Which Way Out?
The Manner and Consequences of Losing Office

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Most of the burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature on the role of leaders in comparative politics and international relations is built on the assumption that leaders choose policies to stay in office. However, leaders can lose office in a variety of ways. Leaders can lose office as a result of ill health; they can lose office in a regular manner; or they can be removed in an irregular manner such as by a coup. How a leader loses office, moreover, significantly affects the leader's subsequent fate. A broader perspective on not just the probability, but also the manner of losing office—and its associated consequences—thus suggests an additional mechanism to explain the behavior of leaders. If policy significantly affects not just whether, but also how, leaders lose office, leaders might design policy to minimize the anticipated negative consequences of losing office. Once we unpack the manner in which leaders lose office, for example, we see that the postulated logic of diversionary war only holds for a subgroup of leaders: those who fear an irregular removal from office.

Keywords: leaders; conflict; diversionary war; coups

In both comparative politics and international relations, scholars focus more and more on the microincentives of the leaders who make the decisions and set policy. To that end, a generation of scholars since Anthony Downs (1957) adopted the simplifying assumption that leaders choose policies to stay in office. Leaders' choices then depend on the anticipated effect of their policies on their tenure, and leaders supposedly pick policies that maximize their time in office. Building on this assumption, scholars have argued that policies such as decisions to initiate or continue international conflict (Levy 1989; David 1991; Fearon 1994; G. Downs and Rocke 1994; Leeds and Davis 1997; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Colaresi 2004; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Lai and Slater 2006) impose or comply with

international sanctions (Marinov 2005), promote economic development (Bates 1981; Wintrobe 1998; Przeworski et al. 2000; Jones and Olken 2005), or time elections (Warwick 1994; A. Smith 2003; Kayser 2005), are fundamentally driven by the leader's desire to maximize his or her tenure in office. Clearly, the assumption that leaders choose policies to stay in office has proved enormously influential and fruitful in international relations as well as comparative and American politics.

Notwithstanding great strengths, the common focus on the *overall* tenure of leaders ignores some important variation in how leaders lose office, which can have important implications for the incentives and behavior of leaders. First, how leaders lose office is an important topic in its own right, as illustrated by the ongoing research into the causes (and consequences) of coups (O'Kane 1993; Londregan and Poole 1990; Belkin and Schofer 2003, 2005). Furthermore, how leaders lose office affects a host of other important political phenomena such as economic growth and international conflict behavior. Thus, Alesina et al. (1996) and Feng (1997) persuasively show that the anticipated irregular removal from office of a leader negatively affects economic growth. More fundamentally, how leaders lose office dramatically affects their postexit fate. If policies affect the hazard, manner, and consequences of losing office, leaders should anticipate these consequences and incorporate them into their decision making and policy choices. Leaders may thus base their policy choices on the consequences of losing office—associated with the manner of losing office—rather than on the overall probability of losing office. In one of the very few studies that take these factors into account, Goemans (2000) showed that an exclusive focus on the overall probability of losing office could not explain why leaders decided to continue, rather than terminate, World War I for four grueling years. A focus on the anticipated postexit fate of leaders, however, successfully explained why both German and Russian leaders continued what they realized to be a losing effort in World War I. In short, with the exception of Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller (1992), scholars have relied on one particular mechanism to explain the behavior of leaders: how policy affects the overall probability of losing office. An alternative mechanism has been almost entirely overlooked. Leaders may choose policy based on its effect on *how* they are likely to lose office, especially when this in turn strongly affects their postexit fate.

With the exception of the limited literature on coups, we know very little about the factors that determine how leaders lose office, their postexit fate, and any potential relationship between the two. To provide a baseline for further research in both international relations and comparative politics, I present and analyze a new data set on how leaders lose office as well as the postexit fate of leaders. I find a striking and strong correlation between the postexit fate of leaders and how they lost office. While only about 8 percent of leaders who lost office in a regular manner suffered exile, jail, or death, fully 80 percent of leaders who lost office in an irregular fashion suffered such punishment. Leaders thus have good reason to consider how they might lose office.

I consider domestic factors and leader characteristics but focus in particular on how international conflict affects the hazard of a regular as well as an irregular removal from office. A focus on international conflict allows me to illustrate that explicit consideration of how leaders lose office leads to predictions and hypotheses different from the predictions generated by the Downsian approach, which considers only the leader's *overall* probability of losing office. Specifically, the current literature on the diversionary use of force postulates that leaders who anticipate removal from office initiate international conflict because conflict can increase their tenure in office while their punishment is limited to the simple removal from office. Because the current literature does not consider that leaders may lose office in different ways, with different consequences for their postexit fate, I argue that empirical support for the thesis of the diversionary use of force has been decidedly mixed. Once I disaggregate how leaders can lose office, the reason for the mixed empirical support for this thesis becomes clear: international conflict barely affects the hazard of a regular removal from office but significantly affects the hazard of an irregular removal from office. My findings thus suggest that the logic of the diversionary use of force holds only for the subset of leaders who fear an irregular removal from office.

The article proceeds as follows. In the following three sections, I briefly review the literature on the diversionary use of force and then develop a new framework to analyze the relationship between international conflict and the risks of losing office in a regular and an irregular manner. The fifth section describes the research design and main variables. In the sixth section, I present the results of my analyses. In the conclusion, I summarize the findings and discuss the implications for the literature on tenure and the use of force.

The Costs and Benefits of International Conflict

To date, the diversionary use of force offers the best-known leader-level explanation for international conflict (Simmel 1898; Levy 1989; Richards et al. 1993; G. Downs and Rocke 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Gelpi 1997; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Until recently, this explanation relied on a psychological mechanism, the so-called in-group–out-group hypothesis articulated by Coser (1956). In the last decade, however, scholars have developed a second, rationalist mechanism to underpin the logic of diversionary conflict (Richards et al. 1993; G. Downs and Rocke 1994; Hess and Orphanides 1995; A. Smith 1996; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Tarar 2006; Goemans and Fey, forthcoming). This rationalist mechanism generally argues that leaders can rationally choose to initiate conflict when they do not anticipate a significantly higher probability of losing office as a result of defeat than they currently face—that is, their punishment is truncated—and victory increases their time in office.

Although there has been significant theoretical progress on the diversionary use of force, empirical support for the various versions of the theory has remained decidedly mixed (James 1987; Levy 1989; Chiozza and Goemans 2003). Thus, contrary to the theory, some scholars have found that the popularity of U.S. presidents (Meernik and Waterman 1996) is not significantly associated with the use of force. On the other hand, Morgan and Anderson (1999, 808) find that "lower levels of support for the [British] prime minister's party are a significant predictor of conflictual behavior on the part of British governments." Similarly, whether crises produce any rallying around the leaders remains hotly contested (Oneal and Bryan 1995; Baker and Oneal 2001; Lai and Reiter 2005). Chiozza and Goemans (2004a) recently found, contrary to the rationalist version of the theory, that victory does not significantly increase the tenure of leaders. (For an extensive and insightful discussion of the mixed record of the diversionary use of force hypothesis, see Oneal and Tir 2006, 757–60.) The weak evidence for what remains a plausible and powerful intuition has even led James (1987, 22) to lament, "Seldom has so much common sense in theory found so little support in practice." Scholars have, however, remained unable to identify why the theory has fared so poorly.

One set of explanations for the poor empirical track record of the theory focuses on the strategic interactions between challengers and targets to argue that leaders with diversionary incentives will not be given the opportunity to divert by their international opponents (A. Smith 1996). A second approach argues that regime type fundamentally affects incentives to divert (Gelpi 1997). Evidence for these amendments to the theory again remains mixed (Leeds and Davis 1997; Chiozza and Goemans 2004b; Miller 1999; Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Oneal and Tir 2006). This article lays the groundwork for an alternative explanation: international conflict fundamentally affects not just whether, but also how, leaders lose office and thereby structures their incentives to divert.

Two Processes of Removal

I propose that the manner and closely associated consequences of losing office—and therefore the private benefits of leaders—depend on at least two different political processes (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Popper 1963). The first process is *regular*, driven by the prevailing norms, rules, and procedures of each country and regime. The second process is *irregular* and involves the threat or use of force.[1] This second process typically involves military actors and culminates in coups.[2] These constitute two fundamentally different processes, which have a different impact on the consequences of losing office. Whereas the regular process typically leads to a peaceful retirement, the irregular process typically results in additional punishment. Successful coup leaders have incentives to make it more difficult, if not impossible, for the deposed leader to mobilize opposition and regain power. Therefore, such

irregular removals often result in the exile, imprisonment, or death of the former leader. Coups and coup threats therefore affect not only the leader's tenure, but also his or her subsequent fate.

International Conflict and Its Effects on the Processes of Removal

International conflict affects each of these processes of removal through its effects on the respective benefits, costs, and probability of success of attempts to replace the leader. I argue, in particular, that international conflict fundamentally affects the costs and probability of success of attempts to irregularly remove the leader. Subsequently, I explore how conflict roles as well as conflict outcomes affect the benefits, costs, and probability of success of attempts to replace the leader.

Challengers in international conflict enjoy the benefits of picking the time and place of their conflicts. I expect this to weakly affect the regular process because leaders in some countries can choose the timing of their elections. This allows such leaders to make the most of any, even if short-lived, rallying around the flag (DeRouen 2000). However, because relatively few countries allow for endogenous election timing, I expect a relatively weak effect. Since targets do not choose the time and place of conflict, they do not enjoy a similarly low hazard of regular removal from office. (Note that the traditional literature on diversionary conflict suggests that regardless of their conflict role, all leaders who face an external threat should enjoy a lowered hazard of losing office.)

> *Hypothesis 1, Conflict Roles and Regular Removal:* Challengers enjoy a lower hazard of a regular removal from office.

Once we shift our focus to the irregular removal from office, however, the conflict role of a leader can have more powerful effects. The initiation of international conflict can provide leaders unique opportunities to deal with potential coup plotters. Idi Amin, the leader of Uganda, attempted such a strategy to eliminate opposition from within the armed forces. In 1978, Amin's domestic control began to unravel, with a plummeting economy and unrest among his core supporters, the military (Omara-Otunnu 1987). Determined to maintain control, Amin began to purge his inner circle, most prominently his longtime second in command, vice president and commander of the armed forces General Idris Mustafa Adrisi (Avirgan and Honey 1982; G. Smith 1980). After Adrisi suffered a highly suspicious car accident, his supporters in the army, particularly the crack Simba (Lion) Regiment and the Chui (Leopard) Regiment, began an open revolt. While the revolt was brutally suppressed, survivors fled across the border into Tanzania (G. Smith 1980). The 1978 war between Uganda and Tanzania started when Amin sent his soldiers in pursuit of the rebels. Contemporaries agree that Amin's primary goal of the invasion was to deal with a threat

from his own military forces. Milton Obote, the former president of Uganda, in exile in Tanzania, put it bluntly at the time: the invasion "was a desperate measure to extricate Amin from the consequences of the failure of his *own* plots against his *own* army" (as quoted in Avirgan and Honey 1982, 52).[3] By going after some of his remaining core supporters, Amin risked antagonizing the very forces underpinning his brutal regime. Thus he tried to blame the Tanzanian forces for the executions of rebels from the Simba Regiment. After the Tanzanian forces recaptured the Kagera Salient, they found "scattered in the bush . . . the bodies of 120 Ugandan soldiers. There had been no Tanzanian troops in the area before, and there was no sign that Tanzanian artillery had landed there" (Avirgan and Honey 1982, 69). The conclusion was inescapable: "the Tanzanian commanders deduced the corpses had been dumped to look as if they were battle fatalities, although they were actually executed mutineers" (Kamau and Cameron 1979, 306). It is not difficult to find other examples in which leaders initiated conflict to forestall an impending coup such as in the cases of the Falklands War, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, or the 1879 War of the Pacific (Levy and Vakili 1992; Schroeder 1994; Farcau 2000). Hence, I expect challengers to enjoy a lower hazard of an irregular removal from office. Because targets have much less freedom to pick the time, place, and circumstances of conflict, I again expect that they do not gain a lower hazard of an irregular removal.

> *Hypothesis 2, Conflict Roles and Irregular Removal:* Challengers enjoy a lower hazard of an irregular removal from office.

I now turn to discuss how the outcome of international conflict affects the two processes of leader removal. I focus, first, on the outcome's effects on the hazard of a regular removal. Since the norms, rules, and procedures that guide the regular process of removal typically are well institutionalized, as in regular elections, I argue that the outcome of international conflict has little or no effect on the *costs* of a regular removal (Debs and Goemans 2008). The benefits and probability of success of a regular removal, however, can be affected by the outcome of international conflict. Scholars have proposed that victory and defeat reveal the foreign policy competence of leaders and thereby influence the potential benefits of replacing the leaders (Richards et al. 1993; A. Smith 1996, 1998). By this logic, there would be few benefits in removing victorious leaders with demonstrated competence but large benefits in removing defeated leaders who demonstrated foreign policy incompetence.

Thus victory should lower the hazard of a regular removal from office. It is important to keep in mind, though, that the process of regular removals is influenced not just by foreign policy competence, but also by regular domestic politics; for example, Winston Churchill, Bülent Ecevit, and George H. W. Bush lost office in elections after their victories in World War II, the 1974 Cyprus War, and the Gulf War, respectively. In all three instances, foreign competence was trumped by (perceived) economic incompetence. Thus, in elections contested on several dimensions, foreign policy

competence is only one factor to weigh in decisions to replace the leader. Nevertheless, demonstrated foreign policy competence should lower the benefits of replacing the leader, although its effect may be dampened by the salience of other issues.

> *Hypothesis 3, Victory and Regular Removal:* Victory lowers the hazard of a regular removal from office.

Following this logic, it can be argued that defeat should increase the hazard of a regular removal from office. As I explain in more detail subsequently, however, I expect that defeated leaders will be replaced in an irregular manner, or not at all.

The outcome of international conflict can have a dramatic effect on the benefits, costs, and probability of success of an attempt to irregularly remove the leader. Victory demonstrates competence and thereby enhances the prestige of the military. As a result, the military finds itself in a relatively strong bargaining position vis-à-vis other domestic actors in deliberations about policy and the budget, thus lowering the potential benefits of a coup. Moreover, victorious and politically ambitious military leaders can reap the rewards of enhanced public status and gain access to power through the regular political process, again lowering the potential benefits of a coup. Finally, victory decreases the probability of success of a coup attempt because victory makes it more difficult to justify—and coordinate—the overthrow of the leader to the troops (and the populace at large). Because of the leader's demonstrated success, fewer people believe that a sufficient number of others will join the coup attempt to make it successful, which in turn makes a coup more costly and less likely to succeed.

> *Hypothesis 4, Victory and Irregular Removal:* Victory decreases the hazard of an irregular removal from office.

Defeat significantly lowers the costs and increases the benefits and probability of success of an attempt to overthrow the leader. After defeat, the potential benefits of a coup increase because defeat often leads to a reorganization of the military (Reiter and Meek 1999), with significant implications for the careers and prospects of the officer corps. A coup, however, allows its military leaders to stave off organizational reform and may constitute a gamble for resurrection of their careers. Moreover, military leaders may want to take over to forestall or overturn a peace treaty that similarly threatens their personal and corporate interests. To prevent a recurrence of hostilities, and to tie the hands of their defeated foe, victorious states often impose restrictions on their opponent's military forces.[4] Defeat also significantly lowers the costs and improves the prospects of success of an attempt to overthrow the leader. As noted previously, the general population takes defeat as an indicator of incompetence of the leader. The worse the defeat, the more people will agree that the leader is incompetent, and the more people can be confident that

others will join them in an attempt to remove the leader. Defeat thus helps to coordinate the expectations of members of the domestic opposition and the people at large (Hardin 1995). As a result, a coup attempt is much less likely to face organized opposition and may instead enjoy popular support and acceptance. The fates of Bolivian presidents Daniel Salamanca and José Luis Tejada Sorzano, after the Chaco War with Paraguay, and of the Greek king Constantine I and many of his ministers, after the disastrous war with Turkey, prominently illustrate this dynamic.

Finally, after defeat in war, leaders sometimes lose power at the hands of their foreign enemy's military forces.[5] Occupying foreign forces typically remove any impediment or potential source of opposition to their rule and hence exile, imprison, or outright eliminate the former leaders. In summary, defeat in war exposes leaders to multiple threats to their political and physical survival. Because the forces that seek to irregularly remove the leader have incentives to strike while the iron is hot, I expect them to preempt any regular removal from office. Hence, I expect that defeat will increase the hazard of an irregular removal, but not a regular removal, from office.

> *Hypothesis 5, Defeat and Irregular Removal:* Defeat increases the probability of an irregular removal from office.

Research Design

To test these hypotheses, I estimate a competing risks model, in which the dependent variables measure how long a leader has remained in office before he or she left office in a particular way. Competing risks analysis allows us to examine multiple models of exit, or risks, in a generalized duration framework by positing risk-specific hazard rates, one for each outcome state (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2000; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999). A great strength of the method is that it allows us to examine how a variable affects the timing of one type of failure separately from its effect on another type of failure. Here, I will examine two risks: exit due to a regular loss of office and exit due to irregular removal. While it is possible to disaggregate irregular exits into more fine-grained categories, I do not pursue such a strategy since tests revealed that this violates the independence assumption underlying the competing risks model. The independence assumption holds that the survival times for each mode of exit are independent of the other potential modes of exit (IIA)—the risk of one mode of exit thus does not affect the risk of the other mode of exit—and each mode of exit could have possibly occurred, given enough time. By further assuming that there exists a latent failure time for each mode of exit and that only the shortest failure time is actually observed, it becomes possible to simply estimate single-state models (one for each mode of exit), where the other modes of exit are treated as randomly right censored.

Following the approach of Chiozza and Goemans (2004b), I estimate semipara-metric Cox proportional hazard models with frailty terms (Therneau and Grambsch 2000). The frailty terms are additional unmeasured covariates α_i, sampled from a gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance θ, that multiplicatively affect the baseline hazards. The frailty parameter is conceptually analogous to a random effect that assesses whether leaders of some countries are more likely to lose power, all the other measured factors being equal. All else being equal, leaders of countries with an α_i greater than 1 face a greater risk of removal from office than accounted for by the explanatory variables. Leaders of countries with an α_i smaller than 1 are less likely to lose office than accounted for by the explanatory variables. Hence, both the explanatory variables and the frailty terms account for the risks of losing office in the models. I cluster observations by country because the leader's chances of survival are likely to depend in some general way on country-specific factors not captured by the explanatory variables in the models (Therneau and Grambsch 2000).

As suggested by Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn (2003), I extend the Cox hazard model to account for nonproportional hazards. A failure to detect and con-trol for time-varying effects could mischaracterize the potentially different political dynamics that drive leaders from office in different manners and could also lead to biased and inefficient estimates. Therefore, I perform specification checks based on the analysis of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals for all the estimated models. I next reestimate the models, including an interaction term of the logarithm of time and each variable that fails to meet the proportional hazards test. The coefficients asso-ciated with each time-interaction variable then measure how the effect of a covari-ate increases or decreases as a function of time in office.

Finally, to overcome problems associated with missing data, I use multiple imputation to fill in the missing values (King et al. 2001). Following Schafer's (1997) approach, I use data augmentation under a multivariate normal model based on all the explanatory variables and the time-in-office dependent variables for the type of office removal (including the dichotomous indicator for office removal). I run five parallel chains of five hundred steps each and set the starting values for each chain by using Expectation-Maximization algorithm estimates of the model parameters computed on a bootstrap sample a quarter of the size of the whole data set (Allison 2002, 38 n. 11). This way, I create five imputed data sets with no miss-ing records. I estimate the models on each data set and report the mean of the five estimates for each model's coefficients and compute the standard errors and signifi-cance levels using Rubin's (1987) formulas.[6]

The data set builds on *Archigos*, Version 2.8 (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza forthcoming), which identifies all leaders holding executive power from 1919 through 2003, how these leaders entered and left office, and their postexit fate. The data contain information on 2,130 leaders from 164 countries. Each leader's spell in office is split into yearly observations (because most of the explanatory variables

are measured on an annual basis). This way, each leader has one record each calen-
dar year he or she was in power. This creates a data set with 10,938 observations.

Briefly, I code the dependent variables in the following way: a regular and an
irregular removal from office as well as the leader's postexit fate.[7] Removal from
office is coded as regular when the leader is removed in accordance with the expli-
cit rules or established conventions of his or her particular country. Examples of
regular removal include voluntary retirement, term limits, and defeats in elections.
In the sample, 1,319 leaders lost office in a regular manner. Removal from office
is coded as irregular when the leader was removed in contravention of explicit
rules and established conventions. Domestic forces are responsible for most irregu-
lar removals from office (477 cases). A small group of leaders (43) was deposed
(directly) by another state's intervention. Irregular removal from office is over-
whelmingly the result of the threat or use of force, as exemplified in coups, defeats
in civil war, (popular) revolts, and assassinations. A handful of leaders were
impeached; if the constitutional court subsequently ruled that this was done uncon-
stitutionally, this is coded as an irregular removal.[8] The postexit fate of leaders is
recorded up to one year after they lost office. This period is chosen to preclude the
possibility that the leader's behavior after he or she lost office, rather than his or
her behavior in office, is responsible for any type of punishment. The postexit fate
of leaders includes three levels of punishment: exile (which includes refuge in a
foreign embassy since such an embassy is considered foreign soil), imprisonment
(which includes house arrest), and death. I record the severest form of punishment.

Data Analysis

I suggested previously that leaders consider how they are likely to lose office
because the manner in which they lose office directly affects their subsequent fate.
I therefore first examine the relationship between how leaders lose office and their
subsequent fate. Subsequently, I present a competing risks model and examine how
international conflict, domestic politics, and leader characteristics affect the differ-
entiated risks of losing office.

The Postexit Fate of Leaders

In table 1, I report a simple cross tabulation of the manner in which leaders lost
office and their subsequent fate. Recall that the leader's fate is recorded for the per-
iod up to one year after he or she lost office. Although simple, this cross-tabulation
produces straightforward and powerful results.

Table 1[9] demonstrates that the manner of exit has a profound effect on the lea-
der's subsequent fate in the period up to one year after losing office. Of the leaders
who lost office in a regular manner, fully 92 percent retired safely from office, and

Table 1
How Leaders Lose Office and the Consequences

	OK, n (%)	Exile, n (%)	Imprisoned, n (%)	Killed, n (%)	Total, n (%)
Ill health	28 (90)	2 (6)	1 (3)	0 (0)	31 (2)
Regular	1,200 (92)	65 (5)	32 (2)	1 (0.1)	1,298 (72)
Irregular	93 (20)	192 (41)	105 (22)	83 (18)	473 (26)
Total	1,321 (73)	259 (14)	138 (8)	84 (5)	1,802 (100)

Note: Pearson χ^2 (6) $= 964.13$, $p < .001$.

only 8 percent suffered some form of punishment. Of the leaders who were removed in an irregular manner, however, only 20 percent suffered no punishment; 41 percent were exiled or fled the country in self-imposed exile, 22 percent were imprisoned for some time, and 18 percent were killed. These findings firmly establish that how leaders lose office significantly affects their postexit fate.

Competing Risks

Having established why leaders care about how they lose office, I next estimate three main models: a model for each manner of exit and, for comparison, a pooled model that aggregates all manners of exit into one category. The coefficients measure the effect of the explanatory variables on the hazard of losing office. A negative coefficient should thus be interpreted to show that an increase in the independent variable, on average, is associated with a decrease in the risk of removal from office and an increase in the expected time in office. The statistical significance of all coefficients is measured using two-tailed tests.

Before I discuss the results in detail, I first asses the crucial assumption of the independence of the different manners of losing office. To that end, I ran a multinomial logit regression, in which the dependent variable recorded whether the leader was in office, lost office in a regular manner, or lost office in an irregular manner. Both the Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests of the IIA assumption found evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the outcomes were independent of other alternatives. Moreover, Wald tests and likelihood-ratio tests rejected the hypothesis that some categories of outcomes can be collapsed. I therefore conclude, as required by the competing risks approach, that each mode of exit is indeed independent of the other potential mode of exit. (The Small-Hsiao test—but not the Hausman test—revealed that disaggregating the irregular removals into two further categories, at the hand of domestic and foreign forces, respectively, resulted in a violation of the independence assumption.)

Turning to the results in table 2, I first briefly compare and contrast some of the results from the competing risks approach and the customary (Downsian) pooled

Table 2
Competing Risks: How Leaders Lose Office[a]

Variable	Pooled		Regular		Irregular	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Mixed regime	0.877**	0.086	29.727**	1.69	0.464**	0.125
Mixed × ln(t)			−3.600**	0.209		
Parl. dem.	1.334**	0.118	29.641**	1.71	−0.682*	0.287
Parl. dem. × ln(t)			−3.490**	0.214		
Pres. dem.	0.769**	0.118	27.646**	1.79	−0.336	0.249
Pres. dem. × ln(t)			−3.270†	0.226		
Trans.	1.227**	0.114	29.526**	1.69	0.460**	0.178
Trans. × ln(t)			−3.498**	0.214		
Civil war	0.222**	0.082	−0.050	0.106	0.004	0.466
Civil war × ln(t)					0.102	0.069
GDP per capita	0.072	0.047	0.081	0.189	−0.227†	0.111
GDP per capita × ln(t)			0.001	0.028		
GDP growth	0.049	0.093	−1.387**	0.398	−2.775**	0.489
GDP growth × ln(t)	−0.300	0.185				
Trade openness	−0.535**	0.154	−0.360*	0.173	−1.333**	0.327
Δ Trade openness	−0.172	0.119	−0.079	0.132	−0.335	0.220
Population	−0.024	0.042	0.059	0.039	−0.113*	0.049
Age	0.292**	0.008	0.188**	0.012	0.008	0.005
Age × ln(t)	−0.043**	0.001	−0.027**	0.002		
Times in office	−0.138**	0.041	−0.154**	0.049	0.141†	0.082
Entry	3.982**	0.229	2.350**	0.327	6.748**	0.501
Entry × ln(t)	−0.582**	0.035	−0.363**	0.052	−0.929**	0.072
Challenger	−0.628**	0.191	−0.475†	0.262	−1.053**	0.350
Target	−0.026	0.128	−0.094	0.167	0.222	0.236
Inheritor	−0.228	0.222	−0.022	0.246	−0.304	0.389
Crisis victory	−0.387†	0.204	−0.374	0.251	−0.874†	0.478
Crisis defeat	−0.264	0.762	−0.324	0.295	0.889**	0.313
Crisis defeat × ln(t)	0.075	0.111				
Crisis draw	−0.305	0.193	−0.292	0.240	−0.520	0.395
War victory	−0.424	0.397	−1.079†	0.578	−1.418	0.018
War defeat	0.680**	0.255	−0.534	0.507	2.096**	0.340
War draw	−0.073	0.355	−0.166	0.475	−1.125	0.813
No. obs.	10938		10938		10938	
No. subjects	2130		2130		2130	
No. failures	1973		1319		477	
Log-likelihood	−11592.9		−7497.3		−2721.8	
Wald test	D = 68.51	p < .001	D = 38.44	p < .001	D = 21.16	p < .001
Θ	0.467**	D = 4.823	0.322**	D = 3.305	0.256**	D = 1.894

a. Missing values are imputed using MI, $m = 5$ (Rubin 1987; Schafer 1997). Estimates and standard errors are adjusted using Rubin's (1987, 76–77) formulas. The Wald test refers to a test of the hypothesis that all coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. For the D statistic in the Wald test, see Rubin and Schenker (1991, 590). For the D statistic for the significance of Θ, see Li et al. (1991). The frailty parameter θ measures the variance of a gamma distribution with mean equal to 1.
†$p < .1$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

approach. Because the pooled model collapses all modes of exit into one category, the coefficients in this model more or less represent "a sort of 'average' effect" of each variable across the different modes of exit (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 171).[10] The competing risks model, in contrast, allows us to estimate how a variable affects one particular mode of exit, in isolation from its effects on other modes of exit. Comparison of the pooled and competing risks results shows that the averaging in the pooled model in some cases obscures significant variation in the effects of particular variables in the competing risks submodels; for example, the results in the pooled model suggest that gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, changes in trade openness, and population size do not significantly affect the overall hazard of losing office. However, in the competing risks model, we see that all three variables significantly *decrease* the risk of losing office in an irregular manner. Similarly, defeat in a crisis does not significantly affect the hazard of the overall loss of office but significantly increases the risk of losing office in an irregular manner. Victory in a crisis does not affect the hazard of a regular removal from office but significantly decreases the hazard of overall and irregular removal from office. Victory in war, interestingly, does not affect the hazard of either overall or irregular removal from office but (weakly) decreases the hazard of a regular removal from office.

The coefficients for parliamentary (and, more weakly, presidential) democracy and the number of times a leader has previously been in office dramatically show how the averaging in the pooled model can mask distinctly different processes since these coefficients are significant but carry opposite signs in the submodels. The number of times a leader has been in office *decreases* the hazard of a regular removal from office but significantly *increases* the hazard of an irregular removal from office, averaging out to a negative effect on the overall hazard of losing office. The previous literature's reliance on the overall hazard of losing office can thus dismiss a factor, such as GDP per capita or population size, as insignificant, although such factors do significantly affect the risks of losing office, but in two distinct and offsetting ways—increasing one risk, while decreasing the other—averaged out into an insignificant coefficient in the pooled model. The competing risks model does not just reveal much more detail about the process of losing office than the pooled model; rather, it identifies significant patterns that the pooled model would positively obscure. Most important, these results suggest that leaders might face important trade-offs in their choices of policy when a policy decreases one risk of losing office, while increasing the risk of another way of losing office.

The Effects of Conflict on How Leaders Lose Office

Turning to a more detailed discussion of the results, I focus on the effect of international conflict on the competing risks of losing office.[11] Disaggregation of the different ways leaders can lose office produces some striking results. I first examine how the conflict roles of leaders affect the hazards of losing office. In line

with both hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2, we see that challengers enjoy significantly lower risks of both a regular and an irregular removal from office, although the effect is both statistically and substantively stronger for the hazard of an irregular removal. Contrary to the logic of rallying around the flag, being a target does not significantly decrease the hazards of either a regular or an irregular removal from office.

Next, I examine how the outcome of international crises and wars affects the risks of losing office. Contrary to hypothesis 3, we first see that victory in a crisis does not significantly decrease the hazard of a regular removal from office. On the other hand, supporting hypothesis 4, victory in a crisis decreases the hazard of an irregular removal from office, although the statistical significance is weak. In the pooled model, we find that the risks in the submodel are still strong enough to average out to a significant negative effect on the overall hazard of losing office. Once we shift our focus to war, we find that victory in war (weakly) decreases the hazard of a regular removal from office, as proposed in hypothesis 3. On the other hand, and contrary to hypothesis 4, victory does not significantly decrease the hazard of an irregular removal from office. For both regular and irregular removals from office, the large coefficients are offset by large standard errors, indicating a lot of uncertainty associated with the effects of victory in war. The effect of victory in war is apparently weak enough that it evaporates in the pooled model: victory in war does not significantly affect the overall hazard of losing office. Overall, the effects of victory on the hazards of losing office are surprisingly weak, and the evidence for hypotheses 3 and 4 is both weak and mixed.

When we examine the effects of defeat, the submodels show that defeat in a crisis significantly increases only the hazard of an irregular removal from office. Although not transparent from the results of the pooled model—because of the interaction term to correct for a violation of the proportional hazards assumption— defeat in a crisis does not seem to significantly affect the overall hazard of losing office.[12] Defeat in war does not affect the hazard of a regular removal but significantly decreases the hazard of both overall and irregular removal from office. Notably, and confirming hypothesis 5, for leaders, the political dangers of defeat in war and in a crisis thus come in the form of an increased risk of an irregular removal, with the associated consequences for their postexit fate.[13] Finally, draws do not significantly affect the hazards of losing office.

The findings on victory and defeat directly contradict a simple selection effect argument and suggest the potential for endogeneity. The selection effect logic suggests a biased sample because leaders should pick conflicts to avoid the worst outcomes. We would then expect that defeat would not significantly affect the hazard of an irregular removal and would perhaps only weakly affect the hazard of a regular removal. Instead, we find the opposite pattern. Defeat in both crises and wars is positively associated with the hazard of an irregular removal. These findings thus throw doubt on a straightforward application of the selection effect logic to war.

Stepping back from the individual coefficients, the combined results reveal that the outcome of international conflict weakly affects the hazard of a regular removal from office but significantly affects the hazard of an irregular removal from office. Strikingly, but as expected, defeat does not significantly affect the hazard of a regular removal but strongly affects the hazard of an irregular removal. Of the hypotheses on the hazard of an irregular removal, hypotheses 2, on challenging, and 5, on defeat, are confirmed, while hypothesis 4, on victory, fares poorly. These findings suggest that leaders might consider their anticipated manner of removal in deciding for or against international conflict. Specifically, these results suggest a twist on the well-known theory of diversionary war. For leaders who anticipate a regular removal from office, international conflict does not seem a particularly attractive option. While initiation and victory bring uncertain benefits, these must be weighed against the potentially dire consequences of defeat. In contrast, for leaders who fear an irregular removal from office, such as a coup, international conflict may well pay. Challenging pays—perhaps because the forces most likely to participate in the overthrow of the leader are otherwise engaged at the front—but somewhat surprisingly, as the large standard errors indicate, the benefits of victory are rather uncertain. Nevertheless, for such leaders, their punishment is truncated, and hence, a gamble for survival might be worth it.

Substantive Effects

I lack the space for a fully detailed discussion of the effects of domestic political and leader-specific variables.[14] Instead, I focus here on the substantive effects of several important variables, including regime type, the leader's manner of entry into office, and the international conflict variables on the hazards of losing office. To that end, I use the survival function to measure how likely a leader is to survive over time under various configurations of the explanatory variables (see Chiozza and Goemans 2004b). To perform this estimation, I posit counterfactual scenarios that are consistent with the time-varying characteristics of the variables included in the models. To examine the effect of international conflict, I posit a scenario in which a leader initiates conflict in his or her first year in office and obtains an outcome in that first year as well.[15]

I first calculate the survival probabilities for the regular removal from office. Leaders of autocracies, who enter regularly and stay at peace, are, on average, virtually guaranteed to remain in office five years or more. After one year in office, leaders of mixed regimes who stay at peace have, on average, about a 98 percent chance of remaining in office, which declines to 91 percent after three years and 71 percent after five years in office. After one year in office, leaders of parliamentary democracies who stay at peace have, on average, a 92 percent chance of staying in office, which declines to 57 percent and 12 percent after three and five years in office, respectively. For leaders of presidential democracies, the survival probabilities drop

Table 3
Survival Probabilities: Irregular Removal from Office[a]

	Manner of Entry		Challenger: Crisis			Challenger: War		
	Regular	Irregular	Victory	Defeat	Draw	Victory	Defeat	Draw
Autocracy								
$Pr(T > 1$ year)	0.974	0.911	0.986	0.924	0.981	0.990	0.765	0.991
$Pr(T > 3$ years)	0.929	0.847	0.936	0.829	0.924	0.948	0.636	0.949
$Pr(T > 5$ years)	0.861	0.791	0.885	0.763	0.870	0.901	0.569	0.902
Mixed regime								
$Pr(T > 1$ year)	0.955	0.852	0.975	0.872	0.967	0.983	0.629	0.984
$Pr(T > 3$ years)	0.880	0.751	0.892	0.724	0.873	0.912	0.458	0.914
$Pr(T > 5$ years)	0.772	0.668	0.810	0.626	0.787	0.835	0.378	0.838
Parl. democracy								
$Pr(T > 1$ year)	0.990	0.967	0.995	0.972	0.993	0.996	0.907	0.997
$Pr(T > 3$ years)	0.973	0.941	0.976	0.934	0.972	0.981	0.848	0.981
$Pr(T > 5$ years)	0.947	0.918	0.956	0.906	0.951	0.963	0.814	0.963
Pres. democracy								
$Pr(T > 1$ year)	0.984	0.944	0.991	0.952	0.988	0.994	0.847	0.994
$Pr(T > 3$ years)	0.955	0.902	0.960	0.891	0.952	0.968	0.755	0.968
$Pr(T > 5$ years)	0.911	0.865	0.927	0.845	0.917	0.937	0.705	0.937
Transitional								
$Pr(T > 1$ year)	0.951	0.837	0.973	0.859	0.963	0.982	0.598	0.982
$Pr(T > 3$ years)	0.868	0.728	0.881	0.699	0.860	0.903	0.420	0.905
$Pr(T > 5$ years)	0.751	0.639	0.791	0.595	0.766	0.819	0.339	0.822

a. In the conflict scenarios, the survival probabilities are computed while setting entry to irregular entry and the involvement as challenger to 1 in the first year and to 0 thereafter. In the case of victory, the leader receives a 1 in the year of victory, 0.5 the year after, 0.33 in the third year, 0.25 in the fourth year, and 0.2 in the fifth year. The frailty term is set at the median value of 1. The remaining variables are set at their mean values.

from 98 percent to 85 percent and 49 percent, respectively. Leaders of transitional regimes, finally, face the worst survival probabilities: after one year in office, they have only a 90 percent chance of staying in office, which drops to 3 percent after three years and to less than 0.1 percent after five years in office. Not too much weight should be given to these findings, given that after about three months in office, the confidence intervals are wide enough to encompass both 0 and 1, a pattern that does not hold for the irregular loss of office.

I turn next to the submodel on the irregular loss of office. Table 3 reports the irregular removal survival probabilities—the probability of surviving in office before being removed in an irregular manner—associated both with international conflict and the manner of entry into office. In the conflict scenario, the leader's entry is set to an irregular entry.

We first note that the manner of entry significantly and substantively affects the survival probabilities for all leaders. Among leaders that stay at peace, leaders of mixed regimes who entered regularly enjoy a 95.5 percent chance of survival after one year in office, whereas entry in an irregular manner lowers their chance of staying in office after one year to 85.2 percent. For leaders of parliamentary democracies, the probability of survival before an irregular removal after one year drops (only) two percentage points, from 99 percent in the case of a regular entry to 96.7 percent in the case of an irregular entry. Generally, autocrats face a roughly 6 to 8 percent higher chance of an irregular removal from office if they entered irregularly, and leaders of mixed and transitional regimes face a roughly 10 to 13 percent higher chance of an irregular removal from office if they entered irregularly.

As Riker (1982) suggested long ago, leaders of parliamentary and presidential democracies always enjoy a substantially lower probability of an irregular removal from office and thus a significantly lower risk of postexit punishment than other leaders. On one hand, the institutions of democracy make it relatively easy to remove leaders from office; on the other hand, they also offer leaders of democratic regimes the protection of a low probability of irregular removal from office; for example, a leader of a parliamentary democracy who enters regularly, stays at peace, and hangs on to power for five years faces a 92 percent chance of a regular removal but only a 5 percent (i.e., $1 - 0.947$) chance of an irregular removal from office. Leaders of mixed regimes, in contrast, face a low probability of a regular removal from office and a relatively high probability of an irregular removal from office. A leader of a mixed regime who enters in a regular manner and stays at peace has a 2 percent chance of regular removal after one year in office. At the same time, such a leader has a 15 percent chance of an irregular removal from office. If he or she manages to stay in office three years, such a leader of a mixed regime faces a 9 percent chance of a regular removal and a 25 percent chance of an irregular removal from office. Confirming the findings in Goemans (2000), we see that for leaders of mixed regimes, defeat in a war carries ominous implications and dramatically increases the probability of losing office in an irregular manner and hence also the probability of subsequent punishment. As anticipated by Mansfield and Snyder (2005), the effects for leaders of transitional regimes closely mirror the effects for leaders of mixed regimes.

Autocratic leaders, finally, face the opposite pattern from democratic leaders: they enjoy a low probability of a regular removal from office but must deal with a moderately high to high probability of an irregular removal from office. On one hand, in their first five years in office, they have a very small chance of a regular removal from office. On the other hand, they must face significantly higher chances of an irregular removal from office than democratic leaders. Their chances of an irregular removal from office increase from roughly 3 percent after one year to 14 percent after five years in office, more than double those of the leader of a

parliamentary democracy, but still 13 to 16 percent lower than for leaders of mixed and transitional regimes.

Table 3 reveals that leaders may be able to overcome the higher probability of an irregular removal associated with an irregular entry by challenging in an international conflict. Compared to a leader who enters regularly but stays at peace, a leader who enters office in an irregular manner tends to lower the chances of an irregular removal if he or she challenges and obtains a victory or a draw in an international crisis. Thus the leader of a transitional regime who enters in a regular manner and manages to stay in office for three years has a roughly 13 percent (1 - 0.868) chance of an irregular removal from office. A leader of a transitional regime who governs under the same general circumstances but enters in an irregular manner faces more than double (27 percent) the chances of an irregular removal. Challenging and victory in an international crisis, however, would dramatically improve the prospects for such a leader, who would then face only a roughly 12 percent chance of an irregular removal. A draw in an international crisis would almost halve the risk of an irregular removal for such a leader (from 27 to 14 percent). Defeat in an international crisis, notably, would only mildly worsen the prospects of such a leader because he or she would face an increase of only three percentage points in the chances of an irregular removal from office. For leaders of mixed regimes, the same pattern holds. A leader of a mixed regime who enters in a regular manner, holds on to power for five years, and stays at peace must contend with a roughly 23 percent $(1 - 0.772)$ chance of an irregular removal from office. If that same leader had entered irregularly, he or she would have had to face a 33 percent chance of an irregular removal from office. Challenging and victory in a crisis would lower the chances of an irregular removal from office for this leader—who entered irregularly, managed to stay in office for five years, and initiated and won a crisis in his or her first year in office—to about 19 percent. Challenging and a draw would leave this leader roughly in the same position as if he or she had entered regularly and stayed at peace, with a 21 percent chance of an irregular removal from office. Defeat in an international crisis would again only moderately increase his or her chances of an irregular removal by about four percentage points.

Challenging still pays if the conflict escalates to war, which is reflected in the lower probability of an irregular removal in the cases of victory and draw. However, we should be careful to interpret the substantive effects here since neither victory nor draw achieved statistical significance in the submodel on the irregular removal from office. Defeat, in contrast, has both a statistically and substantively significant effect. A democratic president who enters irregularly would be much better off if he or she were to stay at peace than if he or she were to challenge and lose a war. Staying at peace, the president would have a 6 percent chance of an irregular removal after one year in office, a 10 percent chance of irregular removal after three years, and a 14 percent chance of irregular removal after five years in office. If the president were to challenge but be defeated in war, his or her chances

of an irregular removal would roughly double, from 6 to 15 percent after one year, from 11 to 24 percent after three years, and from 14 to 29 percent after five years. For leaders of mixed regimes who enter irregularly, the chances of an irregular removal after staying at peace compared to challenging and suffering defeat in a war increase from 14 to 37 percent after one year, from 25 to 54 percent after three years, and from 33 to 62 percent after five years in office. A leader who enters irregularly—and as a result is significantly more likely to leave irregularly as well—thus has much to gain from initiating an international conflict, as long as he or she can avoid defeat in a full-blown war.

I performed several robustness checks, in which I included elections, the number of days since the last election, and duration of the polity. In these tests, the main results were basically unaffected. I also ran the analyses on regime-type subsamples. Notably, conflict has little effect on the hazard of a regular removal in democracies, mixed regimes, and autocracies. I furthermore found that challenging reduces the hazard of an irregular removal for leaders of autocratic and mixed regimes, but not for democratic leaders. For all leaders, defeat in war again significantly increased the hazard of an irregular removal. These findings suggest that leaders of autocratic and mixed regimes may benefit from conflict, whereas democratic leaders do not.[16]

Conclusion

I have provided the broadest examination to date of how leaders lose office and their postexit fate. I found that the postexit fate of leaders varies significantly—5 percent of all leaders were killed, 8 percent were jailed, and 14 percent were exiled within one year after they lost office—and is strongly associated with how the leader lost office in the first place. These two findings imply that leaders have strong incentives to choose policy depending not just on how it affects the probability of losing office, but also depending on how it affects the manner of losing office and thus their likely postexit fate. In particular, leaders have strong incentives to pick policies that avoid an irregular removal from office since fully 80 percent of leaders who lost office in an irregular manner subsequently suffered significant punishment. This basic point holds much promise to offer better explanations of policy choices, not just in international relations, but also in comparative politics; as Cox (2008) recently showed, it helps explain when authoritarian regimes schedule and hold elections.

My analysis has also thrown new light on which leaders are particularly likely to lose office in an irregular manner. Institutionally, leaders of mixed and transitional regimes; leaders of underdeveloped countries, relatively closed to the international trading community; and leaders who have been in power before or entered in an irregular manner are more likely to lose office in an irregular manner. Policies that increase the risk of an irregular removal from office include a poor record of economic growth and defeat in an international conflict. If leaders know that particular

ways of losing office are associated with postexit punishment—that is, exile, jail, or death—they have strong incentives to consider not only how their policies affect the overall hazard of losing office, but also their differential impact on how they will lose office. In particular, leaders who fear an irregular removal from office may take policy gambles that other leaders would eschew to avoid severe personal punishment.

Previous research that focused solely on the overall loss of office threw doubt on some important theories of international conflict. Disaggregation of the loss of office by exit type yields results that resolve some questions and now offers empirical support for some of these theories (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003; Reiter and Stam 2002). However, the results further put into doubt standard theories of the diversionary use of force. For leaders who anticipate a regular loss of office, international conflict can be a decidedly risky gamble since they have little to gain and much to lose. On the other hand, leaders who fear an irregular removal from office stand to gain much more from a successful challenge and lose relatively little from an unsuccessful challenge, except when they lose a full-fledged war. Thus, for leaders who fear an irregular loss of office, with the associated high probability of punishment—most likely leaders who entered in an irregular manner—the way out of their predicament may proceed through international conflict.

Notes

1. The failure to disaggregate the different ways leaders lose office implicitly assumes that voluntary retirements, term limits, the natural death of leaders, coups and revolutions, and foreign interventions to overthrow the leader all result from the same political processes. In other words, a policy choice, such as international conflict initiation, has the same effect on the probability of voluntary retirement, the probability of losing office as a result of term limits or illness, the probability of a coup or a revolution, and the probability of removal as the result of a foreign invasion.

2. With the limited exception of some parliamentary democracies, in this second process, moreover, those who remove the leader typically seek to grab power themselves. For a fascinating and insightful discussion of the tactics of coups, see Farcau (1994).

3. Amin himself admitted, "It was not Uganda's intention to invade Tanzania, we took it merely as a precautionary measure to prevent exiles from infiltrating into Uganda" (as quoted in Kamau and Cameron 1979, 304). Kamau and Cameron (1979, 301) note that Amin also hoped that the opportunity to plunder would at least temporarily buy off any rebellious soldiers: "capture of the Kagera Salient would preempt the return of rebels and exiles—and with trade sanctions against Uganda beginning to bite, it would provide his soldiers with a chance of easy plunder."

4. Typically, victorious states attempt to limit both the size and weaponry of their opponent's military.

5. Between 1919 and 2003, 478 leaders were removed in an irregular manner. Most of these were at the hands of domestic forces, but forty-three leaders were removed by foreign forces. Irregular removal from office is overwhelmingly the result of the threat or use of force, as exemplified in coups, (popular) revolts, and assassinations.

6. The standard errors are computed as the square root of the average of the within-samples variances plus the variance of the coefficient estimates across samples (multiplied by the correction factor, $1 + 1/M$, where M is the number of imputed data sets). The parameter estimates from a multiple imputation procedure follow a t-distribution, with the degrees of freedom equal to $(M - 1)(1 + r^{-1})^2$, where

r is the ratio of the between-to-within variances (multiplied by the correction factor $(1 + 1/M)$). For the nuisance parameters, such as the variance of the random effect θ, whose significance levels are based on χ^2 tests, I compute the repeated-imputation p-values using the approach of Li et al. (1991). For the tests of joint significance and the tests of linear hypotheses, I use the multivariate extension of the approach presented in this article, as is described by Rubin and Schenker (1991).

7. The case description file for Archigos—currently about 650 pages—provides detailed documentation for potentially controversial cases. The file is available at http://mail.rochester.edu/~hgoemans/data.htm. A detailed description of the independent variables is available in the replication file at http://mail.rochester.edu/~hgoemans/research.htm.

8. One hundred seventy-seven leaders lost office as a result of ill health when they either died a natural death (126), committed suicide (5), or retired due to documented ill health (46).

9. Owing to rounding, totals may not add up to one hundred. For 146 leaders who lost office as a result of natural death or illness, 4 leaders who lost office in a regular manner, and 1 who lost office in an irregular manner but died within six months after losing office, postexit fate is considered missing. For twenty-four leaders, no information could be found on postexit fate; of these, twenty lost office in a regular manner and four lost office in an irregular manner.

10. The results from the pooled model should be similar to Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) but may show minor changes because the latter excluded all leaders who lost office as a result of ill health.

11. The international conflict dummies must be interpreted with respect to the excluded category, peace.

12. All R script replication files are available at http://mail.rochester.edu/~hgoemans/research.htm.

13. Note that these findings refute the logic of the gambling for resurrection mechanism of G. Downs and Rocke (1994), which assumes that leaders will not be worse off as a result of war—even defeat—because punishment is truncated.

14. I discuss these results in "Which Way Out? Additional Results and Appendix," available at http://mail.rochester.edu/~hgoemans/research.

15. Hence, the challenger variable is set to 1 the first year and 0 thereafter. Since the outcome is coded as outcome divided by the number of years since the outcome, it is set to 1 the first year, .5 in the second year, .33 in the third, .25 in the fourth, and .2 in the fifth. The other variables are set at their regime-appropriate means.

16. I discuss the robustness checks in "Which Way Out? Additional Results and Appendix," available at http://mail.rochester.edu/~hgoemans/research.

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