

# Autocoups: Conceptual Clarification and Analysis of Power Extensions by Incumbent Leaders

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## Abstract

This study aims to clarify the concept of overstay coups, focusing on power extensions by incumbent leaders. By distinguishing overstay coups from the broader, more ambiguous concepts of self-coups or autocoups, which encompass both executive power aggrandizement and power extension, this research introduces a refined understanding of these specific political events.

The research involves coding overstay coup events and compiling a comprehensive dataset covering the period from 1945 to the present. Using this dataset, two detailed case studies provide qualitative insights into the dynamics and outcomes of overstay coups. Additionally, a regression analysis identifies the determinants of overstay coup attempts, shedding light on the factors that influence incumbents' decisions to extend their power illegitimately.

The findings contribute to the existing literature by providing a clearer conceptual framework and empirical evidence on overstay coups. This research enhances our understanding of the mechanisms and motivations behind power extensions by incumbent leaders, and it examines the implications for democratic resilience, democratic backsliding, democratic breakdown, personalization of power, and autocratic deterioration. The insights gained from this study inform policy and theoretical discussions on political stability and the challenges facing contemporary democracies.

*Keywords:* Coups, Autocoups, Political Leadership

# 1 Introduction

The study of irregular power transitions, encompassing both irregular entries and exits from office, has long been a central topic in political science. However, one form of irregular power transition - the incumbent leader's refusal to relinquish power - remains relatively understudied. This scenario, where leaders overstay their mandated term limits for one or more terms, or even indefinitely, lacks a universally accepted term in the existing literature. To address this gap, this study adopts the term "autocoup" to denote this phenomenon.

Coups, being the primary form of irregular power transitions, have received significant scholarly attention. Research by Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009) indicate that coups account for a substantial portion of such transitions, with roughly two-thirds (65.8%) of 374 irregular exits occurring through coups. Additionally, Frantz and Stein (2016) demonstrate that coups are the most common form of exit in autocracies, surpassing regular transitions by a third.

However, while coups were once frequent, recent decades have witnessed a decline in their occurrence (Bermeo 2016; Thyne and Powell 2019). Conversely, autocoups appear to be on the rise, particularly since the Cold War's end (Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins 2010; Baturo 2014; Versteeg et al. 2020). Despite the significant political impact and rising prevalence of autocoups, their study lags behind that of classical coups, which are extensively documented due to their historical frequency (Thyne and Powell 2019).

This research aims to bridge this gap by focusing on the understudied phenomenon of autocoups as they are at least equally important and warrant comprehensive analysis. Firstly, autocoups are typically accompanied by a disregard for the rule of law, weakened institutions, and potential democratic backsliding or authoritarian personalization. Secondly, like traditional coups, successful autocoups increase the risk of future irregular power transitions. Research indicates that since 1945, approximately 62 percent of leaders who overstayed their term limits through autocoups in non-democratic countries were either ousted or assassinated while in office (Baturo 2019). Thirdly, failed autocoups often trigger instability that fuels protests, violence, and even civil wars.

Despite their significance, autocoups are understudied compared to traditional coups. Although

several relevant concepts and terminologies such as self-coups, autoups, autogolpes, incumbent takeovers, executive aggrandizement, overstay, and continuismo have been proposed and discussed (Marsteintredet and Malamud 2019; Baturo and Tolstrup 2022), there is no clear and widely accepted term to describe these events. Different terms are often used interchangeably or inconsistently, leading to confusion. Moreover, due to the lack of clear concepts, the collection of autoups datasets is still in its early stages compared to the rich datasets of traditional coups. Hence, the limited existing studies on autoups have primarily relied on case studies (Maxwell A. Cameron 1998b; Antonio 2021; Pion-Berlin, Bruneau, and Goetze 2022), with few focusing on quantitative analyses.

To fully understand irregular political leadership transitions and survival, we need to redefine and clarify the term “autoups” first. Based on a clear definition, we can introduce an autoups dataset that can be used for further empirical analysis. This study aims to address these knowledge gap surrounding autoups and contribute in three areas. First, it clarifies the terminology by defining autoups based mainly on power extension. Second, it introduces a new dataset of autoups since 1945 based on this refined definition. Finally, the research utilizes this dataset for a quantitative analysis of the factors that influence leaders’ decisions to attempt autoups.

The subsequent section, based on a comprehensive review of the definitions of power expansions and power extensions, proposes a precise definition of autoups. This will be followed by an introduction to the new autoups dataset in Part III. In Parts IV and V, I will explain the determinants of autoups attempts through two case studies and demonstrate how the novel autoups dataset collected in this study can be used in empirical analysis. Finally, I will conclude in Part VI, summarizing the key insights gained from the study and suggesting avenues for future research.

## 2 Autocoups: A literature review and clarification of definitions

Compared to coups, which are clearly defined and widely accepted as illegal attempts by elites within the ruling group to overthrow the leadership ([Powell and Thyne 2011](#)), the concept of autocoups (also known as self-coups or autogolpes) suffers from a lack of consistency and clarity. This ambiguity hinders our understanding and study of a critical phenomenon in irregular power transitions. To address this gap, we need to tackle two key issues: terminology and definition.

### 2.1 Terminology

The most common term in autocoup literature is self-coup, or autogolpe in Spanish ([Przeworski et al. 2000](#); [Maxwell A. Cameron 1998a](#); [Bermeo 2016](#); [Helmke 2017](#); [Marsteintredet and Malamud 2019](#)). This term gained academic prominence after Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori dissolved Congress, temporarily suspended the constitution, and ruled by decree in 1992 ([Mauceri 1995](#); [Maxwell A. Cameron 1998b](#)). However, as Marsteintredet and Malamud (2019) point out, the term “self-coup” can be misleading, as it implies a coup against oneself, which is inaccurate since it is not self-directed but targets other state institutions or apparatus.

Another approach to describe coups staged by incumbents is to use terms with adjectives or modifiers, such as presidential coup, executive coup, constitutional coup, electoral coup, judicial coup, slow-motion coup, soft coup, and parliamentary coup ([Marsteintredet and Malamud 2019](#)). While these terms can be helpful in specific contexts, their proliferation often adds to the overall confusion rather than providing clarification. Most of these terms focus on the specific methods used by coup perpetrators but fail to clearly identify the perpetrator, necessitating further explanation. In fact, many of these methods could be employed either by or against executive leaders.

A third alternative involves terms like “incumbent takeover” or “overstay”. Incumbent takeover refers to “an event perpetuated by a ruling executive that significantly reduces the formal and/or informal constraints on his/her power” ([Baturu and Tolstrup 2022, 374](#)), based on earlier research

(Svolik 2014). While overstay is defined as “staying longer than the maximum term as it stood when the candidate originally came in office” (Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins 2011, 1844). These terms identify the perpetrator (the incumbent) and/or the nature of the event (overstaying/extending power). However, they do not highlight the illegality or illegitimacy of these actions. Therefore, they cannot serve as a direct counterpart to “coup,” which clearly denotes the illegality of leadership ousters, while “takeover” or “overstay” diminish the severity.

Therefore, this study strongly advocates for “autocoup” as the most accurate and appropriate term. It avoids the pitfalls of other terms by clearly conveying the essence of the phenomenon as a coup-like power grab and effectively distinguishing autocoups from classical coups by highlighting the perpetrator.

## **2.2 Definition**

While terminology is important, another issue arises with the previous definition of autocoups: should we emphasize power expansion or power extension? Power Expansion refers to situations where an executive branch expands its power beyond its original boundaries, often by encroaching on the authority of other branches like the legislature or judiciary. Power Extension, on the other hand, refers to situations where a leader extends their tenure in office beyond the originally mandated term limits. Existing definitions of self-coup or autocoup sometimes touch upon power extensions, but they primarily focus on power expansions, which has several drawbacks.

Firstly, defining autocoups primarily in terms of power expansion does not align well with the definition of a coup. When we define a classical coup, the focus is clearly on the ouster of the current leader, not merely a limitation or restriction on their power. Using the same logic, a more appropriate definition of an autocoup should prioritize the extension of executive leadership. We would not classify an event as a coup if a vice president seizes some power from the president, as long as the president remains in office. Similarly, an executive leader acquiring more power from other branches should not automatically qualify as an autocoup if their term limits remain unchanged.

Secondly, emphasizing power expansion raises issues regarding the purpose of launching an autocoup. As Maxwell A. Cameron (1998a) defined, a self-coup is “a temporary suspension of the constitution and dissolution of congress by the executive, who rules by decree until new legislative elections and a referendum can be held to ratify a political system with broader executive power” (Maxwell A. Cameron 1998a, 220). However, without extending their time in office, the leader faces significant risks once their term expires, as they could face legal or political repercussions for the autocoup itself, leaving behind an overly powerful executive branch for the successor. Although the term “self-coup” gained prominence from the 1992 Fujimori case in Peru, which initially involved seizing power from other institutions, it is important to note that Fujimori ultimately extended his term limits through constitutional amendments. The 1993 Constitution allowed Fujimori to run for a second term, which he won with popularity in April 1995. Shortly after Fujimori began his second term, his supporters in Congress passed a law of “authentic interpretation” which effectively allowed him to run for another term in 2000, which he won amid suspicions and rumors. However, he did not survive the third term. In 2000, facing charges of corruption and human rights abuses, Fujimori fled Peru and took refuge in Japan (Ezrow 2019).

Thirdly, measuring the extent of power expansion to qualify as an autocoup can be challenging. Power expansion might occur as a sudden, significant event, as seen with Fujimori in 1992, or it could be gradual and incremental, as in the case of Putin since assuming power in 1999 (Chaisty 2019). In the latter case, it is unclear whether each step should be considered an autocoup or if the entire process together should be labelled as such. If the latter, determining the point at which it becomes an autocoup is again problematic.

Therefore, this study argues that a more accurate definition of autocoups should prioritize power extension as the core characteristic.

In light of this discussion, we formally define an autocoup as *the practice of current political leaders extending their time in office beyond their originally mandated term limits*. Three key points need to be highlighted for this definition. Firstly, this definition refers to the actual leaders of the country, regardless of their official titles. Typically, this would be the president; however, in

some cases, such as in Germany, the primary leader is the premier, as the president is a nominal head of state. Secondly, while the primary characteristic of an autocoup is extending the term in office, this definition does not exclude instances of power expansion. Both aspects can coexist, but the extension of the term is the central element. Thirdly, autocoups, by their nature, subvert legal norms and established power transfer mechanisms. While they may employ seemingly legal tactics, their essence is illegitimacy. This critical aspect will be explored further in Chapter III.

### **3 Autocoup dataset**

#### **3.1 Defining the scope**

Defining any concept or term inevitably involves borderline cases that are difficult to categorize. In the context of autocoups, it is particularly challenging to determine whether a specific instance of oversteering should be coded as an autocoup. To avoid ambiguity and dilemmas, we will code all instances of incumbents extending their original mandated term in office as autocoups, regardless of whether the extension is patently illegal or superficially legal.

This approach is taken because a truly legitimate amendment to power transition institutions should only apply to subsequent leaders, not the incumbent. If the incumbent changes the rules to their own benefit, the legitimacy of such changes is questionable, even if the amendment procedures appear legal. We have valid reasons to question their motivations since they are the beneficiaries of these reforms.

Even so, some cases remain unclear. For example, consider a two-term limit presidency where the leader wins a second term. Allegations of election rigging might surface, raising suspicions about the fairness of the election results. If such suspicions can be verified with evidence or judicial verdict, the case would undoubtedly be coded as an autocoup. However, proving election rigging in countries with powerful executives can be difficult. In such instances, we will not classify it as an autocoup unless a formal judicial verdict confirms the rigging.

Even in contexts where leaders lack clear term limits or the constitution allows indefinite terms,

identifying autocoups remains possible. We will discuss and explain this in the next section.

## 3.2 Classifying autocoups

Autocoups can manifest in various forms. To understand this phenomenon better, we can categorize them based on several key factors:

- **Methods Employed:** This refers to the specific strategies incumbents use to extend their hold on power. Examples include constitution amending or reinterpreting, election cancelling, delaying or rigging.
- **Degree of Legality:** This dimension captures the extent to which an autocoup deviates from established legal norms. It can range from minor rule-bending to outright constitutional violations.
- **Duration of Extension:** This category focuses on the length of time the incumbent leader remains in office beyond their designated term limits. It could be a single additional term, multiple terms, or even a lifetime hold on power.
- **Outcomes:** This factor examines whether the autocoup attempt is successful or ultimately fails.

This study will primarily focus on the **methods** employed by incumbents to stage autocoups. However, we will also code for other relevant aspects like the degree of legality, duration of extension, and outcomes whenever information is available. This multifaceted approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of the variations within autocoups.

### 3.2.1 Evasion of term limits

Evasion of term limits is a common tactic employed in autocoups. Incumbents often resort to seemingly legal maneuvers to extend their hold on power. These maneuvers primarily involve



manipulating constitutional provisions through various means. The incumbents may pressure legislative bodies (congress) or judicial institutions (Supreme Court) to reinterpret existing term limits, amend the constitution to extend terms, or even replace the constitution altogether. This might also involve popular vote through referendums, or a combination of these approaches. The extension can range from a single term to indefinite rule.

These manoeuvres primarily involve manipulating constitutional provisions through various means.

- **Changing Term Length:** Incumbents might lengthen the official term duration (e.g., from 4 to 6 years) to stay in office longer, even if the number of allowed terms remains unchanged. Examples, in the dataset, include Presidents Dacko (CAR, 1962), Kayibanda (Rwanda, 1973), and Pinochet (Chile, 1988).
- **Enabling re-election:** This approach involves incumbents modifying legal or constitutional frameworks to permit themselves to run for leadership again, despite initial restrictions. These restrictions might include prohibitions on re-election, bans on immediate re-election, or term limits that the incumbents have already reached. An illustrative example is President Menem of Argentina in 1993, who leveraged this tactic to extend his tenure.
- **Removing Term Limits Altogether:** This approach, as seen with President Xi Jinping of China in 2018, technically allows the leader to rule for life, although they may still need to participate in elections (a formality in such cases).
- **Leader for Life:** This differs from removing term limits as the leader still faces elections (although potentially rigged or uncontested). An example is Indonesia's President Sukarno, who attempted to declare himself president for life in 1963 (ultimately unsuccessful).

These methods are often used in combination. Initially, the duration of a term is extended, followed by amendments to allow re-election, then the removal of term limits, and finally, the declaration of the leader for life. For example, Haitian President François Duvalier amended the

constitution in 1961 to permit immediate re-election and then declared himself president for life in 1964.

### 3.2.2 Election Manipulation or Rigging

Election manipulation or rigging is the second most commonly used tactic to extend an incumbent's tenure.

- **Delaying or Removing Elections:** Delaying or removing scheduled elections without legitimate justification is a frequent method used by incumbents to maintain power. For instance, Chadian President François Tombalbaye delayed general elections until 1969 after assuming power in 1960. Similarly, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos suspended elections throughout his rule from 1979 to 2017.
- **Refusing Unfavourable Election Results:** Incumbents may refuse to accept unfavourable election results and attempt to overturn them through illegitimate means. For example, President Donald Trump of the United States refused to accept the results of the 2020 election and tried to overturn them.
- **Rigging Elections:** Winning elections with an extraordinarily high percentage of votes is highly questionable. This study will code elections where the incumbent wins more than 90% of the vote as autoucoups. For instance, President Teodoro Obiang of Equatorial Guinea has consistently won elections with over 95% of the vote in multi-party elections since 1996, indicating election rigging.
- **Excluding Opposition in Elections:** Manipulating the electoral process by excluding opposition parties or candidates from participation, effectively creating a one-candidate race, clearly signifies an autoucoup.

### **3.2.3 Figurehead**

To circumvent term limits, some incumbents might choose a close associate to act as a figurehead, taking the office publicly while the incumbent retains real power behind the scenes. This can be achieved through seemingly subordinate positions.

One example is Russia in 2008. Facing term limits, President Putin selected Dmitry Medvedev to run for president. After the election, Medvedev appointed Putin as Prime Minister. However, most analysts believe Putin wielded the true power throughout this period.

### **3.2.4 Constitutional power transferring**

This tactic involves an incumbent leader manipulating the constitution or legal framework to create a new position of power, or elevate an existing one, before stepping down from their current role. They then strategically take on this new position, effectively retaining significant control despite appearing to relinquish power. For example, in 2017, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Prime Minister of Turkey, spearheaded a constitutional referendum that transitioned the country from a parliamentary system to a presidential one. This new system concentrated significant executive power in the presidency. Following the referendum's approval, Erdoğan successfully ran for the newly established presidency, effectively retaining control under a different title.

### **3.2.5 One-Time Arrangement for Current Leaders**

This strategy involves special arrangements that extend the term or tenure of current leaders without altering the underlying institutions. For example, Lebanon extended President Émile Lahoud's term by three years in 2004 through a one-time arrangement.

## **3.3 Data Coding**

### **3.3.1 Data sources**

Table 1: Sources of coding autocoup dataset

Source	Years	Unit of Research	Observations	Authors
Archigos	1875-2015	Leaders	3409	Hein Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Giacomo Chiozza
REIGN	1921-2021	Leaders	2544	Curtis Bell, Clayton Besaw, Matthew Frank
Incumbent Takeover	1913-2019	Incumbent takeovers	279	Alexander Baturo, Jakob Tolstrup

The autocoup dataset, like most dataset coding procedures, is based on existing studies and datasets. Table 1 outlines the main sources for coding the autocoup dataset. The Archigos dataset (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009) and the REIGN dataset (Bell 2016) provide comprehensive data on all leaders from 1875 to 2021, although our coding only includes autocoups since 1945. These datasets help identify the actual rulers of countries, saving time in distinguishing real leaders from nominal heads of state.

The Incumbent Takeover dataset (Baturo and Tolstrup 2022), which integrates data from 11 related datasets, offers a broad spectrum of cases where leaders significantly reduce the constraints on their power, encompassing both power expansions and extensions. Since some executive takeovers do not qualify as autocoups due to the lack of term extensions, I cross-referenced the Archigos dataset, which includes detailed trajectories of leaders' entries and exits from power, to verify the qualifications for autocoups.

As the Archigos dataset concludes at the end of 2015, I used trusted news reports to validate data from the Incumbent Takeover dataset. In total, I coded 113 observations, with 75 overlapping with the candidate data from Incumbent Takeover. The remaining 38 events were newly coded by the author through verification with other sources such as Archigos, REIGN, and news reports. The

main deviation from the Incumbent Takeover dataset arises from excluding power expansions that do not involve attempts to extend tenure.

### 3.3.2 Definitions of main variables

This section describes the variables included in the autocoup dataset.

- **Country Identification:**

- `ccode` and `country`: These variables come from the Correlates of War project ([Stinnett et al. 2002](#)) and identify the countries included in the dataset, which are widely used in political science datasets, ensuring consistency and compatibility across different studies and datasets.

- **Leader Information:**

- `leader_name`: This variable follows the Archigos dataset's coding and records the name of the de facto leader who wielded power in the country.

- **Timeline Variables:**

- `entry_date`: Captures the date the leader assumed power.
- `exit_date`: Records the date the leader left office.
- `autocoup_date`: Indicates the date the autocoup is considered to have occurred. Since extensions often happen incrementally, this date reflects a significant event marking the extension, such as a legislative vote or successful referendum.
- `extending_date`: Represents the start date of the leader's additional term acquired through the autocoup.

The `entry_date` and `exit_date` come from the Archigos and REIGN datasets, while the other two dates are coded by the dataset creator.

- **Power Transition Methods:**

- `entry_method` and `exit_method`: These categorical variables record how the leader entered and exited power (e.g., election, coup d'état, death).
- `entry_regular` and `exit_regular`: These dummy variables indicate whether the entry and exit methods were regular (e.g., election) or irregular (e.g., coup).

- **Autocoup Details:**

- `autocoup_method`: This key variable captures the various methods leaders use to extend their stay in power (see Section 3.2 for details).
- `autocoup_outcome`: This variable indicates the outcome of the autocoup attempt: “fail and lose power”, “fail but complete original tenure”, or “successful”. For successful coups, the additional term length can be calculated from the difference between `exit_date` and `extending_date`.

- **Data Source:**

- `source`: This variable identifies the dataset source used for coding, primarily differentiating among “Incumbent Takeovers” or other sources.

- **Additional Notes:**

- `notes`: This variable provides context for exceptional cases. For instance, if a leader undertook multiple autocoup attempts, details are recorded here.

The dataset encompasses a total of 14 variables along with the `notes` field.

## 3.4 Data descriptions

Table 2: Autocoup methods and success rates (1945-2021)

Autocoup Method	Autocoup Attempted	Autocoup Succeeded	Success Rate
Enabling re-election	49	34	69.4%
Removing term limits	14	14	100.0%
Delaying elections	9	9	100.0%
Leader for life	9	9	100.0%
Changing term length	7	5	71.4%
Figurehead	6	5	83.3%
One-time arrangement	5	4	80.0%
Refusing election results	4	1	25.0%
Reassigning power role	4	2	50.0%
Rigging elections	3	2	66.7%
Cancelling elections	3	3	100.0%
Total	113	88	77.9%

According to our primary coding, we have identified 113 autocoup cases from 1945 to 2021, involving 74 countries. As shown in Table 2, the most common autocoup method is enabling re-election, accounting for 49 events. This is followed by removing term limits altogether, with 14 cases, and then delaying elections and declaring the leader for life, each with 9 cases.

Examining the success rates of autocoups, the total success rate is 78%, which is significantly higher than the roughly 50% success rate of classical coups. This suggests that incumbents are in an advantageous position to expand or extend their powers as executive leaders. They can do so openly and gradually, whereas coup plotters must operate in secrecy and face numerous challenges such as promissory issues and the risk of betrayal or exposure.

However, the success rates vary significantly across different methods. Removing term limits, delaying elections, declaring the leader for life, and canceling elections are all 100% successful. In contrast, there are only 4 cases of refusing election results, with just one succeeding. Although this

sample is small, it suggests that in regimes where general elections are held and incumbents lose, the system is relatively more democratic. In such cases, incumbents must run for office without the ability to rig elections, making it less likely for them to overturn election results.

## **4 Determinants of Autocoup Attempts: Case Studies**

### **4.1 High attempts and high success rate of autocoups in post-communist countries**

From the dataset, we observe that in post-communist countries, both the frequency and success rate of autocoups are notably high. Post-communist countries refer to those that were communist at the end of the Cold War, regardless of whether they have since transitioned to other types of regimes. In these countries, there are 12 documented cases<sup>1</sup> of autocoups aimed at prolonging incumbency, with only 2 of these attempts failing. Look into the cases in post-communist countries, we can see several characteristics in these countries. First of all, although most of these countries transferred from communist regimes to non-communist countries (except China), they inherit the authoritarian system of communist. Secondly, the transitions did not result in the removal or overthrow of the previous ruling groups and the former communist elites completely remain in power. Thirdly, although most of the countries introduced general elections and term limits, due to the inertia of former communist regimes, the term limits are often broken and the elections are rigged.

For example, Lukashenko was the member Supreme Soviet of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After the dissolution, he assumed the position of head of the interim anti-corruption committee of the Supreme Council of Belarus. He was elected as the first president of Belarus in 1994, then holding the office ever since. The same pattern happens to all the five Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union. In the 1994 constitutions, the presidency has a maximum of two successive terms, but this was removed by Lukashenko in 2004. Further more, International monitors have not regarded Belarusian elections as free and fair,

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<sup>1</sup>The 12 cases involve 11 countries, with Azerbaijan experiencing two autocoup attempts.



except for his initial win. Although a lot of protests against Lukashenko, he claimed to win with a pretty high votes, almost more than 80% in each election. The post-dissolution leaders of these countries are all high officials or heads of the former Soviet republics and continued their leadership in presidency.

## 5 Determinants of Autocoup Attempts: Case Studies

### 5.1 High Frequency and Success Rate of Autocoups in Post-Communist Countries

From the dataset, we observe that in post-communist countries, both the frequency and success rate of autocoups are notably high. Post-communist countries refer to those that were communist at the end of the Cold War, regardless of whether they have since transitioned to other types of regimes. In these countries, there are 12 documented cases<sup>2</sup> of autocoups aimed at prolonging incumbency, with only 2 of these attempts failing.

Examining the cases in post-communist countries, several characteristics stand out:

- **Inherited Authoritarian Systems:** Although most of these countries transitioned from communist regimes to non-communist governments (with the exception of China), they inherited the authoritarian systems of their communist past.
- **Continuity of Former Elites:** The transitions did not result in the removal or overthrow of the previous ruling groups. Instead, the former communist elites remained in power.
- **Subverted Democratic Processes:** Despite the introduction of general elections and term limits in most of these countries, the legacy of the former communist regimes often led to term limits being ignored and elections being rigged.

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came head of the interim anti-corruption committee of the Supreme Council of Belarus. Elected as the first president of Belarus in 1994, he has held the office ever since. Initially, the 1994 constitutions set a maximum of two successive presidential terms, but Lukashenko removed this limit in 2004. Furthermore, international monitors have not regarded Belarusian elections as free and fair, except for his initial win. Despite significant protests against him, Lukashenko claimed to win with a high vote share, often exceeding 80% in each election. This pattern is evident in all five Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union. Similarly, the post-dissolution leaders of these countries were high officials or heads of the former Soviet republics who continued their leadership in the presidency.

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