

# **Leadership Transitions and Survival: Coups, Autocoups, and Power Dynamics**

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# Abstract

This thesis provides an in-depth analysis of irregular leadership transitions, specifically focusing on coups and autocoups, to assess their effects on leader survival and the resilience of democratic institutions. Using innovative analytical methods and a comparative framework, the research explores the factors influencing the occurrence of these events and their broader implications for political stability and democratic erosion.

The study first investigates the key drivers of traditional coups, highlighting the balance of power between incumbent leaders and potential coup plotters. Through a double probit model with sample selection, it is found that the perceived probability of success significantly impacts the likelihood of a coup attempt. Notably, the analysis reveals that military regimes are 277.7% more likely and personalist regimes 94% more likely to experience coups than dominant-party regimes, all else being equal.

The thesis then examines autocoups, a relatively under-explored phenomenon where incumbents manipulate institutions to extend their rule. A refined definition of autocoups is proposed, and a new dataset covering the period from 1945 to 2023 is introduced. Through case studies and empirical analysis, the research demonstrates how this refined definition and dataset can facilitate nuanced comparisons between traditional coups and autocoups.

Finally, survival analysis is employed to compare the tenure of leaders who came to power through coups versus autocoups. The findings show that coup-installed leaders are 2.23 times more likely to be ousted than autocoup leaders, all else being equal. This disparity suggests that autocoups may serve as a catalyst for both the personalization of power and the erosion of

democratic norms and institutions.

This study contributes to political science by offering a precise definition of autocoups, a new dataset, and a comparative approach to studying coups and autocoups, with significant implications for both academic research and policy-making.

***Keywords:*** *Coups, Autocoups, Leadership transitions, Leadership survival, Democratic resilience*

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

A seamless leadership transition is crucial in political life, as it underpins the stability of the political system to a significant extent. Conversely, social unrest and violence often erupt when conventional leadership transitions are disrupted. Furthermore, unorthodox leadership transfers can have profound and lasting consequences for political systems, democratic resilience, and overall societal stability. As a result, irregular leadership transitions have been a crucial research focus within political science.

Among the various forms of irregular leadership transitions, **coups and autocoups** stand out as the two most prevalent and impactful types. This thesis seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the dynamics of coups and autocoups, as well as their far-reaching implications for leadership survival, regime stability, and democratic resilience. By examining these phenomena through a unified theoretical framework, this research offers a nuanced understanding of the intricate interplay between power dynamics, institutional structures, and political outcomes in contemporary governance.

## 1.1 Motivation and research questions

This research is driven by a fundamental question at the heart of contemporary political dynamics: **What factors determine whether political leaders are prematurely ousted from power or manage to extend their tenure beyond constitutionally prescribed limits?** This inquiry is significant because irregular leadership transitions often disrupt the democratic process, often consolidating the power of autocoup or coup-installed leaders through extra-legal means, and consequently contributing to democratic erosion and the resurgence of authoritarianism.

The relevance of this investigation is particularly acute in the current global landscape. According to Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2024 report, global freedom has declined for the 18th consecutive year as of 2023, with political rights and civil liberties diminishing in 52 countries and improvements observed in only 21 ([Freedom House 2024](#)). This persistent global decline in freedom underscores the urgent need to comprehend the factors determining irregular leadership transitions and their far-reaching implications.

To address these complex issues, this study focuses on three primary research questions, which form the foundation for the subsequent chapters:

- **Coup Dynamics and Regime Types:** How do power dynamics and regime types influence the likelihood and success of coup attempts? This question seeks to unravel the intricate relationship between existing political structures and the propensity for forceful leadership changes.
- **Comparative Analysis of Autocoups:** How can autocoups be effectively analysed within a comparative framework alongside classic coups? This inquiry seeks to expand the analysis of irregular power transitions by comparing autocoups to classic coups.
- **Power Acquisition and Leadership Longevity:** Does the method of power acquisition, specifically whether through a coup or an autocoup, have a significant impact on leadership longevity? This question explores the long-term consequences of different modes

of irregular power transitions on political stability and leadership tenure.

## 1.2 Comparative framework: coups and autcoups

Coups have traditionally dominated the academic discourse on irregular leadership transitions, owing to their frequency and visibility (Thyne and Powell 2019). The well-established definition of coups—the forcible removal of incumbent leaders by elites within the existing power structure—has facilitated the development of comprehensive datasets and rigorous quantitative analyses.

However, another form of irregular leadership transition has been largely overlooked: instances where incumbent leaders refuse to relinquish power and extend their tenure beyond mandated terms. This phenomenon, which is termed “autocoup” in this thesis, has received comparatively less attention, resulting in a lack of consensus on terminology, definition, and data collection.

To address this gap, this study proposes a unified framework for analysing both coups and autcoups. By conceptualizing these as related yet distinct forms of irregular leadership transitions, we can develop a more nuanced understanding of the factors that shape leadership survival following unconstitutional changes in power. This comparative approach is crucial for several reasons:

- **Significance and Frequency:** Both coups and autcoups are the most prevalent means of irregular leadership transitions and have a profound impact on democratic resilience. Understanding their dynamics is essential for assessing the stability and sustainability of democratic systems.
- **Conceptual Similarities:** Notwithstanding their distinct characteristics, coups and autcoups share a crucial commonality: both involve the manipulation of power through illegitimate means to subvert established political processes. However, their objectives

and targets differ significantly. A coup typically seeks to forcibly remove the incumbent leader, abruptly truncating their tenure. In contrast, an autocoup is launched by the incumbent leader against the legal successor or the transition process itself, thereby prolonging the leader's tenure.

- **Comprehensive Analysis:** Integrating these phenomena within a unified analytical framework can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of leadership transition, leadership longevity, and their impact on political systems across various regime types.

### 1.3 Research objectives and contributions

This study addresses a critical gap in the literature by presenting a unified framework for analysing coups and autocoups. The key contributions of this research are threefold, aiming to enhance our understanding of irregular leadership transitions and their impact on political systems.

- **Emphasis the impact of regime types on coup attempts:** This study examines the pivotal factor influencing the success or failure of coup attempts: the power dynamics between incumbent leaders and those seeking to usurp them. By focusing on this dynamic, the study highlights the critical role regime type plays in shaping coup risks.
- **Refined definition and novel dataset for autocoups:** This study refines the definition of autocoups and develops a novel dataset encompassing events from 1945 to 2023. This addresses a significant gap in the existing literature and facilitates a comparative analysis between autocoups and classic coups.
- **Survival analysis of leaders from different entry modes:** Employing survival analysis on existing coup data and the newly compiled autocoup dataset, this research demonstrates how different modes of power acquisition significantly impact leadership survival.

These contributions collectively advance the study of irregular leadership transitions by providing a more holistic understanding of irregular leadership transitions, offering new tools and data for quantitative analysis of autocoups, and demonstrating the interconnectedness of power acquisition methods and leadership survival.

## 1.4 Policy implications

The findings of this study offer critical insights into the interconnected phenomena of democratic backsliding, breakdown, and autocratic intensification, providing a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics that underlie these trends.

- **Regression of global democracy levels:** The examination of irregular leadership transitions and leadership survival sheds light on the alarming decline in global freedom levels. This regression can be attributed, in part, to the proliferation of coups and autocoups, which inevitably violate democratic norms and disrupt the trajectory towards stable democracies.
- **Within-regime democratic erosion:** This research elucidates the phenomenon of democratic backsliding within regimes ([Mechkova, Lührmann, and Lindberg 2017](#)), where democracies become increasingly illiberal and autocracies less competitive. The prevalence of autocoups since 2000 ([Bermeo 2016](#)) has contributed significantly to this trend, as incumbents exploit their strategic advantages to extend their rule and undermine democratic institutions.
- **Prevalence of autocoups since 2000:** The analyses in this study explain the rise of autocoups since 2000, highlighting the strategic advantages that incumbents possess, including a higher probability of success and relatively milder consequences in the event of failure. Furthermore, leaders who manage to extend their rule through an autocoup enjoy significantly longer tenures compared to those who come to power through a coup.

- **Addressing the challenge:** Given the difficulties of mounting internal challenges against autocrats, external pressure from regional or international communities may play a crucial role in promoting democratic accountability and preventing the erosion of democratic norms.

## 1.5 Limitations and future research

While this study provides a novel framework for analysing irregular leadership transitions and survival, several limitations underscore opportunities for future research:

- **Refining the autocrat framework:** The attempt to define and classify autocrats represents a pioneering effort in this field. Nevertheless, both the definition and the dataset can be further refined through additional quantitative studies that critically evaluate and analyze the existing dataset. Future research should prioritize refining these definitions to enhance clarity, applicability, and generalizability, ultimately strengthening the framework's explanatory power.
- **Addressing data harmonization challenges:** The current analysis is constrained by the mismatch between the units of analysis (country-year versus leader tenure) in the coup and autocrat datasets. To overcome this limitation, future research should explore data harmonization techniques, such as data fusion or calibration methods, to facilitate more robust comparisons and address these discrepancies. By doing so, researchers can enhance the accuracy and reliability of analyses concerning leadership longevity.
- **Unpacking the link between irregular transitions and democratic backsliding:** Although this study suggests a connection between irregular leadership transitions and democratic backsliding, further empirical evidence is needed to solidify this link. Future research should prioritize longitudinal studies that can track the long-term impacts of coups and autocrats on democratic health across various regimes. Additionally, in-depth



case studies of democratic erosion following irregular power transitions could provide valuable insights into the dynamics of this relationship, shedding light on the underlying mechanisms driving democratic decline.

## **1.6 Overview of the thesis**

This thesis delves into the intricate dynamics of irregular leadership transitions, examining their implications for leadership survival and democratic processes. The study focuses on three key areas: the determinants of classic coup attempts, the conceptualization and analysis of auto-coups, and the impact of power acquisition methods on leadership longevity.

### **Chapter 2: Determinants of classic coup attempts**

While coups have garnered significant scholarly attention, particularly since the early 2000s ([Thyne and Powell 2019](#)), a consensus on the key factors driving coup attempts and their outcomes remains elusive despite extensive research ([Gassebner, Gutmann, and Voigt 2016](#)). This chapter addresses this ongoing debate by shifting the focus from pre-conditions to the strategic calculations of coup plotters.

Prior literature has emphasized the willingness and conditions necessary for launching a coup, yet similar conditions in different contexts may encounter varying levels of resistance due to differences in the incumbent's authority and power. Therefore, coup plotters must consider not only their own resources and conditions but also the strength of their opponent, potential reactions from other political forces, and the overall balance of power.

This chapter posits that coup plotters engage in a cost-benefit analysis, evaluating the balance of power against the incumbent and calculating their chances of success before staging a coup. Given the severe consequences of failure, they are unlikely to act unless success is highly probable. To operationalize this concept, the study utilizes regime types as a proxy for the balance of power between coup perpetrators and incumbent leaders. This approach stems from

the understanding that regime types are inherently defined by power structures and dynamics (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014).

Acknowledging that coup attempts are not random events but rather strategically initiated by plotters, this chapter applies a double probit model with sample selection, as used by J. Powell (2012) and Böhmelt and Pilster (2014), to address inherent selection bias. This advanced approach allows for a more precise evaluation of the factors that influence both the occurrence of coup attempts and their likelihood of success. The analysis demonstrates that the anticipated probability of success is a decisive factor in coup planning, providing robust evidence for the role of power dynamics in shaping such decisions. Importantly, the findings reveal that military regimes are approximately 277.7% more likely, and personalist regimes 94% more likely, to experience coup attempts compared to dominant-party regimes, all other factors being equal.

### **Chapter 3: Conceptualising and analysing autcoups**

While autcoups have gained increased scholarly attention since the 2000s, previous research has been hindered by conceptual ambiguities and a lack of systematic data. This chapter seeks to address the significant gaps in the literature by refining the concept of autcoups and developing a comprehensive dataset for quantitative analysis.

This chapter seeks to address two significant limitations in the existing literature on autcoups. Firstly, the conflation of power expansion and power extension has led to conceptual ambiguity, with autcoups being used to describe both the consolidation of power by incumbents and the extension of their tenure. Secondly, the definition of autcoups has not been aligned with that of classic coups, despite being a distinct subtype. Classic coups are uniformly defined as the unconstitutional removal of an incumbent leader, with a clear focus on the termination of their tenure. In contrast, autcoups often involve the consolidation of power by incumbent leaders through the seizure of control from other state institutions, rather than solely focusing on the extension of their tenure. To bridge this analytical gap, it is essential to inte-

grate the study of autocoups with that of classic coups, thereby establishing a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics of power seizures.

This study proposes a more precise and theoretically consistent definition of autocoups: **the illegitimate extension of an incumbent leader's term in office beyond the originally mandated limits through unconstitutional means.** By focusing on power extension, this definition clearly distinguishes autocoups from other forms of power consolidation while maintaining consistency with the concept of classic coups, which inherently involve removing an incumbent from power.

Building on this refined conceptualization, the chapter introduces a novel dataset encompassing autocoup events from 1945 to 2023, recording 110 attempts and 87 successes. This comprehensive dataset represents a significant contribution to the field, enabling more robust quantitative analysis of autocoups and their consequences. The chapter also demonstrates the dataset's utility through case studies and empirical analyses, highlighting the role of autocoups in driving democratic backsliding and power personalization.

## **Chapter 4: Impact of power acquisition methods on leadership longevity**

Building upon the analyses of classic coups and autocoups established in previous chapters, this chapter presents a comparative analysis of these two forms of irregular power transitions within a unified framework. The focus is on examining the impact of power acquisition methods on leadership survival, comparing the tenure of leaders installed by successful coups against the extended tenures of autocoup leaders.

This chapter argues that leaders installed via autocoups and coups face distinct challenges in consolidating their power, primarily due to differences in the intensity of issues related to illegitimacy, uncertainty, and instability. These disparities create an uneven playing field in terms of power dynamics, with coup-installed leaders at a significant disadvantage. Consequently, the chapter argues that autocoup leaders are more likely to survive longer in their extended tenure

compared to coup-installed leaders.

To test this hypothesis, the study employs sophisticated statistical techniques, including Cox proportional hazards model and time-dependent Cox model. These methods provide a nuanced examination of how different modes of power acquisition affect leadership longevity. The findings support the central argument, revealing a significant impact of power acquisition methods on leader tenure. Specifically, the results demonstrate that, on average, coup-installed leaders are 2.23 times more likely to be ousted from power than autocoup leaders, all else being equal.

This insight contributes significantly to our understanding of the strategic incentives for different forms of irregular power transitions and their long-term consequences for political stability. By elucidating the relationship between power acquisition methods and leadership survival, this chapter offers valuable perspectives on the dynamics of authoritarian persistence and the challenges of democratic consolidation in regimes that have experienced irregular power transitions.

## **Chapter 5: Conclusion and future research directions**

This concluding chapter synthesizes the key findings from each preceding chapter, weaving together the insights gleaned from the analyses of coups, autocoups, and leadership survival. It reflects on the broader implications of these findings for understanding the interconnected challenges of democratic backsliding, power personalization, and political stability across diverse regime types.

The study's findings underscore the complex interplay between irregular power transitions, leadership tenure, and regime stability. By demonstrating the distinct dynamics and consequences of coups and autocoups, this research provides valuable insights into the motivations of political actors seeking to seize or maintain power through extra-constitutional means. Moreover, by emphasizing the substantial differences in leadership survival rates between these two

forms of power acquisition, this study sheds light on the factors that contribute to the persistence or collapse of authoritarian regimes.

Recognizing the limitations inherent in any single study, this chapter also outlines promising avenues for future research. It emphasizes the need for continued exploration of irregular power transitions, particularly in light of evolving global political dynamics characterized by rising populism, democratic decline, and technological advancements that empower both authoritarian actors and pro-democracy movements.

By highlighting the significance of this research for understanding contemporary challenges to democratic governance, the conclusion underscores the broader relevance of the study's findings for both scholars and policy-makers concerned with promoting political stability, democratic resilience, and accountable governance.

## Chapter 2

# Power Dynamics and Coup Attempts: A Selection Mechanism Analysis

### Abstract

This chapter examines coup attempts by focusing on the expected probability of success as a key driver of coup decisions. Using a double probit model with sample selection, the study investigates the relationship between regime types and coup attempts, focusing on the balance of power between coup plotters and incumbent leaders. The findings reveal that regime type is a significant determinant of coup attempts. Notably, compared to dominant-party regimes, military regimes are approximately 277.7% more likely, and personalist regimes are 94% more likely to experience coups, all else being equal. This heightened vulnerability can be attributed to the weaker institutional frameworks and internal power struggles characteristic of these regimes.

**Keywords:** *Coups, Leadership transitions, Regime types, Sample selection*

## 2.1 Introduction

Coups d'état, defined as “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive” (Powell and Thyne 2011), represent a critical threat to constitutional leadership transitions and political stability. The frequency and success of these attempts vary significantly across countries and regions, prompting essential questions about **why coups are more prevalent in certain countries and why some coups succeed while others fail**.

For instance, according to the Global Instances of Coups dataset (Powell and Thyne 2011) (GIC), Latin America and Africa have seen notable variation in coup activity. Bolivia experienced 24 coups between 1950 and 1984, and Argentina saw 20 coups during a similar period. In Africa, Sudan endured 17 coups between 1955 and 2023. In stark contrast, countries such as Mexico and South Africa have remained coup-free since 1950.

Despite decades of scholarly inquiry and the identification of over 100 potential determinants (Gassebner, Gutmann, and Voigt 2016), a consensus on the key factors driving coup attempts and their outcomes remains elusive. The proliferation of variables presents a significant challenge: Is there a more effective analytical framework that prioritizes the most relevant factors of coups, rather than sifting through an ever-expanding list of possibilities?

This chapter introduces a novel perspective on understanding coup dynamics by shifting the focus from pre-coup conditions to the strategic calculations of potential coup plotters. I contend that the anticipated probability of success is a crucial determinant in the decision to initiate a coup. This argument is substantiated by several key observations:

- **High stakes of coups:** Failed coup attempts often result in severe consequences for participants, including imprisonment, exile, or even death. This underscores the critical importance of success for potential plotters.
- **Selectivity of Coup Attempts:** Despite 491 recorded attempts since 1950, these represent a small fraction (approximately 4%) of over 12,000 country-years during the same

period (GIC). This suggests that coups are not impulsive acts but rather carefully calculated gambles.

- **Relatively high success rates:** Approximately half of all coup attempts succeed (GIC). This further suggests that plotters are selective, choosing to act only when they perceive a significant likelihood of success.

Table 2.1: Top 10 countries with the most coup attempts

Country	Coup Attempted	Coup Succeeded	Success Rate
Bolivia	24	11	45.8%
Argentina	20	7	35.0%
Sudan	17	6	35.3%
Haiti	13	9	69.2%
Venezuela	13	0	0.0%
Iraq	12	4	33.3%
Syria	12	8	66.7%
Thailand	12	8	66.7%
Ecuador	11	5	45.5%
Burundi	11	5	45.5%
Guatemala	10	5	50.0%
Total	493	246	49.9%

Source: GIC dataset

Given the difficulty in directly observing the probability of coup success, this study proposes using regime type as a crucial proxy for predicting coup outcomes. The underlying premise is that the balance of power within a regime, which is significantly influenced by its type, ultimately shapes the outcomes of coups. By analysing power dynamics across various regime



types, we can gain more profound insights into the structural factors that affect both the likelihood of coup attempts and their success.

To address the inherent selection bias in studying coup attempts, this research employs a double probit model with sample selection, building on the methodological approaches used by J. Powell (2012) and Böhmelt and Pilster (2014). This method enables the simultaneous analysis of factors influencing both the initiation and success of coups.

This study aims to contribute to scholarly discourse and practical efforts in two key ways:

- **Re-framing coup dynamics through the lens of expected success:** By emphasizing the expected chances of success as a driver of coup attempts, this research offers a more targeted approach to understanding coup dynamics. Specifically, it highlights the selective effect of anticipated outcomes on coup initiation, providing a more nuanced understanding of the strategic calculations underlying coup attempts.
- **Illuminating the role of regime type in shaping coup outcomes:** In the absence of perfect knowledge of internal power balances, this study leverages regime types as a proxy for power structures. By examining the relationship between regime type and anticipated coup outcomes, this research sheds light on how these structures influence the likelihood of coup success, thereby informing strategies for coup prevention and mitigation.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 delves into the complexities of coup attempts and their outcomes, providing a nuanced examination of the underlying dynamics. Section 3 outlines the research design, methodology, and variables employed in this study, providing a transparent and detailed account of the analytical framework. Section 4 presents and interprets the empirical findings, highlighting the key patterns and trends that emerge from the data. Section 5 concludes the chapter by distilling the main insights and implications of the study, and exploring their potential applications in understanding and mitigating coup risks.

## 2.2 Dynamics of coup attempts and outcomes

Coup attempts represent a critical juncture in the political landscape of regimes, driven by a complex interplay of factors that can be broadly categorized into two main components: the **disposition** of potential challengers (their motivations and willingness to act) and their **capability** (the resources and opportunities available to them). This analysis delves into the intricate dynamics of coup attempts, examining the underlying motivations, factors influencing their success, and the role of regime types in shaping a country's susceptibility to coups.

### 2.2.1 Motivations for coups

Coup plotters are driven by a range of motivations, which can be distilled into three primary categories: personal ambition, purported national interest, and self-preservation.

- **Personal ambition:** The allure of absolute power is a potent motivator for many coup plotters. The prospect of seizing control offers the ability to shape national policies without constraint, command significant resources and wealth, make impactful decisions that affect millions, and bask in the prestige and recognition that comes with holding power. The opportunity to leave a lasting historical legacy is also a powerful draw.
- **Purported national interest:** Coup leaders often justify their actions as necessary interventions for the greater good of the nation. While such claims should be scrutinized, some examples demonstrate genuine attempts to address critical issues, such as resolving constitutional crises, facilitating transitions to democracy, or addressing severe economic downturns or social unrest. The 2010 coup in Niger, which ousted President Tandja after he sought an unconstitutional third term, is a notable example ([Ginsburg and Elkins 2019](#)).
- **Self-preservation:** In some instances, coups serve as pre-emptive strikes against perceived existential threats. Motivations in this category include preventing elimination or

political persecution by incumbent leaders, protecting the interests of specific military or political factions, and safeguarding ideological or ethnic groups from marginalization. The 1971 coup led by Idi Amin against Ugandan President Obote exemplifies this motivation, as Amin acted to prevent his removal from a key military command position ([Sudduth 2017](#)).

Despite these potential motivations, it is crucial to note that coups remain relatively uncommon events. Since 1950, coups have occurred in only about 4% of country-years. This rarity underscores the importance of the capability factor – even the most motivated actors require substantial resources and favourable circumstances to successfully execute a coup.

### 2.2.2 Capability for coups

While motivations may spark coup attempts, the capability to launch a successful coup is often more decisive. This capability is pivotal in determining whether potential coup plotters transition from mere contemplation to concrete action. Several key factors influence this capability, which can be broadly categorized into five main areas:

- **Military strength:** A significant advantage in military capabilities over the incumbent regime substantially increases the odds of a successful coup ([Powell et al. 2018](#); [Choulis et al. 2022](#)). This factor encompasses control over elite military units or special forces, access to advanced weaponry and technology, loyalty of key military commanders, and strategic positioning of supportive military units. The balance of military power is often the most critical determinant of coup success, as it directly affects the ability to seize and hold key government installations.
- **Internal divisions within the regime:** Exploiting existing fractures within the government's power structure can provide coup plotters with a critical advantage. These divisions may manifest as ideological disagreements among ruling elites, competing centers

of power within the government, ethnic or regional tensions in the political leadership, or dissatisfaction among mid-level bureaucrats or military officers. Coup plotters can leverage these divisions to build a coalition of support, promising benefits or addressing grievances of marginalized factions within the regime.

- **Public support:** Widespread discontent with the incumbent leaders, particularly within the military or key sectors of society, can create a fertile environment for a successful coup. Factors contributing to public support include economic hardship or inequality, perceived corruption or mismanagement by the government, human rights abuses or political repression, and failure to address critical national issues. While public support alone may not be sufficient for coup success, it can provide legitimacy to the coup plotters and reduce resistance from the general population.
- **Foreign backing:** External support from powerful nations can provide resources, legitimacy, and even direct military intervention to tip the scales in favor of the coup plotters. This support may take various forms, including financial assistance, intelligence sharing, diplomatic recognition, covert military aid or training, and threats of intervention against the incumbent regime. The role of foreign backing in coups has been particularly significant during the Cold War era and continues to shape geopolitical dynamics in many regions.
- **Timing and opportunity:** Identifying and exploiting moments of vulnerability in the incumbent leaders is crucial for coup success. Opportune moments may include national crises or emergencies, periods of political transition or uncertainty, major public events or celebrations, and times of internal conflict within the regime. Coup plotters must carefully assess these windows of opportunity and time their actions to maximize their chances of success.

### 2.2.3 The selection mechanism in staging coups

While historical data may suggest a high success rate for coups, it is crucial to consider the inherent selection bias when interpreting this information. Observers are limited to studying only attempted coups, neglecting the numerous plots that never materialize. This limitation presents a significant challenge in accurately assessing the true likelihood of coup success.

Several factors contribute to this selection bias:

- **Unobserved deterrence:** Preemptive measures by incumbent regimes may effectively deter coup attempts before they materialize, rendering them invisible to statistical analysis.
- **Self-selection of capable plotters:** Those who attempt coups are likely to do so only when they perceive a reasonable chance of success, leading to an overestimation of the overall success rate in observed data.
- **Unreported failed attempts:** Many unsuccessful coup attempts, particularly those in the early planning stages, may go unreported or remain undetected, further skewing the available data.
- **Varying definitions of “coup attempt”:** Inconsistencies in how researchers define and classify coup attempts can introduce additional bias into the data, complicating cross-study comparisons.

To address these challenges and understand coup attempts more comprehensively, a theoretical framework is needed to account for this selection bias. A frequently cited framework (Gassebner, Gutmann, and Voigt 2016; Aidt and Leon 2019) offers a structured approach to assess the disposition and capability of coup attempts by evaluating the anticipated benefits for coup plotters.

The expected pay-off of a coup can be represented by the equation:

$$E(U) = p \times B + (1 - p) \times (-C) \quad (2.1)$$

Where:

- $E(U)$ : Expected utility or pay-off of the coup attempt;
- $B$  represents the return of a successful coup;
- $C$  signifies the cost of a failed coup;
- $p$  represents the probability of coup success.

The condition for staging a coup is when the expected benefit is positive ( $E(U) > 0$ ). Rearranging the equation, we get:

$$p \times B > (1 - p) \times C \quad (2.2)$$

This implies that for a coup to be attempted, the expected benefits of success must outweigh the expected costs of failure.

However, quantifying  $B$  and  $C$  is inherently difficult due to several factors. The intangible nature of some costs and benefits (e.g., loss of life, personal freedom). The variability of outcomes across different contexts. The subjective valuation of power and risk by individual coup plotters.

Given the difficulty in precisely quantifying  $B$  and  $C$ , we can treat them as roughly equal for analytical purposes. This allows us to shift our focus to the probability of success ( $p$ ). The simplified equation becomes:

$$p > (1 - p) \quad (2.3)$$

This suggests that a success probability greater than 50% is necessary for a coup to be attempted. While empirical data shows a slightly lower overall success rate for coups since

1950 (49.9%, as shown in Table 2.1), it is crucial to remember that this is an average and does not reflect the specific probabilities assessed by coup plotters beforehand.

Based on this discussion, we propose the following hypothesis:

***H2-1: The fundamental determinant of a coup attempt is the perceived chance of success. Coup plotters likely require a success threshold of at least 50%.***

This hypothesis fundamentally shifts the focus of coup research from the prerequisites for triggering a coup to the expected coup outcome as the primary determinant. By doing so, it underscores the importance of understanding the factors that influence coup plotters' perceptions of success probability, thereby highlighting the need for a more nuanced approach to coup analysis.

A natural follow-up question arises: What factors determine coup success and, subsequently, influence the decision to attempt one? The answer lies in understanding the complex balance of power inherent in the diverse power dynamics across various regime types.

#### **2.2.4 Regime types and coup susceptibility**

Existing research on coup plotting often concentrates on the dispositions and capabilities of potential perpetrators, overlooking a crucial factor: the dynamic balance of power between those initiating a coup and the incumbent regime. Even when dispositions and capabilities are similar, coup outcomes can vary significantly depending on this balance, underscoring the mediating role of power dynamics in influencing the strategic calculus of potential coup plotters.

For instance, solely attributing coup attempts to military strength oversimplifies the complex reality of these events (Singh 2016). In a highly centralized personalist regime, control over the military may be concentrated in the hands of a small, loyalist faction, making it difficult for potential rivals to garner the necessary support for a successful coup. Conversely, in a more fragmented military regime, internal divisions and competing power centres can create opportunities for ambitious officers to mobilize support and challenge the ruling junta. As

Geddes (1999) notes, a coup's success often hinges on the reactions of these other factions, creating a complex decision-making environment for potential plotters. Furthermore, incumbents frequently employ strategic division within the military as a coup-proofing measure (Böhmelt and Pilster 2014). This involves intentionally creating rival groups within the armed forces, establishing an artificial balance and structural obstacles to coup attempts. Additionally, factors beyond military force, such as internal divisions among ruling elites, public support, and foreign backing, significantly shape the balance of power.

Consequently, a more comprehensive approach involves analyzing the overall balance of power within a political system. However, as noted in the introduction, directly observing this balance presents significant challenges for outside observers, including policy-makers, international organizations, and even potential coup plotters themselves. An alternative approach, and the one adopted in this study, is to analyze factors that decisively shape power dynamics. This method aligns more closely with academic research goals, which focus on understanding the patterns and underlying factors of coup attempts rather than identifying specific power challengers capable of launching successful coups.

Among the various factors influencing power dynamics, regime type emerges as one of the most crucial and observable. Regime types are fundamentally classifications based on power structures within a political system, and different regime types allocate authority differently for critical decisions such as the deployment of military forces, appointment of key officials and military officers, and formulation and implementation of main policies. This allocation of authority, in turn, shapes the incentives and opportunities for potential coup plotters, influencing their likelihood of success.

Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) provides a classification of autocratic regime types based on their power structures, offering valuable insights into the power dynamics within different autocracies and their relative susceptibility to coups. The three main types of autocratic regimes, their characteristics, and their vulnerability to coup attempts are explored as follows (see Table 2.2):



- **Military regimes:** These are characterized by a junta – a group of military officers controlling leadership selection and policy formulation. Examples include regimes in Brazil (1964-1985), Argentina (1976-1983), and El Salvador (1948-1984) ([Geddes 1999](#)). Despite their military nature, these regimes are surprisingly unstable due to internal power struggles within the junta. The absence of a clear final authority and the presence of multiple military factions increase the likelihood of resorting to force to resolve disputes, making these regimes the most vulnerable to coups.
- **Personalist regimes:** In these regimes, power is concentrated in a single, charismatic leader who controls the military, policy, and succession. Examples include Rafael Trujillo's regime in the Dominican Republic (1930-1961), Idi Amin's regime in Uganda (1971-1979), and Jean-Bédél Bokassa's regime in the Central African Republic (1966-1979) ([Geddes 1999](#)). Personalist regimes are relatively stable during the leader's tenure. However, they face a higher risk of coups due to unclear succession plans and vulnerabilities associated with the leader's personal weaknesses, health, and mortality.
- **Dominant-party regimes:** In these systems, power resides within a well-organized ruling party, with leaders acting as its representatives. The party structure and ideology foster internal cohesion and a long-term vision. Examples include the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM), and Leninist parties in various Eastern European countries ([Geddes 1999](#)). Dominant-party regimes exhibit the greatest resilience against coups due to their institutionalized structures, unified leadership, clear ideology, and internal discipline.

Empirical data supports the theoretical framework that different regime types exhibit varying levels of susceptibility to coups. Military regimes, constituting only 5.6% of country-years since 1950, experience a disproportionate share of coups (over 22%). In contrast, dominant-party regimes, representing 22.6% of country-years, account for only 16.7% of coups (see Ta-

ble 2.3). These statistics demonstrate the disproportionate vulnerability of military and personalist regimes to coups, while highlighting the relative stability of dominant-party regimes.

The distinct power dynamics exhibited by these regime types significantly influence their susceptibility to coups. This analysis leads to the second hypothesis:

***H2-2: The susceptibility to coups varies significantly among different types of autocratic regimes, with military regimes being the most vulnerable, followed by personalist regimes, and dominant-party regimes being the least susceptible.***

Table 2.2: Characteristics of Different Regime Types

Regime Type	Power Concentration	Succession	Military Alignment	Stability
Military	Junta	Unclear	May have significant influence	Low
Personalist	Single Leader	Unclear or dependent on leader's will	Subordinated to leader	Moderate (initially), Low (long-
Dominant-Party	Party Leadership	Institutionalized	Aligned with the party	High
Source: GWF & Author				

Table 2.3: Regime types and coups since 1950

Regime Type	Country	Year	Share	Coups	Coups Percent	Success Rate	Likelihood
Democracy		5312	46.7%	124	25.2%	51.6%	2.3%
Dominant-Party		2569	22.6%	82	16.6%	53.7%	3.2%
Personal		1476	13.0%	113	22.9%	44.2%	7.7%
Monarchy		1056	9.3%	25	5.1%	56.0%	2.4%
Military		638	5.6%	110	22.3%	48.2%	17.2%
Other		322	2.8%	39	7.9%	53.8%	12.1%
Total		11373	100.0%	493	100.0%	49.9%	4.3%

Source: REIGN and GIC Datasets

## 2.3 Research design

### 2.3.1 Double probit with sample selection model

This study employs a sophisticated statistical approach to account for the selective nature of coup attempts. While coup attempt rates vary across regimes, success rates tend to be surprisingly consistent, hovering around 50% (as shown in Table 2.3). This suggests that coup attempts are not random acts, but rather strategically planned and undertaken only when the odds of success appear favourable. A standard statistical model would not account for this selectivity, potentially leading to biased results.

To address this issue, we utilize a double probit with sample selection model. This model, known as a Heckman probit model or bivariate probit model with sample selection, consists of two parts:

- **Selection equation (Stage 1):** This stage analyses the factors influencing whether a coup attempt occurs in a particular country-year.
- **Outcome equation (Stage 2):** This stage focuses on the probability of success for those coup attempts that actually take place.

The selection equation (first stage) models the probability that a coup attempt occurs:

$$y_{1i}^* = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Regime_i + \mathbf{X}_i A + \mu_{1i}$$
$$y_{1i} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y_{1i}^* > 0 \text{ (coup attempt occurs)} \\ 0 & \text{if } y_{1i}^* \leq 0 \text{ (no coup attempt)} \end{cases} \quad (2.4)$$

The outcome equation (second stage) models the probability of a coup attempt succeeding, given it occurs.

$$y_{2i}^* = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Regime}_i + \mathbf{Z}_i B + \mu_{2i}$$

$$y_{2i} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y_{2i}^* > 0 \text{ (coup succeeds)} \\ 0 & \text{if } y_{2i}^* \leq 0 \text{ (coup fails)} \end{cases} \quad (2.5)$$

Where:

- $y_{1i}^*$  and  $y_{2i}^*$  are latent variables
- $\text{Regime}_i$  is a categorical variable (military, personalist, or dominant-party)
- $\mathbf{X}_i$  and  $\mathbf{Z}_i$  are vectors of control variables
- $\mu_{1i}$  and  $\mu_{2i}$  are error terms, assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution with correlation  $\rho$

The model assumes:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \mu_{1i} \\ \mu_{2i} \end{pmatrix} \sim N \left( \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \rho \\ \rho & 1 \end{pmatrix} \right)$$

The probability equations are:

$$P(y_{1i} = 1) = \Phi(\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Regime}_i + \mathbf{X}_i A) \quad (2.6)$$

$$P(y_{2i} = 1 \mid y_{1i} = 1) = \Phi(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Regime}_i + \mathbf{Z}_i B) \quad (2.7)$$

Where  $\Phi(\cdot)$  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.

## 2.3.2 Variables

### 2.3.2.1 Dependent variable

The analysis utilizes data on coup attempts and outcomes from Powell and Thyne (2011). A successful coup is defined as one where the incumbent leader is removed from power for more than seven days. The dataset covers the period from 1950 to 2023 and includes information on 491 coup attempts, with roughly half (245) being successful. Descriptive statistics for these coup attempts and regime types can be found in Table 2.1 and Table 2.3.

- **Coup attempt:** Binary variable indicating whether a coup attempt occurred (1) or not (0) in a given country-year.
- **Coup success:** Binary variable indicating whether a coup attempt was successful (1) or failed (0), conditional on a coup attempt occurring.

### 2.3.2.2 Key independent variable: regime type

I categorize regime types following Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) (GWF), focusing on military, personalist, and dominant-party regimes, with democracies and monarchies included for comparison. Descriptive statistics for regime types are presented in Table 2.3.

### 2.3.2.3 Control variables

The control variables are chosen based on the research of Gassebner, Gutmann, and Voigt (2016). They analysed 66 factors potentially influencing coups and found that slow economic growth, prior coup attempts, and other forms of political violence are particularly significant factors. Therefore, we include economic performance, political violence, and the number of previous coups as our main control variables.

- **Economic Level:** Represented by GDP per capita. This measure provides an indication of the overall economic health and standard of living in a country. We use GDP per capita

data (in constant 2017 international 1000 dollars, PPP) from the V-Dem dataset by Fariss et al. (2022).

- **Economic Performance:** Measured using the current-trend ( $CT$ ) ratio developed by Krishnarajan (2019). This ratio compares a country’s current GDP per capita to the average GDP per capita over the previous five years. A higher  $CT$  ratio indicates stronger economic performance. For a country  $i$  at year  $t$ , the  $CT$  ratio is calculated as follows:

$$CT_{i,t} = \frac{GDP/cap_{i,t}}{\frac{1}{5} \sum_{k=1}^5 GDP/cap_{i,t-k}} \quad (2.8)$$

- **Political stability:** This variable captures overall regime stability by including a violence index that encompasses all types of internal and interstate wars and violence. The data for this index is sourced from the variable “actotal” in the Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset (Monty G. Marshall 2005), with 0 representing the most stable conditions (no violence at all) and 18 representing the most unstable.
- **Previous coups:** Included in the selection equation as either: a) The number of previous coups in a country (Model 1), or b) The time since the last coup attempt (Model 2 for robustness check).

## 2.4 Results and discussion

The double probit model with sample selection, estimated using the *sampleSelection* package (Toomet and Henningsen 2008) in R, provides valuable insights into the factors influencing coup attempts and their outcomes across different regime types from 1950 to 2019 (Table 2.4). I present two models that differ slightly in their treatment of previous coups: Model 1 incorporates the number of previous coups, while Model 2 utilizes the time elapsed since the last coup.



Table 2.4: Sample Selection Model of Regime Type and Coup Success, 1950-2019

	Coup Attempts	Coup Outcome
	(1)	(2)
Constant	−1.868*** (0.062)	−1.014* (0.526)
Regime: Democracy	−0.046 (0.073)	0.014 (0.174)
Military	0.561*** (0.086)	0.363 (0.228)
Monarchy	0.299** (0.119)	0.087 (0.282)
Personalist	0.241*** (0.076)	−0.089 (0.199)
Economic trend	−0.020*** (0.003)	0.006 (0.011)
GDP per capita	−0.026*** (0.003)	−0.021** (0.010)
Political violence	0.027** (0.013)	0.024 (0.028)
No. of Previous coups	0.079*** (0.010)	
Observations	9,641	9,641
Log Likelihood	−1,631.677	−1,631.677
$\rho$	0.564** (0.235)	0.564** (0.235)

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 2.5: Average marginal effects of coup attempts (Selection of Model 1)

Term	Contrast	AME <sup>1</sup>	Ratio Percent
Democracy	mean(democracy - dominant-party)	−0.003	−9.160
Military	mean(military - dominant-party)	0.055	186.030
Monarchy	mean(monarchy - dominant-party)	0.024	80.120
Personal	mean(personal - dominant-party)	0.018	61.570
Economic trend	mean(+1)	−0.001	−3.760
GDP per capita	mean(+1)	−0.002	−4.870
Political violence	mean(+1)	0.002	5.270
Previous coups	mean(+1)	0.006	15.930

<sup>1</sup> AME: Average Marginal Effect

### 2.4.1 Selection model: coup attempts

The selection model (Column 1) reveals that military and personalist regimes exhibit significant positive coefficients at the 1% level, indicating a higher likelihood of experiencing coup attempts compared to dominant-party regimes. This aligns with the theoretical expectations regarding internal power struggles within military juntas and succession vulnerabilities in personalist regimes.

Table 2.5 presents the Average Marginal Effects (AME) and ratio percentages to clarify the regime effects. The military regime's marginal effect of 0.07 indicates that the probability of coup attempts in military regimes is 7 percentage points (pp) higher than in dominant-party regimes, *ceteris paribus*. This translates to military regimes being about 277.7% more likely to encounter coups than dominant-party regimes. Similarly, personalist regimes show a 2.4 pp higher probability, about 94% more likely compared to dominant-party regimes.

The control variables show effects in expected directions but with weaker magnitudes.

Stronger economic performance, indicated by higher economic growth trends and GDP per capita levels, correlates with a lower risk of coup attempts. Political violence shows a positive effect, indicating that higher levels of instability increase the likelihood of coups. The positive coefficient for the number of previous coups suggests a “copycat” effect from earlier incidents.

### **2.4.2 Outcome model: coup success**

Turning to the outcome model (Columns 2 and 4 in Table 2.4), the results reveal determinants of coup success. Military regimes demonstrate a higher probability of coup success compared to dominant-party regimes, aligning with expectations that military regimes face higher coup risks due to their increased chances of success. Personalist and monarchical regimes show slight positive effects on coup success, but these effects are not statistically significant.

The control variables exhibit different patterns in the outcome model compared to the selection model. Both GDP per capita and political violence maintain a weak influence, similar to their effects in the selection model. However, the economic trend shows a less significant negative effect on coup success.

### **2.4.3 Model comparison (model 1 versus model 2)**

Comparing the two models, Model 2 employs years since the last coup instead of the number of previous coups, with an interaction term between previous coups (as a binary variable) and years since the last coup. Generally, Model 2 shows results in the same direction as Model 1, albeit with relatively lower coefficients (see Table 2.6).

The differences between Model 1 and Model 2 suggest that while the recency of coups matters, the overall history of coups in a country may have a stronger influence on future coup attempts.

Table 2.6: Average marginal effects of coup attempts (Selection of Model 2)

Term	Contrast	AME <sup>1</sup>	Ratio Percent
Democracy	mean(democracy - dominant-party)	0.006	24.940
Military	mean(military - dominant-party)	0.077	339.370
Monarchy	mean(monarchy - dominant-party)	0.017	73.480
Personal	mean(personal - dominant-party)	0.027	117.520
Economic trend	mean(+1)	-0.002	-4.450
GDP per capita	mean(+1)	-0.002	-5.990
Political violence	mean(+1)	0.003	6.860

<sup>1</sup> AME: Average Marginal Effect

#### 2.4.4 Discussion of key findings

The  $\rho$  values of 0.898 in Model 1 and 0.386 in Model 2, significant at 1% and 10% levels respectively, indicate strong correlation between unobserved factors influencing coup attempts and coup success. This supports the appropriateness of the sample selection model and underscores the importance of considering both stages in the analysis.

The significant coefficients with theoretically consistent directions suggest the model effectively captures key aspects of coup dynamics. The observed disparity between coup attempt rates and success rates across regimes points towards selection bias, further validating the use of the sample selection model.

#### 2.4.5 Implications

The results of this study strongly corroborate the theoretical framework delineated in this chapter, highlighting the critical role that regime structure and the anticipated probability of coup

success play in determining a regime's susceptibility to coup. These findings underscore that coups are strategic actions undertaken when circumstances appear favourable, rather than random occurrences.

The implications of these results for real-world politics are profound. Given that the perceived likelihood of successful coup execution is pivotal in coup attempts, incumbent leaders—particularly those in autocratic regimes—will be strongly motivated to concentrate their efforts on diminishing the capabilities of potential coup plotters, rather than merely addressing the underlying dispositions toward staging a coup.

In practice, this implies that autocratic leaders are likely to prioritize “coup-proofing” strategies. These may include appointing loyal generals and officials over competent ones, fostering factional divisions within the elite, and removing capable or popular military officers and government officials—even those who remain loyal. However, this approach can precipitate a vicious cycle.

The adage, “New levels, new devils”, aptly captures the cyclical nature of coup risk mitigation. Incumbents, often lulled into a false sense of security after neutralizing immediate threats, may find themselves facing new challenges as a direct consequence of their actions. The very act of suppressing potential rivals, while seemingly strengthening their grip on power, inevitably fosters resentment and grievances among those disenfranchised. This, in turn, makes the prospect of a coup increasingly enticing, shifting the calculus of risk for potential plotters. While capability remains paramount in determining the success of any coup attempt, the disposition for such an undertaking, fuelled by discontent and perceptions of vulnerability, cannot be disregarded. Paradoxically, heavy-handed crackdowns on opposition, intended to deter challenges, can inadvertently lower the perceived costs of staging a coup, creating a fertile ground for future instability.

Moreover, if incumbent leaders devote excessive attention to coup-proofing at the expense of economic growth and social development, they are likely to resort to increasingly autocratic forms of governance. This, in turn, can lead to democratic backsliding or even outright break-

down, as well as the entrenchment of authoritarian and personalistic rule.

In conclusion, the findings of this study offer critical insights into the complex dynamics underlying coup attempts and the strategic calculus of incumbent regimes. Navigating these challenges will require a delicate balance between addressing the capabilities and dispositions of potential coup plotters while maintaining a focus on broader governance, economic, and social priorities. Future research should explore the long-term consequences of coup-proofing strategies on regime stability and societal well-being, as well as potential alternative approaches to mitigating coup risks without compromising democratic values and institutions.

## **2.5 Summary**

This chapter explores the most frequent irregular leadership transition, coups, that destabilize political systems and disrupt democratic transitions worldwide, a phenomenon that has garnered extensive scholarly attention yet remains a challenging puzzle. To shed new light on this issue, this study introduces a novel perspective by emphasizing the determinants that impact coup success, moving beyond the mere capability to launch a coup and focusing on the expected probability of success. This approach highlights the critical role played by the perceived balance of power between coup plotters and the incumbents in determining outcomes.

The study employs a double probit model with sample selection, which enables a nuanced analysis of the relationship between regime types and coup likelihood. The results affirm that regime type significantly influences coup vulnerability, with military and personalist regimes exhibiting higher susceptibility to coups compared to dominant-party regimes. This finding is corroborated by historical examples, such as the frequent instability and coup attempts experienced by military regimes in Latin America during the 20th century and various African personalist regimes. The study underscores the importance of building regimes with strong constitutional institutions, as those reliant on military or personal authority prove to be more prone to coups.

A key contribution of this study is its exploration of the paradox faced by autocratic rulers, such as dictators and military juntas. While institutional strengthening could promote regime longevity and reduce the risk of coups, many autocrats resist such reforms due to the potential limitations they might impose on their power. Institutionalization, while beneficial for the regime's long-term stability, may not align with the short-term interests of individual leaders who prioritize their personal control and authority over broader regime security.

The study also identifies policy implications for enhancing political stability, including promoting economic development, strengthening institutional frameworks, and encouraging political inclusivity. This shift towards institutionalization could help reduce the volatility that often accompanies military and personalist regimes.

Furthermore, this research opens several avenues for further inquiry, including:

- Examining the long-term effects of regime types on political stability, including trends toward democratization or authoritarian personalization.
- Investigating the role of international factors in influencing regime types and coup dynamics, especially when internal mechanisms are insufficient to prevent coups.

In conclusion, this chapter provides empirical evidence confirming that regime type plays a decisive role in determining coup risk. It also acknowledges the complex interplay of power dynamics within regimes, offering insights for both scholars and policy-makers focused on promoting democratic transitions and political stability. By shedding light on the strategic decisions behind coup attempts, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of political instability and its potential solutions, ultimately informing strategies for promoting more stable and resilient political systems.

## **Chapter 3**

# **Autocoups: Conceptual Clarification and Analysis of Power Extensions by Incumbent Leaders**

### **Abstract**

This chapter clarifies the concept of autocoups, focusing on their distinct characteristics, particularly the extension of power by incumbent leaders. By delineating autocoups from the more encompassing and ambiguous concepts of self-coups or executive takeovers, which conflate executive power aggrandizement and power extension, this research offers a refined definition of autocoups. Building on this conceptual framework, a novel dataset of autocoup events spanning 1945 to 2023 is introduced. The study employs a mixed-methods approach, combining three types of qualitative case studies that provide in-depth insights into the dynamics of autocoups with a quantitative analysis of the determinants of autocoup attempts and success. This empirical examination demonstrates the utility of the autocoup dataset for future research. This study contributes to the existing literature by providing a clearer conceptual framework, a novel dataset, and a deeper understanding of the mechanisms and motivations underlying power



extensions by incumbent leaders. Furthermore, it explores the implications of autocoups for democratic resilience, shedding light on the effects of autocoups on leadership transitions and political stability.

***keywords:*** *Autocoups, Coups, Dataset*

### 3.1 Introduction

While the study of irregular leadership transitions has predominantly focused on coups due to their frequency and significant impact, another form—the incumbent leader’s refusal to relinquish power—has received comparatively less attention despite its importance. Recent decades, particularly since the end of the Cold War, have witnessed a decline in classic coups and a concomitant rise in this incumbent retention or overstay type of irregular leadership transition (Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins 2010; Baturu 2014; Versteeg et al. 2020).

This chapter aims to redefine and clarify this type of irregular leadership transition, where leaders overstay their mandated term limits, as an *autocoup*. Although analyses related to autocoups are not uncommon, the existing literature exhibits several notable shortcomings:

- **Terminological ambiguity:** The use of terms like “self-coups”, “autocoups”, “autogolpes”, “incumbent takeovers”, “executive aggrandizement”, “overstay”, and “continuismo” in different literature lacks clear, universally accepted definitions, leading to confusion and inconsistent application (Marsteintredet and Malamud 2019; Baturu and Tolstrup 2022). This terminological ambiguity hinders accurate analysis and comparison across studies
- **Limited dataset:** Due to the conceptual ambiguity surrounding autocoups, data collection remains in its nascent stages compared to the rich datasets available for classic coups.
- **Methodological gaps:** The study of autocoups has been hindered by a limited dataset, resulting in a reliance on in-depth case studies (Maxwell A. Cameron 1998b; Antonio 2021; Pion-Berlin, Bruneau, and Goetze 2022) to explore this phenomenon. Notably, quantitative analysis has been underutilized in this field, with few studies employing statistical methods to examine autocoups.

More importantly, analyses of autocoups are often not integrated with those of classic coups, despite their interconnected nature. As a distinct category of coup, autocoups lack a clear and

differentiated definition in relation to traditional coups. Classic coups are typically defined as the complete removal of incumbent leaders, with a focus on the termination of their tenure. In contrast, autocoups often focus more on incumbent leaders consolidating power by seizing control from other state institutions, rather than on extending their tenure. As a result, coups and autocoups are frequently analysed in isolation. This separation has led to a dearth of comparative analyses, hindering a more comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics between these two types of irregular leadership transitions.

Examining autocoups, particularly in conjunction with classic coups, is essential for several compelling reasons. Firstly, both coups and autocoups represent significant and frequent means of irregular leadership transitions, underscoring the need for a comprehensive understanding of these phenomena. Secondly, autocoups, much like coups, have a profoundly detrimental impact on governance, as they undermine the rule of law, erode institutional capacity, and contribute to democratic backsliding or the personalization of authoritarian power. Thirdly, successful autocoups, akin to successful coups, create a precedent that increases the likelihood of future irregular power transitions, thereby perpetuating a cycle of instability. For instance, since 1945, a striking 62% of leaders who extended their terms through autocoups in non-democratic countries ultimately met a tumultuous end, either being ousted or assassinated while in office ([Baturu 2019](#)). Lastly, failed autocoups, similar to failed coups, often precipitate instability, inciting widespread protests, violence, and even civil wars, which can have far-reaching and devastating consequences for the affected country and its citizens.

This chapter addresses these gaps by focusing on autocoups, aiming to clarify terminology, refine concepts and definitions, enhance data collection, and explore determinants through empirical analysis, contributing in three key areas:

- **Conceptual clarification:** The term autocoup will be redefined and clarified, with a focus on power extension.
- **Data collection:** A new dataset of autocoups since 1945 will be introduced based on this

refined definition.

- **Empirical analysis:** Utilizing this dataset, a quantitative analysis of the factors influencing leaders' decisions to attempt autocoups will be conducted.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 will review definitions related to power expansions and extensions, leading to a precise definition of autocoups. Section 3 will present the new autocoup dataset. Sections 4 and 5 will explore the determinants of autocoup attempts through case studies and demonstrate the application of the dataset in empirical analysis. The conclusion will summarize key findings and suggest directions for future research.

## **3.2 Autocoups: A literature review and clarification of definitions**

A significant limitation in the study of irregular leadership transition is the conspicuous lack of integration between research on autocoups and classic coups. Despite both coups and autocoups being crucial mechanisms of irregular leadership change, the existing literature has largely treated these two phenomena in isolation, neglecting to explore their interconnectedness and the nuanced dynamics that govern their occurrence.

This separation is attributable to two primary factors. Firstly, previous research has often overlooked autocoups as a distinct form of irregular leadership transition. Secondly, a persistent conceptual ambiguity has hindered the development of a clear and consistent definition and categorization of autocoups.

Classic coups are typically characterized by the abrupt and comprehensive removal of incumbent leaders, focusing on the swift termination of their tenure. In contrast, autocoups are often defined as events wherein incumbent leaders consolidate their authority by systematically usurping power from other state institutions, rather than merely extending their own tenure.

The absence of a clear, differentiated definition of autocoups in relation to their classic counterparts has exacerbated this divide. While classic coups have been extensively studied and well-defined, autocoups remain a distinct yet under-explored category. This definitional ambiguity has resulted in a dearth of comparative analyses that could illuminate the complex interplay between these two forms of power subversion.

Integrating the study of autocoups with that of classic coups is crucial for bridging this analytical gap. Such an approach would offer a more nuanced and comprehensive perspective on the various mechanisms by which political power can be subverted or consolidated. By examining these phenomena in tandem, researchers can better understand the full spectrum of irregular power transitions, from outright removal to internal power grabs, providing valuable insights into the nature of political instability and regime change.

To strengthen the analysis of autocoups, a crucial first step is to establish a clear and consistent terminology, followed by a refinement of the definition of autocoup to mitigate ambiguity and clarify its distinct characteristics.

### **3.2.1 Terminology**

The most prevalent term in autocoup literature is “self-coup,” or “autogolpe” in Spanish ([Przeworski et al. 2000](#); [Maxwell A. Cameron 1998a](#); [Bermeo 2016](#); [Helmke 2017](#); [Marsteintredet and Malamud 2019](#)). This term gained academic prominence following Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori’s actions in 1992, when he dissolved Congress, temporarily suspended the constitution, and ruled by decree ([Mauceri 1995](#); [Maxwell A. Cameron 1998b](#)). However, as Marsteintredet and Malamud (2019) astutely points out, the term “self-coup” can be misleading, as it implies a coup against oneself, which is inaccurate since the action typically targets other state institutions or apparatus.

Another approach to describing coups staged by incumbents involves using terms with adjectives or modifiers, such as “presidential coup,” “executive coup,” “constitutional coup,”

“electoral coup,” “judicial coup,” “slow-motion coup,” “soft coup,” and “parliamentary coup” (Marsteintredet and Malamud 2019). While these terms can be useful in specific instances, their proliferation often creates more confusion than clarity. Most of these terms focus on the specific methods employed by coup perpetrators but fail to clearly identify the perpetrator, necessitating further explanation. Moreover, many of these methods could be employed either by or against executive leaders, further muddying the waters.

A third alternative involves terms like “incumbent takeover,” “executive takeover,” or “overstay.” Incumbent takeover refers to “an event perpetuated by a ruling executive that significantly reduces the formal and/or informal constraints on his/her power” (Baturu and Tolstrup 2022, 374), building on earlier research by (Svolik 2014). Meanwhile, overstay is defined as “staying longer than the maximum term as it stood when the candidate originally came into office” (Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins 2011, 1844). These terms effectively identify the perpetrator (the incumbent) and/or the nature of the event (overstaying/extending power). However, they fall short in highlighting the illegality or illegitimacy of these actions. Consequently, they cannot serve as a direct counterpart to “coup,” which clearly denotes the illegality of leadership ousters, while “takeover” or “overstay” diminish the severity of the act.

Given that these terms often lack precision, focusing on specific methods rather than the core act of power usurpation, this study proposes “autocoup” as the most suitable term for this phenomenon. Unlike other terms, ‘autocoup’ clearly identifies the perpetrator and the illegitimate nature of the power grab, distinguishing it from classic coups while maintaining a parallel structure in terminology.

### **3.2.2 Definition**

While precise terminology is undoubtedly crucial, another issue arises with previous definitions of autocoups: what is the primary emphasis—power expansion, power extension, or a combination of the two?

Definitions of power expansion and power extension within the field of political science can often be ambiguous or overlapping, presenting a potential source of confusion. To ensure greater clarity in the study of autocoups, it is necessary to distinguish these two distinct conceptual frameworks more clearly:

- **Power expansion:** This refers to the process by which an incumbent leader acquires additional authority or control over state apparatuses beyond their original mandate. This may involve centralizing power, reducing checks and balances, or encroaching on the authority of other branches such as the legislature or judiciary.
- **Power extension:** This describes situations where a leader prolongs their tenure beyond the originally mandated term in office, often through constitutional amendments, cancellation of elections, or other means of circumventing term limits.

Existing definitions of autocoups or related concepts often suffer from ambiguity between power expansion and extension, or they focus more on power expansion, which has several drawbacks.

Firstly, defining autocoups primarily in terms of power expansion does not align well with the traditional definition of a coup. A classical coup is clearly focused on the ouster of the current leader, not merely a limitation or restriction on their power. Using the same logic, a more appropriate definition of an autocoup should prioritize the tenure extension of executive leadership. Power restrictions on incumbents would not be coded as a coup as long as they remain in office. Similarly, an executive leader acquiring more power from other branches could be coded as power aggrandizement but not an autocoup, as long as they step down when their term expires.

Secondly, emphasizing power expansion in autocoups often neglects the ultimate purpose of incumbents. It is irrational for an incumbent to expand executive power only to pass the powerful role to future leaders. Although the term “self-coup” gained prominence from the 1992 Fujimori case in Peru, which initially involved seizing power from other institutions, it

is important to note that Fujimori ultimately extended his term limits through constitutional amendments. The 1993 Constitution allowed Fujimori to run for a second term, which he won in April 1995. Shortly after Fujimori began his second term, his supporters in Congress passed a law of “authentic interpretation” that effectively allowed him to run for another term in 2000, which he won amid suspicions and rumors. However, he did not survive the third term; in 2000, facing charges of corruption and human rights abuses, Fujimori fled Peru and took refuge in Japan ([Ezrow 2019](#)).

Thirdly, measuring the extent of power expansion to qualify as an autoup can be challenging. As Maxwell A. Cameron ([1998a](#)) defined, a self-coup is “a temporary suspension of the constitution and dissolution of congress by the executive, who rules by decree until new legislative elections and a referendum can be held to ratify a political system with broader executive power” (p. 220). However, defining “broader executive power” is inherently problematic and disputable.

Therefore, this study argues that a more accurate definition of autoup should prioritize power extension as its core characteristic. This approach is straightforward and easy to identify in practice. In most cases, autoups involving power extension also involve power expansions as their prerequisite and foreshadowing.

Based on these criteria, I define **an autoup as the illegitimate extension of an incumbent leader’s term in office beyond the originally mandated limits**. This definition emphasizes the core characteristic of power extension while acknowledging the potential for power expansion as a related phenomenon:

- **Leadership Focus:** This definition refers to the actual leaders of the country, regardless of their official titles. Typically, this would be the president; however, in some cases, such as in Germany, the primary leader is the premier, as the president serves as a nominal head of state.
- **Primary Characteristic:** While the primary characteristic of an autoup is extending



the term in office, this definition does not exclude instances of power expansion. Both aspects can coexist, but the extension of the term is the central element.

- **Illegitimacy:** Autocoups, by their nature, subvert legal norms and established leadership transfer mechanisms. No matter how legitimate they claim to be, their illegitimacy is not beyond a reasonable doubt as long as the incumbents are the direct beneficiaries. This critical aspect will be explored further in Section 3.

By clarifying these definitions, this study aims to provide a more precise and consistent framework for understanding and analysing autocoups, thereby enhancing the clarity and rigor of research in this field.

### **3.3 Introduction to the autocoup dataset**

#### **3.3.1 Defining the scope**

Classifying political events as autocoups often involves addressing borderline cases. To maintain consistency and avoid ambiguity, this study adopts a broad coding approach: All instances of incumbents extending their original mandated term in office are coded as autocoups, regardless of the apparent legality of the extension.

This approach is justified because truly legitimate amendments to power transition institutions should apply only to subsequent leaders, not the incumbent. Even when extension procedures appear legal, the legitimacy is questionable when the incumbent is the direct beneficiary.

#### **3.3.2 Classifying autocoups**

To maintain consistency, autocoups are categorized based on several key factors.

- **Methods employed:** Specific strategies used by incumbents (e.g., constitutional amendments, election cancellation).

- **Degree of legality:** Extent of deviation from established legal norms.
- **Duration of extension:** Length of time the incumbent remains in office beyond designated term limits.
- **Outcomes:** Whether the autocoup attempt succeeds or fails.

This study primarily focuses on the methods employed, while coding for other aspects when information is available.

### **Evasion of term limits**

Evasion of term limits is a common tactic employed in autocoups. Incumbents often resort to seemingly legal manoeuvres to extend their hold on power. These manoeuvres primarily involve manipulating constitutional provisions through various means. The incumbents may pressure legislative bodies (congress) or judicial institutions (Supreme Court) to reinterpret existing term limits, amend the constitution to extend terms, or even replace the constitution altogether. This might also involve popular vote through referendums, or a combination of these approaches. The extension can range from a single term to indefinite rule.

These manoeuvres primarily involve manipulating constitutional provisions through various means.

- **Changing term length:** Incumbents might lengthen the official term duration (e.g., from 4 to 6 years) to stay in office longer, even if the number of allowed terms remains unchanged. Examples, in the dataset, include Presidents Dacko (CAR, 1962), Kayibanda (Rwanda, 1973), and Pinochet (Chile, 1988).
- **Enabling re-election:** This approach involves incumbents modifying legal or constitutional frameworks to permit themselves to run for leadership again, despite initial restrictions. These restrictions might include prohibitions on re-election, bans on immediate

re-election, or term limits that the incumbents have already reached. An illustrative example is President Menem of Argentina in 1993, who leveraged this tactic to extend his tenure.

- **Removing term limits altogether:** This approach was implemented by President Paul Biya of Cameroon in 2008. Biya, who had been in power since 1982, successfully pushed for a constitutional amendment that abolished presidential term limits. This change allowed him to run for re-election indefinitely, effectively opening the possibility for him to rule for life.
- **Declaring leader for life:** This differs from removing term limits as the leader still faces elections (although potentially rigged or uncontested). An example is Indonesia's President Sukarno, who attempted to declare himself president for life in 1963 (ultimately unsuccessful).

These methods are often used in combination. Initially, the duration of a term is extended, followed by amendments to allow re-election, then the removal of term limits, and finally, the declaration of the leader for life. For example, Haitian President François Duvalier amended the constitution in 1961 to permit immediate re-election and then declared himself president for life in 1964.

### **Election manipulation or rigging**

Election manipulation or rigging is the second most commonly used tactic to extend an incumbent's tenure.

- **Delaying or removing elections:** Delaying or removing scheduled elections without legitimate justification is a frequent method used by incumbents to maintain power. For instance, Chadian President François Tombalbaye delayed general elections until 1969

after assuming power in 1960. Similarly, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos suspended elections throughout his rule from 1979 to 2017.

- **Refusing unfavourable election results:** Incumbents may refuse to accept unfavourable election results and attempt to overturn them through illegitimate means. For example, President Donald Trump of the United States refused to accept the results of the 2020 election and tried to overturn them.
- **Rigging elections:** Winning elections with an extraordinarily high percentage of votes is highly questionable. This study will code elections where the incumbent wins more than 90% of the vote as autocracies. For instance, President Teodoro Obiang of Equatorial Guinea has consistently won elections with over 95% of the vote in multi-party elections since 1996, indicating election rigging.
- **Excluding opposition in elections:** Manipulating the electoral process by excluding opposition parties or candidates from participation, effectively creating a one-candidate race, clearly signifies an autocracy.

### Figurehead Installation

One strategy employed by incumbents to evade term limits is to install a trusted associate as a figurehead, allowing the incumbent to maintain de facto control while formally relinquishing office. This can be achieved through the creation of seemingly subordinate positions, which in reality serve as conduits for the incumbent's continued influence.

A notable example of this tactic is the 2008 Russian presidential transition. Confronted with constitutional term limits, President Vladimir Putin hand-picked Dmitry Medvedev to succeed him as president. Following Medvedev's election, he appointed Putin as Prime Minister, ostensibly reversing their roles. However, most observers and analysts concur that Putin continued to wield significant behind-the-scenes influence, effectively rendering Medvedev a proxy leader.

### **Reassigning supreme authority to a new role**

This tactic involves an incumbent leader manipulating the constitution or legal framework to create a new position of power, or elevate an existing one, before stepping down from their current role. They then strategically take on this new position, effectively retaining significant control despite appearing to relinquish power. For example, in 2017, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Prime Minister of Turkey, spearheaded a constitutional referendum that transitioned the country from a parliamentary system to a presidential one. This new system concentrated significant executive power in the presidency. Following the referendum's approval, Erdoğan successfully ran for the newly established presidency, effectively retaining control under a different title.

### **One-time arrangement for current leaders**

This strategy involves special arrangements that extend the term or tenure of current leaders without altering the underlying institutions. For example, Lebanon extended President Émile Lahoud's term by three years in 2004 through a one-time arrangement.

### **3.3.3 Data coding**

The autocoup dataset is built upon existing studies and datasets, ensuring a comprehensive and reliable foundation. Table 3.1 outlines the main sources used for coding the autocoup dataset.

The Archigos dataset ([Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009](#)) and the Political Leaders' Affiliation Database (PLAD) ([Bomprezzi et al. 2024](#)) provide comprehensive data on all leaders from 1875 to 2023, although our coding only includes autocoups since 1945. These datasets are invaluable for identifying actual rulers, distinguishing them from nominal heads of state.

The Incumbent Takeover dataset ([Baturu and Tolstrup 2022](#)) integrates data from 11 related datasets, offering a broad spectrum of cases where leaders significantly reduced constraints on their power. This dataset includes both power expansions and extensions, necessitating cross-referencing with Archigos to verify qualifications for autocoups.

Table 3.1: Main Data Sources for Coding the Autocoup Dataset

Dataset	Authors	Coverage	Observations
Archigos	Goemans et al (2009)	1875-2015	3409
PLAD	Bomprezzi et al. (2024)	1989-2023	1334
Incumbent Takeover	Baturo and Tolstrup (2022)	1913-2019	279

In total, 110 observations were coded, with 95 overlapping with the candidate data from Incumbent Takeover. The remaining 15 events were newly coded by the author through verification with other sources such as Archigos, PLAD and news reports.

The main deviation from the Incumbent Takeover dataset arises from excluding power expansions that do not involve attempts to extend tenure.

The dataset encompasses a total of 14 variables along with the *notes* field.

- **Country identification:** Country code (*ccode*) and country name (*country*) from Correlates of War project ([Stinnett et al. 2002](#)).
- **Leader information:** Name of the de facto leader (*leader\_name*, coded following Archigos and PLAD datasets).
- **Timeline variables:** Date the leader assumed power (*entry\_date*), date the leader left office (*exit\_date*), date of the significant event marking the autocoup (*autocoup\_date*), and Start date of the leader's additional term acquired through the autocoup (*extending\_date*).
- **Power transition methods:** Categorical variable for how the leader entered power (*entry\_method*), categorical variable for how the leader exited power (*exit\_method*), dummy variable indicating regular (1) or irregular (0) entry (*entry\_regular*), and dummy variable indicating regular (1) or irregular (0) exit (*exit\_regular*).

- **Autocoup details:** Key variable capturing methods used to extend power (*autocoup\_method*) and outcome of the autocoup attempt (*autocoup\_outcome*, “fail and lose power”, “fail but complete original tenure”, or “successful”). For successful coups, the additional term length can be calculated from the difference between *exit\_date* and *extending\_date*.
- **Data source:** Identifies the dataset source used for coding (*source*).
- **Additional notes:** Provides context for exceptional cases (*notes*).

There are a few coding challenges and decisions worth mention. For cases where extensions happen incrementally, the *autocoup\_date* reflects a significant event marking the extension, such as a legislative vote or successful referendum. In cases where a leader undertook multiple autocoup attempts, details are recorded in the notes field. Care was taken to differentiate between cases of power expansion and actual attempts to extend tenure, which required cross-referencing multiple sources. Determining the success or failure of an autocoup attempt often required in-depth research, especially for less documented cases.

### 3.3.4 Data descriptions

The primary coding has identified 110 autocoup cases from 1945 to 2023, involving 73 countries. This comprehensive dataset provides a rich source of information for analysing trends and patterns in autocoup attempts across different political contexts.

Table 3.2 presents a breakdown of the autocoup methods employed by leaders:

The most common autocoup method is “enabling re-election”, accounting for 46 events. This is followed by “removing term limits” (14 cases), and then “delaying elections” and “declaring the leader for life” (each with 9 cases).

Autocoups have a success rate of 79%, compared to the 50% success rate of classical coups. This high success rate can be attributed to several factors:

Table 3.2: Autocoup methods and success rates (1945-2021)

Autocoup Method	Attempted	Succeeded	Success Rate
Enabling re-election	46	33	71.7%
Removing term limits	14	14	100.0%
Delaying elections	9	9	100.0%
Leader for life	9	9	100.0%
Changing term length	7	5	71.4%
Figurehead	6	5	83.3%
One-time arrangement	5	4	80.0%
Refusing election results	4	1	25.0%
Reassigning power role	4	2	50.0%
Rigging elections	3	2	66.7%
Cancelling elections	3	3	100.0%
Total	110	87	79.1%

*Source: Autocoup dataset*

- **Incumbent Advantage:** Leaders already in power have access to resources and institutional mechanisms that can be leveraged to their advantage.
- **Gradual Implementation:** Unlike sudden coups, autocoups can be implemented gradually, allowing leaders to build support and legitimacy over time.
- **Legal Facade:** Many autocoup methods operate within a veneer of legality, making them harder to oppose openly.
- **Control of State Apparatus:** Incumbents often have significant control over state institutions, which can be used to facilitate their autocoup attempts.

However, success rates vary significantly across different methods.

- **100% success rate:** Removing term limits, delaying elections, declaring the leader for life, and cancelling elections all have perfect success rates. This suggests that once these processes are set in motion, they are difficult to reverse.



- **Lower success rates:** Refusing to accept election results has the lowest success rate, with only 1 out of 4 attempts succeeding. Although the sample size is limited (only 4 cases in total), this trend might suggest several factors at play. These include greater democratic resilience in systems where general elections are regularly held, heightened international scrutiny and pressure in response to blatant manipulation of election results, and stronger domestic opposition to such overt power grabs.

### 3.4 Determinants of autocoup attempts: Case studies

#### 3.4.1 High frequency and success rate of autocoups in post-communist regimes

Our dataset shows a high frequency and success rate of autocoups in post-communist countries. These nations, formerly communist regimes prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, have largely evolved into ‘hybrid regimes’ (Nurumov and Vashchanka 2019), with only a few retaining their communist status. The data documents 12 cases of autocoups aimed at prolonging incumbency in these countries, with only two attempts failing. Examination of these cases highlights several distinctive characteristics:

- **Inherited authoritarian systems:** Despite most of these 12 countries transitioning from communist to non-communist governments (with the exception of China), they retained many authoritarian systems from their communist past.
- **Continuity of former elites:** The transitions did not result in the removal or overthrow of previous ruling groups. Instead, former communist elites often maintained their positions of power.
- **Subverted democratic processes:** While general elections and term limits were introduced in most of these countries, the legacy of former communist regimes frequently

led to the circumvention of term limits and manipulation of elections ([Nurumov and Vashchanka 2019](#)).

### **Case 1: Lifelong ruler–Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus**

Alexander Lukashenko, a former member of the Supreme Soviet of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, became the head of the interim anti-corruption committee of the Supreme Council of Belarus following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Elected as Belarus's first president in 1994, he has maintained this position ever since. Initially, the 1994 constitution limited presidents to two successive terms. However, Lukashenko removed this restriction in 2004. International monitors have not regarded Belarusian elections as free and fair since his initial victory. Despite significant protests, Lukashenko has consistently claimed to win with a high vote share, often exceeding 80% in each election. This pattern is evident across all five Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union, where post-dissolution leaders were typically high officials or heads of the former Soviet republics who continued their leadership in the presidency.

### **Case 2: Transferring power to a handpicked successor–Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan**

Nursultan Nazarbayev served as the first president of Kazakhstan from 1991 until 2019. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, he held de facto leadership as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. Following independence, he was elected as the first president and retained office until 2019 through various means, including resetting term limits due to the implementation of new constitutions. Notably, Nazarbayev did not officially eliminate term limits but instead created an exemption for the “First President” ([Nurumov and Vashchanka 2019](#)). Unlike Lukashenko, who remains the incumbent of Belarus, Nazarbayev transferred the presidency to a designated successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in 2019. However, he retained significant influence as the Chairman of the Security Council of Kazakhstan until 2022.

### **3.4.2 Autocoups for immediate re-election: Cases of Latin America**

Latin America has a long-standing tradition of maintaining term limit conventions. Simón Bolívar, the founding father of Bolivia, was initially a strong advocate for term limits, stating in 1819, “Nothing is as dangerous as allowing the same citizen to remain in power for a long time... That’s the origin of usurpation and tyranny” ([Ginsburg and Elkins 2019, 38](#)). Although Bolívar eventually modified his stance, arguing in his 1826 Constitution Assembly speech that “a president for life with the right to choose the successor is the most sublime inspiration for the republican order,” term limits became a convention in Latin America. Approximately 81% of Latin American constitutions between independence and 1985 imposed some form of term limits on the presidency ([Marsteintredet 2019](#)).

An analysis of cases in Latin American countries reveals two notable patterns.

#### **Often successful at breaking non-re-election or non-immediate re-election restrictions**

Unlike other presidential systems where two terms are more common, non-re-election or non-immediate re-election used to be prevalent in Latin America. According to Marsteintredet ([2019](#)), non-consecutive re-election was mandated in about 64.9% of all constitutions between independence and 1985, while 5.9% banned re-election entirely.

However, adherence to these conventions has varied across the region. Since Mexico introduced non-re-election institutions in 1911 at the start of the Mexican Revolution, they have remained inviolate ([Klesner 2019](#)). Similarly, Panama and Uruguay have never altered their re-election rules, and Costa Rica has only experienced a brief period (1897-1913) permitting immediate presidential re-election since prohibiting it in 1859 ([Marsteintredet 2019](#)). In many other countries, however, constitutions have been frequently amended or violated.

The pursuit of re-election or consecutive re-election, therefore, has been a significant trigger for autocoups aimed at power extension in this region. Our research documents 32 autocoup cases, with over 50% (17 cases) attempting to enable re-election or immediate re-election, and

about 59% (10 cases out of 17) being successful.

Unlike those who attempt to overstay in office indefinitely, many Latin American leaders exit after their second term expires. Examples include President Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil (1995-2003), President Danilo Medina of the Dominican Republic (2012-2020), and President Juan Orlando Hernández of Honduras (2014-2022) ([Ginsburg and Elkins 2019](#); [Marsteintredet 2019](#); [Landau, Roznai, and Dixon 2019](#); [Baturu 2019](#); [Neto and Acácio 2019](#)).

### **Failing to further extend tenure**

This trend does not imply that none of these leaders attempted further extensions, but rather that most accepted their unsuccessful outcomes without abusing their power to manipulate the process. While autoucoups aimed at securing one additional term are often successful, attempts to overstay beyond this are frequently unsuccessful.

In contrast to the previous examples, two contrasting cases illustrate the varied outcomes of term limit challenges:

- **Unsuccessful extension – Carlos Menem (Argentina):** President Menem successfully extended his tenure by one term through a 1994 constitutional amendment allowing one executive re-election. He was subsequently re-elected in 1995. However, his attempt to reset his term count, arguing that his first term (1988-1995) should not count as it was under previous constitutions, was unanimously rejected by the Supreme Court in March 1999 ([Llanos 2019](#)). A similar scenario unfolded with President Álvaro Uribe of Colombia (2002-2010) ([Baturu 2019](#)).
- **Successful extension – Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua):** In contrast, Daniel Ortega, the incumbent president of Nicaragua, successfully extended his presidency. In 2009, the Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua permitted his re-election in 2011. Subsequently, in 2014, the National Assembly of Nicaragua approved constitutional amendments abol-

ishing presidential term limits, allowing Ortega to run for an unlimited number of five-year terms. As a result, he has held the presidency since 2007 ([Close 2019](#)).

### 3.4.3 As common as classical coups: Cases of African countries

Classical coups have been prevalent in Africa, accounting for approximately 45% of all global coups (219 out of 491 cases) since 1950, involving 45 out of 54 African countries (GIC dataset). While autocoups are less frequent compared to traditional coups, they maintain a significant presence in Africa. Among 110 documented autocoup cases globally, 46% (51 cases) occurred in Africa, involving 36 countries. Notably, the success rate of autocoups in Africa is over 84% (43 out of 51 attempts), which surpasses both the success rate of classical coups in the region (roughly 50%) and the global average success rate of autocoups (79%).

Identifying a clear pattern of autocoups in Africa is challenging, mirroring the complexity observed with classical coups. Various factors have been proposed to explain this phenomenon:

- **Natural Resources:** Countries rich in natural resources, particularly oil or diamonds, may see leaders more likely to attempt and succeed in extending their terms ([Posner and Young, n.d.](#); [Cheeseman 2015](#); [Cheeseman and Klaas 2019](#)).
- **Quality of democracy:** The quality of democracy is a critical factor influencing respect for term limits ([Reyntjens 2016](#)).
- **International influence:** International aid or donor influence can play a significant role in discouraging attempts at power extension ([Brown 2001](#); [Tangri and Mwenda 2010](#)).
- **Organized opposition and party unity:** The extent of organized opposition and the president's ability to enforce unity within the ruling party are crucial factors ([Cheeseman 2019](#)).

Utilizing the Africa Executive Term Limits (AETL) dataset, Cassani ([2020](#)) highlights human rights abuses and the desire for impunity as main drivers for incumbents to cling to power.

The more authoritarian a leader, the more likely they are to attempt to break term limits and overstay in office. A leader's ability to secure the loyalty of the armed forces through public investment increases the chances of success in overstaying.

Despite both coups and autocoups being prevalent, there has been a noticeable shift since the end of the Cold War in 1991: Traditional coups have decreased in frequency while autocoups have become more prevalent.

This trend can be partially attributed to the introduction of multi-party elections in Africa in the 1990s, which also brought in term limits for executives ([Cassani 2020](#); [Cheeseman 2019](#)). Before 1991, personal or military rule was more common, and term limits were less frequent. Post-1991, with more term limits introduced, challenges to these limits have increased. However, it is crucial to note that this increase in challenges does not necessarily imply that violations are more common than adherence to term limits, because total power transitions have increased compared to the past.

### **3.5 Empirical analysis: An example of utilizing the autocoup dataset**

The autocoup dataset enables quantitative analyses beyond traditional case studies. This section provides a straightforward example of how to utilize this dataset effectively. To analyze the determinants of autocoup attempts, I employ a probit regression model. This approach differs from the double probit model with sample selection used in [Chapter 2](#) for coup attempts and success analyses. Instead, I use two separate probit models. Due to the high probability of success in autocoups, they do not exhibit the typical sample selection characteristics that necessitated the use of a sample selection model in our earlier analysis of traditional coups.

### 3.5.1 Dependent variables

- **Autocoup attempt:** Binary variable indicating whether an autocoup attempt occurred (1) or not (0) during the tenure of an incumbent leader.
- **Autocoup success:** Binary variable indicating whether an autocoup attempt was successful (1) or failed (0), conditional on an autocoup attempt occurring.

### 3.5.2 Independent variables

The selection of independent variables are consistent with the coup analysis in Chapter 2, plus the population size and the leader's age.

- **Population size:** To account for its potential impact on leaders' tenures, we consider the log of the population size. This transformation helps in managing the wide range of population sizes across different countries. The data is sourced from the V-Dem dataset and is evaluated to understand its influence on power transitions. Larger populations may present more governance challenges and potential sources of opposition, thereby affecting the stability and longevity of a leader's tenure.
- **Leader's age:** The age of the leader is included as an additional variable in the analysis, offering insights into potential correlations with leadership strength. Older leaders may have different experiences, networks, and health considerations that could influence their ability to maintain power. This data is sourced from Archigos and PLAD datasets.

Unlike the analysis of coup determinants, which could theoretically occur in any given year, I assume that an autocoup happens only once during an incumbent leader's tenure, as a successful autocoup negates the need for another attempt. However, this assumption does not always reflect reality, as leaders might attempt further extensions or try again after a failed attempt. For simplicity, I overlook these possibilities in our analysis.

Therefore, in our probit model, the unit of analysis for autocalups is the entire tenure of a leader, rather than a country-year. I establish a base year for the variables: for leaders who staged an autocalup, we use the year of their first attempt as the base year; for leaders who did not attempt to overstay, I use the middle year of their tenure as the base year.

### **3.5.3 Results and discussions**

Table 3.3 summarizes the findings from the probit regression models based on our analysis of the determinants of autocalup attempts and their success.

Model 1, which examines autocalup attempts, reveals only one significant predictor besides the constant term. Among the regime types, personalist regimes significantly increase the likelihood of autocalup attempts, all else being equal. This suggests that leaders in personalist regimes are more prone to attempt to extend their power through autocalups compared to leaders in democratic regimes (reference regime). Leaders in dominant-party and military regimes, however, show no significant difference in the likelihood of attempting an autocalup compared to democratic leaders.

The model for autocalup success (Model 2) shows similar dynamics. Personalist regimes again have a strong positive and significant effect on the success of autocalups compared to democratic leaders. Dominant-party regimes also show a positive and marginally significant effect. However, a detailed examination reveals that about half of the successful autocalups in dominant-party regimes (9 out of 20) exhibit a personalist style, such as “party-personal-military” regimes.

This outcome is logical since personalist leaders are typically much more powerful than other types of leaders, making them more inclined and capable of overstaying in power.

Other factors play an insignificant role in determining the attempts and outcomes of autocalups. This aligns with our conclusions on the determinants of classic coups. Both coups and autocalups are significantly affected by power dynamics. As power transitions involve the strug-



Table 3.3: Determinants of autocoup attempts and success (1945-2018)

	Autocoup Attempts (1)	Autocoup Outcome (2)
Constant	−2.418*** (0.871)	−1.857 (2.834)
Regime: Dominant-party	0.088 (0.146)	0.707* (0.404)
Military	−0.237 (0.190)	0.638 (0.543)
Personalist	0.794*** (0.157)	1.652*** (0.449)
GDP per capita	−0.009 (0.011)	0.062 (0.045)
Economic trend	1.346* (0.804)	1.182 (2.796)
Political stability	−0.037 (0.035)	0.115 (0.125)
Age	−0.001 (0.001)	0.004 (0.017)
Population(log)	−0.046 (0.042)	0.021 (0.144)
Observations	1,031	103
Log Likelihood	−308.469	−43.164
Akaike Inf. Crit.	634.938	104.328

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

gle between seizing and maintaining power, the balance of power status quo inevitably matters in both coups and autocoups. This also explains the high success rate of autocoups. Compared to power challengers, incumbents are in an obviously advantageous position. Incumbent leaders can use state power to their benefit, which is difficult to counteract. Even the abuse of power is often unchecked under a powerful leader's rule.

The empirical analysis of autocoups yields significant implications for real-world politics. In particular, the high overall success rate of autocoups highlights the vulnerability of democratic institutions to gradual erosion by incumbent leaders. The threshold for ousting or impeaching an incumbent leader through constitutional means is exceptionally high, with success often requiring more than a simple majority and substantial support across various sectors. Resorting to illegal means, such as a coup, presents even greater challenges due to high costs, severe consequences, and a low likelihood of success.

Conversely, political dynamics, whether in democracies or autocracies, tend to favour incumbents even when they act unconstitutionally. Incumbents can leverage state resources to achieve their political ambitions, benefiting from a high probability of success and minimal consequences in case of failure. This asymmetry in power and risk creates a concerning scenario: for incumbents who do not respect constitutional institutions, the opportunity to launch an autocoup appears sufficiently low-risk to warrant an attempt.

### **3.6 Summary**

This chapter conducts a thorough and comprehensive analysis of autocoups, with a specific focus on political events where incumbent leaders illegitimately extend their tenure in power. By refining the existing definition and distinguishing autocoups from related concepts such as “self-coups,” “autogolpes,” and “executive takeovers,” this research introduces a novel dataset that catalogues autocoups from 1945 to 2023. This refined definition and the accompanying dataset enable the study to broaden its analysis of irregular leadership transitions. While traditional

analyses often concentrate on the abrupt termination of tenure through coups, this research expands the scope to include the irregular extension of tenure through autocoups. This approach provides a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the phenomenon, highlighting the various mechanisms by which incumbent leaders can subvert democratic processes to maintain their power.

The findings reveal that personalist regimes are significantly more likely to experience autocoup attempts and succeed in these attempts compared to democracies. Dominant-party systems, often exhibiting personalist characteristics, also show an association with successful autocoups. While regime type significantly influences autocoups, other factors appear less impactful, mirroring classic coups where the balance of power is a more essential determinant. The high success rate of autocoups can be attributed to the inherent advantages incumbents possess, such as control over or abuse of state power and the difficulty of removing or impeaching them through legal or illegal means.

However, several limitations warrant consideration for future research. Firstly, the definition of an autocoup requires further commentary and discussion to gain wider acceptance in the academic community. Despite efforts to maintain objectivity, some coding decisions may involve subjective judgments, particularly in borderline cases. Secondly, due to the nature of autocoups, which are less frequent than classic coups (491 coups versus 110 autocoups during the same period), the quantitative analysis cannot be conducted as a country-year variable as in coup studies. This raises the issue of choosing an appropriate base year for the analysis, which requires further discussion and potentially sensitivity analyses.

Despite these limitations, this research significantly enhances our understanding of the mechanisms and motivations behind autocoups, contributing to the literature on political stability and democratic resilience. The findings highlight the vulnerability of political systems, particularly democracies, to erosion from within by incumbent leaders.

Future studies could build on this work by employing the dataset to explore more nuanced power dynamics or examine the long-term impacts of these events on political systems. Particu-

larly fruitful areas for investigation include the relationship between autocrats and democratic backsliding, democratic breakdown, and the personalization of power. Additionally, comparative analyses between autocrats and traditional coups could yield insights into the evolving nature of power consolidation strategies in different political contexts.

In conclusion, this study enhances our understanding of autocrats by clarifying terminology, refining definitions, and providing a comprehensive dataset. Future research could explore the relationship between autocrats and democratic backsliding, democratic breakdown, and the personalization of power.

# **Chapter 4**

## **Power Acquisition and Leadership Survival: A Comparative Analysis of Coup-installed and Autocoup Leaders**

### **Abstract**

This chapter examines the relationship between the methods of power acquisition and the tenure of leaders who ascend to power through unconventional means, with a particular focus on coup-installed and autocoup leaders. The central hypothesis posits that the mode of accession has a profound impact on leadership longevity. Utilizing Cox proportional hazards and time-dependent Cox models, this study provides robust empirical evidence of disparate survival times between these two leader types. The findings reveal that, on average, coup-installed leaders are 2.23 times more likely to be ousted from power than autocoup leaders, all else being equal. These results have far-reaching implications for political stability and democratic processes, suggesting that the perceived low costs and high rewards associated with autocoups may incentivize incumbents to prolong their tenure through this means, potentially contributing to democratic erosion. This research makes a notable contribution to the academic literature by

offering nuanced insights into the dynamics of irregular leadership transitions and enhances our understanding of the complex interplay between power acquisition methods and leadership longevity.

***keywords:*** *Coups, Autocoups, Leadership Survival, Cox Model*

## 4.1 Introduction

The enduring fascination with the longevity of political leaders has sparked extensive research in political science, with scholars seeking to understand why some leaders maintain power for decades while others are ousted in a matter of months or even days. However, a specific subset of leaders—those who ascend to power through coups or extend their tenure through autoups—has received relatively limited attention. Examining the tenures of these leaders is crucial, as it sheds light on the dynamics of irregular leadership transitions and their implications for political stability and democratic processes.

In contrast to leaders who attain power through conventional means, those who rise through irregular channels, such as coups or autoups, present more complex and intriguing cases for study. The Archigos dataset highlights the prevalence of irregular power transitions. Between 1945 and 2015, over half of leaders who assumed power irregularly also exited irregularly, a rate significantly higher than that of leaders who accessed office through regular channels.

Coup-installed and autoup leaders constitute a substantial portion of these irregular cases. The Archigos dataset notes that of 374 leaders who exited irregularly, 246 (65.8%) were ousted through coups. Furthermore, research by Frantz and Stein (2016) demonstrates that coup-related exits account for approximately one-third of all exits in autocracies, surpassing any other transition type. Additionally, the autoup dataset, introduced in Chapter 3, documents 110 autoup attempts between 1945 and 2023, of which 87 were successful.

Measuring the tenure of coup-installed and autoup leaders poses challenges due to the inherent irregularity and uncertainty of their positions. Nevertheless, a comparative analysis reveals that leaders who extend power through autoups tend to have longer average post-autoup tenures (approximately 4.6 years) compared to coup-installed leaders (approximately 11.7 years), suggesting a potential tenure gap of over five years.

A preliminary log-rank test in survival analysis, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, demonstrates a statistically significant difference between the tenures of autoup and coup-installed lead-




Figure 4.1: Survival curves of autoup and coup-installed leaders

ers. The survival curve for autoup leaders consistently exceeds that of coup-installed leaders, indicating longer survival times and a reduced risk of ouster for autoup leaders.

This study posits that the method of accession significantly influences leadership longevity. Coup-installed leaders likely confront greater challenges to their rule, resulting in shorter average tenures compared to autoup leaders. The analysis, employing Cox proportional hazards and time-dependent Cox models, supports this hypothesis, demonstrating that autoup leaders generally experience longer tenures than coup-installed leaders.

This research offers two primary contributions to the field. First, it highlights an understudied factor in leadership survival analysis: the impact of the method of accession to power. The findings suggest that leader survival is influenced not only by ruling strategies but also by the initial method of acquiring power. Second, by employing survival models, this study provides empirical evidence of the significant difference in tenure duration between autoup and coup-installed leaders. This insight may explain the increasing prevalence of tenure extensions



through autocoups since 2000, as more incumbents observe and potentially emulate successful precedents.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a comprehensive literature review on political survival, establishing the context for this research. Section 3 explores the factors influencing the survival of coup and autocoup leaders. Section 4 outlines the methodology and data used, including the application of survival models to analyze the determinants of leadership longevity. Section 5 presents the analysis findings and a detailed discussion of the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes by synthesizing key takeaways and exploring their broader implications for political stability and democratic processes.

## **4.2 Literature review**

The longevity of political leaders, which varies widely across different regimes, countries, and historical periods, has been a longstanding focus of research in political science. This field can be divided into two interconnected areas: regime survival and individual leader survival, which are distinct but related concepts. Regime survival focuses on the endurance of political systems, such as monarchies, political parties, or specific ideological structures, while leader survival concerns the duration of individual leaders' time in office.

Political survival patterns vary widely across different systems. Parliamentary democracies (e.g., Japan, United Kingdom) often experience prolonged periods of party dominance coupled with frequent leadership changes. Similarly, communist regimes (e.g., China) typically demonstrate enduring party rule with more frequent leadership transitions. Presidential systems (e.g., United States) and many military regimes tend to exhibit more frequent changes in both ruling party or junta and leader.

The existing literature on leader survival is extensive and multifaceted. Some studies explore specific mechanisms influencing leadership longevity within particular regimes, such as democracies ([Svolik 2014](#)) or autocracies ([Davenport, RezaeeDaryakenari, and Wood 2021](#)).

Others aim to develop more generalizable theoretical frameworks explaining leader survival across different political systems ([Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003](#)). While a universal theory remains an aspirational goal, the complexities of leadership survival across diverse regime types present significant challenges.

Power transition mechanisms vary substantially across different types of regimes, particularly between democracies and autocracies. Autocratic systems often feature closed leadership selection processes, restricted to a narrow pool of individuals. While some autocracies may hold elections, significant barriers to entry for legitimate challengers typically persist. The opacity of selection processes in autocracies makes it difficult to assess genuine levels of public support compared to democracies. Conceptualizing selectorates or winning coalitions, as proposed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. ([2003](#)), becomes problematic in many autocratic contexts.

Given these complexities, focusing research on specific regimes or leader types may be more fruitful. The study of irregular leaders, such as those who ascend to power through coups or extend their tenures through autocoups, offers a compelling avenue for research due to the inherent complexities and uncertainties surrounding their leadership trajectories.

Two primary perspectives have emerged to explain the dynamics of leader survival. The first emphasizes objective factors and resources, such as personal competence ([Yu and Jong-A-Pin 2016](#)), societal stability ([Arriola 2009](#)), economic development ([Palmer and Whitten 1999](#); [Williams 2011](#)), natural resource endowments ([Smith 2004](#); [Quiroz Flores and Smith 2012](#); [Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2013](#)), and external support ([Licht 2009](#); [Wright 2008](#); [C. Thyne et al. 2017](#)). The second focuses on subjective factors and strategies, including political policies, responses to opposition, and tactics for consolidating power ([Gandhi and Przeworski 2007](#); [Morrison 2009](#); [Escribà-Folch 2013](#); [Davenport, RezaeeDaryakenari, and Wood 2021](#)).

Coups, a significant aspect of irregular leadership transitions, have received considerable scholarly attention. Research has examined coup prevention strategies ([J. Powell 2017](#); [Sudduth 2017](#); [De Bruin 2020](#)). Studies have explored the impact of coups on leadership and the subsequent actions of coup leaders Easton and Siverson ([2018](#)).

However, a significant gap remains in the literature regarding the comparison of leadership survival between coup-installed and autocoup leaders. This study aims to address this gap by investigating and comparing the duration of leadership survival for these two leader types.

By focusing on the comparison between coup-installed and autocoup leaders, this study seeks to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of political survival in irregular leadership transitions. This approach may offer valuable insights into the complex dynamics of leader longevity across different political contexts.

### **4.3 Survival dynamics of autocoup and coup-installed leaders**

Studying leadership survival in political systems is challenging due to the opacity and diverse mechanisms of power transitions. These challenges, however, underscore the significance of this research, as it illuminates understudied dynamics in political leadership. Although the survival of political leaders is complex and varied, some patterns do emerge. Leaders of similar types often exhibit similar characteristics, allowing for meaningful analysis.

#### **4.3.1 Key definitions and scope**

Before delving into the comparison, it is essential to clarify several key terminologies:

- **Coup and autocoup:** These terms are defined consistently with previous chapters to ensure clarity and consistency throughout the study.
- **Tenure length threshold:** To ensure meaningful analysis, this study focuses on leaders with substantial periods in power, applying a six-month threshold to both autocoup and coup-installed leaders. This criterion filters out ephemeral leadership episodes, allowing for a more robust examination of survival dynamics.

- **Autocoup leader:** An incumbent leader who successfully employs illegitimate or unconstitutional means to extend their tenure in power. This definition encompasses various methods of power consolidation that circumvent established democratic processes or constitutional limits.
- **Coup-installed leader:** The individual who assumes power after a successful coup, regardless of their role in the coup itself. This broad definition allows for the inclusion of both coup instigators and those selected to lead post-coup, providing a comprehensive view of leadership dynamics following forceful regime change.

This study focuses on comparing the post-autocoup tenure of autocoup leaders with the post-coup tenure of coup-installed leaders. This comparative approach is motivated by the relevance and similarity of these leader types in terms of illegitimacy, uncertainty, and instability. By examining these parallel yet distinct paths to power, we can gain insights into the factors that influence leadership longevity in irregular leadership transitions.

### 4.3.2 Challenges in power consolidation

Both autocoup and coup-installed leaders confront distinct challenges in consolidating their power, primarily stemming from the varying intensity of issues related to illegitimacy, uncertainty, and instability. This disparity creates an uneven playing field in terms of power dynamics, placing coup-installed leaders at a significant disadvantage. Table 4.1 provides a comparative overview of the main features of autocoup and coup-installed leaders, highlighting these key differences.

Table 4.1: Main features of autocoup and coup-installed leaders

Feature	Autocoup Leader	Coup Entry Leader
Illegitimacy	Normally attained through lawful procedures, but lacking consensus legitimacy	Blatantly illegal
Uncertainty	Initially with some certainty, but decreases as the leader's age grows or health worsens	Significant uncertainty initially
Instability	Relatively stable	Unstable except when a strongman emerges or constitutional institutions are established
Balance of Power	Generally in a better position of power	Initially unclear and challenging to establish a balance

## Illegitimacy

While both types of leaders suffer from a legitimacy deficit, the nature and perception of this deficit differ significantly:

- **Coup-installed leaders:** Their illegitimacy is blatant and unambiguous, stemming from the overt and often violent seizure of power. This overt act undermines pre-existing norms and institutions, generating immediate domestic and international condemnation.
- **Autocoup leaders:** In contrast, autocoup leaders employ a more subtle and deceptive strategy, manipulating legal processes and institutions to create a façade of democratic legitimacy. This veneer of legality, while often thin, can provide a degree of cover and buy time for consolidating power.

## Uncertainty

The irregular paths to power for both types of leaders create uncertainty about the longevity of their rule and the mechanisms of their eventual departure. However, the levels and sources of this uncertainty differ significantly.

- **Coup-installed leaders:** These leaders face a trifecta of uncertainties. First, the immediate aftermath of a coup often involves a struggle for power within the junta or ruling coalition, creating ambiguity about who will ultimately consolidate control. Second, the tenure of coup-installed leaders is inherently precarious, subject to internal rivalries, popular uprisings, or counter-coups. Third, the lack of established succession mechanisms further amplifies uncertainty, making it difficult to predict the transfer of power and potentially triggering future instability.
- **Autocoup leaders:** While not immune to uncertainty, autocoup leaders generally present a clearer picture. The question of who will rule post-autocoup is largely settled, as the incumbent retains power. Furthermore, many autocoup leaders openly aspire to extend

their rule indefinitely or incrementally, attempting to establish a sense of permanence. This perceived stability, whether real or manufactured, can contribute to a more predictable political environment, at least in the short term.

## **Instability**

The awareness of shaky legitimacy and persistent uncertainty inevitably breeds insecurity and a sense of crisis, forcing both autoup and coup-installed leaders to prioritize stabilization measures. However, the nature and intensity of these challenges differ:

- **Coup-installed leaders:** These leaders face the daunting task of rapidly reshaping power dynamics, often resorting to purges and crackdowns to eliminate potential adversaries and consolidate control. This process of dismantling existing structures and building new ones generates significant instability, potentially alienating former allies and triggering resistance from various segments of society. The need to appease powerful actors both domestically and internationally further limits their options, forcing them into compromises that can undermine their authority and long-term stability.
- **Autoup leaders:** In contrast, autoup leaders often benefit from a degree of continuity in regime personnel and institutions. This relative stability allows them to implement changes gradually, minimizing disruptions and mitigating potential backlash. While they may still face opposition, they are less likely to confront immediate and existential threats to their rule, providing them with more time and leverage to consolidate power.

By understanding these contrasting challenges, we can better appreciate the relative advantages and disadvantages faced by autoup and coup-installed leaders. This comparative perspective provides a nuanced framework for analyzing the strategies these leaders employ to consolidate power and navigate the perilous terrain of irregular leadership transitions.

### 4.3.3 Empirical evidence and hypothesis

Empirical evidence substantiates the disadvantage faced by coup-installed leaders, revealing a complex interplay between historical precedent, power consolidation challenges, and leadership longevity. This section presents key data points and introduces the central hypothesis guiding this study.

Data analysis shows a significant correlation between the frequency of coup attempts in a country and the likelihood of future coups. Notably, over a third of coups have occurred in the top ten countries with the most attempts since 1950 (As shown in Table 2.1). This pattern suggests a self-reinforcing cycle of political instability, where each successful coup increases the probability of subsequent attempts, creating an environment of persistent uncertainty for coup-installed leaders.

The disparity in leadership longevity between autocoup and coup-installed leaders is starkly illustrated by survival data. As depicted in Figure 4.1, the average survival period following an autocoup is approximately five years longer than that of coup-installed leaders. This substantial difference in tenure length underscores the divergent challenges faced by these two types of leaders in maintaining their grip on power.

The distinct challenges faced by autocoup leaders and coup-installed leaders in consolidating power create a self-perpetuating cycle that significantly influences their tenure length:

- Coup-installed leaders: Face greater legitimacy challenges and internal instability; Struggle to attract and retain strong support; More vulnerable to internal and external challenges; Shorter average tenures reinforce perception of instability.
- Autocoup leaders: Often benefit from a veneer of legitimacy and a stronger initial position; Better able to consolidate power and attract supporters; Face less immediate threat of overthrow; Longer average tenures contribute to perception of stability.

This cycle suggests that the initial method of power acquisition or extension has far-reaching



consequences for a leader's ability to maintain their position over time.

Based on these observations and the theoretical framework outlined earlier, I propose the following hypothesis:

***H4-1: Political leaders who successfully extend their tenure through autocoups are more likely to survive longer extended tenure compared to coup-installed leaders.***

This hypothesis encapsulates the expected outcome of the divergent challenges and advantages faced by autocoup and coup-installed leaders. By testing this hypothesis, I aim to quantify the impact of the method of power acquisition or extension on leadership longevity, contributing to a more nuanced understanding of political survival in contexts of irregular transitions.

## **4.4 Research design**

This section employs survival analysis to test the hypothesis that autocoup leaders have longer survival times in office compared to coup-installed leaders. This study uses Cox models to analyze the survival tenures of autocoup and coup-installed leaders, controlling for various factors that may affect their time in office.

### **4.4.1 Methodology: Survival analysis**

Two Cox models will be employed to analyze the survival tenures of coup-installed and autocoup leaders:

- **Cox proportional hazards (PH) model:** This model uses only the variables present at the entry year, without considering changes over time.
- **Time-dependent Cox model:** This model accounts for variations in time-dependent control variables such as economic performance and political stability.

The Cox model is preferred over the Kaplan-Meier model because it enables the estimation of the impact of multiple factors. Although it does not directly estimate the duration of

tenure, it assesses the hazard rate associated with being ousted from power. This approach captures different facets of the same phenomenon: as a leader's cumulative hazard of being ousted increases, their probability of survival in office decreases.

#### 4.4.2 Data and variables

The dependent variables include survival time and end point status:

- **Survival time:** Survival time refers to the duration of a leader's tenure, measured in days. For coup-installed leaders, the survival time begins on the day they assume power through a coup. For autocoup leaders, the survival time starts on the expiration date of their original legitimate term. For example, Russia's president Vladimir Putin assumed power in 2000 and, after serving two terms, stepped down in 2008. However, he remained in a powerful position as the prime minister and hand-picked Dmitry Medvedev to succeed him as president, while continuing to control the power behind the scenes. In this case, Putin's survival time begins in 2008, marking the start of his post-autocoup tenure. The survival time concludes on the day the leader finally exits office, applicable to both coup-installed and autocoup leaders.
- **End point status:** This variable indicates the manner in which the leader's tenure concluded, categorized as follows:
  - 0 = Censored:** This status is assigned to leaders who leave office through regular means other than being ousted. This includes leaders transferring power to their designated successors, leaving office as their terms expire, losing in general elections, voluntarily leaving office due to health issues, or dying of natural causes.
  - 1 = Ousted:** This status is assigned to leaders who are forced to leave office. This includes leaders resigning under pressure, being ousted by coups or other forces, or being assassinated.

The key independent variable is the leader type, which categorizes leaders into two distinct groups:

- **Group A = Autocoup leader:** Leaders who extend their tenure through autocoups.
- **Group B = Coup-installed leader:** Leaders who assume power through coups.

This variable is the primary independent variable of interest, serving as the basis for comparing the survival time between these two types of leaders.

The data for both dependent and independent variables are sourced from the autocoup dataset introduced in this study, Archigos, and PLAD.

Control variables include economic performance, political stability, population size, and the leader's age, which are consistent with the autocoup analysis in Chapter 3.

## 4.5 Results and discussion

### 4.5.1 Model results

Using the *surviavl* package in R ([Therneau 2024](#)), I present the regression results for both the Cox Proportional Hazards model (Cox PH) and the time-dependent Cox model in Table 4.2.

Both models showed a statistically significant relationship between leadership type and the hazard of removal from power. Since time-dependent Cox model use the control variables which change over time, I interpret the main findings based on time-dependent model.

Coup-installed leaders were found to have a hazard ratio of 2.23 in the time-dependent model compared to autocoup leaders (reference group), assuming all other variables in the model are held constant. This suggests that coup-installed leaders face a significantly greater risk of removal from power compared to autocoup leaders. At any given time during their tenure, coup-installed leaders are 2.23 times more likely to be ousted from power compared to autocoup leaders, all else being equal in the model.

Table 4.2: Cox models for survival time of different types of leaders

Characteristic	Cox PH Model				Time-dependent Cox Model			
	N	Event N	HR <sup>1,2</sup>	SE <sup>2</sup>	N	Event N	HR <sup>1,2</sup>	SE <sup>2</sup>
<b>Leader Type</b>								
Autocoup leaders	67	30	1.00	—	50	25	1.00	—
Coup-installed leaders	163	163	8.38***	0.240	167	167	1.87***	0.269
<b>GDP Growth Trend</b>	230	193	0.20	1.18	217	192	1.02	1.26
<b>GDP per capita</b>	230	193	0.99	0.011	217	192	0.93***	0.036
<b>Population: log</b>	230	193	1.13*	0.064	217	192	1.12**	0.065
<b>Polity 5</b>	230	193	0.99	0.013	217	192	0.96***	0.015
<b>Political stability</b>	230	193	1.05	0.042	217	192	1.12***	0.048
<b>Age</b>	230	193	1.03***	0.008	217	192	1.02***	0.007

<sup>1</sup>\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

<sup>2</sup>HR = Hazard Ratio, SE = Standard Error

The control variables perform differently in the two models. Economic level (GDP per capita) exhibits statistically significant effects in both models. In the time-dependent model, the hazard ratio of 0.95 indicates that for each unit increase in GDP per capita (measured in units of \$10,000), the hazard (or risk) of being ousted at any given time is reduced by 5%, assuming all other variables in the model are held constant.

GDP growth trend demonstrates a more substantial effect in reducing the risk of coups. Specifically, a 1 percentage point higher economic growth trend is associated with an 80% reduction in the risk of being ousted, although this effect is only statistically significant at the 10% level. This suggests a possible trend where positive economic performance might mitigate the risk of removal from power, but the evidence is not robust enough to confirm this conclusively.

Political stability, as measured by the violence index, shows that a 1-point increase in the index correlates with an 11% higher risk of being ousted. However, this effect is also only statistically significant at the 10% level, indicating a weaker but potentially important relationship between increased violence and the risk of removal from office.

## 4.5.2 Discussion




Figure 4.2: Survival curves for Cox Model

The survival curves in Figure 4.2 displays the survival rates for both types of leaders, highlighting the differences in their survival curves. Both the Cox PH model and the time-dependent Cox model yield similar results. Notably, the survival curve for coup-installed leaders has a significantly lower trajectory than that of autocoup leaders. The steeper drop at the early stage for coup-installed leaders indicates they are more likely to be ousted shortly after assuming power. Additionally, the survival curve for coup-installed leaders crosses the median survival line much earlier (about 3,000 days) than that of autocoup leaders (about 8,500 days). This disparity suggests that autocoup leaders tend to remain in power for longer durations than their coup-installed counterparts.

Figure 4.3 displays the hazard ratios and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for the variables incorporated in the Cox model. Both the Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) model and the time-dependent model produce similar plots, reinforcing the robustness of the findings. Key points to note include:

- The closer the hazard ratio (represented by the dots) is to 1, the less impact the variable has on the risk of being ousted. A hazard ratio of 1 indicates no effect.
- The whiskers extending from the dots represent the 95% confidence intervals. If these




Figure 4.3: Hazard ratios and 95% CIs for Leader Ousting

whiskers cross the vertical blue line at 1, it indicates that the variable is not statistically significant at the 5% level.

- The hazard ratio for coup-installed leaders is significantly greater than 1 and statistically significant at the 5% level. This indicates that coup-installed leaders face a substantially higher risk of being ousted compared to autocoup leaders.
- Most other variables have hazard ratios close to 1, suggesting that a one-unit increase in these variables does not significantly affect the risk of being ousted.
- Although the hazard ratio for GDP growth trend is considerably less than 1 in the time-dependent model, indicating a potential protective effect, it is not statistically significant at the 5% level. However, it is statistically significant at the 10% level, suggesting that better economic performance may help to consolidate the rule of the incumbents to some extent, albeit the evidence is not as strong.

### 4.5.3 Assessing the proportional hazards assumption

Assessing the proportional hazards assumption is crucial for the validity of the Cox model results. To evaluate this, we used the chi-square test based on Schoenfeld residuals to determine whether the covariate effects remain constant (proportional) over time. Although the Cox PH

model violates the proportional hazards assumption, our primary analysis relies on the time-dependent Cox model, which does not show strong evidence of violating the proportional hazards assumption for any covariate. The global p-value of 0.416 is much greater than the 5% significance level, indicating that the proportional hazards assumption is reasonably met for the time-dependent Cox model.

## 4.6 Summary

This chapter explores the survival durations of political leaders who come to power through unconventional means, specifically focusing on coups and autocoups. Based on the hypothesis that the mode of accession affects leader tenure, I use survival analysis techniques, including the Cox proportional hazards model and a time-dependent Cox model, to investigate this phenomenon. The findings suggest that autocoup leaders tend to have longer tenures than coup-installed leaders.

Empirical analysis reveals a significant disparity in tenure length: leaders who assume power via autocoup remain in office for an average of 11 years, compared to just 5.6 years for those installed by coups. Moreover, the time-dependent Cox model indicates that coup-installed leaders are 2.23 times more likely to be ousted from power at any given time compared to their autocoup counterparts, all other factors being equal. These findings underscore the importance of understanding the autocoup as a mechanism through which leaders extend their rule by manipulating legal frameworks and weakening institutional constraints.

The implications of these findings are profound. The relative ease and potential rewards of an autocoup could incentivize more leaders to resort to this method of power retention, particularly in fragile democracies or transitioning regimes. Consequently, democratic backsliding may become more prevalent, as autocoups erode democratic institutions and undermine constitutional norms.

This study contributes significantly to the literature on political leadership survival by show-

ing that the mode of accession has a substantial impact on leader tenure, an aspect that has received limited attention in previous research. Methodologically, this work advances the field by applying robust survival analysis techniques, including both Cox models, to provide a nuanced understanding of the dynamics that influence leadership stability.

However, the study is not without limitations. The analysis relies on an autoup dataset that was collected and coded by the author, a relatively novel concept in the academic sphere. As the understanding and recognition of “autoup” as a term continue to evolve, future research should refine and expand the dataset. Incorporating additional cases and cross-referencing with other forms of irregular leadership transitions would contribute to a more comprehensive view of political survival under such conditions.

In conclusion, this chapter highlights the need for more refined approaches to studying political tenure and irregular power retention. By offering valuable insights into the dynamics of political stability and the risks associated with non-democratic leadership transitions, this research emphasizes the importance of continued investigation into the complex relationships between power, legitimacy, and survival in political leadership.



## **Chapter 5**

# **Coups, Autocoups, and Democracy**

### **5.1 Abstract**

This chapter examines the impact of coups and autocoups on democracy. While extensive research has explored how coups influence democratic governance, far less attention has been given to autocoups. Unlike coups, which can lead to democratic backsliding, authoritarian entrenchment, or even democratic transition, autocoups are more consistently associated with the consolidation of authoritarian rule.

Using data from a widely recognized coup dataset along with a newly compiled dataset on autocoups, this study employs a fixed-effects model to assess their effects on democracy, as measured by the Polity Index. The results indicate that both coups and autocoups lead to a decline in democratic levels. However, coups have a greater immediate negative impact. Notably, three years after these events, democracies affected by coups tend to show significant recovery, whereas those experiencing autocoups exhibit no meaningful improvement.

These findings support the hypothesis that compared to coups, autocoups pose a more persistent threat to democracy. This also helps explain the continuous decline in global democratic levels over the past 18 years, as reported by Freedom House in its 2024 assessment.

## 5.2 Introduction

In the preceding chapters, I clarified the definition of an autocoup, introduced a novel dataset on autocoups, conducted empirical analyses on the determinants of autocoup attempts, and compared the post-event survival times of leaders established through coups versus autocoup leaders. A natural follow-up question emerges: What are the broader impacts of autocoups? Specifically, from a political science perspective, how do autocoups affect the process of democratization?

As previously noted, due to the absence of a widely recognized dataset on autocoups, most existing discussions on their impact have relied on case studies ([Baturu and Elgie, n.d.](#); [Baturu and Tolstrup 2022](#)). To move beyond case-specific analyses and adopt a more systematic and comparative approach, this chapter aims to pioneer empirical research on the democratic consequences of autocoups. The first objective of this chapter, therefore, is to examine whether autocoups reinforce authoritarianism, promote democratization, or have no significant effect on political regimes.

Given the conceptual and empirical connections between coups and autocoups, another key objective is to compare their respective effects on democratization. While both events disrupt existing political orders, their immediate and long-term consequences may vary significantly. Understanding these distinctions is essential for evaluating their broader implications.

To address these questions, this study leverages data from a widely recognized coup dataset alongside a newly compiled dataset on autocoups. Employing a fixed-effects model, it evaluates their effects on democracy, as measured by the Polity Index. The findings reveal that both coups and autocoups lead to an immediate decline in democratic levels. However, coups have a more pronounced negative short-term impact. Notably, three years after these events, democracies affected by coups tend to show significant recovery, whereas those experiencing autocoups exhibit no meaningful improvement.

This study offers two significant contributions to the field of political science. First, it

provides the inaugural empirical analysis of the impact of autocoups on democratization, effectively addressing a critical gap in the existing literature. Second, by directly comparing the effects of coups and autocoups, this research highlights autocoups as a distinct phenomenon that demands increased scholarly inquiry and policy focus.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 analyzes the impact of autocoups on democratization, by comparing the effects with traditional coups. Section 3 outlines the research design, methodology, and variables used in this study. Section 4 presents and interprets the empirical findings, followed by a discussion of their implications. Finally, Section 5 concludes by summarizing the key results and exploring their significance for understanding and mitigating the occurrence of autocoups.

### **5.3 Impact of autocoups on political change**

According to the definition in Section 3.2.2, an autocoup refers to an incumbent leader extending their tenure in power beyond the originally mandated limits, whether through legal or illegal means. While the leader may assume a different title or position, the individual in power remains unchanged. Therefore, unlike traditional coups, an autocoup does not result in real leadership turnover, elite restructuring, or regime change. In other words, the fundamental ruling structure remains intact.

This distinction has important implications. Since regime change rarely occurs following an autocoup, its impact on politics cannot be assessed using conventional methods. Typically, studies on coups and democratization measure their effects by estimating the probability of regime transition—either from autocracy to democracy or vice versa—as seen in previous research on coup outcomes (C. L. Thyne and Powell 2014; Derpanopoulos et al. 2016; Miller 2016). However, this approach is not suitable for autocoups, as they do not directly trigger regime transfers.

Although autocoups rarely lead to formal regime change, this does not mean they have no

impact on political dynamics. In fact, they inevitably shape political trajectories in various ways and, on occasion, can even lead to significant transformations. Therefore, a more appropriate method for assessing the political impact of autocrats is to analyze democratic indices, such as those measured by Polity5 ([Monty G. Marshall and Gurr 2020](#)). The Polity Score, ranging from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy), captures gradual shifts in political regime characteristics rather than abrupt transitions. Thus, even if an autocrat does not result in a formal regime change, subtle shifts in political openness and institutional constraints can still be assessed by examining variations in Polity scores before and after the event. This approach has also been employed in previous studies ([Dahl and Gleditsch 2023](#)).

Although autocrats may not lead to significant regime change, their impact on democratization should not be overlooked. However, their influence differs from that of traditional coups in at least two key ways.

### **5.3.1 The pre-emptive effects of autocrats on political dynamics**

First and foremost, unlike coups, which are marked by clear, decisive events—such as the removal of a leader—autocrats typically unfold gradually, through incremental steps rather than a singular, dramatic event. Incumbent leaders seeking to extend their tenure often lay the groundwork well in advance before executing their final move to remain in power. To reduce resistance and opposition, they engage in extensive preparation, which may include purging officials, suppressing political opposition, cracking down on dissent and protests, and restricting press freedom. Without such measures, an autocrat might face strong internal resistance, and in the worst case, provoke a backlash that not only derails the leader's attempt to extend their rule but also results in their immediate removal from office.

However, once an incumbent successfully secures an extension of their rule, continued repression is not always necessary. On the contrary, some leaders relax political pressure to ease internal dissent and mitigate opposition from external actors. This adaptive approach helps

maintain stability after the autocoup is complete.

As a result, the primary impact of autocoups on political change is often reflected in shifts in political scores before the final stage of the autocoup is enacted. Once the process is completed, further shifts may be minimal. In contrast, coup plotters, unlike incumbents, lack the ability to influence political institutions beforehand, meaning their impact on politics is often felt in the aftermath rather than before the event.

This distinction is evident in empirical cases of autocoups.

One of the most frequently cited examples of an autocoup is Peru's 1992 case, in which President Alberto Fujimori dissolved Congress, temporarily suspended the 1979 Constitution, and ruled by decree until November of that year, when a *Democratic Constituent Congress* was elected to draft a new constitution ([Maxwell A. Cameron 1998b](#)). However, these moves did not immediately grant Fujimori a longer tenure in office.

Under the 1979 Peruvian Constitution, immediate presidential re-election was prohibited. To bypass this restriction, Fujimori initiated a constitutional overhaul, leading to the adoption of a new constitution in 1993, which permitted re-election. Consequently, he secured a second term in 1995 ([Baturro 2019](#)).

An analysis of Peru's Polity5 scores during this process reflects these political changes. Upon taking office in 1990, Peru's Polity score was 8, remaining unchanged in 1991. However, a dramatic shift occurred in 1992, when Fujimori dissolved Congress, causing the Polity score to plummet from 8 to -4. Interestingly, when he formally extended his rule by amending the constitution in 1993, the score rebounded slightly to -1. This -1 score remained unchanged throughout Fujimori's tenure until 2000, indicating a lack of further institutional transformation after the constitutional amendment.

A similar pattern emerges in Belarus under Alexander Lukashenko. Upon assuming office as president in 1994, Belarus had a Polity5 score of 8. However, in 1995, when Lukashenko moved to hold a referendum—defying opposition in the Supreme Council and threatening to suspend its activities—the score dropped sharply to 0. Following the 1996 referendum, which

extended his term by two additional years, Lukashenko officially overstayed his tenure. Consequently, the Polity5 score further declined to -7 in 1996, where it has remained ever since, despite two additional term extensions ([Ash 2014](#); [Baturu and Elgie, n.d.](#)).

These cases illustrate a broader pattern: the impact of autocoups on political change is often reflected before the final stage of the autocoup is enacted, whereas the impact of coups tends to materialize afterwards, as have been fully discussed by previous studies.

Based on this analysis, I propose the first hypothesis:

*H1: Autocoups primarily shape political change in advance, whereas coups typically drive political change only after they are executed.*

### **5.3.2 The singular nature of autocoups**

Secondly, in contrast to the ambiguous nature of coups ([Dahl and Gleditsch 2023](#)), the impact of autocoups on political change rarely contributes to democratization.

The influence of coups on democratization has been extensively examined in existing literature. Some scholars argue that coups—and even the mere threat of them—can act as catalysts for democratization. One argument suggests that coups deliver a political “shock” that may create opportunities for liberalization that would not have otherwise materialized ([C. L. Thyne and Powell 2014](#)). In a critical examination, Derpanopoulos et al. (2016) questioned the role of coups in promoting democracy, engaging in multiple rounds of debate with Miller (2016). More recently, Dahl and Gleditsch (2023) further explored this ongoing discussion, arguing that both democratic and autocratic transitions are likely to follow a coup, with popular mobilization playing a decisive role in shaping post-coup trajectories.

A frequently cited example of a “pro-democracy coup” occurred in February 2010, when Nigerien troops ousted President Mamadou Tandja after he extended his rule autocratically. The Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD) took control, pledging democratic reforms. Their actions were widely celebrated, with both citizens and political opposition

viewing the coup as an opportunity to restore democracy. The CSRD fulfilled its commitment by overseeing free and fair elections in 2011, resulting in Mahamadou Issoufou assuming the presidency (Miller 2016).

While the debate on the democratic consequences of coups remains ongoing, it is evident that their impact is not uniform. In contrast, autocoups almost never lead to democratic transitions, nor do they even marginally enhance political freedoms. This stems from the intrinsic nature of autocoups, which disrupt the established process of political leadership transition, particularly term limits.

Term limits are constitutional provisions that restrict the maximum duration a leader can remain in office. They play a crucial role in both democracies and autocracies by preventing the excessive concentration of power and ensuring political stability. In democracies, term limits promote accountability, leadership renewal, and reduce the risks of corruption and authoritarian entrenchment. In autocracies, when enforced, they can curb indefinite rule, mitigate succession crises, and provide rare opportunities for political transitions. However, without term limits, leaders can entrench themselves in power, undermining institutions and hindering political progress.

As shown in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3, autocoups are executed through either façade legal mechanisms or blatantly illegal methods. This includes amending or disregarding term limits, delaying or cancelling elections, rigging electoral outcomes, or outright refusing to accept election results. While many autocoups maintain a veneer of legality, their defining characteristic is the violation of term limits, which are intended as safeguards against prolonged and unchecked rule.

As previously discussed, before an incumbent leader formally overstays their term, they often inflict significant damage on political institutions. Furthermore, to secure their prolonged rule, they are unlikely to fully restore political freedoms even if they temporarily ease political repression once they have consolidated power.

Case studies from Peru and Belarus illustrate how autocoups lead to a decline in Polity

scores, reflecting democratic backsliding. However, most autocoups occur in already autocratic regimes where Polity scores are low. This aligns with trends observed in coups, which also primarily occur in autocracies.

For instance, in China's 2018 constitutional amendment, Xi Jinping abolished presidential term limits, effectively allowing himself to remain in power indefinitely<sup>1</sup>. However, China's Polity score remained unchanged at -7 before and after the amendment. This pattern is common in autocratic regimes with Polity scores below -6, as they already lack significant democratic features, leaving little room for further decline.

While most autocoups occur in low-Polity-score countries, some have taken place in relatively democratic settings, where the Polity score remains stable despite term limit extensions. This is particularly evident in Latin America, where presidents have amended “no immediate re-election” rules to allow for a second consecutive term, but voluntarily stepped down afterwards. Examples include: Argentina (1993), Polity score remained at 7; Brazil (1997), Polity score remained at 8, Colombia (2004), Polity score remained at 7. In these cases, leaders extended their tenure within a structured political framework without further dismantling democratic institutions (Baturó 2019).

Across all cases—whether in Peru, Belarus, China, Argentina, Brazil, or Colombia—there is no instance where a Polity score increased following an autocoup. In the autocoup dataset which I introduced in Chapter 3, only four cases—Guinea-Bissau (1988), Burkina Faso (1997), Congo-Brazzaville (2001), and Lebanon (2004)—saw minor increases in Polity scores, but the changes were insignificant.

Thus, unlike some coup leaders who justify their actions by claiming to restore democracy (as seen in Niger's 2010 case), leaders who execute autocoups lack any democratic justification. If their true intention were to advance democracy, they would transfer power peacefully rather than violate term limits.

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<sup>1</sup>BBC News, “China's Xi Allowed to Remain ‘President for Life’ as Term Limits Removed,” *BBC News*, March 11, 2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-43361276>, accessed March 14, 2025.



Based on this analysis, I propose the second hypothesis:

*H2: Autocoups are more likely to entrench autocracy than coups.*

## 5.4 Methodology and variables

### 5.4.1 Methodology

As discussed earlier, autocoups are less likely to result in full regime transitions—either from democracy to autocracy or vice versa. Therefore, it is inappropriate to assess their effects solely based on regime transitions or changes that cross a critical threshold. Instead, this study examines political changes through fluctuations in Polity5 scores.

Unlike coup analysis, which primarily focuses on post-event effects, this study examines both pre-event and post-event impacts of autocoups. Specifically, pre-event effects are measured by the change in Polity5 scores three years before the autocoup compared to the year of the autocoup, expressed as:

$$Polity_t - Polity_{t-3}$$

Post-event effects are measured by the change in Polity5 scores three years after the autocoup compared to the year of the autocoup, expressed as:

$$Polity_{t+3} - Polity_t$$

The three-year window is chosen for two key reasons. Pre-event political changes typically occur incrementally, as incumbents consolidate power gradually over several years rather than through a single, abrupt action. Post-event analysis focuses on medium-term effects rather than short-term shocks, as autocoups rarely trigger immediate regime transitions and instead reinforce existing political structures. Short-term fluctuations may be too minor to capture meaningful institutional change empirically.

To estimate how political institutions change before and after autocoups, I employ a linear model with country-case fixed effects. For pre-event effects, I analyze attempted autocoups,

since before the event, no one knows whether the autocoup will succeed or fail.

For post-event effects, I analyze only successful autocoups for three reasons: The majority of autocoups succeed (87 out of 110 cases); failed autocoups tend to produce immediate political shocks, rather than medium- or long-term effects; failed autocoups are often followed by major disruptive events, such as coups, insurrections, or mass protests, making it difficult to isolate their impact. For example, in Niger's case, a failed autocoup in 2009 was followed by a coup in 2010, creating overlapping political effects. In contrast, successful autocoups provide a clearer analytical framework, as their effects are less entangled with other disruptions, allowing for a more systematic assessment of institutional change.

## 5.4.2 Variables

This study uses a global sample of all country-year data from 1950 to 2020, applying a linear model to examine the effects of autocoups on political change. The dependent variable is the change in Polity scores, while the main independent variable is autocoups. The dataset includes approximately 7,500 observations.

The dependent variable measures political change using three-year differences in Polity scores. Model 1 (Pre-event effects):  $Polity_t - Polity_{t-3}$ . Model 2 (Post-event effects):  $Polity_{t+3} - Polity_t$ .

The Polity score ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). Some values in the dataset, such as -66, -77, and -88, represent transitional regimes or special periods. To prevent excessive data loss, I replace these values with the closest valid Polity scores. This approach ensures that the model captures all changes in Polity scores, rather than focusing solely on transitions that cross a democratic threshold.

The main independent variable is autocoups, as introduced in Chapter 3. The dataset includes 110 attempted autocoups (used for pre-event analysis) and 87 successful autocoups (used for post-event analysis). For pre-event analysis, the autocoup variable is binary, where: 1 indi-

cates the presence of an attempted autocoup and 0 indicates no autocoup event.

For post-event analysis, I apply decay functions to account for both immediate and delayed effects, following the methodology of Dahl and Gleditsch (2023). To assess the persistence of autocoup effects, I consider a half-life specification of five years, analysing the impact from the autocoup year ( $y_t$ ) to four years after ( $y_{t+4}$ ).

I also include traditional coups as a secondary independent variable for two reasons. Comparative significance: It is essential to compare the effects of autocoups and coups. Overlapping events: In many cases, coups and autocoups are interconnected, as autocoups can trigger coups. Distinguishing their effects is necessary for a clear empirical analysis.

As in previous chapters, I use the coup dataset from Powell and Thyne (2011). To maintain consistency, I apply the same methodological approach to coups as to autocoups: Binary coding for pre-event effects and decay function coding for post-event effects.

Control variables include economic performance, political stability, and population size, all of which have been analysed in previous chapters. Additionally, I incorporate two dummy variables. The first, “**non\_democracy**,” accounts for regime type, recognizing that non-democratic regimes with Polity scores below -6 have limited room for further decline, while democracies with scores above 6 are less likely to experience significant increases. The second, “**cold\_war**,” follows the approach used in prior studies on the impact of coups on democratization (C. L. Thyne and Powell 2014; Derpanopoulos et al. 2016; Dahl and Gleditsch 2023) and accounts for the Cold War period. This variable captures the observable trend of declining Polity scores from the 1960s to 1990, followed by an upward shift after 1990.

## 5.5 Results and discussion

### 5.5.1 Pre-event effects

Initially, I analyse the trajectory of Polity scores leading up to these events. As presented in Table 5.1, columns 1 and 2 display the empirical results for pre-event effects, examining changes over two years (model 1) and three years (model 2) prior to the event. Consistent with the first hypothesis, Polity scores exhibit a significant decline in the 2–3 years preceding an autocoup. Notably, this downward trend is both more pronounced and statistically significant for autocoups compared to traditional coups.

Column 1 examines the pre-event changes, specifically the difference between Polity scores at time  $t - 1$  and  $t - 3$  ( $Polity_{t-1} - Polity_{t-3}$ ). The results reveal a statistically significant decrease in Polity scores prior to autocoups. On average, Polity scores decline by 0.45 in the two years before an autocoup, holding other factors constant. In contrast, no significant changes are observed before traditional coups, indicating that pre-coup periods do not measurably affect democratization levels.

Column 2 assesses the cumulative impact from three years prior to the event year, calculated as  $Polity_t - Polity_{t-3}$ . As previously discussed, the year of an autocoup or coup witnesses a substantial shock to political institutions. Consequently, both types of events result in a decline in Polity scores relative to three years earlier. However, the negative effect of autocoups is more severe. Polity scores decline by an average of 1.53 in the three years leading up to an autocoup, compared to 1.27 for coups, all else being equal. This disparity reinforces our hypothesis that autocoups have a more detrimental pre-event effect on democratic institutions as incumbents overextend their legitimate tenure.

Table 5.1: The Impact of Autocoups on Democratization(1950–2020): OLS with country-fixed effects

	Dependent variable: Differences of Polity scores			
	Pre-event effects		Post-event effects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Autocoup	−0.449* (0.244)	−1.526*** (0.290)	−0.207 (0.150)	−0.330** (0.166)
Coup	0.013 (0.130)	−1.272*** (0.153)	0.483*** (0.077)	0.715*** (0.105)
GDP per Capita	−0.008* (0.004)	−0.010** (0.005)	−0.010** (0.005)	−0.010** (0.005)
Economic Trend	−0.381 (0.366)	−0.881** (0.437)	−0.537 (0.439)	−0.619 (0.438)
Log Population	0.678*** (0.101)	0.999*** (0.121)	1.157*** (0.122)	1.147*** (0.121)
Political Violence	0.021 (0.020)	0.034 (0.023)	0.026 (0.023)	0.027 (0.023)
Non-Democracy	1.681*** (0.088)	2.451*** (0.105)	2.412*** (0.105)	2.431*** (0.105)
Cold War	−0.236*** (0.088)	−0.245** (0.105)	−0.228** (0.105)	−0.239** (0.105)
Observations	8,859	8,695	8,695	8,695
R <sup>2</sup>	0.048	0.082	0.075	0.076
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.029	0.063	0.056	0.057
F Statistic	55.230***	94.525***	86.739***	88.093***

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

### **5.5.2 Post-event effects**

Columns 3 and 4 present the empirical results for post-event effects, analysing changes in Polity scores following attempted (column 3) and successful (column 4) autocracies.

Column 3 examines the impact of attempted autocracies. The results indicate that attempted autocracies do not have a statistically significant effect on Polity scores. This contrasts with coup attempts, which lead to an average increase of 0.48 in Polity scores over three years, all else being equal.

Column 4 evaluates the impact of successful autocracies. In contrast to attempted autocracies, successful autocracies demonstrate a significant negative effect on Polity scores, with an average decline of 0.33 over three years, holding other factors constant. Conversely, successful coups continue to exhibit positive effects on democratization, resulting in an average increase of 0.72.

These findings yield several key insights. First, while both successful and attempted coups influence Polity scores, only successful autocracies produce statistically significant effects—and exclusively in a negative direction. Second, the impact of coups on democratization is more nuanced. Although post-coup Polity scores may improve, the pre-coup period often involves significant democratic backsliding. My models indicate that, on average, the democratic gains following a coup fail to offset the losses incurred before it.

### **5.5.3 Effects of control variables**

To ensure robust results, I incorporated several control variables into the models. While economic trends and political violence do not exhibit statistically significant effects on Polity scores, other factors warrant further discussion.

The impact of the Cold War is relatively straightforward. As outlined in the research design section, global democracy experienced a general decline during the Cold War period. Consistent with this trend, all four models indicate that the Cold War era is associated with an average decrease of 0.23 in Polity scores.

The effects of GDP per capita, population size, and regime type, however, present a more complex pattern. Counter-intuitively, higher GDP per capita correlates with lower Polity scores, whereas non-democratic regimes and larger populations correspond with positive changes in Polity scores. This pattern may be explained by considering baseline differences between democracies and non-democracies. In established democracies, Polity scores are already high, leaving limited room for further increases. These countries also tend to have higher GDP per capita and lower birth rates, further reinforcing stability in their democratic scores. In contrast, non-democracies start from lower Polity scores, providing greater potential for upward movement. Given that authoritarian regimes often exhibit weaker economic performance and higher population growth rates, their Polity scores may increase as they undergo political transitions or reforms.

Taken together, these results support both hypotheses. First, the primary effects of autocrats on Polity scores manifest before the events occur. Second, whereas coups have ambiguous consequences for democratization, the effects of autocrats are unidirectional—consistently negative.

#### **5.5.4 Robustness tests**

To assess the sensitivity of my key findings to model specifications, I conduct a series of robustness tests. The results indicate that the findings remain consistent across these variations.

First, I compare the effects of autocrats over a period ranging from one to five years after the event. The results show that the effects of coups are positive and statistically significant throughout all five years, with a general trend of increasing magnitude as time progresses. In contrast, the effects of autocrats are negative across all five years but reach statistical significance only three years after the event. This finding aligns with the earlier hypothesis: autocrats never contribute to an increase in Polity scores.

Second, I modify the treatment of autocrats by replacing the decay effects with a dummy

Table 5.2: The Impact of Autocoups on Democratization: one to five years

	Dependent variable: Differences of Polity scores				
	Years after the event				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Autocoup	−0.119 (0.100)	−0.175 (0.139)	−0.330** (0.166)	−0.296 (0.189)	−0.32 (0.205)
Coup	0.192*** (0.064)	0.436*** (0.088)	0.715*** (0.105)	0.778*** (0.117)	0.860* (0.128)
GDP per Capita	−0.004 (0.003)	−0.008** (0.004)	−0.010** (0.005)	−0.011* (0.006)	−0.01 (0.006)
Economic Trend	−0.107 (0.262)	−0.318 (0.366)	−0.619 (0.438)	−0.795 (0.493)	−0.73 (0.540)
Log Population	0.333*** (0.072)	0.711*** (0.101)	1.147*** (0.121)	1.599*** (0.138)	2.051* (0.153)
Political Violence	0.007 (0.014)	0.017 (0.020)	0.027 (0.023)	0.038 (0.026)	0.056 (0.029)
Non-Democracy	0.881*** (0.063)	1.685*** (0.087)	2.431*** (0.105)	3.168*** (0.118)	3.803* (0.130)
Cold War	−0.163** (0.064)	−0.237*** (0.088)	−0.239** (0.105)	−0.194 (0.118)	−0.11 (0.129)
Observations	9,030	8,863	8,695	8,527	8,360
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.051	0.076	0.101	0.121
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.032	0.057	0.082	0.103
F Statistic	29.791***	58.212***	88.093***	117.056***	141.494

Note:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01



variable that differentiates between attempted and successful autocalps. As expected, this adjustment does not alter the core results, though it leads to differences in regression coefficients.

Upon comparing Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5.3 and Table 5.1, it is evident that substituting the decay factor for autocalps and coups with a dummy variable significantly doubles the estimated effects. This finding is consistent with expectations, as the decay factor distributes the influence of events over the subsequent four years, whereas the event dummy captures their impact solely in the year of occurrence.

## 5.6 Summary

However, there is a significant difference between these two cases. Prior to Fujimori's autocalp in 1992, Peru was a democratic country, but the autocalp led to its backsliding into an autocratic regime. China, by contrast, has remained an authoritarian state both before and after Xi Jinping's constitutional amendment.

That is to say, either the current regime is an authoritarian country, or it is an immature democracy. They have to consolidate their power by ways like suppress political opponents, dissidents, popular protests, even press freedom. Otherwise, the backfire from within or opponents might not only fail their attempts to extension, but also even oust them immediately from the office. Therefore, the incumbents have to make good preparation in case the adversary outcomes would not happen.

This has two important implications. First of all, although autocalps could occur in many types of regimes including democracies, the Polity index is relatively in a low level.

Table 5.3: The Impact of Autocoups on Democratization: Dummy autocoups

	Dependent variable: Differences of Polity scores			
	Attempted		Succeeded	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Autocoup	−0.142 (0.244)	−0.400 (0.291)	−0.338 (0.269)	−0.640** (0.321)
Coup	0.672*** (0.126)	0.937*** (0.150)	0.845*** (0.171)	1.384*** (0.203)
GDP per Capita	−0.008* (0.004)	−0.010** (0.005)	−0.008** (0.004)	−0.010** (0.005)
Economic Trend	−0.254 (0.366)	−0.537 (0.439)	−0.318 (0.366)	−0.619 (0.438)
Log Population	0.725*** (0.101)	1.157*** (0.122)	0.711*** (0.101)	1.147*** (0.121)
Political Violence	0.015 (0.020)	0.026 (0.023)	0.017 (0.020)	0.027 (0.023)
Non-Democracy	1.672*** (0.087)	2.412*** (0.105)	1.685*** (0.087)	2.431*** (0.105)
Cold War	−0.230*** (0.088)	−0.228** (0.105)	−0.237*** (0.088)	−0.239** (0.105)
Observations	8,863	8,695	8,863	8,695
R <sup>2</sup>	0.051	0.075	0.051	0.076
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.032	0.056	0.032	0.057
F Statistic	58.555***	86.739***	58.212***	88.093***

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

# Chapter 6

## Conclusion

### 6.1 Main findings

This study provides critical insights into the dynamics and implications of irregular power transitions, with a specific focus on coups and autcoups. The research illuminates the complex interplay between incumbents and challengers vying for power, yielding three key findings.

- **Coup attempt determinant:** The expected success rate significantly influences the likelihood of a coup attempt. This success rate is largely determined by the balance of power between incumbent leaders and challengers, which varies by regime type. Notably, the findings show that military regimes are approximately 277.7% more likely, and personalist regimes 94% more likely, to experience coups compared to dominant-party regimes, all else being equal.
- **Autocoup concept and dataset:** I introduce a refined concept of “autocoup”, defined as an incumbent leader’s refusal to relinquish power as mandated. We present the first publicly available dataset of autocoup events from 1945 to 2023, encompassing 110 attempts and 87 successful autcoups. Case studies and empirical analyses demonstrate the dataset’s utility for quantitative research.

- **Leader longevity:** Survival analysis techniques reveal clear differences in leader longevity between coup-installed leaders and autocoup leaders. The findings reveal that, on average, coup-installed leaders are 2.23 times more likely to be ousted from power than autocoup leaders, all else being equal.

## 6.2 Policy implications

The examination of irregular power transitions and leadership survival offers a crucial perspective on the interrelated phenomena of democratic backsliding, breakdown, and autocratic intensification. The findings of this study provide logical explanations for several political trends:

- **Global democracy regression:** This study elucidates why global freedom has declined for the 18th consecutive year. Irregular power transitions, whether through coups or autocoups, inherently violate democratic norms and disrupt the trajectory toward stable democracies.
- **Within-regime democratic erosion:** The research explains why democratic backsliding often occurs within regimes ([Mechkova, Lührmann, and Lindberg 2017](#)), rather than through regime change. Democracies are becoming less liberal and autocracies less competitive, particularly due to the prevalence of autocoups since 2000 ([Bermeo 2016](#)). As discussed in Chapter 3, autocoups extend the tenure of incumbent leaders without overturning the regime itself.
- **Rise of autocoups since 2000:** The analysis also clarifies why autocoups have been on the rise since 2000. Incumbent leaders possess several strategic advantages: firstly, they have a significantly higher probability of success due to their incumbent vantages compared to coup plotters. Secondly, the consequences of failed autocoups are relatively milder than those for failed coup plotters, resulting in lower costs even if they fail. Lastly,

leaders who manage to extend their rule through an autocoup often enjoy considerably longer tenures compared to coup-installed leaders, thus benefiting more substantially.

- **Role of external pressure:** Due to the challenges of internal opposition to autocoups, where power is concentrated in the hands of incumbent leaders, external pressure from regional or international communities may play a vital role in encouraging adherence to constitutional processes of power transition. For instance, after the general election in Venezuela on July 29, 2024, at least nine Latin American countries rejected the election results and called for dialogue<sup>1</sup>. Although this pressure might not be effective in every case, it showcases the potential influence of the international community in discouraging future autocoup attempts.

## 6.3 Limitations and directions for future research

While the study offers a novel framework for analysing irregular leadership transitions, several limitations require further exploration:

- **Data refinement:** Defining and classifying autocoups is a new approach. Future research should validate this classification system through additional studies and expert evaluations.
- **Data harmonization:** The current analysis faces challenges due to mismatched units (country-year vs. leader) between coup and autocoup datasets. Future efforts should explore data harmonization techniques for more robust comparisons.
- **Democratic backsliding:** While this study establishes a connection between irregular

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<sup>1</sup>While the world waited for the outcome, nine Latin American countries released a joint statement urging transparency and recognition of the voters' will. The nine countries are Argentina, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. On the morning after the election, the same group released a second statement demanding a complete review of the results in the presence of independent electoral observers ([AS/COA](#), accessed on September 9, 2024).

power transitions and democratic backsliding, further empirical evidence is needed to solidify this link.

Future research avenues include:

- **Terminology and data collection:** Refining the “autocoup” concept and achieving wider recognition will facilitate more accurate and comprehensive data collection.
- **Dataset expansion:** Expanding the autocoup dataset with more cases and integrating it with data on other irregular leadership transitions can provide a more holistic view of political survival after these events.
- **Power dynamics and long-term impacts:** Utilizing this dataset, future studies can delve deeper into power dynamics at play and explore the long-term consequences of irregular transitions on political systems, particularly regarding democratic backsliding, breakdown, and personalization of power.

In conclusion, this study significantly contributes to our understanding of irregular leadership transitions, focusing on coups and autocoups. By redefining autocoups, classifying the dataset, analysing determinants, and comparing leader longevity, I establish a robust framework for understanding irregular power transitions and leadership survival. This work deepens our comprehension of democratic resilience and political stability, providing a foundation for future research to conduct further empirical analyses based on the novel autocoup dataset and continue refining the framework.

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# Appendix: Datasets

- **Coup Model Dataset**

- **Dataset Name:** `coup_model.csv`
- **Description:** This dataset is specifically cleaned for the coup model and contains the relevant data points necessary for analysis.

- **Autocoup Dataset**

- **Dataset Name:** `autocoup.csv`
- **Description:** This dataset is an original contribution of this thesis, compiled and curated by the author to support the research objectives.

- **Autocoup Model Dataset**

- **Dataset Name:** `autocoup_model.csv`
- **Description:** This dataset is cleaned for the autocoup model and includes the data required for the modelling process.

- **Cox Proportional Hazards (Cox PH) Model Dataset**

- **Dataset Name:** `survival_cox_ph_model.csv`
- **Description:** This dataset is used for the Cox Proportional Hazards model and contains the data necessary for analysing survival rates and hazard ratios.



- **Time-Dependent Cox Model Dataset**
  - **Dataset Name:** `survival_cox_td_model.csv`
  - **Description:** This dataset is cleaned for the time-dependent Cox model, incorporating variables that account for time-dependent effects in survival analysis.