcome his guest (or guests) by name. Lunch was served almost at once. The food was simple, the wine a *vin ordinaire*. It was usually taken in much silence although de Gaulle could be witty and relaxed. Coffee was offered in the adjacent living room, and on special occasions there was a turn in the park. Afterward, the general would thank the visitor(s) for coming, and return to his study.<sup>8</sup>

The death of their mentally retarded daughter Anne, in 1948, when she was just shy of 20, came as a blow. She was buried in a marble vault in the small churchyard at Colombey. De Gaulle did not believe in displaying sorrow but was deeply affected when he led his mourning wife away from the gravesite with the words, "Come . . . Now she is like all the rest." The couple set up a foundation for retarded children in her memory, and all revenues from the worldwide serializations of his books went into it.

Unhappy with political developments, de Gaulle let his displeasure be known. One obvious reason was the poll taken in February, 1996, which found that a majority of the public had not minded his departure and that very few expected him to return. Not especially forceful, Premier Gouin, the former Socialist president of the assembly, was described by the sympathetic newspaper *Combat* as "a man of good will rather than of determination," a description that would hold for many of the 17 men who formed governments after him. De Gaulle showed his contempt for the new Fourth Republic by refusing the premier's invitation to attend a Paris Victory Day celebration scheduled for May 8.

The assembly's new draft constitution, chiefly the work of the two large Marxist parties and based on their belief in "the necessary dependence of the executive on the legislative," called for a unicameral, all-powerful assembly. This body would elect a powerless president of the republic, who, according to Socialist Party chief and former premier Léon Blum, should only be "a decoration and a symbol," someone whom the deputies could easily unseat. De Gaulle dismissed this draft as "absurd," and politicians seeking office, even those fearful of Communism and the USSR, as well as opponents of any European union, as opportunists wanting to take advantage of his bitterness and have him deliver speeches condemning the draft constitution. Like

the general's faithful followers, they too opposed the apparent return to Third Republic institutions, believing them wholly inadequate to confront the threats faced by the nation. De Gaulle needed no urging: he delivered critical speeches, but came to realize that for his criticism to be effective he had to be politically involved. Because it feared that the draft constitution, by granting excessive legislative power, would enable the Communists to form a government, the MRP fiercely opposed ratification, and in a referendum held on May 5, 1946, the draft was rejected by over a million votes.

De Gaulle was greatly encouraged when the voters again repudiated the Marxist left by increasing the size of the Christian Democratic vote and reducing that of the Socialists and Communists in the new constituent assembly elected on June 2. The MRP, which then called itself "The Party faithful to de Gaulle," was now the largest in France, and its leader, Georges Bidault, who had been de Gaulle's foreign minister, became premier.

In hopes of influencing the newly elected assembly, de Gaulle made an important speech at Bayeux, on the Normandy coast, on the second anniversary of his landing there. He opened with the words: "It was here that the efforts of those who would never surrender ... found at last their decisive justification. And it was here, on this ancestral soil, that the State reappeared, the legitimate State because it was founded on the interest and sentiments of the Nation ... Now the Nation and the French Union await a constitution."

The general reminded his audience that liberation had been achieved "outside the framework of our institutions" that had "failed to meet the requirements of the nation" in a time of crisis. To prevent a recurrence of the Third Republic's failures, it was necessary to devise "superior institutions," and his "Bayeux manifesto" thus launched his attack on the new republic. He specified what he had in mind: "The public powers lack authority in fact or in law unless they are in accord with the higher interests of the country." To mitigate "party strife" and to make the state truly authoritative, "there must exist a national arbiter, over and above political factions, to ensure continuity amidst change."<sup>9</sup>

De Gaulle then described his ideal constitution: it would provide for a popularly elected assembly, a Senate elected by municipal and local councils, and a chief of state situated above parties but with real power to assure "the continuity of the Nation." Thus it proposed a strong separation of powers, with a revitalization of the upper chamber and a predominant executive with power greater than that of the American presidency—but lacking the checks placed on the latter—to bring about the desired separation. If the audience cheered, many in

the constituent assembly feared “Bonapartism” and “dictatorship” in these prescriptions for change.

These critics now included Christian Democrats. Enjoying their control of the assembly, MRP delegates showed themselves less faithful to de Gaulle’s wishes. Second thoughts about creating a strong executive, which evoked memories of Robespierre, two Bonapartes, and other ambitious generals persisted, and they came to support a constitution that did not significantly differ from the earlier rejected draft. It called for the creation of two legislative chambers: one, a sort of Senate called the Council of the Republic, which could only give advice; the other, an *almost* omnipotent National Assembly. The president of the republic would be elected by both houses, and his only real power lay in proposing a premier to an assembly that could easily oust him. Some additional safeguards and a few provisions for a refurbished empire completed this second draft proposal.

Anticipating de Gaulle’s opposition to the weakened executive again called for, a stream of MRP delegates led by Maurice Schumann, who had served as de Gaulle’s aide during the war and who had made moving broadcasts to occupied France, traveled to Colombey to beg him not to oppose the draft. But for de Gaulle, “it’s as much like the other one as a sister.” Nor would the general consider taking control of the powerful MRP, in spite of Debré’s efforts at persuasion, and lead it—and himself—to victory. The Christian Democrats, he charged, were led by those he believed had betrayed him: Bidault, Schumann, and others. In any case, he had made clear his belief that the “party system” would not work in France.<sup>10</sup>

Regardless of his warnings, this second constituent assembly approved this new draft constitution, which indeed placed most power in the lower house of the legislature. On September 29, 1946, de Gaulle spoke at Epinal before sixty thousand listeners to oppose its ratification by the public. He again stressed the need for a strong state based on separation of powers, a strong president empowered to appoint ministers and dissolve the legislature, and a second house that represented local interests. He also alluded to the Soviet threat and the economic ruin of Europe. “Such are our convictions,” he concluded; “[they] pertain neither to the left nor to the right,” and he rejected with contempt insinuations that he was seeking a dictatorship.<sup>11</sup>

Bored by all these elections, on October 13, the day of the referendum, a third of French voters stayed away from the polls, almost a third disapproved, and a little more than a third voted “oui.” The constitution creating the Fourth Republic was approved by a little more than half of those who bothered to vote. The outcome marked another failure for

de Gaulle, as did the legislative elections of November 10, which again made the Communists, with 183 deputies (30 more than in June), the largest party in France. The three large parties, the Communists, the Christian Democrats, and the Socialists, once more took three-quarters of the vote (although the Socialists lost some ground). A “Gaullist Union,” which had been formed in August and led by René Capitant, a constitutional lawyer who worked with de Gaulle in the Free French movement and claimed to speak for several hundred thousand followers, ran poorly, winning only 3 percent of the vote and only a half dozen deputies. An infuriated de Gaulle, listening on an old radio to the news of reestablished Third Republic politicians, once more engaged in ministerial upheavals and reconfigurations, resorted to barrack-room language when he described them as “eunuchs” and “sodomites.”<sup>12</sup>

The two chambers met at Versailles to elect a president of the new republic on a dreary day in January 1947. The old palace was bitterly cold; its splendid halls and marble corridors grimy with the accumulated dirt of the war years. The parliamentarians, wearing overcoats or storm jackets, looked as dingy as the faded glories of the Sun King’s palace. The cold speeded up their deliberations. Their choice was the Socialist Vincent Auriol. When Claude Mauriac, the novelist’s son and a member of de Gaulle’s inner circle, later asked—few others did—why de Gaulle had shown no interest in the post, the general replied, irritably, “after all I have said to them about this unacceptable constitution, they should be so stupid, so base, as to believe that I would be capable of such baseness, such stupidity, as to offer myself as a candidate?” Mauriac and others had pleaded with him that if the danger was as great as de Gaulle feared, and if France needed salvation, then he would be better placed at the Elysée than at Colombey.<sup>13</sup>

With the new institutions in place, power resided in the legislature, notably in the National Assembly. Even though Cold War pressures led to the ejection (by a Socialist government in 1947) of the Communist cabinet members, the domination of the multipartied legislature made ministerial instability a fact of political life. As in the previous republic, the lives of governments could be measured in months. Moreover, a colonial war had broken out in Indochina and it threatened the loss of the French empire.

Premier Georges Bidault was followed by Léon Blum, the “grand old man” of the Socialist Party, whom de Gaulle respected. In a few weeks Blum was succeeded by Paul Ramadier, who ousted the Communist ministers from his cabinet. In view of this instability, the state’s authority,

as de Gaulle had predicted, was again perceived as diminishing. It was not a question of whether to reenter politics and stake his personal prestige in an all-out effort to reunify the country under his banner but when and under what pretext. Certainly he was aware that a group of former Free French members founded in October 1946 was secretly preparing a political movement to work for his return. It was led by André Malraux, flanked by such former *compagnons* as Jacques Foccart, Jacques Soustelle, and Jacques Baumel. Some of the wartime faithful, however, including René Pleven and René Mayer, did not want the Free French memory used for political gain, and their refusal to join his cause upset the general.

Like Clementine Churchill, Yvonne de Gaulle begged her husband to not get politically involved again. She not only appreciated the quiet of Colombey, but also feared that his historical reputation might suffer if his cause failed to gain traction. De Gaulle's remaining brothers and the few close nonpolitical friends agreed. If he himself hated the mechanics of vote-getting, the hand-shaking, backslapping, and need to compromise, if not with principles, at least with men and means, he was determined to try. The opportunity emerged in what he perceived as an imminent Communist threat and the deterioration of East-West relations.

As early as mid-January of 1947 de Gaulle had gathered a few faithful followers to explore the political situation and the possibility it offered for a return to power. Clearly he was preparing a major move when he conferred with a series of visitors during an extended visit (unusual for him) to Paris. They comprised the inner circle of the old London-based Resistance: Soustelle, who had been his spokesman and later intelligence director in Algiers; Debré, his key agent inside the Vichy regime; Malraux, the in-house Gaullist intellectual; Colonel Rémy of the Resistance organized within France; Olivier Guichard; Léon Mazeud; and others. The decision to form a *Rassemblement* (gathering), envisaged as a “national,” as distinct from a “political,” organization, transcending parties and so conforming to the general's wishes, had already been decided on. The outbreak of war in Indochina solidified de Gaulle's conviction that the current regime was incapable of defending French interests overseas. In any event, the decision was taken before the Cold War affected popular perceptions, before the great strikes of 1947, and before the ejection of the Communists from the government.<sup>14</sup> Mounting international tension would serve as the pretext for the formal establishment—and initial success—of a popular Gaullist movement.



De Gaulle had sounded out his “companions” on the usefulness of creating a movement to “reassemble” the French. Debré recalled him as invoking the “impotence of the regime,” the “political disorder” it bred, and threatening “Soviet strategy” as persuasive reasons to reenter the political arena. “Of course, there’ll be a war!” the general told Claude Mauriac. But while there was widespread agreement to go ahead, differences arose over which tactics to use, most importantly whether to ally with sympathetic political parties or to refuse any association with them. Malraux, for one, believed there were only two realities: de Gaulle and the Communists, and that all the rest were “phantoms.”<sup>15</sup>

Malraux was inclined toward (and seemed to relish) a conspiratorial approach. De Gaulle, however, remembered the “leagues,” the extra-parliamentary and paramilitary groups that had threatened French democracy in the 1930s, and feared generating a negative image of antiparliamentarianism. Debré agreed, and persuaded that constitutional impediments would make it difficult for any head of state to dissolve the assembly, he wanted de Gaulle to reach out and work not only with former Free French, but also with leading politicians involved with other parties, Bidault, Lacoste, Mayer, Pleven; that is, with Socialists, Radicals, and Christian Democrats, people who should be given the opportunity to join the cause. Others openly rejected the suggestion, and the general numbered among them. He and his core supporters preferred to avoid any intermediaries between de Gaulle and the “French people” and only agreed to leave the door open to all believers. The memory of wartime unity endured. As in 1944 a great movement would overwhelm adversaries, and de Gaulle anticipated that the parties, even the Communists, would see their members and voters flock to his cause. Debré was won over, and the great reception given de Gaulle’s subsequent speech at Strasbourg on April 7 and press conference of April 24 quelled any remaining doubts.<sup>16</sup>

After a meeting of the Gaullist barons, work began in earnest to prepare a new political apparatus through this old-boy network of Resistance veterans loyal to the general. Sosutelle and Rémy were charged with organizing a political underground out of the remains of the old Resistance underground, while Malraux was to unleash a propaganda blitz. On March 4, at another meeting with a handful of followers in his Paris hotel, de Gaulle definitively settled on the name, *Rassemblement du Peuple Française*, for his movement, which he saw as the nation’s “only hope.” The outset of the Cold War, possible civil war with the Communists (no longer in the government and now fiercely opposed to it), and the deterioration of events in Indochina all inflamed his passion.

There would be three stages in RPF history: its astonishing growth from the time of its formation to the municipal elections in October 1947; from those elections until May 6, 1953, when a frustrated de Gaulle separated himself from it; and from 1953 until 1958, the period during which it died away and no longer appeared as a meaningful political force. In the early and mid-1950s, the general would speak less and less often, and by 1956 hardly at all. It was during this third phase that he would publish the first two volumes of his *Mémoires de Guerre*, *L'Appel* in 1954 and *L'Unité* in 1956.

The first stage got under way on March 30, 1947, at a Resistance setting on the cliffs of Bruneval (in Normandy), the site of a German radar station destroyed by British, Canadian, and Free French commandos in 1942. De Gaulle hinted at the imminence of an important decision when he told his fifty thousand listeners that the state had lost authority: "The day will come," he said, "when, rejecting this sterile game and reforming the badly built structure [of government] which misleads the Nation, and disqualifies the State, the immense mass of Frenchmen will rally around France." The enthusiastic crowd responded with chants of "*De Gaulle au pouvoir*."<sup>17</sup>

Was some sort of uprising being planned? Many on the left thought so, and Blum expressed their fears in the press the next day. That same afternoon Premier Paul Ramadier came to Colombey for a secret midnight meeting. In a frigid interview he told de Gaulle that the French would never forget the country's gratitude toward him but would distinguish between "de Gaulle the liberator" and "de Gaulle the politician." The general ran the risk of losing his military honor guard (which the government had not yet granted) and his right to speak on state-owned radio. De Gaulle replied that he was maintaining his role, that of resister, and assured Ramadier that having "restored the Republic do you think I now want to overthrow it?" On hearing of the conversation, President Auriol vowed that he would not be a Hindenburg, the German president who had asked Hitler to form a government.

The following Sunday (April 7), at Strasbourg de Gaulle proclaimed the birth of the RPF, the Rally of the French People, and hailed it as "capable of promoting the arduous campaign for public safety and radical State reform . . . within the framework of the law." The large crowd sang the *Marseillaise*, and the men who gathered around their chief looked like conquerors. The appeal was confirmed seven days later in an official communiqué issued by de Gaulle's Paris office. The general invited all the French "who wish to unite for the common good," as they had for the liberation and victory of France, to join in the *Rassemblement*. Within 24 hours of the April 14 announcement, twelve thousand Parisians had signed on; by May 1, three weeks after

its founding, hundreds of thousands had asked how to join; and by October 5 the RPF was claiming a membership of between one and one and a half million. Although this number was exaggerated, Lacouture estimated that RPF membership reached four hundred thousand at the time of the October vote—a figure higher than the combined membership of the Socialist and Christian Democratic parties.<sup>18</sup>

In the first part of his Strasbourg speech de Gaulle evoked the past: the war, his role in the provisional government, and the reasons for his resignation the previous January. The second part focused on the present, particularly the domestic and foreign threats to French security. From an economic standpoint there was a need to stabilize the currency, reduce government expenses and state activity, and encourage productivity. He again called for a vague association of capital and labor, seen as a third way between Capitalism and Socialism. The French union was to be strengthened. As for foreign policy, in the US-USSR rivalry France would retain her independence; Germany, reduced to impotence; Europe, remade. He closed with an evocation of the republic and a call to the French people to rally to his cause.

De Gaulle distinguished between the parties, which he held in contempt, and their leaders, “worthy and very capable of directing public affairs except for the system that misleads and paralyzes them.” He then repeated his appeal: “It is time for a regrouping of the French people, which within the structure of the law ... will triumph over the differences of opinion in a supreme effort on behalf of national security and the thorough-going reform of the State.”<sup>19</sup> While the phrase “within the law” eased government fears of revolution by providing assurances that the RPF would be a political movement they could contend with, the call for a new national mobilization, a new Resistance, did not.

To create the allure of a national force and to provide the necessary operating “framework,” cooperation with, rather than competition against, other parties was decided on and the concept of “double membership” was introduced. Any “loyal” (implicitly defined as non-Communist) Frenchman or French woman could belong to the RPF and at the same time retain membership in their original party of choice. Their only obligation was to work for RPF goals. But because the Socialist and Christian Democratic Parties forbade their partisans to join the *Rassemblement* and remain affiliated, there were only divers MRP desertions, fewer Socialist desertions, and none from Communist ranks. Consequently, the far right and center right provided the bulk of the RPF membership. Conservatives, who had suffered disastrous defeats in the elections of 1945–1946, could not let the opportunity to regain power pass them by.

The launching of the movement, coming as it did with one well-timed thrust following another, took on the appearance of an armored attack. The Bruneval and Strasbourg speeches were delivered on March 30 and April 7 (when the National Assembly was on its Easter recess); the communiqué was issued a week later, and a press conference held ten days after that.

At that press conference, a reference made by a journalist to Napoleon prompted de Gaulle once more to deny any interest in establishing a dictatorship. The *Rassemblement*, he insisted, was created not as a political party but as a movement above parties. When asked whether it would then participate in elections, the general replied, "That is not its aim, but it will do so." And in a meeting of the RPF's executive committee in late June, de Gaulle declared as if self-evident that "we will put up candidates at the municipal elections in October."<sup>20</sup> Hence the contradiction at the outset: the RPF claimed it stood above parties, and yet was about to run candidates for legislative bodies.

In a speech delivered at Lille that same month, de Gaulle vaguely outlined an economic and social program highlighted by the call to associate workers and employers, which in so doing was to supersede the class struggle. As the Cold War intensified throughout 1947 the RPF stepped up its attacks on the USSR, which furthered the movement's growth. Soviet pressure on Czechoslovakia to reject Marshall Plan aid during the summer; the reduction of the bread ration in France to two thousand grams a day in August; the creation of the Cominform in September; Communist-led strikes that threatened to paralyze the economy in October and November all generated fears of civil war as well as of a Russian invasion. It did not take much prompting for de Gaulle to strengthen his anti-Communist message. The RPF, he thundered, was created to fight Communists (always referred to as "separatists") as well as to reform domestic institutions. In Brittany, in late July, he made his strongest attack on the French Communist Party.

In our midst, on our soil, there are men who have vowed obedience to the orders of a foreign enterprise of domination, who are directed by the masters of a great Slav power. Their aim is to establish a dictatorship in our country ... That bloc of close on 400,000 men now borders Sweden, Turkey, Greece, Italy! Its frontier is separated from ours by only 500 kilometers, in other words, scarcely the distance of two stages in the Tour de France bicycle race!<sup>21</sup>

This rhetoric, it should be recalled, came at a time when Communists, benefitting from their role in the war and in the Resistance, still enjoyed

enormous prestige and the support of many intellectuals. Even two and a half years later, early US losses in Korea still left the general convinced that World War III and a Soviet invasion of France were imminent.

With regard to colonial policy, de Gaulle's, like Churchill's, war-time aims included the restoration of colonial empires. Because he had also sought the annexation of South Libya from Italy as well as a piece of the Italian mainland and both the Saar region and the Rhineland from Germany, he had rejected the Atlantic Charter of 1941 that called for the renunciation of territorial expansion.<sup>22</sup> Consequently, de Gaulle supported the force (which he had helped to create) of eighty thousand troops sent to reconquer Indochina, which he saw as an integral part of the French Union. In November 1946, the man de Gaulle had installed as high commissioner in the region, without consulting Paris but eager to quell resistance to the reestablishment of French rule, had ordered the bombardment of the port of Haiphong, killing or wounding thousands of Vietnamese. The followers of Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Vietnamese insurgency, retaliated, and a war was under way. De Gaulle was intransigent: Indochina must be retained. The Indochinese problem, he argued in speeches in 1948, could only be handled from "positions of strength." Ho Chi Minh was seen as an agent of international communism, and Indochina, like Algeria, as sovereign French territory.<sup>23</sup>

Those who supported the *Rassemblement* tended to be middle-aged, of lower middle-class origins, and disproportionately with roots north of the Loire River (except for the Gironde region). It drew much of its support from the formerly unpoliticized, but of France's 25 million voters (in a population of 45 million) most were already committed to the three big parties. Consequently, the RPF could expand only at the expense of the existing groups or by superimposing itself on one of them. Because it saw the Communists as the chief enemy (more because of the allegiance to a foreign power than because of any threat posed to private property), and because the Socialists were also ideologically incompatible, that left only the Christian Democrats as potential sources of recruitment. But most MRP leaders resented the Gaullist movement and, as noted, rejected the idea of joint membership.

Power lay with de Gaulle and his close advisors, most of whom had joined him in the Free French movement. They had the authority to make all decisions, and as leader of the group de Gaulle could not be challenged. The governing apparatus was totally authoritarian. The

“Companions of the Liberation,” created by the general, contained over a thousand people and constituted a Gaullist nobility. A total of 783 had belonged to the Free French, 107 to the Gaullist intelligentsia, and only 157 to the Home Resistance. The backbone of the RPF consisted of these “Companions” and others like them, largely but not exclusively on the political right. The RPF also appealed to professionals and to such intellectuals as the jurist Marcel Prelot and, for a time, the political sociologist and philosopher Raymond Aron. But the movement failed to win major support from big business, much of which preferred the classical and quasi-Vichyite right. And between 1948 and the outbreak of the war in Korea, France was enjoying relative prosperity, never a favorable time for a new political movement.<sup>24</sup>

As laid out at Bayeux, the heart of the RPF’s program lay in the reform and strengthening of the state. As de Gaulle so often pointed out, the Soviet bloc lay only three hundred miles to the east and fear of Communist expansion was pervasive. Set forth at Strasbourg and amplified in a January 1948 speech to Saint-Etienne workers, his references to bringing capital and labor together were reminiscent of Vichyite corporatism: they called for contracts between associations of employers and workers regarding conditions, pay, and profit-sharing. However, the public was largely apathetic: workers were not attracted and big business unsupportive. *Rassemblement* goals were to be achieved not by working with other parties, negotiating with their leaders, and making necessary concessions, but mainly from a popular base, showing its support of the government and the chief it would place in power. The RPF program was outlined on postcards (*les cartes nationales*) purchased for one hundred (old) francs and sent to de Gaulle at Colombey with the compliments of the buyer. To some this line of conduct appeared vague and alarming, but it raised perhaps (the equivalent of) \$200,000, at the time a considerable sum.<sup>25</sup>

Carried away by success, de Gaulle decided to run candidates in the October municipal elections. At once, the RPF became another political party, no longer a mass movement above parties. Had de Gaulle realized the implications of his decision, that is, the need to negotiate, to make the political compromises required of parties seeking votes? In all likelihood he did. He had decided to gamble, and in view of the astonishing growth of his movement he had reason for thinking so.

The municipal election campaign came to a close at a Vincennes Racetrack rally on October 5. Like other mass RPF rallies, it was staged by Malraux, who believed in a movement based on “spontaneous nationalism” (in contrast to Soustelle who favored a more cautious political approach). Malraux was fascinated by power, whether Communist

(he had been attracted in his youth to Stalin and in old age was spell-bound by Mao), or fascist (although wholly opposed to Nazism and as a volunteer had fought German forces on behalf of the Spanish Republic, he had marveled at the rise of Hitler). Later he had attached himself to de Gaulle.

During the summer, a series of spectacular rallies had taken place before thousands of frenzied supporters. There were projectors, platforms, music, and floodlights illuminating a huge white platform surrounded by banners depicting the Cross of Lorraine and tricolors, all designed to generate a theatrical effect and stir mass emotions. Crowds up to half a million (according to RPF estimates) attended. Bands played military marches, and for critics the rallies seemed like “many little Nuremburgs.” Guarded by a strong-arm Service d’Ordre, organized by Rémy from the ranks of former Resistance fighters, speakers recalled the achievements of 1944–1946 and deplored the “abyss” created by “the parties.” For such critics as the British journalist Alexander Werth, de Gaulle’s own speeches bordered on demagoguery. “Real Frenchmen” were invited to rally to the general and confront the mortal danger that the Soviet block represented to France. The French Communist Party was to be outlawed. The United States was hailed; the “separatists,” condemned. De Gaulle and other speakers repeatedly let fly at the detested “parties,” each of them “cooking its own little soup, on its own little fire, in its own little corner,” a remark that invariably evoked a groundswell of laughter.<sup>26</sup>

The movement won a great victory in the October 19 municipal elections, receiving 38 percent of the votes, an almost unheard of figure for a single French party operating in a multiparty system. Half came from former MRP voters, according to the *Le Monde* account the next day. Of 92 departmental seats, 52, according to de Gaulle, now fielded RPF mayors. The press called it a tidal wave (*raz-de-marée*).<sup>27</sup> The *Rassemblement* gained an absolute majority in the Paris Municipal Council, where de Gaulle’s brother Pierre was named its presiding officer, carried the important suburbs at the expense of the Communists, and did well in almost all the great provincial cities. Fearful of losing even more votes, the major parties in the National Assembly postponed the regional elections scheduled for October 1948 to the following spring.

The RPF’s startling growth, however, was more a reaction to Cold War events—the spread of Communism in Eastern and Central Europe; the establishment of the Cominform, which first prompted de Gaulle in a Rennes speech to label the Communists as “separatists”; and the crisis in Czechoslovakia—than a wholehearted endorsement of Gaullist objectives. Still, the Gaullists claimed they were seeking

the social and national regrouping of the people of France in order to transform a “bad system” (the Fourth Republic) and would continue to campaign against an “assembly regime” until the *Rassemblement*’s demise in the 1950s. De Gaulle was its driving force, and the authoritarianism displayed by the RPF was checked only by the Gaullists’ need to appear as the legitimate heir to the Third Republic and not to Vichy. On the other hand, de Gaulle’s repeated criticisms of the weak executive and presidential immobility and his advocacy of the direct communication with the people to be enjoyed by the chief of state were not necessarily Maurrasian or even of the right. Socialist Marcel Sembat had similarly condemned the governmental instability resulting from an excessively powerful legislature at the time of World War I. As Léon Blum pointed out, however, such ideas were contrary to republican orthodoxy and evoked memories of three Third Republic presidents who had unsuccessfully sought to increase presidential power: Marshal Patrice MacMahon in 1877, Jean Casimir-Perier in the early 1890s, and Alexandre Millerand in the early 1920s. Put in historical perspective, it was only in the Fifth Republic that the RPF’s concept of presidential power, derived from de Gaulle’s Bayeux speech rejecting the 1946 Constitution, would come to fruition.<sup>28</sup>

Estimates of the *Rassemblement*’s membership were wildly exaggerated. Even so, with the results of the municipal elections, a euphoric de Gaulle denounced the National Assembly as unrepresentative given the extent of the Gaullist victory and demanded that it be dissolved and a new voting system more favorable to the RPF created. (Understandably, members of the National Assembly, not compelled to face the voters until 1951, would have none of this.) *Rassemblement* candidates had won in 13 of France’s 25 largest cities, in what was the most industrialized part of the country. “The wave is rising,” the general declared on November 12. “I tell you again that it’s going to swell until it breaks ... the RPF will continue to grow until it covers the entire nation, with the exception of the separatists, of course.” So confident of the “collapse of the parties” were de Gaulle and Soustelle that they refused to deal with them and even ridiculed the idea of cooperation. A close colleague of de Gaulle’s later confided, “If we had the slightest notion of how to negotiate, we would have been in power in a fortnight.”<sup>29</sup>

Gaullist rhetoric suggested that once in power, the RPF would outlaw both the Communist Party and a hostile press. That part of the Gaullist agenda calling for the association of capital and labor was seen as the total depoliticization of the trade unions and as a prelude to their disappearance. (It would stand in stark contrast to the moderation



shown by the general after he regained power in 1958.) For critics, all this sounded decidedly totalitarian and reminded them of speeches made by Hitler in February and March of 1933 predicting that all Germans would soon be Nazis. Still, had there been a national election in 1947 the Gaullists might well have won an absolute majority in the assembly. And had he the constitutional right to run for president in a popular election at that time, de Gaulle would most likely have won.

Staged by Malraux, the rallies more than ever became political theater. One such rally in the Velodrome d'Hiver in Paris in 1949 surpassed all bounds, with its spotlights, banners, and trumpet flares. There de Gaulle again pointed to the Red Army as "just two relay stops removed from the cyclists' Tour de France." The ugliest scene took place during a rally in Grenoble. A clash broke out between Communists and Gaullists leaving 1 demonstrator shot dead and 14 others badly wounded. An investigation undertaken by Minister of Interior Jules Moch concluded that the shots came from armed Gaullists (he referred to them as Marseilles gunmen) inasmuch as no arms were found on any of the Communists taken into custody and the police had not fired. On other occasions, de Gaulle's security forces drove jeeps into hostile crowds. Moch's report also stated that there were six thousand trained men in de Gaulle's Service d'Ordre, the "shock formations" organized by Rémy in Paris, and another ten thousand in the provinces, and the minister found it inadmissible for a democracy to tolerate a private police force. The killings were exploited by opponents. Until then it was only the Communist Party that frightened people. Now the RPF did too, admitted Charles Pasqua, then a local organizer in Provence.<sup>30</sup>

The government found de Gaulle's demands for the dissolution of the National Assembly and the enactment of a new electoral law more favorable to the RPF as arrogant and threatening, and the three big parties stiffened their resolve to combat his movement. Also resented were the RPF deputies, who were ordered to harass their colleagues in the legislature, to abstain from voting or oppose investiture votes for ministerial posts, and to vote against most government-sponsored legislation. (Excepted were bills supporting church subsidies and religious schools, which might drive a wedge between the Catholic MRP and anticlerical Socialists.) Together with the Communists, RPF deputies in December 1951 voted against the Schuman Plan creating a European coal and steel community. They acted as obstructionists, rationalizing that because the "regime of the parties" was hopelessly corrupt and that only a presidential system could provide needed reform, they could not enter into coalitions with other parties that

would only perpetuate that regime. Ironically, like the Communists they despised, they too went into near-total opposition and made governing difficult for the so-called Third Force of non-Gaullist and non-Communist parties.

De Gaulle's biographers find it difficult to understand why after this impressive victory the general sat back on his laurels and took no initiatives in late 1947 and early 1948. Was he convinced of the imminent collapse of the parties? If so, as Jean Lacouture put it, it indeed seemed ridiculous to negotiate with them. Did two deaths render him immobile: that of a Free French war leader, Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque, in a plane crash in November 1947 and—more deeply felt—that of his daughter the following February. Or was it the forceful action of Socialist interior minister Moch that restrained him. The threat of a civil war launched by the Communists then seemed very real. Moch was forced to confront it, breaking Communist-sponsored strikes while Socialist premier Ramadier ousted the Communists from the government. "Iron man" Moch seemed the right man for the times, and his determined action pushed de Gaulle from the lime-light. The government, helped enormously by the American decision to back it with Marshall Plan aid, was, after all, coping. If, as Jean Touchard said, the RPF was "originally less a party than a kind of general effort of mobilization in case of a foreign or domestic catastrophe," the catastrophe did not occur, and the mobilization lost its *raison d'être*.<sup>31</sup> Did de Gaulle refuse to resort to insurrection because he remained committed to democracy? Or did he refuse because he doubted its chances of success? He would later tell his colleague within the movement, Louis Terrenoire, that "[General] Koenig, who commanded the Armies of Occupation, would not have marched, and I well saw that revolutionary Paris would not budge."<sup>32</sup> Did he realize that some of the more progressive Gaullists would not join him? They had failed to appreciate a remark attributed to de Gaulle that Pétain, after all, had played a useful role in the war, giving France "two strings to her bow"; or, in another version, that de Gaulle was the "sword" and Pétain, the "shield."<sup>33</sup>

In any case, the "wave" did not break. The "Third Force" retained power, getting credit for improved living standards. France joined NATO. The foreign threat diminished. In the absence of any evidence that the Soviet Union was about to invade Western Europe, de Gaulle's

warlike hysteria evoked less of a response. The Gaullist proposal to dissolve the Communist Party continued to raise fears that other parties might be similarly muzzled. Moreover, the general's appeal to workers failed. His corporatist arguments carried no weight, and his prescription for ending class warfare by associating capital and labor, which implied that unions no longer required legal recognition, created further concern. And his refusal to disavow the violence resorted to by his followers or (at one press conference) to dismiss the possibility of a coup cost his movement votes and a loss of membership.

With the return of economic stability, the much-maligned Fourth Republic undertook the immense work of reconstruction and modernization. The government reestablished state authority and showed that de Gaulle had no monopoly on anti-Communism. Business elements saw him as an obstacle to a trend toward free market capitalism and as preventing a center-right coalition from emerging. The MRP closed ranks and expelled Gaullist dissidents. But although the context, both domestic and international, was changing, the *Rassemblement* held fast to its original agenda: it continued to denounce the malfunctioning of a system that was gradually being strengthened, and rather than appearing as a savior, de Gaulle began to look like an agitator. The more frustrated he became, the more extremist and less democratic his speeches sounded. The movement enjoyed only moderate successes in the November 1948 Senate and March 1949 regional elections. The fall in the RPF vote to almost half the 40 percent reached in 1947 sent a shock wave through the Gaullist leadership, which now based its hopes on the national legislative elections scheduled for 1951.

De Gaulle denounced as a sell-out the decision of Georges Bidault's Christian Democratic government to merge the French zone of occupation with that of the United States and Great Britain. He continued to call for a permanently divided Germany and, if no longer the annexation, then for the internationalization of the industrial Ruhr valley. NATO was welcomed in principle, but the general feared a French loss of independence under non-French commanders. He opposed an integrated Western Europe command, the rearming of Germany, and the aforementioned creation of the coal and steel community. His opposition to the Schuman Plan led to a break with some European-oriented followers, including General Georges Catroux.

Whether the movement reached its apogee in early 1948 at the time of its national convention in Marseille on April 17, when the Gaullists estimated the party faithful as close to a million, or just before its vote dropped in the 1951 national election, a peak had been

reached and decline set in. Jean Lacouture believed that the liberalism of some of its most prominent members, for example, Malraux and Louis Vallon (the latter close to the Socialist Party and in the Resistance from the outset), cost it right-wing support, support that its obsessive anti-Marxism made it impossible to replace with votes from the left. Government politicians shrewdly avoided direct confrontation with the RPF. And because the anti-Communism of such Third Force leaders as Robert Schuman, René Plevin, and Jules Moch showed that they were doing a good job of fighting the “reds,” there was no need for a savior. *Rassemblement* votes fell steadily until the 1950 outbreak of war in Korea restored some of the movement’s prestige. Even so, in regional elections held the following year, it barely reached double-digit returns. Despite its goal of uniting the French (again, aside from the Communists), the movement, it was becoming clear, was proving to be a rally of rightists, retaining the confidence of voters who normally voted conservative and even of former Vichyites—but losing that of moderates.<sup>34</sup>

As early as 1949 not only were Liberals disenchanted but hardline conservatives within the RPF, particularly former Vichyites, were frustrated by the general’s refusal to resort to extralegal action and began turning away. The conservative *Le Figaro* published the anti-Gaullist memoirs of his wartime rival General Giraud. That same year Malraux indiscreetly let drop the remark: “De Gaulle took us full speed to the Rubicon and then told us to get out our fishing rods.”<sup>35</sup> If de Gaulle thought of a coup, he both lacked the means and feared that chaos would result; if it was to be a legal takeover (as would be the case in 1958), then the conditions for it were not present insofar as Third Force governments, confident of American support, were unwilling to accept him. More pragmatic *Rassemblement* members preferred parliamentary methods, most notably joining electoral and legislative coalitions. In any event, attempts to impose discipline foundered, and what began as a loose rally was taking the shape of another political party.

It has been argued that de Gaulle’s objective as head of the RPF was not “to wash [the regime] away in an electoral tide” but simply to try to elect enough of his followers to block the functioning of governmental institutions, primarily in the assembly, and so make inevitable a reorganization of those institutions, a reorganization in which the *Rassemblement* would play the role of arbiter and impose the ideas expressed at Bayeux. Whatever his objective, it was the general who gave the orders. He was not simply an icon, but the RPF’s guiding spirit and leader who directed tactics. As he had said on April 14, 1947, “I am assuming direction of it.”<sup>36</sup>

De Gaulle remained intimately involved in managing the movement, at least until 1951. He had organized it on the model proposed at Bayeux, which required authority to rest in the hands of the executive power. Unlike the democratic political parties, its hierarchical structure discouraged any intervention in plenary sessions. The novelist François Mauriac was present during a conversation between de Gaulle and Soustelle held in mid-April 1948. According to Mauriac's diary entry,

[De Gaulle] discussed the most minor details connected with the organization; he knew everyone by name who had been appointed or was up for appointment to various posts, and had much more the air of a politician than of the statesman I usually recognized in him. The fact is that his main preoccupation is no longer the state but the Movement; or, more precisely, the Movement as a means of giving access to the State.<sup>37</sup>

The results of the June 1951 general election came as a shock. The "Third Force" parties, although in a legislative minority when compared to the total number of Communist and Gaullist deputies, had resorted to ingenious, if less than honest, electoral tactics that allowed a parliamentary majority to be fabricated. To begin with, they had advanced the date of the elections from October to June in order to upset RPF preparations. Then the government pushed through an electoral law, the "system of alliances," especially rigged against the Gaullists and the Communists. It allowed political parties able to form an alliance (*apparemment*) to have their votes counted together as if cast for a single party list. And any list or alliance that won an absolute majority in any particular constituency took every seat in that constituency.

The government parties had correctly anticipated that both the Communists and the Gaullists would refuse to join any coalition and accordingly be deprived of legislative seats. The RPF and the PCF condemned what the Communists called a "thieves' ballot," but it got the intended results. Given his aversion to political parties, de Gaulle had made his opposition clear: "There will be no alliance." The *Rassemblement* would compete in splendid isolation: it was not a matter of winning but of standing above the others. All attempts to make him change his mind, coming from such "sagacious companions" as Malraux, Soustelle, Roger Frey, Jacques Foccart, Olivier Guichard, Michel Debré, and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, were contemptuously rejected. For them the contradiction in Gaullist tactics was clear: if interested in winning power by amassing votes, it was

irrational to reject the electoral system. But they had failed to persuade de Gaulle (who seven years later was to show himself as much more accommodating and accepting of existing realities).

Both the Communists and the Gaullists suffered losses accordingly. Gaullists won 22 percent of the votes, but because they had refused to ally themselves with other parties gained only 19 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. Instead of gaining (with possible allies) between 250 and 300 seats, they won only 116 of 627, still making them the second largest party in France (behind the Communists). Parties that joined in coalitions, however, although winning 51 percent of the votes, gained 65 percent of the seats.<sup>38</sup>

Within a year the general lost control of his followers in Parliament. He was furious when RPF general secretary and party leader in the National Assembly, Jacques Soustelle, on his own initiative met with President Auriol in early January 1952 to discuss the possibility of forming a coalition government. Despite the pleas of his “companions,” de Gaulle remained steadfast in his refusal to join with other parties and exercise power. That would have meant eliminating, or, at best, diluting the Gaullist party program and cease being Gaullist (a term, incidentally, the general always rejected). Forbidden to act, the *Rassemblement* could only watch in despair as the parties of the old right took advantage of the nation’s swing back from the left.

At first inclined to accept, which led to de Gaulle’s distrust of him, Soustelle ultimately refused President Auriol’s invitation to form a government. Less than three months later *Rassemblement* hopes suffered a finishing stroke: Gaullist deputies were attracted by the image and program of a new premier-designate, Antoine Pinay, a conservative and former supporter of Vichy. When de Gaulle ordered the RPF deputies to vote against giving him their confidence on March 6, this attempt to impose discipline provoked a schism in their ranks. Despite their leader’s angry orders to oppose any Fourth Republic government, 27 Gaullist deputies, almost a quarter of the total, voted to install Pinay (others abstained), and they were subsequently expelled from party councils.

Why had they done it? Some were opportunists and relished the prospect of sharing in political power. Others remained faithful to de Gaulle’s objectives but had rejected his tactics. In either case, most of the dissidents were conservatives inclined to support the first conservative government of the Fourth Republic, and Pinay doubtless reflected the views of many of the RPF’s middle-class voters when he described the 27 as the vanguard of a much larger group. A despondent de Gaulle was quoted as saying that his return to political power would now require a “national catastrophe.”<sup>39</sup>

It appeared that the general was disowning the movement created to advance his return to office: "They have chosen to guzzle at the trough," he said in an oft-quoted remark, and stated his conviction that parliamentary participation would fail because the very procedures created by the regime made constructive action impossible. In a March 10 press conference, he reminded his listeners that the RPF stood for more than the winning of elections. It was in this context that he made the famous comment: "Every Frenchman was, is, or will be, a Gaullist." Yet the hemorrhage was clear. De Gaulle confided to Jacques Bruneau, an RPF deputy for Brittany, "I'm going back to Colombey and shelving the RPF." When the visitor hinted at the possibility of a return to power in the near future, de Gaulle shook his head: "No, Bruneau, never. Unless we find ourselves losing Algeria."<sup>40</sup> Support fell away rapidly. In a Loire by-election, the RPF lost two-thirds of its vote. The RPF group in the Paris city council lost half its members because of a split in its ranks similar to that in the National Assembly. By September of 1951, de Gaulle and Debré were ready to allow RPF deputies to vote with the government on foreign policy issues. The "participationists" had won, and the RPF moved to give up its policy of obstruction.

Although in a speech in July the general had implied that he was prepared to see the regime collapse, he continued to reject any idea of an illegal overthrow. De Gaulle told the RPF's departmental delegates that "a coup, as in Guatemala, leads to nothing. It simply replaces one sergeant-major with another. It does absolutely nothing for the country. Unless there is at its root general consent. Then it immediately becomes the national operation by which a country rids itself of a regime and puts another in its place."<sup>41</sup>

In September 1952, the remaining *Rassemblement* deputies, now admitted to the highest party councils, met to discuss the conditions for granting support to a new government. A party congress in November went on record as favoring such action. Three months later, Gaullist deputies voted overwhelmingly to invest the cabinet assembled by Radical Party leader René Mayer, the first time that the RPF as a unit voted for a premier, ending its parliamentary isolation and repudiating de Gaulle's earlier view of total opposition. The change in strategy, however, came too late, and RPF strength continued to deteriorate. The municipal elections of April 1953 proved a disaster: the RPF won less than 10 percent of the vote, lost between half and two-thirds of its seats, and was virtually annihilated. Membership shrank to less than one hundred thousand. The Gaullists returned only 10 deputies to the Paris Municipal Council (there had been 52

in 1947) and the loss was even greater in other cities. Embittered and frustrated, de Gaulle was ready to wash his hands of the movement he had created. The left, he said, had turned against him after the Liberation when it moved to reestablish the Third Republic. The right had sought refuge against Communism in the RPF, but had now abandoned him under the “influence of the lords of Money and the Press,” the “incorrigible Vichyites,” and “foreign pressure.”<sup>42</sup>

In that same statement conceding failure, de Gaulle gave RPF deputies the freedom to act on their own responsibility. Only a handful of loyalists, led by Soustelle in the National Assembly and Debré in the Senate, continued to carry the torch, but the *Rassemblement*, as a mass movement, was dead. The classic right, which rode back to respectability and office on RPF coattails, had deserted him to regain power within the system the general had hoped to abolish.

In his *Mémoires d'espoir*, writing of the RPF defections, de Gaulle stated:

Whereupon a number of them left the organization to which they owed their allegiance. It was for this reason, soon afterward, recognizing the trend of events, I put an end to the *Rassemblement*. For the next six years, from 1952 to 1958, I was to devote myself to writing my war memoirs without intervening in public affairs, but never for a moment doubting that the infirmity of the system would sooner or later lead to a grave national crisis.<sup>43</sup>

Only in the campaign against the European Defense Community (EDC) did he remain politically involved. Great Britain and the United States were demanding ratification of the proposed “European Army,” a combined multinational force, by the French Parliament.

In a 1953 press conference, the general blasted “this monstrous treaty” that would rob the French army of its sovereignty. He blamed the concept of a “stateless army of Germans and Frenchmen placed at the entire disposal of the American commander-in-chief” and other “supranational monstrosities” on Jean Monnet, the architect of European economic unity. And when the EDC was rejected by the National Assembly in 1954, de Gaulle hailed it “a first sign in eight years of healthy development” and congratulated the French for regaining their “taste for independence.”<sup>44</sup> He preferred a confederation of national armies, including the British and allowing the Germans to play a small part. The Americans and the British, but especially the Americans, by having tried to force acceptance of the EDC on France would “condemn her to decay.” After Stalin’s death



in 1953, de Gaulle even tried to revive the Franco-Russian alliance, and predicted that if war broke out the British would help themselves to the French Empire. His pessimism then reached new depths. At a subsequent press conference, François Mauriac recalled him saying, “j’étais la France (I was France),” placing emphasis on the past tense.

The sociologist Raymond Aron believed that in the last analysis de Gaulle himself was responsible for the failure of the RPF. Aron had predicted that the *Rassemblement* would break up and told Claude Mauriac that “the General is to blame. He is only interested in strategy and neglects tactics. It’s impossible to say ‘no’ the whole time, particularly in the parliamentary arena. Sooner or later the deputies are bound to have had enough of such a negative attitude.” Malraux had encouraged de Gaulle in refusing concessions on the grounds that his great reputation must remain unsullied, but Mauriac agreed with Aron that “one can’t go on and on saying ‘no.’ Sometimes one must say ‘no’ and sometimes ‘yes’: one must play the game.”<sup>45</sup> In short, the RPF collapsed because of the contradiction between the requirements of participation in parliamentary politics and de Gaulle’s program for total constitutional overhaul. It left the Gaullists in the position of having to wait for a crisis to discredit the Fourth Republic and bring the leader back to power. And when that crisis emerged in 1958, the cadre of political workers born of the RPF experience was to prove momentous.

Simply put, he had refused to make the compromises required to function in a multiparty system. In 1952, when Gaullist deputies began acting more like politicians working within that system rather than as opponents of it, de Gaulle again withdrew from active politics. By 1953 the RPF was finished as a Gaullist party. His May 6 statement acknowledged “without equivocation ... that [his] effort ... has not thus far achieved its goal” and so explained the decision to release *Rassemblement* members from their allegiance to him. A final speech, given at the industrial exhibit grounds at the Porte de Versailles in Paris, reminded his audience that he might yet be called on in “a great crisis” and that he reserved the right “to intervene directly by any means at all, including that of the electoral process.” He then returned to Colombey.<sup>46</sup>

Although the anti-Communism and the hostility to the “regime of the parties” (“croaking frogs,” de Gaulle called them) endured, the general’s views on foreign policy had evolved. The one constant in his attitude after the 1945 victory was driven by concerns over French security. He had initially argued that Germany should be divided into

its various component states, loosely joined in a confederation. "One can and must remake it," he had said on October 1, 1948, "a Bavaria, a Wurtemberg, a Baden, a Rhineland, a Westphalia, a Hanover, two Hesses." These states, he added the following March, would be "linked without doubt by federative lines, but each having its sovereignty." The Rhineland, moreover, should be detached and the Ruhr given separate European status. By the end of 1951, however, in a press conference given December 21, he said, "at present I'm obliged like everyone to take things as they are . . . Let us take Germany as it is and as History made it, enormous and for some admissible of dynamism, ardor, and capacity but always solicited when she finds herself in certain situations by the demons of domination and conquest."<sup>47</sup>

(West) Germany, then, was a reality and one had to adjust to it, but in a way that posed no threat to France—specifically in a European framework with no foreign interference, but a framework that organized Europe around France. Hence the attempt to seek an economic and cultural accord, which foreshadowed the cooperation he would later enter into with West German chancellor Adenauer, for de Gaulle, "a good German." The participation of Europe in the Cold War had created a new situation. De Gaulle found Western European unity as necessary for world stability, and that union was to be based on accord between France and Germany. Yet the partners were not to be equal: France should become the center and the "cornerstone" of any West European entity, while Germany was to be surrounded by controls and restraints.<sup>48</sup> Anything that limited these restraints or threatened French predominance in a wider European organization was to be opposed. These views explain de Gaulle's condemnation of the European Coal and Steel Commission and his outright opposition to the European Defense Community.

He had praised the United States and the Atlantic Alliance most vigorously in a July 9, 1947, press conference, but became increasingly critical, and later, during the controversy over the EDC, even embittered. He regretted that NATO protection did not extend to French holdings in North Africa and resented US interference in French affairs (a concomitant of Marshall Plan aid) and American bases in Morocco and France (a concomitant of the NATO shield). If he came to accept—conditionally—German rearmament, he still resented American pressure for a European Defense Community, which he dismissed as "stateless troops under an American general . . . a Frankenstein that excluded the French Union and risked war." He feared that in the event of war, the Americans would defend "Britain and Spain, and perhaps Brittany, but there the line might be drawn."<sup>49</sup> The general also modified the hard line taken on the French Union: if

in 1953 he still supported the war effort in Indochina, he did not oppose the withdrawal of French forces decided on the next year. But de Gaulle did not back down from the stand taken at an August 18, 1947, press conference when he had made it clear that France would never abandon Algeria.

Still, it was not changes in its foreign policy objectives that had brought about the collapse of the RPF. Subsequent electoral losses had portended its imminent demise, and here de Gaulle remained steadfast in his refusal to compromise, while reiterating his belief that only a crisis would return him to power and install his ideas. When on May 6, 1953, he declared that the *Rassemblement* would no longer participate in elections and legislative bodies, he added:

This mission [of the RPF] is to serve as an *avant-garde*, not in some cartel organized by the political parties to save their own hides but in bringing the people together across the nation and across the social spectrum in order to change the evil *régime* ... [It] is quite likely to come in the form of a serious upheaval, in which case the most pressing necessity would once again be the salvation of the country and of the state.

And de Gaulle had concluded his remarks with the cryptic words: "The collapse of illusions is imminent. We must decide what recourse to take" (*Il faut préparer le recours*).<sup>50</sup>

The RPF has been called many things by its critics: a peculiar form of French fascism with tendencies toward Caesarism and corporatism as well as reactionary nationalism within a Bonapartist tradition.<sup>51</sup> And even its defenders came to admit that if not for the general's comeback in May 1958, its unsavory reputation would have endured. But despite its failure, the experience proved valuable for de Gaulle. He had learned to mingle with the people, "if not to kiss babies at least to shake hands with warmth and a smile," to speak intimately from the hustings instead of oracularly from Olympian heights. He learned what could and could not be done in practical politics. Moreover, as Pierre Lefranc, one of the Gaullist "barons" and later prefect of the Indre Department, made clear, the RPF had created "a network of organizations and committees across France," links used by Gaullists to mobilize support for the general when he staged his resurrection in 1958.<sup>52</sup>

He gained from his association with the many "ardent and idealistic men" of the RPF who would be of great value when he would return. There were always *les fideles*, the faithful, Malraux, Soustelle,

Michelet, Schumann, who had long fought with him and many of whom would serve with de Gaulle in the Fifth Republic. Others, such as Bidault and Pleven, had departed, but his most devoted adherents gained in prominence: the intellectual political tactician Michel Debré; foreign affairs expert Couve de Murville; enthusiastic, vigorous Louis Terrenoire, who possessed “a common touch, political know-how and complete loyalty”; the idealistic Olivier Guichard; and the young Georges Pompidou, “a financial genius turned politician.”<sup>53</sup> Perhaps most important, de Gaulle learned the importance of the need to propose a program and explain it, to clarify his thinking, and to work with colleagues in developing the form and structure of the political philosophy known as Gaullism.

From the standpoint of a doctrinal legacy, the ideas set forth by de Gaulle had been elaborated on and publicized by the RPF, and many of them would be realized after 1958. If his dream of the association of capital and labor proved a dead letter, the constitutional ideas and the federative notions for the French Union would find their way into the constitution of 1958. And it was partly as a consequence of de Gaulle’s activity that the three big parties of the left no longer dominated French politics. Even so, his speeches and public appearances became fewer, and they attracted only party loyalists.

Finally, on June 30, 1955, frustrated by the failure of the RPF and the sight of Gaullist deputies in the government, the 65-year-old general suddenly called a press conference to declare his complete withdrawal from public life. It would be his last public appearance until the crisis of May 13, 1958. “Everything suggests that it will be a long time before we meet again,” he said, and he again indicated that it would require “a rather unusual shock” for him to return. “I say goodbye,” he ended, “perhaps for a long time.” He remained faithful to his promise not to intervene in “the conduct of public affairs” and showed no interest in the 1956 legislative election, a debacle for the Gaullists (only 16 were returned although later 5 more joined them) whose vote, four million in 1951, dropped to under nine hundred thousand.<sup>54</sup> Instead, a new formation under the right-wing demagogue Pierre Poujade, representing discontented shopkeepers and colonialist extremists, collected two and a half million votes.

In September, de Gaulle declared a definitive end to the *Rassemblement*. He only broke his silence to inaugurate a monument to Resistance fighters in June 1956, a speech to the military academy on August 2 of that year, and to deny (on September 12, 1957) comments attributed to him on Algeria. Otherwise, he would remain almost entirely out of sight for the next three years, until

his declaration of May 15, 1958, when he announced he was “ready to assume the powers of the Republic.” When president of a new Fifth Republic, de Gaulle would call his founding of the RPF an “error,” and Michel Debré, then his premier, would add that the movement had compromised and postponed the general’s return to power and his ability to stage a national renewal.<sup>55</sup> De Gaulle would learn from the “mistakes” made: the controversial stagecraft of the rallies, elements of which had been borrowed from Nazi propagandist Goebbels; the absolutist rhetoric of the RPF’s anti-Communist message; its ambition to supersede all other political parties; and its proposal to disband the trade unions.

Meanwhile, the Gaullists were taking part in the “system.” Former RPF deputies sat in the Laniel government in June 1953 and in subsequent governments, most notably that of Jacques Chaban-Delmas, who served as defense minister in the last ministry of the Fourth Republic. If in the winter of 1957–1958 Gaullist conspirators, “a Gaullism of secret action,” was at work, in early 1958 few would have predicted de Gaulle’s return to power a few months later.<sup>56</sup>

During the three years following his (second) retirement from political life, de Gaulle’s contempt for the regime endured, and in almost every case he opposed the governments of the Fourth Republic. The one exception was that of Pierre Mendès-France. The latter’s ability to bring an end to the despised European Defense Community and withdraw France from Tunisia and Indochina elicited rare praise from the general even if he doubted that existing republican institutions would allow the premier to carry out “a constructive policy, a French policy.”<sup>57</sup>

The resentment shown was not alleviated by work on his war memoirs or by trips to Africa and the Pacific islands. His public image faded; visits to him, made less frequently. There was no involvement in politics from December 1955, with de Gaulle’s dismissal of the RPF, until his return to power in May 1958. It was this three and a half year period, about 40 months, that gave rise to a biblical reference, the 40 years spent by the Hebrews in the Sinai, the crossing of the desert (*traversée du désert*), until Moses showed them the promised land. André Malraux may have coined the phrase; or perhaps it was Edmond Michelet, who was more apt to provide a biblical reference. (However, numerous biographers—and admirers—of de Gaulle refer to the entire period between 1946 and 1958 as his “crossing [of] the desert.”) Like de Gaulle himself, the faithful could only hope that some event would restore their fortunes. Some sensed the event would

come from Algeria, where a war for independence had broken out, and some among them took steps there and in Paris to hasten its arrival. They may have drawn encouragement from the general himself. In 1958, wishing one of his followers for New Year's, de Gaulle said, "I despair of our country as much as you do. It is simply that I doubt whether any message, in the present situation, could reverse the course of events. If the climate were to change, then yes, we should act. As for this new climate, let those who can begin preparing it immediately."<sup>58</sup> Certainly by 1955 de Gaulle no longer believed France was capable of achieving the reforms that he envisaged without a cataclysm having first taken place. As he told Léon Noël, a Gaullist deputy, "The French themselves no longer believed in France."<sup>59</sup>

And as the decade neared its end, the political "climate" for Gaullism was improving, but incrementally. In December 1955 only 1 percent of the French hoped that de Gaulle would one day become premier, by July 1956 the figure reached 9 percent, and—as the war in Algeria worsened—in January 1958, 13 percent, mediocre numbers but outstripping those for Socialist leader Guy Mollet or even the popular Radical Pierre Mendès-France.<sup>60</sup> Events were taking hold that would bring an end to the period of waiting, and finally in May 1958, threatened by a military coup, most French people experienced a sense of despair. Their fears would pave the way for de Gaulle's second triumph, his political restoration.

De Gaulle lived in retirement in Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises relying on the discretion of the three hundred villagers, chiefly hardworking farmers. Acquired as a country house for vacations and weekends, the property had become a permanent residence in 1946 and provided a work-space for writing.<sup>61</sup> The loyalists who visited shortly after his abandonment of the RPF continued to hear angry invective about the French, dismissed as "cattle," and the politicians they returned to office assailed as "Fourth Republic eunuchs" and "scum floating on the ocean."<sup>62</sup> Then a silence tended to prevail; the gates were kept closed; the taking of photographs forbidden; and the visits to Paris infrequent.

Long, silent retreats corresponded to de Gaulle's view, expressed in *Le Fil de l'Épée* (The Edge of the Sword), the book on military philosophy published in 1932, that "nothing heightens authority more than silence . . . Since everything stemming from the leader is immediately reverberated, he can create calm . . . provided he is silent. Authority is eroded by waves of paper and floods of speeches." After their first meeting, Malraux had said of the general: "His strength above all

appeared to me in the nature of his silence ... Despite his courtesy, one always seemed to be reporting to him.”<sup>63</sup>

Subsequent visitors to Colombey gave conflicting reports of a “giant brooding in exile, torn between a belief that destiny would call him again and a desperate fear that age was catching up with him, that history had passed him by.” One visitor found him in as state of deep dejection, musing: “Ah, poor France. France is finished for good. Oh, perhaps somebody might discover on French soil some rare mineral that would transform the world balance; but unless that happens, there’s no hope.” But another, an American, in early 1958 heard him sketch a scenario that foreshadowed what was to happen in May when the Algerian crisis brought him back to power.

Some loyal disciples after 1956 tried to involve him in active preparation for a coup against the republic, now embroiled in another miserable colonial war, but he refused even to discuss it. On the other hand, he would lend no moral support to the beleaguered regime: “Why give shots to a corpse?” he acidly remarked to an acquaintance.<sup>64</sup>

Thus de Gaulle became the squire of Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, living a country life with dogs and horses, taking long walks in the adjoining forest or in the little park around which he said he must have walked fifteen thousand times. Yvonne de Gaulle did not regret her husband’s retirement from political life. Still, they were not wealthy, living on only a colonel’s pension (his permanent rank). Not until 1955 did royalties from the war memoirs come in and these went to the foundation he had established in the memory of his daughter. Apparently the general had little notion of money, often dispensing checks to relations and children. Once he remarked on the disappearance of a fine piece of family silver. His wife replied, “And what do you think we’re living on, *mon ami*?”<sup>65</sup>

If his overall health was good, his sight began to deteriorate, and an operation for cataract left him in pain. He had to wear thick glasses, which irritated him and undermined his morale. His son-in-law recalled him saying, “Can you see de Gaulle reviewing troops with thick spectacles on his nose? No, it isn’t possible.”<sup>66</sup> Every Sunday the couple went to mass in the ancient village church, sitting not in a front pew but midway, between two stained glass windows depicting Saint Louis and Saint Joan of Arc. The neighbors they saw regarded the general with awe.

However, he was not idle. In 1952, in the tower study that overlooked a sweep of the rough-tilled fields of Champagne, fields that gave way to distant mountains, de Gaulle began work on his memoirs of the war

years, written, he said, “with great difficulty”—by which he meant with infinite care. For the next four years, day after day shut in his study in a remote tower, he devoted himself to the first two volumes of his *Mémoires de guerre*, great literature if not exact history. He went slowly, using pen and ink, writing and rewriting with endless corrections, emendations, and inserts. The script, illegible to most, was then typed by his daughter. In contrast to Churchill, who dictated, rambled, and expanded, de Gaulle’s memoir was a masterpiece of condensation, which for one biographer proved a “useful way to omit details that contradicted his point of view.” Also unlike Churchill, there was no “syndicate” of helpers as at Chartwell and consequently progress was slow. Although not impartial, his account was vivid and lucid. Still, the judgments were caustic, and acknowledgment of the deeds of others minimal. The memoirs, for that biographer, were “a monument to de Gaulle by de Gaulle.”<sup>67</sup>

The general spared no pains to find the best word and to polish his classical prose. His editor at the publishing house of Plon, chosen for its seriousness, its traditions, and because it had already published his *France et son Armée* in 1938, said that even after galley proofs appeared, de Gaulle practically rewrote them, a costly process, in his passion for precision. He read parts to close friends and specialists, asking for their views, and in early February 1954 was able to tell them the first volume was completed. It was well received, and one hundred thousand copies sold in five weeks.<sup>68</sup> Two more volumes were published in 1956 and 1959, and although an English translation of the first volume appeared in 1955, translations of the second and third did not come until after de Gaulle’s return to power in 1958. By that time Churchill’s version of events was firmly entrenched in the English-speaking world. Although de Gaulle’s memoirs alluded to differences in character of the two men and to “the unfair advantage taken by England of wounded France,” Churchill was treated with respect, as “the great champion of a great enterprise and the great artist of a great history.”<sup>69</sup>

Historians saw de Gaulle’s objective as “reconstruct[ing] the founding mythology of the war years while waiting for the providential circumstances in which it might be politically reactivated,” that is, as keeping his persona alive and the image of his wartime leadership bright in the public memory. Thus there was no contradiction for de Gaulle between word and action.<sup>70</sup> The third and final volume, which carried the story to 1946, was practically finished by May 13, 1958. In it he makes no mention of the profound divisions his 1946 departure created in public opinion and which were reflected in statistics



from the Institut Français de l'Opinion Publique. He would later sum this up with a superb line: "My popularity was like capital with which I could pay off the disappointments that were inevitable among the ruins."<sup>71</sup>

His subsequent memoirs, those written after his presidency and called *Mémoires d'Espoir*, devote only 34 "rather dry lines" to the six years prior to 1958, enabling him to depict himself—not without exaggeration—as living in solitude, merely keeping watch over events during the final days before the uprising of May 13: "I was living at the time in complete retirement at La Boisserie, at home to nobody but my family and people from the village and going only very occasionally to Paris where I received a mere handful of visitors." Because the Gaullism of this bitter period of the Cold War fits rather awkwardly, as one writer put it, into the story of "the long and moving love affair between de Gaulle, France, and the French," he preferred to evoke the historic events of 1940 and the triumphant events of August 1944 "to preserve his own stature as a leader and convince his countrymen of the need to return to the path of her great historical and moral destiny."<sup>72</sup>

Yet he was far from being a recluse. Together with Yvonne de Gaulle, who liked to travel, and often accompanied by Olivier Guichard, who became director of his small personal staff in 1953 when Georges Pompidou left to enter the Rothschild Bank, the general embarked on extended trips between 1953 and 1957, chiefly to visit countries and possessions within the French Union. He had two aims: to remove himself from politics and to extend his regards to members of the Union whose loyalty had made it possible for him to reestablish it and the homeland. Later he was to say that he had always intended to offer the territories freedom in equal association in a French commonwealth or, if they desired it, independence. The first trip, in 1953, was to North Africa. In 1955 he visited Madagascar and Djibouti; in 1956, the longest, the French islands in the Pacific and back through the Panama Canal to Martinique. On one such long, slow voyage, Guichard noted how restless he became with no one to talk to except Yvonne and Guichard himself, most of the other passengers being Australians "who did not concern themselves with politics or intellectual matters." They were driven to showings of nightly movies, which they found thin fare. Guichard recalled a grade B Western, causing de Gaulle to walk out, commenting in English and with a phony American accent: "I've had it, Guichard," I'm going bye-bye." It was on this same ship that he coined one of his famous phrases: he and Guichard were leaning over the rail watching "ominous triangular

fins,” and de Gaulle said thoughtfully, referring to those who had left the RPF to further their political careers: “You see, Guichard, in the RPF the sharks ate the apostles.”<sup>73</sup>

He kept his office on the Rue de Solferino and—in contradiction to what was stated in the memoirs—spent one or two days a week in Paris, where he kept in touch with those leaders of French opinion who still believed in him. His small staff, headed by Guichard, Jacques Foccart, Gaston Palewski, a future minister in a Pompidou government, and Colonel de Bonneval, his aide-de-camp, remained active, seeing that their chief was not forgotten and in full briefings keeping him abreast of political news and rumors.

The Fourth Republic seemed to have acquired a new lease on life thanks to the energetic Mendès-France. The issue of German rearmament was resolved with Germany firmly embedded in NATO and her troops commanded by the allies. Even so, in the press conference held in July 1955, de Gaulle deplored the French approval of German rearmament and argued that the solution for Tunisia and Morocco lay in “association” with France. But only “sincere integration” would resolve the Algerian situation. Hopes for an imminent comeback appeared futile. The frequent fall of Fourth Republic governments in no way concealed the reality—and benefits—of a great economic boom. During its last four years, the gross national product increased, on average, an amazing 10 percent a year. Productivity in all areas soared above prewar levels. The general seemed well aware of this when he had said goodbye and had implied that it would take a “shock” to bring about his reappearance on the political stage. His memoirs conveyed this mood of resignation. Written early in 1958, they ended with the words: “Old man, exhausted by ordeal, detached from human deeds, feeling the approach of the eternal cold, but always watching in the shadows for the gleam of hope!”<sup>74</sup>

Certainly the years were taking their toll. His vision had so deteriorated that he could only see straight ahead. He was forced to give up hunting and riding and smoking as well. Understandably, he felt that his great days were past. During the last of what Terrenoire called “the ungrateful years,” for first time de Gaulle began to turn away from the future. Could he have realized that his political resurrection was at hand?

## DE GAULLE

### RESURRECTION

The shock that de Gaulle had predicted would have to happen for him to return to power took place in Algeria in 1958, when for the first time in the nation's history the army rose against the government and the threat of a civil war loomed large.

Since the end of 1946 French forces were almost constantly repressing rebellions in the nation's overseas territories. A face-saving settlement at Geneva followed defeat in Indochina in 1954, and was in turn followed a few months later by the outbreak of a revolt in Algeria. By opening the road to independence in Morocco and Tunisia, Mendès-France prevented major uprisings from taking place there. Algeria, however, was different: by a legal fiction it was part of France and the home of a million European settlers, a tenth of the population, some of whose families had been there for generations.

On February 6, 1956, the government in Paris lost political control over events in Algeria. The nineteenth premier of the Fourth Republic, the Socialist Guy Mollet who favored a negotiated settlement, named General Georges Catroux, a de Gaulle supporter in 1940, as the minister-resident. Catroux had a reputation as a Liberal, and the French settlers in Algeria, the *pied-noirs*, violently rejected his appointment. With the tacit blessing of the army, which showed sympathy for the settlers and stood by, they launched demonstrations in protest.

It was in Indochina that the army developed a deep alienation from the homeland, specifically from French governments they perceived as indifferent and which they blamed for its military defeat and abandonment of native allies. Those in high command, the future colonels and generals in Algeria, served in Indochina, and the experience shaped their hostile attitude toward the politicians whose support they had sought in vain. A "malaise" took over, which gave way to "bitterness, revulsion and hostility," and it was carried over to Algeria, where

many of the units were sent after the outbreak of hostilities in 1954. Some of these officers had been in Asia or Africa for two decades, were out of touch with developments at home, and found it easy to believe that they had been betrayed by scheming politicians or unpatriotic intellectuals in Paris. If they shared one underlying conviction, it was simply “never again!” This conviction, which took on the fanatical calling of a sacred duty, would find its ultimate test in the Algeria that since 1830 held a special place in the French psyche and history.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, a special relationship had developed between the army and the settlers in Algeria, a relationship unparalleled in any other French colonial connection. Those on active duty understandably gravitated toward the European community. Until late 1958 the business elements in it made efforts to keep demobilized soldiers in Algiers, and fraternization became synonymous with integration. In Colonel Jacques Massu’s Tenth Parachute division, nearly one in ten who married chose local European brides. The inclinations of the army and the European community, especially small business people, civil servants, and shopkeepers, came together. For the first time the colonial army, resisted by hostile populations since Indochina, now had the people (of European descent, to be sure) with it, sharing in what both saw as a common destiny.<sup>2</sup>

When Mollet himself went to Algeria, a mob of settlers attacked him with stones, eggs, and manure. White and shaken, Mollet accepted Catroux’s withdrawal and named a fellow Socialist, Robert Lacoste, whose new repressive policy to support the army revealed that a French mob had dictated the choice of minister and policy to a French head of government. Almost half a million troops, ultimately draftees, the largest French expeditionary force since the Crusades it was said, were sent to Algeria in a futile attempt to corner and put an end to a smaller guerilla army. Massu got a free hand to put down the insurrection by whatever means necessary, and by September 1957 his forces crushed the insurgents in what came to be called the Battle of Algiers. Both sides relied on terror and committed atrocities, and because the army was resorting to torture, military morale among the draftees declined. From that moment in February 1956 until the crisis of May 1958, the army, or at least the officers in it, was to become thoroughly politicized, and when Massu’s troops took over control from the police in Algiers, the army, in effect, was governing Algeria.<sup>3</sup>

At Colombey, de Gaulle remained aloof and enigmatic. Different visitors left with different impressions of where he stood. Mendès-France

believed that he was deeply committed to keeping Algeria French. Maurice Schumann, on the other hand, was convinced that if placed back in charge he would make a deal with the National Liberation Front (FLN), the political arm of the Algerian insurgency. An old friend from the RPF days, Léon Noël, in May 1957, asked de Gaulle whether he would speak out. The general replied,

To what end, when one cannot act? The word must be the prelude to action. If I could act I would speak. But what is the good to say "If I were in power here is what I would do!" That would serve no purpose. The men in power would not do what I suggest—and my speech would provoke useless reactions from all sides.

To inform others of this response, de Gaulle issued a public warning against believing anything attributed to him in a private conversation, ending with the words, "When General de Gaulle thinks it useful to make known the opinion he holds, he will do it himself and do it publicly." He told his former aide, Colonel de Bonneval, that he would never accept power unless he had the possibility at the outset of realizing the reforms he believed were necessary. More pessimistically he had confided to Noël, "[W]hat saddens me as the years go by is not the approach of death; that doesn't frighten me; it's that I have fewer and fewer chances of being useful to the country." But as the situation in Algeria deteriorated, he was predicting to his brother-in-law, Jacques Vendroux, in the fall of 1957 that the turmoil there would bring him back to power.<sup>4</sup>

His situation was a difficult one, and de Gaulle had to proceed with caution. On the one hand he wanted to encourage his supporters in Algeria (in a war now being fought by draftees and becoming increasingly unpopular), and on the other not associate himself with any illegal activity on the part of the upper echelons of the military.

Certainly de Gaulle's views regarding the empire had evolved. As a young officer he had believed that securing and maintaining colonial possessions amounted to a drain on the military. After the French defeat and German occupation, he concluded that the defense of the empire was of major importance. Yet in January 1944, in a Brazzaville speech, he had outlined postwar policy: "[T]o lead each of the colonial peoples to a development that will permit them to administer themselves and later to govern themselves." Ten years later he had accepted the withdrawal from Indochina. This ambiguity, at the very least, allowed him freedom of action. With respect to Algeria, the one constant was that whatever the outcome, the solution there must

be imposed by France and not by the insurgents. The intervention of foreign heads of government, whether American, Russian, or Indian, in Algerian affairs was unacceptable: they would only try to internationalize what was seen as essentially a domestic concern.<sup>5</sup>

Visitors to Colombey continued to disagree about the general's views. Partisans of a French Algeria remained convinced that de Gaulle was unspokenly committed to a French Algeria. Partisans of a negotiated peace (more reluctantly) believed the same thing. Yet in February 1955 he told Edmond Michelet that "all is lost. Algeria will be independent," and to a Gaullist deputy added, "If I had remained in government I would have been able to save our possession, not indefinitely, perhaps ten or fifteen years." To still others he predicted independence as the wave of the future. On October 3, 1956, he frankly told the heir to the Moroccan throne that "Algeria will be independent whether we want it or not. It is written in history."<sup>6</sup> One can only conclude that either de Gaulle said different things to different people or he was sufficiently vague so that different people drew different conclusions. If in the fall of 1957 and the spring of 1958 rumors circulated in Paris that the general favored Algerian independence, they were denied by his faithful followers.

The crisis in Algeria intensified with the bombing of the village of Sakhiet on February 8, 1958. Four months later the Fourth Republic would come to an end and de Gaulle was back in office. Sakhiet was a Tunisian village near the Algerian border. The presence of FLN bases in Tunisia had long exasperated the French military, and an assault by Algerian rebels operating out of Sakhiet on January 15 had triggered a debate in the National Assembly. Premier Félix Gaillard was attacked for not breaking off relations with Tunisia, and a Gaullist deputy declared that only de Gaulle could end the war, the first time a "Gaullist solution" was openly mentioned in Parliament.

Three weeks later the military, on its own initiative, bombed the village. A total of 75 civilians were killed, 30 of whom were children although the French commander in Algeria, General Raoul Salan, had maintained that only military targets were hit. Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba, one of the most liberal and pro-Western heads of government in the Arab world, demanded the evacuation of French troops from his country and recalled his ambassador from Paris. Before he departed, the ambassador visited de Gaulle. According to the statement released by the general's office describing the visit, de Gaulle hoped for a continued Franco-Tunisian association.

The statement also referred to the ambassador's speculation that de Gaulle, although in retirement, might be called on to "arbitrate."<sup>7</sup>

Was de Gaulle actively encouraging his loyalists not only to exploit but to worsen a situation that could restore him to power? Certainly he was on record as prophetically wondering whether a crisis of some sort would benefit him. "Who said I will return only by legal means?" he told Michel Debré. In his subsequent (presidential) memoirs, de Gaulle dismissed the idea that he was encouraging faithful adherents in plots to ensure his speedy return:

I played no part whatsoever either in the local agitation, or the political schemes which provoked it, and I had no connection with any elements on the spot or any minister in Paris. It is true that two or three enterprising individuals, who had participated in my public activity at the time when I was still engaged in it, spent their time in Algeria spreading the idea that one day the fate of the country would have to be entrusted to me. But they did so without my endorsement and without having even consulted me.<sup>8</sup>

His disavowal was disingenuous. Strictly defined, the general was "consulted" and did not, in fact, "endorse." But it was understandable that he not get involved in grubby details and preferred to keep his distance. A conspiracy, after all, might fail, and if so he could keep his freedom of action. But most certainly he was kept informed by supporters acting on his behalf. Soustelle, Chaban-Delmas, Debré, Guichard, Jacques Foccart, and Georges Pompidou were working openly and secretly for his return and in continuous contact with him. Soustelle, in particular, a member of parliament and in close touch with French Algerians, took advantage of de Gaulle's opposition to the regime to persuade them that the general supported an *Algérie française*. Together with the generals and the colonialist right in Algeria and France, Soustelle was attempting to create that "rather violent shock" that de Gaulle, in his farewell address, said would be required to bring him back to office. And de Gaulle, until after his return to power, was careful not to disavow Soustelle. But in the final analysis it was de Gaulle's impeccable sense of timing and tactical skill that mattered.

As the crisis worsened, one heard his name mentioned more frequently. On April 15 the Algerian lobby in Parliament, led by Soustelle, succeeded in overthrowing Gaillard's moderate government. Soustelle had denounced that government's involvement in Anglo-American attempts to resolve the crisis as a prelude to internationalizing what both Gaullists and conservatives insisted must remain a domestic

affair. Almost a month passed without a new cabinet having been formed. When two generals, Raoul Salan and Edmond Jouhaud, went on record that any future French government must commit itself to never accepting an Algeria that “would cease to be an integral part of France,” de Gaulle declared himself scandalized by what he saw as the military’s attempt to dictate government policy. At a meeting in late March with André Philip, the trade union leader who had represented the Free French in Washington during the war, he decried the lack of a strong government able to have the army obey orders. “If there is no government the army will seize power in Algiers.” And he added, in that case, “seeing that there is no longer a State, I shall seize power in Paris, in order to save the Republic.”<sup>9</sup>

The delay in having a new government installed came as a god-send to the plotters. The president of the republic, René Coty, was facing his third cabinet crisis in a year. On March 8, in the newspaper *Le Monde*, the political scientist Maurice Duverger wrote: “The return of de Gaulle is no longer a question of *whether* but of *when*.” In that month, Gaullists set up a network of their own in Algiers. It was led by a businessman, Léon Delbecque, who had been active in the RPF and served in Chaban-Delmas’s office (Chaban was then minister of defense in the Gaillard government). Outwardly sent to lecture troops on aspects of psychological warfare (Delbecque was a reserve officer), his real, if secret, mission was different: to win over army leaders to the Gaullist cause, orchestrate demonstrations calling for an *Algérie française*, and report back to de Gaulle’s supporters in Paris. Delbecque played a leading role in the interactions among the army, the French settlers, and the Gaullists, making over 25 trips in three months between Paris and Algiers and meeting frequently with Olivier Guichard, de Gaulle’s military aide, confidante, and now private secretary. Meanwhile Soustelle and Debré were reactivating RPF political machinery for the secret lobbying of members of parliament, regardless of party affiliation. Gaullists, then, were sweeping into action: Guichard ran de Gaulle’s private office in Paris; Foccart directed personal intelligence work; Pompidou, as a director of the Rothschild bank with extensive business contacts, acted as financial advisor. But it was not yet clear that the army chiefs, including General Salan, wanted the return of de Gaulle.<sup>10</sup>

De Gaulle was never popular with the older French officer corps. They preferred a government they could dominate and found the general’s Delphic utterances as providing less than full backing for the total prosecution of the war. Senior army officers, supported by civilian extremists and the *Algérie française* lobby in Paris, were



plotting their own solution to the Algerian crisis: a military coup that would pave the way for a military dictatorship. Word of these designs reached General Paul Ely, chief of the defense staff, an upright soldier loyal both to the republic and to de Gaulle, and he secretly informed President Coty and de Gaulle about a real threat of civil war.

On April 26 Coty asked René Pleven, a decent if colorless politician who had sat in numerous cabinets, to form a government. On the same day Delbecque in Algiers proclaimed a “watch committee” containing both the military and civilians, and participated in a massive public demonstration opposed to the formation in Paris of a “treasonable government.” It was hoped that those attending the rally would declare for de Gaulle and secure the support of the army and the reluctant General Salan. They did, but the watch committee leaders prudently held back from calling for de Gaulle.

A few days later Delbecque went to see de Gaulle in Colombey. He found the general uncertain, depressed, and unwilling to support the army chiefs. De Gaulle, whose military experience was European, was never comfortable with high-ranking officers in the “colonial” army. Aside from the esteemed Massu, who was a Gaullist but considered nonpolitical, much of the colonial army hierarchy was by tradition Pétainist and supporters of the Vichy regime.<sup>11</sup>

Following the April 26 demonstration, tensions in Algeria mounted and public contempt for the Fourth Republic was growing. The Gaullist camp, especially Soustelle and Delbecque, feared that a competing “committee” led by former paratrooper and student union leader Pierre Lagaillarde could push them aside. An extremist, Lagaillarde, headed a loose confederation of activists and self-styled patriots who called for a violent upheaval that would force the army to intervene and keep Algeria French. According to the testimony of a Colonel Thomazo (at the treason trial of General Salan on May 21, 1962), one of the hardcore officers opposed to the moderate governments in Paris, Delbecque had met with him and other army chiefs urging them to join forces with the Gaullist plotters, telling them “you can only save French Algeria if you overturn the system and if you replace the Republic by General de Gaulle.” Thomazo told the court he was “shocked and astonished that they wanted to politicize a problem . . . which for us was only a problem of defense of territorial integrity and the security of the country.”<sup>12</sup>

De Gaulle’s popularity, if not widespread, was inching forward. It was in a reply to a question put forward by a leading polling agency,

“Who would you like as the next premier,” that the general’s numbers reached 13 percent (in contrast to the 1 percent reached in December 1955), the highest of all the names suggested. On May 11 the newspaper *L’Echo d’Alger*, edited by the influential Vichyite Alain de Sérigny, disappointed by what he saw as procrastination by de Gaulle, published a sensational editorial addressed to him: “Speak up General, speak up quickly; your words are worth actions.”<sup>13</sup> De Gaulle remained silent.

President Coty, who had long acknowledged the need for constitutional reform, then made secret contact with de Gaulle. What conditions might de Gaulle consider necessary to form a government? By phone from Colombey, the general sent a cold reply. He would not appear before the National Assembly in person, although he would accept power if voted on. It was too soon to make more detailed conditions known.

When Pleven failed to form a government Coty turned to Pierre Pflimlin, an Alsatian and a centrist who had objected to the hard line taken by Soustelle and who had replaced Bidault as MRP leader. If you fail, Coty told him, there is only one way out, to call on General de Gaulle. Because Pflimlin had the temerity to write an article in a local Alsatian newspaper suggesting possible negotiations with the Algerian rebels, Salan and three others generals warned President Coty that the French Army would be “outraged” if the territory were abandoned and they demanded that he “keep our flag over Algeria.” The army was dictating to the civilian authorities what their conduct should be. De Gaulle’s name, however, was not mentioned. Delbecq, on his part, informed Debré that should Pflimlin be invested as head of the government, it would lead to a “rupture”: the army would see it as a provocation and Paris should be “prepared.”<sup>14</sup>

This threat from the military and the resentment it generated won support for Pflimlin’s candidacy as the assembly began to debate his investiture the night of May 13. At 6:30 P.M. in Algiers thugs led by Lagaillarde, bearded and in military uniform, launched a demonstration intended once and for all to frighten the deputies into refusing Pflimlin’s investiture and to force the army to intervene. What was planned as a peaceful wreath-laying ceremony commemorating the execution of three French soldiers held prisoner by the FLN, turned into a riot in the courtyard before the Government General headquarters. A mob of over one hundred thousand people, singing the *Marseillaise* and crying “l’armée au pouvoir” (the army to power), was egged on by Lagaillarde and his cheerleaders. Army troops looked on and even provided the mutineers with a truck to batter down the

gates as the mob invaded and sacked the main government building in Algiers. A revolutionary government was proclaimed.

Gaullists, headed by Delbecque and (now General) Massu then arrived on the scene. At first Massu ordered his troops to oust the "ultras" (diehard colonials who insisted on keeping Algeria French) and occupy the building themselves. But carried away by the crowd, he agreed to head a newly formed committee of public safety, and that night sent a telegram to President Coty informing him of his decision "to maintain order." Massu called for the creation of a government of "National Safety" in Paris, "alone capable of keeping Algeria an integral part of France." He appealed to de Gaulle to take the leadership of the proposed revolutionary government.<sup>15</sup>

News of the insurrection reached Paris, and the furious deputies responded by investing Pflimlin by a large majority. A report of Pflimlin's investiture arrived in Algiers at 3 A.M. It caused consternation. If Massu believed he had erred in supporting the insurgents, he was persuaded by Delbecque and other Gaullists that no retreat was possible. At 5 A.M. Massu appeared on the balcony of the government building overlooking the courtyard. The crowd of demonstrators had never disbanded, and he implored them to fight on to final victory. He begged de Gaulle to break his silence, aware that the general's approval would provide cover for the military's support of the insurrection. The Pflimlin government put Soustelle under house arrest (he was soon to escape to Algeria), but took no other action. It relied on the generals to "restore legality."<sup>16</sup>

As the threat from both the mob and the military mounted, de Gaulle came under intense pressure to speak out. The highly respected *Le Monde* editorialized that the only solution lay in his person. Still, he waited. Although made aware by General Ely and his own followers that a military plot against Paris was being prepared and only waiting the final order from Salan and other military leaders, he was skeptical of his chances to return to office. To Chaban-Delmas, who had telephoned, "Your hour has come," de Gaulle replied, "No, no one wants me." And Salan, on May 15, had still made no mention of de Gaulle. He was to do so the next day.

On May 15 Delbecque called for yet another demonstration. He arranged for a "unity appearance" by Salan and other senior commanders on the now-famous balcony. Salan told a crowd of fifteen thousand that he had "assumed full military and civil power" and ended his remarks with *vive l'Algérie française, vive la France*. As he then stepped back, Delbecque hissed: "*et vive de Gaulle*." Salan hesitated, then moved forward and pronounced the words. A roar

came from the crowd. At five o'clock that afternoon, de Gaulle finally issued a statement that he had drafted the day before, ending with the words: "Not so long ago the country in its depths, trusted me to lead it in its entirety to its salvation. Today, with the trials that face it once again, let it be known that I am ready to assume the powers of the Republic." If, as Lacouture put it, he had "not waited to be crowned by Salan," there was no condemnation of the rebellion. Nor was there any mention of Algiers. Even so, the army could believe it had de Gaulle's full backing, and so delayed taking any further action. In the view of journalist Alexander Werth, in allowing for this belief it was de Gaulle "at his best."<sup>17</sup>

Four days later, on Monday afternoon, May 19, de Gaulle drove to Paris to hold a news conference. It would be the first since his farewell conference in July 1955 and the most masterful of his life. At 3 P.M. he entered the gilt reception room of the Palais d'Orsay and sat down at a small, green-covered table. He was now 67 years old, his hair and mustache were grey, but he sat tall and straight. Although he looked older and his voice seemed tired, he displayed his usual self-assurance and quiet arrogance. He despised the politicians, but knew that to return legally he would need Socialist Party support as well as that of the right and center.

He reminded his listeners that he had deliberately stayed aloof for six years and had said nothing politically for the last three. He had vowed, he recalled, to keep silent until he could again serve. Therefore he "belong[s] to no one and to everyone." Things had gone from bad to worse, and now a "great national crisis" had arrived. But the crisis might be a blessing in disguise if it marked the beginning of "a sort of resurrection." Responsible for the Algerian situation, for the FLN insurrection and the behavior of the French army was "the present system in Paris that cannot solve its problems." If called on to "arbitrate," he, de Gaulle, could not be specific regarding the action to be taken: "[N]o judge hands down a decision before hearing the case," but "if the people wished it" he could be useful as head of the French Republic.

Sarcasm showed when he commented: "Now the Algerians shout *vive de Gaulle*, just as the French do in moments of acute anguish." He approved the army's attitude insofar as it shared the Algerian people's desire to see Paris "capable of assuming its responsibility . . . One doesn't shout 'Long live France' when one is not with the nation." He had not disavowed Salan because neither Gaillard nor Pflimlin

had disavowed him. He warned the government against taking strong measures, for example, cutting communications with Algeria as some cabinet ministers had urged. However, he admitted that to be effective he would have to be given “exceptional powers” by “an exceptional procedure . . . an investiture by the National Assembly, for example.”

He showed anger when asked about his attitude toward basic public liberties. “Why should I, at sixty-seven, begin a career as a dictator?” This rhetorical question, according to Werth, elicited some critical murmurs: “Pétain began at eighty-four.” Again refusing to define any specific policy for Algeria, de Gaulle concluded magisterially: “I thought it would be useful for the country to say what I have said. Now I shall return to my village and remain there at the disposal of the country.” For another observer, it was “without a doubt the first time in history that a press conference was used as the path to reach power.”<sup>18</sup>

The reaction in both France and Algeria was now overwhelmingly positive, and de Gaulle’s assuming power as the lesser evil seen as an inevitable solution. Awareness that the military intended to stage its own rebellion had left the politicians immobilized, and despite its outward show of firmness the government in Paris began to crack. Mendès-France criticized de Gaulle for undermining the republic, but Antoine Pinay, then serving as finance minister, pledged support, and even the Socialist Mollet hinted that he might back de Gaulle provided the latter observed proper constitutional forms.

In Algiers the struggle between Gaullists and the *ultras* intensified with the arrival of Soustelle—who had been governor-general of Algeria in the early years of the war—to join Delbecque. The two Gaullists elbowed their way into the Committee of Public Safety and pressured Salan to continue holding off any military uprising within France. Instead, as a first step and show of resolve, he might simply seize Corsica. Give the general time, they argued, and Salan, granted the opportunity to show himself capable of action and yet not take too many risks, agreed. On May 25, 250 paratroops landed at Ajaccio airport. They met with no resistance: even the riot police on the island supported the takeover. This minor action sent shock waves through the National Assembly and revealed the extent to which Paris lay helpless against any subsequent steps taken by the military.

Aware that an attack was likely and growing impatient, de Gaulle let it be known he wanted to meet with the new head of government, Pflimlin, as soon as possible. (A visit by Pinay paved the way for this meeting.) The two men met in the park of the Saint-Cloud Chateau

outside of Paris on the morning of May 26. No firm decisions were reached, but the premier left open the possibility that he would step aside provided that de Gaulle condemn the military's acts of sedition in Algiers. On returning to Colombey and determined to preempt a military invasion of mainland France by taking a public initiative, de Gaulle drafted an important and masterful political statement released by his office later that afternoon.

Yesterday I set in motion the regular procedure necessary for the establishment of a republican government capable of ensuring the unity and independence of the country . . . Any action endangering public order, from whatever side it originates, could have grave consequences. Even though I understand the circumstances, I could not approve. I expect the land, sea, air forces in Algeria to maintain exemplary discipline under the orders of their commanders: General Salan, Admiral Auboyneau, and General Jouhaud. I put my trust in these commanders and intend to make contact with them.<sup>19</sup>

His warning most certainly stopped a military putsch in Paris and other chief cities planned for the night of May 27–28 and to be carried out by paratroops. Salan and the other generals realized that if they moved against an admonition from de Gaulle, they would be unlikely to win and might even face a court-martial. For the otherwise critical Alexander Werth this was “perhaps the greatest piece of statesmanship in the whole of de Gaulle’s career.” It almost certainly guaranteed his return but “at the same time averted the establishment of a military dictatorship in France, or, more likely still, the outbreak of a civil war.”<sup>20</sup>

Pflimlin was incensed at what he considered de Gaulle’s betrayal: his revelation of the meeting both men had promised would remain secret and the fiction that a “regular procedure” had begun to install the general as head of the government. In despair he resigned on May 28, asserting that de Gaulle’s communiqué had put him in an impossible situation. It was well that he did, for President Coty had decided that the Gaullist solution was the only one capable of salvaging the republic.

Still, the Socialist group in the assembly also resented de Gaulle’s comments about a “regular procedure” having begun, and on May 27, by a vote of 117 to 3, declared their “hostility” to his self-proclaimed candidacy. Worried that their opposition might forestall his return to power, de Gaulle asked to see General Salan’s chief of staff, General Dulac. Dulac left Algiers at once and arrived at Colombey the next morning, May 28. De Gaulle questioned Dulac about the army’s plans and the role played in the planned invasion of

France (“Operation Resurrection”) by Generals Salan and Massu. It appears that de Gaulle was uncertain that they had power or whether the activist “colonels” did. This uncertainty argues against de Gaulle’s direct complicity inasmuch as he was unsure as to who was really in charge. On the other hand, he gave what Dulac and the military considered the go-ahead, by saying, after having been informed by Dulac of the details of Salan’s and Massu’s invasion:

I don’t want to appear at once. It mustn’t look as if I have come back solely as a result of this operation. After a few days I want to be called in as an arbiter, by everyone, to take charge of the country in order to spare her useless divisions. I must be seen as the man of reconciliation and not as the champion of one of the factions confronting one another.

He asked Dulac to tell Salan that “what [he, de Gaulle] has done and what [he] will do is for the good of France.”<sup>21</sup>

Gaullist historians deny that this constituted a “green light” to the army. They point to the ambiguity of de Gaulle’s words and the general’s “black humor,” which was not understood by those who did not know him well. What is clear is that de Gaulle now knew of Salan’s plans, specifically the forces available for and the timing of “Operation Resurrection” and the fact that he made it clear to Dulac that he could not look as if he were part of the operation but had to remain, until called on, in the background.

One final meeting between the Gaullist plotters and Salan’s officers throws light on the interaction of the two groups. In Algiers, the commander of the air force, General Jouhard, ordered a top aide, Colonel Nicot, to go the Gaullist office on rue de Solferino the morning of May 29 and get confirmation that de Gaulle had given General Dulac “a green light” the day before. In this meeting, according to both Nicot and Jouhard, a de Gaulle aide, Pierre Lefranc, at their request and in their presence spoke via telephone to de Gaulle in Colombey and then told them that the general had indeed given the go-ahead. Recollections of this meeting, as with so many other encounters, differ. In a letter to *Le Monde* published June 18, 1984, Lefranc denied that a telephone call took place. That led to a counterdenial by Colonel Nicot.<sup>22</sup>

It was then that President Coty intervened. The previous afternoon an antifascist demonstration of three hundred thousand Parisian leftists

had taken place. The demonstrators marched with banners streaming and cries of *Vive la République* and *Non à de Gaulle*. It is likely that the marchers held no strong feelings against de Gaulle's person and would do nothing if he were legally invested, a likely possibility inasmuch as Socialist Party leader Mollet, fearful that the impotence shown by the government could only work to the benefit of the Communists, was already negotiating de Gaulle's return. Still, some journalists and politicians speculated about a revival of the Popular Front, the coming together of democratic Socialists and Communists in the mid-1930s, and the prospect of it worried the conservative Coty.

Coty asked de Gaulle to meet with the presiding officers of the two houses of the legislature, André le Trocquer of the National Assembly and Gaston Monnerville of the Senate. On the following evening the general again drove from Colombey, but the meeting with the two legislators was close to disastrous. De Gaulle presented himself as the only alternative to civil war and posed four conditions for his return: investiture as premier without debate and without his presence during the vote; full power for a year; the dismissal of Parliament during that year, and authorization for his government to prepare a constitution that would be submitted to the voters in a referendum. On hearing the demand for complete emergency powers, Le Trocquer accused him of possessing the "soul of a dictator." Monnerville appealed to him to follow the constitutional practice of appearing before the National Assembly and accepting the six-month limit on emergency powers prescribed by the constitution. De Gaulle thereupon stalked out, telling the two leaders he had "to sort things out with the paratroops" and would "go back to my retreat and nurse my sorrow."<sup>23</sup>

Monnerville and Le Trocquer went directly to the Elysée Palace to report to Coty, who then played a dramatic role in bringing an end to the final governmental crisis of his presidency—as well as to the Fourth Republic. Coty, who above all feared a left-wing counterinsurgency, believed it was either de Gaulle or the paratroops. There could be no more delay. When the two parliamentary leaders had left, he sent an ultimatum to the National Assembly: "[E]ither invest General de Gaulle as head of the government or I resign." At 3 P.M. May 29, Le Trocquer read Coty's message, which cited the threat of Civil war as justification for his going beyond the traditional presidential role. In his *Memoirs of Hope*, de Gaulle hailed the initiative of this "old and good Frenchman," which had ensured that the transfer of power "would not occur without some dignity."<sup>24</sup> If some condemned Coty's initiative, few denied its impact.

Total political power, which de Gaulle failed to secure after the liberation, was now about to be handed to him. His career was to be



resurrected. A revolution had taken place without bloodshed. Word reached Salan's Algiers headquarters in time to postpone the "operation" once again.

De Gaulle's next meeting with Coty, which took place that evening at the presidential residence, was brief. For the third time in 48 hours he drove from Colombey. He entered by a side gate to avoid the ever-present photographers. The general stated his terms: full power, the assembly to go on recess, government by decree, and a mandate to draft a new constitution to be put to the voters in a referendum. Cold and aloof, he initially refused to appear before hostile deputies whom he did not respect. But to ease the path and consciences of the legislators and because he felt that he could not refuse Coty's request to go before the assembly, de Gaulle made two concessions: he would appear in person as customary and the recess would last only until the opening of the scheduled autumn session. In fact, the Fourth Republic's National Assembly never again convened.

During the next two days de Gaulle received various political leaders, including the Socialists Auriol and Mollet, at the Hôtel La Perouse near the Etoile, where he stayed when in Paris. The general was described as "easy-going and jocular," and many would-be opponents left puzzled and charmed. He assured Mollet that as in 1944, when he had refused to tolerate the Liberation Committees of the Resistance, he would reject any autonomous powers that conflicted with those of the central government. By the end of the day, after de Gaulle agreed to offer a choice between independence and membership in the French Community for Algeria, Mollet was won over, declaring that he had experienced "one of the great moments of my life."<sup>25</sup> Won over, too, were nearly half the deputies, when the next day he received representatives of the political parties (except the Communists, who refused to see him).

On Sunday, June 1, he took the rostrum at the Palais-Bourbon. The building was packed, and thousands of police roped off the area. Inside, a nervous de Gaulle, who had not been in the building since January 1946, sat on a government bench. The gathering proved anticlimatic. Although not required to participate in the debate (he had only promised to appear), in complete silence he walked to the tribune, and read a brief (seven-minute) statement, summarizing the crisis and the need for reform, the same message as that delivered during the past dozen years. He again spoke of the "degradation of the state" (but didn't remind people of his long campaign against the Fourth Republic), how the army was "scandalized" by the previous government's lack

of authority, and the threat of civil war. Now, in response to Coty's appeal, he was asking the deputies for six months' (not the entire year first demanded) full power and the legal machinery to draft a new constitution that would be submitted to the voters. He threw a quick glance around the assembly and left. Nor had he swept away old political personnel in favor of a new Gaullist elite. His proposed cabinet contained only a few in the inner circle, including Debré as minister of justice and Malraux as minister of information. It also contained Mollet and Pinay as ministers of state, and nonpolitical "technicians" from the higher civil service. Such *ultras* as Soustelle (still in Algeria) and Bidault were not included.

The cheers, half-hearted from the right and center, were slow in coming. Conservatives were disappointed by the vague terms used to describe the status of Algeria and in the moderation shown. The debate soon ended, and de Gaulle was voted confidence by a vote of 329 to 224 with 32 abstentions and so became the Fourth Republic's last premier. Communists and about half the Socialists present, together with a mixed group of others, including Mendès-France and a future president, François Mitterrand, opposed. The next day a bill was introduced to confer special powers for six months.

The general did not speak in this debate. It was a new de Gaulle, not stiff or haughty, but a relaxed and ordinary politician who sat next to Mollet on a government bench and listened patiently. He had uttered phrases like "the pleasure and honor of being in your midst" and seemed more anxious to disarm opponents than reassure partisans of a French Algeria. Observers were treated to the spectacle of countless deputies eager to shake the great man's hand. Good grace and humor abounded. Expressions of mutual friendship and confidence were exchanged. De Gaulle assured the deputies of his aim to ensure the survival of republican institutions, and even Communist deputies, in the wake of "Operation Sedition" now embraced "Operation Seduction." The text was easily voted by a two to one margin. On returning to his hotel, de Gaulle told the doorman, "Albert, I won." A little later he received Delbecq and told him, "Bravo, Delbecq. You did well." And after a brief silence, "But admit I did well too."<sup>26</sup> Twelve years after his fall and having "crossed the desert," de Gaulle had achieved his political resurrection. He would have wanted it sooner: "I'm ten years too old," he later told his niece.<sup>27</sup>

Two days later, on June 3, the National Assembly adjourned. In two months de Gaulle presented his constitution providing for a strengthened presidency to the voters, and it was adopted by referendum on September 28. Of France's eligible voters, 85 percent turned

out, with 80 percent of them voting to approve the new constitution. It went into effect on October 4, 1958, and a new constitution meant a new, “fifth,” republic. At the end of November a new assembly was elected, which met with Coty on the question of the presidential election scheduled for December 21. Although Coty’s own mandate had two years to run, the constitution that granted it had been superseded; he was no longer the chief of state unless a new constitutionally designated electoral college named him as such. When Coty decided not to run, de Gaulle’s victory became a foregone conclusion. He won 75 percent of the votes of a somewhat larger electoral college than that of the legislature alone, the former electors.

The general took his new post, one now endowed with much greater power, as president of France’s Fifth Republic on January 8, 1959, the first regular army officer since Marshal Patrice MacMahon (in 1873) to become president and the first president since then never to have served in Parliament. Coty said simply that “the first of the French is now the first in France.” As in 1940 a resurrected de Gaulle was the “Man of Destiny.”

To what extent had de Gaulle orchestrated events? He insisted he had told the truth when he said that he had not taken part in the military uprising. But as a Communist interpreter opined, “[I]f he didn’t speak others heard his voice.”<sup>28</sup> Certainly he was kept well-informed throughout, by elements within the military and by his own loyalists. He had even allowed the “Gaullists” to play a part in bringing matters to a head and in precipitating that “degradation of the state” he had so passionately condemned. His timing of the three great public appearances—the May 15 statement, the May 19 press conference, and his “I have embarked” statement of May 27—were masterful strokes. The first ruined Pflimlin’s last chance of quelling the Algiers revolt; the second prepared his “parliamentary” return to power; and the third prevented a military takeover, which would not have served de Gaulle’s purpose.

In 1962, three weeks before the referendum that would grant Algeria its independence, de Gaulle denounced the plots of May 1958. In his *Memoirs of Hope* he denied any involvement, although he acknowledged that “two or three people” associated with him had spread the idea that he should return for the sake of national security. But they had not consulted with him. He intervened, he implied, only to prevent subversion, the establishment of a military dictatorship, and possible civil war.

De Gaulle's first priority had always been the establishment of a strong state. While "crossing the desert" he had shown "venomous contempt" for the parliamentary republic, that "regime of mediocrity and chloroform," that system "floating on the surface of France like scum on the sea." Next was to take the army out of politics; finally, to free France from the "Algerian burden," or so he said. Did he believe in 1958 that France's empire no longer accounted for her power in the modern world? During his presidency he was to preside over the dissolution of much of the French Empire. Historians and political scientists who believe that by the time he returned to power he had little regard for the French in Algeria, argue that he could not display any such lack of concern for the empire's preservation.<sup>29</sup>

Scholars are divided over the extent of de Gaulle's complicity in manipulating the events that led to his political resurrection. Many agree that however well-informed of the activities of those working on his behalf and however reluctant to discourage anyone from undertaking those activities, the general had not organized the uprising of May 13, but on the contrary had always indicated a preference for the legal path to power. The historian Herbert Leuthy, for example, then a correspondent for *Life* magazine, states that de Gaulle was accurate when he proclaimed that "the Algerian *putsch* took place without his knowledge and complicity." Yet other writers argue that not only was he kept informed throughout the crisis by supporters who "worked openly and clandestinely for this return," but that he "held the military sword over the National Assembly." Accordingly his avowal of disassociation was, to say the least, disingenuous. None, however, place de Gaulle's fingerprints on the conspiracy. Even the cynical Alexander Werth, when asking himself whether de Gaulle was "at the origin of the Algiers *putsch* in May 1958," stated that the answer "seems to be no, but that the Gaullists played a leading role in preparing it."<sup>30</sup>

On the other hand, Jean Lacouture writes that the general was not only aware of "Operation Resurrection" but that the Republic did not "die of its own accord": military pressure was exerted; de Gaulle knew of it; and that he "very likely" did indeed "lend a hand to the process whereby the Republic was killed off."<sup>31</sup> Journalists writing shortly after these events took place wondered whether it was accidental that those who claimed to act on de Gaulle's behalf, without his knowledge, should have demanded that he "arbitrate" the day before he offered precisely to do that. They, too, concluded that the general seized power in 1958 by helping to manipulate events, did not return to the helm by accident, as a generous savior, and that the events

of May were caused by “no unguided political plot lacking political leadership.” De Gaulle carefully seeded the storm and then directed it by masterly suggestion. He made use of the army’s frustration, the anti-Communist visions of nationalists, and the fears of a nation to achieve his goals. These goals, it turned out, ran counter to those of the praetorian guard who brought him back. He used the right against the left to get power and the left against the right to hold it. David Schoenbrun, an American newspaperman in Paris at the time, stated flatly that de Gaulle “no doubt was in control of the Gaullists at all times” and was “the mastermind of the coup.”<sup>32</sup>

The general learned a valuable lesson from his earlier experience with executive power—and his fall from it. Handling politicians and army leaders skillfully, rather than imposing himself, he had said simply that he was ready to serve if called on. By the end of May most leading politicians had decided that he alone could save them from rule by a military junta, while the settlers and the army believed that he would serve their interests by keeping Algeria French. Shaped by the hard lessons of the war, the liberation, and the RPF experience, de Gaulle throughout the unfolding crisis remained firmly convinced that his return must be both legitimate and legal. Moreover, his whole character argued both against returning in the pocket of the generals and coming back merely to preside over a government whose executive powers were structurally limited.

Even though there is no evidence de Gaulle played any role in concept or planning of the Army’s “Operation Resurrection,” he was kept informed, especially near the end, and if he did not want to participate in a coup, he had demonstrated his willingness to support the “operation” when the Assembly rejected the Gaullist solution and showed its support for Pflimlin. If reluctant to participate in a conspiracy, faced with a roadblock he might have done so to regain power. Circumstances prevented this when President Coty called for him.

## EPILOGUE

De Gaulle alone possessed the prestige sufficient to treat what he viewed as the morbose Fourth Republic. In any event, few mourned its death. Paradoxically he was not popular; unlike a Hitler he did not stir mass emotions. Almost all France accepted him as the lesser evil, an alternative to the anticipated violence accompanying a military overthrow, rather than the preordained leader. During the next few years he would achieve the three goals he had set himself: to recast the structure of government in France; to crush the *ultra* elements in

Algeria by attacking the Committees of Public Safety; and to make the army wholly obedient to the government. As the premier legally appointed by a parliament—however much it acted under the pressure of a wholly illegal outside movement—and as the elected president of France he was to accomplish these goals by 1962.

De Gaulle's (second set of) memoirs do not show the actual course of events and admit of no clear preestablished plan. In the last years of his presidency he started work on them, and after his departure in 1969 his aides brought required papers and documents to Colombey. He worked almost uninterruptedly, even during holidays in Ireland and Spain. His daughter again typed his drafts. Like the war memoirs, three volumes were planned, but only the first of these *Memoirs of Hope*, entitled *Renewal*, was published by the time he died on November 9, 1970. It appeared a month before his fatal heart attack, and met with a huge public, if not critical, success. He had written two chapters of the next volume, to be entitled *Endeavor*, when he died. The family nevertheless decided to publish them.

Once in office he displayed political mastery. His goals remained constant: in addition to bringing the army under government control, he would win approval of a constitution that would give France a strong executive, and come to terms with the French colonies' desire for independence without sacrificing a future relationship with them. He made each of his objectives support the others. By flying rebel organizer Jacques Soustelle out of Algiers and making him his minister of information, de Gaulle, in the words of Stanley Hoffmann, "yanked the insurgents' sharpest tooth, while at the same time giving the embattled settlers enough of a payoff to keep them submissive if not content."<sup>33</sup> By tying the vote on autonomy for France's black African territories to the vote on his proposed constitution, he obliged right-wingers to swallow his liberal colonial policy and at the same time picked up nine million African votes to sell his majority on the constitutional referendum. By showing himself willing to offer Algeria's Moslem rebels something besides naked force and by taking the gamble of extending the constitutional referendum to Algeria, he reconciled many left-wingers to his tighter, more disciplined constitution, added another three and a half million Algerian votes to his majority, and threw the rebel NLF into the psychological defensive mode.

In all of this, de Gaulle made effective use of surprise, silence, and the oracular utterance. "I have understood you," he told a wildly cheering crowd during his first trip to Algiers after becoming premier. Only four months later, when he abruptly ordered all French army officers to resign from the insurrectionary committees of public safety,

did the right-wing Europeans of Algiers begin to realize that what he had meant was that he understood them but did not approve.

Or had he? Although French—and other—historians have and still do profess great admiration for de Gaulle's success in disengaging his country from its war in Algeria and granting self-government to the new republic in 1962, recent and more critical accounts, for example, that of Éric Roussel, have placed the war—and subsequent events in the history of the first decade of “de Gaulle's republic”—in an international context.<sup>34</sup> [Specifically, with regard to de Gaulle's role in the May events (although not his presidency), they return, to some extent, to the more censorious accounts of the early journalists.] An American historian, Irwin Wall, making use of US State Department archives as well as French documents has argued that conventional interpretations that have de Gaulle set on granting Algerians their independence from the moment he came to power no longer ring true. When the general told the crowd in Algiers that he understood them, he in fact agreed with their desire to keep Algeria French. He saw a French Algeria, or at least an Algeria closely tied to France, as vital to the Mediterranean-Pan-African French sphere that could allow France to play a role equal to that of the Anglo-Saxons in international politics. (The presence of Saharan oil and space to test nuclear weapons made a continuation of the French presence all the more desirable.) Only when the Americans, who were providing the French with much of the military and economic aid needed to continue fighting in Algeria—the planes that bombed Sakhiet were US made—applied pressure during the Eisenhower and, more to the point, the Kennedy administrations to bring the Algerian War to an end and no longer cooperated with de Gaulle's plans both to hold on to Algeria and develop the nuclear capacity begun under the Fourth Republic did the French president realize he would have to grant the former colony its independence. For de Gaulle, this pressure as well as the virtual world hostility—international opinion after the Sakhiet bombing had also turned against France—that was leaving France isolated was as important a motive for withdrawal as domestic fatigue with an apparently endless war and public disgust with the perceived necessity on the part of the military to resort to torture.

De Gaulle realized that although the French army, given free rein in 1959–1960, had “won” the war—with victory measured in terms of a sharp reduction in the number of rebel violent incidents—he would nevertheless have to devise a settlement acceptable to the West. In a famous memo he asked Washington to give Paris parity with the British and the Americans, establishing a kind of “triumvirate”

in the running of NATO. In exchange, France would fully support US policy with regard to Asia and Cuba, and in every way remain a loyal NATO ally. The United States and Great Britain would give support to France in Africa and the Mediterranean, which would, in turn, force the Algerian rebels to come to terms. Such a demand, if arrogant, had worked in World War II. But the weakened Fourth Republic, in financial crisis and political disarray with its empire dissolving, was not seen as a “worthy partner” by its allies. Unimpressed by France’s nuclear potential, Washington insisted that the Algerian situation be resolved before it dealt with France on other matters. The election of JFK, who was even more hostile to France’s Algerian policy than his predecessor, prompted de Gaulle’s government to enter into direct negotiations with the FLN without preconditions. Faced with the collapse of his policies during the Kennedy administration, de Gaulle, as Wall put it, “petulantly embarked a policy of putative independence.”

After his withdrawal from Algeria de Gaulle pulled France out of NATO’s military arm, pressed ahead with the nuclear deterrent started by the Fourth Republic, initiated detente with the Soviet Union, and generally acted as a free agent. In contrast to French historians who bought de Gaulle’s claim that he had always intended to give Algerians their independence, Wall thus argues that the general finally let Algeria go when he realized that only with US support could France hold on to its former colony, the linchpin of its Mediterranean-African base, and play a world role.<sup>35</sup>

De Gaulle continued to govern until 1969. By then three pillars of Gaullist strength had been undermined: those factions that had supported the president against “chaos” (for clearly the previous year he had shown himself inadequate in handling the students’ and workers’ strikes of May when 7 million people brought the economy to a standstill); those citizens on fixed incomes (who had suffered a loss in purchasing power); and the business and industrial community (which resented greater state involvement in the economy and particularly the idea of worker participation in management).<sup>36</sup>

In addition, the body politic had experienced a general decline in popular political energy. During de Gaulle’s 11 years in office, voters were called on no fewer than 15 times for national balloting. That seemed enough, particularly for purposes perceived as useless. “Would the old man never tire of asking yet again if they *really* loved him?”<sup>37</sup> A combination of factors, then, accounted for de Gaulle’s defeat in a lengthy and confused referendum (really aimed at reestablishing his



personal ties to the French people) and his final resignation: electoral ennui; indifference or hostility toward the issues of the referendum; awareness of alternatives; and mounting dissatisfaction with the president, especially among the political notables, tired of being ignored, who now rallied to ward off his attack on their bastion, the Senate. His departure proved that, regardless of the intent of the constitutional text, the president held a personal political responsibility. De Gaulle departed for good, but by rebuilding national executive authority his political resurrection had changed the political face of his country.

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## II

### JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN: “WE NEED TO GET THE UNIONS TO COME HERE, RIGHT AWAY”

Perón's comeback in 1973 after an 18-year exile was little short of amazing. A military coup had ousted him in 1955. The coalition of military, church, and labor that kept him in power had disintegrated, forcing the Argentine president to flee to four Latin American countries before finding refuge in Franco's Spain. The military regime that replaced his not only sought to obliterate all traces of Juan and Eva Perón, but also charged him with the statutory rape of a 14-year-old girl and unsuccessfully tried to have him extradited. Stories circulated that he had never shed his sympathies for fascism and that he had overseas investments of up to \$200 million gotten from admitting Jews to, and then harboring Nazis in, Argentina. All these circumstances would have combined to create a political death for any ordinary politician. That Perón was no ordinary politician had been made clear by his unprecedented and successful efforts at bringing organized labor in support of his regime and by his—and most spectacularly his wife's—success in reaching out to Argentina's urban masses. They came out in the hundreds of thousands to his and Eva's rallies. After his downfall and during nearly two decades on foreign soil, Perón continued to manipulate, sometimes in large measure, sometimes in small, the threads of Peronismo in Argentina with, as Raúl Alfonsín, president of Argentina from 1983 to 1989, put it “the precision of a surgeon.” By keeping the movement united, by maintaining himself as its leader, and by keeping his name and ideas before the public, the deposed president brilliantly staged his political resurrection.

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## PERÓN

## CREATION

Juan Domingo Perón was born in 1895, the son of a farmer. He entered the *Colegio Militar* (National Military School) in 1911. As a captain in 1926, assigned to teach military history in the *Escuela Superior de Guerra* (War Academy), he was influenced by a Spanish translation of *Das Volk in Waffen* (The Nation in Arms), a book published in 1883 by a German general. It convinced him of the need for the country to remain on a permanent military footing to ensure domestic peace and the implementation of its foreign policies. Accordingly, he developed an interest in politics, and played a minor part in the military uprising of 1930 that overthrew longtime president Hipólito Yrigoyin.<sup>1</sup>

His account of the coup showed the importance he attached to public opinion. This seemed foolish to the overwhelming majority of a conservative officer corps, but for Perón mass support appeared indispensable for political success. In the future he would never accept the presidency without it first being sanctioned by a popular election. As a lieutenant-colonel, he served as military attaché to Chile in 1936 and three years later, in the same capacity, in Italy. There he became fascinated by fascism. The colonel claimed to have met Mussolini, whose reliance on mass spectacles he found especially inspiring and whose commitment to corporatism—particularly the regime’s attempt to enlist working-class support—appealing. Perón acknowledged his esteem for the dictator in his memoirs: “He gave me the impression of a colossus when he received me at the Palacio Venezia,” but Perón doubtless exaggerated the acquaintance, if, indeed, it existed at all.<sup>2</sup> If the devastation wrought by the Spanish Civil War left him appalled, it did not diminish his appreciation of fascism as a social movement. As he later explained to a journalist, Perón saw national socialism as “the wave of the future,” one that could lead to “real social democracy.”<sup>3</sup>

Perón was active in the GOU organization, believed by some to stand for *Grupo de Oficiales Unidos* (Group of Officers for Unity)—by others for *Grupo Obra de Unificación* (Group for Organizing Unification), a secret military lodge composed of dissident officers impatient with civilian politicians that played an important part in overthrowing the government in June of 1943. Other officers denied any involvement by Perón and even accused him of cowardice in face of physical danger.<sup>4</sup> The military regime that came to power dissolved Congress (the Argentine legislature), and in 1944, to rid the country of what it saw as political divisiveness, decreed an end to political parties.

Granted the opportunity to become a major player in the new government, the 50-year-old Perón, by this time a full colonel, was named an undersecretary of war. A fellow officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Domingo Mercante, recalled that he had clear ideas about the need for revolutionary change in regard to social issues, and that almost at once he had gotten in touch with labor leaders. Perón understood that the urban working class, especially in the capital, had evolved. Ninety percent literate, it was no longer composed of immigrants from abroad but of native Argentines (most of whom came from rural areas); that is, it now constituted a proletariat in the European sense. But it lacked political representation. The colonel was determined to court labor's support. To make it a source of strength, he asked to be additionally appointed head of the Bureau of Labor, a post both dismissed by his fellow conspirators as secondary at best and christened the "elephants' graveyard" by disillusioned workers. Perón, however, saw the possibility of elevating the Bureau to a department—which he succeeded in doing five days after being sworn in.

Aware that he could reach millions by going on radio, Perón proclaimed that "with the creation of the Department of Labor and Welfare, the era of Argentine social policy has begun." He had intuitively grasped the need to communicate with "the people," and to do that by reaching out beyond the means made available by an installed bureaucratic apparatus. A month later the colonel managed to have his department granted ministerial status with himself as secretary of labor and welfare. His motives were both idealistic and opportunistic. Perón had long argued that the army should take the lead in promoting Argentina's economic and social growth, and that a program of "targeted industrialization," if made official policy, would move the country toward economic independence. There is little doubt that he was also striving to build popular support for the new regime—and for himself.<sup>5</sup>

In an interview given in the early 1960s, he said that he had wanted to make a "real" revolution, not simply play "musical chairs." Yet his

entire career revealed that talk of structural change served as a means to an end. Rather than pursue any ideology, Perón sought political power, and his position as labor minister provided him with an access to a hitherto untried lever for attaining it, that of organized labor. To win its support, the new minister at once required employers to give their workers a one month's salary bonus (the *aguinaldo*) each year.<sup>6</sup>

Argentine workers could appreciate the new minister's efforts on their behalf. Insisting that "the problem with Argentina isn't political; it's social," Perón would expand the nation's bill of rights to include those granted to labor: the right to work, fair wages, adequate training, improved working conditions, and social security and family protection. He promised additional measures to ensure "the preservation of health" arguing that "it's the discontent of the workers that produces all the disturbances. We have to give this revolution a social content, and the only way to do that is to bring the masses into the national life."<sup>7</sup>

In contrast to his colleagues in the military, Perón had recognized the growing importance of labor in Argentina. The Depression of the 1930s had devastated agricultural production. Between 1937 and 1947 the amount of land planted in wheat and corn declined by over a third, with most having been put into pasture and many renters literally pushed out of the countryside. Economic depression and then war forced Argentina to accelerate its rate of industrialization, further increasing the attraction of cities where jobs were seen as more accessible. The rapidly expanding urban poor faced a housing shortage, resulting in the emergence of numerous shanty towns. A crisis was at hand, and it would appear that a crisis of some sort is a necessary precondition for the emergence of a charismatic leader.<sup>8</sup>

Unlike their nineteenth-century counterparts, these new urban (male) workers had the vote (secured in 1911). But existing political parties did not appeal to them; neither conservatives who dominated the Argentine Congress until 1940, nor the Radical Civic Union (UCR) founded in 1890, a party that had lost whatever revolutionary zeal it once possessed and showed interest chiefly in blocking conservatives and winning office for itself. Socialists tried to respond to the needs of labor. However, with an abstract ideology found incomprehensible by migrants accustomed to following individual leaders—their readiness to refer to Perón as *El Líder* (The Leader) was not coincidental—and with an interest in internationalist causes that left workers unimpressed, the Socialist Party was ineffectual.

Although often ruled by successive military dictatorships and fraudulently elected presidents, Argentina was not an underdeveloped country. In addition to possessing a relatively skilled labor force, it could boast of a long and rich cultural history. The capital, Buenos Aires, was founded in 1580, the city of Córdoba in 1573, and its university in 1613, 80 years before the College of William and Mary in Virginia. The country came to produce three Nobel Prize winners and leaders in all the arts. It took pride in a sophisticated, literate, well-educated, and not easily duped people.

The political and economic climate, however, had not changed. In the early 1940s almost half of Argentina's industry was owned by foreigners. The nation's economy largely depended on Great Britain, which bought 30–40 percent (90 percent of meat exports) of everything that Argentina sold. British economic domination combined with growing American investment enabled the two nations to exert leverage that generated resentment. The disparity between the modernization of Buenos Aires and the backwardness of the countryside, moreover, was all too apparent. Finally, the lack of social legislation furthered animosity and contributed to a growing sense of disunity.<sup>9</sup>

Perón's prolabor policies marked a clear shift from those followed by his colleagues. In its first weeks in power, the military government had arrested strikers and harassed labor organizers. Within days of taking office the regime had decreed a law on professional associations that required unions to stay out of politics and had closed down the General Labor Confederation (CGT) faction led by Communists. Perón, on the other hand, urged his fellow collaborators to win the unions over, to get them "to come here, right away."<sup>10</sup>

In addition to having wages increased and labor legislation enforced, much of it for the first time, Perón presided over the formation of new trade unions and promoted the growth of existing ones friendly to him. Organized textile workers, two thousand strong in 1943, numbered eighty-four thousand in 1946; similarly, metal workers saw their ranks swell from two thousand to one hundred thousand in the same period of time. Statutes on social security, housing, vacations, and rural labor were drafted and labor courts created to enforce industrial legislation. Some union leaders received government posts. The colonel's door was open, but only to visitors representing state-approved labor organizations, not to isolated individuals. By 1945 Perón's ministry was the nation's sole collective bargaining agency. Although eroded by inflation, real wages were up by 12 percent. Workers gave him full credit and blamed other, mysterious, factors for the higher prices that resulted in part from their higher wages.<sup>11</sup>



Modeling his tactics on those used successfully by the European dictators, Perón dramatized every move he made. He sought and received wide publicity for his prolabor stance. In public speeches he repeatedly identified with the throngs of listening workers. "You're dirty and I'm dirty. We're dirty together," he told them to rapturous applause. He walked with workers in the industrial suburbs of Buenos Aires, and the perception of concern for their welfare was carried to a wider audience by the radio program starring his new mistress, Eva Duarte. Called "Toward a Better Future," it portrayed the energetic and socially conscious colonel as the Latin "superman." A bond was thus formed between Perón and workers receptive to his efforts on their behalf. Should the colonel lose power, they would lose as well. In December 1943, at a meeting of railroad workers in the city of Rosario, he had been introduced as "Argentina's Number One Worker" (*primer trabajador argentina*), and this image was to endure.<sup>12</sup>

If labor was appreciative, factory owners and the business classes were not. Higher wages and better conditions raised their costs, and the more Perón veered to the left on labor issues, the more he alienated not only civilian elites such as business and the professions, but the armed forces as well. Encouraged by the British and American governments, still suspicious of the military dictatorship, employers could all the more easily label Perón and the military government as fascist and support the political opposition's campaign to roll back his reforms and oust the current administration, presided over by General Edelmiro Farrell.

In the early years of World War II, many Argentines, particularly the German-trained officer corps, wanted to preserve the country's neutrality. Unlike Brazil and other Latin American countries, which joined with the United States and became recipients of economic and military aid, they wanted to have it both ways: to remain neutral yet continue to sell food to beleaguered Great Britain. But under considerable pressure both from pro-Allied groups and Washington, the military head of state, then president Pedro Ramírez, severed Argentine relations with the Axis powers in January 1944. Within a month, conservative military elements, especially strong in the GOU, who feared that the country would enter the war on the allied side, organized another coup, ousted Ramírez and replaced him with Farrell, the vice president and minister of war. Not surprisingly, Farrell's chief aide was the same Colonel Perón who had helped secure Farrell's selection as vice president under Ramirez. He now took Farrell's place

as vice president and minister of war (in addition to retaining his post as head of labor). Clearly, he had emerged as the government's most influential member. In both posts Perón placed his own choices in positions of power, in the war ministry and in the trade unions, where he was working to build labor into a strong political base. To retain the support of the military, he increased its share of the budget. To retain that of labor, he raised the wages of workers.

Although Argentina remained officially neutral, Washington rightly perceived a pro-Axis orientation by much of the nation's armed forces, particularly by its officer corps. Perón himself was in close touch with some German Argentines, most notably Ludwig Freude, a wealthy businessman. And as a military officer, the colonel would strongly object to the Nuremberg trials as opposed to military honor and unworthy of the victors. His stated admiration for Mussolini and a predisposition toward authoritarian rule strengthened allegations of a profascist orientation. For biographer Joseph Page, however, Perón continued to place expediency ahead of ideology, and his admiration for Nazi Germany and fascist Italy was expressed most loudly when the Axis powers appeared to be winning.<sup>13</sup>

Democratic and liberal elements showed no such sympathies, and after Pearl Harbor they supported Washington's efforts to win over the entire Western Hemisphere to the allied cause. Finally responding to North American pressure, on March 27, 1945, Argentina declared war on Germany and Japan. Recognizing Perón as the real power in the Farrell administration, conservative officers blamed him for having abandoned the country's neutrality—and as having betrayed the army. Right-wing officers also chafed at his courting of labor, finding the promotion of trade unions and workers' rights as self-serving and dangerous and preferring to take a harder line against opponents, real and potential. Despite Perón's efforts to appease his fellow officers by supporting more enlistments, providing faster promotions, and stimulating armaments manufacturing, they resented his ambition and rise in popularity. Seeking a source of blame for the discontent driven by rising prices, they were ready to dump him, but in view of his civilian (labor) support feared that so doing threatened an end to the military regime itself.<sup>14</sup>

Another source of dissatisfaction with Perón, one found especially galling by the conservative officer corps, was the colonel's relationships with young women and most notably that with a 25-year-old radio actress named Eva Duarte.

Perón's liaisons with women, although much exaggerated, are more than biographical footnotes. They illuminate aspects of his character

that bore on his leadership abilities and left an impact on Argentine history. The colonel had lost his (first) wife to cancer. In 1926, the year he was promoted to captain, the 31-year-old Perón had married a 17-year-old girl, Aurelia Tízón, a disparity that was not unusual according to Argentine norms. After her early death, it appeared that he would marry a sister-in-law, but nothing came of it. In 1943 another teenage girl was sharing his drab apartment, situated across the street from a large brewery. Although there were other young girls, the inflated numbers, as well as rumors of “sexual aberrations,” was the work of his political enemies. Certainly he profited from the sex appeal he projected. His virile appearance attracted women and drew admiration from macho-minded men. Yet Perón never fathered any children (which fostered claims of sterility). A confession to fellow officers early in his career that he knew only his wife inspired whispers of impotency. Still, stories circulated of a German mistress while in Italy and of deviations ranging from voyeurism to pedophilia.<sup>15</sup>

No doubt Perón was seen as an attractive widower: he was tall, projected a massive appearance, resplendent in an immaculate white uniform and shiny boots. There was always a broad radiant smile, and when he removed his cap, an abundant display of silky black hair. When he had welcomed theatrical celebrities who gathered to support victims of a 1945 earthquake (the event at which he first met Eva), each of the ladies present felt that he cared for her alone.

Both the durability of the relationship and the importance of the role played by Eva in his life surprised his fellow officers. More to the point, they were shocked and affronted by the familiarity displayed and the lack of decorum.<sup>16</sup>

Resentment of “Evita,” as she preferred to call herself, reached an unprecedented level when a friend of hers was appointed secretary of commerce. Perón was unaware that the post had been promised to an army officer. A general later stated that in addition to Perón’s “subversive” policy with respect to labor organizations, the immorality displayed was a legitimate target for criticism: “The revolution had lost all sense of hierarchy ... We were convinced it was our duty to stop the nation from falling into the hands of that woman, as it in fact eventually did.”<sup>17</sup>

On October 9, 1945, officers in the Campo de Mayo garrison (on the outskirts of Buenos Aires), resentful of Perón’s political ambition, upset with his personal behavior, and, above all, opposed to his labor policies, applied pressure on the Farrell administration to force the colonel to resign his three government posts. Labor leaders were

stunned by his departure. Finding his dismissal unjust and fearing that the gains of the past two years were to be nullified, they rushed to offer pledges of support. A few days later Perón was arrested and confined to the tiny island of Martín García, in the mouth of the Río de la Plata. “The three days spent there with Evita,” he recalled, “were devoted completely to ourselves. They were the only three days of real life we had together, a real honeymoon.”<sup>18</sup>

With *El Líder* apparently gone, the unity forged by the opposition to him gave way to internecine wrangling. The officers who had ousted him could not agree on the composition of a caretaker government to replace Farrell’s, and as his opponents hesitated, Perón’s closest supporters began rousing labor support to have him reinstated.

Sometimes a single day can change the course of a nation’s history, and one such day was October 17, 1945, in Argentina. The workers of Buenos Aires then came together to demand Perón’s release from detention. Forced to resign and then arrested, he was about to fade into obscurity. But on that day columns of workers streamed toward the city, their destination the Plaza de Mayo, the great square outside the Casa Rosada, the presidential mansion, in an unprecedented wave of popular support. Some 50,000 (other accounts range from 250,000 to 500,000) people shouted the name of their secretary for labor and demanded his return. Well-dressed *porteños* (a reference to the respectable citizens of the port of Buenos Aires) gaped at dark-skinned workers in overalls alternately screaming “PAY-RON” and chanting “Long live Perón.”

They staged a mass demonstration to demand his freedom and force an unnerved government to reinstate him. That night, after having been freed by the generals who had detained him, he was begged by them to address the crowd still assembled in the square. Perón did so in an historic balcony speech that would guarantee his supremacy over the people and seal the nation’s fate to his own. Rather than bringing an end to his career, his arrest and imprisonment endowed him with an aura of martyrdom. It enabled him to set off an explosion of nationalist sentiment best described in the slogan of the party he was to found: “Argentina for Argentinians.” It would carry him to the presidency and reshape political life. Afterward, whenever asked about his ancestry, Perón replied simply, “17 October.”<sup>19</sup> Four days later, Perón kept the promise he had made to Evita after they had fled the capital and married her.

As a biographer put it, “[O]n that day an entire social class would shed its invisibility, and at the same time a society, ever prone to divisiveness, would find for itself a new dichotomy, defined by one’s

attitude toward Juan Domingo Perón.” However, Joseph Page went on to argue that the events have been mythologized by both sides. The chief distortion had Evita at the cutting edge as she roamed the factories and workshops rallying workers. On the other side, anti-Perón elements described him as a coward, carefully remaining out of sight. There is no truth in either version. Nor is it true (as many anti-Perónists claimed) that October 17 was the work of a few labor leaders who forced their followers to march on Buenos Aires.<sup>20</sup> Both workers, who feared the loss of a man who embodied their dreams, and energetic labor leaders capable of organizing them were necessary to return him to office. Perón’s arrest had mobilized his supporters, and the CGT, the trade union federation, seized the initiative when it called a general strike to assert control.

Many in the sweltering heat had cooled themselves in the fountains in the Plaza de Mayo, a breach of manners that annoyed some editorialists who referred to the colonel’s motley supporters as *descamisados* (shirtless ones). Proper *porteños* wore jackets and ties. Perón intuitively seized on the term coined by opponents as a putdown (like *sans-culottes* in the French Revolution). Taken as one of pride and adopted by the Peronists, it would become the standard to rally his working-class supporters.

If the frenzied support shown by the *descamisados* had intimidated the president and explains his order for Perón’s release, the colonel refused an offer to rejoin the administration, preferring to campaign in the presidential election scheduled by Farrell. The government thereupon pushed the date ahead to the following February in the belief that the Peronists, as *El Líder*’s supporters came to be known, would not be able to unite in time and confront the existing and well-organized parties. Farrell agreed with his advisors that a speedy election would put an end to the political crisis.<sup>21</sup>

To their surprise, union leaders within days established a *Partido Laborista* (Labor Party). It was based on the British party of the same name and came out with a roughly similar program of state intervention. Nationalist organizations and a breakaway left-wing faction of the Radical Party also endorsed the colonel’s candidacy. Some miscellaneous conservatives joined the coalition, while outside the capital Perón made peace with regional parties to broaden his support. The opposition, too, was energized. Traditional parties led by mainstream Radicals banded together to form the *Unión Democrática* or UD (Democratic Union). Even many Socialists, Communists (although the latter, put off by Perón’s anti-Communism, had dissociated themselves from the workers’ demonstration), and progressive democrats

came out in support of Radical candidates. This anti-Peronist coalition campaigned on the slogan, "For Liberty, Against Nazism."

All but two daily newspapers supported the UD, which also had access to radio. Confident of victory, party chiefs were so convinced that the military government would cancel or corrupt the election that they began to conspire to overthrow the regime. They only lacked a leader. The US State Department obligingly provided one: the former ambassador to Argentina who had done much to challenge the regime since its seizure of power and who was now an assistant secretary of state, Spruille Braden.

Braden asked the State Department to examine captured Nazi documents, and Secretary of State Byrnes requested that the FBI and Departments of Justice, War, Navy and Treasury all cooperate in the effort to link Perón to the defeated fascist powers. Braden was in touch with the American embassy, although there is no evidence that Washington sent money or arms to the Democratic Union. However, just weeks before the vote an American State Department study appeared that labeled leaders of the military government as Axis sympathizers and singled out Perón as a suspected fascist. Braden had the "Blue Book," as the study became known, widely distributed throughout Argentina in the hope that it would weaken Perón's candidacy. But by proclaiming his patriotism and charging that his opponents were under the control of the North Americans, the colonel turned Washington's opposition to him against the UD. The election, he thundered, offered a choice between Braden's or Argentina's interests, and his coalition's slogan, "*Braden o Perón*," galvanized the campaign.<sup>22</sup>

With the support of both labor and the Catholic Church—whose views Perón supported (in contrast to the anticlericalism of his opponents—Perón's coalition won handily with 54 percent of the vote (1.5 million versus 1.2 for the UD) in the election held on February 24, 1946. In a victory that exceeded all expectations and left the opposition stunned, it also won all but two Senate seats and almost two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies. Although the press and radio came out for the Democratic Union, the public had not. Perón triumphed because he touched the concerns of most Argentines: labor, much of the middle class, nationalists, and even those conservatives who could not tolerate the Radicals. He had shown himself as an attractive and dynamic candidate in contrast to an opposition that appeared out of touch and rooted in the past. In failing to specify alternative programs, Perón's rivals gave the impression that they opposed the social and economic gains granted workers by the colonel's prolabor

policies. Clumsy (North) American efforts to intervene, as well as the presence of Moscow-oriented Communists in their ranks, had stigmatized Perón's opponents with a foreign taint.

On June 4, 1946, the day he assumed office, Perón began a nine-year reign as president of Argentina. Even those who found his administration repressive could hardly deny that it was also dynamic and imaginative. Most significant was the permanent change in the social structure of the country, when working people were brought into the fabric of society. For this the colonel was idolized by the labor masses, but despised by those who would suffer at the hands of his regime.

With enormous popular support, which together with his authoritarian nature minimized the need to respect political rivals, Perón began to implement the corporatist tenets espoused by the GOU officers. Argentina was to be organized according to economic groups: industrialists, farmers, and workers. At the top would be the state, with the government as the final arbiter. The regime expanded the policies, most particularly the state-directed reforms, that had first appeared in 1944 and which continued to move groups once ignored or repressed to the heart of a movement *El Líder* defined as revolutionary.

Both a party and a state of near hegemonic power were created as Perón began to punish those who led the attempt to oust him the previous year. He purged the universities, dismissing some fifteen hundred faculty members who had spoken out against him. He began exerting greater control over the press, by favoring newspapers that supported him and rationing newsprint to those that did not. In control of both the executive and legislative branches of the government, the president now sought to "Peronize" the judiciary. He proposed the impeachment of three supposedly anti-Perón members of the Supreme Court for having taken sides in the events of October 1945. Although it signified an end to an independent judiciary, loyal legislators and even many lawyers went along.

Together with labor, much of the armed forces—especially the officer corps that realized where its interests lay—served as the foundation of his regime. Although with the end of full conscription the overall size of the armed forces decreased, military spending rose, the number of officers multiplied, and many of them received key posts in industries and government agencies. Even so, the favoritism shown to the labor movement alienated those in the military who opposed it, particularly in the navy, the branch most vocal in its hostility and

which would take the initiative in opposing Perón's reelection in 1951 and in ousting him from power four years later.

The continuation of the benefits bestowed on labor—minimum wages, raised salaries, limited hours, restricted employers' rights over employees, and mandated workplace standards in key industries—was impressive, and unprecedented. In his campaign for the presidency, Perón had promised greater social justice and economic independence. He sought to integrate labor into Argentine society and offer it a larger share of the gross national product in the form of more health care, education, and housing. The gains made were significant: paid vacations, medical services and accident compensation, the establishment of collective bargaining, improved working conditions, workers' housing projects, a renovated social security program, and a reorganized General Confederation of Labor. Indeed, after the army the CGT became the second most powerful instrument in Argentine politics. Not surprisingly, union membership jumped from 522,000 in 1945 to near two million by 1949.<sup>23</sup>

The implementation of a five-year economic plan, which in addition to continuing social reform included public works projects and massive industrialization, helped make for full employment. A powerful foreign trade institute, given a state monopoly over the export of key crops, was created. It required landowners, the losers under the regime's economic policies, to sell their products to the government at low fixed prices. Argentina had undertaken the most state-run economic policy so far seen in twentieth-century Latin America. Perón had created a new political base, the uneasy alliance of workers, manufacturers, and supportive military that had won his election. But from the outset it was clear that urban workers were to be his most important ally. With their standard of living raised and jobs more readily available, it was small wonder that *El Líder* was adored by the laboring masses.<sup>24</sup>

Perón's political opponents had shunned these migrants from the countryside, calling them part of a "zoological flood." He posed as their champion making use of a tactic relied on when he took over the Labor Department in 1943: to encourage strikes, which the government then settled in favor of the workers. The result was a dramatic redistribution of income in favor of labor and virtually full employment, attained by industrialization and by padding the government payroll. Between 1942 and 1955 the number of persons employed by the national government increased by 98 percent.<sup>25</sup>

If, as will be seen, the verdict on Peronism ultimately reached by economists was negative, that was not the case regarding his social



policy. One analyst wrote, "Whatever his motives, Perón was successful in bringing the lower classes into the life of the nation, imparting to them a new sense of destiny and a new consciousness of their power."<sup>26</sup> By 1948 the real wages of skilled industrial workers were 27 percent higher than in 1943, those of unskilled workers, 37 percent higher. The total remuneration of labor, as measured by wages and fringe benefits, jumped by 80 percent between 1943 and 1949, the years that Perón consolidated his rule. In 1943, 500,000 Argentines were covered by social security; in 1949, over 2 million and rising. The share of national wealth going to labor rose by 25 percent between 1946 and 1950.<sup>27</sup>

Working-class enthusiasm for him thus emerged from a rational perception of its interests rather than simply from admiration of the colonel's special gifts of leadership style. Put another way, during the 18 years that Perón was to spend in exile after 1955, his support—and its durability—came not only, or even primarily, from his charisma but from the redistribution of income in favor of labor carried out during his presidency. Another writer said that if populism is defined as the politics of incorporating the lower classes into the life of the nation, and if it is done so without a revolution, then "Perón represented one of Latin America's earliest cases of populism."<sup>28</sup>

The price paid for these gains was the loss of independence—by labor and every other component of Argentine society. A new law on professional associations pushed through (before Perón's arrest) in 1945 enabled him to exert total control over labor organizations. Only those authorized by the state—and only one union for each industry was permitted—could bargain with employers and represent workers before the government, thus enabling the regime to eliminate anti-Peronist unions. In addition, subsequent governments found his high-wages policy difficult to deal with because of the popular expectations it had awakened. By focusing on redistribution over productivity and in encouraging inflation by printing more and more money to meet popular demands, it could not be sustained even during his own tenure. Still, the pro-labor agenda of Perón's first presidency built a firm foundation for his political support, a foundation that would endure.<sup>29</sup>

The vast five-year plan for industrialization and development that Perón had presented to the Argentine Congress in 1946 was prompted by nationalist sentiment—and, as always, by political expediency. He hoped both to lessen Argentina's economic dependence on foreigners and to reach out to industrialists. If the military ensured his position and the trade unions constituted his party's rank and file, he wanted

to recruit business elements as well. When World War II isolated Argentina from foreign markets, new industries emerged to make up for the lack of imported goods. But most employers had objected to the colonel's (he would be promoted to major general at a special session of the Senate in December of 1949) support of striking workers. Industrial expansion would not only please factory owners, but the increased number of jobs would add new workers to the base of the Peronist party. And by emphasizing steel and arms manufacturing, he would also strengthen his support from the military. Accordingly, during Perón's presidency the government pushed industrial development to unprecedented levels. Aided by booming exports that yielded healthy trade surpluses, the gross domestic product grew at a rate of 8.6 percent in 1946 and an astonishing 12.6 percent in 1947. Even the 5.1 percent increase in 1948 was entirely respectable.<sup>30</sup>

During his campaign for the presidency, Perón had promised to embark on a quest for economic independence and so bring an end to foreign domination over such important sectors as transportation and services. The ambitious plan that promised full employment, a more equitable distribution of increased national income, stable prices, greater industrial development, and an improved infrastructure signified a greater role for the state. In 1946 a reorganization of the Central Bank gave it more control over foreign-owned assets. *El Líder's* 1947 "Declaration of Economic Independence," which empowered the government to expropriate foreign holdings, would seem to contradict his strategy to win over business interests. But unlike Castro's Cuba a decade or so later, Perón's Argentina preferred to purchase rather than expropriate, as in the case of the British-owned railroads that were bought for \$600 million in 1948. (The money came from Argentina's trade surplus—the foreign exchange earned during and immediately after World War II through the sale of agricultural products to a devastated Europe.<sup>31</sup>) American telephone company interests were similarly bought out and nationalized, as were airlines, shipping, and local transport. And in July 1947 Perón paid off Argentina's entire foreign debt, an event celebrated in a huge public ceremony marked by the president's proclamation of economic independence. Posing as a champion of Argentina's sovereignty and national interest (and asserting his populist credentials), Perón defined his government as anti-imperialist and his nation as unique, as offering a "third way" between Capitalism and Communism.

The "Third Way" that lay at the heart of his foreign policy was the way deemed by *El Líder* as appropriate for all nations outside the two

superpower-dominated blocs. (He was often credited with originating the concept of the “Third World.”<sup>32</sup>) Perón predicted that if the countries of Latin America did not join together they would remain weak and put upon by more powerful nations. However, unlike Indira Gandhi and Olof Palme, also committed to a more or less neutral stand in the Cold War, he did not support any anticolonial struggle, and his “Third Position” policy, characterized by the battle cry “*Ni yanqui, ni marxista—peronista*,” proved little more than a slogan. And Perón’s anti-Communism persuaded him, despite his Yankee-baiting, that Argentina would stand with the United States in the event of a North American war with the Soviets, a war he thought inevitable.

Regardless of any lack of affection for the colossus to the north, he was not inclined to undermine Washington’s plans for hemispheric cooperation. And although the North American press highlighted the authoritarianism of the Perón regime, Washington’s policy was evolving. It had failed to get Perón overthrown in 1945 or defeated in 1946. To aid Perón’s opponents Braden had sought diplomatic isolation. However, the new US ambassador to Argentina, George Messersmith, and Pentagon pressure to have Argentina integrated into hemispheric defense strategies paved the way for a more conciliatory policy. Still, it was domestic and not foreign policy that preoccupied Perón, and here he was enormously aided by the image projected—and the work accomplished—by his wife.

Eva María Duarte de Perón played a key role in strengthening the ties between the urban poor and organized labor, on the one hand, and the state, on the other. Her husband’s government functioned best, as one analyst put it, when Evita “stoked the fires of working class militancy while he reassured the pillars of society that all was under control.”<sup>33</sup> Until her death in 1952, she placed emphasis on three major organizations: the Social Aid Foundation that she founded and directed, the General Labor Confederation and the workers it represented, and the Peronist Women’s Party she brought into being. By gaining the devotion of the underprivileged, cultivating allies in the trade unions, and seeking the support of women demanding political equality with men, Evita became an important advisor and crucial asset in building the Peronist movement. After the 1946 election, she devoted herself to charitable works. Funds from the state and the CGT enabled her to become a patron of the *descamisados*. Huge sums were allocated to fund hospitals and clinics, establish food programs, and provide disaster relief and low-cost housing for the poor.

Propaganda and well-orchestrated promotions helped Evita build a prominent following of her own. Making use of her growing popularity, she spearheaded a campaign in 1947 to give women the right to vote, adding another layer to the foundation of Perón's regime. When he granted the vote to Argentine women in 1947, a new field for propaganda was opened. Perón could proclaim that he was breaking with tradition (although agitation for female suffrage was of long duration) and declare the regime as eminently progressive. Evita would organize the Women's Peronist Party, which trained devoted agents to instill within its membership loyalty to Perón—not feminist objectives—as the goal.<sup>34</sup> In 1949, with the support of these new women voters, *El Líder* again reconstituted his party, this time under the name *Partido Peronista*, the first party in Argentine history officially named for one person. Like de Gaulle's Rally of the French People, it saw itself more as a movement reaching out to those of various political persuasions.

Although women's suffrage was signed into law on her return from the "Rainbow Tour" of Europe undertaken in the summer of 1947, Evita herself accepted women's traditional responsibilities. That her goal in advancing political rights for women was primarily opportunistic became clear when two years later she founded the women's branch of the Peronist Party. Its stated goal was to ensure that "no woman would be denied the privilege of being a Peronist." Women voted in the presidential election of 1951, which returned her husband to office and gave Peronists control of all provincial governments as well as both houses of Congress. More women than men cast votes for Perón.<sup>35</sup>

In mid-1948 her charitable organization was granted legal recognition, and it became the engine of her social welfare endeavors and her pet project. Supposedly independent, the Foundation carried out much of the state's agenda. By 1950 it employed over fourteen thousand people, including construction workers and some priests, and owned assets of \$200 million. The work done was impressive. Orphanages were built; homes for unwed mothers and the elderly founded; shelters for working women established, and so on. The foundation also provided lunches for schoolchildren, built children's hospitals, created holiday camps for workers, constructed low-cost housing, opened schools to train nurses, and even erected a children's village on the outskirts of the capital. In six years it would build a thousand schools and double the number of hospitals.<sup>36</sup>

Conceivably her preoccupation with children served as compensation for the couple's lack of any of their own. Certainly she took pride in her honorary title, "Spiritual Mother of all Argentine Children." In retrospect, however, her critics were right. Charity, however well intentioned,

did not get to the root of the problems faced by the underprivileged, and the government showed little interest in more radical solutions.

Her life story has passed into legend, filled with distortion and exaggeration. Evita was not the dominant partner in the marriage and certainly not the *de facto* ruler of Argentina. Still, she was more, much more, than a mindless instrument. If Perón had nudged her into playing a political role, she was predisposed to assume it and did well with it. But she remained dependent on Perón, ceaselessly praised him, and even when rumors surfaced that she would be the party's nominee for vice president of Argentina, demanded total subservience to him. With such exhortations as "Peron is everything ... the soul, the nerve, the hope and the reality of the Argentine people .... We all feed from his light," she contributed significantly to the personality cult that he inspired.<sup>37</sup> The message was repeated tirelessly in her autobiography, and made required reading in schools—with explanatory commentaries intended for elementary school teachers.

Evita's emergence in politics galvanized Peronism. By strengthening the threads linking him to the masses, she added to his charisma. In many ways, the wife complemented the husband: her violent rhetoric let him pose as a moderating unifier; her contact with the people allowed him to turn to more elevated state affairs; and her manipulation of the bureaucracy shielded him from the unpleasantness of imposing discipline. She ceaselessly addressed workers, women, and any group willing to listen, making passionate pleas on radio to support Peronist programs. She pictured her husband as the universal savior in the proverbial fight between the *descamisados* and the "oligarchs and traitors, out to crush the shirtless people beneath their boots," and she pleaded with the masses for their help in "flushing traitors from their foul lairs." Critics, however, knew that the political machine put together by Perón and defended by his wife was choking off political dissent.<sup>38</sup> Yet neither she nor her husband could bring an end to the limited but uncompromising political opposition to him, to those who refused to accept the result of Perón's election to the presidency, who boycotted his inauguration, and who declined to participate in legislative activity. One of the tools available to this opposition was Perón's continued relations with the remnants of Nazism, which enabled his adversaries to see themselves as continuing the struggle against fascism.

Recent research, particularly that gleaned from long-inaccessible archives in Argentina, the United States, and several European

countries by Buenos Aires journalist Uki Goñi, lends credence to allegations of collusion with Nazis after Germany's defeat.<sup>39</sup>

In what has been called "an extraordinary piece of investigative reporting" and "a major breakthrough in historical scholarship," Goñi charged that Washington's suspicions were, if anything, understated.<sup>40</sup> Although Perón posed as noncommittal, his agents smuggled three hundred Nazis and other war criminals out of Germany. His support for Hitler, his contacts with Himmler, and his hostility to the Nuremberg trials are well documented, as is the shameful behavior of Argentine diplomats who made ransom demands on Jewish families seeking visas. Besides such notorious figures as Adolf Eichman, Josef Mengele, and Klaus Barbie, dozens of French, Belgian, Italian, and Croatian and Slovak fascists, many of them Nazi collaborators, were also admitted. The documents uncovered by Goñi show that a covert network was managed directly from an office in the presidential palace by Rudolfo ("Rudi") Freude, the young, blond German Argentine who was one of Perón's closest advisors and who in the mid-1940s ran his propaganda apparatus and state intelligence service.

They also show the Vatican and the Catholic hierarchy in Argentina as having colluded to protect thousands of Croatian fascists wanted for acts of genocide, and the Vatican itself as deeply involved in the secret escape network. The Perón government authorized the arrival of the first Nazi collaborators as a result of a meeting in March 1946 between Antonio Caggiano, an Argentine cardinal, and Eugene Tisserant, a French cardinal attached to the Vatican. It was also in Rome that the fiercely anti-Communist Bishop Alois Hudal arranged for the safe transportation of Nazis he had helped to shelter. On one occasion the bishop asked Perón for five thousand visas for German and Austrian "soldiers." Goñi contended that Pope Pius XII knew what was happening and even provided funds for the enterprise.<sup>41</sup>

Argentina was not the only terminus of the so-called Odessa (the acronym for *Organisation der Ehemaligen SS-Angehörigen*) escape routes network established by high-ranking Nazis and war-time German industrialists in 1947 who were aware that they were going to be held accountable. Other South American countries, where Germans constituted a political force, including Brazil and especially Paraguay, must be included. Nazi hunter Simon Weisenthal estimated that close to a billion dollars of wealth was smuggled out of Europe by the Nazis. Perón himself, according to an investigation in Buenos Aires after his downfall, received about \$100 million and Eva was a protector of Capri, a German firm established to provide work for postwar refugees.<sup>42</sup>

"During the war," Goñi wrote, "the president nurtured hopes of leading a pro-Nazi bloc in Latin America, and his special envoy met with Heinrich Himmler and Joachim von Ribbentrop."

According to Perón's avowedly pro-Nazi head of immigration, a victorious Germany would transplant its ideology to Argentina where a new immigration law would remodel the population to "choose the best within the white race to create the Argentina we all yearn for."

Such a policy meant turning away thousands of Jews seeking asylum. The immigration commissioner responsible was later amnesied on the grounds he had granted landing permits to Jews, but to widespread embarrassment it was discovered that most of the exceptions for Jews had been ordered by Perón himself. To counter charges of anti-Semitism, Perón welcomed applications from loyal Peronist Jewish leaders and opened the door to some elderly Jews "because they can leave no descendants." They had to pay, however: Germany used Argentine banks to extort and shelter money demanded from Jews for exit permits.<sup>43</sup>

Freude had won Perón's trust and friendship after winning that of Evita and her corrupt brother, Juan Duarte. Rudolfo's father, Ludwig, was the longtime favorite of Perón who had solicited contributions from German businessmen in Argentina for the colonel's 1945 presidential campaign. One of the richest men in Argentina, Ludwig was empowered by the German government with funds to finance Nazi Intelligence after Argentina broke diplomatic ties with Berlin in January 1944. In early September 1945, when Ludwig was arraigned, then vice president Perón interceded to prevent his expulsion and reduce his sentence to house arrest. It was "Rudi" who had provided the family's summer home as Perón's hideout the following month, after the colonel was ousted by resentful generals hoping to deflect anger aimed at the Farrell administration. As Goñi put it, Perón's subsequent dealings with war criminals accounted for "the greatest escape in the annals of crime." After having helped Nazi war criminals flee to Argentina, he welcomed them at the Casa Rosada and arranged new jobs and identities. Perón went so far as to endorse an amnesty for Nazis in Argentina, but even diehard nationalists could not stomach this, and it was never carried out.<sup>44</sup>

Like much that explains his behavior, Perón's motives for associating himself with the escape route that (for the most part) remained secret for 50 years were more opportunistic than ideological. If Perón himself was not anti-Semitic, insofar as he exploited discontent and his nativism emphasized a pre-Vatican II Catholic tradition, he promoted anti-Semitic sentiment. In combining this nativism with appeals

to populism and nationalism, he quietly encouraged his followers in their anti-Jewish campaigns. Yet the Jewish community within Argentina cooperated with his government, and for one scholar his record regarding Jewish immigration (in contrast to that of welcoming Nazis) was no worse than that of the United States.<sup>45</sup>

The control exerted by the government was not absolute. Although willing to resort to it, Perón rejected violence as a state policy, and his allegiance to the military prevented him from having it totally serve the government's interests. To amass (and retain) power, *El Líder* prevented the emergence of a rival strong enough to contest his exercise of it. He cultivated contention and disarray, setting, for example, the labor wing of his party against the political wing. The establishment of the women's branch, which added a third ingredient to his party's brew, delighted him but in no way diminished his authority. Moreover, Perón was reluctant to delegate power. Not only would competent lieutenants impede his direct ties to his followers, he simply mistrusted those around him. The only person granted any real authority was his wife. As noted, in fact if not in name, Evita took control of the labor ministry and responsibility for keeping and broadening working-class support.

Contributing to her success was the regime's ability to pump out propaganda. It used every medium to rally mass support. Perón went on record repeatedly as wanting to create a nation "socially just, economically free, and politically sovereign." He took pride in his new constitution, which claimed to empower workers and the aged and to provide "social welfare and public works for all."<sup>46</sup>

The regime sought and thrived on popular support and encouraged every manifestation of it. The president had easily won the election thanks to his well-established base in the trade unions and the armed forces, and he made every effort to broaden it by extensive and well-publicized programs of social welfare and public works. Perón and Evita cherished the crowds, which for them legitimized their power, and they staged mass celebrations to bring them out. The two great days (*jornadas*) in the Peronist calendar, May 1 (Labor Day) and October 17 (his reinstatement), provided opportunities for the mass display of mass emotions.

The latter celebration was the largest, highlighted by Perón's speech to an enthusiastic crowd gathered in front of the presidential palace. For a full week before, the occasion was promoted on radio. Schoolteachers dwelt on its importance. It was followed by a holiday



known as Saint Perón's day, and as the years passed, the event became a ritual. In his speech, *El Líder* would list the accomplishments of the past year and ask people if they were happy, invariably evoking an enthusiastic "*sí*." The process established great rapport with those who assembled—and those who listened on radio—leaving them buoyant and convinced that their government was responding to their needs. The regime had transformed May Day, the Socialist-inspired workers' holiday, into another Peronist occasion to reach out to the masses and accept their gratitude. Yet although each event drew huge crowds of up to a million in the Plaza de Mayo, the rallies, when compared to those in Hitler's Germany or Mussolini's Italy, appeared disorganized and turbulent.<sup>47</sup>

The labor legislation enacted, complemented by the work of Eva's foundation that went hand in hand with it, helped ensure his place in the hearts of Argentinian workers. A slogan popularized by the regime, *Perón cumple, Eva dignifica* (Perón fulfills, Eva dignifies), enshrined the couple as the father and mother of the country and its people. The slogan appeared everywhere, on schools, houses, and hospitals. Loyal followers made sure that their names showed on everything under the Argentinian sun: "streets, avenues, railway stations, ships, hospitals, new housing estates, a couple of cities and eventually two provinces." Each project was a piece of propaganda, intended to serve as living proof of the benefits of Peronism. Neoclassical statues of Eva flourished as Perón exploited every means, from skyscrapers to postage stamps, to disseminate his message and embellish the regime's image.<sup>48</sup>

The darker side of Peronist legislation was the law criminalizing *desacatado* (disrespect) as a form of treason. Political rivals and critics of the president and his wife could be accused of *desacatado* and imprisoned. The inevitable silence of their opponents that followed only reinforced the couple's claim of being the people's choice to govern. Selective purges of the judiciary took place to ensure that these laws were enforced. One estimate held that by 1955 Argentine prisons held 14,500 political prisoners.<sup>49</sup>

Because political leaders who stood against the regime were repressed and military leaders periodically purged to keep them in line, there was little opportunity for an opposition to emerge. Supporters of the Democratic Union that had opposed Perón in 1946 were routinely harassed. Even political groups nominally loyal to him but organized and controlled by others were taken possession of. Unconditional loyalty to Perón's person was required. He stamped out the possibility of any incipient political organization of

workers: any desire on their part for any form of political expression required his personal approval. The regime imposed tight restrictions on universities and public schools. New professors were forced to tow the party line and new courses on “justicialist philosophy,” the regime’s official ideology, and even on Evita as a historical and political force, became required curricula.<sup>50</sup>

As dissent was stifled, democracy disappeared. By 1948 there was less open discussion and more tributes to Perón and Evita. The new president of the Chamber of Deputies, the former dentist and party loyalist Héctor Cámpora admitted that it was “an honor to acknowledge being obsequious to Perón.”<sup>51</sup> *El Líder*’s military mentality had him set as a goal the defeat or neutralization of the enemy. But once power was won, a strategy that called for its conquest could not meet the need to preserve the appearance of open competition.

In mid-1949, Perón reached the pinnacle of success. With a humming economy that left the opposition demoralized and the ranks of the faithful swollen, it seemed that the realization of the “New Argentina” Perón had promised to create was at hand. Eliminating the ban on presidential reelection guaranteed a second term of office, given the strength of his party, and encouraged the belief that it would remain in charge for decades. With his reelection imminent and the power and authority of his regime confirmed by *El Líder*’s symbolic promotion to major general at a special session of the Senate at that year’s end, few could have guessed he would not complete that second term.

## PERÓN

## TERMINATION

There were two phases of Perón's presidency: the first, relatively moderate and open; the second, more closed and authoritarian, with the dividing line in late 1949 and early 1950. Yet even earlier, by placing a premium on personal loyalty, Perón began replacing hundreds of officials—including the independents and activists who had first helped to form his Labor Party. Those failing to give wholehearted allegiance, including some high-ranking military officers, were imprisoned for “political offenses.” Trade union leaders whose political aims differed from those of the administration were forced from office. Independent unions (those not sponsored by the state) could no longer represent workers in negotiations, and as their members lost out on wage increases and other benefits the fate of these unions was sealed. Appeals to party unity and insistence on respect for the president resulted in unquestioned obedience. But while *El Líder* consolidated his political control, his opponents were growing more numerous.

Accompanying the loss of political freedom was a shift from liberal capitalism to a recognition of the state's right to intervene in the economy “for the common good.” In 1949 a new constitution that described private property as possessing “a social function” replaced the reference to “property is inviolable” found in the 1853 Constitution. Accordingly, the regime set up a government agency, the Argentine Trade Promotion Institute, with the power to purchase all of Argentina's major crops at low preset prices and then resell them abroad. The government could both keep food costs down in the cities and reap handsome profits from the sales of agricultural produce

to war-starved Europe after 1945. Much of this money was intended to support a massive industrialization program, which furthered the tendency to siphon off labor from the farms to the cities. (Industrial self-sufficiency, however, remained a distant goal inasmuch as most of the “industrial” establishments the Peronists claimed to have created were little more than workshops containing a handful of employees chiefly producing processed foods and textiles.<sup>1</sup>)

This diminution of political and economic freedom should be put in the context of an economic crisis. In 1949 the country experienced the first foreign trade deficit since the end of World War II. At the same time inflation jumped to an annual rate of 31 percent, double the rate of the previous year, and a severe drought cut into agricultural exports. Still, the problems facing the economy were long-term and hidden in the early postwar years. Growth of the urban population meant that more harvests—and beef (the traditional mainstay of Argentine exports)—had to remain in Argentina. The Peronist government had counted on farm and ranch exports, but the combined effects of increased consumption, production shifts, and bad weather—another severe drought in 1951 cut the harvest in Argentina to the lowest level in 50 years and necessitated the importation of grain for the first time since 1898—required basic rethinking of the government’s once liberal economic policies. Smaller sales, the decline in the world price for agricultural goods, and drought all combined to cut export earnings and limited the nation’s ability to import.<sup>2</sup>

Yet another factor adding to Argentina’s economic woes was Washington’s decision in early 1948 that Marshall Plan money would not be used to buy Argentine commodities. Europe was to be supplied with US, Canadian, and other British Commonwealth grains, a decision that proved disastrous for Argentina. By channeling North American grain and meat to European consumers, it shut Argentine exports out of their traditional markets—and what could be sold returned less revenue as record production in the United States and Canada helped to hold down long-standing market prices for grains. Perón appealed to the American ambassador, James Bruce, for a change in policy. His anti-American utterances, the president told him, was just rhetoric; support was promised for Pan-American and Western alliances; his government was committed to the struggle against Communism, and his prolabor policies would further immunize Argentine workers against it. But *El Líder*’s pleas went unanswered. Argentina could sell its agricultural products only to such secondary markets as Spain and Brazil, and neither could furnish the exports Argentina needed, nor, for some time, pay in dollars.<sup>3</sup>

To compound matters, while the prices for exports were dropping, those for imports were rising. The need of manufacturers for new machines and fuel drove up imports, adding to an already unfavorable balance of trade. Urban growth and the resulting demand for energy meant greater consumption of (imported) oil and gas. As economic growth slowed between 1949 and 1952, shortages of key materials meant price increases. Workers pressed the government for wage hikes, leaving Peronists in a bind. In 1949, to deal with inflation, *El Líder* responded with an austerity program: tighter credit, reduced government expenditures, and limits on wages and prices.<sup>4</sup> Having been virtually incorporated into the government, organized labor provided a pillar of support. But its leaders were losing touch with their rank and file as the wage restraints imposed in the struggle against inflation made workers realize that their interests might not coincide with those of the state. Moreover, instead of promoting industrial development, Perón's second five-year plan, launched in 1953, centered on agricultural growth. The plan not only curtailed government involvement in agricultural matters, but now offered incentives to landowners in an effort to revive agricultural production, a reversal of his former cheap food policy. To secure the backing of the wealthy landowners whose support the government had originally shunned, the plan made no mention of any meaningful land reform.

The extent of the relationship between the country's economic problems and greater government control in both the political and economic spheres remains a matter of speculation. Whatever the case, steps taken to counter the opposition to Perón's remedies invariably contributed to the growth of a more authoritarian regime. Peronists advanced the date of the presidential election scheduled for February 1952 to November 1951 and implored *El Líder* (allowed to run again) to stand for reelection. In August the *descamisados* and the women's branch of the Peronist party demanded that a far from unwilling Evita accept their nomination to run for vice president. She did, but then withdrew, allegedly because of military pressure. Tradition-minded officers could not tolerate the prospect of a woman, particularly one so socially unacceptable, succeeding to the presidency and thus becoming their commander-in-chief. (It is conceivable, however, that Perón used military distaste as an excuse for aborting her candidacy: as vice president and a de facto leader of the regime; it was feared that her political value to it would diminish.) An aged figurehead was named instead, and the administration gave as the official reason

for her withdrawal her failure to meet the necessary age limit stated in the constitution. The experience left Evita embittered, and to the extent that the military played a role it showed that Perón's power was not unlimited.<sup>5</sup>

That his support in the armed forces was fading was brought home by a (poorly planned) military coup in September of 1949. Led by a handful of officers, the insurrection was quickly suppressed. Perón retaliated by having its leader sentenced to a 15-year prison term and by purging two hundred allegedly involved officers. Future promotions would be subject to closely scrutinized loyalty checks. Evita, on her part, conspired with CGT leaders in drafting plans to create working-class militias and to stockpile weapons for them in the event of another uprising, an undertaking opposed by her husband both as a military man and counter to his vision of an "organized community." The military was horrified by the very prospect of armed militias.<sup>6</sup>

In preparation for the forthcoming election and with his economic resources dwindling, Perón mobilized his political base: mass demonstrations targeted opponents; the police were ordered to harass political rivals; and state-supported union leaders did their best to discourage strikes.

On November 11, 1951, Perón was easily reelected to a second term as president of Argentina, winning 4.7 million votes (62 percent) of the 7.6 million ballots cast. His major opponent, Ricardo Balbín of the Radical party, received 2.4 million (31.8 percent). Peronists kept possession of both houses of Congress and control of the provincial governments. With their access to the media cut—the government-controlled radio had refused it air time—it was difficult for the opposition to campaign. Still, the entirely credible outcome attested to *El Líder's* continued popular support.<sup>7</sup> It would have been difficult to imagine that within three years he would be forced to leave the country in the wake of a continued economic downturn and growing social and religious unrest, all of which was taken advantage of by a disenchanted military.

Perón needed the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the military. During the 1946 presidential campaign, the leaders of the armed forces found the alternative to him a return to a discredited civilian administration. In the early years of his presidency, Perón had put emphasis on industrial development, economic nationalism, and modernization of the military, and so kept its support. By 1951, however, an appreciable segment of the officer corps was no longer willing to follow. The government's economic failures, coupled with

Evita's mounting popularity and political influence, began to strain *El Líder's* relationship with the armed forces. Their festering distaste for Evita, the illegitimate child of a poor provincial family who became an actress and not considered a fit wife for a high-ranking army officer, much less for a president, had never abated. Her quasi-revolutionary rhetoric and openly antimilitary attitude reinforced their unhappiness with her. Her seeming thrall over the Argentine people and the faith she placed in the *descamisados* aroused their enmity. The military remained a key foundation of the regime, but the officer corps grew estranged from what it perceived as increasingly ambitious *Peronistas*. Ultranationalist officers who disliked the government's championing of the common people and resented the favoritism shown labor found the Peronist party potentially upsetting the balance and norms of society. The promotion of favorites added additional tensions. Only the couple's popularity kept an uneasy peace between them and the armed forces.

The Perón administration began to unravel after the death of Evita. When diagnosed with cancer in 1951, she became a living martyr. Her autobiography, an adulation of her husband, was released on October 17 of that year, and Peronists found it worthy of a literary medal. As death neared, the country was overwhelmed with grief. Masses were held and vigils kept for her recovery, all of which provided the regime with greater support.

It suffered a severe blow when the 33-year-old Eva Perón, who had become a vital asset to the state and to the party, died of cancer on July 26, 1952, just weeks after Perón's inauguration. Although her illness had cut into her energy during the campaign, the regime made great efforts to conceal the fact from the public. Dying, she had fought the disease and continued work at her Foundation. When on May Day, physically supported by her husband, and giving what proved to be her last speech, she weighed just 82 pounds. In dramatic tones, she had once again called on all Argentines to rally behind Perón, and if called on, to fight for him. On June 4, when Perón officially began his second term, she stood in the presidential convertible, but had to be given morphine and secured with a belt holding her to the window behind the driver.<sup>8</sup>

As the end neared, a mass psychosis seemed to grip the country. Plans for a gigantic mausoleum, 150 feet higher than the Eiffel Tower, were made. After her death what one anti-Peronist writer called "bacchanal of necrophilia" took place. Encouraged by the government,

the Peronist faithful began a prolonged period of mourning. During the transfer of the body from the presidential palace to the ministry of labor, where it was to lie in state, eight people died in the crush. Huge crowds waited interminably in line to pay respects, sustained with food served by her Foundation. The radio played recordings of her voice. The General Confederation of Labor organized a torchlight procession with Perón at its head on August 26, and later joined with others in consecrating October 17 as “her day.” Twentieth Century Fox was commissioned to film the event. All this was not government manipulation; it was a genuine outpouring of widespread grief.<sup>9</sup>

Without her Perón seemed deflated. He was all too aware that she had been a symbol of the regime’s concern for the poor and unfortunate, whose prominence at her Foundation could not be duplicated. He would miss her supervision of the party’s women’s organization, her manipulation of the union leaders, and her ability as a spokesperson that had helped him maintain control. In her absence the rhetorical sweep of Peronism and the links between the regime and the *descamisados* were indeed weakened. Having expelled people of intelligence, he became increasingly isolated and his behavior more unconventional. Greater attention—and time—was now spent on sports and recreation. The president favored the company of boxers and other athletes, wore leather jackets, and once an excellent fencer and equestrian now drove cars and scooters and showed interest in fast boats and motorcycles. *El Líder* began to look soft and puffy, with an accompanying loss of dignity. Although the suggestion of numerous observers at the time that Evita’s death played a key role in the regime’s disintegration was an exaggeration—it would fall because the military took advantage of the Perón government’s inability to deliver on the promises made—her absence weakened it considerably.<sup>10</sup>

To “Peronize” the nation’s teenagers, the Ministry of Education had established the *Union de Estudiantes Secundarios* (Union of Secondary Students, or UES). Designed to indoctrinate young people, it was to provide opposition to Catholic youth organizations, and in so doing, place emphasis on sports. With Evita gone, Perón took greater personal interest, becoming involved with the young women’s branch of the UES. He volunteered the grounds of his summer home, and the constant presence of teenage girls in gym shorts led to rumors of orgies. His opponents claimed that he spent lunch hours playing with the girls, providing them with mopeds and stuffing his pockets with pesos for them to pull out. Perón appeared a pathetic figure, a lecher pushing 60 spending time with teenagers or scooting



around Buenos Aires on Italian Vespas with a giggling girl behind him. Clearly Evita's death had deprived him of an anchor: she would not have allowed the presidential residence to take on the appearance of a "presidential harem." When among other accusations of impropriety, a year after his wife's death Perón became linked with a 14-year-old youngster named Nelly Rivas, public opinion started to shift against him.

Although after his downfall a military tribunal found that he had sexual relations with her, whether mistress or ornament was never made clear. His involvement may only have satisfied the need for an undemanding companion. Still, there was no question of poor judgment. When he moved Rivas into the presidential palace to live with him, traditionally Catholic Argentina was scandalized by stories of her trying on Evita's clothes, even her jewels, under the gaze of a smitten Perón.

Equally—or perhaps more significantly—was the continued deterioration of the economy. Inflation remained a main signal of economic imbalance, and in 1952 it returned to an annual rate of 30 percent. Reduced export revenues forced ever greater reductions in resources for desired social programs and ultimately made it impossible for the government to maintain them. As noted, Perón had to reverse his earlier redistributionist and nationalist policies. He could favor one sector of the economy when overall economic growth was taking place, but when stagnant, any gains given to workers would come at the expense of the middle and upper classes. Now labor was to be held in check: workers were asked to accept a two-year wage freeze, and the right to strike was curtailed. As a consequence of the austerity programs carried out, real wages, which had peaked in 1949 (as had real capital product) began falling, and by 1952 were back to 1943 levels.<sup>11</sup>

*El Líder* was losing more elements of his base. Nationalists, too, were showing dissatisfaction with the government. In a search for foreign capital, in contrast to the anti-imperialist, pronationalist policies of the late 1940s, the regime asked an American automobile manufacturer, Kaiser, to produce cars in Argentina. Similarly, Standard Oil of California was asked to develop oil fields in Patagonia. Orthodox Peronists in Congress resented the offer, called it a giveaway, and ultimately refused to ratify it. They pounced on the regime's acceptance of a loan from the Export-Import Bank, reminding Perón that he had promised "to cut off [his] hands" before accepting conditions imposed by foreign lenders.<sup>12</sup>

Reacting to the discontent generated by the failure of his economic policies, Perón turned more sharply to violent rhetoric and

mass actions. He accused the landed oligarchy of blocking reform, and devoted supporters attacked the Jockey Club, a private retreat associated with elite rural landowners and cattle ranchers. As opposition to austerity and antinationalist legislation mounted, so did political repression. The government stepped up censorship and imposed a ban on travel. On February 27, 1951, it seized *La Prensa*, the world-renowned Buenos Aires daily newspaper that was critical of the regime, and turned it over to the CGT. The rationale given was the government's claim that the newspaper had failed to pay its taxes. Only two non-Peronist newspapers now survived, and did so only by being very discreet.

New treason and espionage laws enlarged the definitions of crimes against the state. One such law increased the penalties for the libel and slander of public authorities. *Justicialismo* was elevated to a "national doctrine" whose principles became compulsory learning in Argentina's schools. New titles were found appropriate for Perón. After the 1943 revolution he was the "First Worker of the Republic." In 1946 he became *El Líder*. In 1952 he was hailed as the "Liberator of the Nation," and Evita, before her death, as "Spiritual Chief of the Nation." With austerity—and an end to the drought—conditions improved, making possible a modest increase in real wages and an improved balance of payments. Inflation fell to 4 percent in 1953. But these gains proved short-lived as both industrial and agricultural production continued to stall.<sup>13</sup>

The most serious challenge to the regime—most serious because it brought together traditionally Catholic Argentines and an already infuriated military—came from the Catholic Church. The anticlerical position that Perón adopted in 1954–1955 did what ten years of opposition by his enemies had failed to do: unite them, at least temporarily. It was a chief, although not the sole, cause of his fall from power. Opposition from the church seemed highly unlikely: it had supported Perón in 1946, and Perón, in violation of Argentine tradition, had imposed religious education in public schools. But as the years passed, such social policies as the government's efforts to indoctrinate Argentine youth, and above all the charity work of the Eva Perón Foundation, were seen by church officials as government-inspired competition. When they took Perón's approval of the attempt to canonize Evita as hostile propaganda, *El Líder* was moved to retaliate, and the church, in turn, became both a symbol and a catalyst of resistance against Peronism.<sup>14</sup>

Perón showed himself openly critical of the Catholic Church in a speech given November 10, 1954, when he charged its directors with interfering in labor relations and attempting to build a separate party. Soon after, the police arrested several of the priests Perón had called subversive. In a letter to the president, church officials expressed “astonishment and stupor,” and threatened that “no priest can [remain] indifferent . . . in the face of atheistic, materialistic communism, in the face of absolute divorce, in the face of compulsory lay education, as in other questions of doctrine.” Peronist loyalists struck back: the CGT and the Peronist party scheduled a Luna Park rally two weeks later. Responding to fiercely critical speeches, crowds carried banners displaying such slogans as, “Perón, yes! Priests, no!” “Divorce!” and “Neither Clerics nor Communists!” When Perón finally spoke, he played his favorite card, that of peacemaker. His words of moderation proved a letdown for his impassioned listeners: the affair was now over with; there was no need to worry; clerical infiltration had been “nipped in the bud.”<sup>15</sup>

It was not over, however. A week later an executive decree abolished the federal department that administered compulsory religious education in the public schools. The display of religious symbols during Christmas was banned. A bill passed late at night legalizing divorce and advocated by the Women’s Peronist Party was signed by the president. In what was now seen as an anti-Catholic campaign, Congress also passed laws legalizing prostitution and giving equal rights to illegitimate children, Peronist loyalists spoke of separation of church and state, and those within the party known for having ties to the church lost their posts.

On May 1, 1955, Perón’s supporters called for separation of church and state. When a month later a Catholic religious procession turned into a political demonstration, *El Líder* issued an executive decree bringing an end to publicly celebrated feast days. The Peronist-dominated Congress passed laws ending tax exemptions for church property, legislation viewed as a preliminary to the disestablishment of Roman Catholicism. On the first Sunday in June, parish priests read a letter from the archdiocese of Buenos Aires warning that Rome possessed the weapon of excommunication. And in a nation whose constitution required the president to be a Roman Catholic, the threat was meaningful.

Catholic army officers voiced outrage at the legalization of divorce, the abrogation of religious instruction in public schools—and the jailing and soon the deporting of clergymen. Already upset over the government’s ties to organized labor and the arrogance to the military

shown by the CGT, leaders of the armed forces feared that Evita's quasi-revolutionary rhetoric and openly antimilitary attitude might endure. The reinstatement of the death penalty in the Uniform Code of Military Justice was found especially galling. Instead of "Braden or Perón," they supported an opposition that now rallied to the cry, "Christ or Perón."

The government insisted that the Corpus Christi religious procession scheduled for a Saturday (June 11, 1955), to attract a larger crowd, be held on a weekday. The archdiocese refused a change of day, but agreed to move the ceremony inside the city's main cathedral. Between 100,000 and 250,000 people showed up, spilling out onto the adjacent Plaza de Mayo, and what was intended as a religious event turned into a heated political demonstration. The government charged that the demonstrators burned the Argentine flag. A fabrication, responded opposed Catholics, carried out by the government to create a scandal to offset the impression made by the march. Perón issued an executive decree that removed two monsignors held responsible for the march, and they were deported to Rome. The Vatican retaliated by excommunicating the entire cabinet, although individual names were not provided and it was never made clear whether Perón himself was included. (Years later, the decree of excommunication was rescinded.)

News of the excommunications arrived in Argentina on June 16, and triggered large-scale demonstrations. Taking advantage of the disturbances, and under the cover of a scheduled air show, groups within the air force and the navy (the most conservative elements in the Argentine military), convinced that Perón, too, had been excommunicated, rebelled against the government. The Casa Rosada itself came under fire from the air by navy planes and on the ground by marines, disregarding the crowds that had gathered to watch the aerial tribute. Perón was reported as having saved his life by hiding in the bombproof basement of the nearby army high command. Over the radio he had heard the CGT calling for Peronistas to gather in the besieged Plaza de Mayo. Apparently he tried to stop them, pleading with his supporters to leave the area, but was unable to. The assembled workers stood their ground, many shouting "My life for Perón." They became easy targets for the bombers overhead. Army units loyal to the president sent out armored vehicles to suppress the insurgency, and by late afternoon had captured the ringleaders, but not before several hundred civilians were killed or wounded in the fighting.<sup>16</sup> Later that night, angry young Peronists retaliated by burning churches, including the cathedral and the office of the archbishop.

Clearly, in taking on the Catholic establishment, Perón had met his match. Regardless of a decade of Peronist propaganda, the church's hold over many Argentines remained strong, and it became a symbol of opposition to the regime. The president's anti-Catholic campaign was self-defeating, and provided his enemies in the military with their chance. Once and for all it convinced officers upset with Peronism that its leader was a threat to the country. An anti-Peronist interpretation would have it that it was an inevitable act of totalitarian regimes. But however authoritarian and despotic his regime, Perón was not a totalitarian in the Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini mold. Did he believe that church activity in the political, trade union, and youth spheres threatened his movement? That his anticlericalism was an attempt to refurbish a populist image tarnished by the government's recent anti-Socialist and antilabor policies? Or was it the case that after years of struggle to secure and retain power, an exhausted Perón was no longer the same man and had overreacted to the criticism of only a minority of clerics.<sup>17</sup> Whatever his motives, the escalation of a minor issue, the public denunciation of a few priests in November 1954 to an all-out assault on the constitutional status of the Catholic Church in Argentina, finally put an end to *El Líder's* hold on the loyalty of military officers. Religious ceremonies had long been a component of the military experience, and now the armed forces rose against him.

Shaken by the events of June 16, Perón knew that to stay in power he would either have to annihilate his enemies or accommodate them. He shrank from the former. Although he could have ordered the execution of the rebel leaders responsible for the Plaza de Mayo bloodshed, he chose to imprison them instead. Seeking to reconcile Catholics to the regime, he repudiated the church burnings, guaranteed the clergy's safety, and promised a plebiscite on church-state relations. The opposition wasn't buying any of it. They saw *El Líder's* blandishments as signs of weakness, and as part of an effort to destabilize the regime they encouraged rumors of his imminent resignation, or failing that, his willingness to share power with the military. Perón nevertheless plunged ahead with his newfound policy of appeasement when he purged his cabinet and the CGT leadership of its most radical elements. In a speech given July 5 calling for the cessation of political strife, he absolved opposition parties of participation in the June 16 rising and offered them a truce. But he rejected the Radicals' request for access to government controlled radio.

So, in renewed efforts to conciliate the church, the regime declared an end to its anticlerical campaign. The president sent personal greetings to Pope Pius XII, and ordered the release of a number of

Catholics from prison. But the church hierarchy was not to forget: on July 13 the bishops of Argentina issued a pastoral letter denouncing religious persecution. Perón would have to do more. Two days later, in addressing Peronist legislators, he acknowledged that the revolutionary character of the movement had required the curtailment of individual liberties. Then to widespread surprise, he proclaimed an end to his 12-year revolution and announced his intention to resign his leadership of the Peronist party. "There begins now a new stage," he said, "constitutional in character, without revolutions, because the permanent condition of a country cannot be revolution ... I have stopped being the chief of a revolution and have become president of all the Argentines, friends or foes." And he renewed his pleas for domestic peace.

Perón also promised to remove restrictions on the press and revise electoral laws to give the political opposition (still in the minority) greater representation in Congress. But according to a conversation with the American ambassador, he would not step down unless there was no other way to achieve domestic tranquility. When his political opponents repeated their request to go on the radio, the government now complied; it marked the first time since Perón became president that a voice of dissent was heard on national radio. In a July 28 broadcast Arturo Frondizi, now the head of the Radical party and a leading critic of the government, made clear that there could be no peace without freedom.

The truce lasted only a month. Simply put, the country was too sharply divided between Perón's supporters and Perón's detractors. In mid-August the government announced the discovery of a plot to assassinate the president. The political climate was such that the proposed agreement with Standard Oil failed to win Congressional approval. Demonstrations by anti-Peronists and attacks on the police increased. The new head of the Peronist party in Buenos Aires, John William Cooke, citing the failure of peace overtures to produce any immediate results, advocated more drastic measures. Cooke wanted to organize street demonstrations, and a major gathering was scheduled for August 31 in the Plaza de Mayo.

On that morning, speaking to the large crowd gathered outside the Casa Rosada, Perón offered to resign from the presidency. In a manner reminiscent of the enthusiasm shown on October 17, 1945, he had expected that the hordes of people who had flocked to the plaza would urge him to reconsider. They did: on cue, they refused to accept any sign of abdication. The *descamisados* had once again rallied to his cause. At 6:30 P.M., having deliberately waited, the president

again appeared on the balcony and set off a ten-minute ovation. He began in moderate tones by describing his attempts at reconciliation, only have seen them rejected by his opponents.

Then, responding to the enthusiasm shown by his loyal listeners, Perón shifted gears and spoke in incendiary terms. Certainly it was one of the strangest speeches of his career. He implored Peronists to unite and rise up against “the enemies” of Argentina. “Enemies” (and how to deal with them) was broadly defined: “[A]nyone who anywhere tries to change the existing order in opposition to the constituted authorities or the laws or the constitution can be killed by any Argentine.” He had thus threatened civil war in openly appealing for violence, calling on Peronists to slay five enemies of the movement for every supporter who might fall in the coming conflict. Permission to do this applied not only against those who would take overt action against the regime, but even those who conspired to bring it down. Then, almost as an afterthought, he said that he was withdrawing his resignation. The customary request made at the end of a speech for people to disperse peacefully was conspicuously omitted. The *descamisados*, confident of victory, sang and shouted as they streamed off without incident.

The speech created both bewilderment and repugnance. Had Perón meant to withdraw his resignation? Was he carried away by the passion sweeping the crowd? If so, it would not have been the first time. His mental stability was questioned. An aide later claimed that in fact he had originally intended to make further proposals to revive the truce. Instead he had delivered a call to arms, one even more fiery than those given by Evita and more ominous because he had delivered it. Her absence made a difference. She had been the one who provided the violent rhetoric, and in so doing had allowed Perón to act as an arbiter or peacemaker. With no one of her stature or popularity available, he had to use incendiary language. Whether intended or not, the harangue, known in history as the “five for one” speech, sealed the fate of his second presidency.

Any remaining support for Perón by the armed forces collapsed in its wake. The previous attempt to spark a coup (in June) had failed. Now a more coordinated effort, supported by army units in Córdoba, an industrial and commercial center and Argentina’s third largest city, began on the morning of Friday, September 16. The president, who had feared to arm the workers, had been careful to entrust the Buenos Aires garrisons to officers loyal to him. Consequently, the best hope

for a military uprising lay with units based in the interior. General Eduardo Lonardi, whom Perón had forced into retirement because of his involvement in a 1951 insurgency, took command of the uprising. Forces faithful to Perón at first seemed to have put an end to the rebellion, but naval warships then appeared at the mouth of the Río de la Plata and threatened to blow up oil tanks and refineries should the Peronists refuse to concede. Remnants of military support for the government evaporated as more opponents of the regime came out in support of the rebels. And when the military commanders gave Perón an ultimatum, resign or face full-blown civil war, he accepted his fate. *El Líder* had no stomach for a bloodbath, and on September 19 he submitted his resignation to Congress. The lengthy text described the accomplishments of the Peronist revolution and then explained his decision: he would relinquish his office to secure peace, and as a “simple Peronist” continue to serve the movement.

Had he overestimated the damage that would result if he did not step down? Certainly Perón’s chief concern lay less with social justice than with the preservation of national unity. And if the latter proved impossible to achieve, why plunge back into a senseless struggle for power marked by mass slaughter and extensive civilian damage? In response to remarks made by his followers, “If I were the president, I wouldn’t surrender. I would insist on fighting,” Perón replied, “I would do it too if I were only a general.”<sup>18</sup> In a book written after going into exile, Perón blamed his downfall on the generals assigned to defend the government. They had persuaded him, he said, not to arm the workers who would have come to his defense. (He did not mention that it had been his own decision to leave these matters to the generals.)

Years later, in tapes recorded in Madrid, he blamed the *descamisados*, even if unarmed, for not coming to the rescue. Ignoring such realities as the passage of ten years of time since he had reached out to them and that their economic situation was no better than what it was in 1945, Perón could not conceal his resentment.

Our people, who had received enormous advantages and gains against the exploitation that had victimized them for a century, ought to have had a greater enthusiasm to defend what had been given to them ... They thought with their bellies ... The unions also disillusioned me. A general strike was prepared and they didn’t go out ... Then I reached the conclusion that the Argentine people deserved a terrible punishment for having done this.<sup>19</sup>

Still later, after comparing himself with Castro, Mao, and de Gaulle as “rebels against the United States and Russia” and describing the



world as divided between the North Americans and Soviets, on the one side, and the Chinese Communists and the Third World of emerging nations, on the other, he would accuse the Americans and the British for having provided the rebels with arms.<sup>20</sup>

Most historians appear to have accepted the explanation that Perón wanted to avoid a civil war, a disaster whose results he had witnessed in Spain and to which he had often referred.<sup>21</sup> His unwillingness to face civil war attested to his populist leanings and his wish to preserve national unity. He had quit when it appeared that the conflict would endure and be a bloody one. The church burnings, the jailed opponents, and the threat to arm the workers that had so embittered the military concealed Perón's populism and created a counterrevolution when no revolution had actually taken place. Or he may have simply decided that in view of his opponents' strength and the divisions within his movement he could not withstand a prolonged conflict.

At eight o'clock in the morning of September 20, 1955, carrying a bag of clothing, a small portrait of Evita, a religious icon, and money—according to one account two million Argentine pesos and US\$70,000—Perón was driven to the Paraguayan embassy. As an honorary citizen of that country, he formally requested political asylum. The ambassador transferred him to a Paraguayan gunboat that had been put into Buenos Aires for repairs. For the next 18 years, Juan Perón would remain in exile.

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## PERÓN

## INTERMENT

After he had been deposed by a military coup in 1955, many historians and political leaders in Argentina tried to write Perón off as a has-been, but found it impossible to do so. Throughout his exile, he remained the central figure in Argentine politics. The ten governments that followed, whether elected or imposed but all with military approval and exercising power under the banners of nationalism and order, were beset by chronic inflation and recurrent cycles of recession and recovery. They could not prevent economic disintegration and erosion of the high living standards that had distinguished Argentina from the rest of Latin America. Organized labor, dominated by faithful Peronists and determined not to lose its pre-1955 gains, was—or came to be—their main adversary. And during his 18 years on foreign soil, Perón was to remain in full control of the Peronist movement.

He would be welcomed in countries whose governments resembled his own: Stroessner's Paraguay, Somoza's Nicaragua, Pérez Jiménez's Venezuela, Trujillo's Dominican Republic, and Franco's Spain, and while in each he kept in close touch with millions of followers, keeping alive their expectations of a return and eventual resumption of power: Peronists whose memories of his regime improved with time.

Perón acknowledged and benefitted from the failure of his successors to lift the country from the political and economic morass into which it had fallen. "It is not that we were so good," he later said, "but those who came after us were so bad that they made us seem better than we were"; and it was in exile that the movement founded by the deposed dictator was transformed from a cult into a myth.<sup>1</sup>

Still, Perón did his utmost to keep his name before the public and cultivate that myth. Between his fall in 1955 and subsequent restoration in 1973 he appointed—and dismissed—a great many "personal delegates," individuals designated to speak, authoritatively, for him in

Argentina. They were seldom known in their own right, and, invariably, as soon as they appeared to be using their own initiative or gaining any semblance of popular support, they were summarily dispensed with. The ex-president seemed intent on making it clear to all that there was no number two person in the movement, that there was only one *líder*, Juan Domingo Perón.

In urban industrial areas the trade union movement was used as the vehicle of communication between the leader and his followers, whereas in the interior, where the unions were relatively weak, local politicians who professed unequivocal loyalty were relied on. Regardless of whom he was appealing to, throughout his exile there was a near constant stream of Peronist politicians and union leaders who visited the ex-president in Caracas, or Santo Domingo, or Madrid, and brought back tape-recorded messages, which were duplicated and played to the faithful.

From the home of an Argentine businessman residing in Asunción the ex-president gave his first interview while in exile.<sup>2</sup> He attributed his overthrow to an “oligarchco-clerico reaction” motivated by “ambition and money.” That the church had figured significantly in his downfall was attested to by the presence of several Catholic nationalists in the Lonardi cabinet and the presence of the archbishop of Buenos Aires at the latter’s inauguration. Perón insisted that he hadn’t really resigned and predicted that “the government which comes to power with blood falls from power with blood.” The Peronist party, he added, would survive because of its “leadership” and many “youthful adherents,” and “when the time comes,” he would make good use of its “organizing mystique and doctrine.”<sup>3</sup>

In Buenos Aires a military court of five generals found the deposed dictator guilty of numerous charges: incitement to violence, attacks on Catholicism, burning the flag, having sex with a minor, and betraying the armed forces. The tribunal recommended that he be stripped of his rank, and President Lonardi signed a decree to that effect. Seeming to show especial interest in the details of Perón’s sexual preferences, the justices interrogated Rivas and other girls with whom he had allegedly partied. That his two marriages had failed to produce any children apparently obsessed them. Had he used stand-ins to satisfy his wives? Rivas testified to having had sex with Perón about once every 15 days and without the act ever having been consummated.<sup>4</sup>

On November 1, two days after tribunal’s judgment, Perón accepted an invitation from President Anastasia Somoza to visit Nicaragua, and

soon after left Paraguay. Possibly because he feared an interception by assassins sent from Buenos Aires, his plane took a circuitous route, flying to Rio, where it refueled, then up the east coast of Brazil before turning west to Venezuela, where for the first time he left the aircraft for a hotel. The last refueling stop was Panama. Perón and his entourage arrived on November 7, and rested in a deluxe hotel. After visiting the Panamanian president the next day, he startled the press by announcing that he wanted to stay on in that country. Somoza would have to wait. The stopover turned into a nine-month sojourn.

Perón had predicted that the Lonardi administration, despite the general's promise of a speedy return to a constitutional democratic government, would not survive more than 18 months. It fell from power in less than two, with the military leaders who ousted him placing blame on his choice of reactionary advisors. With *El Líder* no longer on the scene to keep his opponents united, the disparate elements among them had gone their separate ways. Some favored the total suppression of the Peronist party and the Peronist unions. Lonardi, too, had opposed Perón and his circle, but was less hostile to Peronism as such: while rejecting its excesses, its corruption, its takeover of the schools, and its assaults on the church, he was not inclined to undo government control over the economy or the social reforms enacted. He preferred—to use a phrase that would become popular in the 1960s—*peronismo sin Perón* (Peronism without Perón). Those sharing these conciliatory views, however, found themselves outnumbered by hardline nationalists, particularly in the navy and air force, who began repeated attempts to destroy every aspect of Peronism. On November 12 a delegation of high-ranking officers had presented a list of demands, one of which called for the investigation of Peronist officials and union leaders. Lonardi, hoping to restore national unity and not inclined to go along with the harsh measures demanded by the controlling group, preferred freedom for the trade unions to conduct their own affairs and refused to go along. Disillusioned, in poor health, and without a political base, he was forced to resign the next day. He would die in poor health in four months.

A new president, General Pedro Aramburu, the highest-ranking officer among the plotters, replaced him on November 13. What historian Joseph Page called Phase Two of the “Liberating Revolution” had begun.<sup>5</sup> The de-Peronization campaign, designed to undo the work of the Peronists, intensified. The government abolished the 1949 Constitution and dissolved the Peronist party, seizing its property and

blocking its leaders from the political process. Congress, too, was dissolved and the Supreme Court dismissed. An investigating committee charged Perón and congressional Peronists with treason on the grounds that they had used power illegally. Peronist legislators as well as thousands of labor leaders were arrested and banned from political activity, as were military officers and Catholics seen as insufficiently hostile to Perón and accused of subversive activities. Many fled into exile after their release. The government created new unions to dilute the authority of Peronists within organized labor. *La Prensa* was taken from the CGT, which itself was now under government control after an ill-conceived and poorly timed general strike that collapsed in one day, and returned to private hands. It became a rabid anti-Peronist organ.

Aware of the impact made by Peronist propaganda, and of the adulation accorded Evita's corpse, the Aramburu regime hoped to sweep all hints of the past regime from view, to blot out the very memory of Peronism. No Peronist propaganda was allowed; party slogans and insignia, even party songs, were outlawed. Mention of Perón's and Evita's names and the display of their photographs were forbidden; the ex-president was to be referred to in the press as *el tirano prófugo* (the runaway tyrant).

Street names, buildings, public works, and monuments were all renamed in an attempt to expunge *El Líder* from public memory. References to him in official documents also carried the phrase, "the deposed dictator"; to Eva, as "that woman." In private the references were crueler: "the mare" or "the filly"—in Buenos Aires slang, equivalent to "the hooker." (The *descamisados* gave the insults another meaning: she was the lead mare that guided the herd.) One government edict promised prison terms ranging from six months to three years for anyone leaving images or statutes of the despised dictator and his consort in public view, for using words such as "Peronism" or "third way," abbreviations such as PP (Peronist party) or PV (Perón will return). Teachers were ordered to cross out textbook references to the couple. The Eva Perón Foundation was closed and the Children's Village dismantled. The government tried to show the couple's dissolute lifestyle by staging public viewings of their extensive wardrobes, his fleet of motorcycles, and Evita's jewelry. Curious crowds attended, but few minds were changed. Perón and the first lady had never concealed their extravagance, and the finery she displayed had added to her appeal. The attempts of the regime to blacken his image failed as it incompetently mixed fact, unsubstantiated allegation, and argumentation, which could all be dismissed by the Peronist faithful as propaganda.<sup>6</sup>

In Argentina, commemoration of the dead was a national fetish. Eva's embalmed body was a powerful symbol, but the regime feared

that if interred her grave would attract Peronist pilgrims. Yet all agreed on the need for a Christian burial, only somewhere away from Peronist exploitation. On the night of December 22, soldiers burst into the CGT building and took the cadaver on what proved the beginning of bizarre journey. The box containing her embalmed body was put into an army truck and driven to a marine base. When he learned of its presence, the base's commanding officer ordered it removed. The truck was then parked in downtown Buenos Aires, but the mysterious appearance of a candle and flowers next to it prompted another move. The corpse was put in a crate marked radio equipment, and left in the office of the chief of the Army Information Service.

It remained there until the following June when a new chief of information, who had not been told by his predecessor of the crate's contents, was shocked by its accidental discovery. Meanwhile, the disappearance of the corpse had led to all sorts of rumors: the body had been burned; dumped in a river; sent to Europe. The government had avoided a public burial, but the price paid was high. Peronist women demonstrated in the Plaza de Mayo. "Where is Evita" became a rallying cry, and the demand for the return of the body posed a constant problem.

The assault on Perón, the Peronists, and the unions was prompted by more than vengeance alone. The government aimed at launching a new economic program, designed to channel money away from urban workers and promote the recovery of the agricultural sector, both farming and ranching. But the chief explanation for the anti-Peronism of the military leaders was their refusal to accept any regime able to deprive the military of its role as political arbiter or to eliminate it as the decisive factor in the political life of the country. These fears were well-founded. At least for a decade only Peronism with its massive following among the nation's workers posed a potential threat to the continued hegemony of the armed forces.

Because the attack on the Peronist labor movement had put old leaders in prison and replaced them with military men, a new generation of leaders was emerging. They voiced loyalty to *El Líder*, but earned their positions in a struggle against the regime and so were developing some independence. When sufficiently strong, they would comprise a force confronting both their military rulers and Perón. For now, however, it was the anti-Peronist regime that was the enemy, and sporadic acts of violence revealed that the *descamisados* were not inclined to surrender. The persecution launched by the Aramburu regime reinvigorated Perón's supporters. For Argentine workers the image of the ex-president as a great benefactor shone ever more brightly, particularly as their living standards continued to fall. A Peronist resistance arose, and began to coordinate action against the

regime. Ironically, Aramburu's furious vendetta was helping Perón to keep his grip on the unions.

Nor was labor alone in resisting: in June 1956 a handful of Peronists in the army moved against the Aramburu government. Their coup, poorly planned and supported, had no chance of success; harsh reprisals were taken and 27 conspirators executed. In a massive misjudgment, the government had provided the Peronist cause with martyrs.<sup>7</sup>

Despite persistent rumors of great wealth, Perón lived in a relatively modest way. The ex-president rented a small house in Colón and drove a compact Opel car. He mingled with the townsfolk, and liked to attend boxing matches. He completed a first draft memoir, a self-righteous and poorly organized apologia for his decade in power. Speculation mounted about his continued connection to Argentina, especially when a close aide was apprehended trying to cross the border from Paraguay. Perón himself never concealed his determination to remain active in Argentine politics. On December 1, 1955, he sent a message to his followers: "I continue to be chief of the Peronista forces and no one can invoke my authority."<sup>8</sup>

Still attractive to women, his tastes ranged from the sophisticated to the naive and unpolished. The ex-president got together with a 24-year-old dancer, María Estela Martínez, an Argentine who along with six other dancers worked in a nightclub. Under the stage name of Isabel, or Isabelita, and with a trim fragile body, bird-like face, and hair pulled back (perhaps modeling herself on Evita), she looked like a teenager. The two had met when she and several other dancers were asked to join a party with the ex-president "to enliven the festivities." There was a mutual attraction, and although unable to type, Isabel was taken on as his (unpaid) secretary. By mid-January she was living with him. To avoid giving offense to "Evitasts," he did not then marry her, but would finally do so in Spain.<sup>9</sup>

Although there was speculation that the ex-president would settle in Panama, the country did not agree with him. He found the heat oppressive and there were disagreements with political leaders. Also, the junta that had replaced him in Argentina was putting pressure on the government to expel him. Reacting to a report that President Aramburu had called him cowardly for leaving his native land instead of fighting to remain, Perón lashed back. In a letter to Aramburu, he acknowledged having ordered "the cessation of a struggle that I had every likelihood of winning," and added, "You have no idea of the



strength of character and courage required to produce such gestures (*gestos*). For you, killing others in defense of your own person and to further your ambition is a valorous deed.”<sup>10</sup>

In early August of 1956, after a few weeks in Managua, Nicaragua, where he went after leaving Panama, Perón relocated to Caracas where he would remain until the following January. More accessible to Argentina and containing a number of Peronist exiles, Venezuela was then governed by army strongman President Marcos Pérez Jiménez. Jiménez agreed to let Perón enter the country because of the snub received from Aramburu during a Latin American heads of state meeting. When Argentine pressure to oust the “runaway tyrant” gave offence, it became a matter of national pride to resist it, and Perón was allowed to stay on.

But as was the case in Panama, the ex-president did not feel at ease in Caracas. He disliked the climate and poor sanitation, the poverty and the discord, and his small unattractive residence. It was also dangerous. Convinced that Perón was directing a campaign of sabotage and insurrection, the Aramburu government sponsored one, perhaps two, assassination attempts.

Perón was now 60 years old, and it appeared that unless he soon moved to regain power he would be forced to give it up forever. What he had going for him was the fidelity of workers who continued or renewed the worship of their leader and hoped for a restoration. They had formed the spinal column of the Peronist movement and remained his base of power. Could he control its leadership, however much repressed, from outside the country? That he was able to do so explains his success in ultimately regaining power.

According to a future president, Raúl Alfonsín, during his 18-year exile Perón continued to manipulate, sometimes in large measure, sometimes in small, the threads of *peronismo* in Argentina “with the precision of a surgeon.”<sup>11</sup> The ex-president’s primary objective was to maintain himself as the movement’s leader, otherwise all else was lost. He knew that once a local leader emerged who could keep the Peronists together, he would no longer be needed. Second, he needed to keep the movement united and committed to a common goal: that of bringing him back to power. Third, he had to keep his name and ideas before the Argentine public. He prioritized these needs, and would deliberately sacrifice the unity of the movement when his personal leadership was threatened. Starting at the very moment of his exile, Perón attacked each problem deliberately and skillfully.

Because of the government's clampdown, the Peronist movement had begun to splinter into factions. This stood in total contrast to early days when no factionalism within party ranks was tolerated. Now, however, Perón did not object: it suited his strategy of not letting a new leader emerge from a united movement. (It is also true that early in his exile he could not have prevented it had he wanted to.) In any event, while abroad Perón was able to direct party affairs and approve of party leaders most of the time.

When a government decree aimed at the Peronists prohibited political parties from using personal names in their titles and required identification of supporters, *El Líder* responded with the tactic of the "blank ballot." To keep his name in the news, he and other party leaders would urge his voters to cast blank ballots to show their displeasure with elections in which Peronist candidates were not allowed to run. Since voting was mandatory in Argentina for all over 18, a blank ballot complied with the law yet would clearly demonstrate Peronist strength and unity.

The first use of this tactic came during a constituent assembly election in July 1957. Voters were asked to name delegates assigned the task of replacing the 1949 Peronist Constitution. Apprised of the election, Perón wrote a lengthy "memo" advising his followers to cast blank ballots and offering his political and philosophical ideas on the art of governing. Although delegates from parties associated with the radicals emerged victorious, there were 1.2 million blank votes, an astonishing number, which out-pollled any single party. It was generally accepted that Peronist supporters had cast the blank ballots, and a directive sent by Perón to his *compañeros* congratulated them for not "falling into the trap [of voting for other candidates]" and exhorted them "to follow implacably the directives and instructions of the high Peronist Command."<sup>12</sup> The practice would also prove effective in the 1960 and 1963 presidential elections. As time passed, the number of blank ballots decreased a little, leading some, mistakenly, to predict the demise of Peronism. Still, whenever an election was held, the persistently large number of abstentions revealed that voters remained divided between Peronists and non-Peronists. From exile, *El Líder's* tactic revealed the durability of his movement and helped keep an opposition to military rule alive.

Perón also made use of what became known as his "pendular" technique of bestowing favor first on one faction of his movement and then on another, while playing off each against the other. In his absence and subject to repression, the Peronist movement was no longer identified with a single political party (usually outlawed under

military rule) but with various groupings. Peronism without Perón was stimulating the growth of neo-Peronist parties, not necessarily or directly linked to the ex-president. After the dissolution of the Peronist party, he urged his followers to undertake civil resistance to the Aramburu regime. He sent personal delegates to Buenos Aires to deliver and execute his orders while keeping his emissaries on short leash by constant replacements. Peronist workers staged slowdowns, and in 1957 two general strikes stalled economic activity in the country's major cities. Thus, within months of his departure *El Líder* was manipulating events in Argentina and reaffirming leadership over the Peronist faithful who dreamed of his early return.

An associate found him "full of hatred, rancor, resentment and desire for vengeance." Driven not by a principled commitment to substantive goals but committed to strategic and tactical maneuvering, he would make long range political warfare on the men who had ousted him. Aware, however, that there was no chance of a counter-coup and that the struggle was "essentially political," Perón rejected the attempt of militant followers to overthrow the Aramburu regime by force, all the more so because a June 1956 failed coup had been launched without his approval. In a letter to one of his most devoted supporters, John William Cooke, the alias of the Peronist intellectual who popularized the doctrine of armed struggle, who opposed union bureaucrats (and who, after the Cuban revolution, would begin propagating a view of Peronism as the Argentine equivalent of Castroism), the ex-president criticized the (mainly ex-military) insurgents acting in his, Perón's, name. He criticized their "haste," claiming they were only motivated by anger at having been forced from the army.<sup>13</sup>

Continued resistance to the Aramburu regime dampened any enthusiasm its chief may have had for remaining in office. Elections were scheduled for February 1958 and the non-Peronist political parties began to prepare for them. While the ban on Peronists continued, the opposition Radicals (who had not only survived but enjoyed a measure of respect from the military government in view of their past opposition to Perón), were split into two factions: the People's Radical Party (UCRP) led by Ricardo Balbín, and an Intransigent Radical Party (UCRI) led by Balbín's running mate in the 1951 presidential election, Arturo Frondizi. The two had long been rivals and now disagreed on the question of relations with the Peronists. Balbín, who identified himself with the government's economic policies and its virulent anti-Peronism, favored complete dissociation. He had led the party in its opposition

to Perón before 1955 and had given active support to the coup that overthrew *El Líder*; he would now take advantage of the electoral ban against Peronists and replace them as Argentina's dominant party. Frondizi, who kept his distance from Perón's successors, sought a kind of accommodation with the Peronists in order to win over union and working-class support. [Because the Socialist and Communist Parties had long since been cut off from much of their working-class base, the radicals, regardless of their internal conflicts and tactical shifts, constituted the basis of the (civilian) opposition to Peronism.<sup>14</sup>]

Because Perón needed political legitimacy for his supporters and Frondizi needed their votes, a deal was struck. Frondizi would be assured of about two million Peronist votes, and Peronists, in return, both in Argentina and in exile, would receive an amnesty. Frondizi also promised to recognize the Peronist party, restore Perón's economic policies, return property taken from the Eva Perón Foundation, and in two years hold a new election. Both men would long deny entering into any such agreement.

In early 1958, Pérez Jiménez and his government fell from power. The army rose in rebellion, forcing the Venezuelan president to flee the country. Years of government-imposed restraint had concealed buried passions, and mobs from the shanties swept into the capital. Not only the secret police but Perón himself became targets when a newspaper falsely charged him with directing "repression against the Venezuelan people." Fearful for his life, *El Líder* sought out a friendly embassy to receive him, and Spain seemed a likely choice for political asylum. But although Franco remembered the aid sent by Perón in the late 1940s, he took to heart both the warnings of the Argentine government that it would take offense and the concerns of conservative Spanish Catholics still resentful of Perón's anticlerical campaign. The Spanish dictator hesitated, hoping that his fallen Argentine counterpart would find refuge elsewhere. He did, at the embassy of the Dominican Republic.

The new Venezuelan government agreed to let him leave the country, but on the condition that he travel alone. Isabel and their poodles had to be left behind. On January 27 a DC-3 took Perón to the next leg of his exile, the Dominican Republic, ruled by Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo. Isabel, accompanied by Cooke and a new secretary, soon followed.

Perón felt at ease during the two years he would live in the Dominican Republic. "I breathed freely when I arrived in Ciudad

Trujillo,” he said later, “because I felt myself in a friendly country.”<sup>15</sup> Made welcome by Trujillo, the ex-president was grateful to the “Father of the Country.” The dictator who for the past three years ruled the nation—and owned much of it—solved his guests’ security problems and helped with expenses. The deposed president and Isabel traveled freely throughout a country where visiting Peronists were free to enter and leave when they wished.

Surprising was the close relationship he enjoyed with Trujillo. Robert Crassweller noted that the remote and distrustful Dominican dictator was not easy to know or to enjoy, but Perón appears to have done both.

Superficially one would expect little compatibility between the leader who had been elected by labor and the dictator who had suppressed it ... between the strongman who sometimes threatened violence but did not spill blood and the strongman who rarely mentioned violence but perpetrated it daily; between the reader, writer, and incessant communicator and the man of no books and few words; between the exile who could barely scrape up the rent and the possessor of hundreds of millions.<sup>16</sup>

Still, they got along, and in dictated memoirs penned years later Perón’s acknowledgment of the financial help received was evident, even excessive. When the ex-president told the dictator that the Dominican Republic required considerable social investment, Trujillo replied he was aware of the need but that his country was not Argentina, with its “white European population,” and the mild criticism in no way threatened their friendship.<sup>17</sup>

During Perón’s stay in the country, messages and representatives went quietly back to and forth from Argentina. At one point, the Argentine government accused the former president of plotting against the “Liberating Revolution” and in 1959 broke off diplomatic relations with Trujillo. Its concerns were justified. Neither Perón nor Frondizi abandoned the agreement the two had entered into. On February 3, 1958, from Santo Domingo, *El Líder* sent a messenger to Buenos Aires with a handwritten letter instructing his followers to vote for the insurgent Radical Party candidate.<sup>18</sup> His orders were widely obeyed, and with printed instructions carrying Perón’s endorsement, widely distributed.

Peronists took credit for Frondizi’s big win (4 million votes to Balbín’s 2.4 million). International dignitaries, including US vice president

Nixon, attended the May 1, 1958, inauguration of the 49-year-old, balding, bespectacled new president. But if the bargain gave Frondizi the presidency, it cost him the ability to govern. Anti-Peronists, both civilian and military, in view of the Peronist support for Frondizi considered the election as tainted and consequently his administration as illegitimate. Even some militant Peronists—admittedly a tiny minority—who never accepted the arrangement charged that the “the old man sold us like lambs” and wanted nothing to do with Frondizi. Their refusal to follow orders was ominous for the future. These young and very radical leftists who reproached the Peronist leadership for its eagerness to cooperate with a bourgeois establishment party would see their ranks swell after 1969 and result in a break with Perón. All this lay in the future. But while mainstream Peronists put pressure on the new government to fulfill the promises made to Perón, conservatives and the armed forces were not about to disown the Liberating Revolution. If many army and navy officers favored a return to civilian rule, they made it clear they would tolerate nothing that suggested a return to Peronism.

Frondizi soon found he had an impossible road to travel. His appeal to workers raised expectations that could not be met until the country benefitted from the economic development he called for, and programs of economic development are invariably long range in nature. His inability to comply with the terms of the pact entered into with Perón, the pact whose very existence he continued to deny, upset his supporters.

The new president's balancing act satisfied no one. On the one hand, he was accused of undoing the Liberating Revolution (a limited amnesty for some Peronists was granted); on the other, complaints were heard that he believed it didn't go far enough. Nationalists were unhappy when Frondizi reversed himself and allowed US companies to join in the search for oil in Patagonia—for which he had criticized Perón in 1952. His proposal to legalize private education at the university level, which would let the Catholic Church compete with state-controlled universities, generated opposition from Peronists and others who recalled the ex-president's anticlericalism. To support salary increases of up to 60 percent, Frondizi turned to the International Monetary Fund, but the wage restraints, elimination of price controls, devaluation of the currency, and layoff of public employees all demanded by the IMF and (under pressure from the military) accepted by the government left the unions dismayed—and Perón upset. In any event, the austerity imposed had little effect on the economy as inflation continued to rise and productivity remained stalled.

To compound Frondizi's problems, labor unrest, including isolated acts of sabotage, intensified. Strikes by railroad and oil workers broke out near the end of the year and continued throughout 1959.

Had Perón ordered these disturbances? On June 18, 1958, he had called for "a violent campaign throughout the country" to force the government to amplify its decree of amnesty. And in a letter dated December 20 he stressed the need "to begin passive resistance and civil disobedience." He added: "I don't say that we are now going to begin throwing bombs but that we ought to organize a pamphlet campaign, gossip, protests, disobedience, strikes, disorders, provocations, minor sabotage, etc."<sup>19</sup>

The continued labor unrest did not further Perón's political goals, but the repression it generated brought to an end any chance of maintaining the Frondizi-Peronist relationship. Aside from bringing out the needed vote, it had never really worked. Already in late 1958 Peronists were losing patience with the government, and through his correspondence *El Líder* himself began to distance himself from it. A letter from Ciudad Trujillo, dated September 30 of that year and sent to his heir apparent, John William Cooke, alluded to the president's (Frondizi's) "dangerous politics that, instead of pacifying, appears destined to awaken large-scale hatred."<sup>20</sup> Perón's forecast proved accurate, and he would take advantage of the growing disenchantment with Frondizi. The following July he issued a public denunciation of the government and released the text of the secret pact.

By making their agreement public, Perón undermined Frondizi's standing. The latter had already lost much popular support, and the full revelation of his negotiations with the former president led the armed forces to reassert their authority. Anti-Peronist officers openly demanded more conservative economic policies and a crackdown on the union activists who organized protests against the government. Hundreds of them were sentenced to long prison terms by military courts.<sup>21</sup>

The military pressure that had prevented Frondizi from keeping his promises to the Peronists intensified. In 1960 government repression of Peronist militants and supportive leftists contributed to insurrections carried out by followers of the deposed president. Peronists felt betrayed, abandoned their alliance with the UCRI, and fought Frondizi vigorously. The UCRI leaders, in turn, gave up efforts to win Peronist support, insisting that only their party was strong enough to block a return of Peronism.

Frondizi then made a series of blunders that brought an end to his government. His offer to mediate between Washington and the newly established Castro regime in Cuba, later followed by his decision to

host Ernesto “Che” Guevara, the Argentinian-born hero of the Cuban revolution, infuriated the military. When victories in by-elections in 1961 convinced Frondizi that his UCRI could defeat Peronists in future elections, he allowed them to compete in the March 1962 state and gubernatorial contests. As long as Perón himself remained banned from the country, they could organize and run candidates. This was risky inasmuch as many officers wanted Peronists permanently removed from local as well as national politics. And when Peronists won control of 10 of 14 provincial assemblies, the military forced Frondizi to nullify several of their victories. It then charged him with conspiring against the Liberating Revolution, and his arrest was ordered by the leaders of the armed forces, who once more took charge of the government. By this time, however, Juan Perón was no longer in the Dominican Republic. He had entered the final—and most lengthy—stage of his exile by relocating to Madrid.

If outwardly cordial to Perón, the Trujillo regime had become more repressive, thanks to events taking place in the Caribbean. Not only had the collapse of the dictatorships in Venezuela and (Battista’s) Cuba made things difficult for Trujillo, but Argentine pressure on the Dominican Republic to oust the ex-president intensified as Frondizi’s problems with the military mounted. When Perón and visitors to him were placed under surveillance, the ex-president read the handwriting on the wall and began making inquiries.

The Argentine government was anxious to see Perón leave the hemisphere, and because no other American nation was about to grant him asylum, Franco’s Spain again became an obvious choice. The Spanish *caudillo* could no longer refuse the man who had stood by him in his hour of need. (During Perón’s second term, Perón’s ambassador to the United Nations had defended the Franco regime from efforts to ostracize it; and the year before Evita’s tour Spain had received a long-term credit from Argentina to buy massive amounts of that country’s wheat and beef.)

Indeed, the period 1946–1949 were critical years for the Franco government, both from a political and economic viewpoint. After World War II came to an end, it faced worldwide hostility as a surviving fascist regime at the same time that it was threatened by economic distress and famine. Until the intensification of the Cold War, when Spain’s strategic importance was welcomed by the West, the help provided by Argentina enabled the *caudillo* to survive. The Franco-Perón alliance had collapsed, however, when in late 1949 the deterioration of the Argentine economy put an end to the cheap food and credit sent



to Spain. That and Perón's campaign against the Argentine Catholic Church—the church was then a pillar of the Spanish regime—explains Franco's initial reluctance to welcome the deposed Perón.

The ever-cautious Franco did not grant him the status of a visiting dignitary. When Frondizi (not yet removed from office in 1961) paid a visit to Spain, Perón was asked to leave the capital until the Argentine president had departed. Clearly the *caudillo* preferred to avoid any international complications that might be created by the presence of his controversial visitor. Also, in the conservative Spain of that era tongues wagged about Perón's open cohabitation with Isabel, leaving the government uncomfortable. Castilian morality, unlike that practiced in the Caribbean, was such that the ex-president's relationship with her required an early marriage. A private wedding took place in Madrid on November 15, 1961, after friends interceded with a bishop because of the ambiguity created by the alleged ex-communication. The 66-year-old Perón thereupon married the 30-year-old Isabel. His biographers maintain that there was no evidence on his part of strong feelings for her; he wanted a woman at his side, and for it to happen a marriage was necessary. (In the late 1960s, at the time of one of Perón's prostate operations when the anesthesia was wearing off, he asked Isabel not to leave him, but called her Evita.)<sup>22</sup>

*El Líder* was fully aware that many believed his chances of returning to office were fading rapidly. Six years had now gone by since his departure, and twelve thousand miles of ocean now separated him from Argentina. He also knew that a return to power required him to make peace with the church. He and his supporters had long denied that the June 16 decree of excommunication applied to him, arguing that only the pope could excommunicate a head of state. Nevertheless, because questions remained, Perón sought to have the decree overturned.

In a letter to Pope John XXIII, dated January 12, 1963, the ex-president asked for absolution. The Vatican complied, and issued a document stating that he and the Argentine government had only been threatened with excommunication, which once more left Perón constitutionally qualified for the presidency. (Nine years later, he was to deny that his movement had ever opposed the church.) To explain what he called the "contradictions," which he said seemed to have confronted some Catholics in the last years of his presidency, he maintained that several unions experienced differences with the church and that they had asked him to intervene on their behalf.<sup>23</sup>

Financial problems also proved worrisome. Any personal assets that remained in Argentina was beyond his reach because of a government decree that had his property confiscated. In Venezuela, the Dominican

Republic, and now in Madrid, Perón had received financial help from a wealthy Argentine industrialist, Jorge Antonio, who proved a most faithful follower and advisor. In 1962 Antonio paid for the construction of a permanent dwelling in Madrid for the ex-president and Isabel, and continued to cover most of *El Líder's* expenses. Frondizi had sent a \$85,000 "contribution" after his election, and the unions began to contribute \$1,000 a month as well.<sup>24</sup>

The house, which Perón claimed that together with an architect he helped to design, was called "Villa 17 October" and built in the fashionable Puerta de Hierro neighborhood of Madrid. Either because he feared attempts on his life (the explanation given in his memoirs) or because he simply preferred to live quietly, or, more to the point, because he was not invited, the ex-president did not attend public receptions. He made few Spanish friends during his 13-year stay in the country. The government and the army avoided contact with him, and Franco met with him only once, on the eve of his return to Argentina, leaving Perón disappointed and resentful.<sup>25</sup>

In his memoir, Perón revealed how he spent a typical day, describing himself as preoccupied with his "dogs and his roses."<sup>26</sup> What he did not dwell on was his determination to return to power. With the help of Jorge Antonio and other faithful followers, the house became an "operational headquarters" in the Peronist struggle for political restoration. Peronist leaders of every persuasion came to visit, and *El Líder* welcomed them all. Through them he continued to issue instructions to his supporters on how to vote, and in so doing continued to influence the course of events in Argentina.

While in Madrid, Perón acknowledged ties to fugitive Nazi war criminals. On the morning of September 9, 1970, he told an Argentine writer how in 1950 "a German specialist in genetics," identified as a Dr. Gregor, came to visit him. Later, after Mengele's death in 1979, the writer recognized the implication of Perón's comment, and the Red Cross was forced to admit that it had issued Mengele a passport in the name of Helmut Gregor. Lesser-known Nazis could be found at Perón's residence. To one former SS man, the ex-president apologized for entering the war on the Allied side: he had, he said, been "pressured by Yankees."<sup>27</sup>

In describing how he spent his days, Perón also neglected to mention that he was gathering material for a (more comprehensive) memoir. Dictated into a tape recorder and requiring heavy editing, it was eventually published (in 1976) under the title *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón: Relato autobiográfico*. As told to an American interviewer, he

blamed navy units and the British for his overthrow, Great Britain because it resented its loss of exports to Argentina. "In 1945 when I took charge of the government they (the British) exported '30 million to Argentina in textiles ... In 1954 [it was] down to one million. The navy, whose high-ranking officers were all "masons" and who were provided with technology by "the English," finished the job. Why had the navy turned on Perón? Because he was viewed in London as the enemy, and naval officers were "more concerned with England than with the Argentine republic." The ex-president used the same language to explain the navy's role in the failed attempt of June 16.<sup>28</sup>

As the 1960s progressed, Perón's health began to deteriorate. In 1964 he underwent an operation for prostate tumors. They were found to be nonmalignant but recurring, and more operations were needed. More worrisome was a large cyst in his liver, arteriosclerosis, and occasional lapses of memory. At the end of the decade, at the age of 75 and given only three or four years to live by his doctor, the ex-president knew that time for him was indeed running out.

After Frondizi's ouster and the resumption of military control in 1962, the armed forces continued to rule through puppet governments. The preference for civilian administrations rather than open junta rule issued not from any fondness for constitutional proprieties but because of internal divisions within the army and because direct military rule threatened economic aid from the United States and other nations. Supporters of constitutional rule, who later called themselves *Los Azules* (The Blues), favored winning over Peronist support as the most useful way to fight Communism. *Los Colorados* (The Reds) totally rejected a populist approach; their opposition to Peronism was such that they held out for an indefinite military dictatorship.

Following a year of army infighting, the "Blues" prevailed, and elections on all levels were scheduled for July 7, 1963. Once again Peronists were denied the right to nominate candidates of their own. The presidential candidate of the People's Radical Civic Union (UCRP), the Radical Party faction that had lost to Frondizi's UCRI five years earlier, was victorious. The new president, Arturo Illia, a little-known country doctor, secured the most votes but only a quarter of the total cast. One of five voters had followed Perón's orders to cast a blank ballot. In contrast to Frondizi's appeal to Peronists five years before, Illia had made no effort to do so and so lacked organized labor support.

Throughout his exile, Perón had shown great durability, but by the mid-1960s he had reason to fear that his influence was waning.

He had been out of power for a decade; the likelihood of a restoration (for devout Peronists, *el retorno*) was melting away; and several powerful union chiefs, most notably the head of the metal workers' union, Augusto Vandor, were edging toward a Peronism without Perón. Those who held major union posts during the ex-president's administration were banned as candidates, and elections took place for new union leaders. They were chosen by rank and file members and so needed to respond to their wishes, which were not necessarily those of Juan Perón.<sup>29</sup>

In Madrid, *El Líder* was fully aware of, but not adverse to, these divisions within labor. He was on record as saying that he had a right and a left hand, and knew how to use both. The Peronist unions within the CGT served as a powerful political instrument. Perón wanted them to be effective, but not so strong as to act independently of Madrid. Accordingly, he encouraged division between labor officials like Vandor who took a moderate approach, seeking alliances and adaptation rather than confrontation, and more aggressive officials, like the followers of the radical Cooke as well as those of the one-time textile worker, Andrés Framini. The latter had called on Peronists to rise in revolution if excluded from the 1963 election, and Perón had supported Framini's rise to balance the popular Vandor. Still, both presented problems. Should he come to dominate organized labor, Vandor raised the specter of a Peronism without Perón, while the tactics advocated by Framini, if successful, might lead to government repression so fierce as to render the entire movement ineffective. Indeed, Framini's threat of insurrection resulted in his arrest. In any event, neither man could be allowed to replace *El Líder's* command of the labor movement. The difficulties in maintaining this balancing act had added to confusion over the best electoral tactic to follow, and persuaded Perón at the last minute to urge his followers again to cast blank ballots in the 1963 elections.

The Congressional elections held in March 1965 brought the divisions within the Peronist movement to the fore. Despite objections by the military, the Illia government had allowed Peronist parties to form and participate in them. And Peronist candidates—and those calling themselves Peronist—performed well enough to raise hopes in subsequent elections, regional and national. There was talk of fusing all groups identifying themselves as Peronist into a single party. But because it would contain people not personally loyal or even known to him, the ex-president viewed any such reorganization as a direct threat to his leadership. Still smarting from an aborted attempt to visit Argentina

(he was detained in Rio de Janeiro and put on a returning plane), he was not about to let this happen, and accordingly urged his most faithful followers to resist the creation of any such centralized structure.

Threatened both by the inclusion in his movement of unsubmissive politicians and by the divisions within labor, Perón would rally his forces by sending his third wife, Isabel Martínez, if not to Argentina then to neighboring Paraguay in an attempt to counter Vandor's influence, win back control of the unions, and so strengthen his own position of leadership. The decision to send Isabel was logical. If he could not set foot in Argentina, he would have to use someone else, someone who would be seen as an extension of himself. His vision of Isabel acting out the part played by his former wife was strengthened by an awareness that unlike Evita she was not taken as a threat by his enemies. However, Perón's plans to make Isabel into the next Evita failed to take the former dancer's qualifications into consideration.

Although he later claimed that he had politically prepared his wife, there was no sign before 1965 that he had taught her anything except to fence and ride a motor scooter. She had never participated in any of the meetings held by Perón with his visitors and had played no part in "Operation Return." Moreover, Isabel lacked the personality and the close ties to the Argentine people held by her predecessor. Her interest seemed to lie in the latest fashions, which tended to accentuate her youthful figure. On the other hand, she undeniably held symbolic importance as Perón's wife.<sup>30</sup> During her month-long stay in Ascunción, Peronists streamed across the border to meet with her. The results of this—and a subsequent visit to Buenos Aires—however, were negligible. Perón's determination to remain master of his movement—and consequently his animosity toward those who would usurp him—was never more clearly demonstrated than in his struggle against Augusto Vandor. In an unpublished account of Perón's exile, Raúl Alfonsín told how in January 1966 Perón sent a furious letter to José Alonso, the secretary general of the CGT. "In this struggle the chief enemy is Vandor," wrote, and *El Líder* added, "it is necessary to throw everything at them and aim at the head, without respite or mercy. In politics you can't injure; you must kill...Count on all my support ... If [Vandor] were a political director I haven't the least doubt he would already be liquidated."<sup>31</sup> This was unusually violent language for Perón, language that might easily inflame devoted partisans.

Sure enough, a few days before the aforementioned by-election came the first attack against Vandor, by a fanatic racetrack fan, in the hippodrome of San Isidro. Left unharmed—and undaunted—Vandor displaced Alfonso from the CGT in February to keep control

of most of the Peronist labor organizations. A second attempt on his life came a month later. Again, Vandor escaped death, but a close associate was killed in the shootout.<sup>32</sup>

It was to counter Vandor and the threatened loss of his power over the labor movement that led Perón to encourage the radicalization of Peronist youth and the incorporation into his movement of nationalists favoring forceful action. The welcome extended furthered the development of a revolutionary urban guerilla movement. Small groups of militants had already begun to form, groups committed to the violence that would shape both Perón's future and that of Argentina. Both national and international factors explain the emergence of a guerilla movement: the failure of the "shotgun marriage" between Perón and Frondizi in 1958; the despair of hardline Peronists over Vandor's rise to prominence; the influence of the Castro revolution in Cuba; the era of Vatican II and changes in Catholic teaching and practice and the emergence of activist worker priests within the Latin American church; and the deposed president's awareness of the rise of left-wing radicalism in Latin America (especially among the young won over by Castro and Che Guevara) and the need of Peronism to compete for their allegiance.

None of this meant that Perón himself was embracing the left and the radicals within it; he was wedded to military tradition, and he needed a loyal CGT as well as a political movement containing both right- and left-wing elements. Rather he was enlarging his coalition so as to include the hard left. *El Líder* had advocated violence before, but in a decidedly abstract way. Now he wanted "to fire a warning shot across Vandor's bow" and show support for revolutionary Peronists. Leaning to the radical left carried another advantage: it would co-opt anti-American sentiment. Perón was on record as having said, "I am convinced that the worst scourge of our peoples is precisely the economic, political, and social intervention of the United States in our countries." A book he published in 1968, *La hora de los pueblos* (The Time of the People), although filled with what one of his biographers called "loose talk and silly history," showed a marked tilt to the left and a newfound admiration of Third World causes. Although unintended, the effect of his shift in tactics was to help pave the way for the radical and guerilla violence of the early 1970s.<sup>33</sup>

Peronist candidates did well in the mid-1965 congressional elections because the dominant Blue faction in the army had not enforced the

bans against them. Once in Congress, Peronists began undermining the government's legislative program, which together with a trade union assault on the regime's economic policies helped bring about political turmoil. When in early 1966 the government's austerity program—initiated to head off a recession—was met by a wave of strikes, Illia finally lost his military support. The armed forces saw with dismay the failure of two civilian administrations either to resolve the “Peronist problem” or to achieve acceptable economic growth. They launched another military coup on June 28, 1966: Congress was shut down; political parties again dissolved, and near-total authority given to a recently retired general, and a staunch “Blue” who had hinted at taking a more populist line, Juan Carlos Onganía.

As commander of the Campo de Mayo garrison, Onganía had declared that the “armed forces should not govern” but should be “obedient to civil power.” In the same communiqué he urged that all sectors be allowed to participate in a political solution, a clear reference to Peronists (although, hopefully, without Perón). This victory of the Azules, who believed in constitutional government and knew that the Peronists could not be disenfranchised forever, over the Colorados laid the foundation for Perón's eventual return.<sup>34</sup>

When Onganía was sworn in as president (in what was optimistically called the “Argentine Revolution,” Vandor and the highest union chiefs, hoping for a new beginning, showed up as honored guests. Alfonsín cited one exultant union leader: “For us, each government that falls is a step to power.” Thanks to Onganía's apparent willingness to conciliate workers—he had appointed a Peronist as secretary of labor—his administration led many to believe that the Peronist movement would soon emerge under new reformed leadership, carry out a democratic reorganization, and launch a policy of cooperation with the government.

In Spain, Perón, too, gave (conditional) approval to the “Argentine Revolution.” However fearful that the new government's policy of reaching out to labor might usher in Peronism without Perón, he believed he had no alternative. In a recorded message he told his followers that the new military rulers had been making statements compatible with Peronist principles, and that if they created a “popular government” he would be obliged to support it. But it soon became clear that no popular government was intended.

Because of the hopes raised by the new government, and in view of Perón's age, chances for a personal return seemed more remote than ever. Although his hair was still dark and his smile as bright as ever, a skin condition had brought out red blotches on his face. The prostate operations had taken a toll, and only long walks, yoga classes, and a frugal diet kept

him going. The Puerta de Hierro house remained a magnet for visiting Argentines. *El Líder* may have complained of their numbers, but he relished having appreciative guests, including the militant students who affectionately referred to him as *el viejo*, “the old man.”

In a book published in 1967 designed to strengthen his claims to “hemispheric statesmanship,” he began to nurture ties to non-Peronist Argentine leaders. Yet he offered no new approaches to the problems of the 1960s. He expressed a pious wish to “infuse fresh blood into the top echelons of the movement,” but the “new force” he intended to create was one that he could manipulate to counter the growing influence of the politicians and labor chieftains who were challenging him.<sup>35</sup>

Also revealed was Perón’s obsession with conspiracies. The book contained references to an “international synarchy,” a cabal of Capitalists, Communists, Masons, Zionists, and the Catholic Church with the intention of imposing a world order. The nations that had refused to go along, Germany, Italy, and Japan, were thwarted in World War II. Yalta had divided the world between two great imperialistic powers, and the Cold War was just a sham to disguise this reality. If intelligent Peronists found these delusions embarrassing, a lunatic fringe fed on them. When made aware of his poor choice of such phrases as “national socialism” to describe the political essence of Justicialism, Perón again insisted that he was only distinguishing his ideology from Soviet Communism. Yet he never explained how his ideas were in any way socialist, although he believed that the arrival of a (national) socialism was inevitable.

If the current administration was supposed to usher in a neo-Peronist regime based on popular support, it was becoming clear this was not to be the case. Aside from the promotion of a more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy, the Onganía government was soon reflecting the conservative Catholic, rigidly anti-Communist, authoritarian views of its head. It was not only labor that saw the president’s embrace of populism as a ploy to nullify union opposition; that in reality he was seeking, like the Brazilian military regime established two years before, to establish a modernizing autocracy.

Lacking in political skills and totally repudiating the conciliation initially hinted at, the regime showed itself as ideologically uncompromising, taking Francisco Franco’s fascist dictatorship as a model. It campaigned not only against Marxist but liberal influences when it moved against the public universities (which had regained autonomy after Perón was pushed from office). The police moved onto university



grounds, shut down governing councils, and forced the resignation of many faculty members who prized academic freedom, replacing them with government appointees.

Industrial growth had surged following Onganía's commitment to increased foreign—and domestic—investment and the strict guidelines set on wages. But the development stimulated by the government's economic policies was uneven, never reaching the slums of Buenos Aires or such poverty-stricken areas as those in Tucumán Province. Workers resented the freeze on wages, and students opposed the crackdown in their universities. Opposition to the "Argentine Revolution" began to mount, with the unions again taking the lead. A CGT-coordinated national strike shut down major cities, and only fierce government repression forced the labor federation to call off a second wave of strikes in the early spring of 1967. His political antenna alert as ever, Perón now declared himself as dead set against any further cooperation with the government. His shift to a stand of total opposition was reinforced by an awareness that his movement was being infiltrated by hardcore militants who identified themselves as Peronists.

Now Perón was denouncing the Onganía government and Vandor's belief that negotiations with it were still possible. The hard line taken by the regime against the CGT had given the ex-president his chance to reassert full control over the labor movement. He urged the labor federation to show even more resistance, and the split between the Peronists in it who obeyed his injunction and the Vandorists who did not, widened. As usual, *El Líder* gave the impression he was working with both sides. On the one hand, he invited Vandor to meet with him in northern Spain, suggesting a willingness to cooperate for the sake of unity; on the other, he continued to give orders to his loyal labor followers to resist government policies and any union leader who accepted them.

Perón could only have exulted as opposition to the regime intensified. Farmers became more resentful of the taxes imposed on them, while workers, with their wages frozen, believed they were paying for most of government's reforms and gaining the least from them. More significantly, the military's support for Onganía's "Revolution" had begun to fade. The *Azules* were growing impatient with autocratic rule, and wanted the armed forces to move more quickly to civilian government. The *Colorados* expressed disappointment that the dictatorship had not gone far enough to clear away "ideological influences" perceived as threatening society. They wanted an even more authoritarian regime, with the military firmly in control. Student protests against state intervention in the universities in March of 1969 opened the crisis that brought an end to the Onganía regime.

Meetings between union and radical student leaders in Córdoba resulted in a popular uprising on May 29, 1969, 14 years after events in the same city set off the military insurrection that had toppled Perón. In what came to be called the *cordobazo*, which left 14 dead and hundreds wounded in the streets, auto workers joined with students in erecting barricades and burning buildings associated with the government and with foreign conglomerates. Unprepared, the police withdrew and left the provincial capital in the hands of the protestors for two days. Army troops finally quelled the riots and recaptured the city, but the regime's ability to rule suffered a mortal blow. As sporadic protests continued and force was increasingly relied on, Onganía's image as a strong man was shattered. Forced to reorganize his cabinet, he abandoned the wage-freezing anti-inflationary policies previously pursued. The protestors, who represented less a revival of Peronism than the birth of a new radicalism destined to supersede it, had succeeded in showing the administration as incapable of maintaining law and order, and the military lost confidence in him. In a little over a year a new military junta would announce that it had forced Onganía from power.

On July 1, 1969, in yet another assassination attempt, Augusto Vandor was gunned down by unidentified youthful terrorists in his downtown office. It is still not clear who were responsible: radical labor elements upset by his refusal to support a general strike called by the leftist labor faction; radicals who accused him of selling out to the Onganía government; or Peronist revolutionaries who believed that Vandor was disloyal to *El Líder*. Whatever, the assassination was foreseen, if not inspired, by Perón. In an interview given early in 1970, he acknowledged having warned Vandor of a threat on his life, although whether the threat came from the Argentine government, the American ally it was allegedly involved with, or from within the Peronist movement was not made clear. Perón went on to say that "when a traitor appears, I don't expel him. I say 'Take care of him, he's useful; he's generating antibodies.'"<sup>36</sup> Yet later in the interview, the ex-president claimed to have controlled all elements of Peronist movement. If true, and in the event that a Peronist group was in fact responsible, the ex-president might very well have ordered the assassination.

Vandor's murder provided the Onganía government with a pretext to arrest the most combative elements within the CGT. From a larger perspective, his death quickened the change taking place in Argentine politics. Not only was union power further atomized, but the recourse to violence was increasingly relied on.

By 1970 there had emerged what soon became the hemisphere's largest and most powerful urban guerilla group. It identified itself as Peronist, but its members called themselves *Montoneros* (guerrillas); and they shocked the country by kidnaping and then executing former president Aramburu.<sup>37</sup> The killing was called a reprisal for the execution of a general who had led a short-lived insurgency against Aramburu in 1956. The kidnappers had announced that they were submitting him to "revolutionary justice," charged him with assorted crimes, including the profanation of Evita's embalmed body, and because its whereabouts remained a mystery since the Liberating Revolution, demanded to learn its location. Their communiqué announcing the execution ended with the phrase "Perón or Death."

There had long been a left-wing faction in Peronism, just as there had long been guerrilla groups in Argentina, but until the late 1960s both were virtually insignificant, both in numbers and in influence. However, during the following decade *Montonero* forces grew in size and importance. Originally fewer than a dozen in number, within five years of its birth, the organization had five to ten thousand armed members and several times that in supporters and sympathizers.

By the end of 1970, another group, the non-Peronist People's Revolutionary Army (*Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo*, ERP) was active. Unlike the *Montoneros*, who gave allegiance to Perón and were strongest in the Buenos Aires area, the ERP was affiliated with a small Trotskyist party and based primarily in Córdoba. Both staged kidnappings, bank robberies, and assassinations of high-ranking army or police officers. Their members consisted largely of middle-class university students or former students.

As ardent Peronists, the *Montoneros* submerged their Marxism in the rhetoric of revolutionary Peronism, seen as authentically Argentine and as the only source of radical change. They were too young to have direct knowledge of Perón's first administration, and so they tended to hold a romanticized view both of Perón and Peronism. The *Montoneros'* adoption of Peronism was apparently based on their assumption that the Argentine working class was inherently revolutionary, that Juan Perón was its clear leader, and that therefore he was a revolutionary leader. And despite the violence many of them supported, visitors with ties to the group, far from being denounced by the ex-president, were welcomed to Puerta de Hierro.

The immediate goal of the *Montoneros* was simply to create conditions under which *El Líder* could return to power. Their recourse to violence was designed to show the leadership of the armed forces that the restoration of order lay in the return of constitutional government, and they

had no doubt that an honest election would return Perón to the presidency—from which he would lead Argentina to revolutionary Socialism. The ERP, in contrast, believed that the revolution was not limited to Argentina, but was part of a pan-American anti-imperialist struggle.

The death of Aramburu brought down the Onganía regime. A widely held rumor had it that the deposed president was conspiring against the government with the intent of coming back to power. The half-hearted attempt to find the kidnaped general led critics of the government to believe that it had contrived the whole conspiracy. Coming as it did in the wake of the *cordobazo*, it marked the final straw. On June 8, 1970, military forces under the leadership of General Alejandro Lanusse, who had been pressing Onganía to share power with the army only to be repeatedly refused, ousted him and inserted as head of state an unknown army attaché stationed at the Argentine embassy in Washington, General Roberto Levingston. In nine months, he, in turn, would be deposed and replaced by Lanusse himself. Unable to stop the subversion, Levingston had refused to legalize political parties or schedule an election. When renewed rioting broke out in Córdoba, the junta replied by removing him from office and installing Lanusse. Unlike his predecessor, he assumed the presidency to prepare for another transition to civilian government. Lanusse and the leaders of the armed forces acknowledged that for an elected government to be considered legitimate and have a chance to govern effectively, Peronists had to be granted electoral freedom.

In short, the collapse of the “Argentine Revolution” breathed new life into Perón’s dream of a return to power. The generals who favored military rule had tried to dictate solutions to a country increasingly unwilling to follow their lead. The parade of civilian and military presidents who entered and left the Casa Rosada could not restore the country to political and economic health. Armed resistance groups were launching guerrilla-type campaigns to win control. A new generation of more militant leaders had taken control of the trade union movement. Argentina was splintering into a collection of warring groups. The reemergence of yet another junta after Onganía’s fall and the rise of guerrilla groups that moved to challenge the established order through the use of terror was persuading many to rethink their opposition to a Peronist solution. Having failed to reach basic agreement over a proper course of action, the military was reconciling itself to the eventual return of civilian rule. Its leaders preferred someone other than Perón, but were forced to conclude that only their chief enemy could restore stability.

## PERÓN

## RESURRECTION

Even though Lanusse renewed his pledge to hold elections and return to representative democracy, many Peronists remained skeptical. Because he had participated in a failed military uprising against Perón in 1951, they had good reason to doubt him. But the new president was a realist who believed it was possible to unite moderate Peronists and traditional anti-Peronists. Accordingly he was open to negotiations with both—and, to ensure Peronist participation, with Perón himself. In view of the continued hostility of other military leaders to the prospect of a Peronist government, the president agreed to a change in the election law: to require a runoff vote if no candidate won an absolute majority. (The consensus held that a Peronist candidate might win a plurality, but would be defeated in a runoff by a coalition of anti-Peronist political parties.) Moreover, a complicated legality would prevent Perón himself from being a candidate.

To open the way for negotiations that would lead to the restoration of a constitutional order, the government restored Perón's presidential pension (with back pay), and indicated its willingness to talk with the deposed president. Lanusse had the statutory rape charge dropped and hinted that Eva's body might be returned to Argentina. More substantively, the ban on political parties was lifted and Peronist labor leaders were invited to the Casa Rosada for talks.

After struggling for nearly two decades against Perón and his supporters, Lanusse and other military leaders had accepted the necessity of restoring Peronist participation in the political life of Argentina because of escalating political violence and the lack of viable options. On April 1, 1971, political parties, which had been outlawed in 1966 following the military coup, were legalized. Four months later, on August 11, long lines of *El Líder's* followers registered to vote as such for the first time in 16 years, and most cited their preference for his

party, Justicialista Movimiento, the most important of the Peronist parties. In short, the violence of the Montoneros and other guerrilla groups led to the readmission of Peronism but without Perón, in order to inoculate the nation against the far left.<sup>1</sup>

The nation's calamitous economic problems also helped convince the generals that there were few alternatives to legitimizing Peronism. In August 1972, according to World Bank statistics, Argentina shared with Cambodia the dubious distinction of having the highest rate of inflation in the world. From April to December of that year, the cost of living rose by 60 percent. If Perón had wanted inflation to skyrocket just before the election, he got his wish: it reached a high of 64.1 percent for 1972 (compared with 39.1 percent in 1971). A source of immense discontent, it intensified the clamor for regime change.<sup>2</sup>

The new president began planning to turn the government over to civilian rule. Although forbidden to run for the presidency, permission was granted for Perón to visit Argentina and for his party to compete in the election scheduled for March 11, 1973. To ensure that he would be kept off the ticket, the junta imposed a residency requirement for all potential candidates: anyone not residing in Argentina prior to August 25, 1972, was prohibited from running for public office.

Perón responded by taking a hard line. He refused to tell Lanusse who the Peronist candidate in the scheduled presidential election would be. He also refused to condemn the revolutionary wing of his movement that was keeping the country in turmoil. On the contrary, he maintained his alliance with the most militant revolutionaries, the *Montoneros*. At one point the image of Evita was revived by the slogan, "If Evita were alive she would be a *Montonera*." In an interview given to a Paris magazine, Perón was supposed to have called for a violent upheaval in Argentina and to have suggested that if he regained power he would dismantle such reactionary institutions as the army. Peronist politicians denied the authenticity of the article, but Peronist revolutionaries were "delighted."<sup>3</sup>

Perón's personal representative in Argentina, a personable young politician named Jorge Paladino, had sounded most reasonable when negotiating in 1970 for a coalition with Radicals and other parties to pressure the regime into allowing the resumption of political activity. Still, when Paladino backed Lanusse in the latter's quarrels with other generals less willing to make concessions, Perón found this unacceptable. Paladino's resignation later in the year as secretary general of the Justicialista Movimiento (on the grounds that he did not want to divide the movement) was doubtless brought on by Perón's opposition to him. Paladino was becoming too friendly with the government, and *El Líder* wanted to keep his options open. Paladino

was replaced by Héctor Cámpora, the fervently loyal former Peronist member of the Chamber of Deputies.

For 16 years Argentine presidents had treated Perón as a nonperson. This had let him obstruct government policies while allowing him to become a legend and avoid personal accountability for the problems faced by the nation. Now Lanusse wanted to force him to act and take responsibility in the hope that this would both isolate *El Líder* from the revolutionary left and let the faithful see him as he really was, a tired old man. There were risks to this strategy. Radical Peronists might reject any limits on their right to name candidates of their own choosing. If successful, they would be free to nominate Perón, which could expose Lanusse to resistance from the military and other anti-Peronists. But the president was convinced that Perón would keep his end of the agreement—that is, not run for office himself—and that a solution to the Peronist problem could be negotiated.

Perón understood Lanusse's game. He took care to keep the regime on the defensive by creating at least the appearance of a united movement—if not a single party—and relying on the same formula used throughout his career: to preach unity while cultivating chaos. A journalist reported Perón's admission that "it is in the midst of confusion that I handle myself best, and if none exists one must create it. The art of politics is not to govern order but disorder." Yet unity was promoted only to the extent that it left loyalty to *El Líder* as the only common ground for Peronists. While he played off one subordinate against another, he simultaneously deployed them against Lanusse.<sup>4</sup>

On April 13, 1971, Perón held a conclave of Peronist leaders in Madrid. He also met secretly with a high-ranking representative of the Lanusse government. There was no substance to this talk, but the fact that the regime was now dealing directly with Perón pointed to an important concession. Both men agreed to keep their meeting a secret. Lanusse's representative did; Perón did not.

At the same time that he was entering into negotiations with the government, he was telling Peronist politicians to continue "hit[ting] it hard." He was not about to end his offensive against the regime. Nor did he stop encouraging his young leftist supporters. By means of recorded tapes and letters, Perón kept in touch with and encouraged youth organizations advocating a radical brand of Peronism, dropping hints of making them his political heirs. He spoke again of a "national socialism" and praised Castro's Cuba and Allende's Chile.

While bargaining with the government and at the same time stoking the flames of revolutionary Peronism, he was also wooing

conservative army officers who might overthrow Lanusse for making too many concessions. (Perón was aware that because the president had to account to his military peers, he could not risk a Peronist victory and its leader's triumphal return, and so lacked full freedom of action.) *El Líder's* complex tactical thrusts were all carried on simultaneously and all were aimed at restoring himself to power.

However much aware of his variegated maneuvers, the Lanusse government continued to make overtures to Perón. His bust was now displayed along with other presidents in the Casa Rosada. It was disclosed publicly (for the first time) that the Vatican had lifted the decree of excommunication. Perhaps most symbolic was the return to Perón of the coffin containing Evita's embalmed corpse. Ever since its disappearance in 1956, its recovery had topped the agenda of the radical left. *Montoneros* especially had elevated Evita into a cult, and to appease them and other Peronist faithful, her body would be taken from the Milan cemetery where it had finally been buried at Aramburu's orders and brought to Madrid.

On Friday, September 23, 1971, according to the account of the Argentine ambassador to Spain who was in touch with Perón, "a van escorted by two police jeeps turned into [Perón's] driveway." The Argentine army colonel who had taken custody of the body in 1956 supervised the unloading of a black wooden coffin into the living room. Perón, Isabel, and two monks gathered around as his secretary López Rega and Paladino opened the lid. Paladino later said that Perón displayed no visible sign of emotion. There was a moment of silence, and then Perón said only, "It's Evita" and signed a receipt.

The next day, the same Doctor Ara, who had originally embalmed the corpse and who now lived in Madrid, examined the remains. He found some minor damage, a flattening of the nose, but easily repairable. Isabel washed the corpse and arranged its hair. Evita's sisters, who flew to Spain and made a new shroud, wanted the body entombed in Madrid. But it possessed too much symbolic value to remain there. Young left-wing Peronists who had already appropriated her pointed to her violent tirades against oligarchy, her repeated cry of "Perón or Death," and her attempt to purchase arms for her *descamisados* as proof of genuine revolutionary intentions. They hoped to transform "Evita the Saint" into "Evita the Guerrilla." Perón, however, showed little interest and seemed content for the time being to keep the body in an upstairs room.<sup>5</sup>

In early October of 1972 some diehard army units staged an abortive coup to head off the elections scheduled for the following March.



With much popular support, Lanusse defeated these dissidents, whom he referred to as representing a “fascist far right.” Despite this show of force by the government, *Montoneros* (and other militants) remained skeptical of its commitment to reestablishing civilian rule. They had also persuaded themselves that Perón was really a revolutionary and that any cooperation on his part with the government was only a tactical maneuver. *El Líder*’s replacement of the moderate Paladino with the devoted Cámpora seemed to confirm their judgment.

A former dentist who had presided over the lower house of the legislature, Cámpora totally embraced the Peronist cause. Lacking any political base of his own, he was, as a biographer of Perón put it, “one of the most malleable men ever to hold high office ... a ‘mindless acolyte.’” Fiercely loyal to his *Líder*, on one occasion he had unashamedly asked that every square in every town in Argentina be named after Perón and Evita.<sup>6</sup>

The revolutionaries who hailed his appointment had failed to note another of Perón’s appointments in the same month, that of Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Osinde as a military and political advisor, a man of decidedly conservative leanings. Other initiatives for reconciliation taken by Perón included his substitution of “Argentina” for “Peronist” in his rhetoric, his invocation of an agreement between the CGT and the CGE (an employers’ organization) to jointly decide on wages and prices, an agreement that would come to life in the third Perón administration. Also indicative of his desire for reconciliation was *El Líder*’s participation in a short-lived Civic Front of National Liberation, yet another coalition of Peronists and moderate elements, one that included ex-president Frondizi. Perón’s denunciation of Lanusse’s residency requirement was made more to appease his revolutionary supporters than to show opposition. He considered the measure necessary to reassure the military.

Thus in the months leading up to the election Perón was paving the way for his own return to power. Operating from abroad through intermediaries, *El Líder* had reasserted his authority over the unions and the Peronist movement. He now added his voice to those speaking out against multinationals in order to win over business support. Previously a small part of his movement, the Peronist Youth (*Juventud Peronista*) was revamped into a major association for dissident youth groups. Going beyond the populism that had swept him to power, Perón became all things to all people. Workers and their unions anticipated the restoration of the gains made in the late 1940s, while propertied elements saw him as Argentina’s de Gaulle, someone who would replace revolution with stability and order.

His refusal to disavow the *Montoneros*, whom he repeatedly called the “special formations of the movement” and whom he used to force concessions from the government, would ensure the continued support of this far—and violent—left.<sup>7</sup>

Resentful of, and inclined to disrupt, his emerging electoral alliance, it was now the left that needed reassurance. Accordingly, in filmed interviews given in the summer of 1971 approving of violence and dismissing elections, hailing jailed leftists, and quoting Mao, Perón strengthened its confidence in him. He wrote to *Montonero* leaders at year’s end again urging them to strike out at the regime. In the spring of 1972 he refused to condemn the kidnaping and murder of a Fiat executive, even though the guerillas responsible were not Peronists. At the end of that year he told a Madrid newspaper that if he were 50 years younger he too would “plant bombs and take justice into [his] own hands.” Until the day of his inauguration he maintained that such excesses were natural reactions to government violence, and would come to an end when it changed hands.

Why this taste for physical violence? Despite occasional outbursts of rhetoric, Perón had never relied on it. The explanation lies in his distrust of a still powerful military regime and his need of a devoted left to exert continued leverage on Lanusse. Radical Peronists might also prove useful in restraining a monolithic labor unionism. *El Líder* reassured himself that the left could never come to power because it lacked a genuine base in the labor movement. Enjoying the support of only one in every ten Argentines, the left, for Perón, was “like the vinegar in the salad, you have to put in a little so you can eat it.”<sup>8</sup> Clearly, he would overestimate his ability to control it when back in power.

In December 1971, Isabel visited Argentina on another political mission. Her stated purpose was to promote unity in the Peronist movement. Left unsaid was that of consolidating support for her husband. She at once joined with José Rucci, the head of the CGT, to reunite the movement that the firing of Jorge Paladino had deeply divided. Facing a challenge by supporters of the dismissed Paladino, Perón was to take no chances. His wife spent three months visiting numerous Peronist organizations, and a meeting with one of Evita’s sisters carried symbolic significance. In Madrid, meanwhile, Perón continued to welcome non-Peronist leaders as part of his strategy to create the political coalition that would compete in the 1973 election.

Perón remained ever sensitive about his image—he had suffered a setback in 1966 with his aborted return, and he knew there must be no

repeat performance. He had promised not to pose his own candidacy. Yet if he returned to Argentina as anything but a presidential candidate determined to win, he would be seen as a political pawn of Lanusse and the other generals. He also knew (all too well) that a significant faction of the armed forces was determined to keep him from becoming president. A frenzied display of mass devotion could trigger memories of his former excesses with the *descamisados* and incite a military rejection of a Peronist victory without Perón. The timing, too, of a return, was all important: too soon and it might provoke a military coup; too late, it might cost him the election. Late in July 1972 *El Líder* announced that he must remain in Spain to conduct the overall strategy of his movement and not become involved in the day-to-day tactical decisions taken in Argentina. For the time being, he would continue to keep himself in the background, to remain the big question mark on the political scene, and take advantage of the myth evoked by memories of his rule.

Yet Perón was nearing 75 years of age. How appealing would a younger generation find him? He was aware that he needed its support to win, but aware too that young people only knew about him what their parents and grandparents had told them. Still, by the early 1970s successive governments had failed to get stable and impressive growth, and it was understandable that many Argentines should once more look to Perón for leadership. The attitude of many in this older generation was aptly put in 1966, after his aborted return. In the dingy industrial suburbs of Greater Buenos Aires a meat-packer was quoted as saying, “[Peron] will *always* be the moral leader. Look, before 1945, we had nothing and we were nobody. Since 1955, we haven’t had anything either, but *we knew that we’re somebody*. And because of *him*.” This was the image of himself that Perón had to preserve.<sup>9</sup>

Some followers loved Perón for what he did; others, in spite of what he did. But to both he represented hope: for government-provided security; for a better position on the economic ladder; for the future of their country. As long as he remained the great savior from abroad he could maintain that image—the one he had worked so hard to create. Given the repression carried out in his two previous presidencies, Perón at times had trouble with this image, especially his attempt to disclaim the persecution carried out by his government. On one occasion, he told a visitor to Madrid, “It’s sad how they spread lies about my government. There were no political prisoners.”

The visitor, a converted Peronist, begged *El Líder*’s pardon but pointed out, “I myself was imprisoned for opposition activity.”

“Really,” Perón answered. “It’s incredible the things that were done without my knowledge.”<sup>10</sup>

As political violence showed no sign of letting up, Perón knew that time was on his side. He may have encouraged *Montonero* attacks, but he did not entirely control them. Yet he profited from them. The stream of robberies, murders, and kidnaps revealed the embattled regime's inability to cope. Lanusse, like Gorbachev 20 years later, even had he wanted to could not reverse the democratic process he had initiated.

Although four months earlier he had indicated a preference to remain in Madrid, in November 1972 Perón decided on a brief return to Argentina. His stated reason was to consolidate the electoral coalition put together for the following year's election. He had also been challenged by Lanusse to visit: "Even Christ, who was God, did not stay away as the commander of strategic policy, but came down to earth in person," said the president in a July 27 speech at the military academy. Experiencing pressure from the armed forces, Lanusse had felt compelled to launch a personal attack, but did not really believe that Perón would leave Madrid.<sup>11</sup> Aware that the end of his Spanish residency was approaching, *El Líder* experienced feelings of nostalgia: he would always regard the country as *Madre Patria*.<sup>12</sup>

On November 7, to the acclaim of thousands of supporters Cámpora disclosed that in ten days Perón would arrive at Ezeiza Airport in Buenos Aires. Lanusse gave assurances that the government would guarantee his physical safety. In Buenos Aires, extraordinary security precautions were taken. To avoid a general stoppage of work, November 17, the date of his scheduled arrival, was declared a paid holiday, and schools and universities were closed. Only those with passes could come to Ezeiza, and armed troops began to converge upon the airport. Perón and those accompanying him left from Rome, where he had met with Cámpora and 130 enthusiastic Peronists and then with Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti—but not with the pope, who had made it known that he didn't want to be involved in Argentine politics—on an Alitalia jet.

The group, flying first class, consisted of Isabel and a select few, including his private secretary, José López Rega. López Rega has been described as a "curiosity of history." He came from nowhere—and nine years later would go back to nowhere, but in between his power and influence, both unofficial and official, was second only to *El Líder*'s. In the year after Perón's death, it would be supreme. Once a corporal in the Buenos Aires police, and then a failed singer, he had printed unintelligible books on spiritualism and the occult. Having won Isabel's confidence, he eventually won that of her husband. Given the title of private secretary, he became a fixture in the household.<sup>13</sup>

According to the *New York Times* reporter present,

a cordon of troops, tanks, armored cars, and riot police surrounded the airport to keep the several thousand Peronists from getting there. The disappointed throng formed a column over three miles long straggling back to the city in a pouring rain. The 300 that did manage to greet the plane each carried a white plastic pass that got them through given checkpoints and three body searches.<sup>14</sup>

During her prior visit, Isabel had picked out a house in a quiet suburb on the northwest edge of Buenos Aires for them to stay in. Word of their arrival in the neighborhood had spread, and soon crowds of thousands were trampling their garden—and those of their neighbors. Obviously moved by the adulation outside, Perón at the window would gesture and say a few words, while the faithful chanted his name. Isabel stood by, and on occasion substituted for her husband. She would show an enlarged photo of Eva Perón and lead a by now familiar Peronist chant: “*Se siente/Se siente/Evita está presente*” (We feel it/We feel it/Evita is present”). Ice-cream vendors strolled by; and spectators perched in trees and on the roofs. Bass drummers kept a steady beat for the entire weekend, stopping only when *El Líder* spoke to the crowd and on Sunday mornings.

The carnival on Gaspar Campos street revealed the durability of the almost mystical bond between Perón and his followers. The long exile had added to his appeal, revealing, as Robert Crassweller wrote, “a paternal figure who projected hope and understanding, a messenger of peace, a symbol of hope, the incarnation of enduring myths.” The Juan Perón of 1972 evoked radiant legends of the Peronist past: October 17; the emergence of the Argentine working class as a political force; the defeat of Spruille Braden; Evita and her social aid programs. As for *El Líder* himself, “his hair [was] still black, his smile still captivating,” yet he was also an elderly man, and signs of fading energy and occasional bewilderment were noted and commented on. His political tactics were also evoking some criticism. A radical student complained: “We expected him to lead the revolution but he sits at home and wheels and deals.”<sup>15</sup> The observation was fair inasmuch as the ex-president was urging calm and prudence.

Perón scrupulously obeyed the government’s residency requirement imposed on possible candidates and turned down the offer of the Justicialist party for the presidential nomination. It would have given the Colorado faction of the military more ammunition for their

campaign to cancel the election. He did meet, however, with the leaders of 22 political parties, with groups of all sizes, trade union chiefs, and employers' representatives. It proved the widest range of political representatives seen in Argentina in a long time, something the military governments had been unable to achieve but which allowed him to carefully add to a broadening base of political support before returning to Spain.

While praising the Peronist left, *El Líder* made sure to keep his distance from it. One of the political leaders conferred with was Ricardo Balbín, his old Radical opponent and the Radical Party's candidate for the presidency. The two hit it off, and a personal bond was forged, although Balbín rejected any electoral pact. Perón was more successful with other (small) parties in creating the coalition called the Justicialist Liberation Front.

If Perón was not to be its candidate, how could the Peronists win the presidential election? No one else possessed the necessary charisma, and President Lanusse and the generals behind him experienced relief when Perón didn't challenge their rules for the elections and try to seek the post for himself. His coalition rallied behind his handpicked candidate, Héctor Cámpora. As one of *El Líder's* representatives but lacking any independent political experience, it was clear that he would serve as a stalking horse for Perón.<sup>16</sup>

Perón was widely reported as having been "shocked" by the disorder he found in Argentina. His target, however, was not the guerrillas but the armed forces, "a band of gangsters." Yet in a Madrid press conference, the ex-president had again commented that were he 50 years younger he would be in Argentina also throwing bombs and taking justice into his own hands. The Lanusse government responded by prohibiting all radio and television stations from reporting comments made by Perón and by barring him from the country until after the election. These edicts proved something of a blessing: he could now complain of persecution and was spared the ordeal of another long trip in order to campaign with Cámpora. Instead he went to Romania to visit its president, Nicolas Ceaucescu.

During the 1973 campaign the *Montoneros* worked to mobilize working-class support for Peronist candidates, relying on the slogan *Cámpora al gobierno, Perón al poder* (Cámpora to the presidency, Perón to power), which was seen everywhere. Cámpora proved a lackluster candidate who capitalized on Perón's name—that a vote for Cámpora was really a vote for Perón was the message given and

received—and on deep dissatisfaction with military rule. Lanusse's attacks on the Peronist coalition, on the other hand, reminded voters of the fact that the armed forces saw the Peronists as their chief opponents, which enabled Cámpora and other Peronist candidates to take advantage of the antimilitary mood of the country.

Cámpora avoided mistakes, and in the March election he and the Peronists won a sweeping victory, securing the presidency and majorities in the legislature. With almost 49 percent of the votes he defeated Balbín, whose Radicals won just 29 percent of those cast. The elections not only gave the Peronist coalition control of Congress but that of the provincial governments as well. Although Cámpora failed to win a clear presidential majority, because he came so close Lanusse called him the winner. The Radical Party declined to compete in a run-off election although it had a legal right to do so, and Perón's surrogate was inaugurated on May 25, 1973. After an interment of nearly 18 years, the Peronists had regained power.

On that day they took possession of the streets of Buenos Aires. In what was billed as a "people's festival," half a million frenzied human beings swarmed onto the plaza in front of the Congress building where Cámpora was to be sworn in, onto the Plaza de Mayo in front of the Casa Rosada, to which he was transferred by helicopter, and onto the 14 blocks of the immense Avenida de Mayo connecting the two centers of government. They carried placards and banners identifying themselves as union members (most of the crowd), party members, even the various guerrilla groups. Chants of "national socialism," Perón in power," and "Chile and Cuba" rang out. Someone had painted the words "Montonero House" on the side of the Casa Rosada. Some observers were horrified; others shrugged it off: at least the terrorists appeared willing to work legally for change. For apologists of the military regime, it was the day that Marxist subversives took control. For many seeking an end to violence, stagnation, and economic dependency, it marked a new dawn.

*Montoneros* and other guerrilla groups were delighted with the Cámpora administration. Its first official act was a decree of amnesty that released some 400 political prisoners, including some valued terrorist leaders, from their prison cells. This was a bitter pill for the military to swallow, but the Peronists insisted it was necessary for political stability and the price to be paid for a sensible economic policy that could attract foreign capital. To broaden their base, the guerrillas turned to open recruiting in the universities and in the shanty towns, to taking control of the Peronist Youth Movement, and even to infiltrating the trade unions—much to the displeasure of the union chiefs.<sup>17</sup>

Perón made no effort to attend the inauguration, calling it “Uncle Cámpora’s” show and describing himself as “just another subordinate,” a withdrawal that allowed him to distance himself from his surrogate and any errors he might make. And although the election had ostensibly put Cámpora at the head of the Peronist movement and the state, the political challenges that were soon heard from the unions and from his rivals within the party made it clear that the new president was no match for the demands of the office.

*El Líder* was quoted shortly after the elections as saying “[T]he future now belongs to the *muchachos*,” by which he meant the young Peronist militants. While complaining of underrepresentation in the federal and provincial bureaucracies, they saw the victory as a mandate for radical change and pressed ahead with their agenda. One demand, that calling for the creation of a “youth militia,” evoked memories of the call for workers’ militias back in 1955, a prospect that had enraged the army. In view of doubts about the military’s willingness to see Peronists installed in power, Perón was to take no chances. He summoned the authors of the proposal to Madrid and had them removed from his movement.

He was now changing tactics. Fully aware that the presidency was his for the asking, Perón began the transition from gaining power to holding it. His verbal attacks on the military ceased, as did his vague demands for social change. He now looked with dismay at renewed terrorist assaults carried out by those claiming to act in his name: the collection of extortion money by guerrilla groups; the kidnappings of foreign executives and demands for their ransom; the occupation of public buildings; the assassination of a navy admiral. Cámpora appeared incapable or unwilling to restore order, and many Argentines, including even a number of officers in the military, were becoming convinced that only a Perón-led government could restore order yet achieve progressive change.

Perón announced plans to return permanently from exile the following month, in June 1973. Both he and the people who supported him had given little thought to his age and health. It was discovered that he had suffered a minor heart attack the previous year, and before his departure he required additional prostate surgery. His determination not to die in exile precipitated a decision to return quickly, but the chief explanation was the long-standing desire to once more hold power.

Why was much of the military now willing to accept a Perón-led regime after strongly opposing it for so many years? Both the military and Perón had changed. A new generation of officers had emerged, and for them the restoration of a 77-year-old deposed president no



longer appeared as much of a threat. More to the point, the intervening years since *El Líder*'s fall had not brought any political settlement nor lessening of tensions. The deteriorating economic situation, the terrorism of the guerrilla groups, and the ineffectiveness of the intervening military governments had again put the armed forces into a frame of mind ready to accept constitutional government, even Perón's. A political settlement had become necessary—particularly in light of Brazil's dramatic economic development—for the economic turnaround that was considered critical to the national interest.

A holiday had been declared, and free transportation to Ezeiza was offered by the government. Vendors sold food, drinks, banners, and buttons to the huge crowd, estimated at up to two million people. Chants of Perón's name were heard repeatedly. For many it was a quasi-religious experience, as October 17 had been for the *descamisados*.

The dream turned into a nightmare. Before the scheduled arrival of the plane carrying Perón, clashes erupted between right- and left-wing Peronists. By early afternoon chaos had broken out. For orthodox Peronists, it was the struggle between *Montoneros* and the armed guards hired by union leaders that exploded into a roaring gun battle. The guerrillas, they charged, angered by Perón's shift to a more conservative stand, had planned to assassinate him, and those assigned to defend the platform had opened fire in a preemptive strike. Leftist accounts denied any assassination plot and claimed that the right had launched an unprovoked attack. Whatever the cause of what came to be known as the "Ezeiza Massacre," the crossfire and the stampede of people that resulted from it turned the area into a combat zone, with "hundreds" of spectators killed and injured.<sup>18</sup>

On learning of the mounting death and casualty rates, officials decided to divert Perón's jet to a military airport, leaving *El Líder* terribly disappointed. An investigating commission was later appointed, but its findings were never released. That evening Perón made a brief televised speech thanking those who had come and allaying fears that he was hurt. In another nationwide speech given the next evening the image projected was that of a somber chief executive, one who invoked the need of order and discipline when he said, "We are not in condition to keep destroying ourselves, faced as we are with a destiny pregnant with pitfalls and dangers. You don't build the fatherland by shouting, 'My life for Perón!'"<sup>19</sup> Moderates were pleased to hear a denunciation of violence-prone terrorists, although no specific group was named. Indications that the former president, at the very

least, was moving to the political center were reinforced when the next day he was reported conferring with Radical leader Balbín. The latter told the press that he agreed with Perón's "grand design" for the nation, and a broad consensus between Argentina's two big parties was apparently reached. Certainly there seemed to have emerged a more mellow, more mature Perón. And despite another minor heart attack at the end of the month, from which he quickly recovered, observers knew that Cámpora's days in office were numbered. Five days later he restored Perón's rank of lieutenant general and set a new election for September 23.

After only 49 days in office, Cámpora and his vice president gave their resignations to Congress, clearing the way for Perón's return to the presidency. There was no shortage of rumors: that of a Perón-Balbín ticket, spurred by a cryptic comment of Perón's and his meeting with the Radical Party chief; that of the Peronist left seeking to resurrect Cámpora; that of Peronist moderates attempting to empower Isabel; and that of a Peronist-military alliance. None had any basis in reality.

On August 4, in a Buenos Aires downtown theater, Peronists held a nominating convention. It was clear that Perón would be named by acclamation. The only issue in doubt was that of the vice presidency. There was talk of naming Balbín for the job as part of a unity effort to heal the rift dividing the country, but Perón wouldn't hear of it. He knew that he could die in office, and that to have handed his government over to the leader of a rival party was not the move an astute politician would make. Not yet ready to name a successor, he earmarked his wife for the post.

Perón may have decided it made good political sense both to have a loyal supporter at his side and postpone the selection of a successor, which was bound to be controversial. Perhaps he felt that he owed it to Isabel because Eva had desired the post. Whatever the reason, by selecting Isabel Perón he avoided tilting too far to the left or to the right and made it difficult for either side to oppose his choice. She, too, was approved by acclamation, and the entire process, well-orchestrated by López Rega (who favored Isabel's candidacy), took 25 minutes.<sup>20</sup>

Unable to oppose the decision, the Peronist Youth and especially the *Montoneros* appeared stunned by it. It represented yet another defeat: first the disaster at the airport, then the ousting of Cámpora, and now the vice presidential candidacy of Isabel—who was known

to be under the influence of the hated (for his opportunism) López Rega. Still, they reaffirmed their loyalty; she might very well emulate Evita and renounce the nomination. She did not, and her nomination and subsequent accession to the presidency would leave its imprint on Argentine history over the next decade.

Perón accepted his party's nomination on August 18. He told his audience that he appreciated the strains of office but assured his listeners of "satisfactory" health. However, a CIA report showed a chronic heart condition that required digitalis to control fibrillation and nitroglycerin for angina. Vascular disease and occasional urinary bleeding were also mentioned.<sup>21</sup>

Although signs of growing moderation should have prepared his followers, the tone of *El Líder's* brief campaign surprised many of them. In promising stability and national recovery, he called on both union and youth activists to end their protests. Behind the scenes he worked with union and party leaders to shore up their control over the movement's more radical supporters. Perón showed both skill and luck in the way he handled the young militants in his movement. When, however, he believed that he had veered too far to the right and had to tend to his opposite flank, he met with *Momtonero* leaders, who renewed their pledges of support. The fall of Chilean president Salvador Allende at this time made Perón something of a prophet and doubtless had a sobering effect on the *muchachos*.

The campaign itself proved dull and anticlimactic. Perón made no tours and scarcely seemed to exert himself. Balbín, his chief competitor refrained from personal attacks. And Perón received almost 62 percent of the votes cast, the most since 1951, when he gathered about the same amount. Balbín came in a poor second with 24 percent. Nearly two decades before, Perón was a refugee on a Paraguayan gunboat; now he was to return in triumph to the Casa Rosada. He had won over most of the military, the church, and much of the middle and upper classes, the same people who had driven him to exile. His charisma and his widely shared belief that he alone could control the competing forces in the country explains the overwhelming victory. Even Washington looked on with favor at what had to be accepted as an astonishing performance.

Perón's third election victory in the September vote may have been a foregone conclusion. But it was important to him and others that he win appreciably more votes than Cámpora had garnered six months earlier. It was also important that he win over a broad spectrum of the population, getting strong support both in industrial areas and also in the least developed and most impoverished rural districts.

He succeeded in both: Peronism had shown itself as a multiclass movement and as having overcome the much publicized split between Buenos Aires and the interior.

Eighteen years and eighteen days after being forced into exile, the 78-year-old Perón, once more in uniform, was inaugurated as president for the third time. The ministries of interior and foreign affairs were given to men congenial to the *Montoneros*, but the labor and economics posts would be run by traditional Peronist types. López Rega was named minister of social welfare but was told to keep a low profile.

In 1973 Argentina had come full circle: Perón had once again captured the presidency. The tactics used in exile had served him well. Blank votes had served a dual purpose: to keep the government off balance and to keep the Peronist name before the public by exploiting the disenfranchisement of the party. The Peronist-led labor unions made use of strikes as a means to voice political and economic grievances. The disastrous attempted return in 1964 taught *El Líder* an important lesson of timing. He did not make the same mistake, and achieved a success far beyond the imagination of his political enemies. When the movement seemed to be unifying behind another leader, Perón sent his wife, Isabel Martinez, to keep it divided. He did everything in his power to prevent it from unifying behind an alternative. When an associate cooperated too fully with government, Perón sacked him. His campaign tactics made short work of his opponents: the taunting of the military; the refusal to make a deal with the Lanusse government until it was advantageous to do so; the appeal to militants as a fellow revolutionary; above all, his exploitation of the Perón myth in an otherwise apathetic election campaign. Soon, to the dismay of the left, he would purge his administration of anyone who believed in what was called “Argentine socialism.”

Perón promised that his third government would follow “the principles of *Justicialismo*.” No one was to speak of revolution. Change would take place in peace and harmony, in accord with changes confirmed by the rest of the world. He described the radical youth not as justicialist, but socialist. In contrast to it, he proclaimed, “[W]e are *justicialistas*, and the national socialism we speak of has nothing to do with Marxism.”<sup>22</sup>

During his years in exile, he had quietly come to modify his distributionist wage policies, which were the hallmarks of his first presidency. Now he rejected “widespread irresponsible pressure” to double wage levels for all workers. Each received an increase, but of

only about \$40 a month; which may have helped the most in need but did not harm the economy. In return for the unions' promise to accept further wage restraints for two years, price controls would be set and the share of national income represented by wages would rise over a four-year period to the levels of the early 1950s.<sup>23</sup> These signs of a move to the right alienated those who hoped his return would bring about a new, populist-driven era in Argentina.

Not surprisingly, the violence continued. The general secretary of the CGT was shot, unleashing a new wave of killings and bombings. The police blamed the ERP, which denied the killing. Right-wing violence also intensified with the emergence of a new military organization, the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (*Alianza*), that worked with the government police. When a member of the Peronist Youth was assassinated, Arturo Frondizi got a call from Perón: "What am I going to do about all this violence? I could put an end to it if I became a dictator, but I'm too old to be a dictator." The irony lay in the fact that during his exile he had supported the most belligerent labor unions, had encouraged the paramilitary escapades of his "special formations," but now found it difficult to harness the forces he had unleashed.<sup>24</sup>

To their dismay, once returned to power Perón was forming close links with the military and other conservative groups previously opposed to him but now desperate to contain the radical left. His problems were compounded by the differences among his followers as to which course of action to take. Perón wanted all young Peronists to merge into one unit, a General Confederation Of Youth. His real aim was to depoliticize the militants, or at least to make them more manageable. In early October the Peronist high council, purged of its radical members, required all Peronist organizations to repudiate Marxism and to join in the struggle against terrorists and subversion.

The new government promised to build on the "social pact" inaugurated by the *Cámpora* administration. It was designed to halt inflation and promote economic growth by establishing bureaucratic links between the government and the elements of society that Perón hoped to rally in support of his regime. In a revival of the corporatism he had espoused during his first term in office, it would bring together, all under government authority, industrialists and workers, agriculturalists and exporters, bankers and business leaders. The creation of regulatory boards and controls would again put a Peronist regime at the center of the economy.

The chief concern, however, remained youth-inspired violence. As an exile, Perón had praised the "special sections." Now he was

responsible for maintaining order, and as early as his inauguration he made it clear to all, except perhaps to the *Montoneros*, that their goals and methods were anathema to him. In a speech to the CGT on November 8, Perón compared the radical left to “germs” contaminating the body politic. Leftist governors were ousted. Penal legislation stiffening the criminal code was introduced. Still, the violence remained unabated, indeed, augmented by that carried on by right-wing forces. In a two-week period at the start of 1974, 12 left-wing militants were killed and 25 leftist Peronist headquarters were demolished, excesses not denounced by Perón.

In early 1974 Perón moved further to the right. Congress passed new laws providing stiffer sentences for acts of terrorism. (The political violence carried out by the *Alianza* was ignored by the government.) Working through López Rega’s ministry it stepped up its funding of conservative pressure groups whose members attacked “bolsheviks” and other “enemies” of the movement within the unions, the universities, and the party. On the other hand, both to strengthen and broaden his labor support, the president enacted legislation that mandated the rebuilding of CGT unions as industry-wide federations. It also required a four-year interval between labor congresses to protect existing leaders loyal to the government.

In short, after his election President Perón was ready to crack down on terrorism and those seen as supporting it. His view of the *Montoneros*, previously ambivalent, changed after the Ezeiza episode—and especially after the September 1973 assassination of the CGT leader—to one of open hostility. He challenged leftists in his own party on national television, and asserted he would crush them by any means. “If we do not have the law, we will do it outside the law, and we will do it violently, because you cannot oppose violence with anything but violence.”<sup>25</sup>

It has been argued that Perón’s repudiation of the leftists within his movement when finally assuming office was not surprising. His earlier support of them was out of character, and could best be described as a tactical maneuver to enlist their numbers against the military regime. He had always been a strong anti-Communist and had never completely alienated the oligarchy—big landowners and ranchers—despite the propaganda efforts targeting the “beef barons” carried out during his first presidency when he pushed for land reform. Some scholars went so far as to allege a tacit understanding between landowners and Perón to hoodwink workers.<sup>26</sup> What is clear is that Perón had used the radical left to return to power, but now was out to destroy it.

At every opportunity he sided with his movement’s labor sector, dominated by relatively conservative union bureaucrats. Perhaps the

final break with a radical left came at the time of the president's Plaza de Mayo May Day speech in 1974, when he and several *Montoneros* shouted insults at each other. The latter had tried to break through the police cordon they felt was separating Perón from "his people." When Isabel appeared, they greeted her with shouts of "only one Evita." Responding to their shouted complaints, an enraged Perón called them "beardless wonders ... callow and stupid ... infiltrators who work within, and who in terms of treachery are more dangerous than those who work outside." The *Montoneros* then turned their backs on their *Líder* and marched away, chanting "the people are leaving." As they walked out, Perón cut short his speech.<sup>27</sup>

The one bright spot was university reform. Unlike the policy pursued in 1954, here Perón favored less government control, and new legislation to that effect was enacted in 1974. But other problems, economic as well as political, did not go away. Inflation was rising at 6 percent a month, and in July 1974 the European Economic Community, driven by an outbreak of hoof and mouth disease, imposed a ban on imports of Argentine beef.

A cold and damp winter left Perón stricken with pulmonary edema, an abnormal amount of fluid in his lungs. His health worsened precipitously in 1974. In January his doctor informed the cabinet that the president was suffering from a serious heart ailment and had at the most six months to live. Even so, Perón did not curtail his schedule. A strenuous tour of an aircraft carrier, frequent speeches to large and small crowds, and a quick visit to Paraguay, whose congenial government provided an acclamatory reception, doubtless imposed a strain. The president's devoted followers did not help matters when they compared him with other elderly statesmen, Franco, Mao, and de Gaulle. If they could fight on, he could too. But he continued to suffer from heart seizures, leaving him exhausted later in the day.

When on June 27, for the first time, an official announcement hinted at the seriousness of the president's condition, Isabel cut short a European trip and flew back home. Perón remained in bed Saturday morning, suffering from a cold or "grippe," which developed into pneumonia. His last official act was to sign two presidential decrees, one delegating presidential power to Isabel. On June 30 an army chaplain administered the last sacraments, and on the day after that, July 1, he suffered a cardiac arrest and slipped into unconsciousness. At 1:30 P.M., less than a year into his third term as president, Perón's doctors declared him officially dead. Isabel Perón, who the previous day became acting president with full executive powers, had to break

the news to the nation, and did so shortly afterward, seated at a table with the cabinet behind her.

A great public outpouring of grief followed. After a funeral mass at the cathedral on Tuesday, the body was taken to the Congress building where it lay in an open coffin. Visitors walked one by one along a passageway lined with police and union members in work clothes. The lines stretched for blocks. Finally, on Wednesday morning, the gates were closed and the casket moved to the Chamber of Deputies, where a dozen orations paying tribute were given. He was buried in a crypt of a tiny chapel on the grounds of the presidential summer residence in Olivos.

## EPILOGUE

For 30 years Argentine politics had revolved around the person of Juan Domingo Perón, and with his death the nation began to disintegrate.

He had left to his widow and successor as president an untenable situation. Isabel Perón failed to obtain the firm support of any power group, not even the labor unions. Terrorist activity and political violence increased. With Perón's death there disappeared the last hope for any social reconciliation. Conflict between left- and right-wing Peronists gave way to near random terror against—and by—self-styled revolutionaries, on the one hand, and self-styled anti-Communists, on the other. On August 1, the *Montoneros* militarized their organization and resumed guerrilla warfare. Within a year they would become what one observer called “the mightiest guerrilla force ever seen in the whole of Latin America.”<sup>28</sup> Together with the ERP's intensification of its own military campaigns, they threatened Isabel's ability to govern. On September 19 paramilitary elements of the right-wing *Allianza*, known as the Triple-A Death Squads, murdered several dozen prominent leftists, and violence spiraled out of control. Argentina fell into escalating political turbulence, and in early November the government declared a state of siege. Amid this violence the economy crumbled, inflation reached astronomical levels (driven by rising oil prices and the European ban on imported Argentine beef, at annual rates of over 1,000 percent), leaving the nation on the verge of bankruptcy.

As described by the economic historian Howard Rock, Argentina fell into “the classic trap of the Latin American populists.” The government wanted desperately to hold its (labor) base, but to fight inflation had to control wages. When in the late spring of 1975 an



austerity program was established, the unions replied with a general strike, and Isabel had to disavow the economic minister nominally responsible. Suffering from nervous collapse, she absented herself from the presidency and spent a few months in seclusion. Clearly, she was overwhelmed by the task before her.<sup>29</sup>

Isabel was now under the total control of López Rega, acting as the president's private secretary in addition to his post as minister of social welfare. Having loaded the cabinet with political allies, he laid down all of her policies, including the unpopular program of fiscal conservatism. In an attempt to regain Peronist support—and divert public attention—he flew secretly to Madrid in mid-November and returned with Evita's body. When put on display, it momentarily succeeded in its purpose, but as inflation and political chaos continued, the novelty soon wore off.

As both sides resorted more than ever to kidnaps, ransom demands, and assassinations, the political situation moved to open warfare. When Isabel was alleged to have diverted large sums of money from a public charity to her personal account, Congress opened impeachment proceedings in late 1975. By the following February, political, labor, and management leaders, to forestall a military coup, were urging her to resign. She refused; her only concession was a promise not to run again after completing the term scheduled to end in 1977.

Showing concern, the armed forces joined with the CGT in a plan to remove López Rega, and Isabel was forced to comply. (He spent two years in hiding, and was then arrested in the United States and extradited to Argentina. He died while awaiting trial.) As public anger mounted, many observers believed that a military uprising was both inevitable and welcome.

Finally, on March 24, 1976, the armed forces took power, removed Isabel Perón from office and set up a ruling junta. Charged with embezzling funds from the Eva Perón Foundation, she was taken into custody and placed under house arrest. (Released in 1981, she went to live in Madrid.) The new military government was determined to end violence against the regime and bring about economic recovery. It succeeded in its first objective in three years, but at a cost of government-sponsored terrorist tactics. Thousands were subjected to arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, and torture. Many simply disappeared, and a new word, the *desaparecidos*, was added to the political vocabulary. Marginal or totally innocent people were caught up in a total war waged against a violent left. By the end of 1976 right-wing death squads were responsible for 15 abductions a day. "A dirty war" ravaged the country as police and armed bands—for whom the

regime denied responsibility—hunted down, captured, tortured, and summarily killed thousands of suspected subversives. The generals did not use gas, but had their hirelings slit the stomachs of those then thrown from planes over the south Atlantic to have the corpses sink more quickly.

The rules of engagement had changed; the savage repression and torture was carried out with no judicial limits. By the end of 1977 many survivors had fled the country. Organized wives and mothers of “the disappeared” milled weekly in the Plaza de Mayo. A civil rights organization later placed total number of dead and disappeared at nine thousand.<sup>30</sup>

The generals were not to repeat the mistakes of the “Liberating Revolution.” Instead of trying to obliterate or blacken the memory of the Peróns, the regime quietly delivered Evita’s body to her sisters, who buried it in the family crypt in Recoleta Cemetery.

One general replaced another in the Casa Rosada, the latest in December 1981 as the result of a coup organized by General Leopoldo Galtieri. In a misjudgment that proved fatal to the regime, he asserted an old claim of sovereignty over the British-owned Malvinos, or Falkland Islands, and invaded them in April 1982 in an attempt to divert attention from economic woes and reunite the country. When forced to surrender on June 14, the junta fell. His successor called for new elections and a return to constitutional government. An ineffective Peronist candidate lost to Radical leader Raúl Alfonsín, the first electoral loss for Peronism in a presidential campaign. Subsequently, after resounding losses in 1983 and 1985, a Peronist candidate, Carlos Menem, won back the presidency in 1988. With a majority of seats in both houses of Congress and control of most provinces, this once charismatic movement was now fully institutionalized, an achievement whose necessity Perón had recognized but was unable to bring about.

Addendum: In July 1987, grave robbers severed the hands and took the saber of Juan Perón from his grave in Buenos Aires’ Chacarita Cemetery to which it had been moved. The Alfonsín’s administration blamed “rightist” elements intent on destabilizing the government. Nine years later, in 2006, Perón’s body was buried for the third time, now in a mausoleum built in his country home in San Vicente, 52 kilometers south of Buenos Aires, built by union and labor party leaders. The ceremony was marred by violence between rival union groups, leaving 40 people wounded.<sup>31</sup>

### III

## PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU: “REASON OVER PASSION”

Trudeau was that rarity in politics: a leader who didn't crave power, yet led his government for almost 16 years; who resented the subordination of French-speaking Canadians and pushed through legislation guaranteeing them equality with French and English speakers but fought the attempts of Quebecers to separate the province from the rest of Canada; who held a reputation as an intellectual but was a glamorous man-about-town followed by crowds of admiring teenagers, often photographed in fashionable spots in the company of attractive women.

His first administration ensured reform of the criminal code, lowered the voting age to 18, created a more equitable tax structure, raised old-age pensions, and sought a thaw in Canada's relations with the Soviet Union. Concomitantly, he loosened Canada's close ties to the United States and Europe—and incurred Washington's displeasure by his criticism of the war in Vietnam and by his acceptance of draft deserters and evaders. He was also accused of arrogance and hubris by ignoring Parliament, while Western farmers resented his reluctance to have the government work to increase foreign grain sales. Abandoned by a flighty young wife, Trudeau was too disturbed to devote full attention to the challenges of his job, just at the point when his government fell victim to one crisis after another: rising unemployment, the highest budget deficit in Canadian history, accusations of corruption by cabinet members, and resentment by voters in Atlantic and Western Canada of efforts to impose the national will on provincial governments. His pride was such that few realized that what appeared as indifference to the government's worsening situation was distraction caused by emotional turmoil. An electoral defeat led to his resignation and retirement. It proved short-lived. When Quebec called for a referendum on independence from Canada, Trudeau, fixated on

preserving national unity, was persuaded to return to political life. As prime minister once more he successfully campaigned for a rejection of independence by Quebec voters and proposed a new constitution, making Canada fully independent of Great Britain and incorporating a bill of rights.

## TRUDEAU

### CREATION

Aside from a strip along the St. Lawrence River, Quebec, where Pierre Trudeau was born in 1919, was then one of the most isolated and detached regions in North America. An historian described it as “the seat of North America’s most stable and archaic rural society.”<sup>1</sup> French Canadians dominated politics (the provincial capital, Montreal, was known as the second largest French-speaking city in the world), but the English-speaking population ran the economy. A political journalist went further: “Quebec was still a claustrophobic, authoritarian, intimidated society heavy with incense and mothball patriotism when Trudeau was growing up in the 1920s and 1930s.”<sup>2</sup>

In a little book first published in French in 1956, Trudeau sought to explain the conservatism and insularity of his fellow *Québécois*:

A people which had been defeated, occupied, decapitated, pushed out of commerce, driven from the cities, reduced little by little to a minority, and diminished in a country which it had nonetheless discovered, explored, and colonized, could adopt few attitudes that would enable it to preserve its identity. This people devised a system of security, which became overdeveloped; as a result, they sometimes overvalued all those things that set them apart from others, and showed hostility to all change (even progress) coming from without. That is why our nationalism, to oppose a surrounding world that was English-speaking, Protestant, democratic, materialistic, commercial, and later industrial created a system of defense which put a premium on all the contrary forces: the French language, Catholicism, authoritarianism, idealism, rural life, and later the return to the land.<sup>3</sup>

Trudeau was born into a wealthy Montreal family. His father was a self-made millionaire who displayed verve, discipline, and his French

Canadian environment. A Montreal lawyer who went into business, he owned a chain of 30 prosperous service stations. Their sale to a major oil company, in addition to shrewd investments, mainly conservative but which included an amusement park and a controlling interest in the Montreal Royals baseball team, made him a multimillionaire.

The individuality asserted in both Trudeau's philosophy and style of life derived from the experiences made possible both by his family's wealth and his father's teaching. Aware of the need to learn English, the elder Trudeau required his children to write to him in that language and would send them to French schools only after they acquired fluency in English. Pierre became bilingual in French and English, knew Spanish, could understand German, and could read and write Latin and Greek. To toughen his sons—besides an older sister, Pierre had a younger brother—the father insisted on exposure to all sports as well as academic excellence. In later years, Pierre would prefer canoe trips into the wild and travel to exotic places in the world on a shoestring, without documents and during dangerous times. The self-imposed peril and desire to face hardship provided a means of continual self-testing.

Between 12 and 20 years of age, he attended an elite Jesuit combination high school and college in Montreal. The Collège Jean de Brébeuf (named for a nineteenth-century French missionary) lay stress on leadership training and the development of individuality. It enrolled chiefly wealthy boys, though some poor bright ones also attended. Emphasis was placed on the disciplined study of the classics, the development of a capacity for ordered reasoning, and a sense of belonging to a privileged few. The Jesuits prided themselves as the educators of Quebec's French-speaking elite and reminded their pupils that they were "*la crème de la crème*." Casting himself as something of a rebel, Trudeau delighted in taking contrarian stands, showing hostility to authority and provoking fights. (On one occasion he applauded, alone in an outraged class, the British victory over the French on the Plains of Abraham.<sup>4</sup>) Trudeau later acknowledged that his contrarianism dated from his school days: "There is no other constant in my thinking than to oppose accepted opinions. From the time I was in college I had already made up my mind to swim against the tide."<sup>5</sup> The years spent at Brébeuf set a balance between a French and an English orientation. Previously he was not entirely one or the other and skeptical of the Quebec nationalism of his classmates. The school helped turn Trudeau essentially into a French Canadian with impeccable English, rather than a French-speaking anglophone. He excelled in school and received his BA in 1940 before going on to the University of Montreal to study law.

After graduation in 1943, Trudeau joined a Montreal law firm. Finding the work dull and largely meaningless, he left Montreal and the practice of law after a year. And until the mid-1960s, when he definitively embarked on a political career, as a biographer put it, “he hovered, never alighted.”<sup>6</sup> In 1944, because, he said, he wanted to know more about the origins of society, he enrolled at Harvard University to study government and economics, and was awarded his MA the following year. The sixteen courses taken (eight in economics and eight in political science) under such teachers as Wassily Leontier, a future Nobel prize winner, Alvin Hansen, Joseph Schumpeter, and the political scientist Carl Friedrich provided a grounding in Keynesianism, business cycle theory, and liberal political theory. While at Harvard, Trudeau was struck by what he saw as the contrast between his home province and the United States, “this frenetic country brimming with energy and vitality.”<sup>7</sup>

With the end of World War II, he went to Europe and the Ecole Libre des sciences politiques in Paris, and then the London School of Economics (LSE), where he absorbed much of the nineteenth-century liberalism and twentieth-century Fabianism that the school lay stress on. Courses at “Sciences Po” included lectures by the economist François Perroux and the sociologist Raymond Aron. In Paris Trudeau renewed ties with another young Quebecker, Gérard Pelletier, whom he had met at the University of Montreal. Despite differences in their economic status, they shared a mutual interest in Canadian politics and became close friends. In Paris, as in Massachusetts, he was again struck by the provincialism of his native Quebec.

At Harvard he had completed the exams for a doctorate and only a thesis remained. His chosen subject, the interplay between Christianity and Marxism in India, provided a pretext for travel to Asia in 1948–1949. Fleeing formal classwork and postwar British austerity, and with only a knapsack and \$800 he began a solo trip that would take him around the world. Although in some respects inclined toward a certain asceticism, he also liked expensive sport cars and clothes, and the appearance generated was that of a 30-year-old rich boy who was something of a dilettante.

In April 1949, Trudeau allied himself with workers in the mining town of Asbestos in eastern Quebec who were striking both against their employer and the ultraconservative provincial Duplessis government. Referred to as *le chef* because of his popularity and power, Premier (the title given to the head of a provincial government)

Maurice Duplessis led the Union Nationale, Quebec's long ruling nationalist party. The corrupt patronage system relied on and the trust placed in the party by French-speaking voters eager for recognition of a special place in the Canadian Confederation explained the party's accumulation and retention of power. Duplessis had given Quebec its own flag, a large white cross symbolizing the Catholic Church against a blue background with white *fleur-de-lis*, to show the province's cultural lineage in pre-Revolutionary France. (He did this 15 years before Ottawa designated the maple-leaf flag for all Canadians.) Pressing for autonomy, but careful not to push separatism too far, the Duplessis regime maintained a patriarchal style that repressed all signs of liberalism, whether in the government, the church, or the workplace. Five thousand Asbestos workers, seeking a 15 cent an hour pay raise, had walked off their jobs at the American-owned Johns Mansville Company in mid-February 1949. Fostering the myth that Quebec was still "a pastoral society, a Catholic Eden," the provincial government sent police to beat strikers and protect the scabs replacing them.<sup>8</sup>

The episode proved a turning point for the young lawyer. It not only furthered an interest in Quebec politics but gave life to the lectures heard at the LSE about class formation in an emerging capitalist society, about workers suppressed by the same forces that had created their jobs, and the relationship between foreign capital and the Quebec economy. Working people appeared as the best hope for a Quebec that he found hopelessly provincial and unable to cope with changing times. However, he refused the union secretary Jean Marchand's offer to work for the labor movement in Quebec, and turned instead to the federal government in Ottawa as an alternative locus of action, one that might provide a balancing force that could mitigate the worst excesses of Duplessism.

Soon after the settlement of the strike, Trudeau left for the Canadian capital, where he had been hired as a junior economist in the Privy Council Office (the office from which the prime minister gets information and pulls the strings by which the government functions). Trudeau took the job to test his ideas about federalism and to familiarize himself with the realities of government—particularly the perceived treatment of French Canadians as an inferior caste.<sup>9</sup>

Ottawa, Trudeau came to believe, never really valued Canada's bicultural character. He was jolted into realizing that the English-speaking majority deliberately confined French Canadians, no matter how well educated, to subordinate roles. "The most striking example of this attitude," he later wrote (in a brief to the Constitution Committee of the



Quebec legislative assembly), “occurs in the federal civil service, where English is, to all intents and purposes, the only working language . . . The federal capital,” he concluded, “is an English capital.”<sup>10</sup>

In June 1950, Trudeau, Pelletier, and other intellectuals founded *Cité Libre*, a monthly political review that called for the modernization and democratization of Quebec within the Canadian federation. In spite of its small circulation, the journal was avidly read by reform-minded Liberals. Trudeau was the central figure among the “*citélibristes*” who became an influential opposition to the Quebec government, and its pages carried his views both in favor of a strong state and against the separatism implicit in traditionalist nationalism. Although necessarily strong, the state he envisaged would provide greater democracy and additional guarantees of individual freedom than that currently made available. One article, published in both French and English, warned against allowing a weakened federal system and argued that such traditional bases for group identification as religion and nationality should be downplayed.<sup>11</sup>

Too politically involved with *Cité Libre* to remain a civil servant, and because he believed that he had learned enough in that capacity, Trudeau left his government job in 1951 and returned to Quebec to edit the journal on a full-time basis. Still, he made time for world travel, a taste that never left him, often on the spur of the moment and often for weeks on end. During the four years between 1951 and 1956 Trudeau went to western Europe, the Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia. Attendance at a Communist economic conference in Moscow raised questions about the extent to which his radicalism was greater than that admitted to.

Together with Quebec’s conservative political leaders and like them eager to preserve its dominating role, the church, too, preached that Quebec had a special destiny—to keep its traditional society—and in so doing displayed a siege mentality to the rest of Canada and the world. Trudeau rejected such provincialism, and although a lifelong Catholic remained sharply critical of the church’s support for the Duplessis government. At Brébeuf, where he had rebelled against the priests’ authority, his teachers had called him “*un catholique protestant*” because he had constantly challenged their dicta in the name of freedom of thought. However, unlike others who did so, he did not reject dogma; he wanted to keep both the certainties of his faith and the obsession with personal freedom that had taken hold of his imagination.<sup>12</sup>

Although opposed to the Duplessis administration, Trudeau and his friends held no brief for the few Liberals who represented Quebec in the Canadian Parliament. Because they voted for whatever the Anglo-Canadian dominated Liberal Party leadership wanted, they were dismissed as “trained donkeys.”<sup>13</sup> In the early 1960s Trudeau was especially critical of Lester Pearson, leader of the federal (or national) Liberal Party. In 1963 as prime minister, Pearson had bowed to pressure from Washington, then urging Canada to station nuclear anti-aircraft missiles as part of the North American air defense system, and reluctantly dropped his long-standing opposition to nuclear weapons. Trudeau saw this as an act of cowardice, undertaken only for political gain. Together with Marchand and Pelletier, he began leaning toward the moderately socialist New Democratic Party (NDP). But if he saw himself as something of a socialist during most of his *Cité Libre* days, Trudeau never joined the NDP, which placed emphasis on federal politics and not on pursuing reform in Quebec. He preferred to ally himself with the group of left-wing militant Catholics on *Cité Libre*, whose purpose, as two biographers put it, was “to defy the Church’s establishment and help ‘break the silence’ by creating among French Canadians a new awareness of Quebec’s problems.”<sup>14</sup>

The articles published by Trudeau in the late 1950s and early 1960s were socialist in tone and substance. As an economic system, he wrote, “capitalism in our country exploits the worker, and our legislation fails to protect him sufficiently.” He saw Quebec as a class-divided society where the “proletarian condition” of the workers kept them in “a state of insecurity dangerously close to misery” and made Quebec far from “a society of equals.” In one article he noted that the “present private enterprise economy is geared to the satisfaction of individual needs, not to that of collective needs.”<sup>15</sup> These views incorporated both Schumpeter’s gloom about capitalism and Galbraith’s more recent critique of the affluent society. Even so, by the time this article was published in 1962, Trudeau had already begun to distance himself from the anticapitalism affected in the 1950s.

In the 1950s and early 1960s Trudeau appeared aimless and, as noted, even dilettantish. Conservative nationalists who knew him dismissed him as a “dandy,” a rich playboy. Pelletier showed frustration at the frequent journeys to exotic places. Another friend asked him what he was going to do when he grew up. Maurice Duplessis found the son of his old friend Charlie Trudeau, “lazy, spoiled, and subversive.” Single, independent, with servants available, he could afford his style of life. He wore expensive clothes, drove a treasured Mercedes 300SL convertible (for which he had exchanged a Jaguar),

escorted beautiful young women, and traveled to distant lands when he felt like it. But he also did much to cultivate this image, and was always careful to prepare both acts and remarks in advance.<sup>16</sup>

In the mid-1960s Quebec was undergoing a transformation from an essentially conservative society, pessimistic about the future of its French-speaking majority, to a more modern and forward looking one, where a more secular state was to play a greater role in determining the future and in protecting the special rights of French Canadians. By the end of the decade, francophone Quebecers were calling themselves *Québécois*, implying a French Canadian nationalism rooted in the province. French Canadians called this change *la Révolution tranquille*, the Quiet Revolution, and if hastened by the writing and political agitation of Trudeau and others, it was more the product of a developmental process and a change in regime.

Duplessis had died in September, 1959, and the following June the Liberals under a former federal cabinet minister, Jean Lesage, came to power. The political situation in the province took a new and positive turn: abuses, especially official corruption, were brought to a halt; spending on infrastructure increased; and the educational structure, reorganized. Trudeau particularly benefitted from this last reform: he was offered and accepted a job as associate professor of public law at the University of Montreal in September 1961, where he specialized in civil liberties and constitutional law.

Although a believer and churchgoer, Trudeau welcomed a provincial administration that was moving to break the hold of the church on education as well as putting an end to official corruption and promoting social welfare. A threat seen as more ominous was the emergence of French Canadian nationalism in a new guise. Lesage's "Quiet Revolution" was also placing emphasis on greater autonomy for Quebec. In reaching out to traditional nationalist groups as well as to urban professionals and working people, Lesage and the Liberals were even demanding the right to have the province pursue its own foreign policy. The Liberals' slogan for the 1962 provincial election, "*Maîtres chez nous*" (Masters in our own house), struck a disenchanted Trudeau as catering to narrow nationalistic instincts while ignoring twentieth-century economic realities. (At the convention that elevated him to the Liberal leadership in 1968, he would say, "*Maîtres chez nous mais pour tout le Canada*" [Masters in our own house but for all of Canada].) He was and would remain a staunch advocate of Canadian unity, a fierce opponent of efforts to strengthen

the nation's individual provinces. The stage was being set for a contest between Trudeau's vision of federalism (individual equality rather than a special status for any group or province) and a Quebec sense of distinctiveness and pride.<sup>17</sup>

A scornful Trudeau, imbued with rationalism, rejected appeals to emotion and the nationalism on which he insisted it was based. Nationalism, he believed, was responsible for the worst wars in history, and in Quebec, if encouraged by the "Quiet Revolution" and allowed to reach its logical conclusion, would result in the disintegration of the province as subgroups pursued their own agendas. The ultimate outcome, a separate status for the province, would return "the whole tribe [French Canadians] to the wigwam" and prevent the modernization necessary for Quebec's evolution. At a time of growing globalization (although not yet called that; it was then referred to as interdependence among nations), he saw destruction of the federal structure as the height of irresponsibility. With its diverse ethnic groups, Canada could serve as a prototype for the rest of the world. Later, looking back, Trudeau wrote that "a province is not a nation but a mix of diverse people, differentiated by religion, culture, and mother tongue. Was it necessary to grind down all these differences and impose a dominating and intolerant ideology on all minorities? I found this change of direction aberrant. I knew that it led directly to doctrinaire separatism."<sup>18</sup>

The situation in Quebec worsened as random attacks by militant separatists organized in a *Front de libération du Québec* (FLQ), a small terrorist group modeled on Third World anti-imperialist movements (notably the Algerian *Front du libération nationale*), broke out in 1963. Harassment and violence directed against federal agencies and Quebec's anglophones followed, most notably bombings and destruction of mailboxes in Montreal's English-speaking districts. The goal was independence from the rest of Canada.

Trudeau acknowledged the "importance of the French language and culture in North America"; it was an ethnic-based nationalism that he rejected. The Toronto historian Ramsay Cook, who knew him in the early 1960s, recalled that Trudeau came to believe that the Lesage victory now posed a threat to democracy in Quebec. The government then put into place was becoming increasingly nationalist, and "nationalism for Trudeau," Cook wrote, "was a conformist force founded upon conservatism and insecurity. At its worst it was totalitarian." In the Quebec context, nationalism acted as an "emotional substitute for reasoned solutions to real problems."<sup>19</sup> Indeed,

Trudeau's greatest objection to nationalism rested on his conviction that it was based on feelings and therefore irrational. Rather than as a constant and ever-present force in human affairs, he found it a relatively new development in history and the result of a collective determination by a group whose members had identified those things believed to be held in common. Because in practice nationalist sentiment worked against rationality and freedom, it was inherently dangerous. To counter this danger, a federal system based on realism and rationalism and hence constantly seeking compromise was essential for the development of individual liberty. Canadian patriotism found its expression in the federal system, and the role of the federal government was to promote unity in the country. Each ethnic and linguistic grouping, far from weakening the federation, contributed to its strength. Canadians—and others—Trudeau wrote, should cherish “not concepts of uniformity but human values: compassion, love and understanding. Our standard in all activities should be one of excellence, but our routes to its achievement may be as numerous as there are Canadians who pursue it.”<sup>20</sup>

In April 1963, at the federal level, the Conservative regime of John Diefenbaker was replaced by that of the Liberal Lester Pearson. A former diplomat and Nobel laureate, Pearson had presented a reform agenda, but possessing greater experience with international, not national, issues, he seemed unable to cope with Quebec. The new prime minister (who didn't speak French) feared the breakdown of the Canadian state. Concerned, a group of worried young Quebec professionals met weekly during the winter of 1963–1964. Trudeau, though older than most of its members but whose tough federalist stand had attracted attention and who was fluent in English, was very much involved. He had flirted with socialism, but when the leftward-leaning NDP came out with a “two nations in a single state” policy in the early 1960s, a disgusted Trudeau broke with them, charging that they had played into the hands of the separatists. Only the federal Liberal Party, which under Pearson, had become more progressive in its policy positions and more democratic in its inner workings, appeared capable of stemming the tide. Overcoming misgivings, in 1965 Trudeau, together with Marchand—who had already been approached by both federal and provincial Liberals to run for office—and Pelletier, joined the Liberal Party.

Prime Minister Pearson had reason to be concerned about Quebec's heightened promotion of French Canadian nationalism and its quest

for greater independence, a movement that had its roots deep in the nation's history. Canadian settlement was pioneered by France, which had sent sixty thousand immigrants to the colony in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The British conquered Canada in 1759 but permitted Quebec's French-speaking residents to keep their language, their Catholic religion, and French civil law. Overall, however, Canada's absorption of ever greater numbers of English immigrants allowed anglophones to dominate government, business, and culture. When Canada achieved dominion status within the British Empire in 1867, French was again legally recognized as the official language, along with English, of Quebec. But by the mid-twentieth century, many of its five million French-speaking citizens, never comfortable with their minority status, feared that their culture and economic survival were becoming overwhelmed by the nation's English-speaking majority, which outnumbered them by three to one. And when successive Quebec governments embraced these sentiments and began to strengthen ties to other French-speaking governments abroad, in ways that suggested that it was seeking secession, Ottawa understandably became alarmed.

A "safe" election district had to be found for the unconventional Trudeau, and finally one was located, Mount Royal, an anglophone and heavily Jewish area of metropolitan Montreal. On November 8, 1965, Trudeau, Marchand, and Pelletier, the three seen as the most notable French Canadians in the Liberal Party and dubbed Quebec's "three wise men," were easily elected.

Trudeau based his decision to run on the need to show that the hopes placed by Quebec for a French-speaking place in Canada could be realized in Ottawa. He feared that Quebec *nationalisme*, moving in a racist direction, not only posed a threat to Canadian unity but might plunge the province into semifascism. To avoid this catastrophe, he believed that similarly inclined people must work with the party that stood the best chance of election, the Liberal Party. While Liberals were delighted, his socialist friends were livid, and *séparatistes* derided him as another sellout.

Because he had earlier criticized the party he now joined, Trudeau's opponents charged him with hypocrisy and rejected his argument that the need to safeguard the supremacy of the federal government—while guaranteeing equal opportunity for French-speaking citizen—took priority over private preferences. The media, however, jumped on his candidacy. His distinctive character, snappy sports car, appearance at campaign rallies in muddy corduroy slacks and a sports shirt, behavior that shook the sober Canadian political world, caught the

imagination of a normally straitlaced Canadian public. He was utterly unconventional yet stylish, with a reputation as an intellectual but also as a glamorous man-about-town. During his campaign, Trudeau was followed by crowds of admiring teenagers and often photographed in fashionable nightspots in the company of attractive women. Still, he was not an innocent adrift. He had worked at the center of the Ottawa power structure in the Privy Council Office, and once elected was able to show the other two “wise men” the ropes. On November 8, 1965, Trudeau easily won a seat in the House of Commons.

In Ottawa, he enjoyed his reputation as an eccentric. At least initially, he maintained his casual attitude toward clothes. In a parliament whose members customarily appeared in dark suits and laced, polished black shoes, he shocked his colleagues by showing up in open-neck colored shirts, sport jacket, and sandals, sometimes without socks, and did not endear himself to them by driving about in his silver Mercedes convertible.

Although both Marchand and Pelletier held cabinet posts, it was Trudeau's rise from backbencher to prime minister that was little short of meteoric.

The following January (1966), Prime Minister Pearson asked Trudeau to return from Europe, where he had been on a skiing holiday, to serve as his parliamentary secretary. Despite having been savaged by Trudeau scarcely three years before, Pearson acknowledged that he had admired the latter's writings on economics and constitutional law—and, perhaps more to the point, that he needed a prominent Quebecker at close hand. After the defeat of Jean Lesage's Liberals, the separatist party in the province, the Union Nationale, was back in power. Its inability to handle economic and social pressures, together with an outbreak of violent strikes and riots during Quebec's nationalistic celebration on Saint-Jean Baptiste Day (June 24), revealed that the crisis in Quebec had worsened. Only 15 months later and thinking in terms of a successor, on April 4, 1967, Pearson, urged by Marchand, elevated Trudeau to cabinet status as federal minister of justice (Canada's attorney general), a decision widely applauded by the Liberals. As John English put it, Pearson had appointed “the most outspoken constitutional specialist in the party just as Quebec and the Constitution were becoming the major issues facing the government.”<sup>21</sup>

Justice Department officials who had heard of Trudeau's “play-boy” reputation were astounded by the discipline, capacity for work,

and intellectual ability displayed by the new minister. Years later, his staff would recall his “elephantine” memory for detail and his recollection of memoranda by date and even by paragraph. Two themes marked his tenure: the Canadian Constitution and the reform of the Criminal Code.

Although having been defended for decades by conservatives like Duplessis, the nationalist cause in Quebec took on new life when in September 1968 René Lévesque and his *Parti Québécois* (PQ) came to power. The PQ was a new movement calling for a constitutional overhaul that would not only grant Quebec greatly enhanced jurisdiction and revenue sources, but set up a kind of common market between the province and the rest of Canada. Previously, the church, the courts, and even the very existence of the Canadian Confederation had acted as brakes on disunity. The threat of separatism was now a reality to be reckoned with.

The Pearson government named Trudeau to respond to Quebec’s demands for constitutional reform granting greater autonomy to the province. Earlier that year, in a televised federal-provincial conference, the latter had defended the government’s position on the constitutional issue. He again rejected the idea that such reform was needed to fulfill the province’s nationalist goals. Talk of a special status for Quebec was “an intellectual hoax.” The distribution of powers among governments, Trudeau argued, was not as important as the entrenchment of the rights of all citizens. Rather than revising the constitution (the British North America Act—BNA—of 1867), he called for the inclusion in the act of a bill of rights guaranteeing traditional civil liberties and language equality. His strong defense of the federalist stand, in which he argued that all of Canada and not just Quebec must become the “homeland of French Canadians,” brought the new minister to the attention of English-speaking Canadians.<sup>22</sup>

Proof that separatism threatened the disintegration of the Canadian Confederation had dramatically emerged in late July 1967. The stridently nationalist Union Nationale premier of Quebec at the time, Daniel Johnson, had invited Charles de Gaulle to visit the province before going on to an official centennial visit in Ottawa. Although the French president despised French Canadians for their pro-Vichy sentiments, he now saw that the province’s nationalist fervor could help restore French *grandeur* by undermining American hegemony and building a worldwide *francophonie*. On July 23 he sailed up the St. Lawrence River on the French cruiser Colbert, and disembarked at Quebec City. The next day he was driven in a triumphal cavalcade to Montreal, and the towns passed through were lined with cheering



*Québécois*. Having reached Montreal's Hôtel de Ville at noon the next day, and although no speech was planned de Gaulle was asked to address an excited crowd. He invoked both the spirit of liberation that swept through France in 1945 and the affection that his nation was starting to feel again for "the French of Canada." Making his familiar "V" gesture, de Gaulle intoned his usual litany. First came "*Vive Montréal*," which got a roar from the crowd; then "*vive le Québec*," which evoked a louder response; and then, like a bombshell, came "*Vive le Québec ... libre*" ("long live ... a free Quebec"), which sent the crowd into a frenzy. In minutes, news services flashed around the world this provocative intervention in the politics of France's NATO ally. Johnson said that he did not endorse the slogan. Even Lévesque, then a Liberal deputy and moving toward separatism, was dubious. "*C'était un mot de trop*" ("It's a bit excessive"), he told a French reporter, but added "it will speed things up." In dramatizing the cause of Quebec's independence by committing France to the breakup of the Canadian state, it created a furor.<sup>23</sup>

At the next day's cabinet meeting, External Affairs Minister Paul Martin Sr. and Jean Marchand suggested conciliatory words. Trudeau and others, however, prevailed on a furious Pearson to declare de Gaulle's words "unacceptable." According to cabinet minutes, Trudeau argued that "the people in France would think the Government weak if it did not react." A strong reply, moreover, would find favor with intellectuals and the press, both hostile to the French president. Pearson took Trudeau's advice, which matched his own instincts and sent a harsh rebuke to de Gaulle, whose handlers whisked the president back to Paris without visiting Ottawa. And the Frenchman's remarks proved counterproductive. By focusing attention on the Quebec crisis, he made Canadians more receptive to the tough federalism Trudeau was promoting, and his role in the government was strengthened. When six weeks later he made his first major policy statement as minister of justice, he had acquired an air of authority. It was then that he spoke on Canada's need to entrench collective linguistic rights along with individual human rights in a patriated (brought home) constitution containing a charter of rights.<sup>24</sup>

In early December, Trudeau brought his divorce reform bill and amendments to the Criminal Code liberalizing the laws on abortion and homosexuality. The groundbreaking legislation furthered the minister's goals of modernization and secularization, and would make his name even more widely known throughout the federation. Almost immediately he began to be spoken of as a possible successor to Pearson, who had announced his coming retirement.

Allowed only in the event of proven adultery, divorce hadn't been easy to obtain in Canada. Neither French Catholics nor conservative English and Scottish Protestants were eager to relax existing statutes. Pressure for liberalization came from across the border where American movies, music, television, and laxer divorce laws set an example. When Trudeau told the House of Commons, "We are all here to legislate not our own personal morals upon the country but to seek solutions to evils which arise in a civil society and which must be solved by civil or criminal laws," his thoughtful explanations of the need for revision, coming as they did from a practicing Roman Catholic, won applause from most members. Intellectual, legalistic, and impassioned by turns, he argued forcefully that "intolerable" physical and mental cruelty, as well as adultery, constituted reasonable grounds for divorce. He also pushed through a reform of the Criminal Code. Many laws, he argued, were antiquated and unenforceable, including laws criminalizing abortion, prostitution, and homosexuality. His use of the phrase justifying the reform of criminal law relating to sexual acts between consenting adults still resonates: "The state has no place in the nation's bedrooms . . . You may have to ask forgiveness for your sins from God, but not from the Minister of Justice." In addition to changing these laws, the new minister introduced legislation expanding social welfare and tightening gun control. Trudeau's reforms coincided with the public mood and struck a responsive chord: "Expo 67" celebrated a centennial year, and the nation was in a mood to innovate.<sup>25</sup>

To the surprise of critics in Quebec, who predicted that he would soon tire of federal politics, as he had of other causes in the past, Trudeau enjoyed his new job, and while others went on vacation in the summer of 1967, he was working hard. The press was fascinated by this most unusual of ministers. He continued to wear casual clothes—to the consternation of the conservative opposition leader, John Diefenbaker, and delighted in a reputation as swinger and radical.

Pearson had announced that at end of 1967 he would retire as party leader and consequently as prime minister. Trudeau's performance in the cabinet and his growing prominence favored him as a possible successor, at least as a French Canadian candidate for the post. (The Liberal Party traditionally alternated its leaders between French and English speakers, which meant that a French speaker was next in line.) Still, a reluctant Trudeau believed that he was not ready. He had worked with the party and served in Parliament for only two

years, had been a cabinet minister for only ten months, and he feared that he would be beaten by a long-standing, better-organized party professional. He also worried that greatly enhanced party and government responsibilities would cost him much of his cherished personal liberty. Because the Liberals controlled the government, Trudeau, if named their leader, would serve as prime minister until another election took place.

To flee both the Canadian winter and the press, over the Christmas break in 1967 Trudeau set out with two friends for Tahiti's Club Méditerranée—purportedly to read Gibbon's *Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire* but more likely to contemplate running for the leadership of the Liberal Party. One afternoon, while waterskiing, he noticed an attractive 19-year-old college student lying on a raft. Trudeau swam over to talk and in so doing met his future wife, Margaret Sinclair. Stunning in a swim suit, she had drawn crowds of admirers, but did not know who this middle-aged gallant was until told by her mother.

Margaret was the fourth of five daughters of James Sinclair, a former Liberal cabinet minister and his wife Kathleen, whom Trudeau already knew through the couple's continued connection with the party. In the early 1960s Margaret had been a bright and popular high-school student in an affluent district of Vancouver, concerned with clothes, parties, and the attentions of her peers. At the university, she had moved on from football stars to campus radicals as her preferred companions, had learned the rhetoric of the Sixties' revolutionaries, and had experimented extensively with drugs and sex in both Vancouver and Morocco, where she had gone after her graduation in 1968. The hooked Pierre joined the family at the long Club Med table for dinner every night. Although her parents could see his attraction for their daughter, Margaret recalled that she wasn't "particularly impressed," preferring "Yves," a handsome, young water ski instructor. When the couple next met, at the Liberal leadership convention three months later, he would clearly recall Tahiti.<sup>26</sup>

The Canadian prime minister must be the leader of the party—or coalition of parties—winning a plurality, if not a majority, of the legislative seats. As head of government, the prime minister selects his—or her—cabinet ministers. As in all parliamentary systems, the prime minister is responsible to the legislature and must either resign

or call a new election should his party lose a vote of confidence. To discredit Trudeau's candidacy, his opponents quickly made available translations of his bitter 1963 attacks on Pearson. In return, his supporters quickly put together two books compiled from his previous writings. *Federalism and the French Canadians*, the English edition of Trudeau's thoughts on nationalism and related political subjects, the more important of the two, was published in March.

His six-week campaign for the party leadership was unprecedented. Dubbed the candidate of the Age of Aquarius, Trudeau wore a rose in his lapel and promised that he would open 24 Sussex Drive, the Ottawa residence of the prime minister, to countless parties. When asked who would act as hostess, he replied, "Why should there be only one?" His devil-may-care style reflected the desire for change, and his reforms of the Criminal Code paved the way to victory. His colorful personality and his disregard of formality heightened his popularity. As the campaign came to an end, many Liberals came to believe that Trudeau might possibly be the last best hope for preserving the Canadian confederation as a truly bicultural, bilingual federated state and a "just society," the label appropriated by Trudeau to describe his utopia.<sup>27</sup> He was named party leader on April 6, 1968, and when Pearson resigned two weeks later, prime minister.

Ten thousand people had crowded into the undersized Ottawa Civic Center where Liberals from all over Canada gathered to choose their leader and Canada's 15th prime minister. In hindsight, the choice of the 48-year-old Trudeau seemed inevitable. He was the only French Canadian candidate in a party that prided itself on alternating its leadership between the two founding nations. He was the only viable left-liberal candidate in a field of 20. He had Pearson's support. And he was the darling of the news media. They loved his style: his irreverence, his independence, his playboy reputation, his sports car, and his audacity in appearing in sandals and an ascot on Parliament Hill, a place where "serious" politicians wore "appropriate" three-piece suits. Still, on that April weekend in Ottawa his election did not appear at all certain. He was an outsider, barely a Liberal, or even a politician.

To win additional seats in Parliament (the Liberals held a plurality, not a majority, in the House of Commons) and to secure a direct mandate Trudeau called new elections for June 25. As head of government, he could live in the prime minister's official residence at 24 Sussex Drive, the large Victorian mansion overlooking the lawns of Parliament Hill in a scenic and exclusive part of Ottawa. He could also make use of

the prime minister's summer residence at Harrington Lake. It was wholly in keeping with his character that he moved in (to his first own house) with just two suitcases, which he carried himself. Displayed on a wall was the motto held throughout his long public career, *la raison avant la passion* ("reason before passion").

At once, the national campaign got underway. Both by himself and in contrast to his Conservative opponent, Robert Stanfield, Trudeau was an instant television star. His body language, arresting face, studied nonchalance, and agile phraseology provided TV with an endlessly fascinating combination creating across Canada the scenes of action and excitement that television craved. As one analyst put it, "Trudeau was restless, vibrant, and charismatic; whereas Stanfield was thoughtful, plodding, and predictable—a fatal combination for television, which prefers confrontation to dialogue, passion to reason, change to continuity, and which presents personalities and images more adeptly than issues and ideas."<sup>28</sup> Tom Axworthy, who became Trudeau's faithful helper in 1973 and who would draft scores of prime ministerial speeches and memoranda, was struck by Trudeau's ability "to take a speech-writer's text, read it intently, note the four or five main points and a few of the key phrases, close his eyes for several minutes to ruminate on them, and then declare himself ready to deliver it."<sup>29</sup>

The media attention, dubbed *Trudeaumanie* in French and "Trudeaumania" in English, a spinoff of the Kennedy legend, was working in his favor. And Trudeau had the abilities to live up to the myth. Fully swept up and totally enjoying the run for office, his initial reluctance a thing of the past, he told his friends that his whole life had been "a preparation for politics."<sup>30</sup>

He based his campaign on the theme of the "Just Society." Aside from references to individual rather than collective rights and to "two nations"—the special status for Quebec that for Trudeau put it on the road to separation—details were left vague. Its achievement would require promoting equality of opportunity, which implied giving the most help to the most disadvantaged. Also required was a redress of the federal Canadian state's traditional disregard of the French language, the mother tongue of 27 percent of the population. When asked if true he wanted to "put Quebec in its place," he replied, "Yes, Absolutely. And its place is within Canada, with all the advantages and all the influence to which our province is entitled."<sup>31</sup>

His campaign to retain the prime ministership, as that for party leader, resembled a coronation. People, young women in particular,

thronged to see him, even touch him. The flippancy that delighted his admirers alarmed his allies. Each stop was not so much a speech as an appearance. Seeing him both in person and on television, reporters described “the lucidity of his intellect, the romance of his travels, the aplomb of his athletic feats, the magic of his attraction to women, the courage of his convictions, the mystery of his wealth-cum-as-ceticism.” It was not that he said much; rather, he exuded vitality. Exciting change was implied, however much he tried to limit expectations from government. For Trudeau saw the politicians’ role as that of educators: instead of providing solutions, they were to explain problems and outline choices. This professional detachment dazzled voters in 1968. It would infuriate them in 1972.<sup>32</sup>

Trudeau was unwittingly assisted by the actions of the French government, which once more involved itself in Canadian politics. France had invited the Quebec government, but not the federal government in Ottawa, to a gathering of French-speaking countries in the African nation of Gabon. Canadians outside the province took it as an insult, and Trudeau, threatening to make it an election issue, dared Daniel Johnson, Quebec’s premier, to accept. (He wisely refused.) Not only English-speaking Canadians—who admired the new prime minister for “standing up to Quebec”—but Quebecers as well, applauded. In the past, Quebec’s federal leaders were seen as tools of the Anglo-Canadian establishment. Trudeau appeared as his “own man.” The image, not of a flower-sniffing innocent intellectual but that of a tough and brilliant politician who could defend his country’s integrity against all attacks, touched off, as an observer wrote, “an explosion of patriotism, a new feeling among Canadians.”<sup>33</sup>

The election’s outcome was never in doubt. Robert Stanfield, the withdrawn and solemn businessman who had succeeded John Diefenbaker in a bitterly contested Conservative leadership convention the previous summer, ran a colorless campaign and was easily eclipsed. When Stanfield, seeking support in Quebec, accepted the “two nations” view of the Canadian Confederation and referred to a “particular status” for the province, he lost the support of anglophone Tories who preferred Trudeau’s view of “one Canada.” Trudeau’s Liberals won 45 percent of the vote but 155 seats of the 264 in the Commons, a clear majority for first time in ten years. That they also gained a large majority in Quebec—“a feat,” one historian concluded, “which seriously damaged both the *séparatistes* and the more extreme of the Union Nationale autonomists”—was principally the result of his being a *Québécois*.<sup>34</sup> His reassertion of the virtues of Canadian federalism, so reminiscent of his French Canadian predecessors in

Ottawa, accounted for the overall majority he secured in the country. Although Conservatives won handsomely in the Atlantic provinces, Stanfield's home ground, Liberals regained some of the western seats they had lost in the Diefenbaker stampede of 1958. Along with the Conservative defeat, the left-leaning NDP was also seriously mauled. Having accepted even more explicitly than the Tories the necessity of a special status for Quebec, NDP candidates found it difficult to extricate themselves from a position that proved unpopular in English-speaking Canada.

The chief concern for Trudeau as prime minister remained that of national unity, or more precisely, the federal-provincial relationship. To prevent Quebec from leaving the Confederation (and to ensure that English-speaking Canada would not shove Quebec out of it), he got the country to accept two official languages, English and French. In what became known as the Official Languages Act, they were made equal before the law and gave citizens the right to communicate with federal agencies in the official language of their choice. After a period of adjustment and ensuring the availability of free language courses, both English and French were to be used as working languages within the federal government. Opponents of the bill, particularly in Western Canada, claimed that Ottawa wanted to "force French down the throat of every farmer," that in certain areas Ukrainian, German, or Chinese and not French was the largest linguistic minority, and that his goal was to turn Canada into an entirely French-speaking country, all of which Trudeau vehemently denied. He sought to have all Canadians recognize that they were better off in a united country, one that rejected separatism or an exaggerated decentralization, and that the way to ensure unity was through bilingualism. Even so, the act, although widely implemented, failed to brake Quebec's growing estrangement. The federal government also sponsored legislation designed to encourage regional development and make funds available to private companies for investment in such underdeveloped and economically depressed areas as eastern Quebec and the maritime provinces. These programs would have a significant impact, although critics on the left charged that they failed to provide for even partial Canadian ownership of the new industries.<sup>35</sup>

To establish the "Just Society" he had promised in the campaign, Trudeau enlarged the number of civil servants and departments responsible to the prime minister's office, bringing a wave of young people and intellectuals into the government. The voting age was

lowered from 21 to 18, and television was introduced into the House of Commons. He set up an equivalent to the American Vista program, the Opportunities for Youth (OFY), which channeled the energies of the young into such projects as day-care centers, charting wilderness trails, and the cleanup of public areas. The program remained popular until brought to an end by budget cuts in 1975.

During his first term in office, Trudeau did his utmost to steer Canada away from the drift toward a special status for Quebec. Separatist sentiments, although considerably more muted, were also heard in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and in the west, in Manitoba and Saskatchewan.

In one respect, Trudeau's election resembled that of Lincoln's. It, too, turned hardline separatists to greater violence. Notwithstanding the older political movements that preached separatism (Duplessis's Union Nationale and the recently created Parti Québécois [PQ or *Péquistes*] of Jean Lévesque), the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), the extremist group founded in 1963, emerged as the most dangerous threat to public order. Its objective was the overthrow of the provincial government, which it saw as a capitalist dictatorship run by Canadian English speakers and Americans and one to be followed by the re-creation of Quebec as an independent Marxist nation. Reliance on confrontation and terror in an effort to politicize French Canadians gained at least tacit support from students, workers, and frustrated professional people. Initially seen as cranks when FLQ extremists destroyed federal mailboxes, they were taken more seriously after having resorted to bombings (35 between 1963 and 1967, 50–60 between 1968 and 1970; 6 lives by the fall of 1970), the most dramatic of which was the bombing of the Montreal stock exchange that left 27 people injured.

The unprecedented kidnap of James Cross, the British trade commissioner, on the morning of October 5, 1970, in Montreal gave rise to outrage throughout the country, although it met with some sympathy in Quebec. After consulting with the newly elected Quebec premier, the Liberal Robert Bourassa, Trudeau called an emergency cabinet meeting. (To the delight of English-speaking Canada, the Liberals had won nearly 42 percent of the Quebec 1970 election vote by promising to create "a hundred thousand jobs" and by pointing to the advantages of having Liberals in power both in Ottawa and in Quebec.) The PQ won only 23 percent, while Bourassa gained the support of the Montreal business community and that of nearly



all non-French voters. Federal ministers stated they would not give in, though they agreed to air the FLQ manifesto on national radio and television and publish it in the press. Then, three days later, on October 10, Pierre Laporte, Quebec's minister of labor, was also taken from his home at gunpoint and similarly threatened with execution.

Both the Ottawa and Quebec governments took measures to safeguard officials. More drastic action was requested by Montreal mayor Jean Drapeau and by the city's police chief, who complained that traditional procedures were too slow. With indirect negotiations showing no progress, but with deadlines passing and pressure mountin, Bourassa asked the federal government to send in the army and apply Canada's War Measures Act. Caught off guard, and in the absence of laws covering "exceptional measures" in time of peace, the Trudeau government complied.<sup>36</sup> The act, dating from World War I, had never been used in peacetime. Put into effect the morning of October 16, it gave the police almost unlimited power of search without warrants, arrest without charge, and detention of suspects without bail. To organize or attend political rallies, be a member of the FLQ, or speak in support of it was retroactively made a crime. Twenty-five hundred paratroopers now guarded the streets of Montreal while Trudeau went on national television that night to reassure Canadians that their civil liberties remained secure. Special police powers had been temporarily imposed because of the threat to national security. If in private the new prime minister anguished about suppressing individual freedoms in favor of military action, he dismissed protests with the statement that was to haunt the rest of his political life.

In Ottawa, speaking of the FLQ, Trudeau told a reporter, "Our duty as a government is to protect government officials and important people in our society against being used as tools in their blackmail." He added, "There are a lot of bleeding hearts around who just don't like to see people with helmets and guns. All I can say is, go on and bleed, but it is more important to keep law and order in society than to be worried about weak-kneed people who don't like the looks of an army." When the reporter then asked, "At any cost? How far would you go with that?" Trudeau replied, "Well, just watch me."<sup>37</sup> The prime minister's response rankled separatists and civil libertarians—his bleeding heart phrase would be endlessly quoted by critics—but proved to be one of his most admired acts, with public opinion polls showing a 90 percent approval rate.<sup>38</sup>

The police and the army began making mass arrests—a total of 455—in Quebec. Even separatist sympathizers were rounded up. Trudeau's political opponents, John Diefenbaker for the Tories and

David Lewis for the NDP, countered there was no evidence of an emergency that could not be met within “the ordinary powers of the law” and that additional police power could be made available through the Criminal Code.<sup>39</sup> On October 18, the police found Laporte’s body: he had been strangled by his captors. On national TV a shocked Trudeau told the nation that “the FLQ has sown the seeds of its own destruction.” Years later, in his memoir, he still resented the declaration published in the press by a group of Quebec leaders, including Lévesque, that attributed ulterior motives to Ottawa in creating an “atmosphere of semi-military rigidity.” Trudeau strongly denied the charge that the War Measures Act (“the only tool at our disposal”) was employed to crush the very idea of Quebec sovereignty. And the country at large agreed with the government in Ottawa. A Gallup poll taken a few weeks later showed that support came equally from French- and English-speaking Canadians.<sup>40</sup> Violence came to an end, and most detainees were released with less than a dozen convicted of a crime. In December, the government agreed to let Cross’s kidnappers go to Cuba in return for his release. Laporte’s killers, however, were arrested and received lengthy prison terms. The “October Crisis” was over.

Still, French-speaking Quebecers were determined to keep their francophone culture. Embittered by the persistent high unemployment in the province—over 7 percent by the mid-1970s—they would push both Bourassa and the Quebec Liberals in the federal parliament to become more like Lévesque’s *Péquistes*. Bourassa made it clear that he opposed any “patriation” of the Canadian constitution unless it contained assurances that Quebec was entitled to a special position, one that assured the continued use of the French language and guaranteed provincial control over social and cultural matters. After the premier’s success in the 1970 Quebec election (in which the PQ won nearly a quarter of the vote), the provincial legislature, in a gesture to affirm the standing of the Quebec “nation,” renamed itself the National Assembly. Clearly the problem of separatism was not to go away.

Discontent in western Canada, from Vancouver to the Ontario border, also mounted. Not only was there almost universal rejection of the Official Languages Act, but the price of wheat had fallen to new lows. Ottawa blamed overproduction, and because the wheat could not be sold, responded with “Operation Lift”: to pay the farmers to limit production. The farmers complained that the price

paid, \$6 an acre, was too low. The journalist Walter Stewart recalled watching a crowd of 6,000 Saskatoon farmers shaking their fists and booing at every mention of Ottawa. Signs of “We’ve Been Feeding the Wrong Hogs” and “Ottawa, Go to Hell” made old Quebec placards of “*Québec Oui, Ottawa Non*” seem innocent by comparison. If Trudeau got the message, he didn’t seem to show concern when in the capital he spoke of the need to come together and in Winnipeg told the grain growers, “Why should I sell your wheat?”<sup>41</sup>

Critics charged that the prime minister had imposed an iron discipline on his cabinet and party. Relying on his mastery of television, he went over heads of Parliament (when they did not agree with him) to appeal directly to people who, for Stewart, “cannot talk back.” The Canadian prime minister attends the meeting of the House of Commons when it begins with the two o’clock question period to reply to queries raised by members of the opposition parties. Trudeau was accused of ignoring members by making major statements to the media rather than letting contentious issues be debated in the House. The Conservative Opposition portrayed Trudeau as a prime minister who disdained Parliament (repeatedly citing his ill-timed remark that “fifty yards from Parliament Hill, MPs are no longer Honorable Members—they are just nobodies”). For Stewart, “he by-passed the traditional day-to-day accountability and substituted an accountability that occurs only once in any four-or five-year period, at election time.”<sup>42</sup>

Was it his sense of self-confidence that allowed him to take Canadian foreign policy on a different, more independent course, one that occasionally speculated on the benefits of neutrality? (In his youth he had displayed signs of a francophone nationalism as well a collectivist outlook, although after Harvard, Paris, and the London School of Economics, corporatist views were abandoned in the mid-1940s.) If anti-Communist, he rejected the virulent anti-Communism shown below the border and was prepared to loosen the country’s close ties to the United States and Europe. His government reduced the size of Canadian forces in NATO, recognized the People’s Republic of China, began to phase out nuclear weapons, welcomed American deserters and draft evaders, and declared that Canada “should be a refuge from militarism,” all to Washington’s displeasure. Arriving Americans were generally able to obtain legal immigrant status simply by applying at the border, or even after they entered the country. No precise data exist, but Victor Levant, who wrote *Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War*, estimated that about

twenty thousand Americans came to Canada to escape the Vietnam-era draft and twelve thousand others in the armed forces deserted and entered the country. The British were also angered by Trudeau's (early) opposition to arms sales to the apartheid South African government, although he found sanctions unrealistic. The constant was a pragmatism reflective of the Canadian national interest.

President Nixon was especially unhappy. He recalled Trudeau's famous quip uttered the first time the Canadian prime minister visited Washington (March 1969): "Living with you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant: no matter how friendly and even-tempered the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt." The president's tapes had him saying "I would not do anything with the Canadians. That Trudeau is a son of a bitch . . . I'll never go to that country while he's there."<sup>43</sup>

If the public remained titillated by reports of his adventures (he was photographed as he pirouetted alone at a formal reception in Buckingham Palace while other guests walked off to meet Queen Elizabeth), politicians and journalists took offence at his arrogance. The prime minister insulted members of the parliamentary press corps ("a crummy lot") and told his staff not to give out information. He slighted progressives by mocking a group pressing him to intervene in Nigeria's devastating civil war, flinging at them the condescending question, "Where is Biafra," as though they did not know while HE of course did. The apparent unwillingness to get involved in the Nigerian civil war, both because of French support for the Biafran cause and the willingness of former French colonies to view Quebec as possessing its own international identity tarnished his liberal image. And as noted, he slighted colleagues in the House of Commons.<sup>44</sup>

Many years later James Coutts, one of Trudeau's most prominent aides, disclosed that far from being spontaneous, the pirouette, like many other attention-getting gestures, had been planned and even rehearsed by the prime minister to show his disdain of palace protocol.<sup>45</sup>

In a private Roman Catholic ceremony on March 4, 1971, the 51-year-old Trudeau married 22-year-old Margaret Sinclair. Aside from a chance meeting at a Liberal Party convention, the two hadn't seen each other since Tahiti. He had become prime minister; she had gone off to Morocco, at the time a popular gathering place for hippies, before getting a job in the federal Department of Manpower and Immigration. She had taken up his offer (given freely to the young

and beautiful in those days) to look him up in Ottawa. Margaret relocated, having obtained the government post thanks to her father's contacts. At first there were secret spaghetti dinners at 24 Sussex Drive. Then after months of public dating and spending weekends with him privately at the prime minister's country residence, she had finally talked the hesitant Trudeau into the marriage that she said she had fantasized about "since their first date."<sup>46</sup>

The bride had taken French lessons and religious instruction for conversion to Roman Catholicism. It was the first marriage for each, and initially her parents had reservations: Margaret's mother was two years younger than her intended son-in-law, but any efforts to dissuade her daughter were obviously not successful. By the time of the couple's wedding day, the mother was reconciled to the marriage, deflecting objections to the 29-year difference in age: "he may be old but he's a young man at heart." Marshall McLuhan saw the marriage as the act "of a wizard ... the transformation of the whole political scene into a marriage feast, a sign of Trudeau's playfulness, his creativity, and best of all, something that meant the Americans ... have begun to envy us."<sup>47</sup> Margaret became the youngest first lady in the world. The couple left for a brief honeymoon at Garibaldi Provincial Park in British Columbia. Their first child, Justin, was born on Christmas Day that year, and two more sons were to follow.

At the time, the marriage was seen as a brilliant match, personally and politically. Both were interested in politics. Both had traveled and enjoyed skiing, hiking, and skin diving. Still, after 16 years of formal education, Pierre was an intellectual, and Margaret, despite her degree, limited by comparison. His French Canadian Catholic upbringing also contrasted with her far less structured Presbyterian background. Back in Ottawa from their honeymoon, she moved into 24 Sussex Drive to become a politician's wife. She was to remain, as she put it, in the big stone house, and like his mother expected "to bear children, go to mass, and serve tea to friends."<sup>48</sup>

Biographers Stephen Clarkson and Christina McCall wrote that aware of differences between the two, between "the cerebral and brooding father figure and the playfully erratic hippie girl," Trudeau had anticipated problems. Beset by doubts, before the wedding he had repeatedly asked whether she was having second thoughts. Finally he had given in to his desire to end his bachelor days and have the family he long desired. His mother was dying, his brother and sister were pursuing their own lives in Montreal, and while his peers were becoming grandparents, he was living like a young man, still dating.

For the first 18 months of the marriage Trudeau imposed, according to biographer Kevin Christiano, a “purdah-like seclusion upon her” by placing his young wife off limits to the media. He had warned her that appearances to the contrary he was “extremely solitary by nature.” Experiencing an unexpected lonely life alongside her “shy, unsociable man,” as she called him in her memoir, *Beyond Reason*, Margaret saw it was true. She complained that no one at 24 Sussex Drive was allowed to interrupt his routine. Although she traveled extensively (but always with her husband) and had a household staff of ten and nannies for her sons, she felt unfulfilled and at times severely depressed. When she made known her wish for a part-time job, “Pierre refused. He is an old-fashioned man when it comes to the position of women in the home, and he wanted me dependent on him.”<sup>49</sup>

All too soon, his young wife’s “essential childishness and youthful vacuity” began to alarm the serious man under the playboy mask. She acknowledged herself as “weird,” “mystical,” and as a “flower-child.” “Culture for me was rock music,” she wrote in her memoir. For him, culture, or politics, amounted to intense discussions about Malraux or Braque or Schoenberg, usually conducted in French, a language his wife barely understood.

Friends noticed his growing unhappiness. Unable, or unwilling, to change, he remained his inflexible, self-contained self. When his wife complained that he was a workaholic, he retorted that “one of the best things about mother was that she never disturbed [my work].” He had mistakenly expected her to adjust, but as she described herself, she was still a “dizzy, distracted girl” ill prepared to live with a man whose official role put demands on her that she found constraining. Margaret had been mesmerized by Trudeau’s political power and by stories about his style and wealth. She had wanted the excitement of greeting heads of state and dining with royalty, surrounded by photographers, clothes-buying sprees in Rome, the envy of other women excited by her husband’s image and position. Tired of forced conversation with politicians and diplomats at boring receptions and dinners, she came to resent the need to follow the strictly supervised routine an official household demands.<sup>50</sup>

She admitted that she “had no idea how to cope privately with a man who was by nature solitary, by training an intellectual, by circumstance fixated on his work.” In a chapter of her (second) memoir entitled “Mrs Rochester at 24 Sussex Drive,” Margaret described her life at home. “Every two or three weeks I would disappear to New York or London.” Then homesick for her sons, she would return

to Sussex Drive. She moved out of the master bedroom to three small attic rooms on the third floor, her own domain, where “up there, overnight, I became poor mad Mrs Rochester in *Jane Eyre*, the distant spectator, the hidden wife.”<sup>51</sup>

It is true that once the courtship was over, Trudeau had little time for her. Even in the evenings he spent hours absorbed in boxes of official papers. After living with him awhile, she said that she “found all the stories about Trudeau the playboy more and more absurd.” Quite the contrary, “he turned out to be disciplined, preoccupied, concerned with health routines (forty-four laps in the pool after returning home, never more, never less), devout in religion, frugal in way that first discouraged her, then drove her to excesses.” She felt abandoned by a husband “who allocated time to her as if she were an importunate constituent.” Quarrels over money and responsibility left both spouses increasingly unhappy. If dinner conversations with guests on arcane subjects spoken in French caused the latter some embarrassment, it was shrugged off by Trudeau: “Even if we spoke in English, she wouldn’t understand.” Not knowing what to do with her outbursts, Trudeau alternated between tolerance and strictness. Nothing seemed to help. Each retreated into “separate solitudes.” To give herself something to do, Margaret took up photography, not easy inasmuch as she was more the target of the paparazzi than one of them.<sup>52</sup>

As early as the 1972 election campaign, when pregnant with her second son, she told astonished journalists she had become “just Old Mother Earth,” an alarming phrase for a 24-year-old, which, however, revealed the shock of her disillusion. To counter boredom, she fought with the household staff, spent extravagant sums on clothes and decoration, and complained that “official duties were preventing her self-fulfillment through a great career in some yet undefined profession, telling officials’ wives how difficult she found domesticity with Pierre.”<sup>53</sup> Yet life was far from miserable. “She reveled in flirting with Prince Charles and Fidel Castro. She loved holidays with Pierre in the Caribbean, on the Mediterranean, and in the Middle East in the villas and yachts of the rich and powerful.”<sup>54</sup>

“The details of what was actually going on in that ‘large, cold grey mansion,’ as Margaret Trudeau later described her home”—and as Trudeau’s biographers put it—were not known for years. But when they were revealed in a series of remarkable interviews she gave in the late 1970s, and in the two books she talked into a ghost-writer’s tape recorder, what had happened became clear. Clarkson and McCall wrote that “two willful people, emotionally arrested in adolescence,

had contrived to meet and greet and were about to part again in an agonizing marital conflict that would sap Trudeau's political energy for the next five years. For reasons that had to do with their individual needs, they had each gone into marriage harboring delusions about the other that were to have horrendous consequences, both private and public."<sup>55</sup> That her alternate bouts of severe depression and euphoric highs were symptoms of bipolar disorder would not be known, or diagnosed, until years later.

The Trudeau government was falling from favor and suffering a loss of prestige in the early 1970s. The remnants of Trudeaumania could no longer conceal a flat economy. The Arab oil embargo had struck, and the twin problems of unemployment and inflation signaled an end to postwar stability. As was the case in other countries, the Keynesian economics favored by Trudeau seemed unable to deal with stagflation and the problems of a global economy. Between 1966 and 1971, as investment shrank, unemployment increased from 3.6 percent of the labor force to 6.4 percent, and the resulting budgetary deficits worried a disapproving public. The prime minister, distraught by his failing marriage, was less able to deal either with these economic problems or their political consequences. The relentless growth of foreign ownership also prompted demands for government action to reverse the trend and restore control of the country's economic life to Canadians. Economic domination by foreigners sparked both a nationalist wave on the part of English-speaking Canadians and a leftward lurch by a growing NDP, whose more radically oriented members insisted on solutions calling for public ownership of natural resources and major industries. Pressure from the left—and the recovery of the Parti Québécois—proved worrisome to veteran political leaders. They, and others, found Trudeau's preference for dealing with inflation—and consequent budget cutting—rather than with unemployment—upsetting at best.

The increased size and power of the prime minister's personal staff, undertaken in the aim of keeping himself better informed, led to renewed charges that he had placed too much power in the hands of advisers and was ignoring Parliament. And the arrogant manner displayed by the head of government reinforced charges of an imperial prime minister. Instead of explaining his leadership style (which aimed at greater efficiency), he impatiently brushed aside critics, responding to questions in Commons with a waspish comment or an obscenity. He had told striking truckers to "eat shit." On one notorious occasion Trudeau dismissed a critic with a decidedly un-prime-ministerial phrase. (His remark was officially recorded as "fuddle-duddle," a euphemism



that became a catchword). Taking an evermore caustic attitude toward the press, Trudeau showed great annoyance to any act considered an invasion of privacy.<sup>56</sup>

Certainly he was less sensitive to regional concerns other than the Quebec crisis. The government continued to lose support in the West. In 1968 Trudeau had won a majority of the seats west of Lake Superior. In response to a wheat glut and the falling price of grain, Ottawa had told prairie farmers to cut their acreage. Those who obeyed missed out when Soviet and Chinese crops suffered losses and prices soared. A cartoon depicted a buckskin-clad Trudeau in a coonskin hat coming to a Calgary conference. He is being greeted by a dignitary in formal dress bidding him "welcome to the rest of Canada." An "interpreter," also in Western dress, translates the dignitary's remarks: "He says, 'Did you bring the cheque book?'" The caption underneath reads: "Parlez-vous Western Canadian?"<sup>57</sup>

On another trip to the West, Trudeau took offense at signs displayed by wheat farmers protesting his government's reluctance to stimulate foreign grain exports. The prime minister appeared unmoved, but provincial Liberals paid a price. In state elections in the early 1970s, the NDP soared to victory in Manitoba and took the British Columbia vote. But it was inflation that proved the major worry. By the end of the decade the Consumer Price Index hovered at 17 percent. The causes were multifold: industrial wages were rising twice as fast as before; there were the high costs of Expo 67; and Washington's determination to fight the Vietnam War with borrowed money had cheapened the Canadian, as well as the American, dollar.<sup>58</sup> The prime minister seemed unable to cope.

Even the aura projected by Trudeau as the national savior able to deal with Quebec broke down. Robert Bourassa, elected the Liberal premier of Quebec in 1970 by downplaying the constitutional and language issues and promising greater job growth, strengthened his embrace of French nationalism. He became increasingly intransigent in defense of Quebec's special position in the Canadian Confederation, and in June 1971 rejected a constitutional deal that the Trudeau and the anglophone premiers put together at a conference in Victoria, British Columbia. Bourassa insisted that the constitution must provide guarantees for the use of French and for almost total provincial control over social and cultural matters.

In Canada, the House of Commons cannot exceed a five-year term. By custom, however, the government calls an election in its fourth year in office—although it is free to hold one before that time. When

asked when he was going to call one, Trudeau's caustic reply, "In God's good time, whenever I feel it is best," gave rise to renewed accusations of arrogance and hubris.<sup>59</sup> When he finally did so for the fall of 1972, he had lost much of his personal popularity. Ever the realist, Trudeau had anticipated that the government's initial "honeymoon" would last, at most, only a year or two. Speaking of the euphoria in which he had been welcomed, he told his staff and friends that "all of this will end. Trudeaumania will become Trudeaphobia." Still, the loss of popularity was greater than anticipated.

Despite the divorce law and further Criminal Code amendments, the Official Language Act guaranteeing equality of access to English and French speakers, the restructuring of the cabinet, and a thaw in Soviet-Western relations, the feeling that not much had been done could not be overcome. Even Liberal MPs suggested that Trudeau resign as leader and prime minister. He refused, denying that the party had been repudiated and maintaining that only some of its policies were under attack. He seemed to feel all that was necessary to restore Liberal fortunes was to win a new electoral mandate. But visits made by the prime minister throughout the country to meet voters did not help, largely because of his biting replies to questions he considered foolish. More significant, he was accused of mishandling the economy when, together with inflation, unemployment reached its highest point in a decade. Canada's "stagflation" reflected the problems faced by the United States because of Vietnam, but the Trudeau government was charged with doing too little to insulate the Canadian economy.

The national elections held on October 30, 1972, revealed that Stanfield's Conservatives had few solutions to complex economic problems, although they devoted much time to them. It was the criticisms of the new NDP leader, David Lewis, who denounced the "injustices of the just society" and condemned the government for favoring corporate over individual welfare, that struck a responsive chord. Because of perceived economic failures, Trudeau's Liberals suffered a setback: they lost 47 seats, a third of those previously held, falling from 155 to 108; Stanfield's Conservatives won 109; the Socialist NDP picked up 30; minor parties and independents, 17. For a day or two, while recounts took place, Trudeau did not know whether his party would form the next administration. It would, but only by relying on NDP votes.<sup>60</sup>

In contrast to his 1969 campaign, Trudeau had given a lackluster performance. The prime minister was described as "float[ing] across Canada, delivering philosophical discourses on man, government, and society, using the vapid slogan, 'The Land Is Strong.'" Both slogan and campaign fizzled. Trudeau later acknowledged that he had

treated the election “as a simple appeal to the voters: Here is the record of our four years in power; tell us what you think.” A sort of “conversation with Canadians” had been envisaged, an approach that he later admitted was “too cerebral. Politics can’t be conducted at such a rational level, devoid of all emotion.” In the future, he would be more practical, even cynical. Governments at election time, he was heard to say, were “foolish” if they didn’t promise “lower taxes, higher old age pensions, price controls, everything you want.”<sup>61</sup> The turn to greater populism would make him a more effective politician, but the price paid was a loss of originality. Simply put, he would become less unique.

Stung by his near-defeat, Trudeau sought explanations for the dissipation of the enthusiasm that had surrounded his 1968 victory. He blamed his “half-failure” on “half-reforms.” Not all the troops were removed from Europe; capital gains were taxed at half the full rate; and consequently he had lost the support of his party’s left wing. There was no sign, certainly none that was made public, that he related his poor performance in general—and his increasingly irascible behavior in particular—to his marital problems.

The answer from party regulars, from whom his personal life was still concealed, was clear: in surrounding himself with intellectuals who ran the government like a postgraduate course in public policy, he had run a hopeless campaign. What Trudeau needed was a dose of partisanship; he had to become more “political.” The prime minister had never had a kind word to say about the Liberal Party until he joined it, and after he did, the party was something to be tolerated rather than nurtured. He had won the 1968 election without much help from the party establishment, or so he thought. But the rebuff of 1972 changed his thinking; the party apparently counted for more than he had believed. He needed stronger links both to its leaders and workers and more “partisan advice.” He would find them in such professional politicians dating from the Pearson era, politicians whom he had previously disdained, such men as his campaign manager Keith Davey and his younger associate, James Coutts.<sup>62</sup>

On the advice from Coutts, Trudeau now surrounded himself with more politically minded advisers, people like Davey, Coutts, and a political scientist from Winnipeg, Tom Axworthy, people who had proven themselves during Pearson’s time in office. Behaving in a more conventional style, the prime minister sought a better rapport with his party. When traveling he made sure to meet with small groups on a more personal level. Acting on the recommendations of his advisers, he slowed enforcement of the legislation requiring that federal jobs be filled by

bilingual candidates, a move that won approval in parts of Ontario and the west. His government also cut back on immigration in an effort to stifle complaints about unemployment. Cooperating with the NDP, a “total review” of social security was undertaken, and pleased workers received increases in old-age benefits and reductions in income taxes. Trudeau later admitted that the “leftist” reputation gained in Quebec during his days in opposition to the Duplessis regime [had] imposed “a certain reserve.” Although it had not prevented him from recognizing mainland China or enacting a health insurance law, it had put him “on guard.” Now, aware that he’d be supported by NDP members even if more conservative elements of his own party objected, he put forward advanced left-wing projects. In four months a Gallup poll showed 57 percent believed the election had indeed changed him.<sup>63</sup>

To hold his plurality, Trudeau reached out to the New Democrats, who held the balance of power. The NDP, on its part, would keep the Liberals in office in hopes of influencing government legislation. Trudeau conceded that “we are more forced to listen ... we’ll have to compromise.” Pursuing a more progressive agenda, moreover, would prevent the Canadian Liberal Party from going the way of its British counterparts, “who had let themselves be pushed so far to the right by the Labour Party that there were only a handful of Liberals left.” The answer for Trudeau and his advisers was to adopt a left of center agenda.<sup>64</sup> At the time of the worldwide oil crisis in 1973–1974, prices increased fourfold, and Trudeau followed NDP suggestions on ways to redesign Canadian oil policies and so provide greater protection for consumers. The chief result was the formation of a state-owned oil corporation, eventually called Petro-Canada. The government also replied to the Arab-imposed oil embargo by increasing western and northern drilling and negotiating trade policies with foreign producers. Canadians were consequently sheltered from the worst effects of the OPEC increases, although the government still struggled with the big deficits resulting from the expensive social and medical programs of the 1960s and the weak Canadian dollar.

Cuts in the personal income tax, the substantial increases in old-age pensions, and above all the oil pricing policy that sheltered Canadians from OPEC price hikes, together with the decision to promote Canadian self-sufficiency in energy by creating a national market, promote oil sands research, build a new pipeline for the eastern part of the country, and create a national petroleum company all marked a decided shift toward economic nationalism. Even so, the NDP found the government’s initiatives inadequate. By early 1974 the strain of maintaining the Liberals in power showed on the New Democrats,

who feared being seen as an appendage of the governing party. Not even Trudeau's "throne speech" condemning the bombing of Hanoi helped. Nor could Trudeau, unable to refrain from mocking their leaders, show himself as conciliatory. When his programs resulted in renewed popularity for the Liberal government, he and his ministers stopped caring about NDP feelings. The prime minister even dared the party to join with Conservatives. The New Democrats accepted the challenge, and on May 9, 1974, Liberals lost a no-confidence vote forcing a new election. An unabashed Trudeau proclaimed, "I will return as PM."<sup>65</sup>

He was right. Trudeau offered the hardworking yet idealistic Liberal senator Keith Davey the direction of the party's 1974 campaign and took Davey's advice to return to the whistle-stop style of 1968. Accompanying the prime minister was his beautiful young wife and their first son, in a carefully calculated effort to banish the image of a "cynical," reluctantly aging bachelor. A Canadian historian wrote that "the impression of effective leadership was strengthened when contrasted with the low-key Conservative leader Robert Stanfield and with the Tories' unpopular advocacy of a wage freeze and price controls as the essential means of curbing inflation," a measure relentlessly denounced by an energized Trudeau.<sup>66</sup>

A new Trudeau had emerged in the 1974 election campaign. The distant statesman was now a cunning politician. Responding to Stanfield's call for wage and price controls, Trudeau was scornful: it was unrealistic for Canada to isolate its economy from the rest of the world. He was devastatingly effective. His whistle stops, the four or five rallies each day marked by sharp vigorous speeches where hecklers were cut down, bore no resemblance to the playful clown prince on the way to coronation in 1968 or the detached listless professor of 1972. Crisscrossing the country, he deliberately tried to make the campaign livelier. He admitted that he had enjoyed it "up to a point," but "some things I never learned to like. I didn't like to kiss babies, though I didn't mind kissing their mothers. I didn't like to slap backs or other parts of the anatomy. I liked hecklers, because they brought my speeches alive."<sup>67</sup>

In the 1972 campaign, Trudeau was adamant that his wife and son play no part. Now all the stops were pulled out. "Maggie," as the press dubbed Margaret, accompanied him, and the young, beautiful, high-spirited woman proved an unprecedented hit. She told adoring crowds that her husband was "shy, modest, and gentle ... he taught me about love." The Liberal campaign allowed Canada to rediscover

the Pierre Trudeau of 1968. The country again had its own Kennedy, and now, its own “Jackie” as well.<sup>68</sup>

Margaret experienced the best weeks of her married life in the election of 1974, when she achieved “a measure of stardom in own right.” Until then, Trudeau had insisted on privacy, keeping “a watertight seal between my private life and my public life,” although he acknowledged “some of my political life may have spilled over onto the family life” and that “being in politics . . . is not always a good life for the spouse.”<sup>69</sup> In the spring and summer of 1974, Margaret Trudeau had a six-week run on center stage, and the campaign fed the needs of her extroverted personality. The Toronto Liberals who handled things exploited her image as a beautiful and devoted young wife and mother. She enjoyed every minute, and after a hesitant start “took to the hustings with gusto,” made appearances across the country, talking to voters and shaking hands with local Liberals. The “Margaret factor” was described in news reports as significant. When the party’s substantial victory was celebrated in the Château Laurier hotel in Ottawa on election night in 1974, Trudeau gracefully thanked his wife for her help. Her face glowed. She even dreamed of running herself in her father’s old parliamentary district in north Vancouver.<sup>70</sup>

On July 8, 1974, in part because the timing of the NDP decision to abandon the Liberals proved unpopular, in part because the Tories and the NDP ran dismal campaigns, and in part because of their own effective campaign, the Liberals returned to the Trudeau government the majority it had lost in 1972. Their candidates received over 42 percent of the vote and 141 seats to the Conservatives’ 95 and the NDP’s 16. Performing poorly only in the West, the Liberals won enough seats to form a majority government in that year’s election. Acting on the suggestion of Coutts and Davey, Trudeau became a relentlessly partisan head of government, doling out patronage so shamelessly that even a few Liberals blanched.

But if Trudeau’s 1974 election campaign generated hopes that his new government would bring up a wave of exciting new legislation, his admirers were soon disappointed. The vigor and humor of his speeches and the presence of his beautiful young wife showed a liveliness that was not lived up to. The humility apparently learned was of short duration. Instead, endless surveys and conferences were held, and the legislation enacted was not seen as important. He could not have anticipated that the start of his third term in office, when he enjoyed a solid majority in the House of Commons and ought to have been at the peak of his form as a leader, would also mark the onset of a new surge of political and marital problems that led to his fall five years later.

## TRUDEAU

### TERMINATION

Trudeau's marriage, already beginning to disintegrate, fell apart two years later. The day after the 1974 election, Trudeau went back to his briefing books and once more remained inaccessible. He worked in his office all day and usually took lunch with colleagues, although according to Margaret he sometimes "dropped in" to see his sons. The photographers and reporters went on to other stories leaving her, as she put it, "feeling that I had been used" and that "something inside me broke that day."<sup>1</sup>

Pierre, she admitted, showed "immense patience" with the boys, helping her put them to bed, "teasing them, reading to them, listening to their prayers." But when depressed and feeling abandoned, she quarreled with the servants over perceived inadequacies and fought with him "over money and responsibility."<sup>2</sup> As Kevin Christiano put it, "Margaret flailed around for something—anything—into which she could divert the energy that her anxiety had generated." Her husband's advice: to read the works of Plato. Instead, she redecorated, bought clothes, and began, by herself, to take lengthy trips abroad.<sup>3</sup>

After July 1974 she entered into open combat with Pierre to get the attention she craved. First, she took off without consultation for a solitary holiday in Europe, where she searched fruitlessly for a former lover. Then she fell in love with an American senator at a celebrity tennis match in New York and threatened to kill herself with a kitchen knife when questioned by her husband about their encounter, an episode that led to her hospital stay in 1974. She burst into song at a formal dinner in Venezuela, appeared in a see-through T-shirt in Cuba, and cursed him in front of a group of Japanese dignitaries in Tokyo during one of her heated tirades. At home she took to smoking marijuana heavily, though she knew Trudeau hated the habit.

"It became so that Pierre on arriving home from the office would come up not to kiss but to sniff me," she said afterwards.<sup>4</sup>

At a formal White House dinner hosted by the Carters, she wore a midcalf afternoon dress. Her explanation the next day delighted Canadians: "They said I wore a short skirt to the President's dinner last night because I have great legs. Well why not?" Soon the press was publishing more damaging details of alleged extracurricular liaisons of "the prime minister's estranged wife."<sup>5</sup>

Margaret went on Canadian TV to talk at length about how hard she found her role as wife of the prime minister. It was an early sign of trouble in the paradise the public had assumed existed in the prime minister's official residence. She made it clear that she was simply not interested in visiting "dental hospitals, zoos, and adult education centers. They bored me almost to tears." She was not satisfied to be his "country mistress," she later wrote in her memoir, and admitted "I also had a hard time transforming myself from a peasant-skirted, Indian-shirted hippy into a gracious lady."<sup>6</sup>

Her depression worsened, and for two weeks in September 1974 she was treated in the psychiatric unit of the Royal Victoria Hospital in Montreal for what a press release from the prime minister's office called severe emotional distress. (Only later did she learn that the wild swings in behavior issued from bipolar disorder.) Neither the hospital stay nor subsequent psychiatric consultations, nor the professional lessons in photography, nor a private phone line or her own car and freedom from the security officers whose presence so revolted her, nor the birth of a third son in October 1975, nor her baffled husband's agreement that she could travel where she wished or study what she wanted enabled Margaret to overcome her unhappiness. The Trudeaus became increasingly acrimonious in their private exchanges and increasingly tense in public. The public wondered what she would do next. Margaret dabbled in writing, TV interviews, photojournalism, mental health, TV commercials, and day care centers, but discarded each after a short time.<sup>7</sup>

In February of 1976 she took what the press called her "Freedom Trip" to Florida. Margaret stayed with Bill Teron, an Ottawa multimillionaire developer, in his winter condominium on Key Biscayne. Then, after she and Trudeau had quarreled and were barely on speaking terms, there took place the highly publicized weekend party in March 1977—on her sixth wedding anniversary—in Toronto with the Rolling Stones rock group. (She claimed the event had been blown out of proportion by the Stones' press agent.) Lurid accounts with such titles as "Sex Orgies in Canadian PM's Wife's Suite" branded



her as a “promiscuous, irresponsible wife,” and overnight Trudeau became “the most famous single father in the world.” (That they had already separated by this time was unknown to the public.) Soon after, there were trips to New York and Boston followed by almost daily statements and denials from the prime minister’s office. She refused to return as hostess for an official dinner at Harrington Lake, the rambling, wooden, two-story house by the lake, the country home of Canada’s prime ministers, for visiting British prime minister James Callaghan. In an interview given the day before, Margaret had said, “I’ll never go back to the role I played before . . . I’ve had enough of standing in line smiling and shaking hands.”<sup>8</sup>

She desired a style of life that her predecessors wouldn’t have dared to take on. Columnists asked whether she realized she was a public figure and whether she was doing all this intentionally to harm her husband. A particularly bitter article in the *Daily Express* described her as “a self-confessed hippie who smokes pot, uses four-letter words and makes it obvious she doesn’t wear a bra.” One by-product—sympathy for the single father—increased Trudeau’s poll ratings.<sup>9</sup>

In his own memoirs, Trudeau accepted at least some of the blame for the collapse of his union with Margaret. “I was a neophyte at both politics and family life,” he wrote. “I married late in life . . . and I was learning about marriage and parenthood at the same time as I was learning about the workings of politics. So perhaps it was a little too much for me and, regrettably, I didn’t succeed all that well.”<sup>10</sup> Although notoriously parsimonious (and under their marriage contract his wife had no claims on his assets), Pierre gave Margaret half his salary, but it was never enough. He tried to take her away from “the old grey mansion,” her “prison,” by spending time at weekend cottages and on diversions from official tours. He told her to “do whatever you want, be yourself,” but Margaret, who had always viewed herself in terms of other people’s expectations, had no idea who she was or what she wanted. She only knew who she was not. In Ottawa, hearing listeners criticize her, she called a radio talk show and coined the phrase that would define her: “I’m more than just a rose in my husband’s lapel.”<sup>11</sup>

After the trial separation, the Trudeaus announced their agreement to live “separate and apart” with the two sharing custody of their three sons. Margaret later wrote, “In the late spring of 1977, I decided, after many hours of agonizing, to choose independence over my marital vows. The boys, six-year old Justin, four year-old Sacha, and Michel, barely two, were told their mother was going to look for work and would come home often.”<sup>12</sup>

In the autumn, after their separation, Pierre started dating again. The Canadian press, which had not hesitated to describe Margaret's exploits—in part because the foreign press had already done so—showed itself remarkably discreet in regard to his, a double standard that his wife understandably resented. She acknowledged that as “a fervent Catholic with rigid moral standards” he had been entirely faithful while “properly married” and that she was “almost relieved to find he was prepared to start taking out other women.” Divorce, which as a Catholic he opposed, was at least at the time out of the question.

In her memoir *Beyond Reason*, Margaret commented that in the months that followed, Pierre won great sympathy from Canadians for the devotion he showed to his children and his humor in handling “personal developments.” On one occasion he corrected a news report stating that the Rolling Stones was Margaret's favorite musical group. She liked the Beatles better, he noted, and then added, “But I hope she doesn't start seeing the Beatles.”<sup>13</sup>

However hard he tried to separate his public from his private life, it was clear that as prime minister Trudeau was becoming increasingly disengaged. His concentration fell, and aides saw his notes to them as lacking the “crisp correlations” and annotations previously found. He appeared to drift from the task undertaken, and then abruptly refocus his attention. During this third term, when he possessed a secure majority in the Commons and ought to have been at his peak as leader, he was too disturbed to devote full concentration to the challenges of his job, just at the point when his government was falling victim to one crisis after another. Clarkson and McCall, convinced that his marital problems affected his judgment, could not be more clear:

Since his pride prevented him from admitting even to his political intimates how beset he was at home, few people realized that what looked like indifference to the government's worsening situation was, in fact, distraction induced by emotional turmoil. Things fell apart for Trudeau in the period 1974 to 1979 in all the major area of his prime ministerial concerns.

John English agrees that although evidence is “mainly circumstantial [his] personal troubles had a definite impact on his political life.” After the announcement of their separation of May 30, journalists found him “unusually indecisive” after the 1974 election, with a loss

of temper, unpredictability, more curt to the press, “tense, uncertain, and difficult.”<sup>14</sup>

In the second half of 1974 the economy fell into a tailspin and continued to fall throughout the following year. As was the case in other industrialized lands, “stagflation” was the new enemy: while unemployment reached 7.1 percent of the labor force, inflation hit 9.7 percent. Productivity fell as strikes for higher wages (including those of federal civil servants who had won the right to withhold their labor) reached new records in terms of days lost. Finance Minister John Turner and the cabinet called for austerity measures with a “neutral” or balanced budget being the goal rather than higher taxes (because of falling profits) or price controls. Lengthy cabinet meetings were marked by intense debates. When the prime minister hesitated and sought independent economic advice behind Turner’s back, the government’s economic leadership, as Trudeau’s most recent biographer put it, “seemed in disarray—dispirited and uncertain.”<sup>15</sup>

Trudeau seemed puzzled by the growing demand for government action. He asked Canadians to compare their country with others in the aftermath of the Arab oil embargo. When a further drop in productivity worsened inflationary pressures, cabinet members overcame their leader’s hesitation to take action and began debating which strategies to take. On October 13, 1975, on the eve of the Canadian Thanksgiving, Trudeau went on television to warn the country of coming economic restraints, “the heaviest,” he said, “since the Second World War.” He then reluctantly announced the imposition of the mandatory wage and price controls that he had denounced when called for by his opponents the year before.<sup>16</sup>

It was harsh medicine, but it helped. The inflation that reached nearly 11 percent in 1975 fell to 7.5 percent in 1976 and hovered at 7.9 percent in 1977. But as he feared, both he and his government lost credibility by the reversal of course. In December 1975, he created an uproar when he said in a year-end TV interview that “we haven’t been able to make it work —the free market system”; that a future society might require more, not less government intervention; and that permanent price controls might be necessary. These remarks triggered near-hysteria in business circles, now convinced that Trudeau looked to European social democracy as a model. He recalled that he was “accused of everything from communism to fascism.”<sup>17</sup> Protests reverberated throughout 1976, including a massive strike on October 14, when a million workers protested wage controls. Many believed he

had known all along that controls were necessary, even when he had denounced them while campaigning, and his credibility plummeted.

Although a victory for Trudeau's Liberals, the 1974 election had enabled the provinces to strengthen their defenses against any assertion of power by the central government. The maritime states had fallen to the Conservative camp, and in the West the provincial Liberal parties were virtually wiped out. Then, two years later, on November 15, 1976, Lévesque's *Parti Québécois* won a surprise victory, getting 41 percent of the seats in the Quebec national assembly and ousting Robert Bourassa's Liberal government. Bourassa was replaced as party leader and premier by the austere, almost priest-like editor Claude Ryan. However much Lévesque, a former broadcast journalist, wanted to hold radical secessionists seeking political independence in check (a majority of Quebecers, more cautious, preferred compromise and only greater autonomy—not full independence—for the province) the victory nevertheless sent shock waves throughout the province—and the country. Separatism was back on the front burner.

Trudeau was charged with seizing on the issue to conceal his government's failure to solve pressing economic problems. Whether this was true or not, the Quebec problem became paramount as the PQ government began taking fast action. It quickly nationalized the asbestos mines of the American Johns Mansville company. More frighteningly for anglophones was a language law making French the province's only official language: it would be the sole language used in the legislature; others were restricted in education and commerce; and all signs were to be in French. English-speaking firms were ordered to set up programs of "francization." The Office de la Langue Française scoured the province for linguistic insults: public Merry Christmas wishes were removed; hamburgers became *ham bourgeois*; hot dogs, *chiens chauds*. In declaring the law "rigid, dogmatic and authoritarian," Ryan seconded Trudeau's fears about the "chauvinism" of the separatists. The racial basis of their movement was made clear for anglophone Quebec when Premier Lévesque dismissed a *Parti Québécois* by-election defeat in a prominently Jewish constituency of Montreal by commenting that its voters were not "authentically Québécois." English-speaking Quebecers emigrated in larger numbers, and more corporations moved their headquarters from Montreal to Toronto.

Events in the fall and winter of 1977–1978 doomed the national Liberal Party. Both inflation (resulting from higher food prices and

soaring wage settlements after controls were dropped) and unemployment worsened, and the Canadian dollar fell even further. The country seemed weary of Trudeau, and once the shock of November 15 (the PQ victory) faded, the weariness intensified. Tired of his preaching and the sacrifices that English Canadians felt they had made to keep Quebec happy, the “ingrates” there, as political scientist Jeffrey Simpson put it, “had turned around and slapped the country in the face.” The mood of English speakers was grim, and they held Trudeau and his earlier efforts to instill bilingualism as responsible.<sup>18</sup>

Whether responsible or not, he had clearly squandered his power. Within two years of his victory Trudeau’s popularity had fallen to its lowest level. A Gallup Poll taken in August 1976 gave him only a 29 percent approval rating. For journalist George Radwanski, the prime minister’s chief error lay in his postelection decision to devote his next year in office to clearing up the backlog of legislation and to formulating long-range plans. That, in turn, called for a low-key, barely visible government, one resembling that established in the post-1968 period.<sup>19</sup> Why had he chosen this subdued approach? To reward himself with a calmer year? Because of mounting marital problems and Margaret’s hospitalization?

There was also unhappiness in conservative quarters over the government’s foreign policy initiatives. In May 1968 Trudeau had called for a new realism in Canadian foreign policy. “We shall do more good,” he then said, “by doing well what we know to be within our resources to do, than to pretend either to ourselves or to others that we can do things clearly beyond our capacity.”<sup>20</sup> Some dramatic steps were nevertheless taken. The government not only recognized Communist China but deliberately sought to weaken Canada’s economic and cultural attachments to the United States. Trudeau had visited the Soviet Union in May 1971 and signed a friendship protocol. (Although not significant—the two countries only agreed to talk at regular intervals—the treaty was contrary to Washington’s wishes.) His government placed emphasis on protecting Canadian sovereignty rather than participating aggressively in Cold War containment, and to the chagrin of NATO had carried through the proposed cut in the modest Canadian presence in the armed forces made available to the alliance.

Although criticized in Canada for not condemning strongly enough the American presence in Vietnam (he did not think his criticism would have any effect in Washington), the Trudeau government continued to allow draft resisters from the United States to enter Canada. It had also condemned the 1970 invasion of Cambodia

and the resumption of bombing in North Vietnam in 1972. Yet the prime minister did not think it wise or productive to intervene in the Nigerian civil war, although he encouraged the raising of private funds to aid starving Biafrans. (When asked about the breakaway province of Biafra, he in turn had asked, "Where's Biafra," although he knew perfectly well.) And while objecting to South African racial policies, Canada maintained trade relations with the apartheid regime. Nor did his "realism" slacken when Canada continued to sell equipment to the United States for use in Vietnam. But like Sweden's Olof Palme, Trudeau became one of the most outspoken of northern heads of government when it came to advocating an improvement in North-South relations, in part because he too had lived and traveled in those countries and had seen their "misery." Yet the greatest foreign policy concern for his critics was their perception of the government's "incapacity" to meet the problem of American domination of the Canadian economy.

In 1948, 42 percent of all Canadian manufacturing was owned by nonresidents; by 1968 it was 58.1 percent (three-quarters of whom were in the United States), and the figure kept growing. By 1971, outsiders owned 99.7 percent of Canada's oil and coal (76.4 percent by firms and individuals in the United States), 82.3 percent of mineral fuels (67.1 percent by the United States), and 62.8 percent of mining (50.9 percent by the United States). Not surprisingly, foreign investment was greatest where the profits were highest, and one critic lamented that should the trend continue, "Canadians will be left in command of farming, fishing, and wood-chopping." Still, when asked in a television interview whether American domination of the economy hurt Canadians, Trudeau replied that he didn't think so. His explanation that American capital investment and associated technology accounted in large measure for his country's high standard of living rankled his critics. They also resented Canada's loss of its right to legislate for its own industry: Washington's Trading With the Enemy Act prevented any American subsidiary from dealing with North Korea, North Vietnam, China, or Cuba, unless the US State Department gave prior approval.<sup>21</sup>

In mid-1976 Trudeau's Liberals had three years remaining in their mandate. Joe Clark, elected Conservative party leader after Stanfield's 1974 defeat, was still enjoying his political honeymoon, and hardly anyone in the Liberal Party worried about the Tory lead in public opinion. The election of the *Parti Québécois* in November changed the fortune of the major parties only briefly inasmuch as most

English-speaking Canadians believed that Trudeau alone could (for some, might) prevent Quebec from leaving the Confederation. Three months after the PQ victory, the Liberals shot ahead of the Conservatives in the polls, widening their lead to more than 20 points in mid-1977.

Coutts sensed a massive majority if an early election were called. He and Davey, aware that their own polls confirmed public surveys showing the Liberals—if not the prime minister—with a huge lead in public esteem, counseled Trudeau to call a general election in the fall of 1977. Trudeau refused—his worst political decision according to biographer John English—a decision, said his press officer, “pushed on him by advisers who knew little of his inner life,” unaware that he simply lacked the will for “reasons of the heart” and after his separation needed time for himself. Trudeau admitted that he was in poor emotional shape to withstand the rigors of a campaign but argued that a compelling reason did not exist for going to the people. The prime minister and his close associates decided instead to rely on by-elections for 15 parliamentary vacancies. They proved a rout when the Liberals won only two of these seats. The opportunity for a smashing reelection victory vanished with his decision. As economic woes mounted and the impact of the PQ victory receded, the success gained four years ago was disintegrating. The government seemed doomed in a coming general election, required by law to be held in 1979. From the time of Trudeau’s decision not to call for an early vote to the general election, the Liberals suffered an irreversible decline in public support.<sup>22</sup>

For four years after 1976, Canadian political life was dominated by Trudeau and Lévesque, or more precisely, the struggle between them. René Lévesque, who had created the separatist *Parti Québécois* in 1968, knew that his election as provincial premier in 1976 made a mockery of Trudeau’s expressed certainty that separatism was dead. On the contrary, it was back with a vengeance, and Trudeau knew it. The prime minister’s critics repeatedly charged that he was using the federalist-provincialist battle, which was being played out in, but not limited to, Quebec, to hide his government’s failure to solve pressing economic issues. Yet Trudeau’s opposition to separatism was of long duration. As he had stated earlier, “Each man has his own reasons, I suppose, as driving forces, but mine were twofold. One was to make sure that Quebec would not leave Canada through separatism and the other was to make sure that Canada wouldn’t shove Quebec out through narrow-mindedness.”<sup>23</sup>

The air control dispute in 1976 illustrated how far-reaching and deeply rooted feelings were—on both sides. That summer francophone pilots in Quebec wanted the option of speaking French to French-speaking air traffic controllers, provided that both pilot and controller agreed. Anglophone pilots condemned the proposal, calling it a safety issue. Their francophone counterparts responded that their opponents were only interested in preserving their jobs and had showed disdain for the government's efforts to implement the Official Languages Act. A Quebec group representing French-speaking pilots and controllers then broke away from the Canadian Airline Pilots Association. A governmental commission of inquiry found that all over the world pilots spoke languages other than English when in their home countries and English only when flying international flights. Accordingly, it recommended the optional use of French at a few designated airports but not for international flights. The compromise satisfied neither side, and although the issue petered out, Jean Marchand charged Trudeau with selling out to anglophone bigotry and resigned from the cabinet. The affair damaged the government's credibility in Quebec: it was used by separatists as proof that the "Trudeauites" had failed to sell bilingualism to the West and that Canadians had still not accepted the French reality.<sup>24</sup>

Lévesque had promised a referendum on a move toward independence for Quebec. It provided for a transitional stage that he called "sovereignty-association," a Quebec loosely linked to Canada in much the same way as members of what was then called the "common market" were loosely connected to Europe but for all practical purposes remained sovereign nations. Worried Canadians looked to Trudeau to resolve the separatist issue. And here he showed considerable skill, appearing calm and conciliatory and avoiding a direct confrontation. The prime minister rejected special status or decentralization as alternatives for bilingualism, although many in Western Canada as well as in Quebec disagreed. He spoke of changing the constitution to guarantee that any citizen could be "at one and the same time, a good Canadian and a good Quebecer." (In a speech to the US Congress on June 28, 1978, he spoke of Quebec's separation as "a crime against the history of mankind" and against the Canadians' "holy mother, the nation.") And he was successful: popular sentiment in Quebec swung away from independence, and Lévesque had to postpone a referendum that he saw he could not win. But both he and Trudeau knew the problem had not gone away and that economic crises were putting limits on the prime minister's ability to act.<sup>25</sup>

By the late 1970s the glamour of the Trudeau regime was rapidly fading. The termination of wage and price controls in the spring of



1978 had little impact. Not only inflation but unemployment continued to rise. The budget deficit reached \$11.5 billion, the highest in Canadian history. English Canada was becoming increasingly disinclined to tolerate Trudeau's bilingual policy. In 1975 the provinces for the first time collectively spent more of the national product than did the federal government, and when acting together their power exceeded that of Ottawa. By 1979 all but one of the provinces had either Conservative or other opposition governments. The constant preoccupation with Quebec and the national government's perceived lack of sympathy for other provincial concerns had diminished his popularity in the West. It appeared that the majority reached in 1974 had owed less to enthusiasm for the Liberals than to dissatisfaction with Conservatives, and during the next five years Liberal fortunes continued to sink: the wage (if not the price) controls upset labor; government intervention in the economy upset business; and the attempts to impose Ottawa's will on the provincial governments upset voters in Western and Atlantic Canada.

Conservative Party leader Joe Clark was a likable young politician from the Canadian province of Alberta. A favorite of the West, he profited from the prime minister's apparent disregard of Western concerns, highlighted by the tactless comments made by Trudeau during the 1979 election campaign. The prime minister would tell a gathering in Quebec that "farmers are professional complainers. When there is too much sun, they complain. When there is too much rain, they complain. A farmer is a complainer."<sup>26</sup>

Beyond his dismissal of Western problems, the poor economy, and ten years in office, both an anti-French current and a "neoconservative" rejection of big government contributed to Trudeau's growing isolation within the government itself. His combative personality and political troubles had driven important ministers from his cabinet, including the popular John Turner. His friend Gerard Pelletier had left Ottawa to become Canada's ambassador to Paris, charged with defending the federalist position against Quebec's claims for treatment as an independent nation. His political mentor, Jean Marchand, in poor health and dismayed over the outcome of the air controllers' controversy, had resigned from the Ministry of Transport. Other loyal and experienced ministers, with connections to the business community, were preparing to leave.<sup>27</sup>

Finally, political scandals compounded Trudeau's—and his party's—worries. Two Liberal cabinet members were accused of trying to influence a federal judge, while a Liberal senator profited by holding shares in a company that won concessions at federal airports. Another Liberal minister sent his children's nursemaid home

to Scotland on a Defense Department plane. Most serious was the charge directed against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which enjoyed a reputation for integrity. It was revealed that for years the Mounties were engaged in illegal surveillance of suspected members of the Quebec separatist movement, including mail opening, wire-tapping, arson, and burglary.

A respite from his falling popularity took place after Margaret Trudeau left her husband in March 1977. For a time, sympathy for Trudeau's dignified response to her escapades swelled in Liberal ranks. No longer a wife, she had taken to hanging out at a Manhattan disco, Studio 54, where she was photographed with all the "beautiful people." Photographs of her partying half-naked enraged party members, who saw her behavior as a deliberate attack on her husband, even as an attempt to bring down the government. She had now left marijuana for cocaine, and agreed to write her memoirs to support the habit. A British press advanced her \$50,000 for *Beyond Reason* (a takeoff on Trudeau's motto, "reason above passion"), the scandalous memoir that would be published in April 1979, during the Canadian election campaign.

Her activities since the Rolling Stones episode two years earlier showed no signs of cooling down: there were well-publicized flights to New York, London, and Paris, as biographers Clarkson and McCall put it, "to try out men, jobs, and hallucinogens." When she was back in Ottawa there was continual quarreling over money and other matters, and "Trudeau's office staff could always tell from his distraught mood when she was home." Most consequential, her behavior left Trudeau disoriented. He found it difficult to cope with Margaret, all the more so when she alternated "outrageous behavior with poignant requests for understanding that neither husband nor friends knew how to meet."<sup>28</sup>

The possibility of a reconciliation had meant that Trudeau's political staff didn't know whether "the boss," as they called him, would be campaigning in the coming election. Still, they stuck to their game plan (based on the belief that Canadians personally preferred Trudeau to Clark regardless of party affiliation, although in March the two shared equal poll numbers), setting up public appearances and bolstering his ego. "Only you can save the country," they told him. Pepped up, he delivered a brilliant two-hour attack on the Conservatives in the Commons that mocked Clark's weaknesses and implicitly reminded Canadians that he remained the country's strongest leader. And in

interviews, he gave no quarter to prying reporters. "Question: 'What about your marital difficulties, Mr. Trudeau.' Answer: 'I'll tell you about my marital difficulties if you tell me about yours.'"<sup>29</sup>

As scheduled, in April Margaret Trudeau's *Beyond Reason*, written with the aid of a ghostwriter, was published in London and New York. (A second, more sober, memoir, *Consequences*, was to appear in 1982.) Part autobiography and part exposé of her marriage, it described her husband as "authoritarian, cold and stingy." Now, at a time when his political career was viewed as coming to an ignominious end, the spectacular nature of his marital breakdown was the subject of worldwide comment. Margaret Trudeau, who had run away from her husband and family two years before to "find herself," was busily engaged with the media in Canada and the United States as part of the promotion for the book about her life with Pierre. For weeks, Canadian newspapers carried stories about her international exploits as she described her inflated ambitions, her sexual encounters, and her experiences with drugs in the capitals of the world, in an exhibitionist display of self-engrossment that shamed her husband and their young children repeatedly. Her constant capering further damaged Trudeau's reputation as a political leader as well as his dignity. "How can you trust a man whose judgment of people is so bad?" columnists and talk show hosts kept asking. Because Margaret's memoirs disclosed intimate details of her life with Trudeau and her carryings on, her husband, trying to protect his children, admitted that he was hurt by the thought that someday they would be old enough to read "that book."<sup>30</sup>

In between book tours, Margaret took a holiday. Scheduled to go from London to the United States, she would avoid Canada and not "meddle" in the middle of an election campaign. Instead, as she admitted in the later memoir, she accepted an offer from Jorge, "the Peruvian racing driver I had met the summer before in London, to accompany him home to stay with his family and see something of South America."<sup>31</sup>

Going into the 1979 election, Trudeau knew that "it was bound to be a difficult fight." He had to call it with only four weeks left of a five-year term and later recalled that "many experts, including the premiers, were expecting us to lose." Clark had shown unexpected toughness in the House of Commons, often interrupting Trudeau. The prime minister traveled extensively during the campaign, warning listeners that the Parti Québécois held office in the province and

that hard decisions were required to prevent the separatists from succeeding in their efforts to dissociate themselves from the rest of Canada. Although he placed priority on the separatist issue, Trudeau supplied facts and figures to show that compared with rest of world, Canada, ranked first in job creation, had not done badly. But as he admitted, “you don’t win elections on what you’ve done, but on what people expect.”<sup>32</sup>

His analysis proved accurate. Canadians had tired of their charismatic prime minister. Margaret Trudeau’s own analysis accurately pointed to his arrogance, pride, “and increasingly lofty condescension,” which showed insensitivity to the mood of the country. While Clark displayed a much welcomed *bonhomie*, she wrote, “Pierre hardly bothered to move around or cooperate with journalists, making it perfectly clear that he thought Joe was no match for him and that he had nothing to fear. It was all gold for Joe Clark: all he had to do was sit around and pick up the anti-Trudeau vote.”<sup>33</sup>

A respected Toronto historian confirmed that in the spring of 1979 Trudeau knew he was going down in defeat. Kenneth McNaught wrote that although few Canadians thought much of Clark’s leadership potential, “Trudeau himself seemed weary, almost disenchanted, during the campaign.” With ten days to go in the campaign, he retreated to a hotel room to write the first of two speeches to be delivered on successive days in Montreal and Toronto. Aides rushed the handwritten drafts for typing, their hearts sinking as they previewed the text. Against all advice, he had decided to go down swinging on the one subject that mattered most to him in political life—the constitution. In both cities he gave lengthy but fascinating lectures on the need for Canada to bring the constitution home from Great Britain, thus allowing Canadians the right to amend it.<sup>34</sup>

By 1979, one observer commented that the Trudeau government had compiled “one of the most meager records of modern prime ministers,” charging that “bilingualism, Petro-Canada, some temporary increases in social spending, and the diplomatic recognition of mainland China was not that much for eleven years in office.”<sup>35</sup> The high inflation, which Trudeau tried but failed to contain with price and wage controls (that labor leaders found unfair and more effective in holding back union demands than in restraining prices), plus the sense of alienation that prevailed in Western Canada led to the Liberal defeat in 1979. Although the party got 4 percent more of the popular vote than in the previous election, it carried only one constituency west of Winnipeg. Ironically, it was Trudeau’s success in Quebec that led much of the West to believe that the separatist issue was essentially

defused and to give much of its support to the NDP, consequently depriving the Tories of a majority in the Commons.<sup>36</sup>

By the time of the 1979 election, noted political scientist Jeffrey Simpson, "the Liberal Party had exhausted most of the compelling ideas it had built up during the 1960s and early 1970s. The official languages act, new directions in foreign policy, and expanded and often innovative social programs were all initiatives taken during the early years of Trudeau's government." Of his 11 years in office, the second half had been "less fertile" and the last 2 "positively barren." The Liberals' fatigue, and most notably that of the prime minister himself, had made it difficult to address the three most pressing problems confronting the federal government:

national unity, the deteriorating fiscal position, and a growing dependence on imported oil ... In each area, the Liberals either let matters slide or launched a sudden policy initiative that was never followed by concerted pressure, leaving initially hopeful observers with the sad feeling of having witnessed just another partisan manoeuvre. The election of 1979 further illustrated the Liberals' lassitude. Unable to campaign on either a splendid record or fresh ideas for the future, the Liberals gambled everything on the solitary splendor of Pierre Trudeau's leadership.<sup>37</sup>

They knew that Clark himself was their best and only hope for victory. Only the leadership issue favored them, and even that required an isolation of Trudeau from his record. The party did all it could. Liberal ads showed the prime minister in his "gunslinger" pose, standing behind a single microphone, speaking defiantly to his audience about national problems with the caption: "A Leader Must Be A Leader." Every effort was made to place him in direct contrast to Clark. But although Trudeau defeated him decisively in a TV debate among party leaders, 11 years in office had taken too large a toll on the Liberals' credibility. Although voters saw Trudeau as best able to govern the country, by a significant margin Clark was perceived to be "the most principled, understanding and honest of the two." Trudeau's poll ratings slipped to a new bottom of 27 percent.<sup>38</sup>

Thus the Liberals went down in defeat in the vote of May 22, 1979. Conservatives won 136 seats, 6 short of a clear majority, and Joe Clark, not yet 40, became the youngest prime minister in Canadian history. Liberals performed well in the East but poorly west of Ontario,

and won only 114 seats (the NDP, 26). Although Trudeau himself was reelected as an MP, 14 members of his cabinet had lost their seats. Still, the party had avoided political destruction, thanks to its good showing in Quebec, for which Trudeau's colleague, Marc Lalonde (assigned Marchand's task of keeping the party organization in the province secure), and Trudeau's own residual appeal were responsible.

In the ballroom of Ottawa's Chateau Laurier hotel, Trudeau promised to fight again another day. That same night his wife was seen dancing the night away in New York. The picture of a grinning Margaret displayed the next morning in newspapers throughout the world, with arms waving and legs kicking, infuriated Liberals, who were ready to blame her for the disaster, however much she claimed she to be "stricken by his defeat, and [that] the shame, hurt and humiliation were mine just as much as his."<sup>39</sup> Trudeau was always sensitive to criticism of his marital problems and to press coverage of the extramarital liaisons of "the prime minister's estranged wife." It was from all this, as well as from the constraints of the job, that Trudeau felt liberated on the night of May 22.<sup>40</sup>

In his memoirs, Trudeau reaffirmed his intention to lead the opposition. "My first reaction, as always, was combative. I was not going to accept defeat and I would lead the fight, as leader of the Opposition, to come back."<sup>41</sup> Not only did he seem invigorated and willing to fight the Conservative government, his staff also felt confident of his return to office. By leaving a sign in the prime minister's office that read, "We'll be back" they hoped to intimidate the new head of government into believing that his tenure would be a short one. First, however, Trudeau would take some well-deserved time off. One observer vividly described his departure:

It was June 4, 1979, one of those sweet days of sunshine and the smell of cut grass that come late in the capital's brief spring. Earlier that day, Pierre Trudeau . . . jumped into his sports car and sped down the curving driveway towards apparent retirement. His parting words were "I'm free." When the Conservatives arrived several hours later, all handshakes and backslaps and smiles, it appeared that the Trudeau era in Canadian politics was over.<sup>42</sup>

But the worst was not behind him. His marriage came to an end in November, seven months after publication of *Beyond Reason*, although no divorce took place until 1984.

Although she "tried hard to fight it," Margaret was stricken by what she called "the prickling realization that I was partly to blame

for Pierre's defeat." However much she ignored press comment on her life, she was aware of the question circulating in Ottawa during the campaign: "Has Pierre Trudeau's private life affected his judgment? Is a man who has spent eight years married to a woman like Margaret actually capable of leading Canada?" The "Margaret factor," she had read in one newspaper, might possibly decide the results. Characteristically, she admitted, "Pierre never uttered the least reproach. The defeat, he assured me, was entirely his own responsibility . . . [Pierre] is also the most tolerant person I have ever met." But "it was impossible for [her] not to brood," and she felt "increasingly distraught" when thinking of the impending departure from Sussex Drive.<sup>43</sup> Regardless of any feelings of guilt and despite his request she never tell the story, she then gave an interview describing a horrific abortion undertaken as a college freshman in the September issue of *Playgirl* magazine, an account that left much of the country disgusted. Only in the months and years that followed did she began to straighten out her life, kick the cocaine habit, and with the royalties from her book buy a modest house in Ottawa. In 1984 she would marry Ottawa real-estate dealer Fred Kemper and with him have a son and daughter. Pierre, however, remained single.

Nine days after the new prime minister took office, the unfavorable view of Clark's leadership skills had not changed. The Conservatives' polling expert, Allan Gregg, wrote a long memorandum tracing the public perception of Clark and ended with a warning: "[Clark] suffered primarily from being perceived as unqualified to assume the senior office of government, as uninformed and lacking strength. In fact, it may not be an exaggeration to suggest that a national leader has rarely, if ever, assumed office with lower expectations concerning his ability to govern."<sup>44</sup> To the extent that this was true, his predecessor's comeback, should he attempt it, was a matter of time.

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## TRUDEAU

## INTERMENT

For the first time in 11 years, Trudeau was not the prime minister of Canada. Feeling it necessary to get “back to the basics” and with no more official papers to read or letters to sign, he took the summer off “to rest and reflect.” He took an arduous canoe trip in the Northwest Territories, “indulging once again the love of canoeing I have had all my life, paddling all day for a week with men twenty to thirty years younger.” Together with his three sons, he then went out west to the Rockies by train to visit the national parks. And in September he was off to Tibet, growing a beard in the process. The summer of 1979, he recalled, was really “the first time since 1968 I was free to do what I wanted,” and he relished his newly found independence.<sup>1</sup>

Before his departure, Trudeau gave a single press conference. Questioned about his future, he brazenly asserted: “My judgement, as of now, is that I am the best [possible leader of the Liberal Party].” Still, as he later acknowledged, he was torn in two directions: voted out, he could stay out and spend more time with his sons. And concern for his personal life weighed heavily: “I could imagine someone else being prime minister, but I couldn’t imagine anyone else being the father of my children.” On the other hand, the decision of several Liberal MPs that it was time for Trudeau to go and for them to choose his successor rekindled the combative spirit in him, provoking him to stay on and fight. Despite assurances to the contrary, he was unsure of what he would do.<sup>2</sup> Aware that he could never distance his sons from their mother if they all resided in the same city and preferring a French-speaking ambience, Trudeau began searching for a house in distant Montreal if and when he retired. “Typically,” Margaret wrote,

“he settled on the only house in Montreal that has been designated an historical site, an art deco mansion designed by the Quebec architect responsible for Ottawa’s Supreme Court.”<sup>3</sup>

The newly elected prime minister, Joseph Clark, delayed the opening of Parliament for over four months while his fledgling cabinet prepared to govern. Trudeau would have to face the House of Commons in the unaccustomed roles of leader of the official opposition and the nation’s most famous cuckold. When the parliamentary session finally got underway on October 9, Liberal backbenchers cheered his attacks both on Clark’s belief in Canada as a “community of communities” and the new prime minister’s proposed sale of Petro-Canada. They ridiculed the Tories’ pledge to move the Canadian Embassy to Jerusalem (to win the support of Jewish voters). Yet Trudeau’s appearances in the House of Commons were infrequent. During October and early November, he attended sessions only about a fifth of the time, and his performance, apart from a powerful Leaders’ Day speech, was widely described as “lackluster.” Clark, who had (narrowly) captured his party’s leadership in 1976 largely because he was an acceptable second choice to more delegates than any of his rivals, did not preside over a unified party. Yet Trudeau was not inspired to take an aggressive stand, explaining that his successor should be given a chance. The fractious Conservatives ranged from so-called Red Tories, who saw the state as a necessary vehicle to solve social problems, to hardline free enterprisers. Although the party had become more tolerant of French language rights than under Stanfield, for many Quebecers they remained the party of *les anglais*.<sup>4</sup>

Regardless of—for some, because of—Clark’s kindly and courteous manner, even several within his party were calling him a “wimp.” The last Conservative to head the government, John Diefenbaker (in the 1960s), did not believe that Clark was up to the job. When asked how he might perform as prime minister, Diefenbaker had replied that the job was not for any “passing Joe.” The remark was picked up by the *Toronto Star*, whose headline after Clark’s becoming leader ran, “Joe Who?” And Clark was never able to convince Canadians that he knew where the country should be headed. Certainly he lacked Trudeau’s intellectual power, and in contrast to Trudeau (who concealed his unfamiliarity on a subject with a display of abstract philosophy), would stumble for a reply. Also in contrast to the dashing Trudeau, who wore a rose in his lapel, could dress elegantly, and used superb body language, Clark was unathletic, stuffy, awkward in

appearance, and possessed an undistinguished background with no experience outside of politics and none in foreign affairs. Nor could his party, so long out of power, point to recent accomplishments. Instead, they relied on promises, ranging from increased spending intended as incentives for tar-sands plants in Alberta, enriched veterans' pensions, and moving the Canadian embassy in Israel, to various tax cuts such as mortgage-interest and property-tax deductibility (to attract upper-middle-class suburbanites). These promises proved difficult to keep. Their 1979 success—after 16 years in opposition—was largely a protest victory reflecting a widespread desire for change. And it was made possible by winning the support of disaffected Liberals and left-leaning New Democrats whose allegiance would be kept only by offering them measures they found attractive.<sup>5</sup>

If at first glance Trudeau had seemed ready to lead the opposition, as the weeks passed both his colleagues and Trudeau himself began to question his motivation to remain in politics. Many within his party observed that he was struggling with his new role as opposition leader. The militants among them were decidedly unhappy. For years Trudeau had treated them as ignorant foot soldiers expected to mobilize for elections and acquiesce to the party leader in between them. Now they were insisting on their right to be heard. There was much grumbling in Liberal ranks over Trudeau's leadership, or the lack thereof. A group of party reformers, including former ministerial assistants and other activists left frustrated by Trudeau, wanted to discuss the party's future, especially ideological renewal. They invited over two hundred militants, including MPs and former ministers, to a weekend thinkfest in Winnipeg. Conspicuously absent was Trudeau himself, his senior policy adviser, his former campaign manager, and his principal secretary. Although the former prime minister attended some party meetings in the early fall, his participation in them appeared half-hearted. He missed another important gathering, a second weekend meeting of British Columbia Liberals in Vancouver, pleading that he had the flu. (He was spotted in a New York nightclub with a date.) It seemed certain that the national executive, at its next meeting on November 24, would call for a party convention in the spring to vote on the leadership and that Trudeau would suffer the humiliation of having to fight to retain his post.<sup>6</sup>

Margaret commented that he was withdrawn and intermittently depressed. Although he had kept the office used when prime minister (turned down by Clark on grounds that it was too small), he went there less and less often, preferring to delegate the minor tasks required of opposition leaders to aides and vanish into the country.

The defeat, she said, seemed to have aged him, and she was not sure how long he would last in politics. Trudeau's principal secretary, James Coutts, provided encouragement: if he played his cards right, the Tories would be defeated and he'd be prime minister again. Coutts had bluntly told him to keep the beard he had grown if he wanted to signal that he was out for good, but if he thought that he might want to stay on, to shave it off.<sup>7</sup>

Trudeau responded listlessly (although the beard went). He later admitted that he had not been "overly combative" or even effective as opposition leader. Despite a rising Liberal lead in the polls—which in part stemmed from Clark's difficulties in persuading conservative Albertans from having their oil move to world price levels—an indifferent Trudeau wanted an election postponed for another year. He could only hope that Canadians would prefer his "strong-Canada" philosophy to Clark's "strong-provinces" philosophy and come back to the Liberal fold. But he was not thirsting to come back himself and, as the fall advanced, was leaning toward retirement.

In late November, at a Liberal Party convention in Toronto, he seemed to have come to a decision. Refreshed by his newfound freedom, he could no longer see himself returning to power and accordingly announced his intention to resign as party leader—and consequently as leader of the opposition. Believing himself incapable of rebuilding the party and preparing a new relationship between Ottawa and the provinces, six months after his defeat Trudeau decided to leave political life. That his intention was sincere was shown by his meeting with Donald MacDonald, a former leading anglophone minister in Trudeau's cabinet, seen as a sign of support for MacDonald's candidacy as Trudeau's successor.

Early in the morning of November 21, he called his key staff to the office on the third floor of Parliament's Centre Bloc to tell them of his decision to step down as party leader. All of Coutts's best efforts to persuade him to stay on had failed. At ten o'clock he told a few MPs the same thing. When Quebec members asked that he remain as party chief until the referendum on Quebec separation, scheduled by Lévesque for the spring, took place, Trudeau replied that he could be heard as an ordinary citizen of the province. In a hastily called press conference, he made a short statement in both English and French reaffirming his decision. He ended smilingly paraphrasing Nixon's parting words to reporters: "I'm kinda sorry I won't have you to kick around anymore."<sup>8</sup> When the reporters present spontaneously

applauded, Trudeau seemed surprised. Later that afternoon, when he received a five-minute standing ovation in the House, he sat with his face in his hands. When he finally he left Parliament Hill shortly before 4 P.M., he looked broken and tired, his gaze blank and his age showing. Some said all this was feigned, but those who saw the stooped silhouette knew it was real. That Margaret only learned of his decision through a reporter asking her how she felt about it left her enraged. Yet she was not surprised. Throughout the summer and early autumn of 1979, she recalled that Trudeau had become "increasingly despondent about the powerlessness of an opposition leader. He felt, I think, that there was no real role for him in the political future of the country. And he was sixty-one. If he was to have any other sort of future himself, now was the time to begin it."<sup>9</sup> That the breakup of his marriage may have contributed to his despondency did not seem to have occurred to her.

Whether anticipated or not, his resignation stunned the country. The Trudeau era had lasted 11 years, and Canadians, whatever their feelings, had gotten used to him. Editorialists paid respects, although for many the tone was grudging and comments made that the promise was not fulfilled. The Trudeau era, one had to believe, was finally over.

That autumn he anguished over his children's problems in dealing with their parents' separation. Jeered in school about their mother's behavior and their father's fall from office, "they seemed distraught as they bounced back and forth from Stornoway, the official residence provided for the opposition leader, to Margaret's new house in New Edinburgh and as the hostility between their parents, which had long been played down in front of them, was now openly expressed." The family's troubles mounted when Margaret Trudeau began taking mood-altering drugs as a prescribed therapy for her problems. She had reason to worry. Her financial situation was precarious since her husband refused to continue support money and her publishers had gone bankrupt, thereby stopping the royalties owed for her memoir.<sup>10</sup>

Trudeau's biographer(s) credit loyal political advisers such as Tom Axworthy and especially James Coutts for his comeback. The former Toronto management consultant who became the prime minister's principal secretary, who had traveled the country with Trudeau and helped him stage his 1974 victory, was downcast at his employer's decision to resign but was determined to return him to power. "We were defeated, not destroyed," Coutts insisted. Aware that chances of a Liberal victory in 1979 were almost nil, he had been equally

determined to keep the Tories from winning an absolute majority. Counting on the trust placed by Canadians in the Liberal Party for over 40 years because of their managerial competence and their doubts about the Conservatives' shaky young leader, he had worked to keep Liberal losses to a minimum. Even though Liberals won 22 fewer seats than the Tories on May 22, they had lost all but 2 of them by less than a thousand votes and pulled 40 percent of total vote. He had advised Trudeau to keep a low profile during the summer of 1979 while Clark was savoring his victory in the press and with the public. Coutts argued that the opposition leader's office should operate like that of a prime minister in exile. Together with Axworthy, a political scientist from Winnipeg and an expert in Liberal Party history, he proposed the make-up of a shadow cabinet and caucus policy committees intended to energize the Liberal MPs while in opposition. He repeatedly provided assurances that the Clark government would defeat itself.<sup>11</sup>

As early as September 1979, Trudeau heard that Clark was having "difficulties" in getting organized to govern, the reason why it took the Tory leader until October to call the legislature into session (his party had won the election in May). It was evident that Clark was confronting political problems, not surprising for a party long out of power. But his government was using up time, and speed was critical for public support to continue. Not only throughout his campaign but after it as well, Clark had to contend with the omnipotent figure of Pierre Trudeau. The public, even that part hostile to Trudeau, remained fascinated by him and could not help but contrast the new prime minister with his inspiring and charismatic predecessor.

In his memoirs, Trudeau mentioned the lack of organization within the Clark government as having affected his decision to resign his leadership post. "In fact one reason I resigned in November was because I thought Clark's government would be defeated in Parliament by the spring, and I wanted the Liberal party to have enough time to hold a leadership convention and choose my successor before that took place."<sup>12</sup> It's probably more accurate to say that Trudeau was ready to step down as leader, and the fact that Clark was having problems did not coax him to stay. If it pushed him to announce his resignation as leader earlier so his party could reorganize before new elections took place, Trudeau was in for a surprise. The new administration would not even make it to the spring.

By the time Parliament had reconvened, Clark's image as a "wimp" was etched on the public mind because of the problems faced in fulfilling his election promises. His pledge to stimulate the economy by

lowering taxes was upset by his own finance minister, John Crosbie, who had been converted by officials in the Department of Finance to a more realistic outlook. (Coming as he did from the economically distressed province of Newfoundland, Crosbie was disinclined to surrender needed welfare programs.) The promise to move the Canadian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem foundered on threats of retaliation by the Arab oil states. (The Arab Monetary Fund, in a largely symbolic move, withdrew its capital from Canadian banks.) An attempt to privatize the state oil company, Petro-Canada, came up against the stubborn opposition of bureaucrats in the Energy Department, who were concerned about the need to offset the impact of yet another OPEC crisis that had broken out earlier in the year.

Regarding the constitutional issue, Clark had wanted to have Ottawa play no part in the referendum on separatism-association that Lévesque had promised for 1980. The new head of government preferred what Kenneth McNaught called “an overly expansive view of provincial powers.”<sup>13</sup> Put in a larger perspective, Clark was unable to deliver quickly the cooperative federal-provincial relationship (marked by the slogan that Canada was a “community of communities”) that he had vowed would replace Trudeau’s confrontational federalism. Western Canada was unenthusiastic, and Clark was unable to stand up to the scornful belligerence of the Conservative premier of energy-rich Alberta. (His newfound readiness to yield to that premier’s demands for increased oil prices angered the Conservative premier of the industrial province of Ontario.)

When Parliament finally met in October, Liberals had to adjust to an opposition role. Many MPs still called Trudeau prime minister. They took Clark at his word when he said he intended to govern as though his party had an absolute majority, that is, hang on to office for at least two years. Either unaware or skeptical of the Coutts-Axworthy plan for restoring Trudeau to power, they also believed the media was correct in estimating that Trudeau was finished, but even had they known, they would have dismissed the plan as wishful thinking. On the other hand, left alone by business lobbyists, Liberal MPs relished being able to go on the attack. And they grew bolder as the inexperienced Tories struggled to realize such conservative ideas as the privatization of Crown corporations or fulfill such contradictory promises as giving home-owners mortgage payment relief while at the same time reducing budget deficits. Only four months after his defeat in the election, Trudeau was again rising in public opinion polls.

The inexperienced Clark made a series of foreign and domestic policy mistakes. The proposed move of the Canadian embassy to

Jerusalem set off an international firestorm, and the government was forced to scrap it. The austerity budget and the proposed privatization of Petro-Canada proved unpopular. The most serious error was a proposed increase in the federal gasoline tax (as well as new taxes on smoking and drinking) designed to extend Ottawa's share of windfall oil profits and use the additional revenue to pay off the federal budgetary deficit. In contrast, in a speech to the Halifax Board of Trade made before his resignation, Trudeau had promised a comprehensive energy policy that included a made-in-Canada blended price, energy security, greater conservation, and stepped-up "Canadianization" of energy resources. Full-page ads in the press containing the text of his energy speech let it be known that the Liberals could run things more effectively. Still, Clark and the Conservatives remained confident that without Trudeau to contend with they would prevail in the coming (December) vote on the budget.

Trudeau's decision to leave remained firm. That his marriage to Margaret had reached its breaking point was no coincidence. He had completed negotiations for the purchase of the house in Montreal, and he planned to live there with his three sons. Aware that anti-Trudeau feelings ran strong in English-speaking Canada, many Liberals had welcomed the decision. Attractive likely successors in the person of former ministers Donald MacDonald and John Turner might enable the party to regain strength in the West, hold on to Quebec, and with Clark's popularity waning, perhaps defeat the Conservatives in a no-confidence vote and in the election that would necessarily follow..

Then, in a surprise move, on December 10, former finance minister John Turner, now in private law practice, announced that he would not seek the Liberal leadership. Many believed that his chances had been excellent, and Trudeau's resignation coupled with Turner's refusal pointed to a hopelessly leaderless Liberal party. This further emboldened the Conservatives and reinforced their belief that Liberal MPs would not vote against their budget because they would not consider competing in an election without a leader. The Clark administration consequently decided to hold the controversial budget vote at once, and on the next day, December 11, the Liberals got the gift they were looking for. Conservative finance minister Crosbie unveiled the budget that left Coutts ecstatic. It called for an 18-cent tax on fuel, which would worsen the impact left by already high crude oil prices. If the Liberals could call for a motion of no-confidence on the budget and get all of their MPs to attend and vote, they might overturn the



government. Allan MacEachen, the Liberal House leader and a fervent Trudeau supporter, would work to ensure the presence of every Liberal member.

The following evening, the House heard details of the Conservatives' "face-the-facts" budget. If fiscally sound (the fuel charges would finance tax credits for mortgage payments and property rates), it benefitted middle-class home-owners at the expense of working-class renters and gave the Liberals an issue. To enact the measure, Conservatives needed the support of the left-wing New Democratic Party, which was highly unlikely given the regressive nature of the budget. Clark's own legislative assistant, Nancy Jamieson, warned of disaster but was not listened to. With one exception, every Liberal member showed up (one was brought from an Ottawa hospital by ambulance) to defeat the budget by six votes, forcing the Conservatives to dissolve Parliament and call an election.

Trudeau had told the Liberal caucus that while they should of course vote against the budget (and as an MP did so himself), in the event of victory they must not count on him once more to lead the party. He was still determined to leave politics behind.

On December 12, the Liberal Party caucus held its Christmas party. Flush from the well-stocked bar and the excitement of the impending leadership race, the delegates waited for Trudeau, who would be receiving a Christmas-retirement gift. He arrived at 9:15, but remained for only 20 minutes, long enough to receive his gift, a chain saw "to cut down the government," said the master of ceremonies. A smiling Trudeau accepted it with a few words of appreciation and left. The November Gallup Poll, published a few days before and showing a sharp drop in Conservative support, had not changed his mind about retiring. After "hovering" around 36 percent in summer and fall, it had fallen to 28 percent, 19 points behind the Liberals. However, not everyone took the numbers seriously. Gallup polls were known to show a big swing in public opinion and then a swing back the following month. But Coutts and Senator Keith Davey, the party's 1979 campaign chair, noted that Gallup confirmed their own private polls.<sup>14</sup>

In retrospect, Trudeau wondered why Clark hadn't postponed the vote. The former prime minister speculated that his successor had either doubted that the leaderless Liberals would have the nerve to challenge him and risk another electoral loss, or he believed that if he did lose in Parliament he would win in the popular election afterward. On his defeat, Clark set the federal election for February 18, 1980. Trudeau acknowledged that there were those who thought he

had manipulated these events and that his resignation was a ploy to induce false confidence in Clark. He denied that he was that cunning and insisted that it was not until the very morning of the day that he came back as leader, December 17, that he knew he wanted to.

In the party caucus held the day after the fateful budget vote, Liberals had discussed the leadership question. When consulted, Trudeau appeared noncommittal and only suggested that a secret ballot be held. Understandably, some found the former prime minister determined not to return; others believed that he would be amenable to a draft; and still others felt that he was truly undecided and required persuasion. However, party members in English Canada made it clear that they didn't think they could win under Trudeau.

Three years had passed since his separation from Margaret. He had resigned as leader and had made the choice to leave politics. What would it take to make him return? For Trudeau the answer was found in the tale of a Chinese provincial prime minister. As he told interviewers

[I decided] if the party wanted me back I was ready to come back. In saying "the sovereign will have to ask me three times on bended knee," I was quoting an old Chinese legend about a mandarin being asked to return to his post and responding that he would only come if the emperor would ask him on his knees three times. I didn't want to come back unless I was asked three times, that is, unless I was absolutely certain that I was wanted. I counted that as having happened when I was asked by the caucus, the national executive, and my close colleagues, Coutts, MacEachen, Davey and the rest.<sup>15</sup>

In an afternoon session and after an impassioned speech by MacEachen to avoid a bitterly contested leadership battle, the caucus voted to ask Trudeau to return to the leadership. Two possible successor candidates, MacDonald and John Turner (again), agreed that if he did so they would step aside.

Trudeau now considered his options. After serving for more than a decade as prime minister of Canada, he had suffered the first defeat of his political career. But the polls were telling him that he and his party could win the forthcoming election and erase the loss. Moreover, he was not happy with possibility of a Turner draft. The former finance minister had quit Trudeau's cabinet in 1975 over the question of price controls and held a different view of the country's future. And lurking on the horizon was the impending Quebec referendum on separation, for Trudeau the most significant issue of all.

Realizing that the 1979 elections had removed the strongest proponent of federalism from power, Lévesque had felt it opportune to prepare the referendum that would ask the people of Quebec whether they wanted to empower provincial officials to begin negotiations on independence. (His decision inadvertently strengthened support for Trudeau on the part of those who feared the breakup of Canada.) Would Trudeau's long-standing opposition to separatism persuade him to return as party leader (and prime minister in the event of a Liberal victory at the polls) in order to fight it more effectively? If successful, he would end his career as a winner. Moreover, he enjoyed holding power and believed in his ability to use it on behalf of the nation. On the other hand, with Margaret no longer there to guide them in their formative years, his sons needed him. In Montreal he would have more time for them. And of course he had already announced his decision to leave politics.

Coutts pleaded with an uncertain Trudeau. On December 18, he urged the ex-leader to: fight Lévesque on the referendum, then move on to the constitutional issue he had proposed in the spring campaign, and then retire. Finally, at a televised press conference later that day Trudeau stated that he wanted another chance at leadership. He had made up his mind. Was he persuaded by Coutts? Or had he decided when the Clark government's downfall became apparent? Certainly he had wanted to give the impression that he had never actively sought power but that it was thrust upon him. Years later, when talking about what motivated him to withdraw his resignation and return to political life in 1979, he explicitly rejected the allegation that he was involved in a conspiracy to regain power and underlined the need to fight Levesque for the hearts and minds of French Canadians. In a conversation in June 1985 he insisted that his resignation from the party leadership had been sincere.

It had something to do with my family, with the hope that once out of politics, things might ... Well, the less said about that the better. What was of real importance was my recognition that I'd had my chance. From the time of my taking this decision [to resign] and the actual event, Clark brought down his budget ... At the same time Lévesque had made it clear the referendum was at last going to be held. It was almost as though Lévesque was timing the referendum for when I was gone ... [I decided] if the party wanted me back I was ready to come back.<sup>16</sup>

Fourteen years after entering the political arena, Trudeau was still fixated on the federalist-separatist struggle. He was convinced that Lévesque planned to delay the referendum until Trudeau was no

longer on the scene. The former prime minister's assessment that he had "beaten them at their own game when I decided to come back, and that's largely why I did so" is entirely credible. One of the chief arguments used by his friends to persuade him to return was that as prime minister he could fight (separatism) more effectively. That struggle overrode all other considerations, including the faint, and doubtless vain, hopes he still nurtured of reviving his marriage. This was the last best chance that history was offering him, and he seized it.

The decision had been a difficult one. There was the famous walk the night of December 17 trying to make up his mind, and he went to bed having decided against a comeback. But on awakening the next morning, he concluded that he had made the wrong decision and was going to reverse it. He telephoned Jim Coutts (who had prepared two texts: one if Trudeau was returning, the other if not) to tell him, "Okay, we're doing it."<sup>17</sup>

Later, in a press conference theater he told the nation,

[T]his was the single most difficult decision I have ever made. I decided last night, after two days of long consultation with friends and colleagues in the caucus and the party, that because Canada faces serious problems, because the Government has been defeated and because our party faces an election, my duty is to accept the draft of my party—that duty was stronger even than my desire to continue with my plan to re-enter private life.<sup>18</sup>

He had not added that he had not liked references made after his resignation to him as having failed to live up to anticipations and that he was now given a second chance.

Listening to the press conference in London, Ontario, Prime Minister Joe Clark, convinced that the forthcoming election would be a repeat of the 1979 campaign, was delighted. René Lévesque, who on hearing of Trudeau's resignation as party leader had already started preparations for the long-awaited referendum designed to further Quebec separatism, decided to push forward with it.

## TRUDEAU

### RESURRECTION

Trudeau's decision on December 18 to reenter politics put an end to any lingering hopes the couple might have had that the marriage could be saved. A cataclysmic quarrel with Margaret convinced both that it was indeed over, and all that remained was to decide on the future of their children. The two defeats, political and matrimonial—and both clearly related—seemed to have humbled him; his attitude changed, and much of the arrogance previously displayed disappeared. When in 1980 he appeared ready to fight to bring the Liberals back to power, his campaign staff found him energetic, responsive, and unusually cooperative. He listened to and accepted advice ranging from what clothing to wear to which campaign strategies to follow.<sup>1</sup>

The challenges that he faced seemed to have furthered the transformation. From despondent and depressed, he became, seemingly overnight, once more an eager combatant, and this time waged an astute campaign. He gave an excellent opening speech, making no promises beyond that of getting the country running efficiently again. Then he set off on a tour that included the smaller towns where he remained highly regarded. Wherever he stopped, crowds came out to wish him luck.

As with the 1974 election all now swung his way. Seven months earlier Clark had been able to sit back and pick up the anti-Trudeau vote. Their roles were now reversed. Six months of a Conservative government under a man who spent his time either entertaining or listening to advice that invariably turned out to be wrong had convinced most Canadians that they again required a prime minister who knew his own mind, who did his homework, and who worked 16 hours a day—not because he was a workaholic but because he believed that it was the duty of the prime minister to be one step ahead of everyone else.

Lévesque's proposed referendum, scheduled for May, strengthened Trudeau's support throughout the country. Some of those who had voted against him, thinking the separatist danger had ended, now openly missed his voice. Having remained fixated on the federalist-separatist struggle for nearly a decade and a half after entering the political arena, it was scarcely surprising that he would seize "this last best chance that history was offering him." It was indeed his "magnificent obsession."<sup>2</sup>

Liberals did not even try to draft much of a platform: they only promised to prevent the price of oil from rising as fast as Clark seemed prepared to let it rise. They appeared content to rest on the dismal performance of an aborted Tory regime. The Clark-led parliament had enacted only six bills and all of them were minor, ranging from postal rate hikes to changes in tariff rates with New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa. As an observer noted, it was "hardly a record on which re-elections are won."<sup>3</sup>

The strategy called for by Trudeau's advisors proved sound. In the vote cast February 18, 1980, the Liberals won 146 seats, the Conservatives, 103, and the NDP, 32. If the party performed poorly in the West, where his bilingualist policies were still resented (Liberals won only 2 of 75 seats in the four western provinces), they got overwhelming support in Quebec, where they received 68 percent of the Quebec vote and 73 of the province's 74 seats. At Ottawa's Château Laurier hotel, Trudeau opened his victory speech with a ringing "welcome to the eighties." The size of the victory portended what might happen in the long-postponed referendum later that year. In winning, Trudeau joined John A. Macdonald and Mackenzie King as the only Canadian prime ministers to have been voted back in office after losing an election.<sup>4</sup>

Conservatives lost chiefly because Clark had been told to reverse his poor image by not yielding on the government's tax proposals. Because Trudeau's resignation left the Tory government confident of victory, Clark had not believed that his firm stand on higher taxes would cost him votes. Yet his party's own polling showed that hostility to Trudeau had largely subsided and that by a three to one margin the public considered Trudeau as better prepared to handle both domestic and foreign challenges. Furthermore, the prime minister had alienated the civil service. Because Trudeau had politicized it more than ever (promoting friends or civil servants he liked in the conviction that politicians, not civil servants, made policy), dismayed Conservatives had vowed they would make heads roll if they won. Understandably, the threat upset government workers and left them fearful of losing their jobs.<sup>5</sup>

The Conservatives also lost because of the effectiveness of Trudeau's campaigning. The theatrics of the 1979 campaign had vanished. Following the strategy called for by his advisors, Trudeau was determined to place emphasis on Clark's weaknesses and not on himself. Consequently, he gave the same dull speech at every stop, although uncomfortable doing it, and made no specific commitments that the Liberals might later regret. The media had either to cover Trudeau's attacks on the Conservatives or minimize their coverage of his activities, both of which choices were desired by party strategists. If reporters found themselves bored, so much the worse for them. In the fifth week of the campaign 29 exasperated journalists signed a petition asking Trudeau to hold a press conference. Finally he did so, but by then the Liberals had profited from the voters' negative impression of Clark. It is also true that Trudeau far exceeded his Conservative opponents, whether Stanfield or Clark, in his ability to project himself on television. Thus the Liberals' energy policy was left deliberately vague; they only promised a "made in Canada" price for oil and no increase in the gas tax. They also promised greater Canadian control of the economy, but, again, without providing any specific plans. Unlike his 1979 campaign, when he spoke often on the need for national unity, Trudeau largely avoided the subject. Relying on extensive polling, Liberals instead placed emphasis on Clark's flip-flopping, and particularly his shifts on Petro-Canada. Their television ads showed pictures of the prime minister and made repeated use of his name, as, for example, referring to their opponents as "Joe Clark Conservatives," to put the spotlight on him.

Frustrated Conservatives hoped for a rerun of 1979, when Trudeau drew as much attention to himself as possible. They tried to take advantage of the Liberals' new self-effacing strategy. Rather than as "the gunslinger" setting off "to shoot anybody he could find," he was now portrayed as "the fugitive," trying "to sneak in and out of town before anybody can notice." Certainly he was unwilling to speak about the issues he cared most about: national unity, patriation, and other constitutional questions. Hesitant to open a rift between himself and Quebec Liberal leader Claude Ryan, whose views on Quebec's future role in the Confederation he opposed, and reluctant to divert attention from his attacks on the Conservatives, Trudeau avoided the coming Quebec referendum. Only on one occasion, at Newfoundland Memorial University in St. John's, did he speak from the heart. But the question here was one of offshore resources, an entirely different matter. Newfoundland was excited about the prospect of fabulous wealth off its coast. Clark agreed that coastal provinces should control

offshore energy resources just as the provinces held jurisdiction over resources within their land boundaries. Trudeau, however, was straightforward: ownership of offshore resources could be decided only by Canada's Supreme Court. Until it ruled, the federal government could not give away a constitutional power that it might not possess. Until the jurisdictional issue was settled, Trudeau suggested that Ottawa retain jurisdiction but grant Newfoundland maximum benefits from its oil and natural gas until the province's per-capita income rose above the national average. In his remarks on this matter he showed himself as passionate, even eloquent:

At this stage of my political career, I'm not going to change my tune. I want to offer you a larger vision and a grander dream. It's a vision where [Canadians] grow strong by helping each other ... As a politician, the easiest thing for me would be to offer a future in which Newfoundland would be fabulously wealthy ... Well, that wouldn't be Canada ... And that's why the Liberal Party is not asking you to choose between Newfoundland and Canada. And in my province, in my whole career, I've been telling my people that they don't have to choose between Quebec and Canada. You choose the better of both worlds: a stronger Newfoundland in a stronger Canada.

Thus, he defended a larger vision of Canada as a nation, neither "*deux nations*," nor a compact of provinces, the "community of communities," as Clark put it. But this appeal to national unity proved the exception, and in the days that followed Trudeau went back to giving listless, flat speeches.<sup>6</sup>

Whether because of a newly acquired flexibility and responsiveness to his handlers or luck in his choice of opponents, or both, Trudeau was given another chance, and in his final term in office, from 1980 to 1984, he was to fulfill almost all his hopes. He knew that he would not face the voters again, and hence the need to take advantage of his electoral success and transform Canada more dramatically than perhaps any of his predecessors. He would achieve victories in the Quebec Referendum; establishing a Canadian—not a British—Constitution, a national energy policy, and immigration initiatives. There would also be a dramatic peace mission and a role for Canada in a "North-South" dialogue between the rich and poor nations.<sup>7</sup>

Accordingly, Trudeau told his staff to cut down on his paperwork and so enable him to focus on these crucial issues. Of less concern



was federal-provincial cooperation and business-labor relations, areas where he had not been especially successful. With the consent of the provinces, previous prime ministers, dating from 1927 and the Mackenzie King era, had tried to repatriate the constitution and none had succeeded. "It's obvious," Trudeau concluded, "that we'll never have a constitution of our own if we don't do it alone."<sup>8</sup>

Although the challenges were similar to those of the late 1970s, Trudeau's attitude had changed. His new term in office would be that of a "strategic prime ministership," to use the phrase coined by adviser Tom Axworthy, that is, a more disciplined regime (yet with Trudeau's weekends kept open for dates). Aware that this was his last chance to achieve his goals, he stated publicly that he would serve as prime minister for only two or three years, until his agenda was carried out. Years later, he recalled that "by the time I returned to office in 1980, I had learned the lessons of politics. I knew you could not exhaust yourself on every issue that came along. That if you hoped to accomplish those things that were of principal importance to you, you had to compromise [and] there were things I wanted to achieve before my retirement."<sup>9</sup>

The newly arrived Reaganites were deeply suspicious of Trudeau's willingness to have the state play a larger role in the economy. They also recalled how he had decided to cut Canada's contribution to NATO's European forces by half, and they remained resentful of his less-than-enthusiastic support of American initiatives in Vietnam and Cambodia. Canada, they believed, was no longer a serious military nation. "This slide down the slippery slope to disarmament," said one Pentagon official, reflected Trudeau's "soft, almost socialistic attitude to the communist world." Washington also worried about what it saw as the implicit nationalism of an energy policy that emphasized the Canadianization of a foreign (i.e., American) controlled sector. Trudeau did not appear bothered. Preferring a European focus and identifying with such European social democrats as (West) Germany's Helmut Schmidt, Sweden's Olof Palme, and Greece's Andreas Papadreau, he had long displayed a basic lack of interest in American ideas, culture, and internal politics. Nor did he show much familiarity with the popular entertainers, sports heroes, and pop culture south of the border. (On the other hand, he was not that interested in their Canadian equivalents either.<sup>10</sup>)

Early in his new term, Trudeau once again confronted his perennial opponent, Quebec premier René Lévesque. The ruling separatist

Parti Québécois was determined to “go to the people” in a May 20 plebiscite to ask for a mandate to open negotiations with the federal government about an autonomous status, and although confined to Quebec, the vote had implications for the future of North America. It signified, in the words of former minister Jean Chrétien, “the political confrontation of the century in Canada.”<sup>11</sup> Quebec was seeking the dignity of nationhood through what it called “sovereignty-association”: independence in political affairs but close cooperation with Canada in economic and military matters. Trudeau and the federal ministers from Quebec pledged to do everything in their power to defeat another separatist initiative.

The prime minister recalled that at the time the PQ was elected in 1976 on a separatist platform aimed at making Quebec unilingual, English-speaking Canada had seemed asleep. In a televised speech on November 24 of that year, he had warned of the danger of fragmentation, which he called “a crime against humanity.” Canadian prime ministers didn’t usually talk like that, and English Canada had rallied. He noted that from coast to coast people had enrolled in French courses and had stopped “bitching” about bilingual cornflakes boxes and holding conferences on “Whither Canada.” When on April 15, 1980, Lévesque described the forthcoming referendum as the first step toward Quebec’s independence, Trudeau once again believed that “Canada’s fate was at stake, and along with it the fate of our government.”<sup>12</sup> (In his memoirs, he admitted that had the referendum passed, he would have resigned.) His task was made all the more difficult because the leader of the Quebec Liberal Party, the austere Claude Ryan, who was expected to lead the fight for a “No” vote against separation, showed himself as a Quebec nationalist, or as Ryan put it, a believer in the province’s “special status” whose demands for “special powers” were entirely justified.

Sworn into office on March 4, 1980, just ten weeks before the referendum was scheduled to take place, Trudeau knew he had little time. He began at once to marshal his forces. In his parliamentary “Throne Speech,” the formal address in which the government sets out its intentions for the coming session, Trudeau told the citizens of Quebec that regardless of the outcome Lévesque could not deliver on his promise to create a sovereign nation with economic ties to Canada. The premiers of the nine English-speaking provinces had given notice that they would never enter into a common market with an independent Quebec. Consequently, it would become “a tiny French island virtually lost in an English-speaking sea.” As an alternative, Trudeau renewed his pledge to change the constitution in a way that would specifically guarantee the rights of French-speaking Canadians.<sup>13</sup>

With the francophone ministers gathered around him to show Quebecers watching on TV the reality of French power in Ottawa, he spoke eloquently about Canada, “a fortunate nation” but in danger of falling prey to divisive racial conflict, which he called “the enemy within.” Trudeau attacked the ambiguity of the PQ’s ideas. The wording of the referendum provided no mandate for pure “sovereignty,” and if voted on it would only yield a stalemate. His subliminal message: “French Canadians never had it so good, and under a re-dedicated federalism it can be even better.” Then, in early May he made four of the great speeches of his career.

Separatists were attacked both as “intellectuals and academics” who showed contempt for Canada and ordinary Canadians and as “knights of independence” who lacked courage and would lead Quebecers into “the valley of humiliation.” Despite Lévesque’s promises, a *oui* vote would not necessarily result in economic association with the rest of Canada. With tongue in cheek he asked whether a unanimous vote by Cuba or Haiti in a referendum would require the Canadian federation to admit them as members. The question evoked laughter by implicitly portraying Lévesque as someone who would turn Quebec into a banana republic begging Anglo-Canada for economic aid. He mocked the PQ for not having the courage to pose a clear question on outright independence.<sup>14</sup>

Lévesque openly feared and loathed Trudeau. Yet the two men had much in common. Both were sons of lawyers who had died prematurely; both were educated in Jesuit classical colleges; and both had studied law. Each entered politics under the Liberal banner, and each had a mutual friend in Pelletier. But while Trudeau led a national party, his opponent founded a separatist movement, having left the provincial Liberals over the issue of sovereignty for Quebec. Capable of making complex issues easily understandable, a facility learned as television journalist, Lévesque went on the attack. He gave emotionally charged speeches in school auditoriums in working-class districts, accusing Trudeau and his ministers of selling out to the English and mocking the prime minister’s half-English background and Parisian French.

The Parti Québécois had adopted his strategy of *étapisme*, a gradual approach to Quebec’s independence by stages. Its referendum, if successful would create a significant degree of political independence for the province. While Quebec would retain an economic relationship with Canada under a common currency, free trade, defense, and open borders, it would gain full control over its taxes, laws, and foreign relations. Because Clark had promised that the federal government would stay clear of the sovereignty debate in Quebec (where he lacked

a political base), Lévesque and his colleagues felt confident of success. Even when Clark was defeated and Trudeau, the champion of federalism, returned to office, their confidence remained unshaken. They believed they could rely on Claude Ryan, the leader of the Quebec Liberal Party, who while not an outright separatist advocated a “special status” for the province.

Trudeau first worked to neutralize Ryan by treating him as friend and equal. Then he set about organizing cooperation with opponents of the referendum. To allay the suspicions of Quebec Liberals that their federal colleagues would sweep them aside, Trudeau gave the job of directing federal resources to his minister of justice, French-speaking Jean Chrétien, a gifted populist speaker. Chrétien told the 12 other francophone ministers in the Trudeau cabinet they were not to travel or speak anywhere outside of Quebec without permission from Trudeau himself, but to devote all energies to the referendum question.

Quebeckers were warned about the costs of separation. A *oui* vote meant that they would have to compete for Alberta oil together with other international customers. Quebec would be treated by Saskatchewan and other anglophone provinces as a separate country. Ontario would never negotiate any form of economic association with an independent Quebec. Federal ministers predicted “reduced quotas and subsidies” for Quebec farmers and “severe economic decline in Montreal if the Canadian government terminated its \$5 billion in wages, social assistance, subsidies, capital expenditures, and guaranteed loans and contracts.” Trudeau’s minister of energy threatened that Quebec would have to pay *immediately* \$3.8 billion more a year for its oil, which meant \$400 more for each Quebec family to heat its home and \$450 more to drive its cars. Such social services as the child tax credit, pension supplement, and free ambulance service would require “substantial tax increases . . . in a separated Quebec.”<sup>15</sup>

Trudeau spoke to the House of Commons, to the Montreal Chamber of Commerce, to a rally in Quebec City, and in a Montreal arena. His message: the Parti Québécois was deceiving the voters. Rather than asking for a straight up and down vote on political separation, its preference for “stages” meant that more referenda would follow that seeking “sovereignty-association,” and that there was no guarantee that other provinces would offer a separate Quebec such advantages as use of the Canadian dollar and the Canadian passport.

Quebec listened. On May 20, 1980, almost 60 percent of the electorate voted against authorizing Lévesque to seek separation. Even among francophones, 52 percent had voted *non* forcing Lévesque to

shelve the issue, vowing that he would “fight again on another day.” That evening Trudeau told Canadians: “Never have I been as proud to be a Quebecker and a Canadian.”<sup>16</sup>

For many observers, it was his finest hour. He had been summoned to Ottawa by Pearson as one of the three “wise men” who could help keep Quebec in the Canadian federation. There had been many ups and downs in his career, but on this central issue Trudeau had never wavered.

In late May 1980, Trudeau turned to the constitutional reform he had promised Quebec voters in the referendum campaign. Because Canada had no constitution of its own, self-respect alone required a change in the status quo. As noted, its government functioned under the terms of the British North America (BNA) Act, legislation passed by the British Parliament in 1867. The act had formally united the separate British colonies north of the United States into one self-administered entity, creating a powerful “dominion” government to be situated in the new capital city of Ottawa. It gave the federal government the power to tax, regulate trade and banking, provide for the national defense, and set rules for marriage and divorce. The provinces controlled the administration of local justice, education, property, and civil rights. However, there was no provision for adding amendments—requests to do so had to be sent to the British Parliament in London. Now and then there was talk of “patriating,” or bringing home, the BNA Act, which would enable Canada, rather than Britain, to provide amendments. But because the provincial governments feared losing their rights, they had never been able to agree on how amendments would be enacted, and the BNA Act remained unchanged.<sup>17</sup>

The new constitution proposed by Trudeau not only included an amending process, but a charter of rights and freedoms, a Canadian version of the American Bill of Rights. Canada had such a statute, but it was granted through an act of the British Parliament and could be changed at will by that Parliament. By putting a charter into the constitution, basic rights would fall under Canadian control and include guarantees that called for the use of both French and English in the courts and legislatures of the provinces where both languages were widely spoken. In addition, schoolchildren would be taught in whichever language local preference dictated. Although Trudeau had pushed through the Official Languages Act forcing federal institutions to provide services for French-speaking Canadians, he knew

that laws could be unmade as well as made. (In 1890 French-speaking Manitobans had been deprived of French language schools by the province's Anglo-Saxon majority.) Minorities required the complete security that only a constitution could guarantee. A charter of rights (to be negotiated with all the provinces) would provide Trudeau with the means by which he could achieve his dream: "a bilingual, multi-cultural federation" that would serve as a model for other pluralistic societies around the world. Moreover, because it would enable the federally appointed Supreme Court to determine political, economic, and cultural rights, it would halt any movement toward decentralization or a special status for Quebec.<sup>18</sup>

The British Parliament gave the necessary approval on March 25, 1982. Twenty-three days later, in a rain-soaked ceremony on Parliament Hill witnessed by thousands of Canadians who defied the weather to attend, Britain's Queen Elizabeth II signed the proclamation that officially provided the country with a new instrument of government. The nation kept its ties to the British monarchy (the queen remains the head of state), but had achieved full independence. Trudeau had managed to remove the last remnants of colonial rule. The new amendment process and the charter of rights and freedoms not only included French—and English—language rights but prohibited discrimination based on race, ethnicity, color, religion, gender, age, or disability and granted some expanded rights for the provinces. If Quebec refused to accept the new constitution, it was nevertheless a triumph for Trudeau and his advisers.

At one stage in the battle over the constitution, Trudeau hinted that once done, he would step down as prime minister. However, the challenges faced revived his spirits, and when asked in December 1981 about his intentions, he replied, "I'm governing now. I have no plans for retirement."<sup>19</sup>

Turning to foreign initiatives, the prime minister traveled abroad more frequently. He worked actively to support a North-South dialogue aimed at addressing the inequities between the industrialized and developing nations, an interest earlier shown in G7 meetings in the late 1970s and in calls for expansion of Canadian foreign aid. His strong backing of the Contadora plan for stabilizing Central America irritated Washington, whose interventions in the region were escalating steadily. His criticism of the Reagan administration's unilateral "liberation" of Grenada did nothing to reduce the chill in American-Canadian relations. Trudeau supported the Brandt (North-South)

Commission created to close the gap between developed and under-developed nations. However, the final major undertaking of Trudeau's years in office was the so-called peace initiative launched in the autumn of 1983. He visited major world leaders in an effort to improve East-West relations in general, and specifically to urge NATO to begin a dovish retreat from its first-strike nuclear strategy, further upsetting the Reagan and Thatcher administrations.

A less charitable view of Trudeau's pilgrimages held them as a "cynical ploy to offset Liberal party decline at the polls resulting from a disturbing economic situation."<sup>20</sup> In the early 1980s, the worldwide recession reached Canada. Oil prices plummeted (hurting Alberta), but inflation soared (reaching 22.5 percent in 1981). The recession struck younger workers especially hard: in 1982, one-fifth of would-be workers under 25 could not find a job; and the GNP fell by 4 percent in that year, the worst showing since the 1930s. The Canadian dollar, worth 93 US cents in 1981 fell to a low of 70 US cents by 1985. On the other hand, Canada's economic growth after 1982 maintained an average annual increase of 4 percent, revealing that economists were not in agreement about either the problem or the solutions to it. What counted, of course, was the perception that harder times had come to Canada (and to other industrialized countries). Polls showed the public losing faith in the Liberal Party, and the business press was reporting that a new conservative majority, like the one that had vaulted Reagan into the White House the year before, was forming.

Well into his final retirement, Trudeau resented being blamed for Canada's economic problems and attributed them to the many years of Conservative rule that preceded his. He took pride in the record compiled between 1969 and 1984, comparing those 16 years of Canadian development with other industrial nations: first in job creation, second in growth, fourth in price stability. If during that period over \$200 billion was added to the national debt, a 1200 percent increase, the Tories raised it a further \$218 billion in only 8 years, although having made debt reduction a priority. During his years in office the percentage of Canadians living in poverty had dropped from 23 percent in 1969 to 12.8 percent in 1984. Not only had his governments provided more opportunities for French Canadians, he pointed out, but more women and more Jews were in high office and in the cabinet itself.<sup>21</sup>

Beginning with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the coming of the Reagan administration, the Cold War was entering its darkest days since Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, or so Trudeau

believed. He blamed both the Soviets and the “rigidly anti-Soviet stance taken by Reagan and his ideological soul-mate Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain.” Trudeau had written about the horrors of nuclear war in *Cité Libre* in the 1950s and 1960s and remained horrified by the prospect. Years later, after having visited Hiroshima, he was convinced that such a war could not be won. To Indira Gandhi’s great annoyance, he had proposed penalizing India after that government’s decision to explode a nuclear device in 1974. His determination was to see a world free of nuclear weapons and have Canada set an example; this would leave the country without a nuclear military capacity when he left office in 1984. Trudeau told the United Nations that not only was his the first country in world with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons that chose not to do so, but it was also the first nuclear-armed country to have divested itself of them. His proposed comprehensive test ban to limit and then reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear weapons was well received in the United Nations but less so in Washington where the Reagan administration thought him naive, dangerous, and presumptuous.<sup>22</sup> Yet he was (successfully) pressured by (West) German chancellor Helmut Schmidt to let the United States test its Cruise missiles in the Canadian north, which resembled Soviet terrain. Canada, after all, he rationalized, was part of NATO.<sup>23</sup>

Although Trudeau’s mission had no immediate results, it earned him the Albert Einstein Peace Prize and a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. When a year later Mikhail Gorbachev became the new Soviet leader and the USSR and the United States embarked on the course that brought the Cold War to an end, Trudeau took pride that in the fall of 1983 no major Western power except Canada had any peace initiative under way but that “by the fall of 1984 many new ideas were in the air.” An admirer of Gorbachev, the prime minister took some credit in the Reagan-Gorbachev reference to his admonition that a nuclear war could not be won.<sup>24</sup>

By the winter of 1984, Trudeau decided the time had come to leave office. He saw that the Parti Québécois government in Quebec was falling apart and that Lévesque was no longer pushing for outright separation. French power had found its niche in the nation’s capital. It is also true that younger Liberals complained that he was out of touch and a throwback to an age when all seemed possible at a time of budget surpluses and low unemployment. Still, Trudeau had served longer and his imprint upon Canada was probably deeper than



that left by any previous francophone leader. If the French-language newspaper *La Presse* noted that he had failed “to dissipate the sovereignist dream in Quebec or to conciliate English-speaking people in the West,” there was a colorful salute in the Canadian House of Commons. An Alberta MP spoke for many when he commented, “He leaves his footprints all over the nation.”<sup>25</sup>

## EPILOGUE

The estranged couple finally divorced early that spring. In Canadian law an immediate divorce was possible only if both parties agreed. Previously Trudeau had not, and without a mutual agreement a five-year separation was required. Having convinced herself that “Pierre ... was not interested in my mind, or my personality, or my maturation [and what he wanted was] a ‘decorative child-making machine, a plastic wife to rear his children and decorate his home, a symbol, not a person,’” Margaret filed for divorce.<sup>26</sup> Trudeau demanded sole custody of the boys, and in return, Margaret received a financial settlement. Later in the year she married Fred Kemper, an Ottawa real-estate developer, in a civil ceremony.

Trudeau’s successor, John Turner, who had resigned as his finance minister in 1975, succeeded him. Politically inept, clearly on the party’s right wing and resented by the Trudeau Liberals, he erred in calling for an early election. Conservatives rose to the challenge. The ineffectual Clark, forced to resign as party leader the previous year, ran again for the post but was defeated by Brian Mulroney. A bilingual Quebecker who was determined to have his party govern, he believed it could do so only by securing a Tory victory in the province. He had risen to the presidency of the American-owned Iron Ore Company of Canada and was well known to corporate executives south of the border. They and their Canadian counterparts welcomed his pledge of a business-like administration, less government intervention, and stronger ties to the United States.

The outcome of the national election held in September 1984 startled even the Tories. Conservatives won 211 seats (the largest number won by any party in Canadian history, including 58 from Mulroney’s home province of Quebec) to the Liberals’ 40 and the NDP’s 30. The Liberal stranglehold on Quebec had come to an end. Turner had foolishly accepted the opposition parties’ challenge to debate in his rusty Paris-learned French and gave the colloquially bilingual Mulroney a perfect chance to present himself as Quebec’s native son. He promised reconciliation and the restoration of honor to the province that

he said was humiliated by Trudeau's constitution. To other Canadians Mulroney promised continuity, although in a precampaign trip to the White House he had disavowed Trudeau's critical attitude to US policy and pledged to get the relationship back on a more friendly footing.

The Mulroney government's determination to make fully open economic borders with the United States a chief priority resulted in a Free Trade Agreement between the two countries in 1988 and would ensure Canada's acceptance of NAFTA four years later. The new prime minister's eagerness to avoid the animosity that had marked the relations between Trudeau and the provinces led to accords with Newfoundland and Alberta and brought an end to the debate over federal energy policy. Despite campaign calls for privatization and deregulation, however, Air Canada, the Canadian Broadcasting Company, Petro-Canada, and other large crown corporations remained in place, and the government provided tax relief for the oil industry following the near collapse of world energy prices in 1986.

As senior counsel in a Montreal law firm, Trudeau had no clients of his own but made himself available as a consultant. "They don't overwork me," he admitted in his memoir, and he acknowledged that it was his political clout that was desired. His long years in government had won him a wide network of friends and acquaintances overseas. He offered constitutional advice to Vaclav Havel, president of what was then Czechoslovakia, as well as to Mikhail Gorbachev when he was president of the Soviet Union. Trudeau was also a charter member of an informal but influential international network of former heads of state and government known as the Inter-Action Council, a group that met a couple of times a year in various locations to discuss global issues.<sup>27</sup>

The one exception to his determination not to intervene in politics was that regarding constitutional issues. Quebec had not signed on to the new Canadian Constitution, and when Mulroney sought to launch a bold initiative in domestic diplomacy in the late spring of 1987, Trudeau jumped into political battle. Having descended from the rarified heights of his electoral victory in 1984 to new lows in public trust after a series of scandals jolted his cabinet, Mulroney set his sights on a distant prize. He wanted to induce Quebec, his home province, to accept the new constitution. The prize had eluded Trudeau, a fellow Quebecker, and tainted the testy Liberal's greatest public hour.

At Mulroney's invitation, the ten provincial premiers met with him in a closed-door meeting at Meech Lake in the hills of Quebec on April 30, 1987. After hours of bargaining, the ministers agreed to the five demands made by the premier of Quebec as the *sine qua non* for his formal acceptance of the constitution that had been made the supreme law of the land in 1982. They approved a series of amendments to it, one of which recognized Quebec as a "distinct society" within Canada. Quebec also won the right to fill three of the nine seats on the Canadian Supreme Court. A pleased Mulroney hailed the new constitutional accord as bringing Quebec into the constitution and a significant event for Canadians. To compensate them for acknowledging that Quebec was not *une province comme les autres*, the other provinces were ceded extra and unprecedented rights in relation to the federal government.

So extensive was the new authority granted the provinces that some feared that the distribution of powers in the 1982 Constitution Act would be upset. One scholar wrote that the Meech Lake Accord, if approved, meant "a major decentralization of power within an already decentralized state." Another academic agreed that "Canada is to become the most decentralized government on earth."<sup>28</sup> Among other rights, provincial governments nominated candidates for the federal judiciary and approved federal appointments to the Senate and the Supreme Court. They would share with the federal government power to regulate immigration and control federal funds allocated to the provinces for social programs. Finally, each province would receive the right to veto future constitutional reforms, a measure that Quebec had previously insisted on to safeguard its francophone culture.

Trudeau broke his self-imposed silence on political issues when on May 27 he published an open letter in both Montreal and Toronto newspapers. It contained a scathing denunciation of Mulroney and the premiers who had negotiated Meech Lake. Mulroney's options, Trudeau later recalled, were

contrary to the views of Canada that I had tried to promote and defend all the time I was in office ... I took it upon myself to remind Canadians that there is another view of Canada. The Tory party now accepts the right of self-determination of a province as a constitutional right ... I hold that Canada is more than the sum of its parts; it is not a nation merely because the provinces permit it to be, it is a nation because the Canadian people want it to be.<sup>29</sup>

Because the accord both surrendered important federal powers to all the provinces and moved Quebec a giant step toward sovereignty

by declaring it a distinct society, Trudeau's hostility was unrelenting. In public comments, he used such phrases as the "Balkanization of Canada," "federal spinelessness," "Quebec paranoia," and "provincial power grabbing." Mulroney, he said, was a "weakling" who would "render the Canadian state totally impotent."<sup>30</sup> This outspoken rejection of Meech Lake by the former prime minister made opposition to the accord respectable.

With Trudeau's intervention, defense of the constitutional status quo, which began as an eccentric and seemingly futile effort by a few professors, became a popular phenomenon. (A provision in the constitution's amending formula had given the legislatures of all ten provinces and Parliament three years to ratify the accord, so resistance to it had time to grow.) Two Conservative premiers (of Newfoundland and New Brunswick) who had approved the deal were defeated by Liberal opponents of the accord. Triggered by aboriginal and feminist groups fearing their rights would not be adequately defended, dozens of debates were held. Both anti-Quebec feelings in English Canada and anti-Canada feelings in Quebec were exacerbated when Quebec invoked the "notwithstanding" clause in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to halt implementation of a Supreme Court decision overturning Quebec's French-only sign law. The failure of the Manitoba and Newfoundland legislatures to ratify the accord, the time limit for so doing having expired on June 23, 1990, three years after initially proposed, revealed that the centralist Trudeau had bested the decentralist Mulroney.<sup>31</sup>

His credibility hurt and his popularity plummeting because of economic recession and scandals within his government, Mulroney tried again for constitutional reform. After much public debate, the ten provincial premiers, the two territorial leaders, and representatives of Canada's native inhabitants ("First Peoples") reached a new accord at Charlottetown, the capital of Prince Edward Island, in the summer of 1992. Under a new "Canada Clause" listing the "fundamental characteristics" of Canada and Canadians, it recycled the Meech Lake recognition of Quebec as a "distinct society." It also required equality between speakers of the two official languages as well as the promotion of minority communities based on a common language. From Trudeau's perspective, Charlottetown, like Meech Lake, furthered group interests rather than individual rights. At least a quarter of the seats in the House of Commons would be reserved for Quebecers, and the province would, once again, have the right to name a pool of nominees from which three of the nine Supreme Court justices

would be selected. The agreement would be put to the voters in a (nonbinding) referendum.

The former prime minister once more went on the offensive. In late September he republished the chapter of the paperback edition of his and Axworthy's book that condemned Quebec's constitutional maneuvering. It appeared both in the English-language *Maclean's* and in a French version in *L'actualité*. The former sold out within hours of appearing on the newsstands. Trudeau saw the agreement as giving more power to the provincial politicians and nothing to Canada. In an important speech in a Montreal restaurant on October 1, he said that by again proposing a distinct society and a transfer of power to the provinces, "[the Charlottetown agreement] is a mess that deserves a big no." When critics complained that he could never go beyond the same arguments and was "still fighting the last war," he took it as praise of his consistency. Pollsters noted that support for Charlottetown fell 20 points after the speech, and once more credited Trudeau's resistance for giving credibility to the opponents of the measure. The October 26 referendum presented to the voters failed decisively in six provinces, including Quebec and one territory. Once again Trudeau had gone over heads of the government to appeal directly to the voters, and his well-publicized denunciation of the new document as destructive to the federal state tipped the scales against constitutional change.

Trudeau intervened in yet one more constitutional threat to a united Canada. In still another offer of a new economic and political relationship with Canada, a Quebec referendum in 1995 asked voters to approve not outright independence but greater sovereignty. When it became clear to Prime Minister Jean Chrétien in the last week of the campaign that the "no" vote was about to lose, he panicked and promised Quebec a constitutional veto and recognition as "a distinct society." These commitments, in addition to a mass rally in Montreal organized by Liberals, may have made the difference: The referendum was defeated by a razor-thin victory, 50.6 percent to 49.4 percent. That French president Jacques Chirac had told an American interviewer that in the event of a "yes" vote, France would recognize a sovereign Quebec, hadn't helped the separatist cause.<sup>32</sup> On February 3, 1996, Trudeau described the referendum as having been based on lies and demagoguery. The close result and his near defeat in the election of June 16, 1996, resulted in Chrétien's change of tactics: he would attack the separatists head on and turn to Canada's Supreme Court. Two years later, in 1998, the court ruled that Quebec could not

unilaterally separate from the rest of Canada. If, however, a clear majority demanded it, negotiations must be held with the other provinces and the federal government.

Trudeau's personal life was still newsworthy. A daughter, Sarah Elisabeth, was born in May 5, 1991, to the nearly 71-year-old Trudeau and Deborah Coyne, a law professor and constitutional lawyer. Both parents refused to discuss their relationship publicly, leaving a frustrated media starved for details. When he finally produced the memoir he had vowed never to write, it—and a TV series based on it—left readers and viewers disappointed. No revelations emerged. That the book nevertheless made the best-seller lists showed that for many the Trudeau era was a golden age.<sup>33</sup>

Unlike the two other government leaders discussed in this volume, Trudeau had not written his memoirs after his fall from power. Even had he wished to the time out of office was too short. And after he retired, he had long hesitated to do so. However, in 1990 *Towards a Just Society: The Trudeau Years* served the intended purpose of casting in the best possible light the years between 1968 and 1984, when he dominated the politics of Canada as its prime minister. It did so in a rather unusual format. Trudeau, as coeditor, let others for the most part state the case for his lengthy regime. Thus a series of articles, by former associates and advisors, defended the Trudeau record across a broad sweep of issues. The contributors agreed that the Trudeau years were marked by a quest for greater justice with regard both to citizens and regions. They held that Trudeau's initiatives were not only pertinent with praiseworthy results, but were influenced by a humanistic and liberal philosophy. He had interjected these "memoirs" into the Meech Lake controversy inasmuch as the final chapter, written by Trudeau, scathingly criticized Mulroney's stewardship of the constitution by vehemently opposing what the Mulroney government endorsed: amending the Canadian constitution to accord Quebec recognition as "a distinct society." For Trudeau, the effect would have placed collective rights, those of Quebec's francophone majority, above his cherished "dignity and rights of individual human beings."<sup>34</sup>

Trudeau died in his sleep at the age of 80 on September 28, 2000. He had been suffering from Parkinson's disease and prostrate cancer, but even before the symptoms worsened, he kept close to home.

Although always considered aloof and insular (his former wife had once said that he was “destined for eternal solitude”) the public mask seemed to have slipped away and friends described him as an increasingly unhappy man. In 1998 his youngest son, Michel, a 23-year-old microbiologist, was swept to his death in an avalanche in British Columbia. Trudeau grieved privately, and the death left him frail and weakened. He remained close to his surviving sons, and until the last illness he frequently visited his and Miss Coyne’s daughter.

Trudeau served as Canada’s prime minister for 16 years aside from nine months in 1979. Had the issue of Quebec’s separation not resurfaced, he may not have decided to return. And had the Conservatives not called for a budget vote in December 1979, Trudeau would not have returned. He had resigned because he was in a position unfamiliar to him: he had never had to play the part of the underdog and because his private life proved overwhelming and disheartening, he believed that he was not emotionally up to the effort. If he could not maintain his marriage, how could he maintain a nation?

A generation later, critics counted his failures: the liberalism that resulted in deficits and bloated government; little redistribution of income or reduced poverty; a capricious internationalism. But as Canadian journalist Andrew Cohen concluded, he was not to be judged on economic, social, or foreign policies, all of which paled beside the question of preserving the nation, the central issue of his time.<sup>35</sup> Trudeau would be remembered for the constitution, not the deficit he left behind. If a leader, Liberal or otherwise, is judged by whether he achieves his priorities, Trudeau came to office determined to keep Quebec in Canada and have English-speaking Canadians accept Canada as a bilingual and multicultural nation. Thus far, he has succeeded.

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## CONCLUSION

I may at times have neglected these “anonymous forces,” but history is a drama of individuals, too, creatures of their times who shape those times.

—Fritz Stern

In his massive *Study of History*, metahistorian Arnold Toynbee says that the careers of extraordinary individuals are normally marked by phases of “withdrawal and return.” He added that “such a withdrawal may be a voluntary action,” or it may be “forced by circumstances beyond their control.” Regardless, they go back to the environment out of which they came, ready for renewed greatness.<sup>1</sup>

The fall of Charles de Gaulle, Juan Perón, and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, the three heads of government discussed in this book, as well as those of other twentieth-century leaders referred to in the preface, questions Toynbee’s assertion that the withdrawal may well be voluntary. Trudeau’s was undoubtedly sincere when he decided to resign as leader of the Liberal Party—and as prime minister—soon after his electoral defeat. But within months he was persuaded to change his mind, continued to serve as leader of the opposition, and contest the next election. Perón was ousted in a military coup, and de Gaulle, while voluntarily stepping down to show his displeasure with what he saw as a return to the party system he despised, fully anticipated that he would be recalled by popular demand.

While each account reflects the individuality of the circumstances that prompted a fall and subsequent rise, the outlines of a pattern in the careers of political leaders nevertheless emerge. Commonalities appear. Yet they should be taken more as empirically based observations than theoretical constructs leading to any taxonomy of political restoration. At best, they can provide material supporting such an effort.

Each of these three former leaders, usually sooner than later, began planning and working to return to power, either as leader of the opposition to those who succeeded them, or, if in exile like Perón, seeking to control his supporters and prevent any rivals from usurping his place.

All held a vision of how their nation could profit from stronger federal structures. De Gaulle and Perón produced memoirs of their terms in office—although Trudeau's (initially) appeared as the (favorable) recollections of others. These memoirs were self-serving, designed either to present the leaders' vision for the future, or to further their chances for a political revival, or, most likely, both. They had to confront political, regional, ethnic, religious, and economic divisions within their respective countries—de Gaulle's, chiefly political, but all three believed in the larger role to be played by the state in the national economy.

The errors made and the disunity shown by their opponents eased their return to power. A shared conviction that each was particularly well-equipped to overcome a national crisis contributed immeasurably to both their initial rise and political resurrection, and accounted for their insistence on strong centralized government. Sympathy earned from wartime resistance and postwar leadership (de Gaulle), attention paid and support given to the needs of labor (Perón), or from earlier efforts to hold the country together (Trudeau) helped send the three back to office—as did widely held perceptions that they embodied the best hopes of a supportive majority. All voiced concern over foreign policy initiatives taken by the United States. Lessons learned by all three from their “interments” included mastering the art of mending broken reputations and improving communication skills. This period also provided experiences and developed attitudes that help to explain their extraordinary comebacks.

*Ascent to Power:* Perón's path to the presidency was opened by the support given him by the working people of Argentina, support that, unlike his military colleagues, he worked assiduously to win; de Gaulle's, by his heroic image both as wartime leader and strong advocate of a place for France in the allied coalition; Trudeau, as responsible for preventing Quebec from leaving Canada and the enlightened social reforms enacted.

*Recourse to Populism:* Although having emerged from conservative, if not privileged, backgrounds, Trudeau and de Gaulle, like Perón (who came from very modest origins but gained prominence in a conservative military setting), embraced or at least accepted populist solutions. Their political roots, which were based on distinct personality types, let them operate beyond their class.

Whether the result of sincere belief or participation in a common quest for consensus politics, all three at one time or another shared

beliefs in what opponents called socialism (Perón insisted that his, unlike that of the Nazis, was in fact a “national” socialism) or social democracy, or, at the very least, the legitimacy of strong government intervention in the marketplace. De Gaulle’s nationalization of important sections of the economy and proposed economic planning; Perón’s resort to economic planning as well as nationalization, in addition to having the government legally buy crops at low prices to boost exports; Trudeau’s early flirtation with socialism, state ownership of energy (Petro-Canada), and recourse to price and wage controls, to take some examples. All three believed that nation states should be subject neither to unregulated Western capitalism nor state-run Soviet Communism, but find their own course. They also maintained a Cold War stance that encouraged less than fervent support of US overseas objectives held at the time: De Gaulle’s friendship treaty with the USSR, recognition of China, withdrawal from the military arm of NATO; Trudeau’s criticism of Washington’s Vietnam policy and reception of American draft evaders and deserters—and opposition to nuclear weapons; Perón’s condemnation of “Yankee imperialism” and determination to find a “third way” for what came to be called the third world.

*Determination to Preserve National Unity:* The three differed politically, one approaching dictatorship (but not totalitarianism), another authoritarian (but maintaining democratic forms), a third liberal (and progressive). Put another way, they held different views regarding the extent to which the head of government could exercise authority. Yet all three shared a clearly expressed desire for national unity and made an impassioned effort to retain it—and so keep the existent state together. If the danger of fragmentation was less in Argentina, de Gaulle, Trudeau, and Perón had to confront strong divisions within their respective countries and each held a vision of how their country could profit from strong federal structures. Indeed, well-founded threats of national disintegration obsessed Trudeau, while Perón and de Gaulle faced military opposition.

As ruler of postwar France, the latter quickly reestablished the authority of the state. His Rally of the French People movement, insofar as it was intended to be a “national,” as opposed to a merely “political,” organization, embodying people of different political persuasions rather than constitute yet another party, shared much with the *Peronista* movement created by Perón. They differed with regard to their respective bases of support, but both were rigidly hierarchical and authoritarian, with the differences more those of degree than of kind.

Perón's concern with the preservation of national unity and fear of the civil war that might destroy it number among the reasons for his unwillingness to confront his military opponents at the time of the coup that ousted him from power. (He also realized the odds against his doing so successfully were enormous.) Trudeau abhorred the breakaway tendencies of nationalist Quebecers and the further fragmentation of the state that would follow. He found the nation in its entirety as the proper vehicle to ensure the preservation of individual—as contrasted to collective—rights in rejecting an ethnic-based nationalism. For this, and his insistence that provincial energy resources be made available to the nation, he was heavily criticized by the provincial premiers. His determination to have all Canada benefit from Alberta and Newfoundland energy is illustrative.

*Belief in the Larger Role of the State in the National Economy:* Accordingly each demanded that their country not only have greater command of regional resources but set controls on the marketplace and pursue a policy of economic nationalism to make their nation more economically self-sufficient. Perón resented British domination of the Argentine economy and signs of US intrusion. In a quest for economic independence, he reorganized the central bank and gave it more control over foreign-owned assets. His government purchased British-owned railroads, American telephone company assets, airlines, and shipping. He set in place a kind of corporatism in which the economy was organized according to the activity undertaken, but with the state on top (as in Mussolini's Italy), and had the state establish public works and industries.

When allied with the New Democrats, Trudeau created a state-owned oil company. He also supported increased drilling during the oil crises of the 1970s and promoted the use of oil sands extraction. He ordered the building of a pipeline to eastern Canada. Wage and price controls were established, and he admitted that the free market was not working and the need for greater government control was real. As seen, as the ruler of postwar France, de Gaulle not only reestablished the authority of the state in both the political and economic spheres but by nationalizing important sectors of the economy and acknowledging the need for economic planning, advanced it.

*Wish to Return to Power:* Aside from Trudeau, who soon changed his mind about resigning as party leader (and as prime minister), the "fall" was never intended to be permanent, and each planned and worked to return to office. De Gaulle called his a "strategic withdrawal," and

anticipated an early summons to come back to office. When it did not come, he created the RPF, and only after its failure reconciled himself to await the crisis that would enable him to do so. Even in exile, Perón directed his movement by sending emissaries and instructions, employing the tactic of the blank ballot, entering into political alliances with independent radicals and *Montoneros*, and preventing rivals from taking control of the Peronistas. Trudeau again led the opposition to the governing Tories.

*Breaking with their Party.* Previously unaffiliated, and although he had criticized the Party's stand on nuclear weapons, Trudeau became a Liberal. Even so, he long disparaged Liberal—as well as Conservative—MPs until he was persuaded of the need to rely on his party's expertise for any chance of a political resurrection. Both Perón and de Gaulle preferred a movement “above parties,” but it was labor support that allowed the former to prevail. He kept his supporters divided by playing off different factions against each other—orthodox Peronists against those who advocated a “Peronism without Perón” or *Montoneros* against Peronists themselves—to ensure the perpetuation of his leadership.

*Lessons Learned from the Interment:* At first the defeats were found crushing, for some a blow to the ego and a cause for personal depression. De Gaulle expected a popular demand for his immediate recall and suspected opponents of conspiring to prevent it from happening. Trudeau contemplated and soon stated his intention to leave politics. Perón was forced into exile.

Yet during his 12-year “interment,” de Gaulle learned from the RPF experience the art of political compromise, to handle opponents with more tact, even to mingle in crowds. He became (somewhat) less aloof and more approachable. The errors made, the controversial stagecraft of the rallies, the proposals to disband the trade unions, the disdain for other parties and insistence on remaining apart from the political system, the determination not to yield an inch of empire were all abandoned. Perhaps above all, he acquired the conviction that his political resurrection must be seen as entirely legitimate and legal.

Perón's failed attempt to visit Argentina in 1964 taught *El Líder* a lesson in timing: he would return only after having assured himself that existing conditions promised success. The deal with Frondizi showed him when to make an alliance and when not to. He would continue as restored president to keep both friends and enemies

divided, a strategy that worked well until his ties to militant radicals (*Montoneros* and other terrorists) unleashed a force that neither he nor his immediate successors could control. And when resurrected he had learned to tame his earlier distributionist wage plans and prove more politically moderate, if not openly conservative.

Trudeau's "interment" lasted only six months. Yet it reinforced the lesson learned after his poor showing in the 1974 election—to rely on party professionals and abandon the go-it-alone policy previously followed; to focus on a few specific issues such as separatism and repatriation of the constitution; and, when necessary, not to hesitate to call an early election when ahead in the polls.

*Errors of Opponents Eased the Resurrection:* The failures of successor regimes in France, Argentina, and Canada, and the resulting political instability created helped ensure the return of the fallen leaders. The errors made and the disunity of the military governments that succeeded Perón's and the outbreaks of civil strife and threat of civil war brought about his resurrection. Although excessively and unjustly maligned, the Fourth French Republic saw itself threatened by civil war, which created the crisis apparently required for either the emergence of a new leader or the return of an old one. The attempts to expunge the memory of Juan and Eva Perón by those who succeeded him proved counterproductive. The division within the military between those adamantly opposed to Peronism in any form and those willing to accept a Peronism without Perón weakened the ability of the armed forces to keep him out. The intensification of guerrilla warfare did the same for the population at large. Clark's ill-advised budget and the fear of most Canadians that Conservative rule could not ensure the continued survival of the Confederation eased Trudeau's return to office. Perón's comment that "it was not that we were so good but that the failure of our successors made us appear better than we were" is applicable to all three leaders.

*A Time of Crisis Necessary for the Resurrection of a Charismatic Leader:* Apparently required for a political resurrection is a popular perception of a crisis that the fallen leader appears particularly well equipped to resolve: de Gaulle (who anticipated that a crisis was needed for his return), Algeria and the threat of civil war; Trudeau, the coming Quebec referendum and, if approved, the disintegration of the Canadian Confederation that might follow; Perón, the guerrilla warfare and violence that the military governments seemed unable to stop. The ability of the fallen leaders to turn the crisis to

their advantage was essential: whether de Gaulle initiated, controlled, or only benefitted from the army uprising in Algeria is still debated, but he made sure to profit from it by his well-timed interventions.

*Sympathy Won for Past Experiences:* The fallen leaders experienced growing popularity with voters, who came to believe that they owed the leader a debt for past accomplishments: De Gaulle's wartime leadership of the Free French and continued resistance to Vichy; Perón's support of labor and restoration of Argentine pride ("without him, we were nothing"); Trudeau's earlier successes in preventing separatism, providing official status for the French language (admittedly not with universal approval); the social legislation enacted, the favorable contrast issuing from the perception of his successor's inadequacies, and, not least, the sympathy won as the victim of his "runaway" wife's behavior.

*Self-Confidence in Times of Crisis:* A shared conviction that each was especially well equipped to overcome a national crisis contributed immeasurably to their political resurrection.

*The Unforeseen—and Luck:* Despite the commonalities, the uniqueness of the circumstances whose affects cannot be measured: Eva's death; Trudeau's failed marriage; President Coty's ultimatum to the National Assembly threatening resignation unless de Gaulle was recalled.

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# NOTES

## PREFACE

1. The list is not exhaustive. Yitzhak Rabin, Benazir Bhutto, Daniel Ortega, and Fulgencio Battista are among others whose political careers were resurrected after falling from power. Winston Churchill is of course the prime example, and it is his political “interment” during the years 1945–1951 that may serve as something of a case study of political restoration. It is precisely because that history is so well documented that I chose to deal with others. In an earlier book I discussed the political restoration of Olof Palme, Olusegun Obasanjo and Indira Gandhi. *The Fall and Rise of Political Leaders* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

## 1 DE GAULLE: CREATION

1. Granz-Olivier Giesbert, *Dying without God. François Mitterrand's Meditations on Living and Dying* (New York: Arcade Publications, 1998), 85.
2. Winston Churchill, *The Second World War*. Vol. 2, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 682.
3. Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler, 1945–1970* (New York: Norton, 1993), 91.
4. Robert Paxton, “De Gaulle and his Myth,” *New York Review of Books*, April 23, 1992, 18.
5. Cited in *ibid.*, 18.
6. Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman: A Life of General Charles de Gaulle* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1993), 286.
7. Alden Hatch, *The De Gaulle Nobody Knows. An Intimate Biography of Charles de Gaulle* (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1960), 196.

## 2 DE GAULLE: TERMINATION

1. Fondation Charles de Gaulle, *Avec de Gaulle: témoignages*. vol. 2, *Le temps du rassemblement* (Paris: Nouveau monde édition, 2005), 452. Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle* (New York: Avon Books, 1968), 168.
2. Jules Moch, *Rencontres avec de Gaulle* (Paris: Plon, 1971), 20, 22.
3. Lacouture, *De Gaulle*, 167; Alden Hatch, *The De Gaulle Nobody Knows. An Intimate Biography of Charles de Gaulle* (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1960), 200–201.
4. Lacouture, *De Gaulle*, 170.
5. Jean Touchard, *Le gaullisme, 1940–1969* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978), 95; Lacouture, *De Gaulle*, 169–170.

6. Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler, 1945–1970* (New York: Norton, 1993), 169–170.
7. Charles de Gaulle, *The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), 995.
8. Jean-Pierre Rioux, “De Gaulle in Waiting, 1946–1958,” in Hugh Gough and John Horne, eds., *De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France* (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), 39.

### 3 DE GAULLE: INTERMENT

1. Certainly these years are less well known than those containing his wartime experiences. The correct term is “president of the council of ministers,” but the more familiar “premier” will be used.
2. Publications about de Gaulle had become a veritable industry. From the time of his death in 1969 to 1974, 132 books and albums appeared, an average of 26 a year. An average of 17 works a year appeared during the period 1958–1969, and an average of 16 from 1975 to 1990, before the stream showed signs of slowing. Pierre Nora, ed., *Les lieux de mémoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 2:2523, note 26.
3. Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages*, vol. 2, *Dans l’attente (février 1946–avril 1958)* (Paris: Plon, 1970).
4. Jean-Pierre Rioux, “De Gaulle in Waiting, 1946–1958,” in Hugh Gough and John Horne, eds., *De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France* (London and New York: Edward Arnold, 1994), 36, 37.
5. Alden Hatch, *The De Gaulle Nobody Knows. An Intimate Biography of Charles de Gaulle* (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1960), 203.
6. *Ibid.*, 204.
7. Michel Debré, *Trois Républiques pour une France, Mémoires* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984–1988), vol. 2, *Agir, 1946–1958*, 40–42.
8. Pierre Vianson-Ponté, *The King and His Court* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), 32.
9. De Gaulle, *Discours*, 2:5–6.
10. Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman: A Life of General Charles de Gaulle 1984–1988*, vol. 2, *Agir, 1946–1958*, 40–42.
11. De Gaulle, *Discours*, 2:33.
12. Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman*, 323.
13. Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler, 1945–1970* (New York: Norton, 1993), 134.
14. Jean Touchard, *Le gaullisme, 1940–1969* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1978), 97. Don Cook, *Charles De Gaulle. A Biography* (New York: Putnam Publ., 1983), 304.
15. Debré, *Trois Républiques pour une France*, 81–82.
16. *Ibid.*, 83–87.
17. Hatch, *The De Gaulle Nobody Knows*, 209.
18. It was, however, 20 percent below the membership of the Communist Party. Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler*, 141.
19. Hatch, *The De Gaulle Nobody Knows*, 209.
20. Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler*, 138, 141.
21. *Ibid.*, 139.
22. Gerhard Weinberg, *Visions of Victory. The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 165–166.

23. Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires de Guerre*. vol. 1, *L'Appel, 1940–1942: Documents* (Paris: Plon, 1954), 389–390; Douglas Johnson, “De Gaulle and France’s Role in the World,” in Hugh Gough and John Horne, eds., *De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France* (London: Arnold, 1944), 83–94; Alexander Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967), 215, 216.
24. Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 215, 216.
25. Fondation Charles de Gaulle, *Avec de Gaulle: Témoignages*, 2 vols. (Paris: Nouveau Monde Édition, 2005), vol.2. *Le Temps du rassemblement*, 1:11. Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 214, 216, 220.
26. Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 204–205.
27. Hatch, *The De Gaulle Nobody Knows*, 209; Louis Terrenoire, *De Gaulle, 1947–1954, Du RPF à la traversée du désert* (Paris: Plon, 1981), 11.
28. Anthony Hartley, *Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Political Movement* (London: Routledge, 1972), 93; Leslie Derfler, *President and Parliament. A Short History of the French Presidency* (Boca Raton, FL: University Presses of Florida, 1983), 31–33, 55–58, 93–96.
29. Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler*, 144, 145; Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, 101.
30. Cook, *De Gaulle. A Biography*, 307; Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 213.
31. Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler*, 143–144. Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, 98.
32. Terrenoire, *De Gaulle, 1947–1954*, 12.
33. This latter comment was quoted by Colonel Rémy, his wartime associate. Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 213.
34. Pierre Galante, *The General* (London: Frewin, 1969), 169; Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 212–214.
35. Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 214.
36. Lacouture, *De Gaulle*, 177.
37. Christian Purtschett, *Le Rassemblement du Peuple Français, 1947–1953* (Paris: Cujas, 1965), vi; François Mauriac, *De Gaulle* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 286.
38. Fondation, *Avec de Gaulle*, 1:31; Philip Williams, *Crisis and Compromise. Politics in the Fourth French Republic* (Hamden, Conn: Anchor Books, 1964), 327–328.
39. Cited in Roy Pierce, “De Gaulle and the RPF. A Post-Mortem,” *The Journal of Politics*, 16 (February 1954), 111.
40. Lacouture, *De Gaulle, The Ruler*, 152.
41. *Ibid.*, 153.
42. Pierce, “De Gaulle and the RPF,” 115; Purtschett, vii. *L’année politique*, 1954, cited in Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 225.
43. Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 16.
44. Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, 116–117. Terrenoire, *De Gaulle, 1947–1954*, 291.
45. Claude Mauriac, *The Other de Gaulle* (New York: John Day, 1973), 335.
46. Roy Macridis and Bernice Brown, *The De Gaulle Republic. Quest for Unity* (Homestead, IL: Dorsey Press, 1960), 63; Lacouture, *De Gaulle*, 179.
47. De Gaulle, *Discours*, 2:211, 276, 489; Jean-Paul Bled, “Le Général de Gaulle et l’Allemagne durant la traversée du désert,” *Études Gaulliennes* 3 (July–December 1975), 117, 118. De Gaulle was familiar with German culture and read the language fluently. Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, 114.
48. Bled, “Le Général de Gaulle et l’Allemagne durant la traversée du désert,” 119–120.

49. Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, 111–112.
50. De Gaulle, *Discours*, 2:582.
51. For examples of the former, see Alexander Werth and also H. Stuart Hughes, “Gaullism: Retrospect and Prospect,” in E. A. Earle, ed., *Modern France, Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 145–146. For the latter, see René Rémond, *Les Droites en France* (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1982).
52. Fondation, *Avec de Gaulle*, 1:32.
53. Hatch, *The De Gaulle Nobody Knows*, 91.
54. Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 230, 231.
55. Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, 103. Debré, *Trois Républiques pour une France*, 93.
56. Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, 104.
57. Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler*, 157–158.
58. Terrenoire, *De Gaulle, 1947–1954*, 16; Rioux, “De Gaulle in Waiting,” 48–49.
59. Léon Noël, *La traversée du désert* (Paris: Plon, 1973), 115.
60. Rioux, “De Gaulle in Waiting,” 49.
61. Sébastien Danchin, *Le 13 mai sans complots* (Paris: Pensée Moderne, 1959), 13, 14, 16, 22, 85; Danchin and François Jenny, *De Gaulle à Colombey. Refuge d'un romantique* (Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1990), 14, 85.
62. The first from Cook, *De Gaulle. A Biography*, 311; the second from Gordon Wright, *Insiders and Outliers. The Individual in History* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1981), 120.
63. Cited in Jean Charlot, *Le gaullisme d'opposition* (Paris: Fayard, 1983), 164.
64. Wright, *Insiders and Outliers*, 120.
65. Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler*, 157.
66. Ibid.
67. Cook, *De Gaulle. A Biography*, 311.
68. Hatch, *The De Gaulle Nobody Knows*, 212.
69. David Reynolds, *In Command of History. Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War* (New York: Random House, 2005), 513.
70. Gough and Horne, *De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France*, 4. Robert Pickering, “The Writing of Action in de Gaulle’s War Memoirs,” in Gough and Horne (see note 23), 51–69.
71. It was found that 41 percent of the French believed that he had succeeded in his task, as against 36 percent who said he had failed; his departure left 40 percent unhappy, as against 32 percent satisfied and 28 percent indifferent; 21 percent thought that he would return to power, as against 43 percent who said he was gone for good. Cited in Rioux, “De Gaulle in Waiting,” 38.
72. Ibid., 37, 39. De Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, 15.
73. Hatch, *The De Gaulle Nobody Knows*, 212–214.
74. Charles de Gaulle, *The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), 998. Cook, *De Gaulle. A Biography*, 312.

## 4 DE GAULLE: RESURRECTION

1. Paul Marie de la Gorce, *The French Army. A Military Political History* (New York: George Braziller, 1963), 391; George A. Kelly, *Lost Soldiers. The French Army and Empire in Crisis* (Boston: MIT Press, 1965), 146–148.
2. De la Gorce, *The French Army*, 458, 461.

3. Don Cook, *De Gaulle. A Biography* (New York: Putnam Publ., 1983), 314; Edgar Furniss, Jr., *De Gaulle and the French Army* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1964), 19–23.
4. Leon Noël, *La Traversée Du Désert* (Paris: Plon, 1973), 129, 132–133, 146. Cook, *De Gaulle. A Biography*, 315; Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler, 1945–1970* (New York: Norton, 1993), 160; Bernard Ledridge, *De Gaulle* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 227.
5. Cook, *De Gaulle. A Biography*, 315. Noël, 128–129.
6. Cited in Jean Touchard, *Le gaullisme, 1940–1969* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978), 147–149.
7. Alexander Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967), 11–13.
8. Michel Debré, *Trois Républiques pour une France, Mémoires* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984–1988), 292; Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope, Renewal and Endeavor* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 1:17.
9. Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler*, 163.
10. Ledridge, *De Gaulle*, 228; Cook, *De Gaulle. A Biography*, 316.
11. De la Gorce, *The French Army*, 469.
12. Thomazo cited in Charles Maier and Dan White, eds., *The Thirteenth of May: The Advent of de Gaulle's Republic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 401.
13. J. Ferniot, *De Gaulle et le 13 mai* (Paris: Plon, 1965), 123, cited in Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, 146–147; Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 20, 26.
14. Debré, *Trois Républiques pour une France*, 297; Cook, *De Gaulle. A Biography*, 318.
15. Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 28; Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, 154–155.
16. Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 229–230.
17. Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler*, 168–169; Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 34.
18. Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 39; Cook, *De Gaulle. A Biography*, 320; Debré, *Trois Républiques pour une France*, 300.
19. Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler*, 170; Cook, *De Gaulle. A Biography*, 321.
20. Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 44.
21. Dulac quoted by Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler*, 172.
22. Ledridge, *De Gaulle*, 235; Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler*, 172–174.
23. Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, 160; Cook, *De Gaulle. A Biography*, 322.
24. Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 46.
25. Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, 161.
26. Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 150–151; Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, 162.
27. Charles de Gaulle, *Avec de Gaulle: témoignages*. vol. 2, *Le temps du rassemblement* (Paris: Nouveau monde édition, 2005), 256.
28. Maurice Mouillaud, *La mystification du 13 mai au 28 septembre* (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1958), 15.
29. For example, Stanley Hoffmann, *Decline or Renewal: France since the 1930s* (New York: Viking Press, 1974), 291–292.
30. Ledridge, *De Gaulle*, 235–237; Cook, *De Gaulle. A Biography*, 316. Philip Williams nevertheless cites the faithful aide, Olivier Guichard, who admitted that while de Gaulle was kept informed, “we told him all it was necessary to know.” 276. Werth, *De Gaulle. A Political Biography*, 277.
31. Lacouture, *De Gaulle. The Ruler*, 175–176.

32. C. L. Sulzberger, *The Last of the Giants* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 477, 34; David Schoenbrun, *As France Goes* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 237.
33. Hoffmann, *Decline or Renewal*, 255, 258–259.
34. Eric Roussel, *Charles de Gaulle* (Paris: Gallimard, 2002).
35. Irwin Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001). Wall's summary of his argument may be found on pages 264–268.
36. *Le Monde*, May 30, 1969; Georges Dupeux, *La Société française* (Paris: Colin, 1964), 268.
37. William G. Andrews, "The Fall of de Gaulle," *Orbis* 14 (1970), 648.

## 5 PERÓN: CREATION

1. Daniel K. Lewis, *The History of Argentina* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 96; Joseph A. Page, *Perón, a Biography* (New York: Random House, 1983), 33.
2. Juan Perón, *Yo. Relato Autobiográfico* (Buenos Aires: Sud Americana-Planeta, 1986), 27. (The meeting was seen by Perón's biographers as dubious at worst and exaggerated at best.)
3. Robert Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas of Argentina* (New York: Norton, 1972), 88. Mark Falcoff, "Perón's Nazi Ties," *Time Magazine International*, 152, no. 19 (November 9, 1998), 394. Perón denied that his view of national socialism was that of the Nazis.
4. Robert Potash, *The Army and Politics in Argentina: 1928–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 18.
5. Lewis, *The History of Argentina*, 96–97.
6. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 54; Douglas G. Dumont, "Perón's Return to Power. How and Why it Happened," Auburn University Research Paper, 1974, 3.
7. Craig Offman, "Hidden Treasures of History," *Time International*, 22 (November 9, 1998), 127. Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 115.
8. Douglas Madsen and Peter G. Snow, *The Charismatic Bond: Political Behavior in Times of Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 43, 44, 46.
9. Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 92–93; Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 42.
10. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 67.
11. Madsen and Snow, *The Charismatic Bond*, 46.
12. David Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1982. From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 252, 254; Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 92.
13. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 89.
14. Eldon Kenworthy, "Peronism: Argentina's Experiment with Populism," in Joseph S. Tulchin, ed., *Problems in Latin American History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 301.
15. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 25, 79–80.
16. Alicia Dujovne Ortiz, *Eva Perón* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 57; Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 82, 85.
17. Nicholas Fraser and Marysa Navarro, *Eva Perón* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 53–54.
18. Cited in Uki Goñi, *The Real Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Perón's Argentina* (London: Granta Books, 2002), 106.

19. Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Diario secreto de Perón* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana Planeta, 1986), 9.
20. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 127; Fraser and Navarro, *Eva Perón*, 58, 62. Juan Corradi has argued that the crisis of October 1945 “transformed Perón from a military man of fascist proclivities into a new sort of civilian politician—a democratic populist.” *The Fitful Republic: Economy, Society, and Politics in Argentina* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), 60. As suggested by this account, “strengthened” might be substituted for “transformed.”
21. Madsen and Snow, *The Charismatic Bond*, 51.
22. Lewis, *The History of Argentina*, 99. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 140. See also Gary Frank, *Juan Perón vs. Spruille Braden: The Story behind the Bluebook* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980).
23. Dumont, “Perón’s Return to Power,” 4–5; Lewis, *The History of Argentina*, 100.
24. Thomas E. Skidmore, *Modern Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 87.
25. Madsen and Snow, *The Charismatic Bond*, 38.
26. German N. Rozenmachén, “The Social Question,” cited by Kenworthy, “Peronism,” 326.
27. Kenworthy, “Peronism,” 302–303; Skidmore, *Modern Latin America*, 87.
28. Kenworthy, “Peronism,” 299; Frederick Turner and Jose Enrique Miguens, eds., *Juan Perón and the Reshaping of Argentina* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 4, 6.
29. Turner and Miguens, *Juan Perón and the Reshaping of Argentina*, 4, 6.
30. Skidmore, *Modern Latin America*, 87.
31. Dumont, “Perón’s Return to Power,” 9.
32. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 185.
33. Kenworthy, “Peronism,” 303.
34. Clive Foss, “Propaganda and the Perons,” *History Today* 50 (March 2000), 10.
35. Lewis, *The History of Argentina*, 102.
36. Foss, “Propaganda and the Perons,” 13; Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 232.
37. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 199; Fraser and Navarro, *Eva Perón*, 111.
38. Dumont, “Perón’s Return to Power,” 117; Skidmore, *Modern Latin America*, 88.
39. Uki Goñi, *The Real Odessa*. For other illustrations of this research, see Offman, “Hidden Treasures of History,” 22(1); Larry Rohter, “Argentina, a Haven for Nazis ...” *New York Times*, March 9, 2003; Miranda France, “Don’t cry for me ...,” *New Statesman* 131(54) (February 11, 2002), 54; Alan Levy, *Nazi Hunter. The Wiesenthal File* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2002). See also Ronald C. Newton, *The “Nazi Menace” in Argentina, 1931–1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). For a view that seeks to separate Perón from anti-Semitic elements in the military and segments of the upper classes, see Alan Metz, “Reluctant Partners: Juan Perón and the Jews of Argentina, 1946–1955,” in *Judiasm* 41 (1992), 378–394.
40. Mark Falcoff, “Peron’s Nazi Ties,” *Time Magazine International*, 152, no. 19 (November 9, 1998).
41. Goñi, *The Real Odessa*, 96–97, 229, 250.
42. Levy, *Nazi Hunter*, 134–137, 143–145.
43. Goñi, *The Real Odessa*, 183, 58.
44. *Ibid.*, 104–106, 115, 174.
45. Metz, “Reluctant Partners,” 381–382, 384, 386.
46. Foss, “Propaganda and the Perons,” 8.

47. Ibid., 9. Fraser and Navarro, *Eva Perón*, 10.
48. Offman, "Hidden Treasures of History," 114; Foss, "Propaganda and the Perons," 13.
49. George Blankstein, *Perón's Argentina* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 204.
50. The term, an amalgam of the Spanish for "social" and "justice," allows no easy translation. Derived from Catholic and Aristotelian concepts of justice and harmony, it advocated a balance between collectivism and individualism. Given the fractious nature of Argentines and the heterogeneous membership of such a movement, a leader was required; to use Perón's term, a *conductor*.
51. Campora cited in Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 209.

## 6 PERÓN: TERMINATION

1. John Gunther, *Inside South America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), cited in Douglas G. Dumont, "Perón's Return to Power. How and Why it Happened," Auburn University Research Paper, 1974, 9; David Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1982. From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 265.
2. Daniel K. Lewis, *The History of Argentina* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 106; Douglas Madsen and Peter G. Snow, *The Charismatic Bond: Political Behavior in Times of Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 54.
3. Lewis, *The History of Argentina*, 105.
4. Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1982*, 293, 294. Thomas E. Skidmore, *Modern Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 88.
5. Joseph A. Page, *Perón, a Biography* (New York: Random House, 1983), 242.
6. Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1982*, 305–306.
7. Lewis, *The History of Argentina*, 107–108.
8. Alicia Dujovne Ortiz, *Eva Perón* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 72.
9. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 259, 261.
10. Robert Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas of Argentina* (New York: Norton, 1972), 274; Lewis, *The History of Argentina*, 109.
11. Skidmore, *Modern Latin America*, 89; Eldon Kenworthy, "Peronism: Argentina's Experiment with Populism," in Joseph S. Tulchin, ed., *Problems in Latin American History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 303.
12. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 287.
13. Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1982*, 304.
14. Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 271; Lewis, *The History of Argentina*, 110.
15. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 299–315.
16. Uki Goñi, *The Real Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Perón's Argentina* (London: Granta Books, 2002), 189.
17. The first view is that of Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 299; the second, Kenworthy, "Peronism: Argentina's Experiment," 304; the third, Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 215–216.
18. Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 289.
19. Cited in Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 323.
20. Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Diario secreto de Perón* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana Planeta, 1986), 186.
21. Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 288–289; Frederick Turner and Jose Enrique Miguens, eds., *Juan Perón and the Reshaping of Argentina* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 7–8; Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 324.



## 7 PERÓN: INTERMENT

1. Robert Cox, "The Second Death of Perón?" *New York Review of Books*, December 8, 1983, 19.
2. Juan Perón, *Yo. Relato Autobiográfico* (Buenos Aires: Sud Americana-Planeta, 1986), 233.
3. Joseph A. Page, *Perón, a Biography* (New York: Random House, 1983), 333.
4. Uki Goñi, *The Real Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Perón's Argentina* (London: Granta Books, 2002), 190–191.
5. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 337.
6. Tomás Eloy Martínez, *The Perón Novel* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 12, 14.
7. Daniel K. Lewis, *The History of Argentina* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 116; David Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1982. From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 336.
8. Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Diario secreto de Perón* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana Planeta, 1986), 125.
9. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 340.
10. Juan Perón, *Correspondencia*, vol. 1 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Corregidor, 1983), 29. I am grateful to Melissa Johnson for bringing this book to my attention.
11. Alfonsín email forwarded to the author, July 17, 2003, with an attachment entitled, "Perón en el exilio." This paragraph is based on Alfonsín's analysis.
12. Peyera, *Diario secreto de Perón*, 140–141.
13. Cooke helped create the first rural guerilla group, Uturunco, in Tucumán Province. In 1960 he settled in Havana, participated in the Bay of Pigs battle, and unsuccessfully tried to bring Peronism to Cuba.
14. Marcela García Sebastiani, "The Other Side of Peronist Argentina: Radicals and Socialists in the Political Opposition to Perón (1946–1955)," *Journal of Latin-American Studies* 35 (May 2003), 311.
15. Perón, *Yo*, 259.
16. Robert Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas of Argentina* (New York: Norton, 1972), 304–305. Perón's modest lifestyle during his 18-year exile suggests that the millions that he supposedly possessed were either exaggerated—or could not be accessed.
17. Perón, *Yo*, 262.
18. Perón, *Correspondencia*, vol. 3. 37.
19. Lewis, *The History of Argentina*, 120–121; Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 365, 366.
20. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 366.
21. Alfonsín, "Perón."
22. Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 342.
23. Peyera, *Diario secreto de Perón*, 160, 268.
24. Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 315–317.
25. Perón, *Yo*, 278.
26. *Ibid.*, 272–273.
27. Goñi, *The Real Odessa*, 280–281.
28. Perón, *Yo*, 225, 226.
29. Peter Raines, "Peronismo without Perón. Ten Years after the Fall," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* (1966), 124.
30. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 390–391.

31. Alfonsín, "Perón."
32. Ibid.; Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 395.
33. Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 332, 334.
34. Edwin Lieuwen, *Generals vs Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1967), cited in Douglas G. Dumont, "Perón's Return to Power. How and Why it Happened," Auburn University Research Paper, 1974, 47.
35. Juan Perón, "*Latinoamérica*" *Ahora o nunca* (Buenos Aires, 1973).
36. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 411.
37. The term "*montonero*" comes from "*montonera*" (large crowd), which in turn is derived from "*monton*," the Spanish for "bunch" or "pile," and applies to a bunch of people, or crowd, who fought as a group because they lacked the strength to do so individually. During the Wars of Independence, the characteristics of such groups fit the definition of guerrillas. I am indebted to Dr. Graciella Cruz Taura for this information.

## 8 PERÓN: RESURRECTION

1. Daniel K. Lewis, *The History of Argentina* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 135; Robert Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas of Argentina* (New York: Norton, 1972), 339.
2. Ruben de Hoyos, "Second Thoughts in Argentina," *America* 9 (December 1972), 489.
3. Joseph A. Page, *Perón, a Biography* (New York: Random House, 1983), 415.
4. *Panorama*, June 22, 1971, cited in *ibid.*, 420.
5. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 425.
6. *Ibid.*, 427.
7. David Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1982. From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 359.
8. Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 350.
9. James W. Rowe, "Wither the Peronists?" *Latin American Politics* (1966), 438.
10. *The New York Times*, August 20, 1973, 14.
11. Alejandro Lanusse, *Mi testimonio* (Buenos Aires: Lasserre Editores, 1977), cited in Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 432.
12. Juan Perón, *Yo. Relato Autobiografico* (Buenos Aires: Sud Americana-Planeta, 1986), 277.
13. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 400.
14. *The New York Times*, November 19, 1972; Douglas G. Dumont, "Perón's Return to Power. How and Why it Happened," Auburn University Research Paper, 1974, 104.
15. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 442; Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 352.
16. Richard Gillespie, *Soldiers of Peace: Argentina's Montoneros* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 29, cited in Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 353–354.
17. *The History of Argentina*, 135.
18. *Ibid.*, 136; Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 462–464. Nearly one hundred were killed according to doctors who attended the wounded. David. C. Jordan, "Perón's Return..." *Orbis* (Fall, 1973), 1032, cited by Dumont, "Perón's Return to Power," 59. For Crassweller, there were twenty-five dead but many more, perhaps four hundred, injured (*Perón and the Enigmas*, 358).
19. *The New York Times*, July 25, 1973, 11.

20. Wayne Smith, "The Return of Peronism," in Frederick Turner, ed., *Juan Perón and the Reshaping of Argentina* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 134–135.
21. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 474.
22. Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Diario secreto de Perón* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana Planeta, 1986), 318, 342.
23. Frederick Turner and Jose Enrique Miguens, eds., *Juan Perón and the Reshaping of Argentina* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 8; Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1982*, 362.
24. Page, *Perón, a Biography*, 476.
25. Jonathan Kandell, "Perón Widens Purge of Leftists and Crackdown on Guerrillas," *New York Times*, January 24, 1974.
26. See, e.g., Jeanne Kirkpatrick, *Leaders and Vanguard in Mass Society* (Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press, 1971), 35.
27. Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 366; Lewis, *The History of Argentina*, 137–138.
28. Gillespie, *Soldiers of Perón*, 163, cited in Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 370.
29. Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1982*, 365.
30. Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas*, 372.
31. *Los Angeles Times*, September 1, 1987; *Washington Post*, October 18, 2006.

## 9 TRUDEAU: CREATION

1. Robert Bothwell, *The Penguin History of Canada* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2006), 435.
2. Everett Hughes, *French Canada in Transition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943); Ron Graham, *One-Eyed Kings: Promise and Illusion in Canadian Politics* (Don Mills, Ontario: Collins, 1968). Both cited in Kevin J. Christiano, *Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Reason before Passion* (Toronto: ECW Press, 1994), 25.
3. George Radwanski, *Trudeau* (New York: Taplinger Publ. Co., 1978), 49–50.
4. Cited in Michael Vastel, *The Outsider: The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1990), 30.
5. Christiano, *Reason before Passion*, 47. Radwanski, *Trudeau*, 58.
6. Radwanski, *Trudeau*, 61, 65.
7. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *Memoirs* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1953), 38–39.
8. Christiano, *Reason before Passion*, 34–38. After 120 (working) days, the miners accepted the company's original offer of a ten cents an hour wage increase.
9. A recent biographer believes that he probably felt a need to leave the family home and the close relationship with his mother if he were to be fully independent. John English, *Citizen of the World or Man of Destiny: The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau*. Vol.I, *Just Watch Me, 1919–1968* (Toronto: Knopf of Canada, 2006), 204, 209.
10. Cited in Stephen Clarkson and Christina McCall, *Trudeau and Our Times* Vol. II, *The Heroic Delusion* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), 65.
11. Christiano, *Reason before Passion*, 65–66.
12. Nancy Southam, *Pierre: Colleagues and Friends Talk About the Trudeau They Knew* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2005), 4, 7.
13. Thomas Butson, *Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (New York: Chelsea House, 1986), 36.

14. Clarkson and McCall, *The Magnificent Obsession* I:60, 62–63.
15. Cited in Clarkson and McCall, II *The Heroic Delusion*:78–79.
16. English, *Just Watch Me*, 273, 252–253. In the first volume of his biography of Trudeau, John English notes that in early 1947, when in Paris, Trudeau was seeing an analyst, apparently troubled by his status as a 27-year-old virgin, “a status maintained by powerful religious conviction and by a desire to see the world unencumbered.” See the discussion by Brian Bethune, “The Trudeau Revelations,” *Maclean's* vol. 119, no. 41 (October 16, 2006). Accessed at [http://vnweb.hw.wilsonweb.com/ezproxy.fau.edu/hww/results/results\\_single\\_fulltext.Jhtml](http://vnweb.hw.wilsonweb.com/ezproxy.fau.edu/hww/results/results_single_fulltext.Jhtml).
17. Scott W. See, *The History of Canada* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 170.
18. Trudeau, *Memoirs*, 73.
19. English, *Just Watch Me*, 404.
20. Trudeau, *Conversation with Canadians* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972). Cited in Christiano, *Reason before Passion*, 116–117. This paragraph is based on Christiano’s analysis (99–107, 114).
21. English, *Just Watch Me*, 438.
22. Radwanski, *Trudeau*, 92; Kenneth McNaught, *The Penguin History of Canada* (London and New York: Penguin Group, 1988), 312.
23. Cited in Clarkson and McCall, I:103–105.
24. English, *Just Watch Me*, 440–441.
25. Christiano, *Reason before Passion*, 83; Radwanski, *Trudeau*, 93–95.
26. Felicity Cochrane, *Margaret Trudeau, The Prime Minister’s Wife* (New York: Signet Books, 1978), 35; English, *Just Watch Me*, 444.
27. English, *Citizen of the World*, 470.
28. Jeffrey Simpson, *Discipline of Power: The Conservative Interlude and the Liberal Restoration* (Toronto: Personal Library Publ, 1980), 285.
29. Cited in Clarkson and McCall, *The Heroic Delusion*, II:143.
30. English, *Just Watch Me*, 461.
31. Trudeau, *Memoirs*, 87–88.
32. Clarkson and McCall, I:111–112; Radwanski, *Trudeau*, 108.
33. Butson, *Pierre Elliott Trudeau*, 57–58.
34. McNaught, *Penguin History of Canada*, 313, 315.
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37. Cited in Bothwell, *Penguin History of Canada*, 449.
38. *Maclean's*, April 6, 1998, vol.111, n.14, 16; McNaught, *Penguin History of Canada*, 319.
39. Stewart, *Shrug*, 61.
40. Trudeau, *Memoirs*, 140–141, 143, 146.
41. Stewart, *Shrug*, 39, 42. John English, Trudeau’s most recent biographer, acknowledges that the phrase was part of a much longer answer. English, *Just Watch Me*, 107.
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## CONCLUSION

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