

# State Visits and Leader Survival

**Matt Malis** New York University  
**Alastair Smith** New York University

**Abstract:** *Why do political leaders travel abroad? In this article, we propose an informational mechanism linking in-person diplomacy to leader survival. A foreign power visits an incumbent in order to reap a future policy concession; the visit is only worth the effort if the incumbent remains in power long enough to deliver on the deal. A diplomatic visit thus provides a visible and credible signal of the visitor's high confidence in the incumbent's stability in office. Domestic opponents, facing incomplete information as to the incumbent's strength, observe the signal and are deterred from mounting a challenge. Using data on U.S. diplomatic visits from 1960 to 2013, we find strong empirical support for our predictions: A visit with the U.S. president substantially reduces the risk of a leader's removal from office.*

**Verification Materials:** The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the *American Journal of Political Science* Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/9QUMY3>.

Why do political leaders travel abroad? Recent U.S. presidents have spent one-third of their days in office visiting or hosting foreign heads of state (Figure 1); other world leaders conduct visits with similar frequency (Nitsch 2007). Top-level diplomatic visits are the culmination of intensive planning by leaders and their staffs, with great care given to every detail of the exchange and its potential implications. Among political actors and observers, these events seem to wield outsize influence, often prompting policy and political activism and captivating the attention of the popular press. Yet the very practice of face-to-face diplomacy involves behavior on the part of political leaders that political scientists should find puzzling.

First, why are diplomatic visits conducted by leaders themselves, rather than by their agents? Given the high opportunity costs of leaders' time, and the disparity in policy-specific knowledge between heads of state and the specialists who staff their bureaucracies, a face-to-face conversation among leaders is unlikely to be the most efficient means of achieving a given policy objective. Second, why are diplomatic visits conducted in-person, despite the proliferation of technology that facilitates long-

distance communication? The general upward trend in frequency of visits over time, reported in Figure 1, suggests that in-person visits are serving a function beyond the mere exchanging of ideas and information, which can increasingly be done via phone call or video conference. Relatedly, why do visits so often involve a public component, such as a joint press conference, a photographed handshake, or a tour of an iconic landmark or monument? And finally, why are visits treated as a thing of material value that can be proffered or withheld as part of an international exchange?

In this article, we propose a novel theory to resolve these questions, centered around the publicness of a visit, the information it reveals, and the impact of that information on domestic political contestation. Recent literature has made considerable advances in explaining the functions of face-to-face diplomacy within the context of international conflicts and hostilities, from its role in deterring foreign aggression (McManus 2018) to its efficacy in facilitating peace agreements through interpersonal empathy (Holmes and Yarhi-Milo 2016). Yet crisis diplomacy is only one piece of the picture. The shaded bars in Figure 1 represent the proportion of U.S. presidential visits conducted with foreign leaders in the midst

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Matt Malis is PhD Student, Department of Politics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 2nd Floor, New York, NY 10012 (malis@nyu.edu). Alastair Smith is Professor, Department of Politics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 2nd Floor, New York, NY 10012 (alastair.smith@nyu.edu).


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**FIGURE 1 Diplomatic Visits by U.S. Presidents**



Note: Gray bars represent total days spent visiting abroad, plus total days spent hosting visitors, divided by total days in office. Diagonal lines indicate presidential visits conducted with a leader who is experiencing an international crisis.

of international crises;<sup>1</sup> we see that an overwhelming majority of top-level U.S. visits occur as part of the routine conduct of diplomatic relations, outside the context of crisis situations, and thus remain largely unaccounted for by existing theories of in-person diplomacy. To explain this pervasive and puzzling phenomenon, we develop a theory that relates diplomatic exchange to political survival. With evidence from U.S. diplomatic visits from 1960 to 2013, we show that a visit with the U.S. president dramatically reduces an incumbent's risk of removal from office.

Our theory conceptualizes the state visit—defined here as any face-to-face diplomatic meeting between foreign leaders<sup>2</sup>—as a signal of the recipient leader's strength in the face of domestic opposition. Across the spectrum of regime types, the decision to challenge an incumbent leader requires forming an assessment of the leader's secu-

rity in office under incomplete information. For a citizen participating in a protest, an elite member orchestrating a coup, or an interest group or a voting bloc switching political loyalties, a challenge against the incumbent is beneficial if it succeeds but costly if it fails. The likely outcome of such a challenge depends on the strength of the incumbent's hold on power, which a potential challenger cannot know with certainty.

Interstate diplomacy always occurs in the shadow of this domestic competition. When an incumbent leader receives a visit from a foreign power, that leader's domestic opponents learn something from the occurrence of the visit; namely, they learn that the foreign power determined the leader to be worth visiting. The foreign power might hope to extract some future deal or concession from the incumbent, or view the incumbent as a valuable partner (or a necessary if undesired collaborator) in some international policy objective. In any case, the visit represents an investment made by the visitor in pursuit of a future political benefit, the enjoyment of which depends on his or her diplomatic counterpart remaining in office. And because a visit entails a substantial opportunity cost for the visitor—as well as a potential reputational cost, in the case of an adverse outcome—observers cannot dismiss the visit as mere “cheap talk.” Rather, the visit credibly reveals the visitor's private assessment of the incumbent's stability in office.

Two interconnected mechanisms thus induce a relationship between state visits and their recipients' survival in office. First, a *selection* process leads the foreign power to conduct visits with leaders who are *ex ante* more secure in office. This selection effect follows from the visitor's prospective assessment as to which diplomatic investments will yield the greatest returns in expectation. Second, as a consequence of the selection mechanism and the information it reveals, a diplomatic visit performs a *deterrent* function, which strengthens the recipient leader's hold on power. This deterrent effect follows from the belief among the leader's domestic opponents that the visitor is privy to some relevant information to which they themselves may not be—information pertaining to the leader's political health, the nature and severity of the threats he or she faces, or any international factors that may affect the domestic balance of power.<sup>3</sup> Upon observing the signal of the visit, potential challengers become less optimistic that a challenge against the incumbent will succeed, so they become less likely to take part in one.

<sup>1</sup>Specifically, we code a U.S. visit with a foreign leader as occurring during a crisis if that leader's country is listed as an actor in any crisis, as defined by the International Crisis Behavior Project, at any point in the same calendar year as the visit. A similar analysis reveals that only a small minority of visits occur in the same year as a militarized interstate dispute.

<sup>2</sup>Our use of the term *state visit* is a slight abuse of terminology. In diplomatic circles, state visits carry a distinct meaning from other forms of bilateral exchange between leaders, such as official visits or working visits. Our usage here is simply intended to capture any in-person meeting between political leaders of different states that features some public component.

<sup>3</sup>This informational structure complements existing theories of domestic opponents revealing private information to foreign observers; see Schultz (1998).

In short, state visits are both cause and consequence of leader survival.

World powers, of course, have a range of options for supporting their allies' survival in office, as well as various media of exchange for conducting their international dealings. Why would in-person diplomacy be the weapon of choice in achieving a foreign policy objective? Though visits may be accompanied by other forms of material support, the visit itself carries distinct advantages over those other instruments: Its costs—opportunity and reputational costs alike—are more directly borne by the visiting leader himself; its targets are more freely chosen at the discretion of the visiting leader;<sup>4</sup> and its occurrence is more immediately observed and understood by an information-constrained domestic audience. The theorized signaling mechanism need not depend on any sort of premeditation or collusion between sender and receiver. The information conveyed by the visit arises naturally from the foreign power's incentive to invest diplomatic capital in relations with stable incumbents.

Our theoretical model gives rise to the central empirical prediction that visits from a foreign power enhance the recipient leader's survival in office. This prediction receives strong support from examination of U.S. diplomatic activity from 1960 to 2013: A leader's risk of removal is reduced by an estimated 50–70% following a visit to the United States or a visit from the U.S. president to that leader's home country. The analyses condition on a wide range of publicly observable measures of leader strength, supporting the notion that visits serve to reveal the visitor's private information. Visits reduce the risk of both regular and irregular removal, for leaders who do and do not receive bilateral U.S. aid, and their impacts persist both on and off the recipient's election years (and more strongly in the latter). Visits are systematically reciprocated with policy concessions, in the form of voting alignment in the United Nations General Assembly and receipt of U.S. exports. And consistent with our theorized informational mechanism, a visit's impact is greatest for those leaders who appear to be the least desirable U.S. diplomatic partners.

Beyond the empirical implications that we test directly, our theory proves consistent with a number of claims and empirical patterns reported elsewhere in the literature. For one, the starting point of our analysis comports with the conclusion of Lebovic and Saunders's (2016, p. 107) recent assessment of U.S. diplomatic travel, which finds "some evidence of domestic

(including individual-level) influences on diplomacy, but only limited evidence that times of crisis produce distinct patterns in face-to-face encounters." Our theory further provides a microfounded explanation for why visits tend to correlate with economic exchange (Nitsch 2007), why visits are conducted even when they risk inciting a "backlash effect" in public opinion toward the visitor (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009), and why visits can serve as a "trade sweetener" in an interstate exchange, providing the recipient with intangible benefits that prove "advantageous for domestic reasons" (Goldstein 2008). These implications all follow from our theory of the diplomatic visit as a mechanism of strategic information transmission in the context of domestic political contestation. In sum, this study demonstrates that in-person diplomacy is a powerful yet underexamined instrument of statecraft through which world leaders can influence political developments abroad.

## State Visits and Leader Survival

We begin with an informal presentation of our theoretical argument, illustrated by a series of case studies.<sup>5</sup> Throughout the discussion, we differentiate between a foreign power who grants a visit and a domestic incumbent who receives it; our focus is on the political survival of the latter. The primary distinction of interest in our theory pertains to characteristics of the two leaders and the countries they lead, rather than the location of the visit itself, so we apply the same terminology to refer to the respective leaders regardless of where the visit occurs. After formalizing our argument in the subsequent section, we will return to a more precise discussion of the nature of the relationship between the two leaders and the scope conditions under which our theory should apply.

### Visits as Exchange

State visits, especially those granted by major world powers, are often highly valued by the recipient. As such, visits can be proffered as one end of an exchange between the two states. One prominent beneficiary of this tactic was Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, who was known to place considerable stock in state visits with his European counterparts. In 1978, the British government advised the Queen that granting a state visit was

<sup>4</sup>This is in contrast to other policy instruments—foreign aid allocations, troop deployments, trade concessions, and so on—that are subject to greater institutional constraints.

<sup>5</sup>See pages 20–21 in the supporting information (SI) for additional archival evidence illustrating our proposed theoretical mechanisms.

a “mandatory” component of an arms deal with Ceausescu; a trade deal in the automotive industry between France and Romania was likewise smoothed out by a state visit, which French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing later described as an “unavoidable calamity” (Goldstein 2008). A series of diplomatic visits in 2007 between French president Nicolas Sarkozy and Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi reveals a similar type of exchange taking place. Publicly, these visits culminated in the announcement of economic deals including Libya’s purchase of €10 billion of Airbus planes and a grant of exclusive negotiating rights to French weapons manufacturers for Libya’s future arms purchases (Murphy and Gehmlich 2007); more recently, it has been alleged (though not yet adjudicated) that preceding the visits, the Libyan government illicitly contributed €50 million to Sarkozy’s 2007 election campaign (McAuley 2018). These substantial concessions by Gaddafi do not seem to have purchased anything from Sarkozy beyond the visits themselves. Incidentally, a state visit also played a role in Gaddafi’s ultimate removal in 2011. When the Obama administration sought United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval for military intervention in Libya, the African nation of Gabon provided a crucial vote in support of Resolution 1973, which passed with just one vote more than required. In return, President Barack Obama granted Gabonese president Ali Bongo Ondimba a White House visit in June 2011, hosting him at the president’s private guest residence. Bongo publicly called for Gaddafi to step down during the visit, being the first African leader to do so, and providing an important source of support and legitimation for a major foreign policy priority of the Obama administration (O’Grady 2016).

The pattern that emerges across these examples is that of an incumbent leader making some material concession to a foreign power in exchange for a diplomatic visit. A natural question that arises, then, is why these leaders find a visit to be something of value. We propose that the answer can be found in the visit’s impact on leader survival. In political settings like those governed by Ceausescu, Gaddafi, and Bongo, citizens or ruling coalition members who wish to overthrow their leader are incompletely informed as to the leader’s ability to withstand a challenge to power. Taking subversive action against the incumbent pays off if the attempt is successful and the leader is removed; if the leader survives, unsuccessful challengers should expect to suffer retribution. The decision of whether or not to take part in an opposition effort thus depends on one’s belief of the incumbent’s strength in office. In this context, any credible, public signal of the leader’s strength can serve to deter potential opponents from taking action. So it is clear to see why

an incumbent would place considerable value on such a signal.

An in-person diplomatic visit provides a credible signal of the visitor’s high assessment of the recipient leader’s strength because of the conditional costs and benefits associated with the visit. Whatever future benefit the visitor hopes to gain from the visit—be it a direct concession, as in Ceausescu’s grant of Romanian market access to foreign exporters; a mutually beneficial agreement, as in Gaddafi’s purchase of Airbus planes; or a more diffuse commitment of support in foreign policy matters, as characterized the United States’ relationship with Gabon for the remainder of Obama’s tenure—its enjoyment will generally be contingent on the recipient of the visit remaining in office. That the foreign power in each case was willing to expend some effort in order to reap some conditional benefit demonstrated their confidence that their diplomatic counterpart would stay in office long enough to deliver that benefit.

### Information Conveyed by a Visit

This sort of public vote of confidence in an incumbent will influence his or her domestic opponents’ assessments of his or her strength insofar as they believe the foreign power to have access to some relevant information that they themselves do not observe directly.<sup>6</sup> The precise nature of this information will vary by context, but we can consider three general classes. First would be information pertaining directly to the incumbent’s political viability. As one colorful illustration, intelligence agencies work strenuously to develop assessments of foreign leaders’ personal health—which recent research has found to be an especially strong determinant of coalition loyalty and regime stability (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2018)—through means ranging from behavioral and psychological evaluation to surreptitious collection of biomedical evidence (Lewis 2016; Windrem 2004). World powers may likewise be privately informed on impending scandals or other liabilities that an incumbent faces. Perhaps more typically, the incumbent may simply have shared with the visitor some private (but at least partially verifiable) information relating to government finances, economic forecasts, internal security and intelligence capabilities, the coherence and loyalty of the ruling coalition, or any other factors that bear on the prospects of regime survival. The diplomatic visit would thus provide an external

<sup>6</sup>This follows a standard result from the information aggregation literature, whereby individual agents observe private signals drawn from a state-dependent distribution and update on the revelation of each other’s signals.



validation of certain facts that the incumbent would wish to communicate to his or her opponents directly but would lack credibility to do so.

The informational value of a visit may further arise from the multifaceted nature of the threats that an incumbent faces. Our formal model (presented below) depicts an interaction among an incumbent and a single challenger, but this is, of course, a simplification; from the perspective of any one challenger, the interests and capabilities of all other would-be challengers constitute an important and unknown determinant of the incumbent's durability in office. Casper and Tyson (2014) argue that regime insiders are incompletely informed as to their leader's ability to withstand a challenge from mass movements, and vice versa, and that each group is keenly attentive to any information revealed by the incumbent's interactions with the other. Previous work has also considered how, in fully democratic settings, voters and party activists alike face challenges in coordinating their decisions to support or oppose a given candidate—and how these coordination dilemmas may be resolved by commonly observed public signals (Dewan and Myatt 2007). These theories suggest that, insofar as a foreign power has some insight into the attributes and intentions of any one domestic actor, the diplomatic conduct of the former provides valuable information that may sway the decisions of other domestic actors.

Finally, domestic opponents are likely to believe the visiting power to be especially well informed with respect to international factors that shape the incumbent's survival prospects. These factors may include the direct assistance—economic and security, covert and overt alike—that the incumbent receives (or will soon receive) from third parties, multilateral organizations, or the visiting power itself.<sup>7</sup> Existing research has shown, theoretically and empirically, that a leader's survival in office can be bolstered by the receipt of foreign aid (Licht 2010); yet domestic observers may not be aware of the extent or kind of foreign support that their incumbent leader enjoys (Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Wood 2014; McManus and Yarhi-Milo 2017). If the visit communicates to domestic actors that the incumbent receives greater external backing than he or she otherwise would have expected, that information will perform a deterrent function, discouraging opposition efforts and thus bolstering the leader's durability to an even greater extent than would the material support alone.

<sup>7</sup>In the latter case, we maintain a conceptual distinction between the material support and the diplomatic visit that publicizes the material support. We discuss this distinction further in the "Visits and Policy Concessions" section below.

It is worth noting that domestic opponents need not believe the foreign power to be strictly *better* informed than they are as to their own leader's strength, but simply that he or she be *independently* informed, drawing his or her inferences (at least in part) from a separate set of sources and observations. When assessing signals sent by a major world leader, who oversees massive intelligence and diplomatic bureaucracies tasked with gathering information on foreign governments and political developments, such a belief on the part of domestic opponents is certainly well founded. So by our theory, the aforementioned visits played an important role in suppressing, for some time, the discontent that ultimately manifested in Libya's 2011 rebellion, and in securing Bongo's hold on power shortly after he entered office in the wake of the previous president's unexpected death due to cardiac failure (O'Grady 2016). Had d'Estaing believed Ceausescu to be less secure in office, a visit with him would not have been an "unavoidable calamity," but an entirely avoidable one—and the decision to avoid it would have been far less discouraging to Ceausescu's domestic opponents.

### Costs of a Visit

A crucial feature enabling the state visit to serve as a credible signal of incumbent strength is that it imposes costs on the visitor. These costs can take various forms. First, there is a simple opportunity cost, which is borne regardless of the outcome of the visit: Traveling abroad entails a considerable investment of a leader's time, in addition to that of his or her subordinates, which cannot then be spent pursuing other political objectives. As will become clear through our formal model, the central claims relating diplomatic visits to leader survival are supported if this opportunity cost is the only cost that the foreign power faces. Yet we can also conceive of the visiting leader facing the prospect of some reputational cost, imposed by his or her own domestic audience or by other international observers, if the recipient of the visit is removed from office shortly after the visit. We should note that a number of factors render these costs difficult to observe and quantify explicitly: Reputational costs can be diffuse and should rarely be borne on the equilibrium path of play (Schultz 2001). But we might gain some understanding of these costs by considering those cases in which a visit notably does *not* occur.

One telling example can be found in U.S. diplomatic relations with Nicaragua during the latter half of the Cold War. U.S. presidents exchanged visits with Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza DeBayle in 1967, 1968, 1970, and 1971, and Richard Nixon sent his Secretary of State

to Managua in 1973; but in the face of an increasing challenge to power from the Sandinista National Liberation Front, deteriorating economic conditions, and worsening human rights abuses by the Somoza government, visits were cut off for the remainder of Somoza's tenure. Importantly, however, U.S. bilateral aid and covert assistance were maintained at high levels through Somoza's removal in 1979. It does not seem to be the case that U.S. presidents no longer wanted Somoza to remain in office after 1973; rather, what they wanted to avoid was any public demonstration of *wanting* him to remain in office after that point.

A similar pattern can be observed in recent U.S. relations with Egypt. Prior to the unanticipated revolution of January 2011, Egypt was a frequent recipient of U.S. diplomatic visits, accompanied by broad declarations of partnership and support and regular deliveries of military assistance. Yet with the outbreak of large-scale protests, despite deep interest in the political outcome, the Obama administration was careful not to engage directly with Mubarak. President Obama did not meet with Mubarak during this time, nor did his Secretary of State, nor any other current State Department officials; instead, the administration sent a former ambassador, who had been out of government service for over a decade, as an envoy to communicate U.S. views (Stolberg 2011). This tactic, we argue, was employed so as to avoid any impression of showing support to the imminently collapsing Mubarak regime. In contrast, Obama did not hesitate to extol his strong relationship with King Abdullah II of Jordan during a televised visit in the Oval Office in May 2011, amidst several months of major antigovernment protests throughout the kingdom. Sure enough, King Abdullah proved capable of weathering that particular political storm.

Generalizing from these examples, we suggest that powerful world leaders expect to face some reputational cost for engaging diplomatically with incumbents who are soon to be deposed. A large body of research considers how domestic audiences can draw inferences regarding a leader's competence from observing his or her performance in international crises, and punish and reward him or her accordingly (Smith 1998; Tarar 2006). We suggest that a leader may be similarly sanctioned by his or her domestic audience for more routine diplomatic missteps. By this logic, U.S. presidents did not want to be seen investing energy in relations with Somoza or Mubarak, or in trying to support their survival in office, when it would soon be revealed that those efforts were for naught. Alternatively, a leader's reputational incentives may be shaped by the audience's normative concerns. Whereas voters in the United States, for instance, generally prefer to promote

democracy and human rights abroad, they understand that other priorities can override these cosmopolitan motives (Brancati 2014); diplomatic engagement with dictators is often accepted as a necessary evil. However, once an undemocratic leader is removed from office, any support he or she received from the U.S. president appears, in retrospect, to have been less necessary and less morally justifiable. World leaders, not wanting to find themselves on the "wrong side of history," will avoid public displays of support to illegitimate regimes on the verge of collapse. Thus the combination of Somoza's human rights violations and his tenuous hold on power rendered him a prime candidate for material assistance but a toxic partner for diplomatic visits.

## Formal Model

We now turn to a formalization of our argument linking diplomatic visits to leader survival. Due to space constraints, we offer a stylized treatment here, with a full analysis deferred to SI Appendix 1.

Our model features two strategic actors. The first, labeled *F* for *Foreign Leader*, can either visit or not visit the incumbent who is at risk of removal. The second, labeled *C* for *Citizen*, can attempt to remove the incumbent or abstain from doing so. This *C* player might represent a group of citizens who can participate in a protest or rebellion; a member or faction of a ruling coalition who can take part in a coup; an interest group or voting bloc within a political coalition that can endorse an electoral challenger; or any other actor who may be pivotal in unseating an incumbent. Our model of the domestic interaction between the citizen and incumbent draws from the literature on global games of regime change, in which individual agents must coordinate under incomplete information regarding a state of the world in order to upend a status quo (Casper and Tyson 2014; Dewan and Myatt 2007; Malis and Smith 2019; Morris and Shin 2003). We simplify our model to include only a single citizen; the substantive intuition is similar to that of the many-agent game, though in the latter case the impact of a diplomatic visit would be amplified by the citizens' strategic coordination.

Whether a challenge against the incumbent succeeds depends on the state variable,  $\theta$ : If *C* attempts to remove the incumbent and  $\theta < 0$ , regime change (*RC*) occurs; but if *C* attempts removal and  $\theta \geq 0$ , or if *C* does not attempt removal, the status quo (*SQ*) is maintained. This latent  $\theta$ , which we refer to as regime strength, captures a multitude of incumbent characteristics—his control over

resources or over the security apparatus, his latent popularity among the elites or masses, his ability to promote economic growth, or even the degree of foreign backing he enjoys—and reduces them to a single dimension for analytical tractability. In keeping with the global games literature, neither  $F$  nor  $C$  observes  $\theta$  directly, but rather each receives noisy public and private signals. The sequence of the game is as follows: Both players observe their signals and form beliefs about  $\theta$ ;  $F$  decides whether or not to visit; and, having observed  $F$ 's decision,  $C$  decides whether or not to challenge the incumbent.

The players' payoffs are represented as follows:

Citizen		$\theta < 0$	$\theta \geq 0$
Challenge		$\delta$	$-\kappa$
Abstain		0	0

Foreign Power	Status Quo	Regime Change
Visit	$\psi + \eta - \omega$	$-\lambda - \omega$
Not Visit	$\psi$	0

An individual who participates in a successful challenge enjoys a benefit  $\delta$ , which can represent either selective benefits awarded by the incoming leadership, or the expressive utility of participating in political change. An unsuccessful challenge against the ruler yields (in expectation) a retaliation cost of  $\kappa$ . The foreign power's payoff is likewise a function of the action he takes and the outcome of the domestic power struggle.  $F$  enjoys an unconditional benefit  $\psi$  from the incumbent's retaining office, regardless of whether or not  $F$  visits; this can either reflect a genuine affinity for or policy alignment with the incumbent, as compared to his likely replacement, or a simple preference for avoiding instability and disruption of the status quo. The  $\eta$  term represents the additional payoff from whatever deal, concession, or future favor the incumbent can offer in exchange for the visit. Regardless of whether the incumbent survives in office,  $F$  pays a cost of  $\omega$  for visiting, representing the opportunity cost of  $F$ 's time and resources that the visit consumed.  $F$  pays an additional reputational cost of  $\lambda$  if the incumbent is removed following the visit. From this payoff structure, we observe that a citizen will only participate in a challenge when she is sufficiently confident it will succeed, and a foreign leader will only visit when he is sufficiently confident the incumbent will survive.

Of central interest in our model is the impact of a diplomatic visit on the citizen's posterior belief of regime strength. Given that  $F$  is incentivized to visit strong incumbents, and given that  $F$ 's decision is based partly on

his private information,  $F$ 's decision of whether or not to visit has the effect of credibly revealing that private information. The citizen incorporates this revelation into her own private assessment of regime strength; and for a range of citizen types, the observation of a visit deters her from challenging the incumbent when she otherwise would.

## Hypotheses

Equilibrium analysis yields a number of testable empirical implications, which we discuss here and derive formally in SI Appendix 1.

*H1 (Selection):* The foreign power is more likely to visit (a) incumbents whom he or she believes, on the basis of private and public information, to be stronger in office; (b) incumbents with greater policy concessions to offer; and (c) incumbents with whom  $F$  has a higher baseline affinity.

Because the foreign power faces conditional costs and benefits from a visit, the desirability of the visit increases in the size of the benefits and in the likelihood of the incumbent remaining in office long enough to deliver them. An important implication of this hypothesis is that, after perfectly conditioning on all public information of regime strength and all measures of costs, benefits, and baseline affinity, we would still expect to observe variation in  $F$ 's visit decision that is driven by  $F$ 's private information. This leads to our second hypothesis:

*H2 (Deterrence):* A visit from a foreign power reduces an incumbent's risk of removal from office.

A visit credibly reveals  $F$ 's confidence in the incumbent's survival; because  $F$  has some private information, this revelation deters (some subset of) the incumbent's opponents from mounting a challenge; and challenges may be deterred even when they would have succeeded in unseating the incumbent.

The next hypothesis relates to factors that moderate the effects of visits on regime survival.

*H3 (Ex Ante Likelihood):* A visit has a greater impact on regime survival when public information indicates that a visit is *ex ante* less likely to occur.

This relationship is depicted graphically in SI Figure A1 and the intuition is straightforward. If publicly

observable conditions suggest that an incumbent is likely to receive a visit, the occurrence of a visit is unsurprising; so the domestic opponents do not substantially revise their posterior beliefs of regime strength relative to their prior beliefs, and the visit reduces the risk of removal only slightly. If, on the other hand, prior conditions indicate that the foreign power is extremely unlikely to visit, the occurrence of the visit is highly informative, as the citizens infer that the foreign power must have observed an especially positive private signal of regime strength. A visit under such conditions should have a significantly greater effect in reducing the incumbent's risk of removal. Finally:

*H4 (Policy Concessions)* Conditional on surviving in office, the recipient of a visit reciprocates the visitor with a policy concession.

That visits constitute one end of a material exchange between leaders is central to our explanation of why visits occur with the frequency that they do, and the conditional nature of that exchange explains why visits provide credible public signals of incumbent strength.

## Scope

Having formalized our theoretical argument, we can now consider more explicitly the scope of its applicability. First, in what types of political setting does a “citizen” face a payoff structure like the one we have presented? Although the nature of political contestation varies drastically across regime types, a unifying feature is the incentive of political actors to fight on the winning side. Dissatisfied citizens want to participate in successful protests and uprisings; power-hungry elites want to enlist in successful coup plots; opportunistic activists and organized interests want to align themselves with successful leadership challenges; and each of these activities is far less desirable *ex post* when it proves unsuccessful in unseating an incumbent. It is this feature of political contestation that we foreground in our model of domestic politics.

The payoff structure we describe may be most obviously applicable in a nondemocratic context, where the political status quo is widely undesirable and the costs of a failed challenge are severe. But these incentives are certainly not unique to autocratic systems. A similar logic drives the decisions of actors in democratic settings—individual voters, communities, interest groups, or parties in parliamentary systems—in which targeted provision of public benefits is conditioned on past political support. In these contexts, the cost of backing a failed challenger ( $-\kappa$ , in the model) may be better understood

as the foregone benefits, in the form of pork, patronage, or favorable policy, which the *C* player would have enjoyed had she supported the incumbent. Schwartz (1987) models an individual's decision to vote as being driven not by her expected pivotality in the electoral outcome, but rather by her expectation of being pivotal in determining the size of rewards that the electoral winner later delivers to her community. For a voter in this situation, regardless of her true ideological position, it is *ex post* preferable to have been supportive of the winning candidate. Adida et al. (2020) likewise theorize voters in developing democracies as facing coordination dilemmas in moving away from inefficient clientelistic equilibria, and they show that public information helps overcome these dilemmas. A diplomatic visit, we argue, can serve a similar role in coordinating voters' decisions. The logic of public benefits being conditioned on electoral support may be an even better characterization of the behavior of organized interests, firms, unions, or minority parties within a coalition, whose political efforts during a campaign are more visible and more likely to be decisive in the electoral outcome (as compared to individual voters). The necessary condition for our model's applicability is that the “citizen” in a given context have an incentive to support whichever candidate proves successful, but must make her decision in the face of uncertainty.

The next question to consider is what types of foreign leader can be represented by our model's *F* player. The model first requires that the foreign power have some private information about the incumbent's strength. Recall that *F*'s action can be informative and influential even if his private information is less precise than the private signal observed by the domestic opponents. That the U.S. federal government, for instance, has spent \$75 billion per year in intelligence over the last decade (DeVine 2018) suggests that its private signals should actually be quite precise and, hence, that a U.S. diplomatic visit should be quite informative.

In addition, the model requires that the foreign power have a wide range of foreign policy objectives that a concession ( $\eta$ ) from another leader can help accomplish. The formal results do not depend on a strictly positive value of  $\psi$ , meaning that our theory can account for visits that occur when the foreign power has no baseline affinity for the incumbent. In fact, a sufficient condition for the existence of an informative equilibrium is simply that  $\eta > \omega > 0$ : A visit is *ex post* beneficial for the visitor if and only if the incumbent survives. While our model allows for *F* to be susceptible to a reputational cost for backing failed incumbents, the results do not require it; the central claims hold if the foreign power is only constrained by the opportunity cost of his time.



Intuitively, it would seem that if the above conditions hold for any major power, they would do so to the fullest degree for the United States. As such, we focus our empirical analysis on diplomatic visits of the U.S. president.

## Empirical Analysis

Our theory gives rise to the central empirical implication that leaders who receive diplomatic visits from major foreign powers face a lower risk of removal from office than those who do not. This prediction arises from two intrinsically related mechanisms: a selection effect, whereby stronger leaders are more likely to receive a visit, and a deterrent effect, whereby the visit itself enhances the recipient leader's survival. The remainder of the article seeks to provide empirical evidence in support of these two mechanisms and the additional hypotheses presented above.

## Data and Estimation

We test our theoretical predictions with data on diplomatic visits by U.S. presidents from 1960 to 2013. These data are available on the website of the State Department's Office of the Historian, with visits listed separately by travels of the president abroad and visits of foreign leaders to the United States. We construct our main independent variables of interest as a series of indicator variables at the leader-year level: *Visit in United States*, *Visit from U.S. Pres.*, and a pooled measure, *Any Visit*, which takes on a value of 1 if either type of visit occurs. The primary dependent variable in our analysis is leader survival in office, for which we use Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza's (2009) Archigos data set.

We seek to operationalize a range of other quantities from our theoretical model. First, our empirical analysis must, to the extent possible, take account of the publicly observable information regarding regime strength. If we could condition perfectly on all factors that constitute this public information, then any systematic relationship that remained between visits and leader survival would be attributable to the visitor's private information and the revelation thereof. To this end, the subsequent analyses include controls for GDP growth, income, and population; political institutions; leader age and resource rents, which have been found to be strong predictors of survival in office (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2018; Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2015); rotating UNSC membership, which has been shown to yield a range of survival-relevant benefits for member-state leaders (Vreeland and Dreher 2014);

and incidence of protests, strikes, riots, and government purges, all of which indicate some degree of political instability. Because we wish to identify the *informational* impact of visits, independent of any material benefits that may accompany them, we include controls for trade with and aid from the visiting foreign power, as well as the recipient's status as a mutual defense ally with the foreign power. We also want to avoid any spurious correlation that would arise from foreign powers refraining from visiting an incumbent during the latter's election year, so we control for the occurrence of elections for the office of the national leader.

From Archigos's record of leaders' dates of birth, we create the control variable *Relative Age*, which is normalized by subtracting from a leader's age in a given year the life expectancy in Sweden at that time, as a proxy for life expectancy under the best available medical care. We use Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues' (2003) Selectorate (*S*) and Winning Coalition (*W*) size as measures of political institutions. *W* represents the relative number of supporters a leader needs to remain in office, and *S* denotes the pool of potential replacements for the winning coalition. A larger *W* corresponds to more democratic systems, and a lower *W/S* ratio indicates that a leader has a more secure hold on power. From Hyde and Marinov's (2012) NELDA data set, we create a dummy variable indicating whether an election occurred for the office of the national leader during a given leader-year observation (attributing an election only to the outgoing leader in the case of a transition). For the remaining data sources, see SI Table A1.

Our unit of observation is the leader-year. To test the first hypothesis regarding the selective assignment of visits, we estimate logit models with visits as the outcome. For Hypotheses 2 and 3, the primary outcome of interest is leader survival, so we conduct hazard analyses to estimate the impact of state visits. Specifically, we use a Weibull proportional hazards model, of the form  $h(t_j) = pt_j^{p-1} e^{(X_{jt}\beta)}$ , where leaders are indexed by *j*, *t* indicates a leader's year in office, and  $X_{jt}$  is a vector of covariates, including the visit indicators. We specify the shape parameter *p* as a function of *W*, the winning coalition size, with  $p = e^{(\alpha + W_{jt}\gamma)}$ ; this allows a leader's baseline hazard rate,  $h_0(t_j) = pt_j^{p-1}$ , to vary by regime type. Finally, we examine whether visits are reciprocated with policy concessions using a series of fixed effects ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models.

## Main Results: Selection and Deterrence

We first consider the factors that predict U.S. diplomatic visits, as per Hypothesis 1. The three columns of Table 1

**TABLE 1 Predictors of U.S. Presidential Visits (Logit)**

	Visit from U.S. President (1)	Visit in U.S. (2)	Any Visit (3)
Relative Age	−0.011 <sup>+</sup> (0.006)	−0.017*** (0.005)	−0.018*** (0.005)
Winning Coalition	−0.438 (0.467)	0.511 <sup>+</sup> (0.310)	0.451 (0.292)
Selectorate	0.572 (0.480)	0.549** (0.206)	0.494* (0.206)
Election	−0.326 <sup>+</sup> (0.167)	−0.496*** (0.118)	−0.539*** (0.110)
Ln(Pop)	0.163 (0.100)	−0.020 (0.086)	−0.004 (0.081)
Ln(GDP)	0.117 (0.121)	0.181* (0.079)	0.192* (0.081)
Growth	0.029* (0.014)	0.024*** (0.007)	0.027*** (0.008)
UNGA Ideal Pt. Dist. <sub><i>t</i>−1</sub>	−0.453*** (0.120)	−0.435*** (0.097)	−0.451*** (0.094)
UNSC (rotating)	−0.180 (0.179)	0.320** (0.123)	0.310* (0.125)
Instability Index <sub><i>t</i>−1</sub>	−0.201 (0.137)	−0.201** (0.069)	−0.243*** (0.069)
Ln(Imports from US <sub><i>t</i>−1</sub> )	0.427*** (0.117)	0.394*** (0.065)	0.414*** (0.067)
Ln(Exports to US <sub><i>t</i>−1</sub> )	−0.022 (0.087)	−0.125** (0.045)	−0.113* (0.046)
Ln(Econ Aid <sub><i>t</i>−1</sub> )	0.004 (0.017)	0.046*** (0.010)	0.045*** (0.010)
Ln(Mil Aid <sub><i>t</i>−1</sub> )	0.027* (0.012)	0.012 (0.009)	0.013 (0.009)
Ally <sub><i>t</i>−1</sub>	−0.216 (0.187)	−0.316 <sup>+</sup> (0.163)	−0.304* (0.155)
Resource Rents <sub><i>t</i>−1</sub> (% GDP) (imputed)	−0.003 (0.011)	−0.008 (0.008)	−0.010 (0.007)
Country Fixed Effects	No	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,864	6,023	6,023

*Note:* Observations are leader-years. Standard errors are clustered by country.

<sup>+</sup>p < .1, \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01, \*\*\*p < .001.

report the predictors of visits from the U.S. president, visits to the United States, and the pooled measure of visits in either location. The results across all three models are largely consistent with our theoretical predictions. U.S. presidents are more willing to grant visits to countries with larger economies, to those that receive more imports from the United States, and to those serving on the UN

Security Council, as those are the countries with more valuable concessions to offer. The United States conducts more visits with leaders for whom they have a stronger baseline affinity, as reflected in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) ideal point distance and bilateral economic and military aid. Presidents are reluctant to conduct visits with incumbents whose survival in

**TABLE 2 Weibull Hazard Analysis of Leader Removal**

	By Visit Type		Pooled	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Visit from U.S. President	−0.731*** (0.184)	−0.898*** (0.213)		
Visit in United States	−0.984*** (0.108)	−1.118*** (0.118)		
Any Visit			−1.083*** (0.107)	−1.242*** (0.118)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	6,023	6,023	6,023	6,023
Number of Leaders	1,156	1,156	1,156	1,156
Failures	955	955	955	955
Log-Likelihood	−976.063	−738.729	−972.825	−735.581

*Note:* Observations are leader-years. Failures are removal from office by any means. Covariates included but not reported: Rel. Age, W, S, Ln(Population), Ln(GDP), Growth, Ln(Riots<sub>*t*−1</sub>), Ln(Purges<sub>*t*−1</sub>), Ln(Strokes<sub>*t*−1</sub>), Ln(Protests<sub>*t*−1</sub>), Ln(Imports from US<sub>*t*−1</sub>), Ln(Exports to US<sub>*t*−1</sub>), Ln(Econ Aid<sub>*t*−1</sub>), Ln(Mil Aid<sub>*t*−1</sub>), Rotating UNSC Member, UNGA Ideal Pt. Distance<sub>*t*−1</sub>, Ally<sub>*t*−1</sub>, Resource Rents<sub>*t*−1</sub>. Full specification is reported in the supporting information. Standard errors are clustered by country.

\**p* < 0.05, \*\**p* < 0.01, \*\*\**p* < 0.001.

office is uncertain, as indicated by the incumbent's age, election timing, and measures of instability,<sup>8</sup> but they are eager to visit leaders whose security in office is buoyed by high economic growth. A country's winning coalition size (a close analog to measures of democracy or autocracy) is not a robust predictor of visits; however, holding *W* constant, a larger selectorate size—which enhances a leader's security in office—does increase the likelihood of a visit. That visits are positively predicted by imports *from* the United States, but negatively predicted by exports *to* the United States, suggests that visits do not merely follow economic activity, but rather serve as a thing of value offered by the president in exchange for a grant of market access.

The tests of our second hypothesis—that visits enhance the recipient's survival—are reported in Table 2. Columns 1 and 2 report the effects of visits differentiated by location. These results show that visits to the United States and visits from the U.S. president are strong predictors of leader survival in office, significant at *p* < .001. Columns 3 and 4 pool these different types of visit into a single explanatory variable, *Any Visit*. In all models, the magnitude of the effects is substantial: The exponentiated

coefficients yield proportional hazard estimates ranging from 0.48 to 0.30, meaning that, all else equal, a visit is associated with a 51–70% reduction in the risk of removal from office. As reported in SI Appendixes 2.2–2.5, and discussed further below, these results are robust to a range of alternative measures and specifications, and they hold across various subsets of the sample.

Table 3 considers the effect of diplomatic visits on different means of leader removal, as coded by the Archigos data set. Regular removals are defined as cases in which “the leader is removed in accordance with explicit rules or established conventions of his or her particular country,” with all other removals coded as irregular. Visits dramatically reduce the risk of both regular and irregular removal, and the impact is substantially larger for irregular removal (though less precisely estimated, given the relative infrequency of irregular removal). This finding is consistent with the notion that coordination dilemmas are especially acute when it comes to removing a leader by irregular means, and that public signals are especially important in overcoming the inherent risk and uncertainty that accompany such an effort. In a similar vein, the relationship between visits and survival is substantially weaker during the recipient leader's election year, as compared to off-election years, indicating that visits are most effective in deterring extra-institutional challenges against the incumbent.

<sup>8</sup>The instability measure used here is an inverse covariance weighted index, constructed from counts of protests, riots, strikes, and purges. See SI Appendix 2.1 for details.

TABLE 3 Weibull Hazard Analysis of Leader Removal, by Means of Removal

	Regular (1)	Irregular (2)	Any Removal (3)
Visit from U.S. President	−0.869*** (0.212)	−1.800* (0.797)	−1.420*** (0.380)
Visit in United States	−1.156*** (0.123)	−1.583*** (0.423)	−1.273*** (0.161)
Election	1.804*** (0.128)	0.631** (0.241)	1.589*** (0.114)
Visit from U.S. President × Election			0.874+ (0.451)
Visit in United States × Election			0.226 (0.207)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,193	6,193	6,193
Number of Leaders	1,183	1,183	1,183
Failures	791	182	975
Log-Likelihood	−607.419	−210.557	−738.292

Note: Observations are leader-years. All controls from Table 2 are included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered by country.

\*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

### The Informational Mechanism

To examine more thoroughly the informational mechanism linking visits to regime survival, we seek to test Hypothesis 3: that the impact of a visit on leader survival is greatest when a visit is *ex ante* least likely to occur. Tests of this hypothesis are complicated by the fact that multiple factors—public knowledge of regime (in)stability, baseline affinity, reputational costs, and potential concessions—contribute to the *ex ante* likelihood of a visit, and that we lack direct measures of each. We can, however, employ various proxy measures. Table 4 uses the incidence of strikes, protests, riots, and purges as indicators of the common prior knowledge of regime instability. In particular, the first column uses a composite index of these incidents, whereas the second uses a binary measure indicating whether any such event occurred in the year before the visit. Following the Hypothesis 3 prediction of a conditional effect of diplomatic visits, we repeat the hazard analyses from Table 2 while interacting the instability measures with the visit indicators. The magnitude and precision of the interactive estimates vary somewhat by specification, but all results point in the same direction: In the absence of a visit, instability increases the risk of removal; but if a visit occurs in the midst of political instability, the impact of the visit is substantially larger than the

impact of a visit granted to a regime perceived to be stable *ex ante*.

As additional evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, we show that the impact of a visit is highest for leaders toward whom the United States is especially critical in their human rights reporting. (This analysis is reported in SI Table A2 but omitted here due to space limitations.) Visiting such an incumbent is, *ceteris paribus*, less desirable for the U.S. president, and is *ex ante* less likely to occur. A visit under these conditions therefore reveals the U.S. assessment of the incumbent as an inevitable diplomatic partner, and thus provides an even stronger deterrent signal than does a visit with an incumbent toward whom the United States has a higher baseline affinity.

### Visits and Policy Concessions

As a further test of our theory's implications, we examine whether visits systematically yield policy concessions from the recipient leader. The first three columns of Table 5 report the results of separate tests with three outcomes: measures of ideal point distance from the United States in UNGA voting, using both a measure based on all UNGA votes and a measure based only on the subset of votes the U.S. State Department has identified as



**TABLE 4 Weibull Hazard Analysis of Leader Removal, by Regime Instability**

	(1)	(2)
Visit from U.S. President	−1.002*** (0.235)	−0.817*** (0.235)
Visit in United States	−1.137*** (0.119)	−0.876*** (0.130)
Instability Index <sub>t−1</sub>	0.149* (0.065)	
Visit from U.S. President × Instability Index <sub>t−1</sub>	−0.751* (0.330)	
Visit in United States × Instability Index <sub>t−1</sub>	−0.268 (0.200)	
Any Instability <sub>t−1</sub>		0.185* (0.092)
Visit from U.S. President × Instability Index <sub>t−1</sub>		−0.224 (0.350)
Visit in United States × Any Instability <sub>t−1</sub>		−0.648*** (0.190)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,023	6,023
Number of Leaders	1,156	1,156
Failures	955	955
Log-Likelihood	−738.662	−737.027

Note: Observations are leader-years. Failure is removal by any means. All controls from Table 2 (except for individual instability measures) are included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered by country.

+p < 0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

important; and the volume of imports received from the United States. Note that the outcome variables are measured with a one-year lead relative to the regressors, and that the units in the panel structure are leaders rather than countries; this provides us with an estimate of concessions following visits, conditional on the visit recipient remaining in office, which is precisely our theoretical quantity of interest. All three models find visits to be systematically reciprocated with concessions. Whereas the concessions reaped from diplomatic visits may often be case-specific and difficult to observe or quantify, we are able to identify concessions in these domains that apply broadly across countries in their relations with the United States.

The latter three columns of Table 5, however, provide more nuanced insight into the bilateral exchange that a diplomatic visit entails. Each of these outcomes—exports to the United States, and bilateral economic and military aid from the United States—represents a material benefit that the United States can offer the recipient leader

along with the visit; and each one increases following a visit *to* the United States, but not following a visit *from* the United States. In light of this observation, we can interpret a visit from the U.S. president as a more pure case of our theorized exchange: The U.S. president visits an incumbent, gives that incumbent little in the way of material support, but reaches an agreement for a future policy concession from the incumbent—and as a result, the incumbent's risk of removal is substantially decreased. This sequence of events is fully consistent with our theory and difficult to reconcile with other candidate explanations. The survival benefits of a visit *to* the United States, on the other hand, reflect a confluence of factors: the revelation of the U.S. president's private information, as well as the expectation among the incumbent's constituents of future material benefits from the United States. This may help account for the fact visits to the United States have a slightly larger coefficient in Table 2, despite the fact that a U.S. president traveling to the incumbent's country might incur a greater opportunity cost and thus carry a more informative signal.

That a visit to the United States may occur as part of a mutual exchange of material goods, however, does not obviate the importance of our theorized informational mechanism. At a basic level, an account focusing only on the material exchange would still need to provide some explanation as to why the leaders choose to publicize that exchange through a state visit. There may well be complementarities between public visits and material support; indeed, in related work, we demonstrate theoretically how publicity can serve as a force multiplier for material support, drawing attention to it and discouraging opposition efforts to a greater extent than would discreetly delivered assistance (Malis and Smith 2019). In any case, however, the role of the visit itself is fundamentally informational. As a robustness check, we split the sample by leaders who do and do not receive any bilateral military or economic aid from the United States, and find that the effects of visits (both in and out of the United States) persist across each subsample (see SI Table A3).

## Robustness and Alternative Explanations

The main results reported in Table 2 are robust to a range of alternative specifications, including using a Cox rather than a Weibull proportional hazards model (SI Table A5), replacing the winning coalition (W) measure with Polity score (SI Table A6), measuring covariates in  $t$  rather than  $t - 1$  (SI Table A7), imputing missing covariate values (SI Table A8), and disaggregating visits by their State Department classification (SI Table A9). In addition, we conduct

TABLE 5 Policy Concessions Following a Visit (OLS)

	UNGA Ideal Pt. Dist. <sub>t+1</sub> (All Votes)	(Important)	Imports from US <sub>t+1</sub> (ln)	Exports to US <sub>t+1</sub> (ln)	Econ. Aid from US <sub>t+1</sub> (ln)	Mil. Aid from US <sub>t+1</sub> (ln)
Visit from U.S. Pres.	−0.024** (0.009)	−0.041*** (0.012)	0.056** (0.021)	0.033 (0.030)	−0.017 (0.252)	−0.242 (0.228)
Visit in United States	−0.024** (0.008)	−0.037*** (0.009)	0.030* (0.015)	0.056** (0.021)	0.129 (0.108)	0.459** (0.149)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,981	3,374	5,005	5,005	5,005	5,005
R <sup>2</sup>	0.963	0.971	0.963	0.952	0.803	0.742

*Note:* Observations are leader-years. Controls included but not reported: W, S, Ln(Population), Ln(GDP), Growth, Ln(Econ. Aid<sub>t−1</sub>), Ln(Mil. Aid<sub>t−1</sub>), Ally<sub>t−1</sub>, Ln(Imports from US<sub>t−1</sub>), Ln(Exports to US<sub>t−1</sub>), UNGA Ideal Pt. Dist.<sub>t−1</sub>. Standard errors are clustered by country. <sup>+</sup>p < 0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

an instrumental variable analysis that leverages exogenous shifts in priorities between first- and second-term presidents (SI Tables A11 and A12). Results of all robustness tests are consistent with those reported in the main tables.

Given the robust evidence of a relationship between state visits and leader survival, and specific evidence consistent with our theorized mechanism, we finally consider whether other potential explanations could account for the same empirical findings. Perhaps the most natural line of criticism against our central claims is to argue that the observed relationship between visits and leader survival is driven entirely by a selection effect, and that no deterrence is in fact occurring. However, there are certain empirical patterns that are difficult to reconcile with a pure-selection interpretation. First, consider the evidence in Table 4, examining whether the relationship between visits and incumbent removal is conditioned by domestic instability. By a pure-selection argument, a leader's risk of removal would seem the most uncertain (and thus, the hardest for *F* to predict) under high instability; if he or she does visit under such conditions, the higher variance in potential outcomes would imply that he or she faces a higher risk of miscalculating, and visiting an incumbent who is subsequently removed. This would imply that domestic instability weakens the relationship between visits and leader removal. In fact, we observe the opposite: According to Table 4, the relationship between visits and the risk of removal is strongest (i.e., negative and greatest in magnitude) when the visit occurs in the midst of domestic instability, consistent with our deterrence hypothesis. The findings in Table 3 speak to a similar point: Insofar as regular removal is easier for an outside observer to anticipate than irregular removal, a selection-only argument would

predict a stronger relationship between visits and regular removal than between visits and irregular removal; and again we observe the opposite.

## Conclusion

Political leaders' time is severely limited and extremely valuable. When they spend substantial portions of their tenures traveling to foreign countries and engaging in seemingly symbolic acts of in-person diplomacy, analysts of international politics should take that behavior seriously. This is what we have endeavored to do in the present study.

We put forward a rationalist explanation for state visits, built from an account of foreign powers' incentives to invest in relationships with strong incumbents and challengers' incentives to participate in successful opposition efforts. A foreign power selectively assigns visits to incumbents who are more likely to survive in office, and this selection process publicly reveals the foreign power's private assessment of regime strength. Because domestic challengers are incompletely informed as to the incumbent's strength, they respond to the visit by lowering their expectation of the probability that a challenge will prove successful, and they become less likely to take action. This incentive structure and informational environment can characterize political competition across institutional contexts, whether a challenge against the incumbent entails orchestrating a coup, participating in a mass protest, or withdrawing electoral support. State visits enhance regime survival because they deter potential challengers,

who must balance risks and rewards under fundamental uncertainty.

Our findings speak to broader questions of how major world powers can influence political contestation abroad. We contribute to the body of “second-image reversed” accounts of international determinants of domestic politics (Gourevitch 1978) with a novel interpretation of a widely practiced form of statecraft, placing leaders’ survival incentives at the core of our theory. Akin to such widely studied phenomena as development aid, loans, arms transfers, and military intervention, the U.S. president’s choice to invest time and reputation into symbolic support for a foreign leader proves to be a powerful instrument for securing that leader’s hold on power. The ability of world leaders to shape foreign political developments through their diplomatic engagements is a largely unexplored feature of international politics, and one that is rich with opportunities for future research.

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## Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of the article.

### Appendix 1: Formal Model

- 1.1 Analysis
- 1.2 Bayesian Updating
- 1.3 Existence of Equilibria
- 1.4 Extension: Visits Home and Abroad

### Appendix 2: Empirical Analysis

- 2.1 Data notes and sources
- 2.2 Results omitted from main text
- 2.3 Robustness tests
- 2.4 Visit Classifications
- 2.5 Secretary of State Visits
- 2.6 Instrumental Variable Analysis

### Appendix 3: Archival Evidence